Ewing v. Augusta City Council Printed Record

    UNITED STATES

C O U R T O F  A P P E A L S
FIFTH CIRCUIT.

No. 22,309

HERMAN EW ING, LUTHER M cDANIEL, H. M. 
THOMPSON and R. S. WESTON,

Appellants,

versus

THE CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA and LAW SON E.
DOUGLAS,

Appellees,

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Georgia.

PRINTED RECORD.



INDEX.
Page

Summons .......................................................................  1
Complaint ..............................................  3

Exhibit “A”—Agreements between The City 
Council of Augusta and Lawson E. Doug­
las, March 1, 1952 ................................. 10

Exhibit “A”—Agreement between The City 
Council of Augusta and Lawson E.
Douglas, July 12, 1963 ...................   17

Motion for Preliminary Injunction ......................    21
Motion to Dismiss ........................................................ 23

Letter dated Aug. 21, 1964, to Eugene F. Ed­
wards, from Cornelius B. Thurmond, Jr. 24 

Motion of Defendant Lawson E. Douglas to Strike 
Luther McDaniel as Party Plaintiff for Mis­
joinder of Parties ..................................    25

Answer of Defendant Lawson E. Douglas ............  26
Exhibit “A”—Agreement between The City

Council of Augusta and Lawson E. Douglas 37 
Exhibit “B”—Agreement between The City 

Council of Augusta and Lawson E. Doug­
las, dated June 17, 1960 .......................... 45

Motion to Dismiss of the City Council of Augusta .. 48
Letter dated Aug. 24, to Eugene F. Edwards,

from Samuel C. Waller ............................. 49
Answer to Defendant, the City Council of Augusta 50
Notice to take Depositions ....................................... 53
Deposition of Lawson E. Douglas ............................  54
Deposition of Mayor George A. Sancken, Jr...............  71
Citation of Authorities in Support of Defendant

Lawson E. Douglas’ Motions ..........................  89
Stipulations .................................................................  ^
Order, that Luther McDaniel be stricken as a party-

Plaintiff on Grounds of Misjoinder and Opinion 103



II

INDEX— (Continued):
Page

Order Dismissing Complaint .....................................  113
Notice of Appeal ........................      116
Bond for Costs on Appeal ....................................... 117
Additional Designation of the Record by Defendant 118
Plaintiffs’ Designation of the Record ....................... 119
Clerk’s Certificate .................................................  120



SUMMONS,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA—AUGUSTA 
DIVISION.

Civil Action File No. 1186.
HERMAN EWING, LUTHER McDANIEL, H. MAU­

RICE THOMPSON and R. S, WESTON,
Plaintiffs,

versus

THE CITY COUNCIL OF AUGUSTA and LAWSON E.
DOUGLAS,

Defendants.
To the abovle named Defendants: The City Council of 

Augusta and Lawson E. Douglas:
You are hereby summond and required to serve 

upon Ruffin and Watkins, 1007 Ninth Street, Augusta, 
Ga. and Jack Greenberg and James M. Nabrit III, 10 
Columbus Circle, New York, New York, 10019, plain­
tiff’s attorney, whose addresses are shown above; an 
answer to the complaint which is herewith served 
upon you, within Twenty (20) days after service of 
this summons upon you, exclusive of the day of serv­
ice. If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be 
taken against you for the relief demanded in the 
complaint.

EUGENE F. EDWARDS,
Clerk of Court,

P. A. BRODIE, JR.,
(Seal of Court) Deputy Clerk.

Date: July 31, 1964.



2

Note.—This summons is issued pursuant to Rule 4 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Return on Service of Writ.

I hereby certify and return, that on the 4th day of; 
August 1964, I received this summons and served it 
together with the complaint herein as follows: On 
the 4th day of August, 1964 at Augusta, Ga. I served the 
within named City Council of Augusta by serving 
Mayor George A. Sancken, Jr. personally by hand­
ing to and leaving with him a true and correct copy 
of this the original.

I certify and return that I further served the within 
Writ by serving the within named Lawson E. Douglas 
personally by handing to and leaving with him a true 
and correct copy of this the original.

This 4th day of August, 1964.
JAMES E. LUCKIE,

United States Marshal,
By RALPH M. TEMPLES,

(Ralph M. Temples),
Deputy United States 

Marshal.
Marshal’s Fees 

Travel 12 Mi. $1.44 
Service 6.00

7.44



3

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a .............. this
. . . .  day o f ....................... , 19..........

(Seal)

Filed Aug. 7, 1964.

Note.—Affidavit required only if service is made by 
a person other than a United States Marshal or his 
Deputy.

COMPLAINT.

Filed July 31, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Title 
28, United States Code, Section 1343 (3). This action 
is authorized by Title 42, United States Code, Section 
1983, to be commenced by any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof, 
to redress the deprivation under color of a state law, 
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of a 
state of rights, privileges and immunities secured by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States, to-wit, 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, Section 1, and Title 42, United States 
Code, Section 1981, providing for the equal rights of 
citizens and all other persons within the jurisdiction 
of the United States.



4

2.

This is a proceeding for a preliminary and a per­
manent injunction enjoining the defendants, from en­
forcing any law, ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, 
tradition and pattern prohibiting Negro citizens and 
residents of the City of Augusta, County of Richmond, 
State of Georgia, the use and enjoyment of the Mu­
nicipal Golf Course and related facilities and pro­
grams and denying to them solely because of their 
race and color, the right to visit, use and enjoy the 
Municipal Golf Course and related facilities and pro­
grams on a basis of equality with other citizens of 
the City of Augusta.

3.

This is a class action brought by the plaintiffs on 
behalf of themselves and other persons similarly situ­
ated pursuant to Rule 23 (a) (3) of the Federal Rules; 
of Civil Procedure. The class consists of Negro citi­
zens of the United States and the State of Georgia' 
who reside in the City of Augusta. All members of 
the class are similarly affected by the laws, ordi­
nances, regulations, customs, usages, traditions and 
patterns of racial discrimination by the defendants 
which prevent plaintiffs and members of their class 
from using and enjoying the Municipal Golf Course 
and related facilities and programs without restric­
tions based solely upon considerations of race and 
color; said persons constitute a class too numerous 
to be brought individually before this Court, but there 
are common questions of law and fact involved, com­
mon grievances arising out of common wrongs and a 
common relief is sought for each plaintiff and for



5

each member of the class, as will more fully herein­
after appear. The named plaintiffs fairly and ade­
quately represent the members of the class on behalf 
of which they sue.

4„

The plaintiffs are Negroes and citizens of the United 
States and the State of Georgia who are presently 
residing in the iCity of Augusta, and, because of their 
race and color, are prohibited from using and enjoy­
ing the facilities herein set out, which restriction 
violates their constitutional rights as set forth else­
where herein. Plaintiffs are ready, willing and able 
to abide by all rules and regulations of the defend­
ants with respect to the use and enjoyment of such 
facilities which are applicable alike to all persons 
desiring to use and enjoy such facilities.

5.

Defendant The City Council of August is a munic­
ipal corporation in the County of Richmond, State of 
Georgia and is organized and exists under the laws 
of the State of Georgia. Said municipal corporation 
is the owner and lessor of the Municipal Golf Course, 
and the defendant Lawson E. Douglas is the lessee 
of said golf course, a copy of said lease being here­
unto attached, and by reference made a part hereof, 
and is marked as plaintiffs’ Exhibit “A” .

6.

Plaintiffs show that on July 4, 1964, they presented 
themselves at the Municipal Golf Course and were



6

told by the defendant Lawson E. Douglas that they 
could not use and enjoy said golf course and related 
facilities and programs unless they were either mem­
bers or the guests of a member or members. That 
plaintiffs returned on the same day with a member 
of said golf course, to-wit, Donald Franks. That the 
said Donald Franks paid the green fee for himself 
and three  ̂ members of plaintiffs’ class, whereupon 
the said Donald Franks and his guests were given 
permission to use and enjoy the said golf course 
and related facilities and programs. That the defend­
ant Lawson E. Douglas, upon discovering that the 
said guests were Negroes, came out and stopped the 
said Donald Franks and plaintiffs Herman Ewing, 
H. Maurice Thompson, and R. S. Weston from using 
and enjoying the said golf course and related facili­
ties and programs and ordered them off the premises 
and revoked the membership of Donald Franks in­
stantly and without notice.

7.

The Municipal Golf Course and related facilities 
and programs are still being operated by the de­
fendant Lawson E. Douglas who leases from the 
defendant The City Council of Augusta, on a racially 
segregated basis. Said supervision, operation and 
maintenance by the defendants under color of law, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, tradition and 
pattern constitute a denial of the equal protection 
and due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.



7

8.
Plaintiffs and all other Negro residents of the City 

of Augusta have been denied the use and enjoyment 
of the Municipal Golf Course and related facilities 
and programs and have suffered great injury, in­
convenience, and humiliation as a result of the denial 
to them of their constitutional rights to use and enjoy 
the said facilities on an unsegregated basis without 
fear or intimidation, and possible arrest, conviction, 
fine and/or imprisonment,

9,

Plaintiffs and all other Negro residents of the City 
of Augusta are threatened with irreparable injury by 
reason of the conditions herein complained of. They 
have no plain, adequate or complete remedy at law' 
to redress these wrongs and constitutional depriva­
tions other than by this suit for an injunction. Any 
other remedy would be attended by such uncertainties 
and delays as to deny substantial relief and would in­
volve a multiplicity of suits and cause further ir­
reparable injury, damage and inconvenience to plain­
tiffs and all other Negro residents of the City of 
Augusta.

Wherefore, plaintiffs pray that:

(1) The Court advance this complaint on the dock­
et and order a speedy hearing thereof according to 
law, and that upon such hearing the Court enter a pre­
liminary injunction to restrain and enjoin the defend­
ants and each of them from enforcing any law, ordi­
nance, regulation, custom, usage, tradition and pat­



8

tern of racial discrimination, pursuant to which plain­
tiffs and all other Negro citizens of the City of Augusta 
are denied the right and privilege to use and enjoy 
the said Municipal Golf Course, on the ground that 
such law, ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, tradi­
tion and pattern of racial discrimination are violative 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States.

(2) The Court enter a preliminary injunction to 
restrain and enjoin the defendants, and each of them, 
from denying to plaintiffs, and to those similarly situ­
ated, the use and enjoyment of the said Municipal 
Golf Course and related facilities and programs under 
the direction and administration of the defendants or 
either of them, in the same manner and under the 
same terms and conditions as white residents of the 
City of Augusta.

(3) The Court enter a preliminary injunction to 
restrain and enjoin the defendants, and each of them, 
from restricting play to members and their guests, 
and that no similar limitation be enforced.

(4) The Court, upon a final hearing of this cause, 
will enter a permanent injunction similarly enjoining 
the defendants, and will

(a) Enter a final judgment and decree that will 
declare that the law, ordinance, regulation, custom, 
usage, tradition and pattern of racial discrimination 
unconstitutional in that they deny to plaintiffs, and 
all other Negroes similarly situated, who are citi­
zens of the City of Augusta, privileges, and immuni­
ties of citizens of the United States, due process of



9

law and equal protection of the laws secured by the 
Fourteenth Amendement to the Constitution of the 
United States and the rights and privileges secured 
to them by the laws made pursuant thereto.

(b) Enter a final judgment and decree enjoining 
the defendants and each of them, their agents, serv­
ants and employees, from enforcing the aforesaid 
discriminatory practices on the ground that they are 
unconstitutional.

(c) Enter a final judgment and decree enjoining 
the defendants and each of them, their agents, serv­
ants and employees from denying to the plaintiffs, 
and others similarly situated, the use and enjoyment 
of the Municipal Golf Course and related facilities, 
and programs under the direction and administra­
tion of the defendants, or either of them, in the same 
manner and under the same terms and conditions as 
white residents of the City of Augusta.

(5) The Court allow plaintiffs a reasonable amount 
as attorney’s fees and their costs in this suit.

(6) The plaintiffs have such other and further re­
lief as to the Court seems just and proper.

RUFFIN & WATKINS,
By J. H. RUFFIN, JR.,

1007 Ninth Street,
Augusta, Georgia 30903.

JACK GREENBERG,
JAMES M. NABRIT III, 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
10 Columbus Circle,

New York, New York 10019.



10

Verification.

H. Maurice Thompson, being duly sworn, deposes 
and says that he is one of the named plaintiffs in- 
this action and that to the best of his knowledge, in­
formation and belief all of the matters contained 
herein are true.

H. MAURICE THOMPSON.

Sworn to before mje this 31st day of July, 1964.
BESSIE A. DICKERSON, 

Notary Public, Richmond 
County, Georgia.

My commission expires: 2/2,5/67.

EXHIBIT A.

Agreement.

This Agreement and Lease, made as of the 1st day 
of March, 1952, by and between The City Council of 
Augusta, a municipal corporation organized and ex­
isting under the laws of the State of Georgia, herein­
after called Lessor, and Lawson E. Douglas, of the 
County of Richmond and State of Georgia, herein­
after called the Lessee;

(Witnesseth that the Lessor, for and in consideration 
of the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) per 
annum, which is to be paid in the manner herein­
after specified, does hereby let and lease to the Les­
see, upon the term's and conditions hereinafter stated, 
all the following described property, to-wit:



11

All of the Municipal Golf Course of the City of Au­
gusta, bounded generally North by Daniel Field; 
East by the Wheeless Road and Daniel Field; South 
by the Damascus Road; and West by the Damascus: 
Road and lands of the Golf Park Apartments; to­
gether with the building thereon known as the Golf 
Club or Golf Shop, and the equipment used in con­
nection with the operation of such golf course, an 
inventory of which, duly attested by the signatures 
of the Lessor and the Lessee, is hereunto attached, 
Marked Exhibit A, and made by< reference a part 
of this agreement.

The Terms and Conditions upon which this lease 
is made are as follows:

(1) This lease shall begin on the first day of 
March, 1952, and shall end on the 31st day of De­
cember, 1956, unless sooner terminated in the man­
ner hereinafter set out.

(2) The rental to be paid by the Lessee shall be 
the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) per 
year, which shall be payable in equal monthly in­
stallments of One Hundred and Sixty-six Dollars and 
Sixty-six Cents ($166.66) each, payable monthly, in 
advance, on the first day of each month, beginning 
on the first day of March, 1952.

(3) The Lessor agrees that during the term of this 
lease it will furnish the Lessee the water necessary 
to operate said golf course, including that necessary 
to water the greens and fairways, without charge to* 
the Lessee. Lessee shall furnish all other utilities 
necessary in connection with the operation of said



12

golf course, in accordance with the terms of this 
agreement, at his own expense and without liability 
on the part of the Lessor.

(4) The Lessee agrees that during the entire term 
of this lease he will maintain said golf course in a 
playable condition. He further agrees that during 
each calendar year of this lease he will plant not less 
than 16,500' pounds of rye grass seed and 300 pounds 
of hulled Bermuda seed upon the greens and fair­
ways of said golf course, and that during each calen­
dar year he will use not less than 25 tons of fair-way 
fertilizer (4-8-6 or equal) and 4 tons of Vigoro to 
fertilize the same.

Lessee further agrees that he will keep the grass 
upon the greens and the grass upon the fairways cut 
to the usual requirements of a golf course. He further 
agrees that he will take all necessary and proper 
steps to control erosion on the entire golf course, 
so as to prevent any portion of the leased property 
from being damaged by washing or erosion.

Lessee further agrees that the entire length and 
width of each fairway and the entire area of each 
green on said golf course will be planted with grass 
at all times.

(5) Lessee further agrees that he will maintain 
the equipment and club house in their present condi­
tion, or better, normal wear and tear alone excepted.

(6) Lessee agrees that he will operate said golf 
course during the entire term of this lease, accord­
ing to the code of ethics and standards which are



13

now and may from time to time hereafter be estab­
lished by the Professional Golfers Association.

