Tyler v. Phelps Court Opinion

Working File
July 24, 1980

Tyler v. Phelps Court Opinion preview

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  • Case Files, Bozeman & Wilder Working Files. Tyler v. Phelps Court Opinion, 1980. 65bd7ca3-ed92-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/8160d1a3-fb10-4dfa-b150-960629b25bb5/tyler-v-phelps-court-opinion. Accessed May 21, 2025.

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    172 622 FEDERAL REPORTITR, 2d SEtilriS

Cal. v. Petrol SLolts, ctc., 441 U.S. 211, gg

S.Ct. 1667, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979), requires
of a privatc party secking disclosure of
grand jury materials, we do note that the
Court therc focusc<l on thc nccd for a court
ordering releasc to lrc familiar with both
the grand jury procct:rlings and the con-
tours of the laLar "jurlicial llrocce<ling" so
that it nright prulre rly Iimit rlisckrsurc.
Whcrc, as in Lhc yrrescnt casc, a jurlicial
procccrling is only a ;xrssibility, lrollcr limi-
tation is pracLically f<lreckrsc<I.

t3] Grand jury secrccy has trarlitionally
bcen protecterl. Itulc 6(c) continucs that
prutcction whilc lrcrnti[l,irrg rlisclosurc of
grand jury matcrials in ccrtain spccific cir-
cumstances. A district court to whonr ap-
plication for disclosure is made does exer-
cise discrction in granting disclosure but
may not thereby enlarge the exceptions to
grand jury sccrecy. We hold that the dis-
closure sought here would not be prelimi-
nary to nor in connection with a judicial
proceeding.

The July 12, L979 order of the district
court is

REVERSED.

Gary TYLER, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

C. Paul PHIILPS, Director, f)epartment of
Corrections, and Attorney General of
the State of Louisiana, William Guste,
Jr., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 79-3093.

United Stat.es Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.

July 24, 1980.

Petitioner filed petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus. The United States District

Court for thc Fla:;torn I)isirii:t ," (,ouisr:r.:ir,

Adrian G. Duplarttier, J., <r. ,' ..r.:i I antl
petitioner appeaieri. Thc [:..:... .. .,.r.;eirl:r,
Kravitch, Circuit Judgc, hcid i-j.iit ir,r staLc
murdcr JtrosccuLion, irr rvhic.l i,r.iprar1, r.,:r:c
was whethcr p,,.iioner pos. :)sorJ spreciiic
intent to kill or do .grcat Lrr.i,y hirrm 1,,

more than onc,,ers()n, l.ri:rl .:tiurt's jt.;.y
charge which irrsLrur:Lcrl Lh:rt :t,rersor) il:-
tcnrls thc natullrl :rnd llri-'1,*;iie o\ lj(j-
qucnccs of his lrcI an<.1 whi,.:i,..LuL.,l L:-iaL

until such prcsuml)Lion was ()i.i n'tighcrl, t.hc
jury was bound ro find in irccorcian".: ,,.-:t.h

it, affirmatively shiftcd Lo {iL.li:ndanL tilc
burrlcn of prrxrl' ,rn l l:c crit.ir.:ri j;:,.t lrnri Lt..l;
affcctcd thc fur,,irtrrrerrt:tl [:r,r'. ;s rrl' triar,
howcver, because rlistrict cour', in hiib, .rs

corpus proceediirg applied imrlroper i6al
standard in deterrnining whcthcr- ther.c wrrs

sufficient cause for pctitioncr'o proceui...;,
default with rcsy-lect to the clr.ir.ge, cause
would be remande('l for a reconsideratior ,f
that issue.

Reversed and remandeci.

l. Criminal Law s=324

Presumptions rvhich at r ii, preclude
consideration of an elernenl oi the crir:.e
conflict with the prcsur,tption t,i inno. . . .r :
and invade fact-findirrg funetir,:, ;,f ,-.';,;
effect of such conclusive presunr,-:iions is '.o

relieve state of its ourden of ,rroving be-
yond reasonable tloubt everj' element of
crime charged, an unconstiht:c,nal result.

2. Criminal Law F306
Nonconclusive presumptlor:i, rvhici.

shift only the burden of pe:'l;ua1.on to de-
fcndant, arc uncor,sLitutional.

3. Criminal Law e,7?8(6)
In state murder prosecuriolr, in which

primary issue was whether petiiioner pos-
sessed a specific intent to kili or do grcar
bodily harm to more than oue lr,rrson, trial
court's charge which instructuu rhat a per-
son intends the nat.rral and pr<,oable conse-
quences of his acts and which \ratcd thlt
unless and until ',he pr€sun:r . .ii is c,:-
weighed, the jury is bounri ro rrnd in :c-
cordance with the presumptior,, was uncon-
stitutional.



