(Proposed) Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem
Public Court Documents
December 20, 1990

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Simkins v Moses H Cone Memorial Hospital Brief and Appendix of Defendents, 1963. be5a9f66-c49a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/c89d5194-c41d-4edc-b6b1-a6064c3826bb/simkins-v-moses-h-cone-memorial-hospital-brief-and-appendix-of-defendents. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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In T he United States Court of Appeals F or th e F ourth C ircuit No. 8908 G. C. Simkins, Jr., et al., and United States of America, Appellants, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, a corporation, et al., Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina BRIEF AND APPENDIX OF DEFENDANTS — APPELLEES THE MOSES H. CONE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL and HAROLD BETTIS, its Director -v.- H erbert S. F alk 319 Southeastern Building Greensboro, North Carolina . F. WILLIAMS, JR* Attorneys for the Defendants-Appellees The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and Harold Bettis, its Director. % INDEX TO BRIEF Page Statement of the C a se _____________________________ 1 Preliminary Statement___________ ..._________________ 2 Argument _____________ ___________________________ 3 I. T he F ederal C ourts D o N ot H ave Jurisdiction of Actions B y Individuals S eeking R edress for the A lleged Invasion o f T heir C ivil R ights by O ther Individuals or Private C orporations__ 3 II. T he D efendants A re Private Persons and C or porations, and N ot In stru m en ta lities of G ov er n m en t E ither State or F e d e r a l _____________ 5 (1) The method, of selecting the Trustees of the Moses Cone Hospital does not affect the pri vate character of that corporation _________ 6 (2) The ad valorem tax exemptions of the two hos pitals do not affect their character as private corporations ____________________________ 13 (3) The licensure of the two hospitals by the State of North Carolina does not make them agen cies of the S ta te_______________ 14 (4) The nursing programs at the Moses Cone Hos pital do not affect the private character of that corporation _____________________________ 17 l (5) The grants of Hill-Burton funds to the two hos pitals do not make them instrumentalities either of the Federal government or of the State 19 (6) Neither the Federal government nor the State exercises any control over the two hospitals through the Hill-Burton A c t____________ 22 (7) The whole is no greater than the sum of the parts _____________________________ 28 (8) In reference to the position of the American Civil Liberties Union_____________________ 32 (9) In reference to the two individual defendants,.. . 32 III. T he C onstitutionality of th e C hallenged Pro visions of the H il l -Burton Act Is Irrelevant and Is N ot B efo re th e C ourt in T his Action ..^ 33 Conclusion _______________________________________ 37 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961) ____________ 5, 14, 29, 30, 31 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of City of Philadelphia, 353 U. S. 230 (1957) ______________ 12 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) _________________ 8, 9, 10, 13, 24, 37 Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital, 164 F. Supp. 191 (E.D.N.C. 1958), aff’d., 261 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert, denied, 359 U. S. 984, (1959) __________ ____________11, 12, 13, 17, 20, 30, 31, 32 Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F. 2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. den. sub nom. Ghioto v. Hampton, 9 L. Ed. 2d 170____29, 30, 31, 37 Harrison v. Murphy, 205 F. Supp. 449 (D. C. Del. 1962) _____________________________ 30 Khoury v. Community Memorial Hospital, Inc., 203 Va. 236,123 S. E. 2d 533 (1962) ____21, 24, 27, 37 Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, D. C., 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.C.D.C. 1957) 13, 14, 20 National Federation of Railway Workers v. National Mediation Board, 110 F. 2d 529 (D. C. Cir. 1940), cert, denied, 310 U. S. 628 (1940) ___________________________________ 4 Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. C. Md. 1948) ________ 10, 13, 20 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) __________ 22, 33 Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 183 F. 2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950) ___________________________ 33 Williams v. Howard Johnsons Restaurant, 268 F. 2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959) ...._ .._ .15 , 16, 17, 26 Williams v. Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 200 F. 2d 302 (3d Cir. 1952), cert, denied, 346 U. S. 840 (1953) __________________ ____ ...___ 3 28 U. S. Q , $1331 ______________________________ 3, 4 28 U. S. C , §1343 (3) ___________________________ 3, 4 42 U. S. C., §291 et seq__________ :________________ 19 42 U. S. C., §291 _____________________________ 23, 24 42 U. S. C., §291e (f) __________________________27, 33 42 U. S. C , §291m ________________________27, 28, 36 N. C. Gen. Stats., §20-7__________________________16 N. C. Gen. Stats., §20-50 ________________________ 16 N. C. Gen. Stats., §84-4_________________________ 16 N. C. Gen. Stats., §90-18________________________ 16 N. C. Gen. Stats, §90-29 ________________________ 16 N .C . Gen. Stats, §131-126.3_____________________14, 15 N. C. Gen. Stats, §131-126.4___________________ 14, 15 Private Laws of North Carolina, Session of 1913, Chapter 400 _______________ 7 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. 191, 79th Cong, 1st Sess.______25, 26 iv In T he United States Court of Appeals F or th e F ourth C ircuit No. 8908 G. C. S im k in s , Jr ., et al., and U nited States of Am erica , Appellants, M oses H . C one M em o rial H ospital, a corporation, et al., Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina BRIEF OF THE MOSES H. CONE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL and HAROLD BETTIS, its Director STA TEM EN T OF TH E CASE This action was instituted in the District Court ostensibly to redress grievances which were alleged to arise under the Fourteenth and the Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The defendants asserted in the court below that the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned solely with State action and the Fifth Amendment solely with Federal action; that these defendants are private corporations and in dividuals and not in any way instrumentalities either of the State or of the Federal government, and that the District Court therefore had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action; and the defendants moved to dismiss the com plaint on that ground. Judge Stanley adopted this view in his 2 careful and admirably documented opinion of December 5, 1962, and entered judgment on December 17, 1962, denying motions for summary judgment by the plaintiffs and the United States, and granting the motions of the defendants to dismiss the complaint and the pleading in intervention for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. The matter is before this Court on appeal by the plaintiffs and the United States from that judgment. PRELIM INARY STA TEM EN T It is well not to forget—in small questions of Hill-Burton construction requirements and in large questions of consti tutionality—that we are before this Court, at this time and on this appeal, solely on the fundamental legal issue of the juris diction of the District Court over the subject matter of the action. The District Court does not have jurisdiction of ac tions by individuals seeking redress for the alleged invasion of their civil rights by other individuals or private corporations— and it is the position of the defendants that this is such an action, and nothing more. The appellants have devoted a great deal of attention to making something more of the case. For the first time in the history of his office, the Attorney General of the United States, the King’s champion, has raised his lance against the King. He himself concedes that this action is “ exceptional” (U. S. Brief, p. 40), but greater candor would make the word “ unprecedented” — the defendants were able to find no prece dent for his action, and under inquiry in the court below, the Attorney General was able to cite no precedent. It is perhaps fortunate in these “exceptional” circumstances that the shadow of the windmill at which he is tilting does not actually fall across the present case. The plaintiffs asserted in the court below that this was a case of first impression — but the case has actually been de 3 cided many times before in reference to schools, and restau rants, and golf courses, and swimming pools, and even hos pitals, and the principles which govern it are well settled and have been thoroughly defined in this Circuit. If the facility— whether it be a restaurant, or a golf course, or a hospital — is a public one (in the constitutional sense), it is subject to the constitutional amendments and discrimination is unlawful under them. If the facility is a private one, however, it is not subject to the constitutional amendments — and the Federal courts do not even have jurisdiction to consider the matter of discrimination. The issue of jurisdiction therefore hinges on the one basic question — no matter how it is phrased — of whether these defendant hospitals are public corporations in the constitu tional sense or private ones free from constitutional restraints. ARGUM ENT I. THE FEDERAL COURTS DO NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OF ACTIONS BY /INDIVIDUALS SEEKING REDRESS FOR THE ALLEGED INVASION OF THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS BY OTHER INDIVIDUALS OR PRIVATE COR PORATIONS. The jurisdiction of the District Court in this action was invoked pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343 (3). (Complaint |[I, at 4 a ) . Under this section, neither diversity nor a jurisdictional amount is required, but the sec tion nonetheless has a limited application, and it confers origi nal jurisdiction upon the Federal District Courts to entertain those civil actions—and only those civil actions—which are founded on the Fourteenth Amendment and its implement ing legislation. Williams v. Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 200 F. 2d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 1952), cert, denied, 346 U. S. 840 (1953). The jurisdiction of the District Court in this action was also invoked under Title 28, United States Code, 4 Section 1331 on the ground that the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000.00, and that the action was founded on invasions of the rights guaranteed by Section 1 of the Four teenth Amendment and by the Fifth Amendment. (Com plaint ([1, at 4 a ) . The plaintiffs therefore relied for jurisdiction in the court below upon invasions of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment under both Sections 1343 (3) and 1331, and of the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment under Section 1331; and it is clear that the District Court has no jurisdiction under either Section 1343(3) or Section 1331 unless the depriva tions alleged by the plaintiffs are deprivations of those rights guaranteed either by the Fourteenth Amendment or by the Fifth Amendment. The inhibitions of the Fourteenth Amend ment, however, are inhibitions solely against State action, and the inhibitions of the Fifth Amendment are inhibitions solely against Federal action; and neither Amendment applies to action by private persons or corporations. “The guarantees of the 14th amendment, U.S.C.A. Const., relate solely to action by a state government, clearly absent here. Hence, any constitutional rights pertinent to the instant case are those guaranteed by the 5th amendment. De cisive of this constitutional issue is the established proposition that the 5th amendment relates only to governmental action, federal in character, not to action by private persons.” Vinson, Associate Justice, speaking in National Federation of Railway Workers v. National Mediation Board, 110 F. 2d 529, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert, denied, 310 U. S. 628 (1940). It is idle to cumulate citations, for these principles are well settled and have not been disputed by the appellants. Noth ing could be clearer than that “The guarantees of the Four teenth Amendment . . . relate solely to action by a state gov ernment,” and “ that the Fifth Amendment relates only to governmental action, federal in character, (and) not to action 5 by private persons” ; and with these premises, we are back again to the basic question which is determinative of the right of the plaintiffs to bring this action in the Federal courts: Whether The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and the Wesley Long Community Hospital are private corporations, or public corporations either State or Federal in character. II. TH E DEFENDANTS ARE PRIVATE PERSONS AND CORPORATIONS, AND NOT INSTRUMENTALITIES OF GOVERNMENT EITHER STATE OR FEDERAL. The plaintiffs have taken exception (Plaintiffs’ Brief, p. 34) to Judge Stanley’s undertaking to determine if the de fendant hospitals were “public corporations,” and they urged the court below to consider the “ totality” of governmental involvement. The word “ totality” is one upon which the plaintiffs have placed great emphasis, apparently on the basis of inferences drawn by them from the Burton case1 which have led them to conclude — or at least to suggest — that the whole is somehow greater than the sum of the parts. The plaintiffs do Judge Stanley an injustice, however, for he made it quite clear that in determining whether the defendants were subject to the constitutional amendments, he felt it “neces sary” — in his own words — “ to examine the various aspects of governmental involvement which the plaintiffs contend add up to make the defendant hospitals public corporations in the constitutional sense” (207a. Emphasis added), and after examining each such aspect, he then went on to con sider expressly the “Total Governmental Involvement and Participation” (217a) . The plaintiffs still suggest in this Court that our question is “Whether the appellees’ contacts with government are suf ficient to place them under the restraints of the Fifth and 1 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961). 6 fourteenth Amendments against racial discrimination.” This may seem to the plaintiffs a more euphemistic inquiry than whether the defendant hospitals are “public corporations” or even “ public corporations in the constitutional sense”—but no amount of euphemism can conceal the ultimate spade. It is the same question still—and it can still be resolved only by the same examination of the “points of contact” of the de fendant hospitals with government which was made in the District Court. The plaintiffs — in the court below — suggested five of these points of contact of the defendant hospitals with gov ernment/ All were examined carefully and debated fully; it was determined that each was insignificant in itself, and that the whole was no greater than the sum of the parts; and Judge Stanley therefore determined that the defendant hospitals were not “ instrumentalities of government in the constitu tional sense” and are not “ subject to the inhibitions of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution” (221a). These points of contact we are now here to debate once again. (1) The method of selecting the Trustees of the Moses Cone Hospital does not affect the private character of that corporation. The history of the Moses Cone Hospital and its Board of Trustees appears fully in our record and is summarized care fully by Judge Stanley in his opinion (198a), and we shall not belabor it here. The hospital was originally incorporated in 1911 as a private corporation under the general corporation laws of North Carolina. There were ten original incorpora tors, all of whom were private citizens and four of whom were members of the Cone family, and these ten incorporators were named as the first Board of Trustees of the corporation. The 2 2 All five apply to Moses Cone Hospital; only three of them apply to Wesley Long. 7 corporation was subsequently granted a legislative charter by a Private Act of the North Carolina General Assembly3 which ‘'fully ratified, approved, and confirmed” the original Articles of Incorporation. The charter of the hospital provided for a Board of Trus tees of fifteen members, three to be named by the Governor of North Carolina, one by the City Council of the City of Greensboro, one by the Board of Commissioners of the County of Guilford, one by the Guilford County Medical Society, and one by the Board of Commissioners of the County of Watauga. The charter then provided that Mrs. Bertha L. Cone (Mrs. Moses H. Cone), who was the founder and principal benefactor of the corporation, should have the power to appoint the remaining eight trustees so long as she might live; and that after her death or earlier if she should renounce her right to appoint, the eight trustees originally appointed by her should perpetuate themselves by the elec tion of the Board of Trustees (199a). Mrs. Bertha L. Cone died in 1947, and the charter of the corporation was amended in 1961 to eliminate the appoint ment of one trustee by the Board of Commissioners of the County of Watauga. The eight trustees originally appointed by Mrs. Cone and the one trustee originally appointed by Watauga County, or a total of nine members of the fifteen- member Board, are now to be perpetuated through the elec tion of the Board of Trustees (199a). The trustees appointed by public officials or agencies have always been a minority of the trustees of the corporation (199a) . There is no allegation or evidence whatever in our record that any of the appointors of the Moses Cone trustees have ever attempted to instruct or control their appointees as trustees, or to exert any control over the corporation through those appointees; or to indicate that the appointors have ever 3 Chapter 400, Private Laws of North Carolina, Session of 1913 ( 32a). 8 done anything more than to appoint distinguished private citi zens — “ eminent and respectable individuals” — to serve the corporation (cf. 208a). The plaintiffs have advanced the theory that because six members of the Moses Cone Hospital’s fifteen-member Board of Trustees are named by public officials or agencies to serve the private corporation, this somehow affects the private char acter of the corporation. It is certainly not a new suggestion; it was made in 1819 in the Dartmouth College case,4 and per haps even then not for the first time. Dartmouth College was originally incorporated under a crown charter from George III dated December 13, 1769; and this original charter provided for twelve trustees, to be self-perpetuating. The original twelve trustees were all named in the charter by the crown, and among them were the Governor of the Province of New Hampshire, the President and two members of the Council of the Province, the Speaker of the House of Representatives in the Province, and “one of the assistants of our colony of Connecticut.” It was obviously suggested there — as here — that because the trustees were appointed by public authority the corpora tion therefore became public, and Chief Justice Marshall said: “ It has been urged repeatedly, and certainly with a de gree of earnestness which attracted attention, that the trustees deriving their power from a regal source, must necessarily partake of the spirit of their origin; * * * . The first trustees were undoubtedly named in the charter by the crown; but at whose suggestion were they named? By whom were they selected? The charter informs us. Dr. Wheelock had represented 'that, for many weighty rea sons, it would be expedient that the gentlemen whom he 4 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 9 had already nominated in his last will, to be trustees in America, should be trustees of the corporation now pro posed.' When, afterwards, the trustees are named in the charter, can it be doubted that the persons mentioned by Dr. Wheelock in his will were appointed? Some were probably added by the crown, with the approbation of Dr. Wheelock. Among these is the doctor himself. If any others were appointed at the instance of the crown, they are the governor, three members of the council, and the speaker of the house of representatives of the colony of New Hampshire. * * * The original trustees, then, or most of them, were named by Dr. Wheelock, and those who were added to his nomination, most probably with his approbation, were among the most eminent and re spectable individuals in New Hampshire.” 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518,648-9. It was held — in the Dartmouth College case in 1819 — that all of the trustees appointed by the crown were private trustees, and that neither their appointment by the crown nor the public offices held by half of their number affected the privacy of the corporation which they served as trustees. Mr. Justice Story, in a full discussion, then went on to formu late the classic distinction between public and private corpo rations: “Another division of corporations is into public and private. Public corporations are generally esteemed such as exist for public political purposes only, such as towns, cities, parishes, and counties; and in many respects they are so, although they involve some private interests; but strictly speaking, public corporations are such only as are founded by the government for public purposes, where the whole interests belong also to the government. If, there fore, the foundation be private, though under the charter of the government, the corporation is private, however ex 10 tensive the uses may be to which it is devoted, either by the bounty of the founder or the nature and objects of the institution.” 