Ake v. Oklahoma Brief of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and Georgetown Legal Internship Program as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1983
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Ake v. Oklahoma Brief of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and Georgetown Legal Internship Program as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 1983. 345f6f2c-ac9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/836ffdc6-bb04-482d-a8f0-85f896cc97eb/ake-v-oklahoma-brief-of-the-national-legal-aid-and-defender-association-and-georgetown-legal-internship-program-as-amici-curiae-supporting-petitioner. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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No. 83-5424
In The. v
(Jlnurt of tl|P Ilnitp^ States
•• •^^^<.T.-*>..^5cT0BBB Term, 1988 • r v , X ■
y. <- •• • -------' V *". ,.. . ;■ -:/1;. .‘. y
Glenn Burton Ake, y r i
Petitioner,
v.
State of Oklahoma,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court
of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma
BRIEF OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION AND GEORGETOWN LEGAL
INTERNSHIP PROGRAM AS AMICI CURIAE
SUPPORTING PETITIONER
Richard J. W ilson
N ational Legal A id and Defender
A ssociation
1625 K Street, N.W.—Eighth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 452-0620
James M. Doyle *
Georgetown Legal Internship
P rogram
605 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 624-8380
* Counsel oj Record
Issue Presented
Amici will address the following
issue:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT
VIOLATED THE PETITIONER'S
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN
IT DENIED HIM EXPERT AND
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES
NECESSARY TO DEVELOP AND
PRESENT HIS INSANITY DEFENSE
AND TO REBUT THE PROSE
CUTION'S PSYCHIATRIC TESTI
MONY AT THE PENALTY PHASE OF
HIS CAPITAL TRIAL?
-i-
TABLE ££ CONTENTS
Table of Authorities............... iv
Interest of Amici ................. 1
Issue Presented ...................
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT DENIED
DEFENSE COUNSEL EXPERT AND
INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES
NECESSARY TO DEVELOP AND
PRESENT PETITIONER'S INSANITY
DEFENSE AND TO REBUT THE
PROSECUTION'S PSYCHIATRIC
TESTIMONY AT THE PENALTY
PHASE OF HIS CAPITAL TRIAL,
THE PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED ........... i
I. THE PROPER FUNCTIONING OF
THE ADVERSARIAL PROCESS IS
UNDERMINED WHEN DEFENSE
COUNSEL IS DENIED THE MEANS
NECESSARY FOR DEVELOPING A
DEFENSE ........................ 5
-ii-
II. AN ATTORNEY WITH RESOURCES
WHO FAILED TO INVESTIGATE
AN INSANITY DEFENSE ON
PETITIONER'S BEHALF WOULD
HAVE PERFORMED IN A
CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT MANNER....................... 13
III. THE GENERAL POLICIES WHICH
SUPPORT DOCTRINES OF
FINALITY IN THE CRIMINAL
LAW ALSO SUPPORT THE
ALLOCATION TO APPOINTED
COUNSEL OF THE RESOURCES
NECESSARY TO FULFILL HIS
CRITICAL ROLE IN THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM ............... 18
Conclusion............................24
-iii-
TABLE Q£ AUTHORITIES
CASES
Beavers v. Balkcom, 636 F.2d
114 (5th Cir. 1 9 8 1 ) ................. 16
Brennan v. Blankenship, 472
F.Supp. 149 (D.W.D.Va. 1979). . . . 17
Davis v. State of Alabama, 596
F. 2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1 9 7 9 ) ......... 15
Greer v. Beto, 379 F.2d 923
(5th Cir. 1 9 6 7 ) ................... 16
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970).......................... 7
Strickland v. Washington,
___U.S.___ (1984)................. 5,8
13,17,20
United States v. Cronic,
___U.S.___ (1984)................. 5
United States v. Fessel,
531 F.2d 1275
(5th Cir. 1 9 7 6 ) ................... 16
United States ex rel. Smith v.
Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953)........ 22
-iv-
CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES
United States Constitution:
Sixth Amendment . . . .
18 U.S.C. §3006A(e)
(Supp. 1979)........
MISCELLANEOUS:
passim
9
Alschuler, The Defense
Attorney's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.1179 (1975) .................
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law
and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoner, 76 HARV.L.REV.
21-22
Criminal Defense Technical
Assistance Project, A
Study of Defense Services
for Indigent Criminal
Defendants In South Carolina:
Analysis and Recommendations,
26
- v -
American Bar Association,
Standards Relating to the
Administration of Criminal
Justice, (1970) ............. 7,9
Saltzburg, A Special Aspect
of Relevance: Countering
Negative Inferences
Associated With the Absence
of Evidence, 66 CAL.L.REV.
