Correspondence from Kronlage to Chambers, Ralston, Guinier, and Karlan; Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae; Order to File Brief Amicus Curiae; Amicus Curiae Brief of Pascal F. Calogero, Jr.

    CHARLES A. KRONLAGE, JR. 
A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION 

717 ST. CHARLES AVENUE 

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70130-3798 

CHARLES A. KRONLAGE, JR. 

CURT C. KRONLAGE 

June 27, 1988 

TELEPHONE (504) 581-2400 

Mr. Julius L. Chambers 
Mr. Charles Stephen Ralston 
Mr. C. Lani Guinier 
Ms. Pamela S. Karlan 
Attorneys at Law 
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 

Re: Ronald Chisom, et al vs. 
Edwin Edwards, et al 
USDC No. 86-4075, Section "A" 

Dear Messrs. Chambers, Ralston, Guinier and Ms. Karlan: 

Please find enclosed copy of the Motion for Leave to 
Appear as Amicus Curiae, Order and Amicus Curiae Brief 
filed by Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., through undersigned 
counsel, in the above referenced matter. 

harles A. Kronlage, Jr. 

CAKjr/pi 
Enclosures 



THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

RONALD CHISOM, et al * 

Versus' 

EDWIN EDWARDS, et al * 
********************** 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAR 
AS AMICUS CURIAE  

CIVIL ACTION 

No. 86-4075 

SECTION "A" 

Now into court, through undersigned counsel, comes 

Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., who respectfully requests leave to 

appear herein as amicus curiae and to file an amicus curiae 

brief in connection with Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary 

Injunction, said brief to address the limited issues raised by 

that motion. In support of this request, mover avers that: 

1. 

He is currently serving as an Associate Justice on the 

Louisiana Supreme Court. He began his service on the Louisiana 

Supreme Court after he was elected in 1972 to fill a two year 

unexpired term from the First Supreme Court District (Parishes 

of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard and Plaquemines). In 1974, 

he was reelected by the voters of the First Supreme Court 

District to serve a full fourteen year term. 



2. 

Justice Calogero intends to seek reelection to the 

First District seat in 1988. Over the past year, he has been 

preparing for the upcoming election'and going forward with 

plans to qualify for the race in July, 1988. 

3. 

Justice Calogero is a lifelong resident of the First 

Supreme Court District. He now resides in the 10th Ward of 

Jefferson Parish, and has resided at that location since 1984. 

4. 

Justice Calogero has not been made a party to this 

proceeding, and indeed has not appeared herein as an 

intervenor. With respect to the merits of the plaintiffs' 

claims in this litigation, he supports the legal position taken 

by defendants, but he is, of course, prepared to accept 

whatever resolution is achieved by the courts. 

5. 

On the other hand, plaintiffs' motion to enjoin the 

1988 election is of direct concern to Justice Calogero, who has 

invested time, effort and resources in preparing to qualify for 

the 1988 race. He opposes plaintiffs' motion and respectfully 

requests leave of this Court to file a brief as amicus curiae, 

which sets forth the grounds for his opposition to the motion. 



6. 

For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that 

Justice Calogero has an interest in this proceeding which 

should allow him to appear herein and to file a brief as amicus 

curiae. 

Wherefore, Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., requests leave of 

court to appear herein and to file herein the attached amicus 

curiae brief. 

Charles A. Kronlage, Jr. 
717 St. Charles Avenue 
New Orleans, La. 70130 
(504) 581-2400 

Charles A. Kronlage, Jr. 
Attorney for Mover, 
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. 
Associate Justice, 
Louisiana Supreme Court 



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  

I, Charles A. Kronlage, certify that I served copies 
of the foregoing motion and attached amicus curiae brief upon 
the parties stated below by depositing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, first class, addressed to them at 
their respective offices: 

William P. Quigley 
631 St. Charles Ave. 
New Orleans, La. 70130 

Roy Rodney 
642 Camp Street 
New orleans, La. 70130 

Ron Wilson 
Richards Bldg., Suite 310 
837 Gravier Street 
New Orleans, La. 70112 

M. Truman Woodward 
1100 Whitney Bldg. 
New Orleans, La. 70130 

A.R. Christovich 
Suite 2300 
Pan American Life Center 
601 Poydras St. 
New Orleans, La. 70130 