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 668. # # # “This reasoning applies in its full force to eleemosy nary corporations. A hospital founded by a private bene factor is, in point of law, a private corporation, although dedicated by its charter to general charity.” 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518,669. $ * * “When, then, the argument assumes, that because the charity is public the corporation is public, it manifestly confounds the popular with the strictly legal sense of the terms. * * * When the corporation is said at the bar to be public, it is not merely meant that the whole community may be the proper objects of the bounty, but that the gov ernment have the sole right, as trustees of the public interests, to regulate, control, and direct the corporation, and its funds and its franchises, at its own good will and pleasure.” 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 671. (Emphasis added.) It is as true today as it was in 1819 that trustees appointed by public agencies to serve a private corporation, as in our present case, do not thereby become public officials — any more than did the trustees of Dartmouth College because they were appointed by the crown. “To make a corporation public, its managers, trustees, or directors must be not only appointed by public authority but subject to its control. I understand this to be the well established general law result ing from both federal and state decisions.” Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451, 458 (D. C. Md. 1948). And even if these trustees did become public representatives in any sense by virtue of their appointments, 11 they have always been and still are in the minority here; and the Moses Cone Hospital therefore clearly remains — as the District Court found — a private corporation decisively con trolled by its private trustees who constitute (and have al ways constituted) a clear majority of its Board of Trustees. In Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memo rial Hospital/ the James Walker Memorial Hospital was origi nally chartered by the General Assembly of North Carolina; and its original Board of Managers consisted of nine persons, three of whom were elected by the Board of Commissioners of New Hanover County and two by the Board of Aldermen of the City of Wilmington, and only four of whom were selected by Mr. James Walker. The Board of Managers was self-per petuating, and at the time the action was instituted, none of the original managers was still on the Board. The action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the James Walker Memorial Hospital was a private corporation, and that the acts of discrimination complained of therefore did not constitute State action; and this Court affirmed the District Court decision saying “The plaintiffs rightfully confine their effort on this appeal to showing that the hospital is an instru mentality of the State. . . . We may not interfere unless there is State action which offends the Federal Constitution. From this viewpoint we find no error in the decision of the District Court for the facts clearly show that when the present suit was brought, and for years before, the hospital was not an in strumentality of the State but a corporation managed and operated by an independent board free from State control.” 261 F. 2d 521, 525. In our present case, no more than a minority of the Moses Cone Hospital trustees have ever been appointed by public authority. In the Eaton case, a majority of the original 5 5 164 F. Supp. 191 (E.D .N.C. 1958), affd ., 261 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert, denied, 359 U. S. 984 (1959). 12 Board of Managers was appointed by public authority. In the Dartmouth College case decided in 1819, as we have seen, all of the original trustees were appointed by public authority; and lest this be thought to represent an archaic position, in the Girard College case, not ultimately disposed of until 1958, all of the trustees were again appointed by public authority. The plaintiffs have persistently cited the original Supreme Court decision in the Girard College case,6 and have persist ently ignored the subsequent history of that case; but this en tire history is detailed by Judge Soper in his opinion in the Eaton case, and the Girard College case shows unmistakably that the mere appointment of trustees by public authority does not affect the character of a private corporation or agency. The United States Supreme Court decision in the Girard College case in 1957 was based — in Judge Soper’s words — “ only on the ground that the managing board then in control of the college had been constituted an agency of the State by the enabling act and was therefore subject to the Fourteenth Amendment; but . . . the new board thereafter set up by the Orphans’ Court of Philadelphia, being composed of private citizens, was not a State agency and was therefore free to carry out the terms of the Girard will. . . . The court (i.e., the Su preme Court of Pennsylvania) also held that the removal of the old and the substitution of new trustees by the court did not constitute State action within the scope of the Amend ment; and it rejected the theory that State action is inherent in charitable trusts generally even if they are not administered by an agency of the State. We find no decision to the con trary.” 261 F. 2d 521, 526. Judge Stanley decided in our present case — as Mr. Justice Story did in the Dartmouth College case — that the pertinent factor is not who appoints the trustees but who controls the corporation; and he refused to draw any inference from the 6 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of City of Philadelphia, 353 U. S. 230 (1957). 13 mere fact that a minority of the Moses Cone Hospital’s pri vate trustees are appointed by public agencies to serve the private corporation. He then concluded that “The entire rec ord makes it quite clear that the Cone Hospital, originally chartered as a private corporation, is subject to no control by any public authority, and that the appointment of the minor ity members of its trustees by public officers and agencies has in no way changed the private character of its business” (208a) . The defendants submit that this conclusion is un assailable. (2) The ad valorem tax exemptions of the two hospitals do not affect their character as private corporations. The plaintiffs asserted in the District Court — and the de fendants agreed — that the two hospitals are exempt from ad valorem taxes assessed by the City of Greensboro and the County of Guilford, North Carolina. No authority was cited for the proposition that these tax exemptions in any way affect the private character of the defendant hospitals, and the Dis trict Court quite properly refused to draw any inference from the fact. It is common knowledge that virtually all charitable organizations are given tax exemptions — not only from mu nicipal and county ad valorem taxes but from state and fed eral taxes as well — and it can hardly be contended that all such charitable organizations thereby become governmental agencies. The defendant hospitals point out that the sugges tion is refuted, at least by implication since it was necessarily involved, in virtually all of the cases where public charities have been held to be private corporations. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, supra; Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital, supra; Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, supra; Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metro politan Police, D. C., 157 F. Supp. 101 (D* C. D. C. 1957). 14 The plaintiffs imply (they actually said in the court be low) that tax exemption was a factor in the Burton case/ but this clearly puts the cart before the horse. The Supreme Court in the Burton case did point out that “ the fee is held by a tax- exempt government agency” ; but it was unmistakably clear that the agency was tax-exempt because it was a government agency, and not — as the plaintiffs would have it here — that it was a government agency because it was tax-exempt. The District Court in Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropoli tan Police, D. C., supra, 108, said, with some feeling, that “ If each time a government lends its assistance to a private institu tion it were to acquire that institution as an arm of govern ment, then government would indeed become a many armed thing” ; and if the “assistance” referred to by the Court were to include not only direct assistance but also the indirect en couragement afforded by relief from the burdens of taxation, then government at all levels would indeed become a monster even more monstrous than the “many armed thing” feared by the Court. (3) The licensure of the two hospitals by the State of North Carolina does not make them agencies of the State. The plaintiffs asserted in the court below that the two de fendant hospitals are required to be licensed by the State of North Carolina pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, Section 131-126.3; and that these licenses are obtained by application to the North Carolina Medical Care Commission under Section 131-126.4. The District Court found, however, that every hospital in the State of North Carolina is required to secure such a license from the State through the Medical Care Commission (201 a) ;8 and it is quite obvious that if such 7 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961). See Plain tiffs’ Brief, p. 23. 