Tyler v. Phelps Court Opinion
Working File
July 24, 1980

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Case Files, Bozeman & Wilder Working Files. Tyler v. Phelps Court Opinion, 1980. 65bd7ca3-ed92-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/8160d1a3-fb10-4dfa-b150-960629b25bb5/tyler-v-phelps-court-opinion. Accessed May 21, 2025.
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172 622 FEDERAL REPORTITR, 2d SEtilriS Cal. v. Petrol SLolts, ctc., 441 U.S. 211, gg S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979), requires of a privatc party secking disclosure of grand jury materials, we do note that the Court therc focusc<l on thc nccd for a court ordering releasc to lrc familiar with both the grand jury procct:rlings and the con- tours of the laLar "jurlicial llrocce<ling" so that it nright prulre rly Iimit rlisckrsurc. Whcrc, as in Lhc yrrescnt casc, a jurlicial procccrling is only a ;xrssibility, lrollcr limi- tation is pracLically f<lreckrsc<I. t3] Grand jury secrccy has trarlitionally bcen protecterl. Itulc 6(c) continucs that prutcction whilc lrcrnti[l,irrg rlisclosurc of grand jury matcrials in ccrtain spccific cir- cumstances. A district court to whonr ap- plication for disclosure is made does exer- cise discrction in granting disclosure but may not thereby enlarge the exceptions to grand jury sccrecy. We hold that the dis- closure sought here would not be prelimi- nary to nor in connection with a judicial proceeding. The July 12, L979 order of the district court is REVERSED. Gary TYLER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C. Paul PHIILPS, Director, f)epartment of Corrections, and Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, William Guste, Jr., Respondents-Appellees. No. 79-3093. United Stat.es Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. July 24, 1980. Petitioner filed petition for writ of ha- beas corpus. The United States District Court for thc Fla:;torn I)isirii:t ," (,ouisr:r.:ir, Adrian G. Duplarttier, J., <r. ,' ..r.:i I antl petitioner appeaieri. Thc [:..:... .. .,.r.;eirl:r, Kravitch, Circuit Judgc, hcid i-j.iit ir,r staLc murdcr JtrosccuLion, irr rvhic.l i,r.iprar1, r.,:r:c was whethcr p,,.iioner pos. :)sorJ spreciiic intent to kill or do .grcat Lrr.i,y hirrm 1,, more than onc,,ers()n, l.ri:rl .:tiurt's jt.;.y charge which irrsLrur:Lcrl Lh:rt :t,rersor) il:- tcnrls thc natullrl :rnd llri-'1,*;iie o\ lj(j- qucnccs of his lrcI an<.1 whi,.:i,..LuL.,l L:-iaL until such prcsuml)Lion was ()i.i n'tighcrl, t.hc jury was bound ro find in irccorcian".: ,,.-:t.h it, affirmatively shiftcd Lo {iL.li:ndanL tilc burrlcn of prrxrl' ,rn l l:c crit.ir.:ri j;:,.t lrnri Lt..l; affcctcd thc fur,,irtrrrerrt:tl [:r,r'. ;s rrl' triar, howcver, because rlistrict cour', in hiib, .rs corpus proceediirg applied imrlroper i6al standard in deterrnining whcthcr- ther.c wrrs sufficient cause for pctitioncr'o proceui...;, default with rcsy-lect to the clr.ir.ge, cause would be remande('l for a reconsideratior ,f that issue. Reversed and remandeci. l. Criminal Law s=324 Presumptions rvhich at r ii, preclude consideration of an elernenl oi the crir:.e conflict with the prcsur,tption t,i inno. . . .r : and invade fact-findirrg funetir,:, ;,f ,-.';,; effect of such conclusive presunr,-:iions is '.o relieve state of its ourden of ,rroving be- yond reasonable tloubt everj' element of crime charged, an unconstiht:c,nal result. 2. Criminal Law F306 Nonconclusive presumptlor:i, rvhici. shift only the burden of pe:'l;ua1.on to de- fcndant, arc uncor,sLitutional. 