Robert G. Pugh 
330 Marshall Street, Suite 1200 
Shreveport, La. 71101 

Paul D. Kamener 
1705 N. Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 

Julius L. Chambers 
Charles Stephen Ralston 
C. Lani Guinier 
Ms. Pamela S. Karlan 
99 Hudson St., 16th Floor 
New York, New York, 10013 

William J. Guste 
La. Dept. of Justice 
234 Loyola Ave., Rm. 700 
New Orleans, La. 70112 

Blake G. Arata 
210 St. Charles Ave. 
Suite 4000 
New Orleans, La. 70170 

Moise W. Dennery 
Suite 2100 
Pan American Life Center 
601 Poydras St. 
New Orleans, La. 70130 

Mark Gross 
Civil Rights Division 
Dept. of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 20035 

Charles A. Kronlage, Jr. 

This day of June, 1988. 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

RONALD .CHISOM, et al 

versus 

EDWIN EDWARDS, et al 

CIVIL ACTION 

No. 86-4075 

SECTION "A" 

ORDER 

CONSIDERING the foregoing Motion for Leave to Appear 

as Amicus Curiae filed by Pascal F. Calogero, Jr.: 

IT IS ORDERED that Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. be and is hereby 

authorized to appear herein as an amicus curiae and to file an 

amicus curiae brief in response to plaintiffs' motion to enjoin 

the First Supreme Court District election scheduled for October 

1, 1988. 

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this   day of June, 1988. 

Charles Schwartz, Jr., Judge 
United States District Court 



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

RONALD CHISOM, et al * CIVIL ACTION 

Versus No. 86-4075 

EDWIN EDWARDS, et al * SECTION "A" 
********************** 

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF 

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: 

Amicus curiae Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., respectfully 

submits the following in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for a 

preliminary injunction: 

Surely every person who has participated in this 

litigation, whether as a party or as an amicus curiae, can 

agree on one basic principle: a State Supreme Court election 

for a district that includes over 500,000 registered voters 

should not be delayed, enjoined, cancelled or otherwise 

disrupted except as a matter of absolute necessity.  

To argue to the contrary is to argue against the 

provisions of the Louisiana Constitution which require an 

election for the First Supreme Court district in 1988, against 

the interest of the one-half million voters who have every 

right to participate in that election in 1988 and against the 

interests of those persons who have been preparing for some 

time to run for the First Supreme Court District seat in 1988. 



Yet no compelling reason for enjoining the election 

has been offered to this Court, by the plaintiffs or by anyone 

else. 

Plaintiffs champion their likelihood of success on the 

merits. However, even assuming that plaintiffs' prospects for 

prevailing on the merits are good (which includes an assumption 

that the United States Supreme Court will not rule adversely to 

plaintiffs when it considers defendants' writ application), the 

fact remains that enjoining the 1988 election is not imperative 

in order to facilitate the plaintiffs' essential objectives. 

The effect of a preliminary injunction would be that 

none of the voters or potential candidates would participate in 

a Louisiana Supreme Court election in 1988. Of necessity, 

Justice Calogero's term of office, which is scheduled to expire 

at the end of this year, would have to be extended until such 

time as a special election is called. Such a result would 

leave plaintiffs in essentially the same position as they will 

be in if the 1988 election is conducted as scheduled, i.e., 

having the possibility that an election could be held for a 

newly created minority district in 1990. 



On the other hand, if the 1988 election is allowed to 

go forward under the present system, and the justice elected in 

1988 then serves the full ten year term provided for by the 

Louisiana Constitution, plaintiffs' interests need not be 

adversely affected in the least. Another First Supreme Court 

District election is scheduled in 1990, and if plaintiffs were 

to prevail on the merits in this case, the 1990 race could be 

designated as the election for a newly created minority 

district. Further, the urban area of Orleans Parish is where 

most blacks reside, and Orleans is the resiqence of the 1990 

justice incumbent. (The 1988 justice incumbent resides in 

Jefferson Parish). 