8 See also the affidavit of William F. Henderson, Executive Secretary of the North Carolina Medical Care Commission, Appellees’ Appendix p. laa. 15 a license were sufficient to constitute a hospital a government al agency, there could not be any such thing as a private hos pital in the State of North Carolina. These two sections of the North Carolina General Statutes are short, and read as follows: “ 131-126.3. Licensure. After July 1st, 1947, no person or governmental unit, acting severally or jointly with any other person or governmental unit shall establish, conduct or maintain a hospital in this State without a license. (1947, c. 933, s. 6.) ” “ 131-126.4. Application for license. Licenses shall be obtained from the Commission. Applications shall be up on such forms and shall contain such information as the said Commission may reasonably require, which may in clude affirmative evidence of ability to comply with such reasonable standards, rules and regulations as may be law fully prescribed hereunder. (1947, c. 933, s. 6; 1949, c. 920, s. 3.) ” It is apparent that these are regulatory sections, and that the phrase “no person or governmental unit” becomes mean ingless if a “person” becomes a “governmental unit” through the mere fact of licensure; and it has been clearly established in this Court that the mere act of the State in licensing a private institution to carry' on its private operations cannot cause that private institution to become a govern mental agency. Williams v. Howard Johnson’s Restaurant, 268 F. 2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959). “The essence of the argument is that the state licenses restaurants to serve the public and thereby is burdened with the positive duty to prohibit unjust discrimination in the use and enjoyment of the facilities. This argument fails to observe the important distinc tion between activities that are required by the state and 16 those which are carried out by voluntary choice and with out compulsion by the people of the state in accordance with their own desires and social practices. Unless these actions are performed in obedience to some positive provi sion of state law they do not furnish a basis for the pend ing complaint. The license laws of Virginia do not fill the void. Section 35-26 of the Code of Virginia, 1950, makes it unlawful for any person to operate a restaurant in the state without an unrevoked permit from the Commission er, who is the chief executive officer of the State Board of Health. The statute is obviously designed to protect the health of the community but it does not authorize state officials to control the management of the business or to dictate what persons shall be served.” Williams v. Howard Johnson’s Restaurant, supra, 847. Many if not most of the activities of the individual are subject to regulation by government in this modern era, but the State does not thereby adopt, or attempt to control, all of the activities of the individual performed within the scope of the license granted. The doctors and dentists who are plain tiffs in this case, and the lawyers who represent them, are all required to be licensed by the State (N. C. Gen. Stats. 90-18, 90-29, 84-4); and every automobile in North Carolina is re quired to bear, and every driver to carry, a license from the State (N.C.G.S. 20-50, 20-7). These are mere permits, how ever, and not franchises, and they are available to all who wish to and can qualify. It could hardly be contended that every such individual, by virtue of his license, is constituted an agent of the State performing governmental functions in exercising his permit; and it is difficult to see how any of these situations differs substantially from licensing a restaurant or a hospital. It is true that no one may engage in these activities unless he meets certain standards and secures a license from the State, but the suggested inference “ fails to observe” that no one is 17 required to practice medicine, or dentistry, or law, or to drive a car, or to operate a restaurant or a hospital, but that all of these are activities “which are carried out by voluntary choice and without compulsion by the people of the State in accord ance with their own desires and social practices.” It is quite clear that licensing a restaurant does not con stitute State action. Williams v. Howard Johnsons Restau rant, supra. It is equally clear that licensing a hospital does not constitute State action. Eaton v. Board of Managers of James W alker Memorial Hospital, supra. (4) The nursing programs at the Moses Cone Hospital do not affect the private character of that corporation. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the Moses Cone Hospital conducts training and is regularly used as a place of training for student nurses from the Woman’s Col lege of the University of North Carolina and the Agricultural & Technical College of North Carolina, both of which are tax- supported public institutions under the laws of the State of North Carolina; and that in the course of this training “ these student nurses substantially contribute, without charge to the hospital, valuable nursing services for which it would other wise pay substantial sums” (12a). The implication and the argument was that this constituted a contribution by the State to the Moses Cone Hospital. The Moses Cone Hospital then demonstrated that it does not receive any such contribution from the student programs, but that on the contrary it has contributed very substantially of its funds and its facilities to the furtherance of these two educational programs (55a, 181a, 184a, 204a). The plaintiffs then reversed their field, and argued that because the Moses Cone Hospital assists the State in this way, it somehow be comes an instrumentality of the State — doing the work of the State in the place of the State. It was to this position that 18 Judge Stanley directed his attention, and it can fairly be said that he did not have any difficulty with it (212-13a). If con tribution by the State does not constitute the recipient an in strumentality of government — and the United States con cedes that it does not (U. S. Brief, p. 19) — it can hardly be contended that contribution to the State would make the donor an instrumentality of government. We are now back to midfield before this Court — and these nursing educational programs are no longer urged either as a contribution by the State or as a contribution to the State, but instead now constitute a “ joint endeavor” by the hospital and the State (Plaintiffs’ Brief, p. 36). It is truly a moving target, but the entire arc of this pendulum of argument ig nores the fact that both nursing programs are wholly volun tary on both sides — between the Colleges on the one hand and the Moses Cone Hospital on the other. The hospital has no obligation to either of the Colleges except that which it has voluntarily assumed; and each College uses the facilities of the hospital to the extent, and only to the extent, that the hospital has voluntarily agreed it may use them. Neither Col lege in any way controls or directs the policies or the opera tions of the hospital; and the hospital, on the other hand, does not in any way control or direct any facet of these nursing educational programs (212-13a). It seems perfectly clear that the Woman’s College of the University of North Carolina and the Agricultural & Techni cal College of North Carolina are agencies of the State, and that their nursing educational programs are State activities. But those activities are completely controlled by the Colleges — the State has not “ delegated” or “ authorized” or “ acqui esced in” the exercise of its educational function by the Moses Cone Hospital (See Plaintiffs’ Brief, p. 22, n. 30) — and it hardly seems reasonable to suggest that because the hospital permits a portion of those activities to be carried on under the 19 control of the Colleges in its facilities, or that because the hos pital contributes funds to the furtherance of those activities, it thereby becomes an agency of the State. (5) The grants of Hill-Burton funds to the two hospitals do not make them instrumentalities either of the Federal government or of the State. The Moses Cone Hospital and the Wesley Long Hospital have both received Federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act9 in aid of their construction and expansion programs, and these funds were allocated to these hospitals by the North Carolina Medical Care Commission, an agency of the State of North Carolina (213-14a) . Whether the Federal government should contribute funds to a segregated private facility is one question — whether of ethics, of morality, of policy, or simply of politics; and whether the Federal government can constitutionally contribute funds to a segregated private facility — under the Hill-Burton or under any other Act — is another question;10 and both ques tions would appear to be equally irrelevant to our present in quiry. For the appellants in this action do not seek to prevent the contribution of funds under the Hill-Burton Act. They suggest instead that the Hill-Burton Act is unconstitutional, and that because it is, the contribution of funds to a private facility under the Act (even though made and accepted on definite and clearly understood conditions) nonetheless some how infects that facility with a loss of its privacy and private character, and makes it instead an instrumentality of the Fed eral government subject to the inhibitions of the Fifth Amend ment — and because the allocation of Federal funds is made through the Medical Care Commission, makes it an instru mentality of the State as well subject to the inhibitions of the 9 Title 42, United States Code, Sec. 291 et seq. The Attorney General says that it can (U. S. Brief, p. 39).10 20 Fourteenth Amendment. It is quite clear that this is not the law. “ It is well settled that aid given by a government to a private corporation is not enough in itself to change the character of the corporation from private to public.” Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropoli tan Police, D. C., supra, 107. The Attorney General concurs: “Nor do we urge that the receipt of government financial aid is sufficient, without more, to deprive an otherwise private institution of its non-governmental character.” (U. S. Brief, p. 19) . It is equally clear (and particularly in this Circuit) that government control — and not government contribution, whether direct or indirect — is the decisive factor in the deter mination of whether a corporation is public or private. Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hospital, supra; Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, supra; Mitchell v. Boys Club of Metropolitan Police, D. C., supra. The Federal government would indeed be a “ many armed thing” if it acquired every private organization to which it contributes — and it surely cannot be argued that it acquires only those organizations to which it contributes unconstitu tionally, and not those to which it contributes properly. Con tribution by government — whether constitutionally made or improperly made — is contribution still, and nothing more. In the Eaton case, the City of Wilmington and the County of New Flanover had contributed funds to the James Walker Memorial Flospital for many years under State legislation which was subsequently held unconstitutional under the North Carolina Constitution. Thus all of these contributions were unconstitutionally made. But control — and not contri bution — is the decisive factor; and this Court looked to con trol, and held that the James Walker Memorial Hospital “was not an instrumentality of the State but a corporation man aged and operated by an independent board free from State control.” 