Aaron v. Cooper Court Opinion and Record

    IN THE
UNITED STATIS COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NO. 71-3305

YVONNE MARIE BOYD, et al..
Plaintiff3-Amici Curiae 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, 

vs.
POINTE COUPEE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS 
AS AMICI CURIAE

A. M. TRUDEAU
1125 North Claiborne Street 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70116 
MURPHY W. BELL 
1438 East Boulevard 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 

JACK GREENBERG 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Amici
Curiae



IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

NO. 71-3305

YVONNE MARIE BOYD, et al..
Plaintiffs-Amici Curiae,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Appellant, 

vs.
POINTE COUPEE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFFS 
AS AMICI CURIAE

Plaintiffs, participating in this appeal as amici 
curiae pursuant to the Order of this Court entered January 
11, 1972, submit this Supplemental Brief in accordance with

1/the Court's directions contained in its Order of July 10, 1973. 
The purpose of the brief is to identify the issues presented

1/ The Court's Order mistakenly identifies plaintiffs as the 
appellants in its caption, and requires submission of a 

supplemental brief by "appellants" in the body of the Order. To 
avoid any misunderstanding, we are setting out our position in 
this document; we understand the United States, appellant herein, 
is also filing a supplemental brief.



on this record concerning public school desegregation in Pointe 

Coupee Parish which are yet unresolved, and as to which the 

parties continue to maintain adversary positions.

The judgment from which this appeal is prosecuted was
2/

issued by minute entry dated September 20, 1971 (and a copy
thereof is attached hereto as Appendix "AA"). The district

3/court denied the motion of the United States for supplemental 

relief and appended to its judgment a statement of reasons for 

its action which, we believe, can fairly be read as a ruling 

upon each of the three issues which have been discussed in the 

previous submissions of the parties to this appeal: (a) assign­

ment of faculty among Pointe Coupee Parish public schools;

(b) assignment of students to classes in the "Upper Pointe Coupee" 

(Batchelor-Innis) center; and (c) continuing maintenance of 

LaBarre, Rosenwald, and St. Alma as all-black schools. C f -

2/ The order was actually entered October 6, 1971.
3/ Attached to this Supplemental Brief as Appendix "BB" is a 
detailed statement of the history of this case which attempts 
to unravel its tangled procedural skein. We would simply note 
here that although defendants have in the past urged that the 
government's motion in the district court was limited only to 
the faculty assignment question, the record affirmatively re­
flects both that the United States adopted the plaintiffs' and 
plaintiff-intervenors' contentions as their own (see Minute 
Entry of August 11, 1971, attached hereto as Appendix "CC"; Tr. 
8 [Transcript of August 11, 1971 hearing, attached as Appendix 
"B" to "Brief of Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenors" in this 
cause filed December 20, 1971 in this Court]) and also that the

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1 /note 3, supra. The remaining question, then, is whether these 
issues still present live controversies affecting the operation 
of Pointe Coupee Parish schools. We submit that they do.

The latest Hinds County report, with which the record 
on this appeal was supplemented pursuant to this Court's order 
of June 1, 1973, reveals that the violations of the Constitution 
of which plaintiffs and the United States complained, and which 
were sanctioned by the district court's order, yet continue. 
LaBarre, Rosenwald and St. Alma schools are still all-black as 
a result of the plan of student assignment approved by the 
district court; classes at the Upper Pointe Coupee center are 
almost totally segregated; faculty ratios at the various schools 
range from 28.5% black (Poydras) to 93.1% black (Rosenwald).
Thus, the issues presented for resolution at the time this appeal 
was filed remain unresolved.

3/ (continued)
various issues were brought to the attention of the district 
court (e.g,, Tr. 40, 42, 44, 57-58, 65). See note 4 infra.
4/ Indeed, the court's order deals most explicitly with the 
continued maintenance of LaBarre, Rosenwald and St. Alma 
schools as all-black facilities, but the district court also 
makes the explicit finding that the "Pointe Coupee Parish 
School System is now, in fact, a unitary, non-discriminatory 
school system within the meaning and intent of federal law."
In light of the presentation of the Singleton and Batchelor- 
Innis assignment contentions to the district court, this language 
can only mean that these contentions were passed upon and rejected.

