Wright v. Mitchell Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Public Court Documents
October 7, 1946
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Wright v. Mitchell Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 1946. 6dc6b77e-c99a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/81ce48d1-cf8c-4244-81e4-d29ce716e156/wright-v-mitchell-memorandum-brief-in-opposition-to-petition-for-writ-of-certiorari. Accessed December 06, 2025.
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1ST THE
dom*t nf Xht States
October Term, 1946
No.
MRS. GEORGE C. WRIGHT, et al.,
Petitioners,
WILLIAM P. MITCHELL,
Respondent.
s*3(c 31®̂
M EM ORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
£■'<3(6 1W*
T hurgood Marshal.!.,
A rthur D. Shores,
Counsel for Respondent.
R obert L. Carter,
of Counsel.
SUBJECT INDEX
PAGE
Statement of Case----------- ----- ---------------------------------- 2
Questions Presented............................... - ------- --— 5
Summary of Argument--------------------- 6
Argument --------- 7
I. The Decision of the Court that Failure to Pursue
or Exhaust Remedy Provided Under State Law
Which Is In the Nature of a Conventional Judicial
Remedy Does Not Oust the Federal Courts Is Con
sistent. With Precedents of This Court---------------- 7
IT. The Characterization of The Remedy Afforded
Under Table 17, Section 35, Alabama Code of 1940,
By The Circuit Court of Appeals, As A Judicial
Remedy Is Clearly Right ------- ------------------ ----- 8
Conclusion________L—.---------------------------------------------- 11
Table of Cases
Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232 U. S. 134 ------- ----------------8,10
Henderson Water Company v. Corporation Commis
sion, 269 U. S. 279______________________ __ _______ 7
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268— ...-------------- ,.---------- ------- 8
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U. S. 300------ 7
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265
U. S. 196_________ ________________________________ 7, 8
Porter v. Investors Syndicate, 286 U. S. 461, aff’d on
rehearing 287 U. S. 346------------------------------- ------- 7, 8
Prentiss v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 -------7,10
Railroad & Warehouse Commission v. Duluth Street
R. Co., 273 U. S. 625___________________________ __- 7
State Corporation Commission v. Wichita, 290 U. S. 561 8
United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161-------------------- 7
11
United States Constitution
PAGE
Article I, Section 2______ __________________________ 6
Amendment X IV ..._______________________________ 6
Amendment X V __________________________________ 6
Amendment X V II ....___________________________ _ 2, 6
Alabama Constitution
Section 177, Article V III____________________________ 2
Section 178, Article V III______________________ ______ 2
Section 181, Article VIII- ___________________________ 2
Section 182, Article V III__ ___ 2
Section 186, Article V III____________________________ 2
Statutes
Section 31, Title 8, U. S. Code_________________ ______ 6
Section 43, Title 8, U. S. Code________________________ 6
Section 41 (11) (14), Title 28, U. S. Code________ ......... 6
Section 32, Title 17, Alabama Code of 1940 ___________ 2
Section 35, Title 17, Alabama Code of 1940___________ 6, 8
26 Okla. Stat., Sec. 74____ ...__________________________ 10
IN THE
0itpmn? (Enurt of th? Unttpft States
Octobee T eem, 1946
No.
Mrs. George C. W right, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
W illiam P. Mitchell,
Respondent,
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR W RIT OF CERTIORARI
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice of the United States
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States:
Respondent opposes the granting of a writ of certiorari
in this case on the grounds that the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is correct, proper
and consistent with prior decisions and precedents of this
Court. Petitioners seek a review here of a judgment ren
dered upon the pleadings. The judgment of the Circuit
Court of Appeals does not accomplish a final disposition of
respondent’s cause but merely decides that the amended
complaint states a valid cause of action and provides
grounds legally sufficient for a trial of the controversy to
determine the actual merits of the case.
2
Statement of the Case
Respondent, as plaintiff in the District Court of the
United States for the Middle District of Alabama, filed his
complaint against the defendant Board of Registrars, peti
tioners herein, seeking five thousand ($5,000) dollars in
damages, a permanent injunction against, and a judgment
declaratory of, an alleged unconstitutional policy, custom
and usage of the defendant Board of Registrars and their
predecessors in office in subjecting- Negroes to tests not
required of whites, and in refusing to register qualified
Negro electors, while at the same time registering white
persons less qualified than Negro applicants, because of
race or color.