Plaintiffs have not argued that it is essential to 

their interests that an election for a newly created minority 

district be held before 1990. To the contrary, and as set 

forth in the amicus curiae brief which Mover submitted to the 

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (p. 5), plaintiffs have 

indicated that a 1990 election for such a district would be 

compatible with their interests and the interests of potential 

minority candidates who would seek a position on the supreme 

court from such a district. (Plaintiffs assert that any such 

candidates would need a certain amount of preparatory time to 

be able to mount a serious campaign for a position on the 

Supreme Court, and that there is not enough time for such 

preparations to be made before the scheduled 1988 election). 



However, amicus Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Walter 

F. Marcus, Jr., has asked this Court to enjoin the 1988 

electi9n so that he may have the political option of running 

for the Supreme Court in 1990 from either of the new districts 

which would be created if the present First Supreme Court 

District is divided as the result of this litigation. He is of 

the view that if the present district is divided, simultaneous 

elections should be held in 1990 for both new districts, in 

order that he may select the new district (whether it includes 

his Orleans Parish residence or not) in which he would prefer 

to be a candidate in 1990. Thus, he asserts that the 1988 

election should be delayed until he is scheduled to run for 

reelection, at which time he will be free (in his view) to be a 

candidate in either of the newly created districts. 

The stated desire of the 1990 incumbent to protect (or 

enhance) his political options in the face of possible 

reapportionment of the First Supreme Court District is 

understandable. But is the political convenience of that 

justice a legitimate reason for cancelling the 1988 election? 

Mover submits that it is not. 



There is no reason why the political desires or 

concerns of the 1990 incumbent should force the two year delay 

of the 1988 election, at the expense of the 1988 incumbent, 

other candidates who plan to run in 1988, the over 500,000 

voters in the First Supreme Court District, the Louisiana 

Constitution and the orderly functioning of the state judicial 

system. 

The amicus curiae brief of the 1990 incumbent refers 

to "the opportunity usually afforded a public official, whose 

district has been divided, to run for election in either of the 

two newly created districts." The opportunity referred to, 

however, is one which may be afforded 

statutory provision when the seats in 

scheduled for simultaneous elections, 

by a constitutional or 

question are regularly 

as opposed to the 

situation presented here, where there is no such constitutional 

or statutory provision and the elections for the seats are 

staggered (as required by the Louisiana Constitution). 

For example, elections for seats in the Louisiana 

Legislature are scheduled simultaneously, and incumbent 

legislators in districts that have been reapportioned have the 

right to run "at the next regular election" in "any district 

created in whole or in part from the district existing prior to 

reapportionment...." La. Const., Art. 3, §4(B). 



In such instances, granting the incumbent the option 

of running in any newly created district does not require 

shortening the term of any other incumbent, or cancelling an 

election held in any other district. Because all incumbents 

run for reelection at the same time, allowing them the option 

of running in more than one district has no such adverse 

consequences. 

In the staggered election system involved here, 

however, there is only one election scheduled for the First 

Supreme Court District in 1990. Under these circumstances, no 

precedent requires this Court to accept the 1990 incumbent's 

suggestion that the 1988 election must be delayed for two years 

so that he can have the luxury of choosing between simultaneous 

races in 1990. 

Further, even if the terms in question were not 

staggered, the Louisiana Constitution contains no provision for 

judicial elections similar to the option provided to incumbent 

legislators by La. Const. Art. 3, §4(B). Nor is mover aware of 

any other authority which requires that upon reapportionment of 



a judicial district, the incumbent must be given the 

opportunity to run in more than one new district. 1 

In conclusion, there is no legal or equitable 

consideration which justifies the issuance of a preliminary 

injunction. Mover respectfully urges this Court to deny 

plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief. 

Charles A. Kronlage, Jr. 
717 St. Charles Ave. 
New Orleans, La. 70130 

Charles A. Kronlage, Jr. 
Attorney for Mover, 
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
Louisiana Supreme Court 

1 Fairness dictates than an incumbent be given a district 
from which to seek reelection at the conclusion of his term, 
even if the only district which holds an election at the 
conclusion of that term does not include the incumbent's 
residence. However, it is a different matter altogether to say 
that the incumbent must be given the choice of running in more 
than one of the new districts, particularly when, as here, 
extending that opportunity to one incumbent requires altering 

,the term of another (by cancelling an election and artificially 
extending the latter's term). Note also that the 1990 
incumbent resides in Orleans, and asks for the double 
opportunity of running either in a new district that includes 
his Orleans residence or the other newly created district.