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We believe, therefore, that the present unconsti­
tutional conditions in the public schools of Pointe Coupee 
Parish are the direct and continuing result of the order from 
which this appeal was taken. They are thus properly before 
this Court and their correction is required. Furthermore, 
although the procedural posture of this matter is complicated 
and perhaps even unwieldy, the case is properly here on appeal 
and this Court has an obligation (taking into account the latest 
enrollment and faculty figures by which the record has been 
supplemented) to enforce the Constitution. Cf., e.q., Hall v. 
St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).

The Merits

Without attempting to duplicate the extensive material 

already filed in this cause, we believe it would be helpful if 

we very briefly summarized our contentions with respect to each 

issue for the benefit of the Court.

1. Faculty. The government's motion for supplemental 
relief in the district court alleged that faculty assignments 
were not in compliance with Singleton v. Jackson Municipal 
Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969). The 
district court denied the motion. As of October 12, 1971, the 
ratios among the nine school facilities operated by the defen-

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dants (treating Batchelor-Innis as a single school) ranged from 
30% black (Livonia) to 95% black (Rosenwald). As noted above, 
the most recent figures demonstrate variances from 28.5% black 
to 93.1% black. This Court should direct entry of an order by 
the district court requiring full compliance with Singleton.

«
2. Testing. Following remand of this case to the 

district court for submission and approval of desegregation 
plans other than freedom-of-choice, sub nom. Hall v. St. Helena 
Parish School Bd., supra, an HEW-devised plan was entered. There­
after, without hearing, the district court on August 21, 1970 
granted a motion to modify the plan by, inter alia, assigning 
students to academic or vocational campuses in the Batchelor- 
Innis (Upper Pointe Coupee) area of the parish according to 
their performance on standardized achievement tests. The latest 
report indicates the resulting segregation of classes is nearly 
total. The matter was raised and discussed before the district 
court (Tr. 40, 44), which apparently believed the issue was 
precluded by this Court's dismissal of an earlier appeal for 
untimeliness even though this Court's Order (in No. 30467) stated 
it was "without prejudice to further proceedings in the district 
court which may be warranted in this school desegregation case" 
(Tr. 62-63). The district court denied supplemental relief.
The classes continue segregated, in clear violation of this

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Court's rulings from Anthony v. Marshall County B d . of Educ.,

419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969) through Moses v. Washington Parish 
School Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972). As was done in 
Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 446 F.2d 911 
(5th Cir. 1971), this Court in this case should direct reinsti­
tution, immediately, of the HEW plan for the Batchelor-Innis 
area and elimination of the testing proposal.

3. Retention of all-black schools. Plaintiff-intervenors1 
motion for further relief, adopted by the United States and by 
the plaintiffs (Tr. 6, 8) specifically complained that the 
continuance of three all-black schools in the parish meant that 
a unitary school system had not been achieved. These resulted 
from the abandonment of the HEW pairing plan allowed by the 
August 21, 1970 district court order referred to above. The 
district court dealt with this contention extensively in its 
minute entry, concluding that these schools were "de facto" 
segregated. Such a ruling is patently ridiculous and flies in 
the face of the record and this Court's rulings in such cases 
as Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 457 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.
1972) and Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist.,
467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972) (eii banc) , cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___ (1973). For the reasons we set out in our brief tendered
in No. 30467, the HEW plan must be reinstituted in these areas 
of the parish also.

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CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs would respectfully pray that the judgment
of the district court be reversed with directions.