(7) Lessor and Lessee agree that all monies col­
lected by the Lessee from greens fees, memberhips, 
club house locker rentals, concessions and all other 
sources upon or arising out of the use of such golf 
course, during the term of this agreement shall be 
the property of the Lessee, and the Lessor shall have 
no right or claim to the same so long as the Lessee 
carries out his obligations under the terms of this 
agreement. !

(8) It is further understood and agreed that 
Lessee shall have the right to raise the amounts of 
greens fees, membership dues, club house locker 
rentals and other charges for the use of said golf, 
course, or any of its facilities, when necessary to 
meet increased cost of labor and the operation of said 
golf course, provided, nevertheless, that Lessee 
shall not raise the daily greens fees for the use of 
such course to an amount exceeding One Dollar and 
Fifty Cents ($1.50) per day on Saturdays, Sundays, 
Wednesday afternoons and/or holidays, nor to more 
than One Dollar ($1.00) per day on other days, nor 
shall Lessee raise the monthly dues for the use of 
said golf course and club house abovte the figure of 
Seven Dollars and Fifty Cents ($7.50) per month.

(9) The Lessor shall have the right during the 
entire term of this lease to make periodic inspec­
tions of the equipment hereby leased for the purpose 
of determining its condition, and whether or not it is 
being maintained in accordance with the terms of 
this agreement.



14

(10) Lessee agrees that he will, at his own ex­
pense, procure and maintain during the entire term 
of this lease a policy of public liability insurance, 
with rider attached for the protection of the Lessor 
against any/ contingent liability, which policy shall 
be in limits of $10,000.00 for one person and $20,000.00 
for more than one person. He will also procure and 
maintain at his own expense a policy of owner’s, 
landlord’s and tenant’s insurance, with rider at­
tached for the benefit of the Lessor, which policy 
shall be in the sum of $10,000.00.

(11) It is further agreed between Lessor and 
Lessee that a Committee from the Municipal Golfers 
Association, consisting of three members of that 
Association, shall have the right at all times during 
the term of this lease to make inspections of the golf! 
course and of the golf club house, and the equipment 
therein contained, and shall further have the right, 
at all times during the term of this lease, to confer 
with the Lessee in regard to any improvement neces­
sary for the maintenance or operation of said golf 
course, or in the maintenance of the same. Said 
Committee shall further have the right at all times 
during the term of this lease to confer with the Rec­
reation Committee of the Council in regard to any 
improvements needed on said golf course, or any 
recommendations in regard to its maintenance or 
operation, or any complaints that they may have in 
regard to the maintenance and/or operation of said 
golf course, which have not been remedied by the 
Lessee after they have conferred with him and given 
him a reasonable time to remedy the same.



15

(12) Lessee agrees that contemporaneously with 
the signing of this contract he will furnish to the 
City Council of Augusta a bond, with good security, 
in the amount of $2,000.00, to be approved by the 
Mayor and the Finance and Appropriations Commit­
tee, conditioned for his faithful performance of all 
of his obligations hereunder, including the payment 
of the rental hereby reserved, the maintenance of 
the golf course and equipment, and the operation of 
the same in accordance with this contract, and the 
return of the equipment leased hereby in a condition 
as good or better than its present condition, ordinary 
wear and tear alone excepted.

(13) Should the Lessee fail to perform any of his 
obligations under this contract in accordance with 
the terms hereof, the Lessor shall have the right, 
upon thirty* days’ notice to the Lessee, to declare 
this contract null, void and of no effect, and to re­
enter and seize all of the property hereby leased, un­
less the Lessee shall within such thirty-day period 
cure the default existing at the time of such notice. 
Any notice given pursuant to this agreement shall 
be mailed to the Lessee, by United States Registered 
mail, addressed to him at the Club House on the 
property, and proof of the delivery of such a regis­
tered letter to the Postal authorities of the United 
States, so directed to the Lessee and with postage 
paid, shall be conclusive evidence of the giving of 
such notice. This remedy is cumulative of all of the 
other remedies at law or in equity which the Lessor 
may have for the enforcement of this contract, and 
shall not be the exclusive remedy for such enforce­
ment.



16

(14) Should the Lessee default in the performance 
of any of the terms of this contract, and should the 
Lessor elect either to terminate or not to terminate 
this agreement, Lessor shall nevertheless forthwith 
have an action at law or in equity, whichever is most 
appropriate and expeditious, against both the Lessee 
and the surety on his bond for any loss or damage 
which the Lessor may have suffered by reason of 
such default.

In Witness Whereof, the Lessor has caused these 
presents to be executed by its Mayor and attested 
by its Clerk of Council, pursuant to resolution duly 
adopted on the 3rd day of March, 1952, and the Lessee 
has hereunto set his hand and seal, all in duplicate, 
and all as of the day and year first above written.

THE CITY COUNCIL OF 
AUGUSTA, (L.S.)

By ILLEGIBLE,
(Seal) Mayor,

Attest:
ILLEGIBLE,

Clerk of Council,
Lessor.

Signed, Sealed and Delivered in the presence of:
VERLA L. CHOLOST,

Notary Public, Richmond Co., 
Ga.

LAWSON E. DOUGLAS, (L.S.) 
Lessee.



17

Signed, Sealed and Delivered in the presence of: 
VERLA L. CHOLOST, 
ILLEGIBLE,

Notary Public, Richmond Co., 
Ga.

EXHIBIT “A” .

State of Georgia,
Richmond County.

This Agreement, made and entered into this 12th 
day of July, 1963, by and between The City Council 
of Augusta, a Municipal Corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the. State of Georgia, here­
inafter called lessor, and Lawson E. Douglas, of the 
County of Richmond and State of Georgia, herein­
after called lessee;

Witnesseth, that whereas on May 30, 1956, the 
parties hereto entered into a lease agreement cover­
ing certain property in the City of Augusta, designat­
ed as the “Municipal Golf Course” , as amended 
by instrument dated the 17th day of June, 1960, and 
said parties are now desirous of further amending 
said lease agreement and of extending the term there­
of upon certain terms and conditions.

Now, Therefore, the lessor, for and in considera­
tion of the annual rental stipulated in said lease 
agreement and the performance and discharge by 
the lessee of the other obligations of said lease agree­
ment, as heretofore amended, and as herein modi­
fied, and of the additional obligations, herein as­
sumed, and the lessee, for and in consideration of 
the benefits accruing to him under said lease agree­



18

ment and the extension of the period of said lease, 
do hereby agree as follows:

1.

Paragraph numbered 3 of the the said lease and 
agreement dated the 30th day of May, 1956 is hereby 
amended so as to read as follows:

“The lessor agrees that during the term of this 
lease, it will furnish the lessee the water necessary 
to operate said golf course, including that necessary 
to water the greens and fairways, at a flat and equal 
charge per month of $50.00. Lessee shall furnish all 
other utilities necessary in connection with the 
operation of said golf course, in accordance with 
the terms of this agreement, at his own expense, and 
without liability on the part of the lessor.”

2.
Said lease is hereby extended for a period ending 

on the 31st day of December, 1971, unless sooner 
terminated in the manner provided herein and in 
said lease agreement.

3.

The lessee agrees to improve the eighteen (18) 
fairways on said golf course so as to bring the said 
fairways up to the condition to compare with other 
courses in and around the City of Augusta, all at 
an aggregate, approximate, improvement cost of 
$16,000.00 and to improve said, fairways upon the 
following schedule:



19

(a) In the year 1963, to improve six (6) fair­
ways provided weather conditions are suitable.

(b) In the year 1964, to improve six (6) additional 
fairways.

(e) In the year 1965, to improve the remaining 
six (6) fairways.

Time is of the essence of this agreement.

4.

The within lease is hereby amended so as to enure 
to the benefit of the heirs and assigns of lessee, pro­
vided that lessee shall not in life assign this lease 
to a third party without prior approval of lessor.

5.

Should the lessee fail to punctually perform any 
of his obligations under the said lease agreement as 
amended and in accordance with the terms thereof, 
lessor shall have the cumulative remedies specified 
in paragraph 13 of said lease agreement.

6.

Except as herein expressly modified, all of the 
terms, provisions, conditions of said lease agree­
ment dated the 30th day of May, 1956 as amended 
by instrument dated the 17th day of June, 1960, shall, 
remain of full force and effect and said lease as 
amended is hereby fully ratified and affirmed.



20

In Witness Whereof, the lessor has caused these 
presents to be executed by its Mayor and attested 
by its Clerk of Council, pursuant to authority, con­
tained in resolution adopted by lessor in its meeting 
on the 6th day of May, 1963, and the lessee has here­
unto) set his hand and seal, in duplicate originals, 
the day and year first above written.

THE CITY COUNCIL OF

Attest:

AUGUSTA, 
By ILLEGIBLE,

As Its Mayor,

(Seal)
ILLEGIBLE,

As its Clerk of Council, 
Lessor.

Signed, sealed and delivered by Lessor in the pres-
ence of:

ILLEGIBLE,
ILLEGIBLE,

(Seal) Notary Public, Richmond 
County, Georgia.

LAWSON E. DOUGLAS, (L.S.) 
(Lawson E. Douglas),

Lessee.

Signed, sealed and delivered by Lessee in the pres-
ence of:

GLORIA R. BRYAN, 
CORNELIUS B. THURMOND, 

JR.,
(Seal) Notary Public, Richmond 

County, Georgia.



21

MOTION FO'R PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

Filed Jul. 31, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

Plaintiffs move this Court for a. preliminary in­
junction, pending the final disposition of this cause, 
and as grounds therefor rely upon the allegations of 
their complaint and show the following:

1. Plaintiffs and others similarly situated are be­
ing excluded from the Municipal Golf Course solely 
because of their race and color.

2. The exclusion of plaintiffs and those similarly 
situated is in violation of the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States.

3. Plaintiffs are irreparably harmed by the de­
fendants’ policy and practice of excluding them from 
the Municipal Golf 'Course.

4. The issuance of a preliminary injunction here­
in will not cause undue inconvenience or loss to the 
defendants.

Wherefore, plaintiffs respectfully pray that this 
Court advance this cause on the docket and! order 
a speedy hearing of this action according to law 
and after such hearing enter a preliminary injunc­
tion enjoining defendants, and their agents, em­
ployees, successors and all persons in active con­
cert and participation with them from:



22

1. Enforcing any law, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, usage, tradition, and pattern of racial dis­
crimination pursuant to which plaintiffs and all other 
Negro citizens of the City of Augusta are denied the 
right and privilege of using and enjoying the facili­
ties of the Municipal Golf Course.

2. Denying to plaintiffs and those similarly sit­
uated the use and enjoyment of the Municipal Golf 
Course and related facilities and programs under 
the direction and administration of the defendants 
or either of them in the same manner and under the 
same terms and conditions as white residents of the 
City of Augusta.

RUFFIN & WATKINS,
By J. H. RUFFIN, JR.,

1007 Ninth Street,
Augusta, Georgia 30903.

JACK GREENBERG,
JAMES M. NABRIT, III, 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
10 Columbus Circle,

New York, New York 10019.



23

MOTION TO DISMISS.

Filed Aug. 24, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

Now comes Lawson E. Douglas, one of the defend­
ants in the above styled case and moves the Court 
as follows:

1.

To dismiss the action because the complaint fails 
to state a claim against this defendant upon which 
relief can be granted.

Respectfully submitted, 
THURMOND, HESTER, 

JOLLES & McELMURRAY, 
CORNELIUS B. THURMOND, 

JR.,
Attorneys for Defendant 

Lawson E. Douglas.
Post Office Address:

Southern Finance Building,
Augusta, Georgia.



24

Law Office
Thurmond, Hester, Jolles & McElmurray 

(Successors to Sanders, Thurmond, Hester & Jolles) 
Southern Finance Building 

Augusta, Georgia

August 21, 1964.

Mr. Eugene F. Edwards,
Clerk of Court,

United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Georgia,

Augusta Division,
Federal Post Office and Courthouse, 

Augusta, Georgia.

In Re: Herman Ewing, et al. vs. The City Council 
of Augusta and Lawson E. Douglas, Civil 
Action #1186.

Dear Mr. Clerk:
In reference to the above captioned case, you will 

please find enclosed herewith on behalf of defendant 
Lawson E. Douglas, the following pleadings which 
you will please file in said case:

1. Motion to Dismiss.

2. Motion to Strike for Misjoinder of Parties.

3. Answer.



25

Thanking you for your cooperation in this matter, 
I am

Very truly yours,
THURMOND, HESTER, 

JOLLES & McELMURRAY, 
CORNELIUS B. THURMOND, 

JR.,
(Cornelius B. Thurmond, 

Jr.).
CBT, Jr./grb.
cc: J. H. Ruffin, Jr.,
cc: Mr. Samuel E. Waller.

MOTION OF DEFENDANT LAWSON E. DOUGLAS 
TO STRIKE LUTHER McDANIEL AS PARTY 
PLAINTIFF FOR MISJOINDER OF PARTIES.

Filed Aug. 25, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

Now comes Lawson E. Douglas, one of the de­
fendants in the above styled case and moves the 
Court as follows:

1.

This defendant moves to strike Luther McDaniel as 
a party plaintiff on the ground that said complaint 
does not allege that said Luther McDaniel has ever 
applied for and been refused the use of the Augusta 
Golf Course and therefore to join said Luther 
McDaniel as a party plaintiff with plaintiffs Herman



26

Ewing, H. Maurice Thompson and R. S. Weston is a 
misjoinder of parties.

Respectfully submitted, 
THURMOND, HESTER,

JOLLES & McELMURRAY, 
By CORNELIUS B. THURMOND, 

JR.,
Attorneys for defendant, 

Lawson E. Douglas.
Post Office Address:

Southern Finance Building,
Augusta, Georgia.

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT LAWSON E. DOUGLAS.

Filed Aug. 24, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

Now comes Lawson E. Douglas, one of the defend­
ants in the above stated case and files this his An­
swer and respectfully shows to the Court:

First Defense.

The complaint fails to state a claim against this 
defendant upon which relief can be granted.

Second Defense.

This Court is without jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of this complaint because for this Court to 
have jurisdiction under Title 28 United States Code,



27

Section 1343 (3), the action complained of must be 
State action under color of State Law and the acts 
alleged of this defendant Lawson E. Douglas are 
the acts of an individual and do not constitute State 
action within the meaning of the lav/.

Third Defense.

These plaintiffs are not entitled to maintain a class 
action in the absence of allegations and proof that 
citizens other than plaintiffs had been excluded from 
using the golf course on same or similar grounds as 
plaintiffs allege, if such allegations constitute depri­
vation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
to plaintiffs by the Constitution of the United States 
within the meaning of the law and under the facts 
of this case.

Fourth Defense.

That this defendant is entitled to the rights, priv­
ileges and immunities secured by tht Constitution 
and Laws of the United States, to-wit, the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
Section 1 and Title 42, United States Code Section 
1981 providing for the equal rights of citizens and 
of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States to make and enforce contracts, etc , and that 
this defendant as lessee under the Lease Agreement 
alleged in the complaint is entitled to operate the 
Augusta Golf Course under the terms and conditions 
of his said lease, the same which does not expire until 
the 31st day of December, 1971, as his own private 
enterprize and business, in a manner and fashion in 
accordance with his plans and desires and in ac­



28

cordance with the desires of his business customers 
and guests.

(a) That reference to Lease Agreement dated the 
1st day of March, 1952, (Exhibit “A” to Complaint) 
will show that the real estate on which is located the 
Augusta Golf Course was leased by The City Council 
of Augusta to Lawson E. Douglas from the 1st day 
of March, 1952 until the 31st day of December, 1956, 
that lessee Douglas would pay an annual rental pay­
able monthly in advance and that with the exception 
of water, lessee would furnish all utilities, would 
maintain the golf course in playable condition, plant 
not less than 16,500 pounds of Rye Grass Seed and 
300 pounds of hulled Bermuda Seed, use not less 
than 25 tons of fairway fertilizer and 4 tons of Vigoro, 
take all necessary steps to prevent erosion, main­
tain equipment and club house in present condition 
or better condition, pay all costs of labor in operation 
of the golf course, maintain at his own expense publid 
liability insurance, maintain owner’ s, landlord’s and 
tenant’s insurance for the benefit of the lessor, fur­
nish bond with good security conditioned for the faith­
ful performance of his obligations, payment of rental, 
maintenance of course and equipment, all of these 
things at this defendant’s own expense.