261 F. 2d 521, 525. 21 The provisions of the Hill-Burton Act have had recent consideration by the Supreme Court of Appeals of the Com monwealth of Virginia in Khoury v. Community Memorial Hospital, Inc., 203 Va. 236, 123 S.E. 2d 533 (1962). The hospital there was a non-stock, non-profit corporation char tered under the laws of Virginia to establish, construct, and maintain a regional hospital, and somewhat more than half of its construction funds had been contributed by the Fed eral government under the Hill-Burton Act, another portion had been contributed by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and the balance had been provided by local subscriptions. The management of the hospital was vested in a self-perpetuating board of trustees. The Virginia Court had these things to say: “We next turn to the question of whether the use of federal and state funds for construction thereby consti tuted the hospital a public corporation. “The distinctions between a public and a private cor poration have been so carefully drawn and so long recog nized that we experience no difficulty in answering the question in the negative.” [The Court then cited, and quoted from, the Dart mouth College case.] “The hospital is not owned by the federal or the state government, albeit federal and state funds may have made its construction possible. It is not an instrumentality of government for the administration of any public duty, al though the service it performs is in the public interest. Its officers are not appointed by and are not representatives of government, notwithstanding that their authority stems from legislative enactments. Under these circumstances, the hospital falls squarely within the time-honored defi nition of a private corporation.” 22 # # # “The hospital was established pursuant to a charter, granted by the Commonwealth, conferring upon its public spirited organizers the right and authority to operate as a private corporation. That charter is a contract between the state and the incorporators. One of the unwritten provisions of that contract is that the trustees of the cor poration shall have the right to conduct its affairs as they might, in their sound discretion, see fit. Inherent in the charter is the understanding that, except as provided by law, the state will not interfere in the corporation’s inter nal affairs.” Control and not contribution is the decisive factor, and the mere contribution of Federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act therefore clearly cannot change the character of a recipi ent from private to public, or constitute that private recipient an agency of the Federal government; and a fortiori the mere fact that the Federal funds were allocated to the private re cipient through a State agency cannot constitute that private recipient an agency of the State. The private corporations clearly remain private despite the contributions, and the Fourteenth and the Fifth Amendments erect no shield against their “ merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. T 13 (1948). (6) Neither the Federal government nor the State exercises any control over the two hospitals through the Hill- Burton Act. The appellants have apparently come to agree—with Judge Stanley and with the decided cases — that control, and not contribution, is the decisive factor in determining whether a corporation is a private one or a public one in the constitu tional sense, for in this Court the Hill-Burton program has now become “ the Hill-Burton hospital system,” a misnomer 23 implying a continuing supervision which the Act itself ex plicitly disclaims. The Hill-Burton Act does not provide for the construction of hospitals by the Federal government or by the States, but simply undertakes “ to assist in the construction of public and other nonprofit hospitals.” 42 U. S. C. Sec. 291 (b ). Yet the appellants are apparently contending that when a private hos pital accepts Hill-Burton funds in aid of its own construction program, it is thereafter assuming to act for the State in “per forming an essential governmental function” (Plaintiff’s Brief, p. 29), and “ that such a non-governmental institution be comes pro tanto a State instrumentality with concomitant obligations” (U. S. Brief, p. 20). This contention, however, ignores the fact that the only logical conclusion to be drawn from these illogical premises is that a private hospital which does not receive any financial aid at all from government, is shouldering the assumed burden “pro even more tanto” — so that under this reasoning, the more private it is, the more public it would become. It is difficult to see why this reasoning should apply to hospitals when it does not apply to other fields which suggest it much more strongly. The State has actually undertaken to provide educational opportunity for its citizens, for example — a true commitment; and it is simply underlining the obvious to point out that Duke University (like Dartmouth College), by its mere existence, lightens the burden of that commitment “ pro tanto.” Yet Duke University (like Dartmouth College) was privately endowed and is privately controlled; it has joined no State “ system” ; and (like Dartmouth College) it is clearly a private institution, and not an instrumentality of government. The Hill-Burton Act, as we have seen, does not require the State to construct hospitals, and while the State may be interested in fostering the development of adequate facilities, 24 it has made no commitment to hospital care as it has to edu cation. A private hospital (like a private college) may be do ing something useful and generally approved whether or not it has received Federal or State funds, but it enjoys no fran chise or monopoly, and it is quite obvious that it is not shoul dering any burden for the State or relieving the State of any legal obligation and that such a private hospital “ is not an in strumentality of government for the administration of any public duty, although the service it performs is in the public interest.” Khoury v. Community Memorial Hospital, Inc., supra, 123 S. E. 2d 533, 538. The Attorney General here does not attack the “ rule” — and the word is his — “ that an otherwise private institution is not subject to the nondiscrimi nation provisions of the Constitution merely because . . . it is generally open to the public” (U. S. Brief, p. 19); and Mr. Justice Story pointed out in 1819 the danger of assuming “ that because the charity is public the corporation is public” and emphasized specifically that “A hospital founded by a pri vate benefactor is, in point of law, a private corporation, although dedicated by its charter to general charity.” Dart mouth College v. Woodward, supra, 671, 669. The popular name of the Hill-Burton Act — given it by the Congress — is the “ Hospital Survey and Construction Act.” The declared purpose of the Act is to assist in the inventory of existing facilities, “ to assist in the construction of public and other nonprofit hospitals,” and to authorize research and experiment for the effective development and utilization of services and facilities (42 U.S.C. 291) ; and it is again appar ent (as in the case of the North Carolina Hospital Licensing Act) that if the assistance rendered a private nonprofit hos pital under the Act makes that hospital a public one, the phrase “public and other nonprofit hospitals” becomes meaningless.11 11 The Attorney General doffs his cap to this suggestion. U. S. Brief, p. 28. 25 If there is a “ Hill-Burton hospital system” — as the ap pellants suggest — it is a truly secret society, for while many “public and other nonprofit hospitals” have applied and quali fied for Hill-Burton funds, no instance is cited where any hos pital has either joined the “ system” or been drafted into it without receiving a grant-in-aid. The parties agreed in the court below — and Judge Stanley found — “ that the Hill- Burton funds received by the defendant hospitals should be considered as unrestricted funds” (214-15a); and it is evident that they were unrestricted except for the minor limitations on and conditions of the grants-in-aid. And we have already seen (and the United States has agreed) that the receipt of gov ernmental aid is not “ sufficient, without more, to deprive an otherwise private institution of its non-governmental charac ter.” (U. S. Brief, p. 19) . The United States has also virtually conceded that the Hill-Burton Act does simply establish a program of grants-in- aid (U. S. Brief, p. 29, and n. 20); and indeed this virtual concession would appear virtually inescapable, for in addition to the portions of legislative history cited by the Attorney General, the following colloquy took place at the hearings on the Bill before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor: “ Senator Taft. Dr. Smelzer, as I understand it, and as the Surgeon General says, there shall be so many dollars, $100,000,000; say $5,000,000 allotted to the State of Ohio, that in Ohio, say, the Federal grant will be 50 per cent, then any private hospital can apply for that grant. Dr. Smelzer. Yes, sir. Senator Taft. And then the Surgeon General may grant that Federal grant directly, we will say, for the en largement of the private hospital, and when that money is gone that is owned by the private hospital, is it not? 26 Dr. Smelzer. Yes, sir. Senator Taft. It is a gift for that particular private hospital. Dr. Smelzer. Yes, sir.” (Hearings before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. 191, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 22). It should be remembered—in considering all of the “ re quirements” of the Hill-Burton Act which are detailed by the appellants — that the Hill-Burton Act does not actually “ re quire” anything of anyone, for no hospital is required to ac cept Hill-Burton funds. The appellants fail—in the words of this Court—“to observe the important distinction between ac tivities that are required by the state and those which are car ried out by voluntary choice and without compulsion by the people of the state in accordance with their own desires and social practices.” Williams v. Howard Johnsons Restaurant, supra, 847. All of the so-called “ requirements” of the Hill- Burton Act are purely and simply “conditions of the grant” to be accepted or rejected voluntarily by a private non-profit hospital. If it wants the money, then the hospital accepts the conditions of the grant; but this is a “voluntary choice” made “without compulsion” and not obedience to mandate; nor is it an abject surrender of privacy, but instead a simple accept ance of agreed conditions in clearly-defined areas of agree ment. It should also be noted that the Hill-Burton Act does not in any way “ authorize” or “ sanction” discrimination, and that it does not say affirmatively to any hospital that it may dis criminate. It does require — as a condition of the grant of Federal funds — that the State plan (if the State wishes to participate) shall provide for adequate hospital facilities “without discrimination.” It further provides that the Sur geon General “ may” by regulation require of any applicant 27 hospital — if such hospital wants a grant of funds — an assur ance that there will be no discrimination; and the Act then provides that under certain circumstances, the Surgeon Gen eral shall waive this assurance of non-discrimination which he was not required to exact from the applicant to begin with. 42 U. S. C. Sec. 291e ( f ) . Nowhere, however, does the Hill-Burton Act “authorize” or “ sanction” or even “affirmatively permit” discrimination. At most, it simply provides that in the stipulated circum stances the assurances of non-discrimination normally exacted as conditions of the grant shall be waived, so that the appli cant under these stipulated circumstances may qualify for Hill-Burton funds without agreeing to any limitations of (and quite obviously without receiving any dispensations to en large) its otherwise lawful conduct in this area. And finally, even when the assurances of non-discrimination are not waived but are exacted as conditions of the grant of funds, those assurances relate wholly and solely to non-discrimination in the admission of patients; the Act does not deal in any way or to any extent (even as a condition of the grant) with the matter of staff admissions. It should be abundantly clear that all of the “ require ments” of the Hill-Burton Act are purely and simply condi tions of the grant of funds, for the Act itself — as the Vir ginia Court in the Khoury case pointed out — expressly dis claims any Federal control over the hospitals to which Federal funds are contributed under the Act. Title 42, United States Code, Section 291m provides as follows: “ 291m. State control of agencies Except as otherwise specifically provided, nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as conferring on any Federal officer or employee the right to exercise any super vision or control over the administration, personnel, main- 2 8 tenance, or operation of any hospital, diagnostic or treat ment center, rehabilitation facility, or nursing home with respect to which any funds have been or may be expended under this subchapter.” The appellants have apparently had some difficulty with Section 291m, which they have attempted to alleviate by suggesting here that the Federal government does exercise control but does so through the State agency. This sugges tion, however, ignores the fact established in the court below that The North Carolina Medical Care Commission (which is the relevant agency of the State) disclaims any authority, and makes no attempt, to exercise any supervision or control over the administration, personnel, maintenance, or operation of any hospital licensed by it under the North Carolina Hos pital Licensing Act, whether such hospital has received or has not received Hill-Burton funds; and that the Attorney Gen eral of the State of North Carolina has ruled that The North Carolina Medical Care Commission has no such authority.12 Judge Stanley concluded below that “no state or federal agency has the right to exercise any supervision or control over the operation of either hospital by virtue of their use of Hill-Burton funds, other than factors relating to the sound construction and equipment of the facilities, and inspections to insure the maintenance of proper health standards.” (217a). In the face of Section 291m and the unequivocal position of The North Carolina Medical Care Commission and the Attor ney General of the State of North Carolina, it is difficult to see how this conclusion can be challenged. ;(7) The whole is no greater than the sum of the parts The defendants did contend in the court below that each 12 See the affidavit of William F„ Henderson, Executive Secretary of The North Carolina Medical Care Commission, and the Opinion of the Attorney Gen eral of the State of North Carolina dated 10 February 1962 and filed below with that affidavit, both of which are printed herewith, Appendix, p. laa. It may be significant that in printing their voluminous appendix of 225 pages, the appellants omitted to bring forward these particular documents. 2 9 of these points of contact of the two hospitals with govern ment which were suggested by the plaintiffs is insignificant in itself — and that the whole could be no greater than the sum of the parts (218a). The plaintiffs, on the other hand, seemed to feel that some magic in the phrase “ totality of govern mental involvement” could abrogate both mathematics and common sense so that five times zero would equal five and not zero; and as Judge Stanley indicated, they cut this wand from the Burton case (217a) .13 It might be pointed out initially that the points of con tact in the Burton case were far more numerous and far more substantial than anything which has even been suggested here —the restaurant in Burton, simply for a starter, was a lessee in a building owned, operated, heated, and structurally main tained by the Wilmington Parking Authority, a tax-exempt government agency — and Judge Gewin’s careful analysis of the Burton case in his dissenting opinion in Hampton v. City of Jacksonville1,1 makes this abundantly clear, by weight and by measure. But it is hardly necessary to sift these points of contact straw by straw, for the Burton case, by its own defini tion, is purely and simply a leasing case, a recognized category of cases adverted to by Judge Stanley below (217-18a), by the Attorney General here (U. S. Brief, p. 17, n. 10), and by Mr. Justice Clark for the majority (there were three dissents) in the case itself when he carefully limited his holding to the specific facts of the case: “ Because readily applicable formulae may not be fash ioned, the conclusions drawn from the facts and circum stances of this record are by no means declared as uni versal truths on the basis of which every state leasing agreement is to be tested. * * * Specifically defining the limits of our inquiry, what we hold today is that when a 13 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961). 14 304 F. 2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. den. sub nom. Ghioto v. Hampton, 9 L. Ed. 2d 170. 3 0 State leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to have been the case here, the proscrip tions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with by the lessee as certainly as though they were bind ing covenants written into the agreement itself.” Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715, 725-6 (1961). Compare Harrison v. Murphy, 205 F. Supp. 449 (D. C. Del. 1962). The plaintiffs also now rely in this Court on Hampton v. City of Jacksonville which found State action where two city- owned golf courses were conveyed to purchasers subject to a possibility of reverter if the properties were not forever used as golf courses. Judge Gewin wrote a strong and well-reasoned dissent: Judge Jones concurred specially on the sole ground that the reverter clause was calculated and “ intended” by the City to effect discrimination; and the case therefore rests on Chief Judge Tuttle’s theory that a possibility of reverter as sures “ complete present control.” 304 F. 2d 320, 322. This position not only deliberately refuses to accept the holding of the Eaton case — which has flatly ruled on the same problem in this Circuit — but (as Judge Gewin points out) also ignores the reasoning of that case. In the Eaton case, Judge Gilliam pointed out in the District Court that “The only way the City and County can claim an interest in the property or any con trol over the property would be in the event that the hospital ceased to be used for the care of the sick and afflicted of New Hanover County. The purpose and effect of the deed is to carry out the intent of the charter to create a public charity but not a public corporation. The City and County may eventually regain the property, but this possibility is distinctly within the control of the hospital corporation. Only the latter possesses initiative with regard to the same” 164 F. Supp. 191, 197; and this Court approved that reasoning, and found that the hospital was “ free from State control.” 31 The defendants submit that reason lies with Eaton, and that a possibility of reverter is far from tantamount to “com plete present control” ; but in any event, it is evident that the problem does not exist in our present case and that neither the Burton case nor the Hampton case is analogous, for the Moses Cone Hospital does not lease from the State and the State has no possibility of reverter in its property. Instead — as Judge Stanley found — “The Cone Hospital owns, and has owned since 1911, the fee simple title to the real property on which its hospital is located. Its Board of Trustees has the ex clusive power and control over all real and personal property of the corporation, and all the institutional services and activi ties of the hospital” (200a). The plaintiffs suggest that the right of the United States to recover its Hill-Burton contribution if within twenty years after the completion of construction the owner of the facility shall cease to be “non-profit” (or if the facility shall be trans ferred to an unqualified transferee) is similar to a possibility of reverter; but this is remoteness compounded. Reversion takes effect by operation of law; these provisions merely con fer a right which may or may not be enforced. Under a pos sibility of reverter, the property itself reverts; the right pro vided here is for a monetary recovery, and there is no provi sion for the recovery of any interest in the facility itself. It seems apparent that this right of recovery is simply another condition of the grant of funds, but even a possibility of re verter is not tantamount to “complete present control” ; and this right of recovery in any event is at least one step further removed, for it is clearly not tantamount to a possibility of reverter. This case has been argued differently, of course, but ex cept for the “power and prestige” of the Attorney General and the voluntary cooperation of the Moses Cone Hospital in the nursing educational programs of the two colleges, there is 32 no single point of contact here which is not to be found in the Eaton case, (including Federal money); and conversely and to put this case well within the Eaton case, there were a number of additional contacts