Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Brief for Petitioners
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1983
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Brief for Petitioners, 1983. c5c26636-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/8308e5f6-1d5a-48e6-a352-eef0a449e271/cooper-v-federal-reserve-bank-of-richmond-brief-for-petitioners. Accessed May 16, 2025.
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No. 83-185
In t h e
CSIourt of tijf States
October Teem, 1983
Sylvia Cooper, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
F ederal R eserve B ank oe R ichmond.
P hyllis B axter, et. al.,
v.
Petitioners,
F ederal R eserve B ank oe R ichmond.
ON W RIT OP CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS POE THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
J. LeV onne Chambers
J ohn T. Nockleby
Chambers, Ferguson, Watt,
Wallas & Adkins, P.A.
951 S. Independence Boulevard
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202
J ack Greenberg
0 . P eter Sherwood
Charles Stephen R alston
E ric Schnapper*
16th Floor
99 Hudson Street
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
Counsel for Petitioners
* Counsel of Record
QUESTION PRESENTED*
Did t h e C o u r t o f A p p e a l s e r r in
h o l d i n g t h a t a p r i o r f i n d i n g t h a t any
p a t t e r n o r p r a c t i c e o f employment d i s c r i m
i n a t i o n was not " p e r v a s i v e " p r e c l u d e s , as a
matter o f res j u d i c a t a , a l l employees from
l i t i g a t i n g any i n d i v i d u a l c la ims o f d i s -
c r i m i n a t i o n ? *
*The p a r t i e s t o t h i s l i t i g a t i o n are s e t out
at p . i i o f the P e t i t i o n .
1 -
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Quest ion Presented ......................................... i
Table o f A u t h o r i t i e s .................................... i i
Opinions Below .................................................. 1
J u r i s d i c t i o n ....................................................... 2
Rule In vo lved ..................................................... 3
Statement o f the Case ................................... 4
Summary o f Argument ...................................... 15
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 21
I . The Binding E f f e c t o f
D e c i s i o n s in Class A c t i o n s . . 21
I I . The Baxter Claims Are Not
Barred by Res J u d i c a t a ............ 33
(1) The D i s t r i c t Court in
Cooper Did Not Decide
the Mer i ts o f the
Baxter Claims ...................... 33
(2) The D i s t r i c t Court in
Cooper Ex pr es s ly Reserved
the Right o f the Baxter
P l a i n t i f f s t o Bring
This L i t i g a t i o n ................. 56
I I I . The A p p l i c a t i o n o f C o l l a t e r a l
Estoppel To This Case ............... 63
C onc lu s i on ............................................................ 67
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
American Pipe C o n s t ru c t i o n Co. v. Utah,
414 U.S. 538 ( 1 974) ____ ______. . . 23
Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399 (5th
C i r . 1 978 ) ........................................ 30
Branham v . General E l e c t r i c C o . , 63
F.R.D. 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) . . . 46,48
Brown v. F e l s en , 442 U.S. 132
(1979) 35
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S.
591 (1 948) .................................. . . . . . 64
C o nn ec t i cu t v. T e a l , 73 L. Ed 2d 130
(1 982) .......................................... 44
C o s t e l l o v. United S t a t e s , 365 U.S.
265 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,35
Dickerson v. United S ta te s S t e e l
C o r p o r a t i o n , 582 F.2d 827
(3d C i r . 1978) ..................................... 45
Federated Department S t o r e s , In c . v.
M o i t i e , 452 U.S. 394 (1981) . . . . 34,49
Franks v . Bowman T ra n s p o r t a t i o n C o . ,
424 U.S 747 (1 976) ........................ 47 ,48 ,50
Furnco C o n s t ru c t i o n Corp. v .
Waters , 438 U.S. 567 (1978) _ 44
Cases: Page
- iii -
General Telephone Co. v . F a l c on , 457
U.S. 147 (1982) ............................... 27 ,3 3 ,4 3
Harr ison v. Lewis , 559 F. Supp. 943
(D.D.C. 1983) ......................................... 46
Hughes v. United S t a t e s , 71 U.S.
(4 Wal l . ) 232 ( 1 866 ) ........................ 35
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Brotherhood o f Team
s t e r s v. United S t a t e s , 431 U.S.
360 (1977) ........................ 5 , 1 6 , 3 2 , 4 3 , 4 7 , 5 0
Kreraer v. Chemical C o n s t r u c t i o n C o r p . ,
456 U.S. 461 (1 982) .................... 17,1 8 ,3 8 , 4 9
Marshal l v . K irk land , 602 F.2d 1281
( 8th C i r . 1979) .................................... 31
Montana v . United S t a t e s , 440 U.S.
147 (1979) ................................................ 63
Muskel ly v. Warner & Swassy C o . ,
653 F.2d 112 (4th C i r . 1981) . . . 46
R u s s e l l v . P l a c e , 94 U.S. 606
( 1 876) ......................................................... 64
Stastny v . Southern B e l l T e l . & T e l .
C o . , 628 F .2d 267 (4th C i r .
19 80 ) ..................................................... 46
Woodson v. Fu l to n , 614 F.2d 940
(4th C i r . 1 980) .................................... 30
St a tu te s
28 U.S.C. § 1254 ( 1 ) ...................................... 3
Cases; Page
IV
Cases: Page
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) ....................................... 13
42 U.S.C. § 1981 ................. 11
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 ..................... 4
C i v i l R ights Act o f 1964, T i t l e
VII ......................... ............................... .. . 5 , 4 7 , 5 1
Rules
Rule 23, F . R . C . P .......................... 2 2 , 2 4 , 2 7 , 2 8 , 4 7 ,
50
Rule 2 3 ( a ) , F . R . C . P ...................... 26
Rule 2 3 ( b ) , F .R .C .P . . . . . . . . . . . . . ___ 26,32
Rule 2 3 ( c ) , F .R .C .P . ............... 3,23
Other A u t h o r i t i e s
Franke l , "Some P re l im ina ry Observa
t i o n s Concerning C i v i l Rule 23 " ,
43 F.R.D. 39 ( 1 967) ...................... 32
F. James, J r . & G. Hazard, C i v i l Pro
cedure (2d ed. 1977) ................. 25
3B Moore ’ s Federal P r a c t i c e
§ 2360 (2d ed. 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . 22
C. Wright & A. M i l l e r , Federal
P r a c t i c e and Procedure
(1 972) ................. 2 2 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 9 , 4 6
Restatement o f Judgments, 2d
(1982) ...................................................... 34,62
v
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1983
No. 83-185
SYLVIA COOPER, e t a l . ,
P e t i t i o n e r s ,
v.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND,
PHYLLIS BAXTER, e t a l . ,
P e t i t i o n e r s ,
v.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND.
On Writ Of C e r t i o r a r i
To The United S t a te s Court o f Appeals
For The Fourth C i r c u i t
BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
OPINIONS BELOW
The d e c i s i o n o f the c o ur t o f appeal s
i s r e po r te d at 698 F.2d 633, and i s s e t out
a t p p . 1 a - l 8 5 a o f t h e A p p e n d i x t o t h e
2
P e t i t i o n f o r Writ o f C e r t i o r a r i ( h e r e i n
a f t e r c i t e d as " P . A . " ) . The o r d e r denying
r e h e a r i n g , which i s not ye t r e p o r t e d , is
s e t out at P.A. 186a. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s
Memorandum D e c i s i o n o f Oc tober 30, 1980, i s
n o t r e p o r t e d , and i s s e t o u t a t P . A .
191a-96a . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s F ind ings o f
Fact and Co nc lu s i ons o f Law, which are not
r e p o r t e d , are se t out at P.A. 197a-285a.
The d i s t r i c t c our t o r d e r s o f May 29, 1981,
and F e b r u a r y 26 , 1,9 8 2 , w h i c h a r e n o t
r e p o r t e d , are se t f o r t h at P.A. 286a-89a
and P.A. 290a-97a r e s p e c t i v e l y .
JURISDICTION
The judgment o f the Court o f Appeals
was entered on January 11, 1983. A t ime ly
P e t i t i o n f o r Rehearing was f i l e d , which was
d e n i e d on A p r i l 6 , 19 83 by an e q u a l l y
d i v i d e d c o u r t . (P.A. 186a) . This Court
granted an e x t e n s i o n o f time in which to
3
f i l e the P e t i t i o n f o r Writ o f C e r t i o r a r i
u n t i l August 4, 1983. The P e t i t i o n f o r a
Writ o f C e r t i o r a r i was f i l e d on August 4,
1 9 8 3 , and was g r a n t e d on O c t o b e r 3 1 ,
1 9 8 3 . J u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h i s C o u r t i s
invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1 2 5 4 ( 1 ) .
RULE INVOLVED
R u l e 2 3 ( c ) ( 3 ) , F e d e r a l R u l e s o f
C i v i l Procedure , p r o v i d e s :
(3) The judgment in an a c t i o n
maintained as a c l a s s a c t i o n under
s u b d i v i s i o n ( b ) ( 1 ) o r ( b ) ( 2 ) ,
w h e t h e r o r n o t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e
c l a s s , s h a l l i n c l u d e and d e s c r i b e
t h o s e whom t h e c o u r t f i n d s t o be
members o f the c l a s s . The judgment
in an a c t i o n maintained as a c l a s s
a c t i o n under s u b d i v i s i o n ( b ) ( 3 ) ,
w h e t h e r o r n o t f a v o r a b l e t o t h e
c l a s s , s h a l l in c l ud e and s p e c i f y or
d e s c r i b e t h o s e t o whom t h e n o t i c e
prov id ed in s u b d i v i s i o n ( c ) ( 2 ) was
d i r e c t e d , and who have not r eques ted
e x c l u s i o n , and whom the c o u r t f i n d s
t o be members o f the c l a s s .
4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On Marcia 22 , 19 77 , t h e c;EuC b r o u g h t
s u i t ag a i n s t the Federal Reserve Bank o f
R i c h m o n d a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e Bank had
d i s c r i m i n a t e d aga ins t b la ck employees in
making promot ions at i t s C h a r l o t t e , North
C a r o l i n a f a c i l i t i e s , and t h a t i t had
d i s c r i m i n a t e d in p a r t i c u l a r ag a i n s t S y lv ia
C o o p e r b e c a u s e o f h e r r a c e , f i r s t by
r e f u s i n g t o promote her t o a s u p e r v i s o r y
p o s i t i o n and t h e n by d i s c h a r g i n g h e r .
J u r i s d i c t i o n was as s er te d under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e—5. ( J .A . 6a—11a) . On September
21, 1977, Cooper and three o t h e r pr e s e nt or
former Bank employees ( the "Cooper p l a i n
t i f f s " ) were p e r m i t t e d t o i n t e r v e n e as
p l a i n t i f f s . ( J .A . 12 a -23a ) . On A p r i l 28,
1 9 7 8 , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t c e r t i f i e d a
p l a i n t i f f c l a s s c o n s i s t i n g o f b lacks who
had been employed at the Bank's C h a r l o t t e
branch s i n c e January 3, 1974, and had been
/
- 5 -
d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t on the b a s i s o f
r a c e . ( J .A . 2 4 a - 3 2a ) .
The case was t r i e d wi thout a j u r y in
September, 1980. The case was heard under
the b i f u r c a t e d procedure common in T i t l e
VII c l a s s a c t i o n s , and e x p r e s s l y s an c t i o n e d
by t h i s Court in I n t e r n a t i o n a l Brotherhood
o f Teamsters v. United S t a t e s , 431 U.S. 360
( 1 9 7 7 ) . Under that procedure p l a i n t i f f s
were r eq u i re d t o e s t a b l i s h at the September
1980 hear ing that there had been a p r a c t i c e
o f c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; i f that burden
were met, the i d e n t i t i e s o f the p a r t i c u l a r
c l a s s members who were the v i c t i m s o f that
p r a c t i c e were t o be r e s o l v e d at a l a t e r
h e a r i n g .