(b) That thereafter by instrument dated the 30th 
day of May, 1956, the aforementioned Lease Agree­
ment was modified and extended, a copy of said 
agreement dated the 30th day of May, 1956 is hereto 
attached and marked defendants Exhibit “A” and 
that reference to said agreement will show that the 
Lease Agreement was extended to the 31st day of



29

December, 1961, all the provisions of the lease dated 
the 1st day of March, 1952 were republished and in 
addition thereto a paragraph numbered 15 was added, 
whereby the lessee was to rearrange holes numbers 
10, 11, 12 and 13 so that there would be no joint use 
of any fairway for two greens and to provide an 
additional safety factor to the players using the golf 
course and that lessee would install permanent air 
conditioning in the golf shop, all of these at his own 
expense.

(c) That thereafter, by instrument dated the 17th 
day of June, 1960, a copy of which is hereto' attached 
and marked defendants Exhibit “B” , the said Lease 
Agreement of May 30, 1956 was extended to the 31st 
day of December 1966, and paragraphs 6, 8, 11 and 
15 of the lease were eliminated, lessee agreed to re­
place the grass upon all the greens with Tifton 328 
Grass, to lime, aerate and fertilize the fairways and 
to enlarge and improve 12 of the 18 tees in use all at 
the approximate improvement cost of $8,000.00, which 
cost was to be born by lessee, this defendant.

(d) That thereafter by instrument dated the 12th 
day of July, 1963, a copy of which is attached to the 
complaint as Exhibit “A” , the said lease was further 
amended and extended to the 31st day of December, 
1971, the lessor no longer to supply water to the golf 
course but the lessee to pay for water in addition 
with his other utilities, the lease was amended so as 
to enure to the benefit of the heirs and assigns of 
lessee and particularly in paragraph 3 thereof, the 
lessee (this defendant) agreed to improve the 18 fair­
ways at an approximate improvement cost of $16,- 
000.00, this to be the sole expense of the said lessee.



30

(e) That in the operation of the golf course, this 
defendant has had to purchase much valuable and 
expensive equipment, the same consisting of three 
tractors, six greens mowers, a pick up truck, four mis­
cellaneous mowers, one five section gang-mower, one 
three section gang-mower, a fertilizer distributor, 
combination fertilizer distributor and seeder, har­
rows, edgers, aerating machine, verticut machine, 
power sprayer and much miscellaneous equipment 
including water hoses, sprinklers, and all the other 
necessary small tools and equipment necessary in 
the operation of a golf course, all of this equipment 
having been purchased with the money of this de­
fendant and the title to said equipment being in this 
defendant.

(f) That this defendant bears all of the expenses 
of operations of said golf course, his latest operating 
expense statement being as follows:

Rent and Water .................................  $ 2,400.00
Gas, Oil and Repairs ......................... 2,665.58
Advertising ..........................................  315.00
Utilities ...............................................  1,516.67
Seed, Fertilizer and Supplies ............  8,990.13
Insurance .............................................. 463.62
Salaries to employees ......................... 12,484.00
Payroll Taxes ....................................... 870.72
Licenses and Taxes ..............................  214.10
Depreciation on equipment ................ 976.35

Total ................................ $30,896.17

(g) That the real estate which this defendant 
leases is not contained within premises on which the



31

City Council of Augusta carries on or operates any 
of its functions, nor is there contained within said 
real estate any facility operated by the said City 
Council of Augusta, nor is the operation of the golf 
course by this defendant necessary to or dependant 
upon the operation by the City Council of Augusta of 
any function, but on the contrary, this defendant has 
the sole and exclusive use and possession of said 
real estate.

(h) That since the 1st day of March, 1952, the 
operation of the Augusta Golf Course has been the 
sole business enterprize of this defendant, that this 
defendant has been solely responsible for the acquisi­
tion of equipment to maintain it, responsible for the 
maintenance of improvements, responsible for uti­
lities, responsible for payment of all labor, all as 
shown above, that none of such operation is under­
written or supervised in any fashion by the lessor, 
that there is no guarantee by anyone that this de­
fendant would o*r will make a profit in the operation 
of this golf course but on the contrary in the event 
that the operation of said golf course should become 
unprofitable, that the monetary loss would be the 
menetary loss and debt of this defendant and of no 
other person, firm, corporation or of The City Coun­
cil of Augusta, the other defendant.

Fifth Defense.

That this defendant operates the Augusta Golf 
Course as a private club which is not in fact open 
to the public but whose membership is genuinely 
selective upon the basis that they possess that degree 
of physical training and skill to enable them to play



32

golf upon the course with reasonable skill, with the 
least fear of harm to others using the golf course 
without damaging or abusing the course and with 
that mental knowledge and acumen of the rules, 
ethics and etiquette of golf necessary to allow one 
member or group of members to be compatible com­
panions or participants in the use of the golf course 
with other members and that these plaintiffs have 
not alleged that they possess said physical and men­
tal qualifications or that Negroes as a class, who they 
allege they represent, possess them.

Sixth Defense.

1.

In answer to paragraph 1 of the complaint, this 
defendant admits that the provisions of the sections 
cited of the United States Code and the Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States cited provide 
and authorize certain actions and confers jurisdiction 
upon United States District Courts as to the subject 
matter contained within said sections and within said 
Fourteenth Amendment but except as herein admit­
ted, the allegations of said paragraph 1 as they are. 
alleged to apply to the plaintiffs are conclusions and 
are denied.

2.

In answer to paragraph 2 of the complaint, this de­
fendant admits that the purpose for which plaintiffs 
filed this proceeding is for a preliminary and per­
manent injunction enjoining this defendant from pro­



33

hibiting the plaintiffs from the use of Augusta Golf 
Course (erroneously referred to as Municipal Golf 
Course) but except as herein admitted, the allega­
tions of said paragraph 2 as they apply to the plain­
tiffs are conclusions and are denied.

3.

In answer to paragraph 3 of the complaint, this 
defendant admits that Rule 23 (a) 3 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure pertains to class actions, 
admits that the Negro citizens of the United States 
and the State of Georgia who reside in the City of 
Augusta would constitute a class under some cir­
cumstances but except as herein admitted, the al­
legations of paragraph 3 as they relate to these plain­
tiffs and as they relate to Negro citizens as a class 
are conclusions and are denied.

4.

In answer to paragraph 4 of the complaint, this de­
fendant admits upon information and belief that plain­
tiffs are Negroes and citizens of the United States and 
the State of Georgia who are presently residing in the 
City of Augusta but except as herein admitted, para­
graph 4 of the complaint is denied and for answer, 
this defendant shows that the plaintiffs Herman 
Ewing, H. Maurice Thompson and R. S. Weston were 
prohibited by this defendant solely from using the 
Augusta Golf Course because the Augusta Golf 
Course is a private business club and has a member­
ship roster of sufficient number and quantity so that 
the playing capacity of said golf course is already 
over-taxed and over-extended and for the Augusta1



34

Golf Course to take on plaintiffs as new members 
would prevent some of the present members from 
using the said golf course for which they have al­
ready paid their membership dues; further, that 
there existed on and prior to July 4, 1964. and at 
present, the situation that because of the large num­
ber of the present members, the course was and 
is customarily crowded, making it on many occas- 
sions difficult and unpleasant for the present mem­
bers to use the said course so as to enjoy it in the 
manner and at the time which it would be their desire 
to so use and enjoy same.

5.

In answer to paragraph 5 of the complaint, this de­
fendant admits all of said allegations with the ex­
ception of the allegation that a copy of said lease is 
attached as Exhibit “ A” to the complaint because 
the Lease Agreement actually consists of that lease 
dated March 1, 1952 and the amendment dated July 
12, 1963, both of which are attached to the complaint, 
and in addition thereto, two additional amendments 
dated May 30, 1956 and June 17, 1960, which are here­
to attached as this defendants Exhibits “A” and “B” 
respectively.

6,

In answer to paragraph 6 of this complaint, this de­
fendant denies that plaintiffs did on July 4, 1964 pre­
sent themselves at the Augusta Golf Course and says 
that on said July 4, 1964, three of said plaintiffs, to-wit, 
the plaintiffs Ewing, Thompson and Weston applied



35

to his defendant to play golf, but did not apply to 
use related facilities and programs and those three 
plaintiffs mentioned were informed that the Augusta 
Golf Course was a private club and that they would 
not be permitted to play on the golf course unless 
they were either members or the guests of a mem­
ber. This defendant denies that Donald Franks paid 
the Green Fee for himself and three members of 
plaintiffs class, but admits that part of the plaintiffs, 
to-wit, the plaintiffs, Ewing, Thompson and Weston 
did apparently return on the same date with the said 
Donald Franks whereupon the said Donald Franks 
alone entered the Pro Shop, showed his membership 
card and registered in three persons as his guests 
but that the said Donald Franks failed and refused 
and the said plaintiffs Ewing, Thompson and Weston 
failed and refused to enter the Pro Shop and sign the 
Guest Register properly and in accord with the regu­
lation of this defendant and in as much as this de­
fendant had informed plaintiffs Ewing, Thompson 
and Weston that this defendant operated the Augus­
ta Golf Course as his private business and as a pri­
vate club and in as much as neither said plaintiffs 
Ewing, Thompson and Weston nor the said Donald 
Franks had registered in the Guest Register as re­
quired, this defendant requested plaintiffs Ewing, 
Thompson and Weston to leave, that said plaintiffs 
did leave at this defendants request and because of 
the infraction of the rule of this defendant, the mem­
bership of the said Donald Franks was revoked and 
the said Donald Franks was refunded the unused 
portion of his annual membership which he had pre­
vious! v purchased, and except as herein admitted 
the remaining allegations of paragraph 6 are denied.



36

7.

In answer to paragraph 7 of the complaint this de­
fendant admits that he operates a golf course which 
is called the Augusta Golf Course and admits that 
he leases the real estate on which is located the 
Augusta Golf Course from The City Council of Au­
gusta but except as herein admitted, denies the re­
maining allegations of paragraph 7.

8.

This defendand denies the allegations of para­
graph 8 of the complaint.

9.

This defendant denies the allegations of paragraph 
9 of the complaint.

This Defendant Demands Trial By Jury.

Wherefore this defendant prays:

(a) For judgment declaring that the complaint 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; 
and/or

(b) For judgment that this Court is without juris­
diction because said complaint is not one under color 
of State Law; and/or

(c) For judgment that the plaintiffs cannot main­
tain this action as a class action; and/or



37

(d) That his defenses be sustained and that he 
be henceforth discharged without costs.

THURMOND, HESTER, 
JOULES & McELMURRAY, 

By CORNELIUS B. THURMOND, 
JR.,

Attorneys for Defendant, 
Lawson E. Douglas.

Post Office Address:
1400 Southern Finance Building,

Augusta, Georgia.

DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT “ A” .

Agreement.

This Agreement and Lease, made by and between 
The City Council of Augusta, a municipal corpora­
tion organized and existing under the laws of the 
State of Georgia, hereinafter called “Lessor” , and 
Lawson E. Douglas, of the County of Richmond and 
State of Georgia, hereinafter called the “Lessee” ;

Witnesseth, that the Lessor, for and in considera­
tion of the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) 
-per annum, which is to be paid in the manner herein­
after specified, does hereby let and lease to the 
Lessee, upon the terms and conditions hereinafter 
stated, all the following described property, to wit:

All of the Municipal Golf Course of the City of 
Augusta, bounded generally North by Daniel Field; 
East by the Wheeless Road and Daniel Field; South 
by the Damascus Road; and West by the Damascus



38

Road and lands of the Golf Park Apartments; to­
gether with the building thereon known as the “ Golf 
Club” or “ Golf Shop” , and the equipment used in 
connection with the operation of such Golf Course,— 
an inventory of which, duly attested by the signa­
tures of the Lessor and the Lessee, is attached as 
Exhibit “ A” to a former agreement and lease be­
tween Lessor and Lessee, dated as of March 1, 952.

The Terms and Conditions upon which this lease 
is made are as follows,:

(1) This lease shall begin on the first day of Janu­
ary, 1957, and shall end on the 31st day of December, 
1961, unless sooner terminated, in the manner here­
inafter set out.

(2) The rental to be paid by the Lessee shall be 
the sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) per 
year, which shall be payable in equal monthly in­
stalments of One Hundred and Sixty-Six Dollars and 
Sixty-Six Cents ($166.6'6) each, payable monthly, in 
advance, on the first day of each month, beginning 
on the first day of January, 1957.

(3) The Lessor agrees that during the term of 
this lease it will furnish the Lessee the water neces­
sary to operate said golf course, including that 
necessary to water the greens and fairways, with­
out charge to the Lessee. Lessee shall furnish ail 
other utilities necessary in connection with the 
operation of said golf course, in accordance with 
the terms of this agreement, at his own expense, 
and without liability on the part of the Lessor.



39

(4) The Lessee agrees that during the entire term 
of this lease he will maintain said golf course in a 
playable condition. He further agrees that during 
each calendar year of this lease he will plant not 
less than 16,500 pounds of rye grass seed and 300 
pounds of hulled Bermuda seed upon the greens and 
fairways of said golf course, and that during each 
calendar year he will use not less than 25 tons of 
fairway fertilizer (4-3-6 or equal) and 4 tons of Vigoro 
to fertilize the same.

Lessee further agrees that he will keep the grass 
upon the greens and the grass upon the fairways cut 
to the usual requirements of a golf course. He further 
agrees that he will take all necessary and proper 
steps to control erosion on the entire golf course, so 
as to prevent any portion of the lessed property from 
being damaged by washing and erosion.

Lessee further agrees that the entire length and 
width of each fairway and the entire area of each 
green on said golf course will be planted with grass 
at all times.

(5) Lessee further agrees that he will maintain 
the equipment and Club House in their present con­
dition, or better, normal wear and tear alone ex­
cepted.

(6) Lessee agrees that he will operate said golf 
course during the entire term of this lease, accord­
ing to the code of ethics and standards which are 
now and may from time to time hereafter be es­
tablished by the Professional Golfer’s Association.



40

(7) Lessor and Lessee agree that all monies col­
lected by the Lessee from greens fees, memberships, 
club house locker rentals, concessions and all other 
sources upon or arising out of the use of such golf 
course, during the term of this agreement shall be 
the property of the Lessee, and the Lessor shall have 
no right or claim to the same so long as the Lessee 
carries out his obligations under the terms of this 
agreement.

(8) It is further understood and agreed that 
Lessee shall have the right to raise the amounts 
of greens fees, membership dues, club house locker 
rentals and other charges for the use of said golf 
course, or any of its facilities, when necessary to 
meet increased cost of labor and the operation of 
said golf course, provided, nevertheless, that Lessee 
shall not raise the daily greens fees for the use of 
such course to an amount exceeding One Dollar and 
Fifty Cents ($1.50) per day on Saturdays, Sundays, 
Wednesday afternoons and—or holidays, nor to more 
than One Dollar ($1.00) per day on other days, nor 
shall Lessee raise the monthly dues for the use of 
said golf course and club house above the figure 
of Seven Dollars and Fifty Cents ($7.50) per month.

(9) The Lessor shall have the right during the en­
tire term of this lease to make periodic inspections 
of the equipment hereby leased for the benefit of 
determining its condition, and whether or not it is 
being maintained in accordance with the terms of 
this agreement.

