Lyons v The State of Oklahoma Petition for a Reconsideration or Rehearing and Reasons Therefor
Public Court Documents
June 5, 1944

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Lyons v The State of Oklahoma Petition for a Reconsideration or Rehearing and Reasons Therefor, 1944. 4d6a112f-bc9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/81572c0a-68af-4aad-955a-7bc9f4d69416/lyons-v-the-state-of-oklahoma-petition-for-a-reconsideration-or-rehearing-and-reasons-therefor. Accessed July 30, 2025.
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B E F O R E T H E (tort rtf tin lnttr& itora October Teem, 1943 No. 433 W . D. L yons, Petitioner vs. T he State of Oklahoma PETITION FOR A RECONSIDERATION OR REHEARING AND REASONS THEREFOR T hoegoot) Marshall, 69 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York. A mos T. H all, Tulsa, Oklahoma W illiam H. H astie, Washington, D. 0. B E F O R E T H E irtpmnp (tart at tljr Wnltib BUUn October Term, 1943 No. 433 W. D. L yons, Petitioner vs. T he State of Oklahoma PETITION FOR A RECONSIDERATION OR REHEARING To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and the Associate Jus tices of the Supreme Court of the United States: Comes now the petitioner herein and presents this peti tion for a reconsideration or rehearing* and for the vacating of the judgment of this Court affirming a judgment of the Criminal Court of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma. Jurisdiction The judgment of this Court herein prayed to be recon sidered was entered on the 5th day of June, 1944. This petition for a reconsideration or rehearing is filed within twenty-five days from June 5, 1944, in accordance with Rule 33 of this Court. 2 Reasons for Petition I. The decision herein conflicts with a decision o f this Court in Brown v. Mississippi, yet the opinion herein fails to mention the Brown case. In Brown et at. v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936), the issue before this Court was essentially the same as in the present case. There prisoners were tortured by police officers and thus forced to confess. A day later they were taken before other public officials and reputable private citizens, none of whom had been party to the prior wrong doing, and in peaceful surroundings free from all indicia of coercion, were permitted to give “ voluntary” confessions. This Court, in its opinion, described the situation by quot ing, with approval, the following language from the dis senting opinion of the Supreme Court of Mississippi: “ All this (the extortion of the first confession) having been accomplished, on the next day, that is, on Monday, April 2, when the defendants had been given time to recuperate somewhat from the tortures to which they had been subjected, the two sheriffs, one of the county where the crime was committed, and the other of the county of the jail in which the prisoners were confined, came to the jail, accom panied by eight other persons, some of them deputies, there to hear the free and voluntary confession of these miserable and abject defendants. The sheriff of the county of the crime admitted that he had heard of the whipping, but averred that he had no personal knowledge of it. He admitted that one of the defen dants, when brought before him to confess was limp ing and did not .sit down, and that this particular defendant then and there stated that he had been strapped so severely that he could not sit down, and as already stated, the signs of the rope on the neck of another of the defendants were plainly visible to all. Nevertheless the solemn farce of hearing the 3 free and voluntary confessions was gone through with, and these two sheriffs and one other person then present were the three witnesses used in court to establish the so-called confessions, which were re ceived by the court and admitted in evidence over the objections of the defendants duly entered of rec ord as each of the said three witnesses delivered their alleged testimony” (297 U. S. at 282-3). In these circumstances this Court considered it too clear to require extended discussion that the prisoners could not have been free from the coercive effect of the violence which attended the first confessions at the time of the second con fessions. Convictions obtained through the use of these “ voluntary” confessions were held to deny due process of law. In the present ease, the coercion attending the first con fession was so clear and gross that the inadmissibility of that confession has been conceded throughout the trial and subsequent appeals. Its great immediate effect upon the prisoner being admitted, the necessary inference of some substantial continuation of that effect exists here as in the Brown case. Hence, it becomes pertinent to inquire whether any circumstances intervening between the first and second confessions or attending the second confession distinguish the two cases. A longer time elapsed between the first and second con fessions in Brown v. Mississippi than in the present case. The prisoners there at least had a night’s rest and twenty- four hours to regain their composure. Here the brutal in quisition of the early morning hours normally devoted to rest was followed by the second confession on the same day. There is no significant difference between the circumstances immediately attending the second confessions in the two cases. Indeed, in the Brown case, the absence