3. Criminal Law e,7?8(6) In state murder prosecuriolr, in which primary issue was whether petiiioner pos- sessed a specific intent to kili or do grcar bodily harm to more than oue lr,rrson, trial court's charge which instructuu rhat a per- son intends the nat.rral and pr<,oable conse- quences of his acts and which \ratcd thlt unless and until ',he pr€sun:r . .ii is c,:- weighed, the jury is bounri ro rrnd in :c- cordance with the presumptior,, was uncon- stitutional. 4. Judgment e75l An erroneous instruction rviil support a collateral attack on r:onstitutional validity of a state court's jurlgment only if ailing instruction so infcctcd the entire trial that resulting conviction violates due process. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14. 5. Criminal Law e778(5) Habeas Corpus o= 113(13) In state murder prosecution, in which primary issue was whether petitioner pos- sessed specific intent to kill or do great bodily harm to more than one person, trial court's jury charge which instructed that person intenris the natural and probable consequenccs of his acts and which statetl thnt until stttrh presuntptiotr wits out- weighcd, the jury was boun<l to find in accordance with it, affirmativcly shifted to defendant the burden of proof on critical fact and thus affected fundamental fairness of trial; however, becausc district court in habeas corpus procccding applied improper legal standard in determining whether there was sufficient cause for petitioner's procedural default with respect to the charge, causc would be remanded for a reconsideration of that issue. 6. Habeas Corpus e45.3(l) For purpose of rule preventing federal courts from granting habeas relicf l.o peti- tioner whose claim is nonreviewable in state court because of petitioner's procedural de- fault unless there is cause for the procedur- al default, an attorncy nee<l not be so in- comlletent as to give rise to a scparate ground of relicf to bc inc<.rmlletcnt enough to satisfy the "cause" requirement. 7. Habeas Corpus e25.1(9) A fedcral habcas court which is prcsentcd with a sufficiency of evidence claim must, assuming llrocedural prerequi- * Circuit Judge ot the Sixth Circuit, sitting br" designation. l. ]'he Louisiitna statute inll)ositlg a mandatory death penalty for persorrs found guilty of first degree nrurdt'r was declared unconstltutional in Robert.s v. Lorti.siarta, 428 U.S. 325' 96 S.Ct. 3001. 49 t-.Ed.Ztl {)7'1 (197(i). Robt'rls wus de- cidcd altcr 'lvler's tlral, littt l->clore thc l-ouisi' ana Suprenre Court l'cviewed his conviction. 1ry.)I,J.) sites have bccn satisfieci,'ij',r.,r rc,ief souqht if on thc recorJ cvi<l.nu( .. .'.,cLci aL tria. rl, rational trir:r of fact cou.J l,ilve foun.r prot-'I of guilt bei'ond a reasonJDlu (ioubt. 8. Homicide ,F250 On thc evidencc adduccu at state mui' rler prosecution, a rat.ior trjcr <,,- fact could have found llroof of p,ctitioner"'s guiit beyond a rcasonrLle tloui-rL. Jack Peebles, Nerv Orieans, La., fvi peti- tioner-appellant,. Abbott J. Recves, Assr. Dist. A'":"v., lic- search & Allltcals, Grctn::, Lr., ior I"r)s./orl- dc nts-allllcllcrcs. Aplrcal [rorn LIte UrtiLctl Stlt,cs Uis'"rit:t Court for the Eastcrn Distr.icr of Louisii.na. Before COLEMAN, Clief Jutigr, anci PECK * and KRAVITCH, Oircuit Judges. KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge. Gary Tyier, appeilanr, w::..- first degrec niurder in I-,,' . , ....- . CI and sentenced to dic. Or ao,reat, .:rc cieath penalty I was vacatcd bu! thc ,'". 