in Eaton which are not to be found here (e.g., the possibility of reverter, the City and County contributions, and the majority of the Board of Man agers) . It is submitted that the Eaton case does control our present case; that its reasoning is still wholly valid; and that — on precedent and on reason — it requires the affirmance of the District Court. (8) In reference to the position of the American Civil Liber ties Union Discrimination by private persons is not itself violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is therefore difficult to credit as a serious one the suggestion that the mere omission of the State to make illegal this permissible conduct is violative of the same Fourteenth Amendment — that all under the one amendment the State commits a crime in failing to make a crime of that which is admittedly not a crime. (9) In reference to the two individual defendants The plaintiffs did not allege any specific grievances against the two individual defendants, or request any specific relief against them. It is difficult to see why they were joined in this action at all, but it is apparent in any event that they were joined in their respective capacities as Director and as Admin istrator of the two hospitals; that their involvement is wholly derivative; and that they are even more clearly behind the shield which protects the two private corporations in this ac tion from any offense against constitutional guarantees through their purely private actions. If a corporation is a pri vate one, and not an instrumentality of government, either State or Federal, it follows inevitably that an individual act ing for that private corporation—and once removed—cannot 33 be an agent of government, either State or Federal, in so act ing; and that the Fourteenth and the Fifth Amendments “erect no shield against (his) merely private conduct.” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1948); Watkins v. Oak- lawn Jockey Club, 183 F. 2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950). III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS OF THE HILL-BURTON ACT IS IRRELE VANT AND IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT IN THIS ACTION. The plaintiffs asserted in the court below that the so-called “ separate but equal exception” of Section 291e (f) of the Hill- Burton Act is unconstitutional. The Attorney General of the United States intervened in the action, and said that he too thought these provisions were unconstitutional. The defend ants have always maintained that the constitutionality of these provisions is completely and wholly irrelevant in this action; and Judge Stanley agreed that the question of con stitutionality is not an issue in this case (220a). It is true, as the plaintiffs note (Plaintiffs’ Brief, p. 40, n. 53), that the defendants do not rely on the separate but equal provisions of the Plill-Burton Act to excuse their conduct — not because such an argument is preposterous (even if it is preposterous) but simply because it is irrelevant. The defend ant hospitals do agree, however, that if they were public cor porations in the constitutional sense — or if one prefers, if their contacts with government were such that they were sub ject to the constitutional amendments — it would be prepos terous to suggest that the provisions of the Hill-Burton Act or of the Surgeon General’s regulations could possibly excuse un constitutional conduct on their part; but this merely empha sizes again the entire irrelevance of the question of the con stitutionality of the Hill-Burton provisions. The defendants have pointed out again and again that the 3 4 significant question — and the only significant question — in this case is whether these defendant hospitals are govern mental instrumentalities or private corporations. If they are instrumentalities of government, then they are subject to the constitutional amendments and discrimination is unlawful under those amendments; and the provisions of the Hill- Burton Act can neither authorize nor excuse violations of the constitutional amendments. But if these hospitals are private corporations, they are not subject to the amendments; the Federal courts do not even have jurisdiction to consider the matter of discrimination; and the defendant hospitals need no charter, no license, and no apology, or if you will, no “ authori zation,” no “ sanction,” and no “permission” — whether from the provisions of the Hill-Burton Act or from any other source — for their purely private conduct. Either way, how ever, public or private, the constitutionality or unconstitu tionality of the Hill-Burton provisions cannot possibly affect the result, and it is therefore quite apparent that the consti tutionality of these provisions is not relevant in the present action or before this Court for consideration. The defend ants cannot concede (since the issue is not involved), but would be entirely willing to assume for the purposes of argu ment, that the challenged provisions of the Hill-Burton Act are unconstitutional. It is an assumption of no moment, for the defendant hospitals are private corporations still and their conduct is private conduct, and the constitutional amend ments “ erect no shield against merely private conduct.” The Hill-Burton contracts between the Federal govern ment and these two private hospitals are executed contracts; and the only significance of the separate but equal provisions of the Hill-Burton Act in our present case is to establish that these private hospitals — in accepting Hill-Burton funds — did not agree to any limitations on their lawful private con duct in this area, but that on the contrary, they had an express 35 understanding with the Federal government when they ac cepted the funds that they would retain their private charac ter and their freedom of action in the precise area which is under challenge here. The United States has said (in its brief, at page 41) that “ It was the underlying federal statute (the Hill-Burton Act) which unquestionably led to the North Carolina program of hospital construction and which instigated the discrimina tions which this action seeks to enjoin.” This is a sweeping and wholly implausible generalization. It does not appear in our record, for it did not appear relevant until we began to speculate about instigation, but it is a matter of ascertainable fact that at the last annual audit report at September 30, 1962, the Moses Cone Hospital trust fund (which was estab lished wholly through private endowment except for the Hill- Burton contribution) showed total assets of $14,242,594. These assets, at this value, included the hospital land at a value of $1.00; buildings and other physical assets at depreci ated cost (the accumulated reserve for depreciation of physi cal assets of $2,039,327 already greatly exceeded the total Federal contribution of $1,269,950 under the Hill-Burton A ct); and 492,025 shares of the common stock of Cone Mills Corporation at a nominal total value of $3.00 — the current market value of the stock is approximately $12,00 per share. The Federal government is concededly a larger operation than the Moses Cone Hospital trust, but it is nonetheless quite obvious that the trust fund was entirely adequate and clearly charged with the obligation to build and operate the hospital in accordance with the purposes of the trust — regardless of aid or “ instigation” from the “ underlying federal statute.” It is therefore something less than plausible to suppose — if we are to indulge, with the Attorney General, in supposition — that the Moses Cone Hospital would have accepted the rela tively minor Federal contribution to its construction funds if 3 6 its Trustees had for a moment suspected that in doing so, they were surrendering any degree of control over the affairs of the hospital to the Federal government, and not simply agreeing (as conditions of the grant of Federal funds) to meet the cor ridor widths and other construction requirements under the Hill-Burton Act which would presumably have been met or exceeded in any event in any modern hospital. The conditions of the grants of Hill-Burton funds were clearly defined by the Act and by the regulations of the Sur geon General pursuant thereto, and it was explicitly stated in the Act itself (Section 291m) that the Federal government would not attempt to exercise any supervision or control over the operations of the hospitals but that they might pursue their lawful private ends in accordance with their own desires and social practices; and this explicit understanding would certainly appear to constitute a tacit recognition that these recipients did not waive their privacy in accepting Hill-Burton funds. It should be emphasized that the plaintiffs and the Attorney General are not asking this Court simply to declare that the Federal government may not constitutionally give funds to a segregated private facility. They are asking a great deal more than this. They are asking this Court now to de segregate all those private facilities to which Federal funds have been given — over a period of years — under the Hill- Burton Act, even though those funds were given on the con dition and with the understanding that those private facilities might retain their freedom to conduct their private affairs in their own way. It is important to notice that this action does not even seek to bar further Hill-Burton contributions to these two hospitals on the conditions provided by the Act; it seeks instead to change the conditions of the grants already made. Where a public facility receives public funds, we might feel that since Government has continuing control of the public facility, it 3 7 is not unreasonable that it should change the conditions of the grant just as it might change the operations of the facility. But where Government gives funds to a private facility — in Senator i aft s words a gift for that particular private hos pital” — with an express understanding that the private facil ity shall retain its privacy in a particular area, it is difficult to accept the suggestion that Government may thereafter invade the privacy of that facility, and change its character over its protest, in the precise area of understanding. If the Federal government may not constitutionally contribute funds to a segregated private facility, then it can presumably be stopped from making further contributions on those conditions; but that would certainly seem to be the way to go. "To emascu late ancient rules which have guided the Judiciary through its long history solely for the purpose of achieving a particular result, is to set the judicial ship afloat in troublesome waters without chart, compass or rudder.” Judge Gewin dissenting in Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F. 