4. Judgment e75l
An erroneous instruction rviil support a

collateral attack on r:onstitutional validity
of a state court's jurlgment only if ailing
instruction so infcctcd the entire trial that
resulting conviction violates due process.

U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.

5. Criminal Law e778(5)
Habeas Corpus o= 113(13)

In state murder prosecution, in which
primary issue was whether petitioner pos-

sessed specific intent to kill or do great
bodily harm to more than one person, trial
court's jury charge which instructed that
person intenris the natural and probable

consequenccs of his acts and which statetl
thnt until stttrh presuntptiotr wits out-
weighcd, the jury was boun<l to find in

accordance with it, affirmativcly shifted to

defendant the burden of proof on critical
fact and thus affected fundamental fairness

of trial; however, becausc district court in
habeas corpus procccding applied improper
legal standard in determining whether

there was sufficient cause for petitioner's
procedural default with respect to the

charge, causc would be remanded for a

reconsideration of that issue.

6. Habeas Corpus e45.3(l)
For purpose of rule preventing federal

courts from granting habeas relicf l.o peti-

tioner whose claim is nonreviewable in state

court because of petitioner's procedural de-

fault unless there is cause for the procedur-

al default, an attorncy nee<l not be so in-
comlletent as to give rise to a scparate

ground of relicf to bc inc<.rmlletcnt enough

to satisfy the "cause" requirement.

7. Habeas Corpus e25.1(9)
A fedcral habcas court which is

prcsentcd with a sufficiency of evidence

claim must, assuming llrocedural prerequi-

* Circuit Judge ot the Sixth Circuit, sitting br"

designation.

l. ]'he Louisiitna statute inll)ositlg a mandatory
death penalty for persorrs found guilty of first
degree nrurdt'r was declared unconstltutional in
Robert.s v. Lorti.siarta, 428 U.S. 325' 96 S.Ct.
3001. 49 t-.Ed.Ztl {)7'1 (197(i). Robt'rls wus de-

cidcd altcr 'lvler's tlral, littt l->clore thc l-ouisi'
ana Suprenre Court l'cviewed his conviction.

1ry.)I,J.)

sites have bccn satisfieci,'ij',r.,r rc,ief souqht
if on thc recorJ cvi<l.nu( .. .'.,cLci aL tria. rl,

rational trir:r of fact cou.J l,ilve foun.r prot-'I

of guilt bei'ond a reasonJDlu (ioubt.

8. Homicide ,F250

On thc evidencc adduccu at state mui'
rler prosecution, a rat.ior trjcr <,,- fact
could have found llroof of p,ctitioner"'s guiit
beyond a rcasonrLle tloui-rL.

Jack Peebles, Nerv Orieans, La., fvi peti-
tioner-appellant,.

Abbott J. Recves, Assr. Dist. A'":"v., lic-
search & Allltcals, Grctn::, Lr., ior I"r)s./orl-

dc nts-allllcllcrcs.

Aplrcal [rorn LIte UrtiLctl Stlt,cs Uis'"rit:t

Court for the Eastcrn Distr.icr of Louisii.na.

Before COLEMAN, Clief Jutigr, anci

PECK * and KRAVITCH, Oircuit Judges.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge.

Gary Tyier, appeilanr, w::..-

first degrec niurder in I-,,' . , ....- .

CI

and sentenced to dic. Or ao,reat, .:rc cieath

penalty I was vacatcd bu! thc ,'". 'icrion

was affirmed, Starc r'. Tyler, S'12 So.2d 5'7'1

(La.), cert. danicd, 4lJ1 l-'.S 9i?. 9? S.Ct.

2i80, 53 L.Ed.2d 227 (',:'-' Afttr' :rnsuc-

cessfully pursuing slzlle .:trt,r'rs eo:'rus. ?-r'.1-

er v. Phelps,353 So.2d 105tr (Le.i:liS), trr,s

28 U.S.C. :\ 2254 actior. was f.lcd. Tl,e

district court ilenicd relicf ano thc 1,,cii'-io.:-
er appeais. rVe rcvcrse .rn'1 remand

At lhe iirne of the oifcr,se, Carl' T;'ir:r
was a 16-1',-ar-oltl stir(ienL at Lestreirzln

High Schor-ri. Thc rnorning of thc niurd"r
had been marke<l by genrrral !urnt.-iil and

racial tensi,tr,s, ztnd Tylcl' had bcen suspcnci-

ed from schooi. Later i:, the tlrry i1e was

Becaust' ol li()l)(r'ts. 'I1 lcr's Je:lth s(.r,tcnce \\'as

vacatcd lrrtd lilc lrlllrl'lsu;iill\:r)t \\'Itlloui, ligibili-
ty lor 1>artllc, lrrolllttiur: Jl' stlsl).'llsiL)lr ol s(:)-

tence for tN'unt!' )'eilrs wJ:; lo)poscd. Stltrt' v.