Respondent, a colored person of African descent, duly
meets all the requirements for registration and voting-
under the Constitution and laws of the United States and
the State of Alabama.1 He is a citizen of the United States
and a bona fide resident of the State of Alabama. He is
over 21 years of age. He is neither an idiot nor insane and
has not been convicted of any felony or crime. He is a
taxpayer of the State and paid taxes in full on real prop
erty with an evaluation in excess of three hundred ($300.00)
dollars prior to the time he offered to register. In short,
respondent possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for registering and voting under the laws
of the United States and of the State of Alabama (R. 5).
On July 5, 1945, respondent made due application to
petitioners, the official registrars of voters of Macon
County, for registration in order to be eligible to vote in
1 The Constitution of the United States, Article I, Sections 2 and
4, the 17th Amendment, and the Constitution of Alabama, Article
VIII, Sections 177, 178, 181, 182, 186; Alabama Code of 1940, Sec
tion 32, Title 17.
3
future federal as well as state elections. Respondent was
refused registration solely on account of his race or color
after being required to answer questions and to produce
two persons to vouch for him, while white persons were
being registered forthwith without being subjected to such
tests, all pursuant to a general, habitual and systematic dis
criminatory practice of petitioners (R. 6).
Respondent did not bring this cause of action because
of the sole act of the petitioners in refusing him registra
tion but instituted suit to contest the constitutionality of a
policy, custom and usage established by petitioners’ prede
cessors in office and maintained by them to prevent Negroes
from registering and voting in the county of Macon. The
core of respondent’s amended complaint may be found in
Paragraphs 6, 9, 10 and 11 thereof, where it is alleged:
“ 6.
Plaintiff, William P. Mitchell, is colored, a per
son of African descent and Negro blood, is over the
age of twenty-one years. He is a taxpayer of the
State of Alabama, and pays tax on real property with
an assessed valuation in excess of Three Hundred
Dollars. Plaintiff alleges that he is able to read and
write any passage of the United States Constitution,
that he has never been adjudged guilty of felony or
any crime and that he is not an idiot or insane.
Plaintiff further alleges that by reason of the alle
gation herein above made, he was in all particulars
on the 5th day of July, 1945, and still is possessed
of the qualifications of an elector and as such was
and is entitled to be registered as such elector.”
” 9.
That defendants have established and are main
taining a policy custom and usage of denying to
plaintiff and others on whose behalf this suit is
4
brought the equal protection of the laws by requiring
them to submit to tests not required of white elec
tors applying for registration and have continued
the policy of refusing to register qualified Negro
electors while at the same time registering white
electors with less qualifications than those of Negro
applicants solely because of race or color.”
“ 10.
That on or about the 5th day of July, 1945, dur
ing the regular registration period while defendants,
Mrs. George C. Wright and Virgil M. Guthrie, were
acting as registrars of voters under the laws of
Alabama in conducting the registration of persons
qualified to register, plaintiff made application at the
Macon County Court House, the place for registra
tion of persons qualified to register, he filled out the
regular form for registration, he produced two per
sons to vouch for him, as required by the board, he
correctly answered such questions as were asked in
proof of his qualifications, and was ready, willing
and able to give any further information and evi
dence necessary to entitle him to be registered; that
by reason of the said fact hereinbefore made, plain
tiff was entitled to be registered as a voter. Plain
tiff applied for registration in order to be eligible to
vote in future federal as well as state elections.”
“ 11.
Plaintiff further shows that during such regis
tration period and on or about the 5th day of July,
1945, white persons presenting themselves for regis
tration were not required to present persons to
vouch for them, but were registered forthwith, where
as your petitioner solely because of his race and
color was required to wait long hours before being-
permitted to file his application, was required to
present persons to vouch for him, after which the
said defendants denied plaintiff application and
wrongfully refused and illegally failed to register
plaintiff on said July 5, 1945, solely on account of
his race, color and previous condition of servitude.
Plaintiff further states that it has become the gen
eral habitual and systematic practice of said Board
of Registrars, including these defendants, Mrs.