At the September, 1980, t r i a l P h y l l i s
1/
Baxter and f o u r o t h e r b l ac k Bank employees
1 / Brenda G i l l i a m , Glenda Knott , A l f r e d
Harr ison and S he rr i McCorkle. Emma R uf f i n
a l s o s o u g h t t o t e s t i f y , b u t b e c a u s e
she was in grade 4 and thus cove red by the
6
( t h e " B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s " ) , none o f whom
were named p l a i n t i f f s in the Cooper a c t i o n ,
sought t o t e s t i f y r egard ing a l l e g e d a c t s o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n aga in s t them by the Bank.
The de fe nd a nt , however, o b j e c t e d t o t h e i r
t e s t i m o n y , u r g i n g th e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o
r u l e that i t would not r e s o l v e the mer i t s
o f those " i n d i v i d u a l c la ims and that t h i s
ev i d e nc e we hear j u s t goes to t h e i r c la im
that there i s a pa t t e r n and p r a c t i c e . " Tne
t r i a l c ou r t agreed to so l i m i t c o n s i d e r a -
2 /t i o n cl that testimony.
On O c t o b e r 30 , 1S80, the d i s t r i c t
c ou r t i s sued a Memorandum o f D e c i s i o n which
]_/ c ont inued
t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g o f a p a t t e r n o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n aga in s t b lacks in grades 4
and 5, she d id not j o i n as a p l a i n t i f f in
the subsequent Baxter l i t i g a t i o n .
2/ T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t , p. 400 (handwri tt en
p a g e number 3 4 0 ) ( t e s t i m o n y o f S h e r r i
McCorkle . )
7
he ld that the Bank had engaged in a p a t t e r n
and p r a c t i c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in denying
promot ions t o b la ck employees in pay grades
4 and 5. ( P . A . 1 9 4 a ) . With r e s p e c t t o
p r o m o t i o n s o f b l a c k s in pa y g r a d e s 6
and above , however, the c o u r t he ld :
There does not appear t o be a pa t te r n
and p r a c t i c e p e r v a s i v e enough f o r the
c ou r t to o rd er r e l i e f . (P.A. 194a) .
The d i s t r i c t c o ur t c onc luded that two o f
the named p l a i n t i f f s , S y l v i a Coo per and
C o n s t a n c e R u s s e l l , b o t h o f whom were in
pa y g r a d e 6 o r a b o v e , had b e e n d e n i e d
p r o m o t i o n s on the b a s i s o f r a c e . ( P . A .
1 9 2 a - 1 9 3 a ) . The c o u r t ' s O c t o b e r , 19 80 ,
o p i n i o n c o n t a i n e d no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e
t e s t i m o n y o r d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m s o f
Baxter o r any o f the o th er Baxter p l a i n
t i f f s . The c our t d i r e c t e d coun se l f o r the
p l a i n t i f f s t o propose more d e t a i l e d " f i n d
ings o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law con
8
s i s t e n t w i t h [ i t s ] f i n d i n g s . " ( P . A .
1 9 4 a ) .
Undaunted by the f a i l u r e o f t h e i r
i n i t i a l a t t e m p t t o o b t a i n in t h e C oo pe r
l i t i g a t i o n a d e c i s i o n on t h e m e r i t s o f
t h e c l a i m s o f t h e B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s ,
c o u n s e l f o r p l a i n t i f f s t r i e d a n o t h e r
approach. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n
contemplated the appointment o f "a s p e c i a l
master f o r a Stage I I p r o c e e d i n g ] ] t o . . .
i d e n t i f y c l a s s members e n t i t l e d t o r e l i e f . " .
( P . A . 1 9 5 a ) . But t h e c o u r t had f o u n d
c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t o n l y
b l a c k s in p a y g r a d e s 4 and 5 , and t h e
Baxter p l a i n t i f f s were in grades 3, 6 o r 7.
Thus a d e t er m in at i o n as t o which b l a c k s in
g r a d e s 4 and 5 were the v i c t i m s o f d i s
c r i m i n a t i o n would n e c e s s a r i l y have l e f t
s t i l l unreso lved the c laims o f the Baxter
p l a i n t i f f s . S ince those Baxter p l a i n t i f f s
a p p a r e n t l y c o u l d n o t be r e p r e s e n t e d
9
by C o o p e r in the p r i v a t e c l a s s a c t i o n ,
c o u n s e l f o r p l a i n t i f f s u r g e d , in t h e i r
Proposeo Find ings o f Fact and Conc lu s i o ns
o f Law, that the EEOC ins tead be permi t ted
t o pr es s the c la ims o f those employees at
3 /
t n e s t a g e I I p r o c e e d i n g . on F e b r u a r y
27, 1981, however, the de fendant f i l e d a
r e s p o n s e s t r e n u o u s l y o b j e c t i n g t o t h i s
V
p r o p o s a l .
3 / Paragraph 27 o f the Proposed Conc lu
s i o n s o f Law read in p a r t :
The Court i s o f the o p i n i o n . . . that
. . . the M ast er s h o u l d r e c e i v e e v i
d e n c e and make r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s w i t h
r e s p e c t t o P h y l l i s B a x t e r , Brenda
G i l l i a m , Glenda Knott , A l f r e d Harr ison
and S h e r r i M c C o r k l e . . . . They are
w i t h i n the s cope o f [ the] i n d i v i d u a l s
who have c l a i m s whi ch may a p p r o p r i
a t e l y be pursued by EEOC.
This proposed Conc lus i on was not adopted by
the t r i a l c o u r t . See P.A. 283a.
4 / De f en dan t ' s Response t o P l a i n t i f f s '
Proposed Findings o f Fact and Co nc lus i ons
o f Law, pp. 8 - 10 , 14, 18.
10
While t h i s p r o p o s a l f o r EEOC r e p r e s e n
t a t i o n was s t i l l p e n d i n g , c o u n s e l f o r
p l a i n t i f f s made y e t a t h i r d a t t e m p t t o
o b t a i n in the Cooper l i t i g a t i o n a r e s o l u
t i o n o f the m e r i t s o f the Baxter c la i m s .
On March 24, 1381, the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s
moved t o in ter ven e as i n d i v i d u a l s in the
Cooper l i t i g a t i o n . ( J .A . 39 a - 5 1 a ) . The
proposed compla int in i n t e r v e n t i o n a s s e r te d
that each o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s had been
den ied a promotion as a r e s u l t o f r a c i a l
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , bu t d i d n o t a l l e g e t h a t
ther e was any gen era l p r a c t i c e o f d i s c r i m i
n a t i o n a g a i n s t b l a c k s in p a y g r a d e s 6
and a b o v e . The d e f e n d a n t bank o p p o s e d
t h i s m ot i on , i n s i s t i n g that i f the Baxter
p l a i n t i f f s w i sh ed t o p u rs u e t h e i r i n d i -
v i d u a l c la ims they cou ld and should f i l e a
5 /
s e p a r a t e l a w s u i t . The d i s t r i c t c o u r t
5 / See pp. 57 -58 , i n f r a .
- 1 1 -
agreed, and at a hear ing on May 8 , 1981,
den ied from the bench the motion t o i n t e r -
1 /
v e n e ; t h e c o u r t a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t
i t would not permit the EEOC to r e p r e se n t
the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s in the Cooper l i t i q a -
1/t i o n .
Four days l a t e r , on May 12, 1981, the
Baxter p l a i n t i f f s , f o l l o w i n g the s ug g e s t i o n
o f the d i s t r i c t c o ur t and the de fe nda nt ,
f i l e d a c i v i l a c t i o n a l l e g i n g r a c i a l
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in employment in v i o l a t i o n
o f 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On May 29, 1981, the
d i s t r i c t j u d g e e n t e r e d a w r i t t e n o r d e r
f o r m a l l y denying the motion t o in ter ven e in
C o o p e r , e m p h a s i z i n g , " I s e e no r e a s o n
why, i f any o f the would be in te r v e n o r s are
6/ T r a n s c r i p t o f Hearing o f May 8 , 1981,
pp. 17 -18 . That d e c i s i o n was memoria l i zed
in an o r d e r o f May 2 9 , 1 9 8 1 . ( P . A .
2 8 6 a - 2 8 9 a ) .
7 / T r a n s c r i p t o f Hearing o f May 8 , 1981,
p . 19.
12
a c t i v e l y i n t e r e s t e d i n p u r s u i n g t h e i r
c l a i m s , t h e y c a n n o t f i l e a S e c t i o n 1981
s u i t next w e e k . . . . " (P.A. 291a) . On the
same day the judge i s sued h i s F ind ings o f
Fact and C onc lu s i o ns o f Law, which f o r m a l l y
r e j e c t e d the p r o p o s a l t o permit the EEOC to
pursue in the Cooper l i t i g a t i o n the c la ims
o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s .
Having thus s u c c e e d e d in t h w a r t i n g
three d i f f e r e n t attempts to o b t a i n in the
C o o £ e r l i t i g a t i o n a r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e
c l a i m s o f t h e B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s , t h e
de fendant Bank moved on Ju ly 2, 1981, t o
d i s m i s s t h e B a x t e r c l a i m s , a s s e r t i n g
t h a t t h e y were " b a r r e d by r e s j u d i c a t a "
because o f the d e c i s i o n in C oo pe r . ( J .A .
71a e t s e q . ) . On February 26, 1982, the
d i s t r i c t c o u r t denied the motion t o d i s
miss . (P.A. 290a) . The d i s t r i c t ju d ge ,
h o w e v e r , e n t e r e d t h e f i n d i n g s n e c e s s a r y
to permit the de fendant t o appeal from i t s
- 13 -
d e c i s i o n pursuant t o 28 U.S.C. § 1 2 9 2 ( a ) .
The c o u r t o f appeal s granted the de fendant
l e av e t o take such an appeal .
On Ja n u a ry 11 , 1983 , t h e c o u r t o f
a p p e a l s r e v e r s e d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s
d e c i s i o n in B a x t e r . The F o u r th C i r c u i t
d id not suggest that the t r i a l c o u r t had
i m p l i c i t l y c o n s i d e r e d and r e s o l v e d the
c o n f l i c t i n g c o n t e n t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h e
s p e c i f i c c l a ims o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s ;
i t r e a s o n e d , r a t h e r , t h a t the l a c k o f a
f i n d i n g o f c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n v o l v
ing grades 6 and above barred as a matter
o f r e s j u d i c a t a any c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the
p a r t i c u l a r c l a i m s o f b l a c k s in t h o s e
g r a d e s ;
They . . . are . . . p r e c l u d e d by the
de te r m in at i o n o f the D i s t r i c t Court
t h a t t h e r e was no d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in
promotion out o f pay grades above pay
grade 5 . . . . (P.A. 179a) .
One o f t h e B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s , A l f r e d
Ha rr i so n , was in pay grade 3. Ne i ther the
14
d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s Memorandum o f D e c i s i o n
nor i t s Find ings o f Fact and Co nc lu s i o ns o f
Law even c o n s id e r e d whether there was c l a s s
wide d i s c r i m i n a t i o n regard ing promot ions
o u t o f g r a d e 3 . The c o u r t o f a p p e a l s
n o n e t h e le s s he ld that H a r r i s o n ' s c la im too
was barred by res j u d i c a t a . The d i s t r i c t
c o u r t had found a p r a c t i c e o f d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n in promot i ons from grades 4 and 5, and
t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s o v e r t u r n e d t h a t
d e t e r m i n a t i o n :
We . . . r e v e r s e the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s
F i n d i n g s and C o n c l u s i o n s o f c l a s s
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in p r o m o t i o n s o u t o f
g r a d e s 4 and 5 . . . . ( P . A . 1 2 9 a ) .
The c ou r t o f a p pe a l s , nominal ly r e l y i n g on
t h i s c o n c l u s i o n , h e l d t h a t H a r r i s o n ' s
c la im was
pr ec lud ed by our de te rm in at i on on t h i s
appeal that there was no p r a c t i c e o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in pay g r a d e 5 and_
be low. (P.A. 179a) (Emphasis added) .