'icrion was affirmed, Starc r'. Tyler, S'12 So.2d 5'7'1 (La.), cert. danicd, 4lJ1 l-'.S 9i?. 9? S.Ct. 2i80, 53 L.Ed.2d 227 (',:'-' Afttr' :rnsuc- cessfully pursuing slzlle .:trt,r'rs eo:'rus. ?-r'.1- er v. Phelps,353 So.2d 105tr (Le.i:liS), trr,s 28 U.S.C. :\ 2254 actior. was f.lcd. Tl,e district court ilenicd relicf ano thc 1,,cii'-io.:- er appeais. rVe rcvcrse .rn'1 remand At lhe iirne of the oifcr,se, Carl' T;'ir:r was a 16-1',-ar-oltl stir(ienL at Lestreirzln High Schor-ri. Thc rnorning of thc niurd"r had been marke<l by genrrral !urnt.-iil and racial tensi,tr,s, ztnd Tylcl' had bcen suspcnci- ed from schooi. Later i:, the tlrry i1e was Becaust' ol li()l)(r'ts. 'I1 lcr's Je:lth s(.r,tcnce \\'as vacatcd lrrtd lilc lrlllrl'lsu;iill\:r)t \\'Itlloui, ligibili- ty lor 1>artllc, lrrolllttiur: Jl' stlsl).'llsiL)lr ol s(:)- tence for tN'unt!' )'eilrs wJ:; lo)poscd. Stltrt' v. Tyter,342 So.2d 574. 577 76 (La.), cer: itttjt : 431 U.S. 9r7, i)7 S.Ct l)bLl, 53 L.!-i- ', (1977). Scc e/so .Sa;ilc r'. .iLttktns, lJ i . :,. .... 157 (l-a.197U1 TYLEIT v. PHELPS Cite as 622 F.2d 172 (1980) 'rf Lruisiana, 'rl relief and , of Appeals, t:at in state .rimary issue *ed specific ,iy harm to if ourt's jury . person in- ,able conse- stated that ,veighed, the rdance with fendant the lrct and thus .:ess of trial; ,'t in habeas '"oper legal cr there was ; procedural .idrge, cause sideration of t.) preclude i the crime ,f innocence ,,n of jury; rptions is to 1',,'oving be- element of .-,nal result, ,fls, which rsion to de- ',, in which ;t-ioner pos- ,r do great ,rrson, trial lhat a per- ai,lle conse- .rtated that on is out- 'lnd in ac- 'as uncon- 622 I.'EDEITAL RBPORTER, 2d SERIESfi4 nicketl up antl takcn lrack to school by a a.pu,y sheriff u'ho susltt'c"ttl ht' was truani. By thc time Tylcr and thc tlcputy arrivecl at the school, thc school <lfiicials ha<l <lecidetl to closc thc school and send all students homc. Af tcr ircing tokl to go home immediatcly, Tyler lloartlerl a bus loacled with other stutlents' Upon leaving the school grounds' lhe bus was met with jeering and rock-throwing by the assembleil crowtl. As the llus proceed- ed, someone on the bus shot a '45 caliber automatic revolvcr into the crowd' The bullet struck antl killcti onc bov antl grazcd anothcr. It was allcgctl thtt Tylcr shot thc pistol antl the jury so found in convicting him. In his appeal to this court, Tyler raises two issues, both of which wcre raiscd on <lirect appeal and in his petition for state habeas: iirst, he contentls he was convicted on the basis of an unconstitutional jury "to.g"t second, hc contcnds therc is insuf- ficient evidence to convict him of first de- gree murder' At trial, the prillliri- issue rt':': : rtlci- strom's mcnlal sLatc al' the tinli' i "' homicitle. He prescntcrl psychiat"e '-":- *ony f.o* rvhich his counsui a:gucd r'c hi'd not actecl with thc rctluisitc nlens rea Pur- suant to thc statc's re<1ucsl, thc Lllri cout't charged the jury thal "thc law plcsiiltrcs that a person intends i'he crdirr:rr1 cr;trsc- or"n"at^ of his voluntal'i' acts " 1"tc .'1"- ionaun,'. timcly objccLiou was u\ urrulcd; his conviction was affirri'rctl on ap1'cal ''o thc ttontoru Supreme Courl, but was revcrsed by the United States Supr"me Court' The Courl notctl thtt thc cltlrrgt' lti issuu in Sanristrorn is itml)itiuor:s; it i:r trllt)lci-rr *tl"ttr"a it is it conclrrsivt: (i c'' l:' "'; i::ld Sandstrom causctl the 'iellh oi tl''r r iciitlt vou musL iinr-l hc ti'tl st ir'Lcntion:rli'r') t'l' 'nonconclusi,e (i' c', if yt-ru fintl Si'ntlr''rom .uur"d the death of rhe victirn a;rd if hc Dresents no evidcnct'-o the contrit:"i'' )'';'.i