George C. Wright and Virgil M. Guthrie, and their
predecessors in office to refuse to register Negro
residents of Macon County, including the plaintiff,
William P. Mitchell.”
The cause was heard in the District Court upon a motion
to dismiss the amended complaint on the ground that said
complaint failed to state a cause of action. Upon the hear
ing of said motion, the District Court sustained petitioners ’
motion to dismiss and issued an order dismissing the com
plaint. From that order respondent appealed. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judg
ment of the District Court and remanded the cause.
Questions Presented
I. Where a Registrar or Board of Registrars of
Voters, Pursuant to a Policy, Custom and Usage, Sub
jects Respondent and All Other Qualified Negro
Applicants to Tests Not Required of White Appli
cants Who Apply for Registration in Order to
Qualify to Vote in Forthcoming Federal and State
Elections Can Relief Be Sought in the Federal Courts
in the Form of a Class Action Seeking Declaratory
Judgment and Injunction Restraining Such Registrar
or Board of Registrars from Subjecting Negroes to
Tests Not Required of White Applicants, Without
First Exhausting Remedies Under State Law?
6
II. Does the Action of a Registrar or Board of
Registrars of Voters, in Refusing to Register Respon
dent and Other Qualified Negro Applicants on Ac
count of Race and Color, Amount to a Deprivation
of the Rights Secured Under the Laws and Constitu
tion of the United States, Namely Article I, Section 2,
14th, 15th and 17th Amendments to the Constitution,
Subdivisions 11 and 14 of Section 41 of Title 28,
Sections 31 and 43 of Title 8 of the United States
Code.
Summary of Argument
I
The Decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals That
Failure to Pursue or Exhaust the Remedy Provided Under
State Law in the Nature of a Conventional Judicial Pro
ceeding Does Not Oust the Federal Courts of Jurisdiction
Is Consistent with Precedents of This Court.
II
The Characterization of the Remedy Afforded Under
Title 17, Section 35, Alabama Code of 1940, by the Circuit
Court of Appeals as a Judicial Remedy Is Clearly Right.
7
A R G U M E N T
I
The Decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
That Failure to Pursue or Exhaust the Rem
edy Provided Under State Law in the Nature
of a Conventional Judicial Proceeding Does
Not Oust the Federal Courts of Jurisdiction Is
Consistent with Precedents of This Court.
This Court has been careful to make a distinction be
tween judicial and administrative remedies in determining
whether the remedies in question need be exhausted before
application can be made to federal courts for relief. When
the remedy is administrative or legislative, the rule of this
Court is that the state remedy must be pursued and com
pleted before the aggrieved party can have any standing in
the federal courts. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery;2 3
Porter v. Investors Syndicate;8 Railroad d Warehouse
Commission Co. v. Duluth Street R. Co.;4 Henderson Water
Company v. Corporation Commission;5 * Pacific Telephone <&
Telegraph Company v. Kuykendall;e Prentiss v. Atlantic
Coastline Company;7 United States v. Sing Tuck.9
On the other hand, remedies provided under state law
that are judicial in nature need not be invoked or pursued
before an action can be maintained in the federal courts.
2 302 U. S. 300.
3 286 U. S. 461; aff’d on rehearing, 287 U. S. 346.
4 273 U. S. 625.
B 269 U. S. 279.
0 265 U. S, 196.
7 211 U. S. 210.
8 194 U. S. 161.
8
State Corporation Commission v. Wichita; 9 Porter v. In
vestors Syndicate, supra; Bacon v. Rutland R. Co. ; 10 Lane
v. Wilson; 11 Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company v.
Kuykendall, supra.
Whenever the question has been presented, this Court
has carefully examined the remedy provided to determine
whether it was legislative or judicial in nature. Prentiss
v. Atlantic Coastline Co., supra; Lane v. Wilson, supra;
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Kuykendall,
supra; Porter v. Investors Syndicate, supra.
The Circuit Court of Appeals in applying the rule that
judicial remedies need not be exhausted before application
can be made to the federal courts was following a well-
established rule of law consistently adhered to in the deci
sions of this Tribunal. There is, therefore, no basis or rea
son for this Court to review or examine the decision of
the court below.
II
The Characterization of the Remedy Afforded
Under Title 17, Section 35, Alabama Code of
1940, by the Circuit Court of Appeals as a
Judicial Remedy Is Clearly Right.