In f a c t t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e c o u r t o f
appeal s on the c l a s s c l a i m s , l i k e that o f
15
the d i s t r i c t c o u r t , r e f e r r e d o n l y t o grades
4 and 5, and was devo id o f any d i s c u s s i o n
o f whether there was c la s s w id e d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n ag a i n s t b l ac ks in pay grade 3. Upon
c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s '
P e t i t i o n f o r Rehearing and Sugges t i on f o r
Rehearing En Banc , the p a n e l ' s d e c i s i o n was
upheld by an e q u a l l y d i v i d e d (4 -4 ) c o u r t .
(P.A. 188a) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I . The q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d by t h i s
c a s e i s n o t w h e t h e r a j u d g m e n t on t h e
m e r i t s o f a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e in a c l a s s
a c t i o n o r d i n a r i l y p r e c lu d es members o f the
c l a s s f r o m r e l i t i g a t i n g t h a t s p e c i f i c
i s s u e . P e t i t i o n e r s acknowledge the c o r
r e c t n e s s o f that p r i n c i p l e . The problem
h e r e i s t o a s c e r t a i n what the d i s t r i c t
c our t in f a c t d e c i d e d .
1 6
1 1 . ( 1 ) The d i s t r i c t c o u r t in the
Cooper l i t i g a t i o n n e i t h e r c o n s id e r e d nor
r e s o l v e d t h e m e r i t s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l
c la ims o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s .
The t r i a l in C o o pe r was a l i m i t e d
s t a g e I p r o c e e d i n g whose p u r p o s e was t o
determine whether there was a p r a c t i c e o f
c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . The d i s t r i c t
c ou r t c onc luded regard ing d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in
pay grades 6 and above that " t h e r e does not
ap pe ar t o be a p a t t e r n and p r a c t i c e o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n p e r v a s i v e enough f o r the
c o u r t t o o r d e r r e l i e f . " (P.A. 194a) . That
f i n d i n g does not p r e c lu d e the p o s s i b i l i t y
t h a t t h e r e were p a r t i c u l a r a c t s o f d i s
c r i m i n a t i o n aga in s t the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s
in g r a d e s 6 and a b o v e . T h i s C ou r t has
r e p e a t e d l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t even in the
absence o f c l a s s w id e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n there
may be " i s o l a t e d or ' a c c i d e n t a l ' o r spo
r a d i c d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a c t s . ' " Teamsters v.
1 7
United S t a t e s , 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977 ) .
The t r i a l judge in Cooper r e p e a t e d l y
r e fu s e d t o c o n s i d e r and r e s o l v e the c la ims
o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s . When the Baxter
p l a i n t i f f s s o u g h t t o t e s t i f y a t t h e
Cooper t r i a l s , the judge ac cepted a de fe nse
p r o p o s a l t h a t t h e c o u r t n o t " r u l e on
i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m s . " The d i s t r i c t c o u r t
r e fu s e d t o permit the EEOC to p r e s e n t the
c l a i m s o f the B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s in the
Cooper l i t i g a t i o n , and r e j e c t e d an attempt
by t h e B£ x, t. £ L p l a i n t i f f s t o a c t u a l l y
i n t e r v e n e i n C o o p e r . Thus t h e Ba x t e r
p l a i n t i f f s n e v e r had in Co o pe r "a ' f u l l
and f a i r o p p o r t u n i t y ' t o l i t i g a t e [ t h e i r ]
c l a i m s . ' " Kremer v . Chemical Co ns t r u c t i o n
Corp . , 456 U.S. 461, 480 (1982 ) .
The d e c i s i o n o f the co ur t o f appeals
a p p e a r s t o h o l d t h a t the f a i l u r e o f the
d i s t r i c t c o ur t t o d e c id e the mer i t s o f the
i n d i v i d u a l Baxter p l a i n t i f f s in the Cooper
18
c l a s s a c t i o n somehow p r e c l u d e s the Baxter
p l a i n t i f f s from b r i n g i n g a second a c t i o n .
Such a r u l e would be i n c o n s i s t e n t with the
e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e t h a t r e s j u d i c a t a
o n l y bars c la ims p r e v i o u s l y r e s o l v e d "on
the m e r i t s . " Krerner v . Chemical Cons t ruc
t i o n Corp . f 456 U.S. 461 , 466 n .6 (1 982) .
(2) Res j u d i c a t a does not apply where
the j u d g e who i s s u e d t h e f i r s t d e c i s i o n
e x p r e s s l y r e ser ved the r i g h t o f the p l a i n
t i f f s t o b r i n g a s e c o n d a c t i o n . At the
hear ing on the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s ' motion t o
i n t e r v e n e in C o o p e r , t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e
announced:
I 'm go ing t o deny the motion wi thout
p r e j u d i c e t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s
o f the f o u r would be i n t e r v e n o r s t o
mainta in a se pa ra te a c t i o n . 8/
The c o u r t ' s w r i t t e n o r d e r d e n y i n g t h a t
motion r e i t e r a t e d :
8/ See p. 60, infra.
- 19
I s e e no r e a s o n why, i f any o f the
would be i n t e r v e n e r s are a c t i v e l y
i n t e r e s t e d in pursuing t h e i r c la i m s ,
they cannot f i l e a S e c t i o n 1981 s u i t
next week, nor why they cou ld not f i l e
a c l a i m w i t h EEOC n e x t week. ( P . A .
2 8 8 a ) .
Thus i t was the c l e a r i n te n t o f the d i s
t r i c t c o u r t in Cooper t o permit the in s ta n t
l i t i g a t i o n .
The a p p l i c a t i o n o f r e s j u d i c a t a i s
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e s i n c e t h e
de fendant in Cooper e x p r e s s l y argued that
B a x t e r c o u l d and s h o u l d f i l e h e r own
l a w s u i t . In s u c c e s s f u l l y oppos ing B a x t e r ' s
m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e in C o op er the Bank
a s s e r t e d :
A p p l i c a n t s . . . can s t i l l go t o the
EEOC o f f i c e and f i l e a l l the charges
they d e s i r e . . . t h e r e f o r e , there i s no
way ther e w i l l be any p r e j u d i c e to the
a p p l i c a n t s in d e n y i n g t h e i r m o t i o n ,
s i n c e they can pursue any i n d i v i d u a l
c la ims they have in se parate p r o c e e d
in g s . 9 /
9/ See p. 61, infra.
20
Less than two months a f t e r i n s i s t i n g in
Cooper that the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s c o u ld and
should f i l e t h e i r own s u i t , the Bank moved
t o d i sm is s that s u i t , arguing that i t was
barred by res j u d i c a t a .
I I I . The Baxter p l a i n t i f f s are barred
by c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l from l i t i g a t i n g o n l y
those i s s u e s which were a c t u a l l y d ec id e d in
C oo pe r .
The B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s in pay g r a d e s
6 and above are bound by the Cooper d e c i
s i o n that any c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in
those grades was not s u f f i c i e n t to warrant
a c la s s w id e remedy.
One o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s , A l f r e d
Harr i son , i s in pay grade 3. S ince n e i t h e r
c o u r t b e l o w e v e r c o n s i d e r e d o r d e c i d e d
whether there was c la s s w id e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
in pay g r a d e 3, H a r r i s o n s h o u l d be p e r
m i t t e d t o o f f e r p r o o f on remand o f the
21
e x i s t e n c e o f such a p a t t e r n and p r a c t i c e o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t f ou nd t h a t t h e r e
had been i n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ag a i n s t
two named p l a i n t i f f s in C o o p e r , S y l v i a
Cooper and Constance R u s s e l l , both o f whom
were in pay grade 6 o r above . The c o ur t o f
a p p e a l s r e v e r s e d t h e s e f i n d i n g s o f d i s
c r i m i n a t i o n ; the c o ur t o f a p pe a l s , however,
app are nt l y misunders tood the d i s t r i c t c our t
to have he ld that there was no d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n in grades 6 and above. A c c o r d i n g l y ,
the c ou r t o f a p pe a l s ' d e c i s i o n regard ing
the i n d i v i d u a l c la ims o f Cooper and R u s s e l l
should be vacated and remanded.
ARGUMENT
I . THE BINDING EFFECT OF DECISIONS
IN CLASS ACTIONS___________________
The q u e s t i o n presented by t h i s case i s
not whether a judgment de termining on the
mer i t s a p a r t i c u l a r i s s ue in a c l a s s a c t i o n
22
o r d i n a r i l y p r e c l u d e s members o f the
c l a s s f r o m r e l i t i g a t i n g t h a t s p e c i f i c
i s s u e . P e t i t i o n e r s d id not q u e s t i o n that
p r i n c i p l e below and do not seek t o cio so
he r e . The c o u r t o f ap p e a l s , however, ap
p l i e d a f a r more sweeping r u l e , app ar ent ly
assuming that an adverse de te r m in at i o n on
t h e m e r i t s o f any s i n g l e c l a s s i s s u e
p r e c l u d e s c l a s s members from l i t i g a t i n g a l l
o t h e r i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g t h e same s u b j e c t
mat ter .
P r i o r t o the 1966 amendments t o Rule
23, there was in the case o f a s o - c a l l e d
" s p u r i o u s " c l a s s a c t i o n no p r o c e d u r e
10/ The a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s p r i n c i p l e
p r es u p p os es , i n t e r a l i a , tha t the c l a s s was
in f a c t c e r t i f i e d , t h a t c l a s s members
r e c e i v e d any r e q u i r e d n o t i c e , t h a t the
named p l a i n t i f f adequate ly r e pr ese n ted the
i n t e r e s t s o f the c l a s s , and that the co ur t
r e nde r i ng the d e c i s i o n had j u r i s d i c t i o n to
do s o . See 18 C. Wr ight and A. M i l l e r ,
F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e , § 4455
(19 7 2 ) ; 3B Moore ' s Federal P r a c t i c e 1i 2360
(2d ed . 1982) .
23
f o r de termining p r i o r t o judgment which o f
the p o t e n t i a l members o f the c l a s s c la imed
in the compla int were ac t ua l members and
would thus be bound by the ju d g m e n t . A
number o f c o u r t s h e l d o r i n t i m a t e d t h a t
c l a s s members might be permi tted t o i n t e r
vene a f t e r a d e c i s i o n on the mer i t s f a v o r
ab le t o t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , in o rd er t o secure
the b e n e f i t o f the d e c i s i o n f o r themse lves ,
a l t h o u g h t h e y would p r e s u m a b ly be u n a f
f e c t e d by an u n f a v o r a b l e d e c i s i o n . In
o r d e r t o prevent such "one-way i n t e r v e n
t i o n , " s e c t i o n s ( c ) ( 1 ) and ( c ) ( 2 ) were
a d d e d t o R u l e 2 3 , d i r e c t i n g t h a t t h e
p r o p r i e t y o f c l a s s c e r t i f i c a t i o n be r e
s o l v e d " a s s o o n as p r a c t i c a b l e , " and
r e q u i r i n g c l a s s members in a Rule 2 3 ( b ) ( 3 )
a c t i o n t o d e c i d e p r i o r t o any r e s o l u t i o n on
the mer i t s whether t o remain in the c l a s s .
American Pipe Co ns t r u c t i o n Co. v . Utah, 414
U.S . 538 , 54 6 -9 ( 1 9 7 4 ) . Rule 2 3 ( c ) ( 3 )
24
d i r e c t s the c o u r t a d j u d i c a t i n g a c l a s s
a c t i o n to in c l ud e in i t s judgment a d e s i g
na t i on o f the i n d i v i d u a l s who are memoers
o f the a f f e c t e d c l a s s .