Respectfully submitted

A. M. TRUDEAU
1125 North Claiborne Street 
New Orleans, Louisiana 70116 
MURPHY W. BELL 
1438 East Boulevard 
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 

JACK GREENBERG 
NORMAN J .CHACHKIN 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Amici
Curiae

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 26th day of July, 1973,

I served two copies of the foregoing Supplemental Brief for 
Plaintiffs as Amici Curiae upon the attorneys for the parties 
herein, John F. Ward, Jr.,Esq., 206 Louisiana Avenue, Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana, and Gerald Kaminski, Esq., United States 
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, by United States 
mail, first-class postage prepaid.

Norman J. Chachkin 
Attorney for Plaintiffs

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

BATON ROUGE DIVISION

MINUTE ENTRY s 
SEPTEMBER 20, 1971 
WEST, J.

YVONNE MARIE BOYD, ET AL
VERSUS
POINTS COUPEE PARISH SCHOOL 
BOARD, ET AL

CIVIL ACTION 
NUMBER 3164

* * * * * * *
This matter carao on for hearing on a prior day on the 

motion of the United States of America, intervenor herein, for 
supplemental relief when, after hearing the evidence and arguments 
of counsel, the Court took time to consider. Now, after due con­
sideration, the motion of the United Statea of America for 
supplemental relief is DENIED.

REASONS
The- e-vidence in this case show3 that this Court issued 

an order on July 25, 1359, requiring implementation of integration 
plans for the Pointe Coupee Parish schools. This order and plan 
was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on January 6, 
1970. Certain modifications to this plan were requested by the 
School Board which, by order of this Court dated August 21, 1970, 
were granted. That order was appealed and on November 13, 1970, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal.

appendix aa



Pursuant to these orders, all students in the Pointe
Coupee Parish School System were assigned to schools on a 
racially non-discriminatory basis. If all students had, in 
fact, continued to attend the schools to which they had been 
assigned, integration of the schools would have been complete, 
and substantially in accordance with existing ratios of whites 
to negroes in the system. But as a result of these assignments, 
some 1800 or more students left the public school system to 
attend private schools. The result was the re-establishment 
of three all negro schools in the system. None of the white 
students who left these schools were permitted to attend other 
schools in the system. They left the public school system which, 
of course, they had a legal right to do. Consequently, the re­
establishment of the colored schools in the Pointe Coupee Parish 
School System has in no way been brought about by State action.
The segregation resulting is purely de facto in nature. It would 
be foolhardy to continue to reshuffle the student population 
every time some students exercised their legal right to leave 
the public school system in an effort to keep "spreading" the 
white students among all of the schools. Somewhere the line must 
be drawn between forced segregation and segregation which comes 
about by lawful choice. The point has been reached in the Pointe 
Coupee Parish System whore this Court must conclude (1) that the 
orders of this Court pertaining to integration of schools have been



complied with? (2) that the Pointe Coupee Parish School Board 
is operating a unitary, non-discriminatory school system? (3) 
that there is. no State action involved in the re-segregation of 
certain schools in the system? and (4) that whatever re-segregation 
of schools now remains is no different from that remaining in many 
northern areas —  it is purely cle facto, resulting from the exercise 
of n legal right by some white students to leave the public school 
system. This is simply an inevitable result of forced integration 
of schools and does not give rise to the supplemental relief 
sought by the Government. The Pointe Ccupee Parish School Board 
has not returned to a freedom of choice plan. Students in that 
system must attend the school to which they are assigned if they 
are to remain in the system. And if they do so, all schools 
would be integrated in strict accordance with the law. In other 
words, the students do not have any freedom of choice insofar as 
what school in the system they v/ill attend. If they attend any, 
they mu3t attend the one to which they have been assigned. But 
they do, of course, have the choice of withdrawing from the system 
entirely and attending private schools if they wish. The fact 
that many of them exercise this choice does not supply any merit 
to the contention that a dual system of schools has been re-established 
by the School Board. If the students who have left the system choose 
to return, they will, once again, be assigned to a school in accord­
ance with the integration plan under which the School Board is forced 
to operate. Thus, the fact that certain schools have become re­
segregated involves no State action of any kind.