must find he did so intcntior::rlll') I:'u'-:urrli)- tlon. e..utaingly, thc Corrrt conslticr';tr "hc due process ramifications o{ both i}'lres ()' PresumPtions' This casc, like Sanrlstro nt v' LIonLtnit' 442 u.i. sro, 99 s.ct. 2450, 61 L.E(l'2d 39 (19?9)' involves the constiLutionality of a state .iu.go o, liresumptions' Unlike Sarul- stroi, howevcr, this case also involves thc "r.ttion of whcther haLrcas corpus relief is ivailable to a ticfenrlant who rlid not object io the charge at trial' Accordingly' this court must detcrrnine f irst wheLher the charge as given was unconstitutional' and ,".oid whclher any unconstitutionality must go unredrcssctl because of the rulc articut"ated in Wainwright v' Sykes' 433 u.s. zz, 9? s.ct. 'A97,53 L.Ed'2d 594 (197?)' t1] Presumptions rvhich atrl -tL'.1/rccluLic consideration of an el"ntelli ol :3' crlmc conflict with the l)resunrption oi :ili jci:;lcu "ni inrua" the factfinriirrg func'"ior of,-tI^'c i;;r. IJnitcd Starc's '' L'ni'-ul ':t:Il(''r J-l ; 'rui co.,438 u.s.'1:2,93 s( lri'li' J' L.Ea.za 85a (i9?8); )I<trisattt:;" UnitaLt Stoto., 342 U.S. '24t, i2 S'Ct' 2'i0' 96 L'i'lJ' iAS (lgsZ). The efitct of such conclu'ivc orcsumptions is to r' i'c'lc tht Sl.:rtt of its ir..l.r' of proving bcvond a rt:'sonulrlc doubt "u"ry element of lhc crimt chargcd' in-rn"on.titutional rcsult iincler In re ll/ar- ri,p, ssz U.S. 358, 90 S'Ct' 1063, 25 L'Ed'2d 368 (ie?o). Did the charge on Presumptions rlnconst'- ,nlirf "il;"ff'J:::"1":;"i':'I:;:i .]]]l -'1utionary'sn;rt tn" Burden of Proof ltro'a'nt' are also unconstilu[ionirl' Such to thc DcfendanL? a trresumPtir)n wiIS :rt isstle in !t'u)li;nc|' In Sanri.strt.x n v. Montitrtir, thc rle fcnrlant iitttu'' izr U'S' llSl' 95 S C'-' 1831' 44 was chargerl with ,,tle Iibcr,.tc hornicirlc," 1,.!}l.2ri l-168 (19?l>;, u'ltcre Litc jtrr'' hld beon Mont.Cotle Ann. "s 4S-5 102 (19?U)' which chargerl that nialicc r'fot'cthouv:" i: rn es- rc<luircs th^l thc hrnticitle [,c c.,nrrnittctl scnti"l irnrl in<lis,crlslrltlt'clt't.,.rt': i ')i niu:'- ,urlxlscly.r kn'wingly. The rlcfcnrlant atl- ,r.i, r,rt that if thc St^te ,ro"'cd iirc hr'rr''- nritte<l that hc killcrl thc victim, Irut tlcnicrl .i.lu *,* lxlth inle ntitlnltl antl unllwful, thathcrlitlstlllttrlxlst:Iy<lrkn<lwitlgly.m:tlicealtlrcthouglrLwitsl<lbcinrl,Iiod;n- itrl- thc ti- ilrd ,lf- Ll rt ,.us IU- l, '- ",i; lhc ..e(i ile r'lll 'inri :im ior r)Ill lrc ., ou I l l)c ,,i ,lc ,lic r{t .iL' I|tl ,l Lti its ,lc '(1, 2(l ('h i)c ,.h l. ,,t ,,n 1'l'l,Dtt v. I,lllil,l,S ,css Lhe trefcnrr*nt r)rov.(r u, ,, ,,.il-r,-;";;';;'i*irn)r)rions urc (ru(ructior,r,,, ,,,,,,'"L:ancc of thc cvirlcnc. t'.t hc.ctcrl in thc sions which thc rurv rcquirastl:c "irir.,r,_roheat of passion. 421 u.s. at 686,95 S.Ct.;; make under (,erra.. circumsr.r:: .:: t,.,r1898. The Court in S;tndstrom rcitcrateJ absence of evi.r. .cc in the "i.. u,ir.;hits Mullanas' hol<ling thrtr such nun.un.lu- reads rhc..)ury to a difrcrcnt;;:r,r;;;;;: sive, burden-shifting r:hargcs ,r. ,n.orrti- conclusion. i l,rcsumption uurrri.rrucs rc,tutional. 442 lJ.S.'l'L s'2A, gg S.CL. itL z4sg. cxisl only so lon1. as; itls nur ur.l..,.,,.r. ,ri Sec also PatLerson v. Ncw York, 422 IJ.S. outweighed by evirlcncc in thc c:-r,_,io ri:. 197,97 S.Ct. 2319,58 L.E(1.2d 2g1 (19??). contrary. BuL ut.lass anci unt;i t)ie prc_ sumption ts so i,ulii,elgrted, llt._ jury is 13] At Tyler's trial, as is rclcvant here,2 bound to find in accorclincc rritt, ,ira'rrrr- thc primary issuc was whcthcr Tylcr pos_ sumlttion. sesscd a sllecific intcnt to kill or ,fo g.