Rule 23 does n o t , however, purpor t to
"determine the b ind ing e f f e c t o f a judgment
. . . [or ] p r e s c r i b [ e ] any p a r t i c u l a r a d j u d i -
JJ_/
c a t o r y e f f e c t t o i t ------ " Rather , Rule
23 d i r e c t s t h e a t t e n t i o n o f t h e c o u r t
d e c i d i n g a c l a s s a c t i o n , and o f any c o ur t
sub sequent ly c a l l e d upon to a s c e r t a i n the
a d j u d i c a t o r y e f f e c t o f that d e c i s i o n , to
the a c t u a l language o f the judgment. I t i s
in the p a r t i c u l a r t erms o f t h e judgment
t h a t the f i r s t c o u r t i s c a l l e d upon t o
s p e l l out what i t has de c i de d and wfto were
the p a r t i e s t o t h a t l i t i g a t i o n , and i t
1 1/ 7A C. Wright and A. M i l l e r , Federal
P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e , § 17 89 , p . 177
(1972 ) .
25
i s by t h o s e t e rms t h a t the r e s j u d i c a t a
e f f e c t o f the judgment must be determined .
In a s c e r t a i n i n g what i s s u e s o r c l a i m s
cannot be l i t i g a t e d because o f the d e c i s i o n
in an e a r l i e r c l a s s a c t i o n , " s p e c i a l care
nay be requ i r ed in i d e n t i f y i n g the i s sue s
or c la ims prese nte d and in r e l a t i n g them to
the s c o p e o f the c l a s s a c t i o n . " 18 C.
Wright & A. M i l l e r , Federal P r a c t i c e and
1 2/
P r o c e d u r e , § 4455, p . 473 ( 1 9 7 2 ) ~
In a c i v i l a c t i o n on b e h a l f o f a
s i n g l e i n d i v i d u a l , one would o r d i n a r i l y
e x p e c t t h e p l a i n t i f f t o p r e s e n t , and
the c o u r t t o r e s o l v e , a l l o f h i s o r her
c l a i m s and c o n t e n t i o n s w i th r e g a r d t o a
J_2/ See a l s o F. James, J r . & G. Hazard,
J r * ' C i v i l P r o c e d u r e , § 11 .2 8 , p. 587 (2d
ed. 1S77) ( " [ T ] h e very nature o f a c l a s s
s u i t r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e r u l e s o f r e s
j u d i c a t a be a p p l i e d t o i t w i th s p e c i a l
c a u t i o n . " }
26
p a r t i c u l a r s u b j e c t matter or t r a n s a c t i o n .
In c e r t a i n in s ta n c es an i n d i v i d u a l p l a i n
t i f f may be r e q u i r e d t o do s o . But in
d e t e r m i n i n g t h e s c o p e o f t h e d e c i s i o n
in a c l a s s a c t i o n the c o u r t s cannot indulge
in any assumption that every p o s s i b l e c la im
a g a i n s t the d e f e n d a n t o f each and e v e r y
c l a s s member was in f a c t l i t i g a t e d and
d e c i d e d . A c l a i m o f a p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s
member, o r an i s s u e o r f a c t r e l e v a n t t o
that c la i m , i s not o r d i n a r i l y a d ju d i c a t e d
in a c l a s s a c t i o n u n l e s s t h e c l a i m o r
q u e s t i o n i s common to both the c l a s s and
the named p l a i n t i f f , and un less that named
p l a i n t i f f i s in a p o s i t i o n t o " f a i r l y and
a d e q u a t e l y p r o t e c t the i n t e r e s t s o f the
c l a s s . " Ru l e 2 3 ( a ) . Rule 2 3 ( b ) p o s e s
ye t a d d i t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s re gard ing what
c la ims and i s s u e s may in f a c t be l i t i g a t e d
in a c l a s s a c t i o n . "The mere f a c t that an
ag gr i eved p r i v a t e p l a i n t i f f i s a member o f
27
an i d e n t i f i a b l e c l a s s o f persons o f the
same race o r n a t i o n a l o r i g i n i s i n s u f f i
c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h h i s s tand ing t o l i t i g a t e
on t h e i r b e h a l f a l l p o s s i b l e c l a i m s o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n aga in s t a common e m plo yer . "
General Telephone Co. v . F a l c o n , 457 U.S.
147, 159 n. 15. (1982) (emphasis added) In
sum, whi le an i n d i v i d u a l p l a i n t i f f o r d i n a r
i l y would n o t , and under some c i r cumstances
c o u l d n o t , p i c k and c h o o s e among t h e
r e l a t e d c la ims and i s s ue s t o p r e s e n t in a
s i n g l e l a w s u i t , " c a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n t o the
requi rements o f . . . Rule . . . 23" r e q u i r e s
j u s t such s e l e c t i v i t y in the c h o i c e o f
q u e s t i o n s t o be r e s o l v e d in a c l a s s a c t i o n .
East Texas Motor F re i ght v . R o d r iq u e z , 431
U.S. 395, 405 (1977 ) .
Those mat ters which a c o u r t d e c l i n e s
t o a c t u a l l y r e s o l v e in a c l a s s a c t i o n o f
c ourse remain open f o r l i t i g a t i o n in some
fu tu re a c t i o n . The same i s t rue o f i s s ue s
28
which co uns e l f o r the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p a r t y ,
mind ful o f the requi rements o f Rule 23 and
o f the problems o f m an a ge ab i l i t y a s s o c i a t e d
with any c l a s s a c t i o n , d e c l i n e s t o pr es ent
o r p r es s f o r r e s o l u t i o n . Falcon n e i t h e r
encourages nor r e q u i r e s the c l a s s r e p r e s e n
t a t i v e t o p l ead the broad es t c o n c e i v a b l e
c l a s s c la im and f o r c e the c o ur t t o reduce
i t t o a more manageable s u i t c onsonant with
R u l e 2 3 . I f t h e d e f e n d a n t in a c l a s s
a c t i o n b e l i e v e s that the membership o f the
proposed c l a s s or the s cope o f the proposed
c l a s s c l a i m s ar e t o o n a r r o w l y d e f i n e d ,
i t i s f r e e t o u r g e t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o
expand o r a l t e r e i t h e r . But a de fendant
d i s s a t i s f i e d with the c l a s s d e f i n i t i o n or
the c la ims o f f e r e d by a p l a i n t i f f cannot
wi thho ld i t s o b j e c t i o n and l a t e r complain
that o t h e r i s s u e s should have been l i t i
gated o r that o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s should have
29
oeen members o f the c l a s s .
A s c e r t a i n i n g p r e c i s e l y what i s s u e s
were in f a c t l i t i g a t e d and r e s o l v e d in a
c l a s s a c t i o n w i l l not always be a s imple
t a s k . The mere f a c t t h a t a c o m p l a i n t
a l l e g e s a wide v a r i e t y o f c l a ims does not
i t s e l f ensure that the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e par ty
cou ld o r d id in f a c t l i t i g a t e a l l or most
o f them at t r i a l . C f . Eas t Texas Motor
13/
13/ " Th e b a s i c e f f o r t t o l i m i t c l a s s
a d j u d i c a t i o n as c l o s e as p o s s i b l e t o
m a t t e r s common t o members o f the c l a s s
f r e q u e n t l y r e q u i r e s that n o n p a r t i c i p a t i n g
members o f the c l a s s remain f r e e t o pursue
i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n s that would be merged or
b a r r e d by c l a i m p r e c l u s i o n had a p r i o r
i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n been b r o u g h t f o r the
r e l i e f demanded in the c l a s s a c t i o n . An
i n d i v i d u a l who has s u f f e r e d p a r t i c u l a r
i n j u r y as a r e s u l t o f p r a c t i c e s e n jo i n e d in
a c l a s s a c t i o n , f o r i n s t a n c e , should remain
f r e e t o seek a damages remedy even though
c l a i m p r e c l u s i o n would d e f e a t a s e c o n d
a c t i o n had the f i r s t a c t i o n been an i n d i
v i d u a l s u i t f o r t h e same i n j u n c t i v e
r e l i e f . " 18 C. Wright & A. M i l l e r , Federal
P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e , § 4 4 5 5 , p . 474
(1972 ) .
30
F re i g h t v . R o d r i g u e z , 431 U.S. 395, 405-06
( 1 9 7 7 ) . In some in s ta n c e s l i m i t a t i o n s on
t h e c l a i m s o r i s s u e s a c t u a l l y p r e s e n t e d
and r e s o l v e d in a c l a s s a c t i o n may be
a p p a r e n t on t h e f a c e o f t h e c o m p l a i n t
i t s e l f . S e e , e . g . , Bogara v . C o o k , 586
F. 2d 399 (5th C i r . 1978) ( i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n
f o r damages n o t b a r r e d by e a r l i e r c l a s s
J_4/
a c t i o n seeking o n l y i n j u n c t i v e r e l i e f ) .
The terms o f the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n or
o r d e r re gard ing c e r t i f i c a t i o n may d e f i n e
t h e c l a s s i s s u e s more n a r r o w l y than the
c o m p l a i n t i t s e l f . See e . g . , Vioodson v .
F u l t o n , 614 F . 2d 940, 942 (4th C i r . 1980)
( c e r t i f i c a t i o n d e c i s i o n e x c l u d e d c l a i m s
r eg ard in g d i s c r i m i n a t o r y d i s c h a r g e ) . In
14/ In s u s t a i n i n g that i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n ,
the F i f t h C i r c u i t noted that i t had "no way
o f knowing that [ the e a r l i e r s u i t ] would
have been manageable as a c l a s s a c t i o n i f
i n d i v i d u a l damage r e l i e f had b e e n r e
q u e s t e d . " 586 F .2d at 408.
31
the i n s t a n t c a s e , f o r example, the Cooper
c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e d a g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f b o t h
race and sex (J .A . 15a) , but the c e r t i f i c a
t i o n o r d e r l i m i t e d t h e c l a s s c l a i m t o
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n on the b a s i s o f r a c e . ( J .A .
27 a ) . The s cope o f the i s su es o r c la ims
a c t u a l l y l i t i g a t e d at t r i a l may be narrower
s t i l l . S e e , e . g . , Marshal l v . K i r k l a n d ,
602 F.2d 1282, 1298 (8th C i r , 1979) ( d e c i
s i o n on c l a s s c l a i m n o t r e s j u d i c a t a
as t o c l a s s members whose c laims were not
in f a c t p r es ent ed t o the t r i a l c o u r t ) . The
o p i n i o n and judgment o f the d i s t r i c t c o ur t
must be c a r e f u l l y s c r u t i n i z e d t o a s c e r t a i n
whether each o f the c l a s s c la ims or i s s ue s
prese nte d at t r i a l was in f a c t r e s o l v e d by
the c o u r t on the m e r i t s .
The p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t
w i l l not in f a c t r e s o l v e a l l the i s s u e s a
p l a i n t i f f seeks t o l i t i g a t e i s p a r t i c u l a r l y
32
r e a l when, as i s o f t e n the c a s e in Rule
2 3 ( b ) ( 3 ) c l a s s a c t i o n s , the c o u r t uses the
f a m i l i a r d e v i c e o f a s p l i t t r i a l . See
F r a n k e l , "Some P r e l i m i n a r y O b s e r v a t i o n s
Concerning C i v i l Rule 23 , " 43 F.R.D. 39, 47
(1 96 7 ) . Such b i f u r c a t e d p r o c e e d i n g s are
p a r t i c u l a r l y common in the t r i a l c o u r t o f
c o m p l e x T i t l e V I I c l a s s a c t i o n s . In
such cases
[ a ] t the i n i t i a l , " l i a b i l i t y " s t a g e
. . . [ the p l a i n t i f f ] i s not r e q u i re d to
o f f e r e v i d e n c e t h a t each p e r s o n f o r
whom i t w i l l u l t i m a t e l y s e e k r e l i e f
was a v i c t i m o f the e m p l o y e r ' s d i s
c r i m in a t o r y p o l i c y . I t s burden i s t o
e s t a b l i s h a prima f a c i e case that such
a p o l i c y e x i s t e d . . . . [A] d i s t r i c t
c o u r t must us u a l l y c onduct a d d i t i o n a l
p r o c e e d in g s a f t e r the l i a b i l i t y phase
o f the t r i a l t o determine the s cope o f
t h e i n d i v i d u a l r e l i e f . . . . [ T ] h e
q u e s t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l r e l i e f does not
a r i s e u n t i l i t has been p r o v e d t h a t
the employer has f o l l o w e d an employ
ment p o l i c y o f unlawful d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Brotherhood o f Teamsters v.