of any coer 4 cive conduct at the time of the second confession and the absence of the parties who extorted the first confession are admitted. Thus, it is even clearer there than here that the only coercive influence in question was the violence to which the prisoners had previously been subjected—violence from the effects of which Brown had a better and longer oppor tunity to recover than did petitioner. In the matter of trial procedure the cases are substan tially alike. In each case the Trial Judg*e admitted the con fession and then charged that it should be disregarded if the jury had reasonable doubt as to its voluntary character. In the Brown case this Court concluded that the finding of the Trial Court and jury that the prisoners were free from coercion was so patently unreasonable as to offend basic notions of fair trial. Yet, in the present case this Court concluded that reasonable men might differ on the issue of whether or not the defendant was free from coercive influ ence when he made the second confession. It is respectfully submitted that these two decisions are irreconcilable. Despite this conflict no mention of the Brown case appears in the present opinion. It is believed that the doctrine of the Brown case is sound and salutary, and that it should not be rejected sub silentio or otherwise. In the interest of justice and to clarify an important issue likely to recur frequently in the administration of criminal justice, reconsideration of the decision herein is prayed. II. This Court should reexamine its conclusion that the denial o f a specific instruction directing the attention o f the jury to the relation o f prior coercion to the second confession involved no issue o f due process. In the opinion herein this Court examined the general instruction of the Trial Court to the effect that a confession 5 obtained by force, intimidation or threats is inadmissible. The opinion also takes cognizance of the fact that the Trial Judge denied petitioner’s request for a specific instruction that, if the second confession was influenced by fear en gendered by the treatment at the time of the first confession, then the second confession must be disregarded. The Court then concluded that no essential element of fair trial re quired this specific instruction. This conclusion should be reexamined. The effect of the brutality attending the first confession upon the prisoner’s mind twelve hours later was a critical issue in this ease. I f the resolution of this issue was a matter upon which there could have been reasonable dif ferences of opinion, it was all important that the jury under stand precisely the question for its decision. The outcome of a trial for a capital felony here depended upon the jury ’s decision as to the mental carry-over of fear and compulsion from one occasion to another in circumstances under which human experience shows the very great probability of such carry-over. The very minimum requirement of a fair trial is that the minds of the jury be directed specifically to this issue. This ease does not involve a “ mere error” in a jury verdict. This case presents a situation which is clearly in consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice. A person who is on trial for his life or liberty should be entitled to concrete, specific instructions to the jury, which will fully and clearly articulate the dramatic and fully alive situation to which he is exposed. The test of due process does not lie in vague generalities, but in con crete situations. In so far as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has in it any life, it has that life by virtue of its application by this Court to specific, con crete, factual situations. 6 Further evidence that the specific instruction which the Court refused to give involved a fundamental issue of fair trial is to be found in the verdict of the jury. The jury had before it uncontroverted evidence of an atrocious mur der without any circumstances of mitigation whatever. Yet the jury did not impose the death penalty. This verdict is explicable only on the theory that the jury under the general instructions given erroneously believed that the circum stances immediately surrounding the second confession con sidered alone made it admissible, but the continuing coercive influence of the earlier event was too obvious to permit the imposition of the death penalty on such untrustworthy evi dence. The specific instruction requested was essential to make clear to the jury their duty in the premises and thus to assure the petitioner the substance of fair trial. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons petitioner respectfully urges that a rehearing be granted and that upon further considera tion the judgment of June 5, 1944, affirming the judgment of the lower court in this cause, be set aside. Respectfully submitted, T hurgood Marshall, 69 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York. A mos T. H all, Tulsa, Oklahoma W illiam H. H astie, Washington, D, C. I, T htjkgood Marshall, attorney for the petitioner, W. D. Lyons, do hereby certify that the foregoing petition for re hearing of this cause and for vacating the order reversing the judgment of the lower court is presented in good faith and not for the purpose of delay. T huegood Marshall, Attorney for Petitioner. [3701] L awyers P ress, I nc., 165 William St., N. Y . C .; ’Phone: BEekman 3-2300