*t I charge you with State Speciar Cilrre bodily harm to more than one 1,..run.r'lr- # I rcqucsted undcr l'resurrrpli.;ns ii:)t asmuch as the facts rcvcalcrl that Tyler the defcndant inlcnrleJ th" r.,t..',.1 .r,i firc<i a fully loatlcrl pistol only oncc, thc probablc consc(lucnucs of tris: r,c... (T. Stutc .relierl hcuvily ,'n thc stul.t.ry llrc- 59F) (Ernph^sis .tltlt:tl). surtrPtion thtt:r rlelurrllrnt intcntls tlrc nat- This chargc is so sinriLlr to Lhr .:i,rir.g. in ural anrl Prollrlrlc ('onse(lu('pccs of lris.cLs. Sands/ronl thaL lvc (':Irr conle Lo no c()nclu- La.Rev.stat. lb:482. Thc ,r'secutor sion but that it had tire samc cffcct :is ri-..i. srresserl this ,resumption in bd; ";;;; ;:,;i ,T:::[t:t;ir::,,,":r,,1[ j]r.:{i;; and closing argumcnts' rnc luage ttren was convictea on the basis of :rn uncor,stitu-chargcd thc jury: tional chargc.{ ir: '\.,ts . 'i.{, 2. At trial whethcr.fyler actuall-v f.ired the pistol was at issue. He does not, ho\4,ever, contena inthis court th;rt thcre rvas itrsLrf.ficicnt cvitiencci to sul)port the concltrsiorr tlrirt ht: f.iretl tht, shot.Accordingly, wo ar(. trL.ating thr.case ,,, tf]ougflTyler did fire thc shot. 3... 1t- -t.l: rime ot t.ylcr,s rriat, t_a.Rev.Star.Ann. ti l4:30(a) was the only, <Jt f.inirior-r "r-ii;;; ';;- 1ircr., murdcr :r1>;rli<:irlllc t() tll(, l.:l(:ts ot. thc case.I( rctrd, in r(.1(.vau)t l)irrt: l.irst tlcgrr,t, rrrtrrtlt,r is tlrr. killing ol.lr lru.nran l;t:ing ***l** (4) when the offender hus a specrlic lntenlto kill .or to inflict great boclily, fl".," .,po,i more than one l)ersoll . . (F_nrphisis added) Apl)arently, 'l'),ler rvas chargccl rvith I.irst cle-grce rnurder, a (.itl)itul crinrt., so that the counof general jurisdiction rarher rhan tlr" j;;;ii; cortrt would ha,,e jurisdictir)n ()v(,r the <iase. In Louisiana at this tirne, the juvcnile ",,r',.r f,uJjurisdiction over all noncapitai .use*. t_u.lier. Stat. I3:1570. llad the cust, bt,cr.r a<ijutlicatcJ in jtrvenilc corrr(, th(, r11()st sr\,(,r.(, pLurishrrrertt rYhich corrld hrrvt. lrIr,rr trrrPos,,rl *,,r 1,,r,,,,i1,:srrl>t'r'",ision rurlrl tlrt. itli(, ()l lw.(,nt),,,nc ltt lt .1rr,'cnilt. rlt,(r'ntiorr llrr.ility. lrtrrtltr.rlrn,,rt,, lraclthe lury convictctl 'l'yler of ,, t"r."._i,,.iuJ.iJ offense of first degret, nturtler, ttr" ,,r." ,uoulJ have had to be renranded to (hc .1ur"nit., ..,r",.itl tl. We rec,ignizc tilat dotrltl s Irirvc l;er,rr cx_pressed as to whclhor S:trtr/slr.rrnl is r(,troactive. See United Sralt,s r.. Spitgel, 604 F.2d SOf isth Cir. 1979), cert. denierJ, U.S. - ,,r,,s.ct.2l5l,64 L.Ed.2J 787 (t9s0). :..; :: S.'trtdslrrrrrt is nol r<.t:.,r.r..t\(,, :l()\\...,, :, :liis cltarge was uncollstituti( 11:r1 .litdcr ilttjj. nc,\. v. Wilbur,42 I U.S. 66.i, vJ S C(. lSbt, .r+ r_.icr 508 (1975), which haC bcr:n Cr.ciJed 1rrio.. ro tiretrial in this case. The Maine homicidr: rti.,.[]1,. irt i-.;:;r.e iri ilii:::_ nry t,sl.altlishr:d two t5,. , er; hor)ii(.idu: .,. ;. r,.r and m:rnslrrulllltcr. It(,lit tll)us ()l. li(rillr. rd, ;(.- qrrircd proof that th(j kiillig rvlrs ul.r];r,.r ir. i. ,. neithcr justilied nur c.xc,rsc.) a:rtl r::,.. :..or:rl. In addition to proof of an unla,,r.lul -nd intcrt_ tional killing, the proseculion had to esrablish the killing was with r:ialice aforr,tlrorl;hl in order to prove murder. 1-he lury cl:iri;.1c, Iiotr.- ever, required the jurS .o rnf.cr Il)arlr!.i] i,:..rid- thought fronr proof ol :lt intcntionai irid un- lawful killing unless the dcfendant piur,.e<.i tharhe acted in the heat , 1' lrassion 'o, .ru.rd.jn provocation. The Su1>rerne Coun heltj sLlch a chrr;.;i to bc uncons(itulion:rl llec:rusr. ll l)crltits :1.:t, ltrrr. Iu convict a dt'lertdant of rriLrrcle r t:r,crr rhrrr-:1ii, rt isits likL,lv ;r.s ,?ot tllat ltc u,as gLirltr,. .rrrl,,. r,l. rrurrrslirtrglrtr.r'. 