1011 (1978)................. 12
Note, The Indigent's Right
to an Adequate Defense:
Expert and Investigational
Assistance in Criminal
Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L.REV. 632 (1970)............. 10
53-5425
In The Supreme Court of the United
States
October Term, 1983
Glen Burton Ake,
Petitioner
v.
State of Oklahoma,
Respondent
Interest q± Amici
The National Legal Aid and Defender
Association (NLADA) is the sole national
voice for the overwhelming majority of
- 1 -
public defenders, private attorneys and
defender clients who make up its defender
membership. Representing nearly 600
member public defender offices and about
7,000 individual defenders, NLADA has
spoken out on national issues of concern
to the legally indigent and their
attorneys in both civil and criminal
cases.
The Legal Internship Program is a
graduate degree program in Trial
Advocacy. Each year since 1960 ten E.
Barrett Prettyman Fellows have
represented indigent criminal defendants
in the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, the District of Columbia
- 2 -
superior Court and the United states
District Court and the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. since the program's
inception, Georgetown graduate fellows
have represented more than two thousand
indigent clients in the District of
Columbia courts. Fellows also supervise j
third year law students from Georgetown
University Law Center who undertake to
represent indigents charged with
misdemeanor offenses in the Superior
Court. The third component of the
fellowship — alongside teaching and
practice — is scholarship. Fellows must
complete a thesis of publishable quality
-3-
in order to earn an LL.M. degree.
Amici are vitally interested in the
role played by defense counsel in the
administration of criminal justice. it
is that interest which leads us, after
considering the content of this case, to
join as amici curiae in urging this Court
to hold that the Petitioner's right to
effective assistance of counsel was
violated when the trial judge refused to
Provide expert psychiatric and
investigative services necessary to
develop his insanity defense and to rebut
prosecution psychiatric testimony at the
Penalty phase of his capital trial.
- 4 -
I
proces?PERtoFUNCTIONING of the adversarial
This term in United StafPc v.
£r'°nifi/ ---U,S*---' 52 USLW 4560 (1984)
and Strickland v. __u.s.__ _
52 USLW 4565 (1984) this Court made its
first extended statements concerning the
scope and content of a criminal
defendant's right to effective assistance
of counsel. A central theme in the
Court's opinions was stated by Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court in
S trickland v. Washinqfpn .
-5-
The benchmark for judging
any claim of ineffectiveness i
must be whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the
adversial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as
having produced a justresult. j i
52 USLW at 4570. j
Amisi contend that unless attorneys j
acting on behalf of indigent defendants
are provided with the means necessary to ;
develop reasonable defenses, their
representation is doomed to fall below
the standard set in Stricklanri v.
Washington,
Not every lawyer can be a tactical |
genius and even very good lawyers do not
perform equally well in every case. That
-6-
\
there will be some variance in lawyer
performance was implicity accepted by
this Court when in McMann v. Richarrifinn
it referred to "the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases".
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). It is fair to
say, however, that no one disputes that
counsel has a duty to explore and develop
the factual context of reasonable
defenses. ABA, Standards Relating to the
Prosecution Function and the Defense
Function §4.1 (1970); Alschuler, The
Defense Attorney's Role in Plea
Bargaining, 84 Yale L.J. 1179 (1975).
At times this exploration quickly
will lead to obvious dead-ends. At times
-7-
totoo, it may be possible adequately
conduct an exploration without seeking
the provision of expert or investigative
service. For example, counsel may be
able to eliminate potential defenses
Simply by conferring with his client.
£txickIan(1 v- Washington,
---U.s.---, 52 USLW at 4571. m other
cases, published works on forensic
techniques may obviate the need for
expert services. Nevertheless, there
will continue to be cases in which
defense counsel, barred by ethical
standards from testifying at trial,
cannot develop a defense without having
an investigator available to testify.
Moreover, there will continue to be
cases, such as the Petitioner's, in which
the absence of a witness is compounded by
the absence of any personal expertise on
the part of counsel in a highly
specialized and technical field.The
Congress and the vast majority of state
legislatures make provision for such
cases. 18 U.S.C. §3006A(e) (Supp. 1979);
Statues cited, Petition for Certiorari at
13n. °f the legal commentators who
have addressed the issue agree that some
cases will call for the appointment of
expert psychiatrists. See e.g., ABA
Standards Relating to the Administration
of Criminal Justice §1.5 (Draft 1968);
Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate
Defense: Expert and Investigational
Assistance In Criminal Proceedings, 55
Cornell L. Rev. 632, 641-643 (1970) .