United S t a t e s , 431 U.S. 324, 360-62 (1 97 7 ) .
Shou ld a t r i a l c o u r t c o n c l u d e in such a
33
case that there was no c la s s w id e d i s c r i m i
n a t i o n , i t would o r d i n a r i l y have no o c c a
s i o n t o c o n s i d e r at any l a t e r p r oc e e d i n g
w h e t h e r p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s m i g h t
n o n e t h e l e s s h a v e b e e n t h e v i c t i m s o f
i s o l a t e d ac t s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . Just as
the c o u r t s cannot assume t h a t , i f a c l a s s
i s c e r t i f i e d , " a l l w i l l be w e l l f o r s u r e l y
the p l a i n t i f f w i l l win and manna w i l l f a l l
on a l l members o f t h e c l a s s , " Gen era l .
T e l e p h o n e v . __F a l c o n , 457 U. S . a t 1 6 1 ,
so t o o they cannot assume that every c la im
somehow r e l e v a n t t o the p l a i n t i f f s ' com
p l a i n t w i l l in f a c t be l i t i g a t e d and
r e s o l v e d on the m e r i t s .
I I . THE BAXTER CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED
BY RES JUDICATA______________________
(1) The D i s t r i c t Court in Cooper Did
Not Decide The Meri ts o f th e
Baxter Claims
A f i n a l judgment on the m e r i t s o f a
c l a i m p r e c l u d e s the p a r t i e s , i n c l u d i n g
34
c l a s s m e m b e r s , f r o m r e l i t i g a t i n g t h a t
c la i m . Federated Department S t o r e s , I n c , v .
M o i t i e , 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1 98 1 ) . But t h i s
p r i n c i p l e o f r e s j u d i c a t a does not apply t o
a l l cas es in which a par ty f a i l s t o o b t a i n
the r e l i e f i t sought in the i n i t i a l l i t i g a
t i o n ; o n l y i f t h a t d e n i a l o f r e l i e f was
based on a d e c i s i o n on the mer i t s o f the
c la im i s the u n s u c c e s s fu l p a r t y t h e r e a f t e r
pr ec lu d ed from l i t i g a t i n g the same c la im.
" I f the f i r s t s u i t was d i sp o s e d o f on any
ground which d id not go t o the m e r i t s o f
the a c t i o n , the judgment r e n d e r e d w i l l
prove no bar t o another s u i t . " C o s t e l l o v .
United S t a t e s , 365 U.S. 265, 286 (1 96 1 ) ;
see R e s i a t e m e n t _ ^ _ J u d £ n i e n t s 2d, § 20
( 1 9 8 2 ) . This Court has r e p e a t e d l y d e c l i n e d
t o g i v e such p r e c l u s i v e e f f e c t t o d e c i s i o n s
whi ch f a i l e d t o r e s o l v e the m e r i t s o f a
35 -
d i s p u t e d c l a i m . a f i n d i n g t h a t some
e a r l i e r a c t i o n d id r e s o l v e the mer i t s o f a
c la im , l i k e any a p p l i c a t i o n o f r e s j u d i
c a t a , must be made " o n l y a f t e r c a r e f u l
s c r u t i n y . " Brown v . F e l s e n , 442 U.S. 127,
132 ( 1 979) .
There i s no qu e s t i o n that the Baxter
p l a i n t i f f s wanted and r e p e a t e d l y attempted
t o l i t i g a t e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l c la ims in the
Co 0£ £ £ a c t i o n . I t i s e q u a l l y c l e a r ,
however, that the de fendants s u c c e s s f u l l y
prevented them from do ing so . Although the
Baxter p l a i n t i f f s were permit ted t o t e s t i f y
at the Cooper t r i a l , the de fendant i n s i s t e d
that the d i s t r i c t c our t not r e s o l v e t h e i r
i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m s , b u t c o n s i d e r t h e i r
t e s t i m o n y o n l y i n s o f a r as i t t e nd e d t o
15/ C o s t e l l o v . United S t a t e s , 36 5 U.S.
765 ( 1 9 6 1 ) ; Hughes v . Un i ted S t a t e s , 71
U.S. (4 W a l l . ) 232 (1 86 6 ) ; Gilman v. R i v e s ,
35 U.S. (10 P e t . ) 298 (1836 ) .
36
e s t a b l i s h t h e e x i s t e n c e o f c l a s s w i d e
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . This d i s t i n c t i o n was made
when t h e f i r s t B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f was
c a l l e d t o the s tand :
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . My understand
ing now i s t h a t , e x c e p t f o r [ C o o p e r
and the thre e o th e r named p l a i n t i f f s ] ,
you w o n ' t r u l e on i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m s
and t h a t t h i s e v i d e n c e we h e a r j u s t
g o e s t o t h e i r c l a i m t h a t t h e r e i s a
p a t t e r n and p r a c t i c e .
* * *
THE COURT: . . . I think the answer t o
your q u e s t i o n i s that i s c o r r e c t . The
o n l y p e o p l e as t o whose r i g h t s the
C ou r t has a d u t y t o make a p r e s e n t
d e c i s i o n ar e t h e f o u r p e r s o n s named
who have themselves a s s e r te d in t h i s
case a p e r s o na l r i g h t t o r e c o v e r y . 16/
F o l l o w i n g t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s i n i t i a l
Memorandum o f D e c i s i o n , which apparent ly
p r e c l u d e d C o o pe r f rom r e p r e s e n t i n g the
i n t e r e s t s o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s at the
Stage I I p r o c e e d i n g s , c o uns e l f o r p l a i n -
16/ See n . 2 , supra.
37
t i f f s sugges ted that the EEOC be permi t ted
t o pr es en t in those p r o c ee d i n gs the i n d i
v i d u a l c l a i m s o f the B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s .
(See p . 9 , s u p r a ) . The d e f e n d a n t a g a in
o b j e c t e d :
The d e f e n d a n t s u b m i t s t h a t t h o s e
w i t n es s es are not e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i
c i p a t e in Stage I I p r o c e e d i n g s . The
pe op le in qu e s t i o n t e s t i f i e d at t r i a l ,
but had not p a r t i c i p a t e d in the a c t i o n
o t h e r than as p a s s i v e c l a s s members.
T h e i r t e s t i m o n y was on the i s s u e o f
£i£.JLS l i a b i l i t y , a l t h o u g h t h e i r
t e st imony f ocused on pe rs o na l g r i e v
ances . These peop le are not p a r t i e s
[and] they are not i n t e r v e n o r s . . . . 17/
The t r i a l c o u r t uphe ld the d e f e n d a n t ' s
a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e EEOC s h o u l d n o t be
J_8/
permi t ted t o pursue the Baxter c la i m s .
F i n a l l y , the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s attempted to
in te r ve ne in the Cooper l i t i g a t i o n in o rder
J_7/ De fen da n t ' s Response to P l a i n t i f f s '
Proposed F ind ings o f Fact and Conc lus i ons
o f Law, p . 8. (Emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) .
18/ See p . 11, s u p ra .
38
t o p r e s e n t t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m s f o r
a d j u d i c a t i o n at the Stage I I p r o c e e d i n g s .
The d e f e n d a n t s u c c e s s f u l l y o p p o s e d t h i s
attempt as w e l l . (P.A. 28 6a - 289 a ) . Far
f r om h a v i n g in C o o pe r "a ' f u l l and f a i r
o p p o r t u n i t y ' t o l i t i g a t e [ t h e i r ] c l a i m , "
Kremer v . Chemical C o n s t r u c t i o n C or p . , 456
U.S. 461, 480 (1 98 2 ) , the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s
in f a c t had no o p p o r t u n i t y whatever t o do
so in that ca se .
I t i s a l s o c l e a r that the t r i a l c o ur t
d i d n o t in f a c t d e c i d e t h e i n d i v i d u a l
c la ims o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s . P h y l l i s
B a x t e r , f o r e x a m p l e , a l l e g e d t h a t on
s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s between 1975 and 1978 she
a p p l i e d f o r c e r t a i n v a c a n c i e s , " b u t was
den ied the p o s i t i o n s beause o f her race and
c o l o r " . ( P . A . 6 6 a ) . P l a i n t i f f G i l l i a m
contended that she was denied promot ion to
a j u n i o r C o m p u t e r C o n s o l e p o s i t i o n in
November o f 1976 b e c a u s e o f r a c i a l d i s -
39 -
c r i m i n a t i o n . P l a i n t i f f s K n o t t , Harr ison
and McCorkle made e q u a l l y s p e c i f i c c l a ims
about d e n i a l s o f promotions t o p a r t i c u l a r
v a c a n c i e s . ( . Id*) N e i t h e r the d i s t r i c t
c o u r t ' s Memorandum o f D e c i s i o n (P.A. 191a)
nor the Judgment (P.A. 52a-62a) c o n t a in any
r e f e r e n c e w h a te v e r t o B a x t e r , G i l l i a m ,
Knott , Harr i son , o r McCorkle. The lower
c o u r t ' s F ind ings o f Fact and Co nc lus i ons o f
Law d e s c r i b e t h e c l a i m s o f t h e B a x t e r
p l a i n t i f f s , n o t i n g t h a t in g e n e r a l t h e y
were f u l l y q u a l i f i e d f o r the p r o m o t i o n s
they sought and o f t e n more exp er i en ced than
the whi tes who were a c t u a l l y appointed t o
the p o s i t i o n s i n v o l v e d . (P.A. 247a-254a ) .
But nowhere in the Findings i s there the
s l i g h t e s t s u g g e s t i o n that the t r i a l judge
had in f a c t reached any c o n c l u s i o n as to
why the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s had been denied
those p a r t i c u l a r promot i ons .
40
The C ou r t o f A p p e a l s , h o w e v e r , b e
l i e v e d that the c la ims o f f o u r o f the f i v e
19 /
B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s were p r e c l u d e d by
r e s j u d i c a t a b e c a u s e o f t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n r e g a r d i n g c l a s s w i d e
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . At the time o f t r i a l these
f o u r p l a i n t i f f were in pay g r a d e s 6 o r
above , and both Cooper and the EEOC c laimed
and s o u g h t t o p r o v e t h a t t h e r e was a
ge n er a l p r a c t i c e o f p r om ot i ona l d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n aga in s t b l ac ks in those pay gr ade s .
The d i s t r i c t c o ur t c onc luded t h a t , o the r
t h a n r e g a r d i n g b l a c k s in pa y g r a d e s 4
and 5 , " t h e r e d o e s n o t a p p e a r t o be a
p a t t e r n and p r a c t i c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
p e r v a s i v e enough f o r the c o u r t t o o r d e r
r e l i e f . " (P.A. 194a) . This h o l d in g cannot
p l a u s i b l y be read as a d e c i s i o n that there
had never been any d i s c r i m i n a t i o n aga ins t
1_9/ Baxter , Knott , G i l l i a m and McCorkle.
41
b l a c k s above g r a d e 5, o r even t h a t such
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n had b e e n p a r t i c u l a r l y
rare o r unique. S ince the d i s t r i c t c our t
in the same o p i n io n a l s o held that p l a i n
t i f f s Cooper and R u s s e l l , both o f whom were
in grades 6 o r above , "were d i s c r im in a t e d
a g a i n s t on ac c ou n t o f t h e i r r a c e " ( P . A .
19 2a ) , i t s h o l d i ng o n t h e c l a s s c l a i m
c a n n o t mean t h a t the re was no such d i s -
c r i m i n c i t i o n in t h o s e g r a d e ! s . The o n l y
p l a u s i b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t ' s
d e c i s i o n i s t h a t a c t s o f d i s c r imin at i o n
a g a i n s t e m p lo y e e s in g r ades 6 and above
were not s u f f i c i e n t l y widespread t o warrant
a c la s s w id e remedy.