(10) Lessee agrees that he will, at his own expense, 
procure and maintain during the entire term of this



41

lease a policy of public liability insurance, with rider 
attached for the protection of the Lessor against any 
contingent liability, which policy shall be in limits 
of $10,000.00 for one person and $20,000.00 for more 
than one person. He will also procure and maintain 
at his own expense a policy of owner’s, landlord’s 
and tenant’s insurance, with rider attached for the 
benefit of the Lessor, which policy shall be in the 
sum of $10,000.00.

(11) It is further agreed between Lessor and 
Lessee that a Committee from the Municipal Golfers 
Association, consisting of three members of that As­
sociation, shall have the right at all times during 
the term of this lease to make inspections of the golf 
course and of the golf club house, and the equipment 
therein contained, and shall further have the right, 
at all times during the term of this lease, to confer 
with the Lessee in regard to any Improvement neces­
sary for the maintenance or operation of said golf 
course, o!r in the maintenance of the same. Said 
Committee shall further have the right at all times 
during the term of this lease to confer with the Rec­
reation Committee of the Council in regard to any 
improvements needed on said golf course, or any 
recommendations in regard to its maintenance or 
operation, or any complaints that they may have in 
regard to the maintenance and/or operation of said 
golf course, which have not been remedied by the 
Lessee after they have conferred with him and given 
him a reasonable time to remedy the same.

(12) Lessee agrees that contemporaneously with 
the signing of this contract he will furnish to the 
City of Augusta a bond, with good surety, in the



42

amount of $2,000.00, to be approved by the Mayor and 
the Finance and Appropriations and Charity Com­
mittee, conditioned for his faithful performance of 
all of his obligations hereunder, including the pay­
ment of the rental hereby reserved, the maintenance 
of the golf course and equipment, and the operation 
of the same in accordance with this contract, and 
the return of the equipment leased hereby in a con­
dition as good or better than its present condition, 
ordinary wear and tear alone excepted.

(13) Should the Lessee fail to perform any of his 
obligations under this contract in accordance with 
the terms hereof, the Lessor shall have the right 
upon thirty days’ notice to the Lessee, to declare 
this contract null, void and of no effect, and to re­
enter and seize all of the property hereby leased, 
unless the Lessee shall within such thirty day period 
cure the default existing at the time of such notice. 
Any notice given pursuant to this agreement shall be 
mailed to the Lessee, by United States Registered 
Mail, addressed to him. at the Club House, and upon 
the delivery of such a registered letter to the postal 
authorities of the United States, so directed to the 
Lessee and with the postage paid, shall be conclu­
sive evidence of the giving of such notice. This 
remedy is cumulative of all of the other remedies 
at law or in equity which the Lessor may have for 
the enforcement of this contract, and shall not be 
the exclusive remedy for such enforcement.

(14) Should the Lessee default in the performance 
of any of the terms of this contract, and should the 
Lessor elect either to terminate or not to terminate



43

this agreement, Lessor shall nevertheless forthwith 
have an action at law or in equity, whichever is most 
appropriate and expeditious, against both the Lessee 
and the surety on his bond for any loss or damage 
which the Lessor may have suffered by reason of 
such default.

(15) It is expressly agreed between the parties 
hereto that in keeping with a certain communication 
of April 2, 1956 to The City Council of Augusta, that 
the Lessee herein is to re-arrange holes 10 through 
13 as are now laid out at the golf course, so that 
there will be no joint use of any fairway for two 
greens, and so as to provide an additional safety 
factor to the players using said golf course, which 
re-arrangement is to be in keeping with a certain 
set of plans of prior date now in the Engineer’ s 
Office of the City Council of Augusta, Georgia.

Furthermore, that the Lessee agrees to install for 
use during the summer of 1956 a permanent air- 
conditioning system at the Golf Shop, at the expense 
of the Lessee.

The execution of these presents, and the renewal 
of the Lease as herein provided, is made upon the 
representations of the Lessee to, in good faith, make 
the alterations herein set forth expeditiously, so that 
the same might be used during at lease a portion of 
the summer of 1956 golf season.

In Witness Whereof the Lessor has caused these 
presents to be executed by its Mayor and attested 
by its Clerk of Council, pursuant to action of The



44

City Council of Augusta in its meeting of April 16, 
1956, and the Lessee has hereunto set his hand and 
seal, all in duplicated, this 30th day of May, 1956.

THE CITY COUNCIL OF 
AUGUSTA (L.S.)

By ILLEGIBLE,
Mayor,

Attest:
ILLEGIBLE,

Clerk of Council,
Lessor,

Signed, Sealed and Delivered by Lessor, in the pres­
ence of:

THELMA RABUN,
LOUISE STORY,

(Seal) Notary Public, Richmond
County, Ga.

My Commission Expires August 19, 1958.
LAWSON E. DOUGLAS (L.S.), 

Lessee.

Signed, Sealed and Delivered by Lessee, in the 
presence of:

VER.LA L. CHOLOST, 
ILLEGIBLE P. FULLER,

(Seal) Notary Public, Richmond
Co., Ga.

My Commission expires 11-7-56.



45

DEFENDANT’S EXHIBIT “ B ” .

State of Georgia,
Richmond County.

This Agreement, made and entered into this 17th 
day of June, 1960, by and between The City Council 
of Augusta, a municipal corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Georgia, here­
inafter called Lessor, and Lawson E. Douglas, of 
the County of Richmond and State of Georgia, here­
inafter called the Lessee:

Witnesseth, that Whereas, on May 30, 1956 the 
parties hereto entered into a lease agreement cover­
ing certain property in the City of Augusta designat­
ed as the “Municipal Golf Course” and said parties 
are now desirous of extending the period of said 
lease upon certain terms and conditions.

Now, Therefore, the Lessor, for and in considera­
tion of the annual rental stipulated in said lease 
agreement and the performance and discharge by 
the Lessee of the other obligations of said lease agree­
ment, except as herein modified, and of the additional 
obligations herein assumed, and the Lessee, for 
and in consideration of the benefits accruing to him 
under said lease agreement and the extension of the 
period of said lease, do hereby agree as follows:

(1) Paragraphs six (6), eight (8), eleven (11) and 
fifteen (15) of said lease agreement are hereby elim­
inated and shall no longer be considered effective 
as conditions of the agreement between the parties.



46

(2) Said lease is hereby extended for a period 
ending on the 31st day of December, 1966, unless 
sooner terminated in the manner provided herein 
and in said lease agreement.

(3) The Lessee agrees to replace the grass upon 
the present greens with Tifton 328 grass, to ade­
quately lime, aerate, and fertilize the fairways and 
to enlarge and improve twelve (12) of the tees now in 
use, all at an aggregate, approximate, improvement 
cost of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000.00).

(4) Lessee agrees that work on said improve­
ments shall begin immediately and all of said im­
provements shall be satisfactorily completed within 
twenty (20) months from this date. Time is of the 
essence of this agreement.

(5) Should the Lessee fail to punctually perform 
any of his obligations under this agreement as here­
by amended in accordance with the terms thereof, 
the Lessor shall have the cumulative remedies speci­
fied in paragraph thirteen (13) of said lease agree­
ment.

(6) Except as herein expressly modified, all the 
terms, provisions, and conditions of said lease agree­
ment dated May 30, 1956 shall remain of full force 
and effect.

In Witness Whereof, the Lessor has caused these 
presents to be executed by its Mayor and attested 
by its Clerk of Council, pursuant to authority con­
tained in Resolution adopted by Lessor in its meet­



47

ing on May 16, 1960, and the Lessee has hereunto 
set his hand and seal, in duplicate, the day and year 
first above written.

THE CITY COUNCIL OF
AUGUSTA (

By ILLEGIBLE,
Its Mayor,

Attest:
ILLEGIBLE,

Its Clerk of Council,
Lessor,

Signed, sealed and delivered by Lessor in the pres­
ence of:

ILLEGIBLE,
ILLEGIBLE,

(Seal) Notary Public, Richmond
County, Georgia.

ILLEGIBLE, (L.S.),
Lessee.

Signed, sealed and delivered by Lessee in the pres­
ence of:

ILLEGIBLE,
ILLEGIBLE,

Notary Public, Richmond 
County, Georgia.

Verification.

(Title Omitted.)

Personally appeared before the undersigned at­
testing officer, came Lawson E. Douglas, who after



48

being duly sworn deposes and says that he is one 
of the Defendants in the above styled case and that 
the facts set forth in the within and foregoing An­
swer are true and correct to' the best of his knowledge, 
information and belief.

LAWSON E. DOUGLAS, 
(Lawson E. Douglas).

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 18th day of 
August, 1964.

GLORIA R. BRYAN,
(Seal) Notary Public, Richmond

County, Georgia.

MOTION TO DISMISS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF
AUGUSTA.

Filed Aug. 24, 1964.
(Title Omitted.)

The Defendant, The City Council of Augusta, 
moves the Court as follows:

1. To dismiss the action as against it on the ground 
that the complaint fails to state a claim against 
the said defendant, The City Council of Augusta, up­
on which relief can be granted.

Dated August 24, 1964.
(Signed) SAMUEL C. WALLER,

(Samuel C. Waller),
Attorney For Defendant,

The City Council of 
Augusta.

909 Marion Building,
Augusta, Georgia.



49

The City Council 
of

Augusta, Georgia
Augusta—Richmond County Municipal Building-

August 24, 1964.
Samuel C. Waller 

City Attorney

Mr. Eugene F. Edwards, Clerk 
United States District Court 

Southern District of Georgia 
Augusta Division

Federal Post Office and Court House 
Augusta, Georgia

Re: Herman Ewing et al. vs. The City Council of Au­
gusta and Lawson E. Douglas, Civil Action No. 
1186.

Dear Mr. Edwards:
In connection with the above stated case, we en­

close herewith the following pleadings being filed on 
behalf of the Defendant, The City Council of Augusta:

1. Motion to Dismiss.

2. Answer.
Very sincerely yours,

SAMUEL C. WALLER, 
(Samuel 1C. Waller),

City Attorney.
SCW: co 

Enclosures.



50

ANSWER OF DEFENDANT, THE CITY COUNCIL 
OF AUGUSTA.

Filed Aug. 24, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

For answer to the Complaint of the Plaintiffs in the 
above entitled cause, and subject to its Motion to 
Dismiss, the Defendant, The City Council of Augusta, 
says:

1. In answer to the first paragraph of the Com­
plaint, which is unnumbered, this Defendant admits 
that the sections of the United States Code referred to 
therein are correctly paraphrased but denies that the 
relief authorized by said Code sections is applicable 
to this Defendant.

2. In answer to Paragraph No. 2 of the Complaint, 
this Defendant admits that the Plaintiffs have set 
forth therein the purpose of the proceeding, but denies 
that there is in existence in The City of Augusta a 
municipal golf course, and further denies the re­
maining allegations contained therein.

3. In answer to Paragraph No. 3 of the Complaint, 
this Defendant admits that the Plaintiffs are at­
tempting to proceed, under the Rule cited therein, as a 
class action, but for want of sufficient knowledge or 
information, is unable to form a belief as to the truth 
of the remaining allegations contained therein.

4. In answer to Paragraph No. 4 of the Complaint, 
this Defendant admits, upon information and belief,



51

that the Plaintiffs are Negroes and citizens of the 
United States and the State of Georgia and who are 
presently residing in the City of Augusta, but for 
want of sufficient knowledge or information, is un­
able to> form a belief as to the truth of the remaining 
allegations contained therein.

5. In answer to Paragraph No. 5 of the Complaint, 
this Defendant admits that it is a municipal corpora­
tion under the laws of Georgia and that is is the owner 
and lessor of certain property formerly known as the 
“Municipal Golf Course” and that Lawson E. Douglas 
is the lessee thereof, but denies that Exhibit A at­
tached thereto constitutes the entire lease agree­
ment between it and said lessee, inasmuch as the 
lease agreement consists of two additional amend­
ments, one dated May 30, 1956, and another dated 
June 17, 1960; and except as herein admitted, denies 
the remaining allegations contained therein.

6. That in answer to Paragraph No. 6 of the Com­
plaint, this Defendant, for want of sufficient knowl­
edge or information, is unable to form a belief as to 
the truth of the allegations contained therein.

7. That in answer to the Paragraph No. 7 of the 
Complaint, this Defendant admits that the property 
formerly known as the “Municipal Golf Course” is 
still being operated by the Defendant, Lawson E. 
Douglas, but for want of sufficient knowledge or in­
formation, is unable to form a belief as to the truth 
of the remaining allegations contained therein.

8. In answer to Paragraph No. 8 of the Complaint, 
this Defendant, for want of sufficient knowledge or



52

information, is unable to form a belief as to the truth 
of the allegations contained therein.

9. In answer to Paragraph No. 9 of the Complaint, 
this Defendant denies the allegations contained there­
in.

Wherefor this Defendant prays judgment that the 
Complaint of the Plaintiffs be dismissed with costs 
to the Defendants.

Dated 24 day of August, 1964.
SAMUEL C. WALLER, 

Attorney for jthe Defendant, 
The City Council of Augusta.

909 Marion Building,
Augusta, Georgia.

Affidavit.

State of Georgia,
Richmond County.

Personally appeared before me, an officer duly 
authorized to administer oaths, George A. Sancken, 
Jr., who, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he 
is Mayor of the City Council of Augusta, and as such 
is authorized to make this affidavit; that the facts 
set forth in the within and foregoing answer are true.

Sworn to and subscribed before me, this 24th day 
of August, 1964.

GEORGE A. SANCKEN, JR.
ELIZABETH -KITCHENS, 

(Seal) Notary Public, Richmond
County, Georgia.

My Commission expires Mar. 1, 1967.



53

Filed Aug. 31, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

To: Cornelius B. Thurmond, Jr., Esquire,
Southern Finance Building,

Augusta, Georgia, 
and

Samuel C. Waller, Esquire,
Marion Building,

Augusta, Georgia.

Please take notice that the depositions of: Lawson 
E. Douglas, Augusta Municipal Golf Course, Augusta, 
Georgia; Mayor George A. Sancken, Jr., City-County 
Building, Augusta, Georgia will be taken pursuant to 
Rule 30, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure upon oral 
examination beginning at 2:30 P. M., on September 4, 
1964, in the City-County Building, Room 302, Augusta, 
Georgia before the Honorable Patricia Boose, Court 
Reporter, or before some other officer authorized by 
law to administer oaths. The examination will con­
tinue from day to day until completed. You are by 
means of this notice afforded an opportunity to be 
present at the aforesaid time and place and take such 
part in the examination as you may desire and as 
shall be fit and proper.



54

This 31st day of August, 1964.
J. H. RUFFIN, JR.,

(J. H. Ruffin, Jr.),
J. D. WATKINS,

1007 Ninth Street,
Augusta, Georgia.

JACK GREENBERG, 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III. 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
10 Columbus Circle,

New York, New York.

DEPOSITION OF LAWSON E. DOUGLAS.

(Title Omitted.)

Room 302, City-County Bldg.
Augusta, Georgia.

September 4, 1964.

The following deposition of Lawson E. Douglas was 
taken before me at the place and on the date above 
stated. The witness was duly sworn and, under oath, 
testified as follows:



55

[2] MR. LAWSON E. DOUGLAS, being first duly 
sworn, testified:

Examination by Mr. Ruffin:

Mr. Ruffin:
We’d like to state for the purposes of the record that 

this deposition is being taken pursuant to Rule 30 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Q. Would you state your full name for the benefit 
of the record, please?

A. Lawson E. Douglas.
Q. And are you the lessee of the Augusta Municipal 

Golf Course?
A. No, I am the lessee of the Augusta Golf Course. 
Q. Of the Augusta Golf Course—which was origin­

ally known as the Municipal Golf Course?
A. That’s right.

By Mr. Thurmond:
Speak up a little bit, he won’t be able to get those 

nods on that.

Q. If I assure you that the Augusta Golf Course 
and the Municipal Golf Course, I mean, are the same 
things—is that all right with counsel?