Tyter,342 So.2d 574. 577 76 (La.), cer: itttjt :

431 U.S. 9r7, i)7 S.Ct l)bLl, 53 L.!-i- ',
(1977). Scc e/so .Sa;ilc r'. .iLttktns, lJ i . :,. ....

157 (l-a.197U1

TYLEIT v. PHELPS
Cite as 622 F.2d 172 (1980)

'rf Lruisiana,
'rl relief and
, of Appeals,
t:at in state

.rimary issue
*ed specific
,iy harm to
if ourt's jury
. person in-
,able conse-
stated that

,veighed, the
rdance with
fendant the
lrct and thus

.:ess of trial;
,'t in habeas
'"oper legal
cr there was
; procedural
.idrge, cause
sideration of

t.) preclude
i the crime
,f innocence
,,n of jury;
rptions is to
1',,'oving be-
element of
.-,nal result,

,fls, which
rsion to de-

',, in which
;t-ioner pos-
,r do great
,rrson, trial
lhat a per-
ai,lle conse-
.rtated that
on is out-
'lnd in ac-
'as uncon-



622 I.'EDEITAL RBPORTER, 2d SERIESfi4
nicketl up antl takcn lrack to school by a

a.pu,y sheriff u'ho susltt'c"ttl ht' was

truani. By thc time Tylcr and thc tlcputy

arrivecl at the school, thc school <lfiicials

ha<l <lecidetl to closc thc school and send all

students homc. Af tcr ircing tokl to go

home immediatcly, Tyler lloartlerl a bus

loacled with other stutlents'

Upon leaving the school grounds' lhe bus

was met with jeering and rock-throwing by

the assembleil crowtl. As the llus proceed-

ed, someone on the bus shot a '45 caliber

automatic revolvcr into the crowd' The

bullet struck antl killcti onc bov antl grazcd

anothcr. It was allcgctl thtt Tylcr shot thc

pistol antl the jury so found in convicting

him.

In his appeal to this court, Tyler raises

two issues, both of which wcre raiscd on

<lirect appeal and in his petition for state

habeas: iirst, he contentls he was convicted

on the basis of an unconstitutional jury

"to.g"t 
second, hc contcnds therc is insuf-

ficient evidence to convict him of first de-

gree murder'

At trial, the prillliri- issue rt':': : rtlci-

strom's mcnlal sLatc al' the tinli' i "'
homicitle. He prescntcrl psychiat"e '-":-
*ony f.o* rvhich his counsui a:gucd r'c hi'd

not actecl with thc rctluisitc nlens rea Pur-

suant to thc statc's re<1ucsl, thc Lllri cout't

charged the jury thal "thc law plcsiiltrcs

that a person intends i'he crdirr:rr1 cr;trsc-

or"n"at^ of his voluntal'i' acts " 1"tc 
.'1"-

ionaun,'. timcly objccLiou was u\ urrulcd;

his conviction was affirri'rctl on ap1'cal ''o thc

ttontoru Supreme Courl, but was revcrsed

by the United States Supr"me Court'

The Courl notctl thtt thc cltlrrgt' lti issuu

in Sanristrorn is itml)itiuor:s; it i:r trllt)lci-rr

*tl"ttr"a it is it conclrrsivt: (i c'' l:' "'; i::ld

Sandstrom causctl the 'iellh oi tl''r r iciitlt

vou musL iinr-l hc ti'tl st ir'Lcntion:rli'r') t'l'
'nonconclusi,e (i' c', if yt-ru fintl Si'ntlr''rom

.uur"d the death of rhe victirn a;rd if hc

Dresents no evidcnct'-o the contrit:"i'' )'';'.i

must find he did so intcntior::rlll') I:'u'-:urrli)-

tlon. e..utaingly, thc Corrrt conslticr';tr 
"hc

due process ramifications o{ both i}'lres ()'

PresumPtions'

This casc, like Sanrlstro nt v' LIonLtnit' 442

u.i. sro, 99 s.ct. 2450, 61 L.E(l'2d 39 (19?9)'

involves the constiLutionality of a state

.iu.go o, liresumptions' Unlike Sarul-

stroi, howevcr, this case also involves thc

"r.ttion 
of whcther haLrcas corpus relief is

ivailable to a ticfenrlant who rlid not object

io the charge at trial' Accordingly' this

court must detcrrnine f irst wheLher the

charge as given was unconstitutional' and

,".oid whclher any unconstitutionality

must go unredrcssctl because of the rulc

articut"ated in Wainwright v' Sykes' 433

u.s. zz, 9? s.ct. 'A97,53 L.Ed'2d 594 (197?)'