That the d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n on
c la s s w id e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in grades 6 and
a b o v e was n o t i n t e n d e d t o r e s o l v e t h e
p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l c la ims o f the Baxter
p l a i n t i f f s , o r o f any o t h e r e m p l o y e e s ,
was c o n f i r m e d by the j u d g e ' s s u b s e q u e n t
42
s ta tements and o r d e r s . At the hear ing on
the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s to
i n t e r v e n e in C o o g e r , a q u e s t i o n a r o s e
reg ar d in g whether the j u d g e ' s p r i o r d e c i
s i o n on the c l a s s c la im might somehow l i m i t
subsequent c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l
c l a i m s . The t r i a l c o u r t e x p r e s s l y r e j e c t e d
any s u c h c o n s t r u c t i o n o f i t s e a r l i e r
d e c i s i o n :
I 'm not r u l i n g that t h e i r r i g h t s are
barred — t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s to
make i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m s are b a r r e d
by res j u d i c a t a . You can have s e v e r a l
pe op le who may be e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r y
w i t h o u t t h a t e v i d e n c e p r o v i n g t h a t
there had been a c la s s w id e d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n . 20/
In i t s o r d e r d e n y i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n , the
d i s t r i c t c o ur t exp l a ine d that i t s e a r l i e r
o p i n i o n had merely " found no p r o o f o f any
c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a b o v e g r a d e
5 .......... " ( P . A. 287a) .
20/ T r a n s c r i p t o f Hearing o f May 8, 1981,
p . 20.
43
The d i s t i n c t i o n drawn by the d i s t r i c t
c o u r t between p r o o f o f c l a s s w id e d i s c r i m i
n a t i o n and p r o o f o f i n d i v i d u a l a c t s o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s f u l l y supported by the
d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s C o u r t . In T e a m s t e r s
v. United S t a t e s , 431 D.S. 324 ( 1 9 7 7 ) , che
C o u r t h e l d t h a t p r o o f o f a p a t t e r n o r
p r a c t i c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n r e q u i r e s more
t h a n p r o o f o f " t h e mere o c c u r r e n c e o f
i s o l a t e d o r ' a c c i d e n t a l ' o r s p o r a d i c
d i s c r i m i n a t o r y a c t s . " 431 U .S . at 336.
G e n e r a l T e l e p h o n e v . F a l c o n n o t e d t h a t
there i s a "wide gap" between the o c c u r
rence o f an i n d i v i d u a l ac t o f d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n and e x i s t e n c e o f a c la s s w id e d i s c r i m i
na tory p r a c t i c e :
Even though ev idence that [a m in o r i t y
employee] was passed over f o r promo
t i o n when s e v e r a l l e s s d e s e r v i n g
whites were advanced may support the
c o n c l u s i o n t h a t [ t h e e m p l o y e e ] was
d e n i e d the p r o m o t i o n b e c a u s e o f h i s
n a t i o n a l o r i g i n , such ev idence would
not n e c e s s a r i l y j u s t i f y the a d d i t i o n a l
44
i n f e r e n c e . . . that t h i s d i s c r i m i n a t o r y
t r e a t m e n t i s t y p i c a l o f [ t h e em
p l o y e r ' s ] p r o m o t i o n a l p r a c t i c e s . . . .
457 U.S. at 157-58. This Court has c o n s i s
t e n t l y r e j e c t e d e f f o r t s t o t r e a t t h e
absence o f c l a s s w id e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as i f
i t were an a f f i r m a t i v e de fe ns e t o a c la im
o f p a r t i c u l a r a c t s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
In C o n n e c t i c u t v . T e a l , 73 L . E d . 2 a 130
( 1 0 8 2 ) , the Court e x p l a i n e d :
[ p ] e t i t i o n e r s seek s imply t o j u s t i f y
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n aga in s t respondent on
the b a s i s o f t h e i r f a v o r a b l e t reatment
o f o t h e r members o f r e s p o n d e n t ' s
r a c i a l g r o u p . . . . I t i s c l e a r t h a t
C o n g r e s s n e v e r i n t e n d e d t o g i v e an
e m p l o y e r a l i c e n s e t o d i s c r i m i n a t e
ag a in s t some employees on the b a s i s o f
race or sex merely because he f a v o r
a b l y t r e a t s o t h e r members o f t h e
employees group.
73 L.Ed.2d at 141-42. Furnco C o n s t r u c t i o n
C o r £ . _v_.__W a t e r s , 438 U . S . 567 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,
emphasized that " [a] r a c i a l l y ba lanced work
f o r c e c a n n o t immunize an e m p l o y e r f rom
l i a b i l i t y f o r s p e c i f i c a c t s o f d i s c r i m i n a
tion. 438 U.S. at 579.
45
The l o w e r c o u r t s h a v e r e p e a t e d l y
r e c o g n i z e d t h a t p r o o f t h a t t h e r e i s no
c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n does not pr ec lu d e
the p o s s i b i l i t y that there may have been
i n d i v i d u a l in s ta n c e s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . In
D i c k e r s o n v . U n i t ed S t a t e s S t e e l Corpora-
t i o n , 582 F .2d 827 (3 r d C i r . 1 978 ) , the
employer advanced the same argument o f f e r e d
by r e s p o n d e n t h e r e , i n s i s t i n g t h a t the
d i s m i s s a l o f a c l a s s w i d e c l a i m b a r r e d
s u b s e q u e n t i n d i v i d u a l l a w s u i t s by c l a s s
members . The c o u r t o f a p p e a l s r e j e c t e d
that c o n t e n t i o n :
The c l a s s c la ims were not examined as
a mere a g g r e g a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l
c l a i m s . . . . R a t h e r , the d i s t r i c t
c o u r t l ooked t o s t a t i s t i c a l ev idence
o f f e r e d t o s u p p o r t the e x i s t e n c e o f
a p r a c t i c e or p a t t e r n o f d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n ____ The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g
o f an absence o f c l a s s - w i d e d i s c r i m i
na t i on i s not n e c e s s a r i l y i n c o n s i s t e n t
with a c la im that d i s c r e t e , i s o l a t e d
i n s t a n c e s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o c c u r
r e d . . . . T h e r e f o r e , t h e c o u r t ' s
d e c i s i o n as to the c l a s s - w i d e c la ims
o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n d o e s n o t , as a
46
m a t t e r o f r e s j u d i c a t a , b a r c l a s s
members f rom a s s e r t i n g i n d i v i d u a l
c l a i m s o f p e r s o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
582 F.2d at 830-31 .
See a l s o Harr ison v . L e w is , 559 F. Supp.
943, 947 (D.D.C. 1983) ; Branham v. General
e l e c t r i c Co . , 63 F.R.D. 667 671-71 (M.D.
Tenn. 1 9 7 4 ) ; 18 C. Wr i ght & A. M i l l e r ,
Federal P r a c t i c e and P r o c e d u r e , § 4455, p p .
4 7 3 - 7 4 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . S e v e r a l c i r c u i t s h a ve
c o n s id e r e d or upheld c la ims o f i n d i v i d u a l
c l a s s members or r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s d e s p i t e
ho l d in g that the ev id enc e d id not suppor t a
H /
f i n d i n g o f c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
The d i s t i n c t i o n r e p e a t e d l y r e c o g n iz e d
by t h i s Cour t , and c o r r e c t l y a p p l i e d by the
d i s t r i c t c o u r t in t h i s c a s e , d o e s n o t
r e c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n s i m i l i a r t o t h e
21/ S e e , e . g . , Muskel ly v . Warner & Swasey
C o . , 653 F.2d 112 (4th C i r . 1981) ; S tastny
v. Southern B e l l T e l . & T e l . Co . , 628 F.2d
267 (4th C i r . 1980) .
- 47
"one-way" i n t e r v e n t i o n which e x i s t e d p r i o r
t o the 1966 amendments t o Rule 23 . The
a c t u a l d e c i s i o n a t a s t a g e I p r o c e e d i n g
b inds the p l a i n t i f f c l a s s as we l l as the
d e f e n d a n t , and that d e c i s i o n has a s i m i l a r
impact on both p a r t i e s . I f the p l a i n t i f f s
p r e v a i l at s tage I o f a b i f u r c a t e d T i t l e
V I I h e a r i n g , the f i n d i n g o f a c l a s s w i d e
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n does not r e s u l t au tomat i c
a l l y in the e n t r y o f judgment f o r each
c l a s s member. Rather , that d e c i s i o n merely
c r e a t e s a r e b u t t a b l e presumpt ion, app l i ed
at the s tage I I remedy he a r i ng , that each
c l a s s member was the v i c t i m o f d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n . I n t e r n a t i o n a l Brotherhood o f Tearn-
s t e r s v_.__U n i t e d S t a t e s , 431 U . S . 3 2 4 ,
357-62 and nn. 45-46 (1 97 7 ) . The employer
remains f r e e t o attempt to overcome that
presumption and t o prove that any p a r t i c u
l a r c l a s s member was n o t such a v i c t i m .
Franks v . Bowman T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Co, 424
48
U . S . 7 4 7 , 773 and n . 32 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . C o n
v e r s e l y , a s tag e I f i n d i n g o f no c la s s w id e
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n has an un qu es t i onab le and
c o m p a r a b l e a d v e r s e e f f e c t on any c l a s s
member t h e r e a f t e r seeking t o l i t i g a t e an
i n d i v i d u a l c la im o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . Such a
c l a s s member would o r d i n a r i l y be barred by
c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l from seeking t o suppor t
h i s o r her i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m by o f f e r i n g
p r o o f o f a gen era l p a t t e r n o r p r a c t i c e o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . Branham v. General E l e c
t r i c Co . , 63 F.R.D. 667, 671-72 (M.D. Tenn.
1974) ; see pp. 63 -67 , i n f r a .
The o p i n i o n o f the c o u r t o f a p p e a l s
s u g g e s t s an a l t e r n a t i v e b a s i s f o r i t s
d e c i s i o n - - t h a t the B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s ,
having u n s u c c e s s f u l l y sought t o have t h e i r
c la ims ad ju d i ca te d in the Cooper l i t i g a
t i o n , are not e n t i t l e d t o renew that e f f o r t
in another l a w s u i t . Such a r u le i s impl ied
by the f o l l o w i n g passage ;
49
The p l a i n t i f f s seek t o es cape the bar
c r e a t e d by the d e t e r m i n a t i o n in the
c l a s s a c t i o n s u i t by arguing that they
were prevented by the D i s t r i c t Court
in prov in g t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l c la ims in
the c l a s s a c t i o n t r i a l . This argument
would d i s r e g a r d the f a c t t h a t the
t r i a l was b i f u r c a t e d by agreement o f
the p a r t i e s . (P.A. 179a-180a) .
This argument seems to a s s e r t , and the bank
a p p e a r s t o a r g u e , t h a t i f t h e B a x t e r
p l a i n t i f f s " l o s t " in Cooper in the sense
that they merely f a i l e d i to o b t a i n a d e c i -
s i o n on t h e m e r i t s o f t h e i r c l a i m s ,
such a " l o s s " p r e c lu d e s any fu r t h e r attempt
to o b t a i n a j u d i c i a l de t er mi na t i on o f those
c l a i m s .
Such a r u l e would be c o m p l e t e l y at
odds with the long e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e s
o f r e s j u d i c a t a , which p r e c lu d e l i t i g a t i o n
o f on ly those c la ims p r e v i o u s l y r e s o l v e d
" o n t h e m e r i t s " . Kremer v . C he mi c a l
C o n s t ru c t i o n C o r p . , 456 U.S. 461, 466 n. 6
( 1 9 8 2 ) ; Federated Department S t o r e s , I n c .