Mr. Thurmond:
No, I’m; going to object any time you use the words 

“ Municipal Golf Course” , because it’s our position on 
the matter that when Mr. Douglas leased the property 
from the [3] City in 1952, he changed the name to the 
Augusta Golf Course, and that’s what it has been 
known as for fourteen years. And to call it the Municipal



56

Golf Course would be a misnomer, and would be in­
jecting into the record the not true name of the course.

Mr. Ruffin:
In the description of the lease it refers to it as the 

Municipal Golf Course of the City of Augusta, and 
that’s why I didn’t think there would be any serious 
objection—we just used the term interchangeably, 
simply for convenience sake.

Mr. Thurmond:
Well, of course I can see that it was initially de­

scribed in the lease as Municipal Golf Course, as a 
generic designation as to what the property was under 
the lease. But to refer to it as anything other than the 
Augusta Golf Course, to my mind would be an inac­
curacy not called for.

Mr. Ruffin:
All right.

(By Mr. Ruffin):
Q. Mr. Douglas, are you presently leasing the Au­

gusta Golf Course from the City Council of Augusta? 
A. Yes.
Q. How long have you leased the Augusta Golf 

Course from the City Council of Augusta?
A. Since 1952.
Q. Since 1952? Is the Augusta Golf Course incorpo­

rated?
A. No.
Q. Can you recall, or do you recall approximately 

how many [4] members you have at the golf course? 
Approximately, sir.



57

A. I’d say 300, or more.
Q. Would your club accommodate any further 

members, or any additional members?
A. At times, yes. At the present, no.
Q. The 300 figure that you gave, does it include 

guests, or just 300 members?
A. Members.
Q. Are your members allowed to invite guests to 

the Augusta Golf Course?
A. On occasions, yes.
Q. Are these occasions stipulated or written in 

any rules?
A. No.
Q. Are any of your members negro?
A. No.
Q. Are there any resolutions or by laws or state­

ments of policy regarding the number of members 
that can be taken in at your club?

A. ;Nq.
Q. What is the procedure required for obtaining 

membership?
A. We have a House Committee. You turn your 

application in and it’ s approved or disapproved.
Q. Who are the members of the House Committee? 

[5] A. One is Mr. Carroll Warr, and Warren Wolfe, 
and myself.

Q. Warren Wolfe and yourself? How is this Com­
mittee selected or elected?

A. I selected it.
Q. You selected it?
A. Yes.
Q. Are there any other members who have equal 

authority with you?
A. No.



58

Q1. How many members is one member permitted 
to invite at the same time?

A. Well, the most the he could have would be a 
foursome. That would be him and possibly three 
guests.

Q1. Is there any restriction on who his guests might 
be, or whom his guests might be?

A. Yes.
Q. What are these restrictions?
A. The restrictions would be either—the colored 

race.
Q. That is the only restriction on guests?
A. Yes.
Q. Who imposes this restriction?
A. I do.
Q. And I believe you said earlier that you selected 

the [6] Screening Committee, is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. What do you take into consideration in selecting 

a Screening Committee?
A. Whether—how long he’s been in town, or how 

long—how he wants to play golf—a number of things 
could come into it.

Q. Do you have to report to any other body or any 
other person what you do with reference to the Augusta 
Golf Course?

A. No.
Q. Do the members who make—or do the persons 

who make application to the Augusta Golf Course 
have to establish a mental level or capacity to play 
golf?

A. No.
Q. What does one have to do in order to qualify as 

a member, or qualify for membership?



59

A. Come out and make application, and I’ll turn it 
over to the House Committee.

Q. If the House Committee, which consists of two 
other persons and yourself, should decide to admit a 
particular member-person as, a member, could you, 
as the leasee of the Augusta Golf Course, override this 
decision?

A. Yes.
Q. Who sets the policy as far as racial exclusion is 

concerned?
[7] A. I do.

Q. Do you enjoy any tax exempt status?

Mr. Thurmond:
Now I’ll object to that question on the ground that 

the words, “tax exempt status” , could include a multi­
tude of sins and would need clarification before the 
witness could give an intelligent answer. Go ahead 
and answer to the best of your knowledge and ability, 
just like I told the Mayor.

A. Well, I paid the floor taxes, utility bills and 
everything on that—all my equipment out there—I 
paid taxes on it, but I do not pay taxes on the property 
itself.

Q. Do you pay any taxes on the equipment that is 
leased by you from; the City Council of Augusta?

A. At the present I’m not using any of the City 
Council’s equipment—it’s all worn cut.

Q. Have any negroes been refused permission to 
play on the Augusta Golf Course?

A. Yes.
Q. By whom were they refused?
A. Me.



60

Q. Was there any particular reason why you re­
fused them permission to play?

A. Yes.
Q. Will you state for the record what that reason 

was?
[8] A. Well, I don’t have any colored members at the 
present, and I have the other members who have paid 
their dues, and it’s objectionable—and if it’s objection­
able to them; it’s interfering with my business and it’s 
—I have a private business, it’s my contention.

Q;. The property where the Augusta Golf Course is 
located belongs to whom—you Or the City Council of 
Augusta?

A. It belongs to the City Council of Augusta and 
the City.

Q. The building which houses—and the golf 
club. ..

Mr. Waller:
I object to that question because this is purely a 

matter of law and with reference to the lease—who 
owns what I don’t believe the witness could be called 
upon to explain the ownership of the property that he 
is leasing.

Q. Do you own the building which is located on the 
Augusta Golf Course?

A. No.
Q. Do you know of your own knowledge who owns 

the building?

Mr. Waller:
I object to that question and the use of the word 

“owns” , inasmuch as the suit is based on a lease



61

between lessor and lessee, and the ownership of 
property under lease could be developed as a matter 
of law with reference to the lease. And ownership is a 
somewhat vague term.

Mr. Thurmond:
And on the further ground that a lessee [9] cannot 

impeach his landlord’s title, whatever that title might 
be, whether he has title or not. As long as the lessee is 
in possession it is immaterial who owns the leased 
property.

Q. Do you know of your oiwn knowledge who owns 
the building?

A. The best of my knowledge would be the City 
Council of Augusta.

Q. All right. Do you maintain any liability insur­
ance at the golf course?

A. Yes.
Q. The Augusta Golf Course?
A. Yes,
Q. And for whose benefit is that insurance taken 

out for?
A. For the protection of the City.
Q. When you say the City, you mean the City Coun­

cil of Augusta?
A. The City Council.
Q. Is there any inspection authority from the City 

Council of Augusta that comes uip or goes up to the 
Augusta Golf Course periodically to inspect?

A. No.
Q. Has there ever been an inspection authority 

from the City Council of Augusta?



62

A. I’ve had numerous councilmen come out and 
look the course [10] over, but it wasn’t an official in­
spection.

Q. According to the original lease of 1952 entered 
into between yourself and City Council of Augusta— 
a committee from the Municipal Golfers’ Association 
consisting of three members of that association shall 
have, or did have the right at all times, during the 
time of that lease, to inspect the golf course and the 
golf club house and the equipment contained therein. 
Do you know from your own personal knowledge how 
these members were chosen?

Mr. Thurmond:
I object to that question on the ground that the ques­

tion apparently refers to paragraph eleven of the 
lease agreement dated March 1, 1952, as amended 
by agreement dated May 30, 1956, and that such para­
graph eleven was deleted from the lease by that 
amendment dated June 17, 1960, and. any question 
with reference to paragraph eleven would be moot. 
And on the further ground that there is no evidence 
as to the legal entity of such Municipal Golfers’ Asso­
ciation, or who the members are.

Mr. Ruffin:
That’s what I’m trying to ascertain—who.

Q. Do you know how the members were selected 
from 'the Augusta-Municipal Golfers’ [Association—- 
this inspection committee?

A. At the present I don’t recall.
Q. But you were a party to this lease in 1952?
A. Yes.



63

Q- With the City Council of Augusta? Do you have 
any intentions [11] of admitting negroes to member­
ship in the Augusta Golf Course?

Mr. Thurmond:
Now I object to that question on the ground that it 

calls for a state of mind as to the future. And the wit­
ness cannot be bound beyond five minutes from now, 
or even that long as to what his state of mind will be 
five minutes from now or next week or next year.

A. I couldn’t answer that question.
Q. Do you know—you know what your intention is 

now.
A. At the present—no.
Q. Let me see do I understand you. Presently you 

have no intention of admitting negroes to member­
ship to the Augusta Golf Course?

A. Right.
Q. Is there any other body or person to whom an 

appeal can be made, other than yourself, as far as 
negroes becoming members of the Augusta Golf Club?

A. No.
Q. How are your fees determined, with reference 

to use of the Augusta Golf Club—your green fees?
A. We have 'a monthly ticket, and a guest ticket, 

and a yearly ticket.
Q. How are the green fees determined for monthly, 

yearly or [12] what have you?
A. Those three categories.
Q. My question is. .. . (Off the record discussion).
A. Well, the amount of that—due to the cost of 

materials and things, it keeps going up. And the 
amount of pay—traffic the course can handle. On cer­



64

tain days it can handle more and on certain days it 
can’t. Some months it can handle more and some 
months it can’t, so it fluxuates.

Q. Is there any maximum or minimum green fee 
that is imposed by the City Council of Augusta.

A. I think that’s been waived.
Q. It’s been waived? What is the maximum amount 

of traffic that the Augusta Golf Course can accom­
modate at one time? In order that that might be crys­
tal clear, what is the maximum amount of players 
that can play at one time on the Augusta Golf Course?

A. Well, that varies. Once again, you could have 
twenty players on the course and that would tie up 
the whole course.

Q. Is that the maximum number that it would ac­
commodate?

A. No, as a rule it could accommodate about 180 
players.

Q. At one time?
A. That’s throughout the day.
Q. No, I don’t mean throughout the day. I mean 

at one time. How many people can you have on the 
Augusta Golf Course playing [13] golf at the same 
time?

Mr. Thurmond:
I object to that question on the grounds that it 

doesn’t—the question doesn’t take into consideration 
weather conditions, whether or not the question intends 
to be answered in the light of inclement conditions and 
other factors not stated in the question to enable the 
deponent to compose an intelligent answer.



65

Q. On a normal day—on a sunshiny day, how many 
people can play on the Augusta Golf Course at the 
same time?

A. Roughly 150 or less.
Q. If a tournament were being conducted today, 

how many people could pay on the Augusta Golf Course 
at the same time?

A. Well, today would be short, and couldn’t get 
over 125—because the days are shorter—in the spring 
of the year you’d get a few more in than that.

Q. During inclement conditions—that is to say on a 
rainy day, how many people could play golf on the 
Augusta Golf Course at the same time?

A. Well, once again—you’d have to go back to your 
weather conditions—and that would be hard to answer. 
You might not get the first foursome off the first tee.

Q. All right. Do you have any written rules and 
regulations with reference to restrictions imposed on 
membership?
[14] A. We have our regulations at the clubhouse, 
yes.

Q. Do you have written rules and regulations?
A. On the back of the scorecards and posted around 

on the tees.
Q. These written rules and regulations, do they 

have anything to do With membership as such?
A. No.
Q. Precisely what do these written rules and reg­

ulations—what are they?
A. They are simple courtesies of golf—how to con­

duct yourself in the clubhouse and some of the things 
that you can’t do on the golf course.

Q. There is no segregation on the Augusta Golf 
Course with reference to sex, is there?

A. No.



66

Q. There is no segregation on the Augusta Golf 
Course with reference to minors, is there? Children— 
are children permitted to play?

A. Yes, we have an age limit—twelve and a half.
Q. This is the minimum age?
A. Yes. Unless they are accompanied by a parent— 

and they can walk along with them.
Q. Who sets the policy which restricts the member­

ship to the [15] Augusta Golf Course to whites?
A. I do.
Q. Are there any minutes or rules and regulations, 

other than those you have mentioned, concerning— 
general rules of the club in force?

A. No.
Q. All right, I believe that’s all.

Examination by Mr. Thurmond:
Q. I’d like to put him on re-direct, o r . . . Mr. Doug­

las, I believe in answer to the question as to what 
were the restrictions to people playing the golf course, 
you mentioned one category. Let me ask you this—can 
a drunk play on the golf course?

A. No.
Q;. Can a person too young play on the golf course?
A. No.
Q. Can a rowdy person play on the golf course?
A. He is rejected, also.
Q. Can a person too old play on the golf course?
A. Yes.
Q. Now I believe you stated that there was no 

mental level required for members or participants 
or players on the golf course. [16] Do you allow per­
sons to play on the course who do not have any ability 
to play golf?



67

A. No.
Q. Now with reference to the question you were 

asked about your liability insurance—does that in­
surance protect you?

A. It protects the City of Augusta.
Q. Does it protect you? Are you the named insured 

on the policy ?
A. No.

Mr. Thurmond:
Now I reserve the right—I’m only asking that ques­

tion and I’m not waiving any rights relative to the 
previous asking of the question relative to the liability 
insurance, because the policy will speak for itself 
and can be produced. And it’s mv personal opinion 
that the witness is in error as to the terms of his own 
policy.

A. I think I know what you are talking about pres­
ently. . .

Mr. Thurmond:
But I don’t want him to be in a position of having 

told a falsehood. (Off the record discussion.)

Mr. Thurmond:
Well then, get on the record, Mr. Douglas, and ex­

plain then, if you will, the answer previously given to 
you with reference to the insurance.

A. Well. ..

Mr. Ruffin:
Well, first of all let’ s ascertain whether [17] or not 

he’s certain. I mean you recall one thing and he recalls 
another.



68

Mr. Thurmond:
No. I’m speaking—I’ve never seen the policy, but 

knowing . ..

Mr. Ruffin:
Then I suggest that the previous answer stand 

then. ..

Mr. Thurmond:
Well, he had a right to explain what he thought you 

were asking about.

Mr. Ruffin:
I don’t think he has the right to do it after prodding 

by you .. . .  (off the record discussion).

Mr. Thurmond:
Let’s get back on the record now. Go ahead and ex­

plain if you will, Mr. Douglas, what insurance or bond 
you were thinking about when you were asked the 
question on direct examination?

A. Well, I had in mind. ..

Mr. Ruffin:
Note my objection.

A. My performance bond that I had to give to the 
City in order to obtain the lease from the City to guar­
antee them that I would produce so much.

Q. Do you purchase any insurance policies from 
any agents in town?

A. Yes,
Q. And what do those policies—what type of in­

surance do [18] you purchase?



69

A. Liability insurance.
Q. All right, and who does that—do those policies 

protect?
A. It protects me. Protects me, because my per­

formance bond would take care of the rest of the City’s 
liability.

Mr. Thurmond:
I think that’s all.

Re-Examination by Mr. Ruffin:
Q. You indicated, Mr. Douglas, that the minimum 

age for playing on the Augusta Golf Course is twelve 
and a half years—and any person who is younger 
would have to be accompanied by his parent, is that 
correct?

A. Yes—but he’s not a full fledged member to play 
golf—I mean, he can’t play eighteen holes because he 
would be holding up the course.

Q. What can he play?
A. Well, he could just play a few holes of golf.
Q. Can he actually learn to play golf on the Au­

gusta Golf Course? In other words, he doesn’t—a per­
son who is under twelve and a half, or who is twelve 
and a half would not have to be a person who knows 
how to play golf.

A. We do not take them under twelve and a half 
unless they [19] are under the guidance of their par­
ents.

Q. I understand that. But does this person who is 
under twelve and a half, who is accompanied by a 
parent—or his parents—Have to know how to play 
golf?



70

A. He could be accompanied by his parents, and 
learning the etiquette of golf and the rules of golf, 
and learning how to play golf at the sme time, through 
instructions of his parents—for his own safety, sir— 
sake.

Q. Would you permit a person to become a mem­
ber of the Augusta Golf Course who does not know how 
to play golf, but who is in the process or leanrning—be 
this person an adult or a person who—or a minor who 
is twelve and a half years old or under accompanied 
by a parent or parents?

A. State that question again, please.
Q. Would you permit an adult who is in the process 

of learning to play golf to play golf on the Augusta 
Golf Course—either as a member or as the guest of 
a member?