t1] Presumptions rvhich atrl 
-tL'.1/rccluLic

consideration of an el"ntelli ol :3' crlmc

conflict with the l)resunrption oi :ili jci:;lcu

"ni 
inrua" the factfinriirrg func'"ior of,-tI^'c

i;;r. IJnitcd Starc's '' L'ni'-ul ':t:Il(''r J-l ;
'rui co.,438 u.s.'1:2,93 s( lri'li' J'

L.Ea.za 85a (i9?8); )I<trisattt:;" UnitaLt

Stoto., 342 U.S. '24t, i2 S'Ct' 2'i0' 96 L'i'lJ'

iAS (lgsZ). The efitct of such conclu'ivc

orcsumptions is to r' i'c'lc tht Sl.:rtt of its
ir..l.r' of proving bcvond a rt:'sonulrlc

doubt "u"ry 
element of lhc crimt chargcd'

in-rn"on.titutional rcsult iincler In re ll/ar-

ri,p, ssz U.S. 358, 90 S'Ct' 1063, 25 L'Ed'2d

368 (ie?o).

Did the charge on Presumptions rlnconst'- ,nlirf "il;"ff'J:::"1":;"i':'I:;:i 
.]]]l

-'1utionary'sn;rt tn" Burden of Proof ltro'a'nt' are also unconstilu[ionirl' Such

to thc DcfendanL? a trresumPtir)n wiIS :rt isstle in !t'u)li;nc|'

In Sanri.strt.x n v. Montitrtir, thc rle fcnrlant iitttu'' izr U'S' llSl' 95 S C'-' 1831' 44

was chargerl with ,,tle Iibcr,.tc hornicirlc," 1,.!}l.2ri l-168 (19?l>;, u'ltcre Litc jtrr'' hld beon

Mont.Cotle Ann. 
"s 

4S-5 102 (19?U)' which chargerl that nialicc r'fot'cthouv:" i: rn es-

rc<luircs th^l thc hrnticitle [,c c.,nrrnittctl scnti"l irnrl in<lis,crlslrltlt'clt't.,.rt': i ')i niu:'-

,urlxlscly.r kn'wingly. The rlcfcnrlant atl- ,r.i, r,rt that if thc St^te ,ro"'cd iirc hr'rr''-

nritte<l that hc killcrl thc victim, Irut tlcnicrl .i.lu *,* lxlth inle ntitlnltl antl unllwful,

thathcrlitlstlllttrlxlst:Iy<lrkn<lwitlgly.m:tlicealtlrcthouglrLwitsl<lbcinrl,Iiod;n-



itrl-
thc
ti-

ilrd
,lf-

Ll rt
,.us

IU-
l, '-

",i;
lhc
..e(i

ile

r'lll
'inri

:im
ior
r)Ill

lrc
., ou

I

l l)c
,,i

,lc
,lic
r{t
.iL'

I|tl
,l

Lti
its
,lc

'(1,

2(l

('h

i)c
,.h

l.
,,t

,,n

1'l'l,Dtt v. I,lllil,l,S
,css Lhe trefcnrr*nt r)rov.(r u, ,, ,,.il-r,-;";;';;'i*irn)r)rions urc (ru(ructior,r,,, ,,,,,,'"L:ancc of thc cvirlcnc. t'.t hc.ctcrl in thc sions which thc rurv rcquirastl:c 

"irir.,r,_roheat of passion. 421 u.s. at 686,95 S.Ct.;; make under (,erra.. circumsr.r:: .:: t,.,r1898. The Court in S;tndstrom rcitcrateJ absence of evi.r. .cc in the "i.. u,ir.;hits Mullanas' hol<ling thrtr such nun.un.lu- reads rhc..)ury to a difrcrcnt;;:r,r;;;;;:
sive, burden-shifting r:hargcs ,r. ,n.orrti- conclusion. i l,rcsumption uurrri.rrucs rc,tutional. 442 lJ.S.'l'L s'2A, gg S.CL. itL z4sg. cxisl only so lon1. as; itls nur ur.l..,.,,.r. ,ri
Sec also PatLerson v. Ncw York, 422 IJ.S. outweighed by evirlcncc in thc c:-r,_,io ri:.
197,97 S.Ct. 2319,58 L.E(1.2d 2g1 (19??). contrary. BuL ut.lass anci unt;i t)ie prc_

sumption ts so i,ulii,elgrted, llt._ jury is
13] At Tyler's trial, as is rclcvant here,2 bound to find in accorclincc rritt, ,ira'rrrr-

thc primary issuc was whcthcr Tylcr pos_ sumlttion.
sesscd a sllecific intcnt to kill or ,fo g.*t I charge you with State Speciar Cilrre
bodily harm to more than one 1,..run.r'lr- # I rcqucsted undcr l'resurrrpli.;ns ii:)t
asmuch as the facts rcvcalcrl that Tyler the defcndant inlcnrleJ th" r.,t..',.1 .r,i
firc<i a fully loatlcrl pistol only oncc, thc 

probablc consc(lucnucs of tris: r,c... (T.
Stutc 

.relierl hcuvily ,'n thc stul.t.ry llrc- 
59F) (Ernph^sis .tltlt:tl).