421 LJ.S. irt 7():1, lri ..,, i .,1 l ll{)2 (r.rnph:rsis irr oriliirriri). In tltt, clrst'irI I)ar, tlle St.rLq wlrs r;:rlr.1..t,.tJ IU prove Tyler acted with u :,pecific inrcrii r.r kjrl or to inflict great bodily,harrrr cn rilir:.u tl i.._ .)rlr_, pL:rson. If the 1>rosccution 1;;-ovt.cl onl\ s r, ( jii(. intent to krll onc l)er.s(,n. tll(.lr rr ti:.si tlc..:r.qt. murder convictlon wuul(t nor riL.. .t.he :urvcharge, however, requircd the jury, ro co...ircl" 'ui,{h t, .t f .o't! ,' .;fl ; Y r :v. i'. I ::f .l . ,;1. 'ii * ,-.. ,.\7. {. , .1; tr'# ' .; '1,:4 ;il, i L76 622 }'EDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERII'S Must the Unconstitutionality of the Charge Go Unredressed? It is undisputed that for a trial error to be reviewable in Louisiana, an objection must be made at the time of its occumence. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841.5 It is also undis- puted that Tyler's counsel made no objec- tion to the erroneous charge. Accordingly, in a simplistic and conclusory argument, the State asserts that under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, Sg L.Ed.2d 594 (19?7), any error must go unredressed. We disagree. t4l Initially, we note that the State ig- nored the threshold question of whether the correctness of a jury charge is reviewable at all, and if so under what bya n erroneous ln- struction will sip-port a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment only if the ailing instruction so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Henderson v)6ibhe,l131 U.S. 145, tS4, 97 S.Ct. 1?90, 7736, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977), quoting from Cupp v. Naughten,414 U.S. l4l, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (19?3). Com- pare Blenski v. LaFollette, 581 F.Zd 126 (?th Cir. 19?8) (charge not so uninformative and confusing as to constitute a denial of due proccss) with Bcrricr v. Egclar, 588 F.2d 515,521 22 (6th Cir.), cuL <lcnied,439 u.s. 955, 99 S.Cr. 354, 58 L.Ed.2d 34? (19?8) (a muddled charge on who had the burden of proof on sclf-defcnse so infecterl the fair- ness of the trial as to warrant habcas re- lief). Scc a/so Cronnon v. Alabama, 587 F.2d ?16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,440 U.S. 974, 99 S.Cr. 1542, 59 L.Ed.zd 792 (t979); Bradley v. Y|'ainwright, 561 F.zd 1200 (5th Cir. 1977); Higgins v. WainwrighL, 4?A F,2d 177 (sth Cir. 1970); Bonner v. Henderson, 517 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1975); Pleas v. Wain- wright,44l F.zd 56 (sth Cir. 1970). Thus, that Tyler possessed such intent from proof of such an effect, unless the defendant proved to the contrary. Thus, Tyler could have been con- victed of first degree murder even though it is as likely as not thar he did not intend to kill or do great bodily harm to more than one person. This is an unacceptable possibility under the ruling of Mullaney v. Wilbur. the thrr:shold issue ior this court is whether the charge given here so infectc<.! the trial as to render it fu:.rlamentalll, unfair. We conclude that it di..l. The effect of thc charge in this cesc wai affirmatively to shift to the dcfenCant the burden of proof on a critical fact rvhich was in dispute-namely, whether Tyler had a specific intent to harm more than one per- son. Inasmuch as thcre is very }ittle er.i- dence to