50
v. M o i t i e , 452 U.S. 394, 398 ( 1 981 ) . In
a d d i t i o n , such a r u l e would wreak ha voc
with the ad m i n i s t ra t i o n o f Rule 23. Every
c la s s member would be f o r c e d t o in ter ven e
to a s s u r e t h a t h i s o r he r c l a i m was not
f o r f e i t e d merely because a c o u r t f a i l e d to
d e c i d e i t . No c o m p e t e n t p l a i n t i f f ' s
c o u n s e l c o u l d e v e r a g a i n a g r e e t o t h e
b i f u r c a t i o n o f the t r i a l o f a c l a s s a c t i o n ,
s ince b i f u r c a t i o n would c a r ry with i t an
i n t o l e r a b l e r i s k that the c la ims o f c l a s s
members would be l o s t merely because they
were n o t r e s o l v e d . In l i g h t o f t h a t
danger , no c o n s c i e n t i o u s d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
even at the u r g i n g o f d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ,
could ever o rd er b i f u r c a t i o n .
The de f a c t o a b o l i t i o n o f b i f u r c a t i o n
would impose an enormous a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
burden on the f e d e r a l c o u r t s . The p r o c e
dure e x p r e s s l y approved by t h i s Court in
F r _a n k s and T e a m s t e r s e v o l v e d , and has
51
ga ined widespread acceptance in T i t l e VII
c l a s s a c t i o n s , because i t g r e a t l y r educes
the t ime needed to t r y such c a s e s . As the
lower c o u r t s are we l l aware, the t r i a l o f
even a h a n d f u l o f i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m s o f
employment d i s c r i m i n a t i o n can be as time
consuming as a t r i a l t o determine whether
ther e i s a c la s s w id e p r a c t i c e o f d i s c r i m i -
n a t i o n a f f e c t i n g a n e n t i r e p 1 an t . I n
the in s ta n t c a s e , f o r example , the t r i a l
c o n s u m e d a t o t a l o f s i x d a y s ; o f t h i s
p e r i o d l e s s than two days o f t e s t imony
d e a l t with the c l a s s c l a i m, and over f ou r
days o f hear ings concerned the i n d i v i d u a l
c la ims o f the named p l a i n t i f f s and s e v e r a l
c l a s s members. Had each i n d i v i d u a l c la im
o f every c l a s s member been p r e s e n t e d , the
t r i a l would d o u b t l e s s have l a s t e d s e v e r a l
months r a t her than a few days . A s i m i l a r
e x p o n e n t i a l g rowth in the l e n g t h o f a l l
T i t l e VII t r i a l s would be p r e c i p i t a t e d by
52
a r u l e that the f a i l u r e o f a c o ur t t o f i nd
c l a s s w i d e a i s c r i ra m a t r o n a t a s t a g e I
hearing a u t o m a t i c a l l y pr ec lu d e s l i t i g a t i o n
o f a l l i n d i v i d u a l c la i m s .
I f such a r u l e was in f a c t app l i ed by
the c o u r t o f a p p e a l s in t h i s c a s e , the
n o t i c e a c t u a l l y sent t o c l a s s members was
f a t a l l y d e f i c i e n t . The n o t i c e a d v i s e d
c l a s s members
[T]he judgment in t h i s c as e , whether
f a v o r a b l e o r u n f a v o r a b l e . . . w i l l
in c l ud e a l l c l a s s members; a l l c l a s s
members w i l l be bound by the judgment
o r o t he r de t erminat i on o f t h i s a c t i o n .
(P . A . 36a)
The unambiguous meaning o f t h i s n o t i c e was
that the c la im o f a c l a s s member would be
l o s t on ly i f there were in f a c t a "de te rm i
na t i on " o f that c la i m , and i f that de termi
n a t i o n w e r e " u n f a v o r a b l e . " N o t h i n g
in the n o t i c e in any way suggested that a
c l a s s member w o u l d somehow be " b o u n d "
because the c our t d id not i ssue any " ju d g
53
ment o r o t h e r de te rm in at i o n " r egard ing h i s
o r her c la im.
The d e c i s i o n o f the c o u r t o f appeal s
t o d i sm is s the c la ims o f p e t i t i o n e r Ha rr i
son d id not r e s t on. the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s
d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e c l a i m o f c l a s s w i d e
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n g r a d e s 6 and a b o v e .
S ince Harr ison he ld o n l y a grade 3 p o s i
t i o n , the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n r e ga r d
ing promot i ons out o f the h igher grades was
n o t c o n t r o l l i n g . N e i t h e r the d i s t r i c t
c o u r t ' s Memorandum o f D e c i s i o n , F ind ings o f
Fact and Co nc lus i ons o f Law, or Judgment
c o n t a in any r e f e r e n c e whatever to whether
o r not there was a pa t te r n o f d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n in p r o m o t i o n s o u t o f g r a d e 3. In
ho ld in g that H a r r i s o n ' s c la im was barred by
res j u d i c a t a , the c o u r t o f appeal s as s e r te d
t h a t t h a t c l a i m " i s p r e c l u d e d by o u r
de t er mi na t i on on t h i s appeal that there was
no p r a c t i c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in pay grade
54
5 and b e l o w . " (P.A. 179a) .
But the p h r a s e " i n pay g r a d e 5 and
b e l o w " masks a c r i t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n
between the ac tu a l d e c i s i o n o f the Fourth
C i r c u i t and the nature o f H a r r i s o n ' s c la im.
The i s s ue in f a c t c o ns id e r ed and r e s o l v e d
by the c our t o f appeals was o n l y whether
the d i s t r i c t c o ur t erred in f i n d i n g d i s
c r i m i n a t i o n in p r o m o t i o n s f rom g r a d e s 4
and 5; the d i s t r i c t c o u r t made no f i n d i n g
a b o u t , and the c o u r t o f a p p e a l s had no
o c c a s i o n e v e n t o c o n s i d e r , p r o m o t i o n
p r a c t i c e s a f f e c t i n g b l a c k e m p l o y e e s in
g r a d e 3. I t i s c l e a r t h a t the c o u r t o f
appeal s we l l understood that the o n l y i ssue
o f c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n b e f o r e i t
i n v o l v e d g r a d e s 4 and 5 . In t w e l v e
d i f f e r e n t p a s s a g e s the c o u r t o f a p p e a l s
d e s c r i b e d the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g o f
c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , in e v e r y c a s e
no t in g that that f i n d i n g concerned grades 4
55
and 5 . In t h e c o u r s e o f a n a l y z i n g
the ev id enc e bear ing on whether there was
c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , the c o u r t o f
a p p e a l s r e p e a t e d on more t h a n t h i r t y
o c c a s i o n s that the i s sue b e f o r e i t was the
s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g
2 3 /
g r a d e s 4 and 5 , e m p h a s i z i n g a t o n e
p o i n t , " [ w ] e are c o n c e r n e d s o l e l y w i th
a l l e g e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in pay grades 4 and
5 . " ( P . A . 9 9 a ) . The a p p e l l a t e c o u r t ' s
a c t u a l c o n c l u s i o n r e g a r d i n g c l a s s w i d e
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i s e q u a l l y unambiguous :
[A] f i n d i n g o f e i t h e r a pr ima f a c i e
c a s e o r o f a p a t t e r n o f c l a s s d i s -
2 2 /
2 2 / P . A . 7a , 15a, 25a , 26 a , 27a , 28a ,
3 4 a , 55 a , 104a, 123a, 124a n . 4 0 , 129a.
2 3 / P .A . 2 9 a , 3 0 a , 35a , 36a , 37a , 38a ,
55a , 57a , 5 8 a , 5 9 a , 61a , 62a , 64 a , 65a
n . 24, 70a, 71a, 72a , 77a, 78a, 79a, n . 2 6 ,
80a , 8 2 a , 9 3 a , 9 9 a , 1 0 3 a , 1 0 4 a , 1 0 5 a ,
1 08a, 110a, 111a, 113a, 114a, 116a, 117a,
122a, 124a, 126a, 127a , 128a.
56
c r i m i n a t i o n in promotions out o f pay
grades 4 and 5 o r a Finding o f Fact, o f
such a p a t t e r n i s no t s u p p o r t e d by
any s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e ........... Vv e
a c c o r d i n g l y r e v e r s e t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t ' s F i n d i n g s and C o n c l u s i o n s o f
c l a s s d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in promot ions out
o f p a y g r a d e s 4 and 5 . . . . ( P . A .
12 8 a - 129a ) .
Nowhere in the a p p e l l a t e o p i n i o n i s there
the s l i g h t e s t s u gg e s t i o n that the panel was
c o n s i d e r i n g , or even aware o f , any a l l e g a
t i o n in Cooper o f c l a s s w id e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
24 /
in promot i ons out o f pay grace 3. Ac co r d
i n g l y , n o t h i n g i n t h a t r e c o r d can in
any way f o r e c l o s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f Ha rr i
s o n ' s c l a i m in t h e B a x t e r l i t i g a t i o n .
(2) The D i s t r i c t Court in Cooper
Ex pr es s ly Reserved the Right o f
the Baxter P l a i n t i f f s t o Bring
This L i t i g a t i o n
24/ The few r e f e r e n c e s in the c o u r t ' s
o p i n i o n to pay grade 3 co n t a in no sugges
t i o n that the c o u r t b e l i e v e d there was any
such a l l e g a t i o n . (P.A. 3a, 30a, 37a, 98a,
118a, 153a) .
57
Txhe p r o c e d u r a l h i s t o r y o f t h i s c a s e
p r e s e n t s an a d d i t i o n a l b a s i s f o r r e j e c t i n g
the d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n that the d e c i
s i o n in Cooper r e q u i r e s d i s m i s s a l o f the
c o m p l a i n t in B a x t e r . i n o p p o s i n g t h e
attempt o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s t o i n t e r
vene in Co op e r , the de fendant i n s i s t e d that
i n t e r v e n t i o n was s imply unnecessary s in ce
the B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s were f r e e t o f i l e
t h e i r own l a w s u i t . In the D e f e n d a n t ' s
Response t o Motion t o I n t e r v e n e , the bank
ar gu ed :
[A] pp l i c a n t s . . . can s t i l l go t o the
EEOC o f f i c e and f i l e a l l the charges
they d e s i r e ------ T h e r e f o r e , there i s
no way there w i l l be any p r e j u d i c e t o
t h e a p p l i c a n t s in d e n y i n g t h e i r
m o t i o n , s i n c e t h e y can p u r s u e any
i n d i v i d u a l c la ims they have in s epa r
ate p r o c e e d i n g s . (P .4)
At the o r a l argument on that motion in the
d i s t r i c t c o u r t , the defendant r e i t e r a t e d
t h i s c o n t e n t i o n :
58
COURT:
MR. HODGES:
MR. HODGES:
Mr. Hodges [ c oun se l f o r
d e f e n d a n t ] , are you
saying that they could
br ing a sepa rat e
s u i t w i tn in whatever
the time would be
f o l l o w i n g the d i s m i s s a l
o f t h i s case?
I d e l i e v e they cou ld i f
they wanted t o pursue
t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l c la ims
and i f the s t a t u t e was
t o l l e d -and whatever was
not barred by the
s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s ,
then they cou ld pursue
s e p a r a t e l y . . . .
* * * *
. . . [T]hey cou ld go
f i l e charges with
the EEOC, f i l e a case
under 1981, but they
could not p a r t i c i p a t e
any l on ge r in t h i s
c as e . They are not
e n t i t l e d s imply t o go
in to Stage 2 t o pursue
t h e i r c l a i m s . They ' ve
go t t o do what any
o th e r P l a i n t i f f with a
complaint has go t t o do
and that i s go through
the proper pr o ce du re .