surtrPtion thtt:r rlelurrllrnt intcntls tlrc nat- This chargc is so sinriLlr to Lhr .:i,rir.g. in
ural anrl Prollrlrlc ('onse(lu('pccs of lris.cLs. Sands/ronl thaL lvc (':Irr conle Lo no c()nclu-
La.Rev.stat. lb:482. Thc ,r'secutor 

sion but that it had tire samc cffcct :is ri-..i.
srresserl this ,resumption in bd; ";;;; ;:,;i 

,T:::[t:t;ir::,,,":r,,1[ j]r.:{i;;
and closing argumcnts' rnc luage ttren was convictea on the basis of :rn uncor,stitu-chargcd thc jury: 

tional chargc.{

ir:

'\.,ts
.

'i.{,

2. At trial whethcr.fyler actuall-v f.ired the pistol
was at issue. He does not, ho\4,ever, contena inthis court th;rt thcre rvas itrsLrf.ficicnt cvitiencci
to sul)port the concltrsiorr tlrirt ht: f.iretl tht, shot.Accordingly, wo ar(. trL.ating thr.case ,,, tf]ougflTyler did fire thc shot.

3... 
1t- -t.l: rime ot t.ylcr,s rriat, t_a.Rev.Star.Ann.

ti l4:30(a) was the only, <Jt f.inirior-r 
"r-ii;;; 

';;-
1ircr., murdcr :r1>;rli<:irlllc t() tll(, l.:l(:ts ot. thc case.I( rctrd, in r(.1(.vau)t l)irrt:

l.irst tlcgrr,t, rrrtrrtlt,r is tlrr. killing ol.lr lru.nran l;t:ing
***l**

(4) when the offender hus a specrlic lntenlto kill .or to inflict great boclily, fl".," .,po,i
more than one l)ersoll . . (F_nrphisis
added)
Apl)arently, 'l'),ler rvas chargccl rvith I.irst cle-grce rnurder, a (.itl)itul crinrt., so that the counof general jurisdiction rarher rhan tlr" j;;;ii;

cortrt would ha,,e jurisdictir)n ()v(,r the <iase. In
Louisiana at this tirne, the juvcnile 

",,r',.r 
f,uJjurisdiction over all noncapitai .use*. t_u.lier.

Stat. I3:1570. llad the cust, bt,cr.r a<ijutlicatcJ
in jtrvenilc corrr(, th(, r11()st sr\,(,r.(, pLurishrrrertt
rYhich corrld hrrvt. lrIr,rr trrrPos,,rl *,,r 1,,r,,,,i1,:srrl>t'r'",ision rurlrl tlrt. itli(, ()l lw.(,nt),,,nc ltt lt
.1rr,'cnilt. rlt,(r'ntiorr llrr.ility. lrtrrtltr.rlrn,,rt,, lraclthe lury convictctl 'l'yler of ,, t"r."._i,,.iuJ.iJ
offense of first degret, nturtler, ttr" ,,r." ,uoulJ
have had to be renranded to (hc .1ur"nit., ..,r",.itl

tl. We rec,ignizc tilat dotrltl s Irirvc l;er,rr cx_pressed as to whclhor S:trtr/slr.rrnl is r(,troactive.
See United Sralt,s r.. Spitgel, 604 F.2d SOf isth

Cir. 1979), cert. denierJ, U.S. - ,,r,,s.ct.2l5l,64 L.Ed.2J 787 (t9s0). :..; ::
S.'trtdslrrrrrt is nol r<.t:.,r.r..t\(,, :l()\\...,, :, :liis
cltarge was uncollstituti( 11:r1 .litdcr ilttjj. nc,\. v.
Wilbur,42 I U.S. 66.i, vJ S C(. lSbt, .r+ r_.icr
508 (1975), which haC bcr:n Cr.ciJed 1rrio.. ro tiretrial in this case.