Under Section 35, Title 17 of the Alabama Code of 1940,
a right of appeal is provided when registration is denied.
The pertinent provisions of the statute are set out below:
“ Any person to whom registration is denied shall
have the right to appeal, without giving security for 9 10 11
9 290 U. S. 561.
10 232 U. S. 134.
11 307 U. S. 268.
9
costs, within thirty days after such denial, by filing
a petition in the circuit Court or Court of like juris
diction held for the county in which he or she seeks
to register, to have his or her qualifications as an
elector determined. Upon the filing of the petition,
the clerk of the Court shall give notice thereof to
the solicitor authorized to represent the state in said
county, who shall appeal and defend against the peti
tion on behalf of the state. Upon such trial the Court
shall charge the jury only as to what constitutes the
qualifications that entitle the applicant to become an
elector at the time he or she applied for registration,
and the jury shall determine the weight and effect
of the evidence, and return a verdict. From the
judgment rendered an appeal will lie to the supreme
Court in favor of the petition to be taken within
thirty days. Final judgment in favor of the peti
tioner shall entitle him or her to registration as of
the date of his or her application to the registrars.”
The remedy therein provided is the type traditionally con
sidered judicial. The aggrieved parties may go into a cir
cuit court or court of like jurisdiction in the county in which
he seeks to have his registration determined. Trial by jury
is provided, and the court is required to charge the jury
as to what constitutes the qualifications necessary for an
applicant to become an elector at the time of his application
for registration. The jury is required to determine the
weight and effect of the evidence and return a verdict.
From an adverse decision the aggrieved party may take an
appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama.
Under this statute, the court has no initiatory func
tions. The proceedings must be commenced by the ag
grieved person who contests the decision of the Board of
Registrars. Normally administrative agencies are not so
circumscribed but have the authority to commence a hear
ing on their own application, to call parties before them and
10
to make a determination of the issues involved. Prentiss v.
Atlantic Coastline Co., supra. A court merely has the
authority to declare and enforce liabilities, rights and duties
as they exist on present or past facts and under a rule of
law already operative: Legislative functions, on the con
trary, have an element of futurity and generality which is
not characteristic of judicial inquiries. Prentiss v. Atlantic
Coastline Company, supra.
The remedy provided herein is similar in nature to that
provided under the Oklahoma statute in the case of Lane
v. Wilson, supra, which this Court characterized as judi
cial.12 The Circuit Court of Appeals has gone thoroughly
into this phase of the proceedings. A substantial portion
of the majority opinion and the entire concurring opinion
are devoted to a careful analysis of the state remedy pro
vided and to a determination of its classification as admin
istrative or judicial. In deciding that it was a judicial
remedy, the Circuit Court of Appeals was merely following
the rules and the yardstick which this Court has consistently
used in making such determination in previous decisions.
12 The Oklahoma Statute (26 Okla. Stat. Sec. 74) provided in
part: “ and provided further, that wherever any elector is refused
registration by any registration officer such action may be reviewed
by the district court of the county by the aggrieved elector by his
filing within ten days a petition with the Clerk of said Court, where
upon summons shall be issued to said registrar requiring him to
answer within ten days, and the district court shall be a (give an)
expeditious hearing and from his judgment an appeal will lie at the
instance of either party to the Supreme Court of the State as in civil
cases. * * * ”
11
Conclusion.
The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals is neither
ambig’uous nor confused. It in essence holds that the com
plaint states a cause of action and that federal courts have
jurisdiction to grant the relief applied for upon proof that
such relief is warranted according to the facts and evidence
adduced in a trial on the merits. Under these circum
stances, the public interest and the interest of the litigators
will be best served by refusing to grant the writ of cer
tiorari as prayed for by petitioners and by allowing a com
plete adjudication of all the issues involved in this litiga
tion in a trial on the merits as ordered by the Circuit Court
of Appeals.
W herefore, for the reasons hereinabove advanced, the
petition for writ o f certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
T htjrgood Marshall,
A rthur D. Shores,
Counsel for Respondent.
R obert L. Carter,
of Counsel.
L a w y e r s P r e ss , I n c ., 165 William St., N. Y. C.; 'Phone: BEekman 3-2300