2d 320 331 (1962). CO NCLU SIO N The defendants have pointed out that this case is con trolled, in its every facet, by well-established principles of law, and they have cited chapter and verse to document that thesis. No one would argue that the law, simply because it is well settled, can never be changed, but it might well be argued that where the law is well settled, change should be a legisla tive rather than a judicial process and application should be prospective rather than retroactive. Yet this Court in this case is asked to write new law, not in an open or unsettled area, but in defiance of established principles unshaken from Dartmouth College in 1819 through Khoury in 1962; it is asked to write this new law judicially in flat contravention of the expressed legislative will of the Congress; and it is asked not only to write this new law, but to apply it retroactively to 3 8 alter existing rights widely held under the well-settled prior law. The defendants submit that precedent is both clear and sound, and that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, H e r b e r t S. F a l k C h a r l e s E. R o t h 319 Southeastern Building Greensboro, North Carolina Attorneys for the Defendants The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and Harold Bettis, its Director Appendix IND EX TO APPENDIX Page Affidavit of William F. Henderson------------------------- laa Exhibit A to Affidavit--------------------------------------- 4aa (Filed: June 8, 1962) W ILLIAM F. HENDERSON, being duly sworn, says: (1) That he is the Executive Secretary of The North Carolina Medical Care Commission, and that he has held that position since March, 1958; (2) That every hospital (as defined in N.C.G.S. 131- 126.1) in North Carolina is required by law to obtain a license to operate from The North Carolina Medical Care Commis sion; that the requirements for such licensing are set forth in the North Carolina Hospital Licensing Act (Article 13A of Chapter 131 of the General Statutes of North Carolina), and in the rules and regulations of The North Carolina Medical Care Commission established thereunder; and that these re quirements for licensing are applied — equally and alike and without any distinction whatsoever — to all hospitals in the State of North Carolina, public or private, profit or non profit, and whether or not such hospitals have received or have not received Hill-Burton funds; (3) That the purpose of the North Carolina Hospital Licensing Act as set forth in N.C.G.S. 131-126.2 is “ to pro vide for the development, establishment and enforcement of basic standards: (1) For the care and treatment of individuals in hospitals and (2) For the construction, maintenance and operation of such hospitals, which, in the light of existing knowledge, will insure safe and adequate treatment of such individuals in hospitals” ; that The North Carolina Medical Care Commission requires compliance with the standards es tablished by it under the Hospital Licensing Act before it will license a hospital to operate in North Carolina, but the Rules and Regulations for Hospital Licensure in North Carolina prescribed by The North Carolina Medical Care Commission Affidavit of William F. Henderson laa under the authority of the Hospital Licensing Act (and par ticularly N.C.G.S. 131-126.7) expressly require that “The gov erning board” of each hospital “ shall be the supreme author ity in the hospital to which the administrator, the medical staff, the personnel, and all auxiliary organizations are directly or indirectly responsible” ; and that The North Carolina Medi cal Care Commission has no authority, and does not attempt, to exercise any supervision or control over the administration, personnel, maintenance, or operation of any hospital licensed by it under the North Carolina Hospital Licensing Act, whether such hospital has received or has not received Hill- Burton funds; (4) That he is familiar with The Moses H. Cone Memo rial Hospital and the Wesley Long Community Hospital, both of which are located in Greensboro, North Carolina; that li censes to operate have been issued to both of these hospitals by The North Carolina Medical Care Commission under the North Carolina Hospital Licensing Act; but that The North Carolina Medical Care Commission has no authority, and does not attempt, to exercise any supervision or control over the administration, personnel, maintenance, or operation of either of these hospitals; (5) That The North Carolina Medical Care Commission has recently requested the advice of the Attorney General of the State of North Carolina as to its powers and authority; that on the 10th day of February, 1962, the Attorney Gen eral of the State of North Carolina rendered a written opinion to the North Carolina Medical Care Commission stating that the said Commission has no power or authority under the laws of North Carolina (including the Hospital Licensing Act) to interfere with or control in any manner the selection of the personnel on the medical staff or any of the operational proce dures of a local hospital, or to control anything pertaining to the internal operation of a local hospital, and “has no legal 2 a a authority and cannot impose, as a condition of Federal and State assistance, any requirements whatsoever relating to the selection of personnel and professional staff” and “ may not require guarantees by applicant hospitals that physicians of all races will be granted privileges to practice within such local hospitals” ; that there is attached hereto as Exhibit A, and made a part of this affidavit, a copy of the said opinion dated 10 February 1962 rendered by the Attorney General of North Carolina to The North Carolina Medical Care Commission; and that this opinion of the Attorney General has been ac cepted by The North Carolina Medical Care Commission as a definition of its powers and authority under North Caro lina law. This the 30th day of May, 1962. W i l l i a m F. H e n d e r s o n Executive Secretary, The North Carolina Medical Care Commission Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of May, 1962. Kathryn W. Hughes Notary Public My commission expires 7-31-63. 3 a a STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e P. O. Box 629 Raleigh 10 February 1962 Honorable William F. Henderson Executive Secretary Medical Care Commission Box 9594 Raleigh, North Carolina Dear Mr. Henderson: You call my attention to Sec. 635 of Title VI of the Pub lic Health Service Act, which is commonly referred to as the Hill-Burton Act. This section, which also appears as 42 USCA 291m, states in substance that no Federal officer or employee shall have the right to exercise any supervision or control over the administration, personnel, maintenance, or operation of any hospital, diagnostic or treatment center, rehabilitation facil ity, or nursing home with respect to which any funds have been or may be expended under this subchapter. You state that the question has been raised as to whether or not the Medical Care Commission may impose, as a con dition of Federal and State assistance, requirements relating to the selection of personnel and professional staff, and if the Commission may require guarantees by the applicant hospitals that physicians of all races will be granted privileges to practice within such institutions. Exhibit A Annexed T o Affidavit of William F. Henderson 4 a a In looking over the so-called Hill-Burton Act, I find that there is no conformity requirement, so far as Federal law is concerned, which requires the State Administrative Agency, in this case the Medical Care Commission, to supervise and control the selection of the medical staff or the operation and management of a local hospital which has been estab lished and built pursuant to grants-in-aid made to the State agency for such purpose. An examination of Article 13 of Chapter 131 of the Gen eral Statutes, as amended, shows that there is no power or authority granted to the Medical Care Commission whereby the Commission may in any manner interfere with or con trol the selection of the personnel on the medical staff or any of the operational procedures of a local hospital. The Medical Care Commission of this State is con cerned with contributions for indigent patients (G.S. H i l l 9 ), the construction and enlargement of local hospitals (G. S. 131-120), loan funds for medical and other students (G. S. 131-121) and the expansion of the Medical School of the University of North Carolina. Outside of the loan funds I would say that the primary duties of the Medical Care Commission relate to plans for the construction and mainte nance of hospitals, medical schools and related facilities. The chief function of the Medical Care Commission is to survey the hospital needs of a county or area, approve applications far funds, promulgate standards and policies for the con struction, remodeling or additions made to hospitals. The regulatory authority of the Commission relates to these pur poses of establishing hospitals; that is, the physical facilities, and I find no provision of law that would give the Medical Care Commission the right to control the physicians on the staff, their method of selection or anything pertaining to the internal operation of a local hospital. What I have just said is also applicable to the Hospital Licensing Act, which ap 5aa pears as Article 13A, Chapter 131 of the General Statutes. If you will examine Article 12 of Chapter 131 of the General Statutes, known as the Hospital Authorities Law, and also Article 13B, Chapter 131 of the General Statutes, which represents additional authority of subdivisions of gov ernment to finance hospital facilities, and, in fact, any of the hospital laws, you will find that such hospitals as to their internal administration are governed by local boards of trus tees, boards of managers or hospital authority, and that the Medical Care Commission has nothing to do with or no con trol over these administrative boards and bodies. I advise you, therefore, that the North Carolina Medical Care Commission has no legal authority and cannot impose, as a condition of Federal and State assistance, any require ments whatsoever relating to the selection of personnel and professional staff. Furthermore, the Commission may not require guarantees by applicant hospitals that physicians of all races will be granted privileges to practice within such local hospitals. If a physician of any race feels himself ag grieved by the action of any such governing authorities, then his grievances are matters to be considered by the governing authorities of the local hospitals, and they are not proper matters to be considered by the Medical Care Commission. Yours very truly, T. W. BRUTON Attorney General RALPH MOODY Assistant Attorney General RM:cap 6aa