The Maine homicidr: rti.,.[]1,. irt i-.;:;r.e iri ilii:::_
nry t,sl.altlishr:d two t5,. , er; hor)ii(.idu: .,. ;. r,.r
and m:rnslrrulllltcr. It(,lit tll)us ()l. li(rillr. rd, ;(.-
qrrircd proof that th(j kiillig rvlrs ul.r];r,.r ir. i. ,.
neithcr justilied nur c.xc,rsc.) a:rtl r::,.. :..or:rl.
In addition to proof of an unla,,r.lul -nd intcrt_
tional killing, the proseculion had to esrablish
the killing was with r:ialice aforr,tlrorl;hl in
order to prove murder. 1-he lury cl:iri;.1c, Iiotr.-
ever, required the jurS .o rnf.cr Il)arlr!.i] i,:..rid-
thought fronr proof ol :lt intcntionai irid un-
lawful killing unless the dcfendant piur,.e<.i tharhe acted in the heat , 1' lrassion 

'o, 
.ru.rd.jn

provocation.
The Su1>rerne Coun heltj sLlch a chrr;.;i to bc

uncons(itulion:rl llec:rusr. ll l)crltits :1.:t, ltrrr. Iu
convict a dt'lertdant of rriLrrcle r t:r,crr rhrrr-:1ii, rt isits likL,lv ;r.s ,?ot tllat ltc u,as gLirltr,. .rrrl,,. r,l.
rrurrrslirtrglrtr.r'. 421 LJ.S. irt 7():1, lri ..,, i .,1
l ll{)2 (r.rnph:rsis irr oriliirriri).

In tltt, clrst'irI I)ar, tlle St.rLq wlrs r;:rlr.1..t,.tJ IU
prove Tyler acted with u :,pecific inrcrii r.r kjrl
or to inflict great bodily,harrrr cn rilir:.u tl i.._ .)rlr_,
pL:rson. If the 1>rosccution 1;;-ovt.cl onl\ s r, ( jii(.
intent to krll onc l)er.s(,n. tll(.lr rr ti:.si tlc..:r.qt.
murder convictlon wuul(t nor riL.. .t.he 

:urvcharge, however, requircd the jury, ro co...ircl"

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L76 622 }'EDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERII'S

Must the Unconstitutionality of the
Charge Go Unredressed?

It is undisputed that for a trial error to
be reviewable in Louisiana, an objection
must be made at the time of its occumence.
La.Code Crim.P. art. 841.5 It is also undis-
puted that Tyler's counsel made no objec-
tion to the erroneous charge. Accordingly,
in a simplistic and conclusory argument, the
State asserts that under Wainwright v.

Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, Sg L.Ed.2d
594 (19?7), any error must go unredressed.
We disagree.

t4l Initially, we note that the State ig-
nored the threshold question of whether the
correctness of a jury charge is reviewable
at all, and if so under what bya

n erroneous ln-
struction will sip-port a collateral attack on
the constitutional validity of a state court's
judgment only if the ailing instruction so

infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction violates due process. Henderson
v)6ibhe,l131 U.S. 145, tS4, 97 S.Ct. 1?90,
7736, 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977), quoting from
Cupp v. Naughten,414 U.S. l4l, 147, 94
S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (19?3). Com-
pare Blenski v. LaFollette, 581 F.Zd 126
(?th Cir. 19?8) (charge not so uninformative
and confusing as to constitute a denial of
due proccss) with Bcrricr v. Egclar, 588
F.2d 515,521 22 (6th Cir.), cuL <lcnied,439
u.s. 955, 99 S.Cr. 354, 58 L.Ed.2d 34? (19?8)
(a muddled charge on who had the burden
of proof on sclf-defcnse so infecterl the fair-
ness of the trial as to warrant habcas re-
lief). Scc a/so Cronnon v. Alabama, 587
F.2d ?16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,440 U.S.
974, 99 S.Cr. 1542, 59 L.Ed.zd 792 (t979);
Bradley v. Y|'ainwright, 561 F.zd 1200 (5th
Cir. 1977); Higgins v. WainwrighL, 4?A F,2d
177 (sth Cir. 1970); Bonner v. Henderson,
517 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1975); Pleas v. Wain-
wright,44l F.zd 56 (sth Cir. 1970). Thus,

that Tyler possessed such intent from proof of
such an effect, unless the defendant proved to
the contrary. Thus, Tyler could have been con-
victed of first degree murder even though it is
as likely as not thar he did not intend to kill or
do great bodily harm to more than one person.
This is an unacceptable possibility under the
ruling of Mullaney v. Wilbur.

the thrr:shold issue ior this court is whether
the charge given here so infectc<.! the trial
as to render it fu:.rlamentalll, unfair. We
conclude that it di..l.

The effect of thc charge in this cesc wai
affirmatively to shift to the dcfenCant the
burden of proof on a critical fact rvhich was
in dispute-namely, whether Tyler had a
specific intent to harm more than one per-
son. Inasmuch as thcre is very }ittle er.i-
dence to support that propositiorl other than
the presumption at issue here, it is folly to
argue that the erroneous charge did n,rt
affect the central determination of guilt or
innocence.