* * * *
59
MR. HODGES: I f t h e y ' v e go t i n d i
v id ua l c l a i m s , l e t
them f i l e i t . Let them
go through the proper
p r o c e d u r e s . 2 5 /
A mere 55 days a f t e r thus i n s i s t i n g that
the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s c ould and should f i l e
t h e i r own s u i t , th e d e f e n d a n t moved t o
d i s m i s s t h a t l a w s u i t as b a r r e d by r e s
2 6 /
j u d i c a t a . i n t h e c o u r t o f a p p e a l s
t h e d e f e n d a n t e x p r e s s l y d i s a v o w e d t h e
p o s i t i o n i t had taken in Co op e r , e x p l a i n i n g
" Th e Bank d i d a t t h e t i m e e r r o n e o u s l y
a s s e r t t h a t i n d i v i d u a l c l a i m s c o u l d be
2 7 /
p u r s u e d . " gu t ha v in g thu s p r e v e n t e d
the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s from l i t i g a t i n g t h e i r
c la ims in C oo pe r , the bank was n e c e s s a r i l y
25/ T r a n s c r i p t o f Hearing o f May 8, 1981,
pp. 7, 8, 16.
26/ J .A 71a. The d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion to
D i s m i s s was f i l e d in B a x t e r on J u l y 2,
1981.
27/ Reply B r i e f o f A p p e l l a n t , iSio. 82-1259
(4th C i r . j , p. 2.
60
es topped from oppos ing the f i l i n g o f the
sepa rat e l awsu i t which the bank i t s e l f had
a d v o c a t e d .
The argument advanced by the bank in
o p p o s i n g t h e m o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e was
e x p r e s s l y adopted by the d i s t r i c t c o u r t in
denying i n t e r v e n t i o n . During the argument
on t h a t m o t i o n the d i s t r i c t j u d g e made
c l e a r that h i s d e c i s i o n in Cooper l e f t the
B a x t e r p l a i n t i f f s f r e e t o f i l e a new
a c t i o n :
COURT: Mr. Hodges i s agree ing
with [the p l a i n t i f f s ]
tnat u l t i m a t e l y they can
a l l come in here . He
says they are e n t i t l e d
t o have the EEOC fu n c t i o n
in t h e i r cas es b e f o r e
they have a s tand ing to
be in t h i s c a s e , and I
think h e ' s r i g h t .
* * * *
COURT: I 'm go ing t o deny the
motion wi thout p r e j u d i c e
t o the i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s
o f the f o u r would be
61
i n t e r v e n o r s t o maintain
a sepa ra te a c t i o n o r to
f i l e a se pa ra te c l a i m . , . .
MR. CHAMBERS [ counse l f o r p l a i n
t i f f s ] : Your Honor,
would that wi thout
p r e j u d i c e be a l s o with
r e s p e c t t o t h e i r r i g h t s
under 1981, because we
w i l l move tomorrow
morning f o r a se parate
l a w s u i t .
COURT: Sure, wi thout p r e j u d i c e
to any r i g n t s they have
under 1981 o r under the
Equal Employment A c t . 2 8 /
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s o rd er denying i n t e r
v e n t i on emphasized:
I s e e no r e a s o n why, i f any o f the
would be i n t e r v e n o r s are a c t i v e l y
i n t e r e s t e d in pursuing t h e i r c la i m s ,
t h e y c a n n o t f i l e a S e c t i o n 1981
s u i t next week, nor why they cou ld not
f i l e a c l a i m w i t h EEOC n e x t week.
( P . A . 288a) .
28/ T r a n s c r i p t o f Hearing o f May 8, 1981,
pp. 12, 17-18. (Emphasis added) .
62
The d i s t r i c t j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n i s by i t s e l f
d i s p o s i t i v e o f the res j u d i c a t a d e f e n s e .
Res j u d i c a t a i s n e v e r a p p l i c a b l e i f a
p l a i n t i f f ' s c la im in an e a r l i e r a c t i o n was
29 /
r e j e c t e d "wi thout p r e j u d i c e , " o r i f the
c o u r t in the f i r s t a c t i o n e x p r e s s l y r e
served the p l a i n t i f f s r i g h t t o maintain a
30 /
second a c t i o n .
29/ R e s t a t e m e n t o f Ju dgm ent s , S e c o n d ,
§ 2 0 ( 1 ) ( b ) : "A pe rs on a l judgment f o r the
de f en d a n t , a l though v a l i d and f i n a l , does
not bar another a c t i o n by the p l a i n t i f f on
the same c la im . . . (b) when . . . the c our t
d i r e c t s that the p l a i n t i f f be nonsui ted ( o r
t h a t the a c t i o n be o t h e r w i s e d i s m i s s e d )
wi thout p r e j u d i c e . . . . " ( 1982 ) .
30/ R e s t a t e m e n t o f Ju dgm ent s , S e c o n d ,
§ 2 6 ( 1 ) ( b ) : " ( 1 ) When any o f the f o l l o w i n g
c i r cumstances e x i s t s , the gen era l r u le . .
does not apply t o e x t i n g u i s h the c la im and
. . . the c la im s u b s i s t s as a p o s s i b l e b a s i s
f o r a s e c o n d a c t i o n by t h e p l a i n t i f f
ag a i n s t the de f endant : . . . (b) The c our t
in the f i r s t a c t i o n has e x p r e s s l y r eserved
t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t t o m a i n t a i n t h e
second a c t i o n . . . . " ( 1982 ) .
63
I I I THE APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL TO THIS C A S E ____
Although the r e j e c t i o n o f a c la im o f
c l a s s w i d e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n does not p r ec lu d e
t h e s u b s e q u e n t l i t i g a t i o n o f c l a i m s o f
i n d i v i d u a l c l a s s members, i t w i l l o r d i n a r
i l y r e s t r i c t the e v i d e n c e and i s s u e s on
whi ch such s u b s e q u e n t l i t i g a t i o n may "be
based . "Under c o l l a t e r a l e s t o p p e l , once an
i s s u e i s a c t u a l l y and n e c e s s a r i l y d e
termined by a c our t o f competent j u r i s d i c
t i o n , that de ter mina t i o n i s c o n c l u s i v e in
subsequent s u i t s based on a d i f f e r e n t cause
o f a c t i o n i n v o lv i n g a pa r ty t o the p r i o r
l i t i g a t i o n . " Montana v. Uni te d S t a t e s , 440
U.S. 147, 1 53 (1 979) . As with res j u d i
c a t a , o f c o u r s e , the bar o f c o l l a t e r a l
e s t o p p e l must be app l i ed with c a r e . " I t
must be c on f i ne d t o s i t u a t i o n s where the
matter r a i s ed in the second s u i t i s i den
t i c a l in a l l r e s p e c t s w i th t h a t d e c i d e d
64
in t h e f i r s t p r o c e e d i n g and w h e re t h e
c o n t r o l l i n g f a c t s and a p p l i c a b l e l e g a l
p r i n c i p l e s remain unchanged. " Commissioner
v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1948 ) .
" I f there be any u n c e r t a in t y on t h i s head
in the r e co rd — as , f o r example: i f i t
appear that s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t mat ters may
have been l i t i g a t e d . . . wi thout i n d i c a t i n g
. . . upon which the judgment was rendered —
the whole s u b j e c t matter o f the a c t i o n w i l l
oe at l a r g e . . . . " R u s s e l l v . P l a c e , 94
U.S. 606, 608 (1876 ) .
With regard t o p e t i t i o n e r Harr i son , i t
i s c l e a r t h a t n o t h i n g was l i t i g a t e d o r
de c id ed in the Cooper l i t i g a t i o n regard ing
w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e bank e n g a g e d in a
p a t t e r n and p r a c t i c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i n g
a g a i n s t b l a c k s in p r o m o t i o n s o u t o f pay
grade 3. Harr ison should thus be f r e e on
remand to seek t o p r o v e , in suppor t o f h i s
65 -
i n d i v i d u a l c la im , that such a p a t t e r n and
p r a c t i c e e x i s t e d .
The o t he r Baxter p l a i n t i f f s , who are
in pay grades 6 and above , are bound by the
t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n in Cooper that any
p a t t e r n or p r a c t i c e o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in
those grades was not " p e r v a s i v e enough f o r
t h e c o u r t t o o r d e r r e l i e f . " But w h i l e
i t i s apparent that t h i s passage d id not
a d j u d i c a t e the i n d i v i d u a l c la ims o f any o f
the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s , i t i s unc l ear how
widespread o r uncommon the d i s t r i c t c o u r t
a c t u a l l y conc luded d i s c r i m i n a t i o n was in
those pay gr ade s . A f r equency o f d i s c r i m i
nat i on i n s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y c la s s w id e
r e l i e f might s t i l l be adequate t o pr o v i d e
s i g n i f i c a n t e v i d e n t i a r y support f o r i n d i
v i d u a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c l a i m s . S i n c e
the Baxter c la ims are t o be t r i e d by the
same judge who de c i de d Coope r , the d i s t r i c t
c o u r t w i l l be in a p o s i t i o n on remand to
66
r e s o l v e , based on the intended meaning o f
the o r i g i n a l Cooper d e c i s i o n , the e x t e n t t o
which the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s may i n t r o d u c e ,
in suppor t o f t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l d i s c r i m i n a
t i o n c l a i m s , ev id enc e o f a l l e g e d ac t s o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n v o l v i n g o t h e r b l a c k
e m p l o y e e s in p a y g r a d e s 6 and a b o v e .
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t in t h i s case found
that the bank had engaged in i n t e n t i o n a l
r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in denying promot ions
t o two o f the named p l a i n t i f f s , S y l v i a
C o o p e r and C o n s t a n c e R u s s e l l . ( P . A .
1 9 2 a - 1 9 3 a ) . I t c o n c l u d e d in p a r t i c u l a r
that Cooper , who was in pay grade 7, had
been un la w fu l l y denied a promot ion t o grade
8, wh i l e R u s s e l l , a grade 6 employee , had
been i l l e g a l l y r e j e c t e d f o r a promot ion t o
g r a d e 7. The c o u r t o f a p p e a l s r e v e r s e d
both o f these f i n d i n g s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .
( P . A . 1 2 9 a - 1 7 1 a ) . But the o p i n i o n and
panel which over turned those f i n d i n g s a l s o
67
e r r o n e o u s l y assumed, as i s apparent from
the d i s c u s s i o n o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s ,
that the t r i a l c o u r t had found there was no
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n at a l l at the bank in grades
6 and above . The c o u r t o f a p pe a l s ' mis
reading o f the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s ho ld in g on
the q u e s t i o n o f c l a s s w id e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in
grades 6 and above n e c e s s a r i l y t a i n t e d i t s
r e j e c t i o n o f the c l a i m s o f R u s s e l l and
C oo pe r t h a t t h e y were d i s c r i m i n a t o r i l y
d e n i e d p r o m o t i o n s o u t o f g r a d e s 6 and 7
r e s p e c t i v e l y . A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e Four th
C i r c u i t ' s d e c i s i o n d i s m is s in g the c la ims o f
Cooper and R u s s e l l should be vacated and
remanded f o r r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n in l i g h t o f
t h e c o r r e c t c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e t r i a l
c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n on the c la s s w id e c la i m s .
CONCLUSION
The judgment and o p i n io n o f the Fourth
C i r c u i t , i n s o f a r as t h e y h o l d t h a t the
c la ims o f the Baxter p l a i n t i f f s are barred
68
by r es j u d i c a t a , should be r e v e r s e d . The
judgment and o p i n io n re gard ing p l a i n t i f f s
Cooper and R u s s e l l should be vaca ted and
remanded f o r fu r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n in l i g h t
o f t h i s C o u r t ' s o p i n i o n .
R e s p e c t f u l l y submi t ted ,
J. LeVONNE CHAMBERS
JOHN T. NOCKLEBY
Chambers, Ferguson, Watt,
Wallas & Adkins , P.A.
951 S. Independence
Boulevard
C h a r l o t t e , North Car o l ina
28202
JACK GREENBERG
0. PETER SHERWOOD
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON
ERIC SCHNAPPER*
16th F loor
99 Hudson S t r e e t
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
Counsel f o r P e t i t i o n e r s
*Counsel o f Record
MHIEN P*fSS INC. — N. y. C. 2 1 9