Petitioner1s case provides an
illustration of the wisdom of those
views.
When a defense lawyer is deprived
of services necesary to develop his case
that deprivation does not create merely a
gap in the evidence; it also removes an
important check on the opposing advocate.
In Petitioner's case this was clearest at
the penalty phase, when no informed
response was possible to the
prosecution's agressive use of
- 10-
psychiatric testimony. The hamstringing
of Petitioner's lawyer was also made
evident during the trial's guilt stage,
however, when the prosecutor repeatedly
emphasized to the jury that the
psychiatrists had no opinion of the
petitioner's sanity at the time of the
offense, capitalizing on the inference
that since the psychiatrists had no
opinion, the defense was meritless.
Since a decision to deny expert services
to a defendant imposes no corresponding
handicap on the prosecution, similar
distortions of the adversary process will
arise whenever services necessary to the
defense are withheld from defense
- 11 -
counsel. See Saltzburg, A Special Aspect
of Kelevance: Countering Negative
Inferences Associated With the Absence Of
Evidence, 66 CAL.L.REV. 1011 (1978)
- 12-
I I
AN ATTORNEY WITH RESOURCES WHO FAILED TO
INVESTIGATE AN INSANITY DEFENSE ON
PETITIONER'S BEHALF WOULD HAVE PERFORMED
IN A CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT MANNER.
The evidence against the Petitioner
was overwhelming. It included, among
other things: a 44-page statement given
to the police; an oral admission to a
third party; and the possession, in the
presence of the third party, of property
belonging to the victims. Any lawyer
would have been forced to recognize that
the chances for defending the case on the
theory that the Petitioner did not commit
the acts with which he was charged were,
to say the least, bleak. Cf., Strickland
-13-
v* Washington/ aupxa 52 u s l w at 4571.
On the other hand, the Petitioner's
mental state at his arraignment plainly
suggested a potential insanity defense.
A competency evaluation was ordered sua
■SJ2QHt£. Following that evaluation, a
state psychiatrist recommended that:
Because of the severity of
his mental illness and
because of the intensities
of his rage, his poor
control, his delusions, he
requires a maximum security facility. . .
Throughout his trial, Petitioner received
high doses of a powerful anti-psychotic
medication. Particularly in light of the
state of the factual
the only responsible
unpromising
defenses,
-14-
professional decision for Petitioner's
lawyer to make at that point was to
continue to explore the insanity defense.
The trial lawyer in this case
attempted to do so but was thwarted by
the court. if he had not made the
attempt he might well be found to have
rendered constitutionally ineffective
assistance. Indeed he would have been
vulnerable to the criticism voiced by the
Fifth Circuit in v. AlaJaama, 596
F.2d 11214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1979);
In summary, Davis's
attorneys knew that Davis
had a history of mental
problems, knew that insanity
was his only possible
defense, knew, or thought,
that Davis himself would be
little help in developing
the defense, knew what
possible outside sources
might be developed, and - to
judge from what they said
when they argued for a
continuance - knew that
without some investigation
they had practically no
defense to offer. Still
they made no effort to
investigate or develop the
possible sources of
evidence. This is not a
borderline case; it is a
clear breach of the duty a
defense attorney owes to his client.
Numerous opinions have found counsel
ineffective for failing to explore an
insanity defense. See, e.g., Davis v.
Alabama, supra; United States v. Fesspi .
531 F. 2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1976); G r e e r v .
379 F. 2d 923 (5th Cir. 1967);
Beavers v. JBalkcom, 636 F.2d 114 (5th
-16-
Cir. Unit B 1981); Brennan v.
.Blankenship , 472 F.supp. 149 (D.w.D.va.
1979) . The Sixth Amendment guarantee of
effective assistance of counsel is
undermined as significantly when diligent
counsel are prevented from fulfilling
their role in the adversary process as
when incompetent counsel shirk their
duties. The consequences to "a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable"
the test of Strickland v. Washington,
.smLa, 52 USLW at 4570 - are the same.