A. Yes.
Q. All right. No further questions.
(Deposition concluded.)

[20] I have read the preceding pages and hereby ac­
knowledge, by signing below, that it is a complete and 
accurate record of my testimony in the cause of ac­
tion cited on page one hereof as given by me on Fri­
day, September 4th, 1964, in Room 302, City-County 
Building, Augusta, Georgia, before Paul C. Blanchard, 
Notary Public.

LAWSON E. DOUGLAS.
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 11th day of 

September, 1964.
PAUL C. BLANCHARD,

(Paul C. Blanchard),
(Seal) Notary Public.

My Commission expires on: August 31, 1968.



71

DEPOSITION OF MAYOR GEORGE A. SANCKEN,
JR.

(Title Omitted.)
Room 302, City-County Bldg., 

Augusta, Georgia, 
September 4, 1964.

The following deposition of Mayor George A. Sanck- 
en, Jr. was taken before me at the place and on the 
date above stated. The witness was duly sworn and, 
under oath, testified as follows:

[2] MAYOR GEORGE A SANCKEN, JR., being first 
duly sworn, testified:

Examination by Mr. Ruffin:

Mr. Ruffin:
Before we begin, I’d like the rule of sequestration be 

invoked. (Off the record discussion.)

Mr. Ruffin:
I’d like to state for the purpose of the record that 

this deposition is being taken pursuant to Rule 30 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(By Mr. Ruffin):
Q. You are Mayor George A. Sancken, Jr.?
A. Yes.

Mr. Waller:
Let me interrupt. Any objections to testimony going 

to be heard when the deposition is presented? Do you



72

intend to present this deposition in a trial, or is this 
for discovery?

Mr. Ruffin:
Yes.

Mr. Waller:
Well, do you want to reserve the right to object, or 

do you want the objections noted?

Mr. Ruffin:
Well, I think. ..

Mr. Thurmond:
Well, we’ll stipulate to reserve all rights of objec­

tion until the trial. ..

Mr. Ruffin:
According to Rule 30, we have a right, under the 

scope of examination, unless otherwise ordered by 
the Court, as provided by Rule 30, B or D—the de­
ponent may be examined [3] regarding any matter 
not privileged which is relevant to the subject matter 
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to 
the claim or defense of examining party, or to the 
claim or defense of any other party, including the 
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and 
location of any books, documents or other tangible 
things, and the identity and location of persons hav­
ing knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground for 
objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at 
the trial, if the testimony sought appears reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evi­
dence. And under this rule I would submit that you



73

could note your objection here, but we would still be 
permitted to go along with the interrogation.

Mr. Thurmond:
Excuse me, Jack. I don’t really think that was what 

he asked. In other words, we want to know if we can 
stipulate at this time that all objections are reserved, 
or do you want us just to keep interrupting you during 
your examination to get the objections in the record? 
See?

Mr. Ruffin:
I’m sorry.

Mr. Thurmond:
If we reserve the right object until the trial, then 

you could go on without being interrupted and im­
peded.

Mr. Ruffin:
I would prefer that you object on the course.

Mr. Thurmond:
You would prefer that we object now, during the 

examination?1

[4] Mr. Ruffin:
That’s right.

Mr. Thurmond:
Then is it fair that we can let the record say that 

no objections are reserved?



74

Mr. Waller:
I don’t see—just disregard it. Why do we have to 

say—don’t you think it would be better just to go 
ahead and object, and let the chips fall where they 
may?

Mr. Thurmond:
Let the understanding be upon statement of counsel) 

for plaintiff.

Mr. Waller:
Yes.

Mr. Ruffin:
Now we may proceed?

(By Mr. Ruffin):
Q. Are you Mayor George A. Sancken, Jr.?
A. Yes.
Q. And you are mayor of the City of Augusta?
A. Yes.
Q. When did you take office?
A. January 6, 1964.
Q. Since the—since you have been mayor of the 

City of Augusta, have there been any negotiations 
with reference to voluntarily desegregating the Au­
gusta Golf Course?

A. Well, to answer the question, I think I will have 
to say that unofficially there has been an attempt to 
do it, just by discussion. I don’t have the authority on 
my own to negotiate any matter of that nature.
[5] Q. You deny having the authority to negotiate? 
On whom would you say this authority rests?

A. On Council.



75

Q. On the City Council of Augusta?
A. Yes. I might add, any contract that the City 

enters into is a mutter for full Council.
Q. But as mayor of the City—as chief executive 

of the City, you do—you are empowered to negotiate 
preliminarily and submit these matters to Council?

Mr. Thurmond:
Now I object to that question, because it asks for a 

legal conclusion which the witness may or may not 
be capable of answering, and that it asks for a legal 
conclusion as to what the extent and scope of his au­
thority is.

Mr. Ruffin:
Have you finished? As chief executive of the City, 

he ought to be in a position to know what his authority 
is; and secondly, I’m wondering whether or not you, 
since you represent Mr. Douglas, have proper stand­
ing to object.

(By Mr. Ruffin):
Q. What was your answer to the question?

Mr. Waller:
Will you state the question again, please?

Q. As chief executive of the City of Augusta, do 
you have authority to negotiate preliminarily with 
.other—with third parties and present the negotiations 
to the City Council of Augusta?

Mr. Waller:
I object to that question on the ground [6] that it is 

too vague and indefinite for a reasonable answer to be



76

givien to it. What do you—what is m>eant by the word 
“ negotiate” , for example? Break the question down 
into two parts, if you don’t mind.

Q. Well, first of all, let’s determine whether or not 
he can answer. He may understand.

Mr. Waller:
Well, I’m objecting to the form of the question in 

that it’s too vague to indicate to the witness what is 
desired.

Mr. Thurmond:
And I note the same objection.

Mr. Waller:
Better try to answer the best you can, George.

A. Well, I think I have the perfect right, in my 
position as mayor of Augusta, to discuss matters with 
third parties concerning some of these things. But I 
still go back to the question that unofficially—it's all 
unofficial nature.

Q. Have you discussed the desegregation of the 
Augusta Golf Course, either officially or unofficially, 
with any negro citizens of Augusta?

A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall the names of these negro citi­

zens?
A. I discussed it with you—do you want me to men­

tion your name, I guess, Jack Ruffin.
[7] Q. That’s really my nick name—Jack.

A. And I don’t recall anybody else that I have spe­
cifically talked with—that is the proponents of de­
segregating the golf course.



77

Q. Have you discussed the matter with Rev. C. S. 
Hamilton?

A. I believe I was in a meeting on one occasion 
where Rev. Hamilton brought that question up. I don’t 
think—I don’t recall having any specific prolonged dis­
cussion about the matter. I think I will just have to re­
serve the right to say that I don’t specifically recall the 
circumstance. I know it has been mentioned in his 
presence on one occasion.

Q. Now during the course of these discussions, 
were you under the impression that these negotiations, 
were attempted for the benefit of those persons who 
were immediately concerned—that is to say with whom 
you were carrying on the discussion, or did you—were 
you under the impression that these negotiations were 
for the benefit of all of the negroes in the City of Au­
gusta? ;: gy

Mr. Thurmond:
Now I’m going to object to that question on the 

ground that the question assumes a state of facts 
contrary to what the Mayor has just testified to. Testi­
mony is that he has a recollection of one generalized 
discussion. The question asked for a series of dis­
cussions, and that’s contrary to what the witness has 
already testified to.

Mr. Waller:
I note the similar objection, in that the [8] word “ne­

gotiations”  is used in the question, and there’s no evi­
dence that negotiations have taken place between the' 
Mayor and any parties—only discussions.



78

Mr. Ruffin:
I believe that he indicated—as you say—the Mayor 

had indicated that he had discussed the matter with 
me and in a meeting he had discussed it with Rev. 
Hamilton. I believe he indicated earlier that these 
discussions really were unofficial. I really don’t see 
where it’s any ground to. ..

Mr. Thurmond:
Well, I mean you are making us note our objections, 

so there’s no need for us to argue the point. We’ll just 
note them.

Mr. Ruffin:
Very well.

(By Mr. Ruffin):
Q. Would you like for me to repeat the question? 
A. If you would, please.
Q. Were you under the impression that these dis­

cussion which we use interchangeably with the word 
“ negotiations” were for the benefit of those persons 
who were immediately discussing it with you, or were 
they for the benefit of the negroes of the City of Au­
gusta?

Mr. Thurmond:
I note another objection on the ground that there has 

been no definition as to what is meant by discussions 
or negotiations, or the subject matter of the discus­
sions or negotiations.

[9] Mr. Ruffin: 
All right.



79

Mr. Waller:
Go ahead and answer the question to the best of 

your knowledge.

A. Best—well, I feel that when you talk about de­
segregation of any given unit, that you are speaking 
of the whole and not for a given few. (Off the record 
discussion.)

Q. If substantial changes were proposed concern­
ing the alteration of the golf course, would the City of 
Augusta—that is to say, the iCity Council of Augusta 
have to approve it?

A. Would you repeat that?
Q. If substantial changes were proposed concern­

ing the alteration of the Augusta Golf Course, would 
the City Council of Augusta have to approve these sub­
stantial changes or alterations?

Mr. Thurmond:
I note an objection to that question on the ground 

that there has been no evidence or definition of what 
is meant by “ substantial changes or alterations” .

A. Well, I think that City Council is—is just bound 
under the terms of the lease—whatever substantial 
improvements or corrections to the golf course might 
be. But we only look to the lease and the wording of 
the lease.

Q. Could the golf course be used as another type 
of facility—that is to say other than a golf course, 
without the approval of the City Council of Augusta?

[10] Mr. Thurmond:
Now I object to that on the ground that the lease 

speaks to—for itself. The lease is pleaded, and the



80

ternqs of the lease are in the pleadings and the lease 
speaks for itself.

A. I just would like to ask a question here, just a 
minute.

Mr. Thurmond:
Let me go ahead and add a little bit more. And on 

the further ground that this witness neither in his 
official capacity or unofficially has the right or power 
to change the provisions of the lease. All right.

A. Now I’d like to have the question repeated.
Q. If substantial changes were proposed concern- 

in the alteration of the Augusta Golf Course, would 
these changes have to have the approval of the City 
Council of Augusta?

A. I believe I answered that part of the question.
Q. Could the Augusta Golf Course be used as an­

other type of facility—that is to say other than a golf 
course, without the approval of Council?

A. Well, I don’t fully know how to answer that ques­
tion, because the—it is a golf course now and there’s 
a least in existence that I understand runs to 1971, 
and—but if any change would be made, City Council 
would certainly have to approve it.

Q. All right. Does the City have the right to review 
schedules and audit books of the lessee?

[11] Mr. Thurmond:
Same objection noted, on the grounds that the lease 

speaks for itself.

Mr. Waller:
I note the same objection.



81

A. As far as I know, the City has the—leases the 
golf course for a stated fee, and except for the stipu­
lations in the lease, we have—then we have no further 
jurisdiction.

Q. Could the facilities leased to Mr. Douglas be 
used for any other purpose, other than golf purposes, 
without prior approval from the City Council?

Mr. Thurmond:
I object to that question on the ground that the an­

swer calls for speculation and conclusion on the part 
of the witness.

A. Well, I would not question—what do you mean, 
som-ething like a housing development, or whether 
we could just abandon the golf course?

Q. There is certain equipment that has been leased 
to Mr. Douglas along with the golf course, and I’d like 
to know from you could this equipment be used in any 
other facility?

A. Well, I don’t know. ..
Q. Without prior approval from City Council?
A. Well, I know of no equipment that is leased along 

with the Municipal Golf Course lease.
Q. According to the original lease in 1962, between 

the City [12] Council of Augusta and Lawson E. Doug­
las, the lessor has the right to inspect the equipment 
used. Is this for the benefit of the lessor—this—the 
right to inspect the equipment used—for the benefit of 
the lessor, the City Council of Augusta?

A. I. ..

Mr. Waller:
I object to this question to determine if this is a part 

of the present contract of the City—between the City



82

and Mr. Douglas. What paragraph do you state this is 
—relating this to the contract, what paragraph is this?

Mr. Ruffin:
It’s—it’s in the original lease in 1952, on page—para­

graph nine.

A. My answer to the question is that I am not 
familiar with any such terms.

Q. All right, are you familiar with the terms of the 
original lease of 1952?

A. No, I’m not.
Q. You’re not. Are you familiar with the lease of 

1956, between the City Council of Augusta and Lawson 
E. Douglas?!

A. No, I’m not familiar with the terms of that lease. 
Q. Are you familiar with the lease of 1963, between 

the City Council of Augusta and Lawson E. Douglas? 
A. That’s the July lease—signed in July?
Q. Yes.

[13] A. I’ve read that lease.
Q. You have read that lease?
A. Yes.
Q. According to the 1963 lease, which you concede 

that you have read, one provision is that before the 
lease can be assigned, prior approval must be ob­
tained from the City Council of Augusta. Does the les­
see as a result of the lease enjoy any special tax ex­
empt status?

Mr. Thurmond:
I object to that question on the ground that the part 

of the question with reference to tax exempt status has 
no connection with paragraph four of the lease amend­



83

ment dated July 12, 1963, with which the question was 
prefaced.

A. Would you read the question again, please?
Q. Yes. I believle one of the provisions of the 1963 

lease reads, “ Before the lease can be assigned, prior 
approval must be obtained from the City Council of 
Augusta.” The question is whether or not the lessee, 
Lawson E. Douglas, enjoys any tax exempt status.

A. Well, I’m not immediately—any tax exempt 
status, but my assumption would be that he does.

Mr. Waller:
Does what?
A. Does he enjoy a tax exempt basis?

Mr. Thurmond:
Now I’m going to object to the answer of [14] the wit­

ness on the ground that it’s not responsive to the ques­
tion. It assumes a state of facts which was not shown to 
exist, and there is no definition as to whether we—or 
the witness refers to ad valorem taxes, license taxes, 
or just what the witness refers to. But mainly on the 
ground that it assumes—it’s based on an assumption 
and there is no evidence to substantiate the assump­
tion.

Q. Have you had an opportunity to discuss the de­
segregation of the Augusta Golf Course with Mr, Doug­
las, the lessee?

A. Yes.
Q. Will you state for the record the substance of 

your conversations with the lessee, Mr. Douglas?



84

A. Well, I’ll begin my statements by—unofficially 
I talked with Mr. Douglas and Mr. Thurmond, reciting 
the matter, and it has been my feeling that he has a 
bona fide lease, and that—if I can seek the right 
word—I was just interceding, you might say, in behalf 
and through my discussions with Mr. Ruffin, in his 
behalf. And recognizing the fact that I felt the he had 
a bona fide lease with the City, it was more or less done 
on a unofficial, friendly manner.

Q. Will you state the substance of the discussion?
Mr. Thurmond:

Well, I’m going to object to anything that calls for 
the witness to state what the defendant, Lawson E. 
Douglas, said, on the ground that the witness is not a 
party to [15] this suit.

A. I’m trying to reflect back. I consider the fact 
that my discussion—and this is rather vague in my 
mind—but again, I tried to intercede in behalf of the* 
discussions I had with you, and to see that the whole 
matter could be worked out without the necessity of 
a Court case. I might add that I—based on the subse­
quent events that I was unsuccessful in that endeavor. 
I don’t. . . .

Mr. Thurmond:
If the witness is—excuse me. Have you finished? I 

don’t want to interrupt, but. .. .
A. Well, I mean I’m through with my comment, 

unless there is some specific question he has in con­
nection with it.

Mr. Thurmond:
Well, I wish to interpose a motion to strike that part 

of the answer which contains the testimony about it



85

was his personal or private desire that the matter 
could be worked out without the necessity of a Court 
suit on the ground that it assumes a legal situation 
and legal status between the lessor and the lessee 
which would make a Court suit necessary, and on the 
ground that there is no evidence that such Court suit 
was necessary, nor is there any legal reason why 
such Court suit would be necessary; and on the further 
ground that it’s an expression of the witness’s per­
sonal desires and it is not relevant evidence in this 
law suit.