There is no credible evidence to show that there has
been any racial discrimination in the hiring or firing of 
supervisory personnel. The evidence conclusively show3 that 
supervisory personnel have been properly integrated and that 
race is no longer a consideration in the employment of such 
personnel. If race is not a factor, and if using qualifications 
as the primary criteria results in an imbalance between white 
and ne-gro personnel, so be it. There is nothing wrong with 
such a result where no discriminatory intent or plan has been 
shown. Ko such plan or intent has been shown here. The Pointe 
Coupee Parish School System i3 now, in fact, a unitary, non— 
discriminatory school system within the meaning and intent of 
federal law. The supplemental relief sought i3 therefore denied.

UHITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE



APPENDIX BB

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Throughout the following description of the history 
of this cause, the following terms will be used to describe 
the various parties: the original plaintiffs will be referred 
to as the "BOYD Plaintiffs;" the plaintiff-intervenors in the 
district court as the "DOUGLAS Plaintiffs;" the defendants as 
the "BOARD" and the United States as the "GOVERNMENT."

These proceedings originated with this Court's 
invalidation of the Pointe Coupee Parish freedom-of-choice 
desegregation plan, in light of Green v. County School Bd. of 
New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), and its remand to the 
district court for adoption and implementation of a new and 
effective desegregation plan. 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969). On July 25, 1969, the district 
court ordered implementation of alternative plans on a phased 
basis. The result of this order and the alternatives was that 
all of the HEW-recommended sbhool pairings would be implemented 
over a two-year period, rather than in the fall of 1969. The 
BOYD plaintiffs had filed objections to the BOARD proposals 
but these were overruled.

bl



On October 10, 1969, following the declaration 
by the Governor of Louisiana of a so-called "freedom of choice" 
school holiday for Monday, October 13, 1969, the DOUGLAS Plain­
tiffs sought, and were granted, leave to intervene in this 
action. (Judge West being temporarily absent from the district, 
that motion was heard before and granted by Judge Mitchell, of 
the New Orleans Division). Following an emergency appeal to 
this Court, a temporary restraining order was issued barring 
participation in the said "freedom of choice" holiday.

On or about August 10, 1970, the BOARD filed a Motion 
in the district court to amend its desegregation plan by 
zoning areas of the parish which had been, or were scheduled 
to be, served by paired schools under the July 25, 1969 order.
On August 21, 1970, the BOYD plaintiffs mailed to counsel and 
the district court, written objections to the BOARD'S motion. 
However, on that same date (August 21), and without any hearing, 
the district court entered an order approving the modifications.

Counsel for the BOYD plaintiffs did not receive 
notice of the entry of the August 21, 1970 order. Consequently, 
the BOYD plaintiffs filed no Notice of Appeal within the time 
prescribed by the Singleton time schedule. On August 31, 1970, 
however, the DOUGLAS plaintiffs did file a Notice of Appeal, 
subsequently docketed as No. 30467 in this Court.

b2



On the same date, August 31, 1970, the DOUGLAS Plain­
tiffs filed a Motion for Summary Reversal of the district court's 
order. This document was never served upon counsel for the BOYD 
Plaintiffs.

The first notice the BOYD Plaintiffs had that the
district court had approved the BOARD'S requested modifications
was upon receipt of the BOARD'S Motion to Dismiss the appeal
of the DOUGLAS Plaintiffs (for lack of standing) and opposition
to the summary reversal. Immediately thereafter, undersigned
counsel sent the following telegram to the members of the Panel
to which No. 30467 had been assigned:

Please be advised that plaintiffs Boyd 
et al. were never notified either of 
August 21 district court order or August 
31 motion for summary reversal. Had we 
been so advised we would also have filed 
notice of appeal and sought summary 
reversal. Plaintiffs do not wish at 
this point however to delay consideration 
of the appeal, which we urge has merit.
We will furnish the court with copies of 
our opposition to the school board's 
request for modification, which we filed 
with the district court on the same day 
that the plan was approved, and we 
request the court's favorable consideration 
of the arguments which we sought to bring 
to the attention of the district court.