-17-
I
Ill
THE GENERAL POLICIES WHICH SUPPORT
DOCTRINES OF FINALITY IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
ALSO SUPPORT THE ALLOCATION TO APPOINTED
TRIAL COUNSEL OF THE RESOURCES NECESSARY
TO FULFILL HIS CRITICAL ROLE IN THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM
Final criminal judgments are
desirable for a number of reasons. They
conserve resources; they promote a sense
of judicial responsibility; they enhance
the educational and deterrent functions
of the criminal law and they provide (at
least in some cases) an opportunity to
begin a process of rehabilitation. See
generally, Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus For State
Prisoners, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 441, 451-453
-18-
(1963) . When a state such as Oklahoma
interprets this Court's opinion in United
States -LSLIjl Smith So. Baldi . 344 U.S.
561 (1953) as sanctioning the uniform
denial of expert psychiatric assistance
in every case it makes the attainment of
these incidents of prompt, final
judgments impossible.
Petitioner's case, is an
illustration. The difficulty is not
simply that the defendant had a
persuasive insanity defense and was
unable to present it; the difficuty is
that Oklahoma has adopted a procedure
which makes it impossible to know whether
a potential defense existed or not.
-19-
Where defense counsel is provided
with the resources necessary for
exploring a defense, an early, final
resolution can be achieved in several
ways. A psychiatric examination may
reveal that no defense exists, or it may
reveal that the defense is so implausible
that legitimate tactical considerations
mandate foregoing it. See, Strickland v.
Washington. supra. It may result in a
defense being presented at trial and
accepted or rejected by the trier of
fact. The Oklahoma approach eliminates
all of these potential means for
resolving a case. It preserves only the
potential for a post hoc analysis which
- 20-
is not only too late but is less reliable
since it is conducted by a reviewing
court inevitably less informed than trial
counsel or the trial jury before whom a
defendant has a right to present his
defense if he chooses.
Even those commentors who take the
most restrictive approach to collateral
attacks on criminal convictions would
permit collateral attacks where the
meaningfulness of the trial process is at
issue. Professor Bator, writing
specifically about the right to counsel;
notes that:
Deprivation of counsel in
cases where the demands of
fairness embodied in the due
process clause call for
- 21-
representation by counsel
is, I submit, precisely the
kind of error which should
deprive a state litigation
of sanctity. It casts doubt
on the meaningfulness of the
process provided by the
state for the resolution of
all the issues in the case:
we cannot say that any
question in the case, state
or federal, has had a fair
and full litigation, for
purposes of finality, if the
defendant is found to
require the assistance of
counsel because in the
circumstances of the case he
was incapable of making an
adequate defense himself.
Bator, supra, at 458.
The interests of the administration of
justice are not served if the states are
allowed to believe that Smith v. Bflldl
permits them to withhold necessary
subsidiary services from defense counsel
- 22-
only to discover that convictions must be
vacated when, during the course of a
collateral attack, impressive exculpatory
psychiatric evidence is generated. Amici
urge this Court to clarify for state
courts and legislatures the fundamental
fact that the guarantee of effective
assistance must be understood to include
not merely the services of an attorney
but of an attorney equipped to fulfill
his or her role as an adversary: equipped
where it is necesary with expert
assistance.
-23-
CONCLUSION
Amici join in supporting
Petitioner's claims that his rights to
due process of law* egual protection of
the laws and compulsory process were
violated. The particular interest of our
organizations, however, is in the
guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel and we have sought in this brief
to emphasis that aspect of Petitioner's
claim.
The reported opinions suggest that
there may be serious deficiencies in the
pretrial preparation of many defense
lawyers. Strazzella, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses,
-24-
New Problems, 19 ARIZ.L.REV. 443 (1977).
These deficiencies ought not to be
aggravated by a grudging attitude towards
the allocation of rescources demonstrably
necessary for a functioning defense.
Empirical research seems to indicate that
just that aggravation is occuring. One
study notes that: "The problems
discussed above have caused several
private attorneys appointed to represent
indigent defendants to simply forego
these necesary services on the assumption
that they are no longer available...
Lawyers have given up any hope of
receiving funds for these necessary
services and believe that, even if
-25-
if requested, they will not be
approved___ " Criminal Defense Technical
Assistance Project, A Study of Defense
Services For Indigent Criminal Defendants
In South Carolina: Analysis and
Recommendations, 39-40 (1981).
Amici urge this Court to state
clearly that the right to effective
assistance of counsel includes the right
to those services necessary for the
fulfillment of counsel's adversary role,
to eliminate whatever confusion may have
survived this Court's opinion in Unitsd
States ex rel. Smith 2L±. Bflldl t SUPISf anc*
to remand this case for a new trial.
-26-
» r« ,
Respectfully submitted,
JAMES M. DOYLE
(Counsel of Record)
RICHARD J. WILSON
-27-
*