Q. Did you suggest to the defendant, Lawson E. 
Douglas, that [16] he voluntarily desegregate the Au­
gusta Golf Course?

A. Yes.
Q. Will you state for the record precisely and ex­

actly what you said?
A. I doubt if I can precisely state exactly what f 

said, but I can, in general terms, state this—that f 
suggested that perhaps Mr. Douglas could desegre­
gate the golf course, but recognizing the fact that I 
felt that he had a bona fide lease that Council had 
entered into with him—but I think the pricipal point 
is that I did make that suggestion to him—also along 
the line that I could only do it on the basis of a direct 
discussion with him about—and not as an official— 
in any official capacity.

Q. What was his response or reply to your sug­
gestion?

Mr. Thurmond:
There again, I interpose the objection as to anything 

this witness testifies to as to what Mr. Douglas said, 
on the ground that this witness is not a party to this



86

suit, and on the further ground that Mr. Douglas is a 
party to this suit and is available for deposition or as 
a witness, and can be asked what he said.

A. As near as I recall, he expressed the point 
that the felt he had a bona fide lease and that under 
his lease he was not willing to desegregate the golf 
course.

Q. According to the original lease that was entered 
into between [17] the defendant City and the defend­
ant Lawson E. Douglas, members of the Municipal 
Golfer’s Association were permitted to inspect the 
equipment. . . .

Mr. Waller:
I object to that question because that is not the terms 

of the lease. You’re not quoting from the present lease.

Mr. Ruffin:
’52 lease. .. .

Mr. Waller:
That section has been stricken, though. That’s Sec­

tion Eleven?

Mr. Thurmond:
That’s right, Section Eleven.

Mr. Ruffin:
It’s beginning on page three, paragraph eleven—“it 

is further agreed between the lessor and lessee. .. . ”

Mr. Waller:
That’s Section Eleven, right?



87

Mr. Ruffin:
Paragraph eleven or Section Eleven—it’s on page 

three. “That a Committee from the Municipal Golfer’s 
Association consisting of three members of that asso­
ciation . . . ”

Mr. Waller:
See, paragraph eleven has been deleted in the 

1960. . . .

Mr. Ruffin:
We’re taling about the original lease, though. We’re 

talking about the status of the original lease, before 
it was stricken.

Mr. Waller:
What happened prior to 1960—is that your question?

[18] Mr. Ruffin:
That’s right.

Mr. Waller:
I object to that question because the Mayor testified 

he took office in 1964 and would not be qualified to tes­
tify.

Mr. Ruffin:
Well, whatever was binding on his predecessor 

would certainly be binding on him.

Mr. Thurmond:
All right, ready? I object to the question because 

apparently the question refers to paragraph eleven 
of the original lease agreement, dated 1 March, ’52, 
as amended by amendment: dated 30 May, ’56, on the



88

grounds that the pleadings show that paragraph elev­
en has been deleted, that paragraph eleven is a moot 
part of the lease, has no present force or effect, and 
on—well, that’s enough grounds.

Q. The question was who were—are the members 
of the Municipal Golfer’s Association.

Mr. Waller:
You skipped one. Go back one—was that the ques­

tion—who are the members?
A. I do not know.
Q. As far as you know now, are there any members 

of the Augusta—are there any members of the Munici­
pal Golfer’s Association who have the right to inspect 
the Augusta Golf Course?

Mr. Waller:
I object to that question on the ground that it’s a 

question of law. It’s not in the contract—the present 
[19] lease arrangement. There is no provision for a 
Municipal Golfer’s Association, or any right to inspect 
on their part, and we, since your question relates to 
the past and there is nothing in the lease which governs 
that.
Mr. Thurmond:

And I object on the ground that there is no evidence 
in the record or the case to show that there is any such 
entity known as the Municipal Golfer’s Association, or 
who its members are.

Q. What was your answer?
A. I know of no such terms in the lease—the exist­

ing lease.



89

Q. All right, is there any inspection authority from 
the City that has the right to inspect the facilities at 
the Augusta Golf Course?

A. To my knowledge there is none.
Q. No more questions.

Mr. Thurmond:
I don’t think I’ll ask you any questions.
(Deposition concluded.)

CITATION OF AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DE­
FENDANT LAWSON E. DOUGLAS’ MOTIONS,

Filed Nov. 30, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

Now comes Lawson E. Douglas, one of the defend­
ants in the above styled case and presents and tenders 
to the Court the following Citation of Authorities in 
Support of his Motions and prays that the Court grant 
each and every motion of said defendant.

Respectfully submitted,
THURMOND HESTER, 

JOULES & MC ELM.URRAY, 
By CORNELIUS B, THURMOND, 

JR.,
Attorneys for defendant 

Lawson E. Douglas.

Jurisdiction and Purpose of 42, USCA 1981, et; seq.

This action proceeds under Title 42, United States 
Code, Section 1981, et seq. commonly referred to as the



90

Civil Rights Acts and under 28 USCA, 1343. 42 USCA 1983 
provides that every person who under color of any 
statute or ordinance of any state, subjects any citizen 
of the United States to the deprivation of any rights 
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitutions 
and laws shall be liable to the party injured in an ac­
tion at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding 
for redress.

To the effect that a City is not “person” within the 
meaning of 42 USCA, 1983, see the case in 365 US 514, 
on remand in 291 F 2nd 706.

The purpose of Chapter 42 of the United States Code 
was adequately stated in 166 F Supp. 33, Reargument 
denied 176 F Supp. 278, a New York District Court 
case in 1958 which held:

This Chapter was enacted to enforce USCA Con­
stitutional Amendement Number 14 to the Federal 
Constitution which is directed to State Action and 
the invasion by an individual of rights of other indi­
viduals is not within the purview of the amendment 
and the jurisdiction conferred on the United States 
Federal District Court under 28 USCA 1343 is similarly 
limited.

Elements Necessary to State a Cause of Action.

Not any action alleging any facts whatsoever is per­
missible under the Civil Rights Acts contained in 42 
USCA 1981, et seq.

The petition must state a cause of action. As was 
held in 313 F 2nd 536 (CA Colorado 1963) it is necessary



91

to state a cause of action that the petition allege the 
following:

1. An act by the defendant under Color of State 
or local law, and

2. The deprivation of a right, privilege or immunity 
secured by the Constitution and Laws of the United 
States.

See the case in 216 F Supp. 465 (DC NC 1963) which 
held that in the absence of additional allegations show­
ing the hospital corporation was an instrument of the 
State, the class action by negro physicians and pa­
tients to prohibit the hospital from denying courtesy 
staff privileges solely on account of race and to re­
quire admission of patients on a non-segregated basis 
was controlled by a prior Court of Appeals decision 
that the hospital was a private corporation and not an 
instrument of the State and the Federal Court had no 
jurisdiction to redress alleged deprivation of Civil 
Rights by private individuals.

See also 179 F Supp. 211, affirmed 280 F 2nd 426, cert, 
denied 364 US 849 which held that in an action for viola­
tion of this chapter (Chapter 42 of United States Code) 
unsupported conclusions in complaint that defendants 
that conspired together to deprive plaintiff of due proc­
ess and equal protection without specification of facts 
upon which conclusion was based was insufficient.

It is contended by defendant that the petition in this 
case does not state a cause of action.



92

Burden of Proof,

The burden of proof that this case is one within the 
jurisdiction of this Court and is one for appropriate 
relief, is upon the plaintiffs.

See the case in 211 F.Supp 657 which holds that to 
establish a claim for damages under 42 USCA 1983, the 
conduct complained of must have been engaged in un­
der color or state law and must have subjected the 
plaintiff to deprivation of rights, privileges, or immu­
nities secured by the Federal Constitution.

There is no allegation in this petition nor is there 
cited or referred to any law of the State of Georgia 
that the conduct of defendant Douglas is under color 
of such state law, and in fact no such state law exists.

See also the case in 280 F 2nd 531 to the effect; that:

In class action by Negro patrons of bus company 
to enjoin company form enforcing its published rule 
in seating passengers according to race, plaintiffs, 
who failed to prove a joint or agreed action between 
the bus company and the City commissioners, were 
precluded from arguing that company’s action in es­
tablishing segregated seating constituted state action.

Neither is there an allegation or proof that the al­
leged action of defendant Douglas is the result of a 
joint or agreed action between the City and said de­
fendant.

Luther McDaniel is an Improper Party-Plaintiff, and 
this Case is not a Class Action.



93

Defendant Douglas contends that this suit is not a 
class action. While Rule 23(a) provides that if persons 
constituting a class are so numerous as to make it im­
practicable to bring them all before the Court, such of 
them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate 
representation of all may, on behalf or all, sue or be 
sued when the character of the right sought to be en­
forced for or against a class is (3) several, and there 
is a common question of law or fact affecting the 
several rights and a common relief is sought.

There is no allegation nor can there by proof that 
Negroes as a class and that each member of such 
class has the several right to play golf on the Augusta 
Golf Course. Nor is there alleged that there is a com­
mon question of law or a common question of fact 
affecting said several rights. Of the four plaintiffs in 
this case, one of them has never applied to defendant 
Douglas to play golf on the Augusta Golf Course, only 
three of them applied, and there are no allegations 
that any other negroes, either individually or as a 
class, have ever applied to defendant Douglas to play 
golf on the Augusta Golf Course.

See the case of Williams vs Kansas City Missouri 
(DC Missouri 1952) 104 F Supp. 848, affirmed 205 F1 2nd 
47, cert, denied 346 US 26 which held that the plaintiffs 
who were allegedly excluded from a Municipal Swim­
ming Pool because of their race could maintain an ac­
tion for declaratory judgment and injunction for depri­
vation under color of state law of rights secured to 
them by the 14th Amendment on their own behalf, but 
could not maintain same as a class action on behalf of 
all other citizens similarly situated, in the absecne of



94

proof that citizens other than plaintiffs had ben ex­
cluded from the swimming pool on similar grounds.

In this case there are no allegations that other ne­
groes had been excluded. Also, in this case, there is the' 
very distinct factual situation that the only exclusion 
alleged is that three of the plaintiffs were excluded 
from playing golf at the Augusta Golf Course which 
this defendant contends is his private business. Even 
if the Golf Course in this case was operated by the 
City of Augusta, which it is not, the plaintiffs could not 
maintain this suit as a class action.

If the three plaintiffs who applied to play on the golf 
course cannot maintain a class action, then Luther 
McDaniel, who did not apply and who has not been re­
fused is an improper plaintiff and should be stricken 
for misjoinder of parties.

This Case is not one Under Color or State Law, the 
Complaint Fails to State a Claim Against this 
Defendant Upon Which Relief can be Granted, 
and the Case Should be Dismissed.

It is no longer open to question that a state may not 
constitutionally require segregation of public facili­
ties, whether the state action is by legislation or by 
executive action.

On the other hand, private conduct abridging indi­
vidual rights does no violation to the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment unless to some 
significant extent the state in any of its manifestations 
has become involved in it.



95

In the case of Peterson vs City of Greenville, 373 
US 244, the petitioners remained seated at a lunch 
counter of a store, even though the Manager, in the 
presence of the police, announced that the lunch coun­
ter was being closed and everyone should leave. The 
Manager stated to petitioners to leave because Inte­
grated service was not only contrary to local custom 
but was in violation of a City Ordinance requiring 
separation of the races in restaurants. The petitioners 
were convicted in the Recorder’s Court for violating 
the State Trespass Statute, on appeal the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina affirmed and on certiorari, 
the Supreme Court of the United States reversed. 
There was a Greenville City Ordinance requiring sep­
aration of the races in restaurants the Supreme Court 
held as follows:

“* * * It cannot be disputed that under our deci­
sions ‘private conduct abridging individual rights 
does no violence to the equal protection clause unless 
to some significant extent the State in any of its mani­
festations has been found to have become involved in 
it’ . Burton vs Willming Parking Authority 365 US 
715; Turner vs Memphis 369 US 350.

It cannot be denied that here the City of Greenville, 
an agency of the State, has provided by its ordinance 
that the decision as to whether a restaurant facility 
is to be operated on a desegregated basis is to be re­
served to it. When the state has commanded a par­
ticular result, it has saved to itself the power to de­
termine that result and thereby ‘to a significant ex­
tent’ has ‘become involved’ in it, and in fact, has re­
moved that decision from the sphere of private



96

choice. * * * The Kress Management, in deciding to 
exclude negroes, did precisely what the City Law 
required.”

The Court went on to say that the convictions had 
the effect of enforcing the ordinance passed by the 
City of Greenville, an agency of the State and that 
when a state agency passes a law compelling persons 
to discriminate against, other persons because of racei 
and the state criminal processes are employed in a 
way which enforces the discrimination mandated by 
that law, that this is a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.

Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the result in the 
Peterson case but stated that the Supreme Court did 
not question the long established rule that the Four­
teenth Amendment reaches only state action, citing 
the Civil Rights cases 109 US 3 and does not suggest 
that such action may be found in the mere enforce­
ment of trespass laws in relation to private business 
establishments from which the management, of its 
own free will, has chosen to exclude persons of the 
negro race. Mr. Justice Harlan continued as follows:

“Judicial enforcement is of course state action, 
but this is not the end of the inquiry. The ultimate 
substantive question is whether there has been ‘state 
action of a particular character’ (Civil Rights cases, 
Supra. 109 US at 11))—whether the character of the 
states involvement in an arbitrary discrimination is 
such that it should be held responsible for the dis­
crimination.”



97

A case which more adequately considers the matter 
of the “ significant extent of involvement by the State” 
is that of Burton vs Willmington Parking Authority 
365 US 715. In the Willmington Parking Authority case, 
the Willmington Parking Authority was created by 
the State of Delaware for the purpose of erecting park­
ing facilities to relieve the parking crisis which threat­
ened the welfare of the community. The authority was 
given wide powers including that of constructing or 
acquring by lease, purchase or condemnation, lands 
and facilities and of leasing portions of any of its 
garage buildings or structures for commercial use 
where, in the opinion of the authority, such leasing 
was necessary and feasible for the financing and 
operation of the facilities. The act setting up the au­
thority provided that the rates and charges for the 
facilities must be reasonable and would be deter­
mined exclusively by the authority for the purposes 
of providing for the payment of the expenses of the 
authority, the construction, improvement, repair, 
maintenance and operation of its facilities and the 
payment of the principal and of the interest on its 
obligations and to fulfill the terms and provisions of 
its obligations with others or with the City of Will­
mington. The authority had no power to pledge the 
credit of the State of Delaware but did have power 
to issue its own tax exempt revenue bonds and all 
property owned or used by the authority was exempt 
from state taxation. The first project undertaken by 
the authority was the erection of a parking facility, 
the property was acquired by negotiated purchases 
and part of the property was purchased for partly in 
revenue bonds of the authority and partly in cash 
donated by the City of Willmington and the City of



98

Willmington later gave the parking authority almost 
Two Million Dollars which the authority applied to 
the redemption of the bonds delivered to one of the 
sellers of part of the property. Before the authority 
began construction of the facility, it was advised by ex­
perts that the anticipated revenue from the parking of 
cars and the proceeds from the sale of its bonds would 
not be sufficent to finance the construction costs of 
the facility. To secure additional capital needed for 
its debt-service requirements and make the bond fi­
nancing practicable the authority decided it was nec­
essary to enter into long term leases with responsible 
tenants for commercial use of some of the space* 
available in the project garage building and the pub­
lic was invited to bid for these leases. Such a private1 
lease for; 20 years and renewable for another ten 
years was made with the coffee shop for use as a 
restaurant, dining room, banquet room, cocktail 
lounge and bar. The coffee shop was to lease multi­
level space within the exterior walls of the structure 
and there was not a marked public entrance lead­
ing from the parking portion of the facility into the 
restaurant proper. The authority agreed to decorate 
the leased premises without costs to the lessee in­
cluding utility connections, ceramic tile, connecting 
stairs, Wraught Iron Railings and show windows. 
The authority furnished heat to the restaurant, gas 
service for the boiler room and would make all nec­
essary structural repairs and the restaurant agreed 
to use the leased premises in accordance with all 
applicable laws, statutes, ordinances, rules and regu­
lations of the authority. The authority had power to 
adopt rules and regulations respecting the use of its 
facilities. Other portions of the structure were leased 
to other tenants including a book store, a retail jeweler



99

and a food store. Upon completion of the building 
the authority located thereon official signs indicat­
ing the public character of the building and flew1 from 
the mast-heads on the roof both the state and national 
flags. The financial arrangements made by the au­
thority were made so that the parking facility would 
be a self contained self supporting authority. The 
plaintiff in the case parked his car in. the authorities 
building and entered the restaurant which was a part 
of this building, he was refused service and filed suit 
in the State Court. The Supreme Court of Delaware 
denied the plaintiffs claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Supreme Court of the United 
States reversed. Of significant to note however, is the 
reaffirmation by the Supreme Court in this case to the 
effect that:

“The Civil Righsts cases, 109 US 3, ‘imbedded in our 
Constitutional Law’ the principle that the action in­
hibited by the first Section (equal protection clause) of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may 
fairly be said to be that of the states. That amendment 
erects no shield against merely private conduct, how­
ever discriminatory or wrongful.’ ”

The Court went on to say:

“ It is clear, as it always has been since the Civil 
Rights cases (US) Supra that ‘individual invasion of 
individual rights is not the subject, matter of the 
amendment,’ at page 11, and that private conduct 
abridging individual rights does not violence to the 
equal protection clause unless to some significant 
extent the state in any of its manifestations has been 
found to have become involved in it. * * * Ony by sift­



100

ing facts and weighing circumstances can the non 
obvious involvement of the state in private conduct 
be attributed its true significance.”