Concluding that the charge affectcd the
fundamental fairness of the triiil tioes not
end our inquiry, however. Becausc Tylcr's
trial counsel failed to objec+" to the errone-
ous instruction, we must determiner whether
the district court was correct in concluding
that the procedural default undcr Louisi-
ana's contemporaneous objection rule bars
habeas relief by this court.

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. i2, : '

S.Ct. 2a97, 53 L.Ed.2d b94 (19??), a(r!r;,):r-
ishes us that absent cause for the 1;rocedur-
al default and actual prejudice from the
error, principles of comity and fcderalisn
prevent federal courts frr.rm granLing hab(..
as relief to state prisoncrs who.:c ciainr i:;

non-reviewable in statc court becausc of ti.,
default. This rule was designed 'uo avoiu
the perceived effect of Fay v. Noia, 872
u.s. 391, 83 S.Cr. 822,9 L.Ed.2d b37 (1963),
of encouraging "sandbaggrng" by defcnse
lawycrs in the state trial. 433 Li.S. at 8g, g?

S.Ct. at 2507.

Considering first lhe "prejudice" prong,
we find Tyler was prejudiced by the im-
proper jury charge. As discussed above,
the error was sufficienlly egregious to con-
vince us that Tyler u,as denicd a iundamen-
tally fair trial. Sae Huris v. Strx.:rrs, 606

5. For a discussion of the Louisiana contempo-
raneous objection rule by then Justice Tate, scc
State v. Wrestle, Inc., 360 So.2d 831 (La.1978),
modified on other grounds sub notil. lJurch v.
Louisiana, 441 U.S. I30, 99 S.Cr. 1623, 60
L.Ed.2d 96 (1979).



l

r: wJlcther
,l the trial
'i ...r. We

ase was
..rdant the
.,'hich was
..r had a

n one per-
iittle evi-

other than
,s folly to

r;e did not
r of guilt or

.ffected the

..,1 does not
rrrse Tyler's
lie emone-

i;re whether
,r concluding
.rter Louisi-
,n rule bars

u.s. 72, 97

??), admon-
,re procedur-
'c from the

federalism
':rnting habe-

,se claim is

L:ltuse Of the
.cd to avoid

Noia, 372
r 837 (1963),
i,t'defense
..S. at 89, 9?

i le c" prong,
b1' the im-
.sed above,

:ious to c<,n-

"und3nrcn-
j,u-i::.:i:d

- '=----

'l'YLDIt v. I'llDLI'S
Cltc as 622 t-.2d 172 (1s80)

l'.2r1 6J9 (Sth ()ir. 1979); l'raernln v. Gcor- lins v'. Aug't,457i t:'.2t)'.

-77

I ^l1U rr 2 r8l,h

gia,599 I,'.2d 65 (5th Cir.), cert. dcnicd, M4 Cir. 19?ti), t,,:'t. d,:nict|, .: )v U.S. i1Jtj, .,.,

U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 661, 62 L.llti.2d e{1 S.Ct. 105?,5e L.Ed.2o 96 \iii?g), th::; a.a.:li
(1980); Berrier v. Hgeler,583 F.2d 515 (6th ilof knowle,i,r; b1r gv;.,y . o,rr.-,ei t.l...r ;he ac-
Cir.), cert. denietl,439 U.S..95I;,99 S.Ct.35! lltion. of rr,,, r.rial judg,. ,., .r:r.r..rc.i rr duc
58 L.tld.2d 347 (19?8); collins v Auqey,5?7 I'process viol:riion .s suffjci:nr cau.c ^',,r fr:l-
F.zd 110? (8th Cir. 1978), cert. !"!i:!,439 | ;re to object.?
u.s. 1133, 99 S.Ct. 1057, 59 L.Ed.2d 96

(19?9); Sinco.x y.. tinitetl Stares, 571 F.2d We find :his deiinitio:r cf the "ri;urc"

8?6 (sth Cir. f978); Bromv,ell v. Williams, clcment of :i.'kc's 
"o 

bc ""1';le""lv r:on:;ist-

445 F.Supp. 106 (D.NId.197?). BuL see Blen- ent with thc prlicios sta"".i b1' -.. S)'kcs

ski v. LaFolletLe, 581 F.2d 126 (?th Cir. Court. By nr-'t bi,-.'iing & t:eicntlr.,t io obvi-

Though ,,cause" was undefined in thc permitting Lrullsel to sandliag, but r-ri,iy giv-

S./es Jpinion, subscquent-d€ciliffis-havq ing relief to defendants when the errone-

giren .eaning rol,lte-i..rrr-Strucrat court\ous, nontactical dccisions b-v c<.rutiscl resul':
-f"ii indicatcrl that incffcctive counscl, \ l)reJuorcc'

short of that neccssary to make out a Sixth I

Amendment claim, will satisfy the "cause" -/ 15'6) As in "Iimincz " 
":;lt'llc' 