support that propositiorl other than the presumption at issue here, it is folly to argue that the erroneous charge did n,rt affect the central determination of guilt or innocence. Concluding that the charge affectcd the fundamental fairness of the triiil tioes not end our inquiry, however. Becausc Tylcr's trial counsel failed to objec+" to the errone- ous instruction, we must determiner whether the district court was correct in concluding that the procedural default undcr Louisi- ana's contemporaneous objection rule bars habeas relief by this court. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. i2, : ' S.Ct. 2a97, 53 L.Ed.2d b94 (19??), a(r!r;,):r- ishes us that absent cause for the 1;rocedur- al default and actual prejudice from the error, principles of comity and fcderalisn prevent federal courts frr.rm granLing hab(.. as relief to state prisoncrs who.:c ciainr i:; non-reviewable in statc court becausc of ti., default. This rule was designed 'uo avoiu the perceived effect of Fay v. Noia, 872 u.s. 391, 83 S.Cr. 822,9 L.Ed.2d b37 (1963), of encouraging "sandbaggrng" by defcnse lawycrs in the state trial. 433 Li.S. at 8g, g? S.Ct. at 2507. Considering first lhe "prejudice" prong, we find Tyler was prejudiced by the im- proper jury charge. As discussed above, the error was sufficienlly egregious to con- vince us that Tyler u,as denicd a iundamen- tally fair trial. Sae Huris v. Strx.:rrs, 606 5. For a discussion of the Louisiana contempo- raneous objection rule by then Justice Tate, scc State v. Wrestle, Inc., 360 So.2d 831 (La.1978), modified on other grounds sub notil. lJurch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. I30, 99 S.Cr. 1623, 60 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979). l r: wJlcther ,l the trial 'i ...r. We ase was ..rdant the .,'hich was ..r had a n one per- iittle evi- other than ,s folly to r;e did not r of guilt or .ffected the ..,1 does not rrrse Tyler's lie emone- i;re whether ,r concluding .rter Louisi- ,n rule bars u.s. 72, 97 ??), admon- ,re procedur- 'c from the federalism ':rnting habe- ,se claim is L:ltuse Of the .cd to avoid Noia, 372 r 837 (1963), i,t'defense ..S. at 89, 9? i le c" prong, b1' the im- .sed above, :ious to c<,n- "und3nrcn- j,u-i::.:i:d - '=---- 'l'YLDIt v. I'llDLI'S Cltc as 622 t-.2d 172 (1s80) l'.2r1 6J9 (Sth ()ir. 1979); l'raernln v. Gcor- lins v'. Aug't,457i t:'.2t)'. -77 I ^l1U rr 2 r8l,h gia,599 I,'.2d 65 (5th Cir.), cert. dcnicd, M4 Cir. 19?ti), t,,:'t. d,:nict|, .: )v U.S. i1Jtj, .,., U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.llti.2d e{1 S.Ct. 105?,5e L.Ed.2o 96 \iii?g), th::; a.a.:li (1980); Berrier v. Hgeler,583 F.2d 515 (6th ilof knowle,i,r; b1r gv;.,y . o,rr.-,ei t.l...r ;he ac- Cir.), cert. denietl,439 U.S..95I;,99 S.Ct.35! lltion. of rr,,, r.rial judg,. ,., .r:r.r..rc.i rr duc 58 L.tld.2d 347 (19?8); collins v Auqey,5?7 I'process viol:riion .s suffjci:nr cau.c ^',,r fr:l- F.zd 110? (8th Cir. 1978), cert. !"!i:!,439 | ;re to object.? u.s. 1133, 99 S.Ct. 1057, 59 L.Ed.2d 96 (19?9); Sinco.x y.. tinitetl Stares, 571 F.2d We find :his deiinitio:r cf the "ri;urc" 8?6 (sth Cir. f978); Bromv,ell v. Williams, clcment of :i.'kc's "o bc ""1';le""lv r:on:;ist- 445 F.Supp. 106 (D.NId.197?). BuL see Blen- ent with thc prlicios sta"".i b1' -.. S)'kcs ski v. LaFolletLe, 581 F.2d 126 (?th Cir. Court. By nr-'t bi,-.'iing & t:eicntlr.,t io obvi- Though ,,cause" was undefined in thc permitting Lrullsel to sandliag, but r-ri,iy giv- S./es Jpinion, subscquent-d€ciliffis-havq ing relief to defendants when the errone- giren .eaning