The material referred to was forwarded to the Court. On
September 23, 1970, the GOVERNMENT filed a Memorandum
suggesting a remand for further evidentiary proceedings. On
October 21, 1970, counsel for the BOYD Plaintiffs filed a

b3



brief amicus curiae together with a motion for leave to thus
appear. By order of October 26, 1970, this Court granted the
BOYD Plaintiffs leave to participate in the pending appeal as 
amicus.

Thereafter, on November 13, 1970, upon motion of 
the BOARD, the appeal of the DOUGLAS Plaintiffs was dismissed 
for failure to file a timely brief, but "without prejudice to 
further proceedings in the District Court as may be warranted 
in this school desegregation case."

The BOYD Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs in five other 
Baton Rouge Division school desegregation cases then filed 
motions seeking inclusion of reporting provisions in the 
desegregation decrees of the district court. The BOYD Plain­
tiffs sought updated faculty and student information prior to 
commencing the further proceedings in the district court 
contemplated in this Court's 1970 Order dismissing the appeal. 
That relief was subsequently ordered by this Court, sub nom. 
Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 443 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 
1971) .

July 26, 1971, the DOUGLAS Plaintiffs filed a "Motion 
for Further Relief" which the district court subsequently 
scheduled for hearing August 11, 1971. August 10, 1971, the

b4



GOVERNMENT filed a "Motion for Supplemental Relief Counsel

for all parties appeared at Baton Rouge for the hearing on 
August 11, 1971- At that time, as reflected in the minute entry 
(Appendix "CC" infra), the district court dismissed the DOUGLAS 
Plaintiffs from the action as intervenors, but the motion for 
further relief was adopted by both the BOYD Plaintiffs and the 
GOVERNMENT. As reported in the body of this Supplemental Brief, 
the motions, and all relief sought by either the GOVERNMENT, 
the BOYD Plaintiffs, or the DOUGLAS Plaintiffs, was denied by 

the district court.

Following that hearing, on September 1, 1971, counsel 
for the DOUGIAS Plaintiffs was associated with counsel for 

the BOYD Plaintiffs.

Because they were informed that the GOVERNMENT would 
appeal the district court's order, the BOYD Plaintiffs did not 
file a separate appeal but determined to support the GOVERNMENT'S 
appeal. Following a motion by the BOARD to limit their partici­
pation on this appeal, this Court on January 11, 1972, permitted 
the BOYD Plaintiffs to proceed herein as amici curiae.

b5



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

BATON ROUGE DIVISION

MINUTE ENTRY: 
August 11, 1971 
WEST, J.

YVONNE MARIE BOYD, ET AL

versus CIVIL ACTION

POINTS COUPEE PARISH SCHOOL 
BOARD, ET AL

NO. 3164

This cause cane on for hearing this day on (1) motion by Intervening 

plaintiff, Enmitt J. Douglas, for further relief; (2) defendants’ motion to 

dismiss improper intervention and motion for further relief filed by such 

improper intervenor; and (3) Government1s motion for supplemental relief.

PRESENT: Murphy W. Bell, Esq.
Attorney for intervenor, Emmitt J. Douglas

Norman Chachkin, Esq.
Attorney for plaintiffs

John F. Ward, Jr., Esq.
Attorney for defendants

Frank D. Allen, Jr., Esq.
Attorney for the Government

Counsel for defendants files a motion for summary judgment, and it is 

DENIED.

The Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss Emnitt J. Douglas asai 

improper intervenor, and counsel for plaintiffs and the Government adopt the 

dismissed intervenor's motion for further relief.

Defendants file exhibit D-#l (school survey).

The Court hears the arguments of counsel, and the matter is SUBMITTED.

A P P E N D S  c c