557 F'zd

1978). ous mistakcs oy nis trial counsel wc :rrc rrot

prong.5rffiT.2d-.506(5thCrr.19??),''hiscoul.])rcacase
ffiO n.2 (Sth Cir. 19?8) (dictum), cert. where rigiti application of ihe J, l'.'es ruic

deniecl, 439 U.S. 1133, 99 S.Ct. 105?, 59 will run aiotrl r-rf thc Supr'cnre Court's ad-

L.Ed.2d 96 (19?9); Coopcr v. I'itzharris,586 monition thrt Syxc's is not' Lo be i,lipiied ir
F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (cn banc), cerl. such a way as to rcsult irt it rniscarri;rge of

denied, 440 U.S. 9?4, 99 S.Ct. 1542, 59 justice. 433 U'S ti gl, 'i'i S.trt :'r 25C8'

L.Ed.zd ?93 (19?9); Jiminez v. Estelle,557 Because thc district corrL :l)i,iie(; r:.e im'

F.2d 506, 511 (5th Cir-l!!Q_(qtictum). We prol)cr lcg:,, sLuntlar,: in

asre.4.itHtrerei*ljvple[piiiSuU-in C,rt- "cause," 6 it :s unknorvr. r"hcl-. rig,tl

6. While Tyler nrade a Sixth Amendnrent effec. I within the :.pplicablc ji.i1l)c1:ircs u jon,pi
tiveness of counsel claim at the district court I tence. .'t acffettrta v. 1::!'.'' 280 I-.:.. -,92 (5u',

level, he has not pursued that claim here. ,-J Cir. l9C-,, flerrir'; r'. I:s:c,'/r 49: F.2d 125
(Srh cir. l$l.l), rrhc.rril..: .'.,., l',3 F.z, j

wn, (D.C.Cir.1980) (48 
664

U.S.L.W. 2698), in the context of discuss- petiti(jner's rrial cou:rs,:i.,...,r ,.. . ..iade.,
ing the "cause" prong of Rule 12, Fed.R. deliberar. dtcision .or t ) ,bjc(.i :,. ri)c ,.pr.e,

Crinr.P., the coun stilted:
Even when counsc'l's perrormance is ge.eral- ilff"l;., :11fl,:H:: ;:r:,:;:t:l;j
ly competent, however, he may, through satisfied \{,lrh the cliarge aJ a wholc 

'nd 
,lid

oversight or ignorartce, fail to prescnt a sub- not want ro rrrsr specilic objcclions !o isol,..t-
stantial constitutional claim. Binding a de- ed portio:.;s of the chargc. Funhernrore, i,ne
ferrdant to the It)ilt('riitlly dcficient jtldgnlellt .l.the rrr:rirr j.strlicirti.l.ls l\,r (:o.tcml)()r.:rl(,,
of his att()rt)ey wottltl trt'ir st't'tst'less Pt'ttltlll' ous ott.jt.t:ti.rr rules r:;. L I c.trrsc, th( l)r(,\,,,rrt
in most cases becitttst' trrttst defettdattts lacl< attorne\.: from drlrbe,rrt,.. . ,, ignrlril:g trtltl er-
the legal sophisticatlolr to nlonitor their at- rors in or.:,-'r to have "built-in" grounds lor
tomey's perfornrance appeal. A tr:al jucge is enlitleci io have ob-

8. In his order denying the writ of habeas cor- jections raiseei at. a time rvhett po'.tr:lr:il erlor
pus the district judge stated: can be l)re\'anted.

T1'ler argtres thlrt thc "citust"' ()f his tlilrl (!-mphasis r'Jdt'd )

ClrrlnSel'S failUre (o ol)j(fCt to tltc ltrry,Chargr. It set'lns cl('irr tlrrl llrt .lisiritt *r!rrt \\'rS

rras that his courrsel u,as int'llt'ctive. l.ack applying a r'.tlu whi(lh lvt,.tlti rctirtire a sltorvin3
-.fe:fective coulsel is irlsg raisecl as a sel)a- of Si.\th Atllt'l)(llllellt irltlti"ttvettcss tr. sittisi'v

=ie grounds for habeas relief. H<ltvever, the the "causc" eienlel)t ol -5-I/ics. The (listrict
.:i+. :*rstrted basis lor the ciainr of int,ffcc- corlrt erri'(l :Ir so doing. .l-n ;lttorlruY n!'ed llot
:x:--;sei is the l:trltrrc 111 1r[r1t'r't t() (hc jtlr\ lrq' 51r it\t'.' r]a:(';lt 'ls tt" '- r't rise ((' :l scu'rr''ttt'

=r-=- ---'::: .:ir'.::! '.lte tttt:rr.' rr'cr'rd. 'l'r'
ri=I=:S:iL :i:i'::C:-i ::.* :ls ::: :r "

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