rol,lte-i..rrr-Strucrat court\ous, nontactical dccisions b-v c<.rutiscl resul': -f"ii indicatcrl that incffcctive counscl, \ l)reJuorcc' short of that neccssary to make out a Sixth I Amendment claim, will satisfy the "cause" -/ 15'6) As in "Iimincz " ":;lt'llc' 557 F'zd 1978). ous mistakcs oy nis trial counsel wc :rrc rrot prong.5rffiT.2d-.506(5thCrr.19??),''hiscoul.])rcacase ffiO n.2 (Sth Cir. 19?8) (dictum), cert. where rigiti application of ihe J, l'.'es ruic deniecl, 439 U.S. 1133, 99 S.Ct. 105?, 59 will run aiotrl r-rf thc Supr'cnre Court's ad- L.Ed.2d 96 (19?9); Coopcr v. I'itzharris,586 monition thrt Syxc's is not' Lo be i,lipiied ir F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (cn banc), cerl. such a way as to rcsult irt it rniscarri;rge of denied, 440 U.S. 9?4, 99 S.Ct. 1542, 59 justice. 433 U'S ti gl, 'i'i S.trt :'r 25C8' L.Ed.zd ?93 (19?9); Jiminez v. Estelle,557 Because thc district corrL :l)i,iie(; r:.e im' F.2d 506, 511 (5th Cir-l!!Q_(qtictum). We prol)cr lcg:,, sLuntlar,: in asre.4.itHtrerei*ljvple[piiiSuU-in C,rt- "cause," 6 it :s unknorvr. r"hcl-. rig,tl 6. While Tyler nrade a Sixth Amendnrent effec. I within the :.pplicablc ji.i1l)c1:ircs u jon,pi tiveness of counsel claim at the district court I tence. .'t acffettrta v. 1::!'.'' 280 I-.:.. -,92 (5u', level, he has not pursued that claim here. ,-J Cir. l9C-,, flerrir'; r'. I:s:c,'/r 49: F.2d 125 (Srh cir. l$l.l), rrhc.rril..: .'.,., l',3 F.z, j wn, (D.C.Cir.1980) (48 664 U.S.L.W. 2698), in the context of discuss- petiti(jner's rrial cou:rs,:i.,...,r ,.. . ..iade., ing the "cause" prong of Rule 12, Fed.R. deliberar. dtcision .or t ) ,bjc(.i :,. ri)c ,.pr.e, Crinr.P., the coun stilted: Even when counsc'l's perrormance is ge.eral- ilff"l;., :11fl,:H:: ;:r:,:;:t:l;j ly competent, however, he may, through satisfied \{,lrh the cliarge aJ a wholc 'nd ,lid oversight or ignorartce, fail to prescnt a sub- not want ro rrrsr specilic objcclions !o isol,..t- stantial constitutional claim. Binding a de- ed portio:.;s of the chargc. Funhernrore, i,ne ferrdant to the It)ilt('riitlly dcficient jtldgnlellt .l.the rrr:rirr j.strlicirti.l.ls l\,r (:o.tcml)()r.:rl(,, of his att()rt)ey wottltl trt'ir st't'tst'less Pt'ttltlll' ous ott.jt.t:ti.rr rules r:;. L I c.trrsc, th( l)r(,\,,,rrt in most cases becitttst' trrttst defettdattts lacl< attorne\.: from drlrbe,rrt,.. . ,, ignrlril:g trtltl er- the legal sophisticatlolr to nlonitor their at- rors in or.:,-'r to have "built-in" grounds lor tomey's perfornrance appeal. A tr:al jucge is enlitleci io have ob- 8. In his order denying the writ of habeas cor- jections raiseei at. a time rvhett po'.tr:lr:il erlor pus the district judge stated: can be l)re\'anted. T1'ler argtres thlrt thc "citust"' ()f his tlilrl (!-mphasis r'Jdt'd ) ClrrlnSel'S failUre (o ol)j(fCt to tltc ltrry,Chargr. It set'lns cl('irr tlrrl llrt .lisiritt *r!rrt \\'rS rras that his courrsel u,as int'llt'ctive. l.ack applying a r'.tlu whi(lh lvt,.tlti rctirtire a sltorvin3 -.fe:fective coulsel is irlsg raisecl as a sel)a- of Si.\th Atllt'l)(llllellt irltlti"ttvettcss tr. sittisi'v =ie grounds for habeas relief. H<ltvever, the the "causc" eienlel)t ol -5-I/ics. The (listrict .:i+. :*rstrted basis lor the ciainr of int,ffcc- corlrt erri'(l :Ir so doing. .l-n ;lttorlruY n!'ed llot :x:--;sei is the l:trltrrc 111 1r[r1t'r't t() (hc jtlr\ lrq' 51r it\t'.' r]a:(';lt 'ls tt" '- r't rise ((' :l scu'rr''ttt' =r-=- ---'::: .:ir'.::! '.lte tttt:rr.' rr'cr'rd. 'l'r' ri=I=:S:iL :i:i'::C:-i ::.* :ls ::: :r " lEbi--=r-.==:- ---.r'-:--'--.> - : 1t '.ii:# #