Beginning on page 723 the Supreme Court went on to 
say that in the Willmington Parking Authority Case 
that the context of other factors must be added and 
acknowledged and considered the following factors 
in its decision:

1. The facility and its financing and its leasing 
were designed to be a self contained self supporting 
unit, the in comb from parking and the income from 
the leasing being necessarily put together to pay its 
obligations, its obligations not being paid if one stood 
alone from the other.

2. The land and building were publicly owned, 
dedicated to public uses in the performance of es­
sential governmental functions.

3. The commercially leased areas of the building 
constituted a physically and financially integral and 
indeed indespinsible part of the states plan to operate 
it as a self-sustaining unit.

4. Upkeep and maintenance of the building, includ­
ing repairs, were the responsibilities of the authority 
and paid out of public funds.

5. The peculiar relationship of the restaurant to the 
parking facility in which it is located confers on each 
an incidental variety of mutual benefits.



101

6. The obvious fact that the restaurant was oper­
ated as an integral part of a public building devoted to 
public parking service.

This case seems to show us the amount of state in­
volvement necessary to constitute “ a significant ex­
tent” . There is no such state involvement presented in 
the instant case. On the contrary, this defendant Doug­
las has leased the real estate since the year 1952 and 
since that day has been responsible for upkeep, re­
pairs, utilities, insurance, fertilizing, planting, acqui­
sition of equipment necessary to operate the course, 
and in addition has been required to expend large 
sums of money in the betterment of the property. The 
property which he leases is not a part of any other 
facility of the City of Augusta nor is there located on 
said property a facility of the City of Augusta. There 
is not control of the City of Augusta over the charges 
to be made by the lessee to his business customers. 
There is no underwriting of expenses by the City of 
Augusta. If the business which defendant Douglas 
operates results in a profit, the profit is his. If his 
business results in a loss, the loss is his. When he pur­
chases trucks, tractors and mowers, he must either 
take the money out of his own pocket, or sign his own 
name on a written obligation to pay whoever lends 
him the money with which to acquire this equipment.

It is respectfully submitted that this case does not 
present one of state action and consequently fails to 
state a claim against this defendant upon which relief 
can be granted.



102

STIPULATIONS,

Filed Dec. 4, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

Upon the hearing of the motions in this case before 
the Court on the 14th day of September, 1964, in the 
Federal Courthouse in Brunswick, Georgia, the follow­
ing Stipulations were entered into between Counsel for 
the plaintiffs and for both of the defendants, said 
Stipulations having been reduced to writing as follows, 
and it is thereby stipulated as follows:

1.

That the lease agreement between The City Council 
of Augusta, one of the defendants and Lawson E. 
Douglas, the other defendant, is contained in the orig­
inal lease dated March 1, 1952, a copy attached to the 
petition, the amendment of May 30, 1956, a copy at- 
tacher to the answer of defendant Douglas, 
the amendment dated June 17, 1960, a copy attached to 
the answer of defendant Douglas, and the amendment; 
dated July 12, 1963, a copy attached to the petition, the 
same to be considered as evidence in lieu of introduc­
tion of the originals or executed copies thereof.

2 .

That said lease as amended never did require and 
does not now require the defendant Douglas, lessee 
under said lease, to operate the leased property as a 
segregated golf course and that said lease never did 
prohibit and does not now prohibit the defendant Doug­



103

las to operate said leased property as a segregated 
golf course.

Now comes the parties, by and through their at­
torneys of record, and enter into the Stipulations set 
forth above.

RUFFIN AND WATKINS,
By JACK GREENBERG,

JAMES M. NABRITT, III, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

SAMUEL C. WALLER,
(Samuel C. Waller),

Attorney for Defendant The 
City Council of Augusta.

THURMOND, HESTER,
JOLLES & Me ELMURRAY, 

By CORNELIUS By THURMOND, 
JR.,

Attorneys for Defendant 
Lawson E. Douglas.

ORDER.

Filed Dec. 7, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

This is a complaint wherein the jurisdiction of the 
Court is invoked under Title 28 United States Code 
Section 1343 (3) which allows the District Courts to 
have original jurisdiction in any civil action author­
ized by law to redress the deprivation, under color or 
any state law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom



104

or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured 
by the Constitution of the United States or by any 
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens. 
The rights, privileges or immunities are alleged to 
be secured to the plaintiffs by the Constitution, Four­
teenth Amendment, and Title 42 of the United States 
Code Section 1981.

The complaint alleges that plaintiffs are Negroes 
and citizens of the United States and because of their 
race and color are prohibited from using and enjoy­
ing a golf course which was on the 1st day of March, 
1952, leased by defendant the City Council of Augusta 
to defendant Lawson E. Douglas. The original lease 
agreement dated March 1, 1952 is attached to the peti­
tion, an amendment dated May 30, 1956 and an amend­
ment dated June 17, I9601 are attached to the answer of 
defendant Douglas and an amendment dated July 12, 
1963 is attached to the complaint. It was stipulated 
orally between Counsel for all parities during hearing 
on the motions that those documents contain the lease 
agreement between The City Council of Augusta and 
Lawson E. Douglas.

The plaintiffs alleged that this suit is a class action 
brought on behalf of themselves and other persons 
similarly situated, the class consisting of Negro citi­
zens of the United States and the State of Georgia 
who reside in the City of Augusta and that all mem­
bers of the class are similarly affected by the racial 
discrimination which prevents them and members 
of their class from using the golf course.

The comjplaint further alleges that plaintiffs Her­
man Ewing, H. Maurice Thompson and R.S. Weston



105

presented themselves to defendant Lawson E. Douglas 
on July 4, 1964 and were informed by defendant Doug­
las that they could not play on said golf course unless 
they were either members or the guests of a member, 
that they returned the same day with a member who 
paid the green fee for himself and said three plain­
tiffs were given permission to play on the golf course 
but that when defendant Douglas discovered that 
plaintiffs were Negroes, that he stopped them from 
playing golf, and revoked the membership of the 
member with whom they were in company. The mem­
ber whose membership was revoked is not a party to 
this suit.

To this petition, the defendant Douglas filed his 
Motion to Strike plaintiff Luther McDaniel for mis­
joinder of parties on the ground that the complaint 
does not; allege that said Luther McDaniel had ever 
applied for and been refused the use of the Augusta 
Golf Course.

The defendant Lawson E. Douglas also filed his 
Motion to Dismiss the action on the ground that the 
complaint failed to state a claim against him: upon 
which relief can be granted.

The City Council of Augusta filed its Motion to Dis­
miss on the ground that the complaint failed to state 
a claim against it upon which relief can be granted. 
All three named motions were argued before this 
Court on September 14, 1964, by Counsel of Record for 
all parties.

Looking first to the Motion of defendant Douglas 
that Luther McDaniel is not a property party-plaintiff,



106

there are no allegations in the petition that Negroes 
other than three of the plaintiffs had ever applied to 
play golf on the golf course or that plaintiff McDaniel 
ever applied to pay golf and was refused .The com­
plaint alleges only that three of the plaintiffs had ap­
plied to the defendant Douglas and that the defendant 
Douglas had prevented them from playing golf on 
the course. While Rule 23 (a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides that if persons constituting 
a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable 
to bring them all before the Court, then such of them, 
one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate repre­
sentation of all may on behalf of all sue or be sued 
when the character of the right sought to be enforced, 
for or against the class is several, and there is a com­
mon question of law or fact affecting the several rights 
and a common relief is sought. Thus it would seem 
that under the allegations of the comjplaint, the ques­
tion arises as to* whether or not Luther McDaniel can 
maintain this action as a class action in the absence 
of allegations that he and other members of the class 
have a several right to play golf on the Augusta Golf 
Course. Without allegations that Luther McDaniel ap­
plied for and was refused the right to use the golf: 
course, then there is not a common question of fact 
or of law as to his rights and the rights of other three 
plaintiffs because the other three plaintiffs allege 
that they did apply and were refused the right to play 
golf on the golf course. There is contained within the 
complaint, unsupported conclusions to the effect that 
the suit is one for the purpose of preventing the de­
fendants from enforcing any law, custom, usage or 
tradition which prohibits Negro citizens to the use 
and enjoyment of the golf course, and that Negroes



107

are prohibited from using and enjoying the facilities 
elsewhere alleged in the complaint and that such re­
striction violates their constitutional rights.

Therefore on this part of the case it would seem 
that the only allegations of fact relating to the ap­
plication of Negroes to play golf and their refusal are 
those concerning three of the plaintiffs who presented 
themselves to the defendant Douglas on July 4, 1964. 
The allegations relative to Luther McDaniel and to 
Negroes as a class are conclusions unsupported by 
any allegations of fact. See the case of Williams .vs 
Kansas City (DC Missouri 1952) 104 F. Supp. 848. Af­
firmed 205 F. 2nd 47, Cert, denied 346 US 26 which 
held that the plaintiffs who were allegedly excluded 
from a municipal swimming pool because of their 
race could maintain an action for declaratory judg­
ment and injunction for deprivation under color of 
state law of rights secured to them by the Fourteenth 
Amendment on their own behalf, but could not main­
tain same as a class action on behalf of all other citi­
zens similarly situated, in the absence of proof that 
citizens other than plaintiffs have been excluded from 
the swimming pool on similar grounds. See also the 
case in 179 F. Supp. 211, Affirmed 280 F. 2nd 426. Cert, 
denied 364 US 849 which held that in an action for vio­
lation of Chapter 42 of the United States Code, that 
unsupported conclusions in the complaint that defend­
ant had conspired together to deprive plaintiff of due 
process and equal protection without specification of 
facts upon which conclusions were based were insuf­
ficient.



Now, considering the motion of defendant Douglas 
to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it fails to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it is 
seen that there are no allegations in the complaint 
that defendant Douglas is an agent or employee of the 
City or an agent or employee of the State of Georgia, 
but on the contrary the complaint alleges that the de­
fendant Douglas is a lessee of property owned by the 
other defendant. Nor is it alleged that the acts of the 
defendant Douglas are the result of a conspiracy be­
tween him and the other defendant. Nor is it alleged 
that there is a city ordinance or state law providing 
for either mandatory or permissive racial segrega­
tion in the operation of a golf course. Nor is it alleged 
that the golf course is located within or constitutes 
an integral part of any other facility owned and oper­
ated by the City or that there is any other facility 
owned and operated by the city located upon said 
golf course.

Thus the sole question presented by this complaint 
is whether the mere fact that a municipality owns real 
estate upon which is located a golf course and which 
is leased to a private individual constitutes such sig­
nificant involvement by the city as to constitute state 
action under the decisions of the United States Su­
preme Court and bring the lessee Douglas under the 
prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment.

It is no longer open to question that a state in any 
of its manifestations may not constitutionally require 
segregation of public facilities, whether said state 
action is by legislation or by executive action.



109

In the absence of allegations that defendant Douglas 
is an agent or employee of The City Council of Augusta 
or of the State of Georgia, this case does not fall within 
the prohibition of Griffin vs Maryland US 12 L.ed 
2nd 754.

In the absence of allegations that the golf course is 
located within and is an integral part of another pub­
lic facility, this case does not fall within the prohibi­
tion of Turner vs Memphis, 369 US 350, which involved 
a restaurant as an integral part of a municipal air­
port building, nor does it fall within any of the other 
cases involving similar situations where lease areas 
or facilities are located within Courthouses or other 
public buildings.

In the absence of any allegation that the City Coun­
cil of Augusta operates the golf course, the complaint 
does not fall within the prohibition of Holmes vs City 
of Atlanta (DC1 Georgia 1954) 124 F. Supp. 290, Af­
firmed 223 F. 2nd 93.

in the absence of allegations of a City of Augusta 
Ordinance or a State Lav/ providing for either manda­
tory or permissive racial segregation, the case does 
not fall within the prohibition of Peterson vs Green­
ville, 373 US 244.

The action inhibited by the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is such action as may 
fairly be said to be that of the state. The Civil Rights 
Cases, 109 US 3.



110

The Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
of Burton vs Willmington Parking Authority, 365 US 
715 reiterated the law as follows:

“It is clear, as it always has been since the Civil 
Rights Cases (109 US at page 11) that ‘individual 
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter 
of the amendment’, and that private conduct abridg­
ing individual rights does no violence to the equal 
protection clause unless to some significant extent 
the state in any of its manifestations has been found 
to become involved in it.”

Thus the question for decision here is whether or 
not: the mere leasing by defendant The City Council 
of Augusta of real estate upon which is located a golf: 
course to the defendant Douglas is such a “ signifi­
cant involvement” as to make the action of defend­
ant Douglas the action of The City Council of Auguata.

Mr. J'ustic Harlan in the Peterson vs City of Green­
ville case, Supra, commented as follows:

‘The ultimate substantive question is whether there 
has been ‘State action of a particular character’ (Civil 
Rights Cases, Supra, 109' US at page 11)—is whether 
the character of the state’s involvement in an arbi­
trary discrimination is such that it should be held 
responsible for the discrimination.

In the instant case, it is stipulated that the lease 
agreement neither requires nor prohibits the lessee 
in the selection of his business guests. There are pro­
visions in said lease imposing upon the lessee many



I l l

obligations relative to the care of the property, at 
his own expense, as any prudent lessor would require. 
The defendant; Douglas, as lessee, covenants to main­
tain the property in good condition, usual wear and 
tear excepted, to pay to the lessor a stipulated rent, 
to pay all utilities bills, and to supply all materials 
and equipment necessary in the operation of his busi­
ness on the property. There are no provisions in the 
lease, and consequently no covenants, that the lessor 
underwrites, aids or assists the lessee in the main­
tenance of the property or in the qperation of it. It is to 
well embedded in our law to require citation, that in 
the absence of stipulations to the contrary, the lessee 
has exclusive possession and control over the leased 
premises during the term of the lease so long as the 
lessee performs his covenants. There is no allegation 
in the complaint that defendant Douglas is not per­
forming his covenants or that as a matter of law or 
fact that the lessor could declare the lease terminated.

In the Burton vs Willmington Parking Authority 
case, the Supreme Court of the United States stated 
that only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances, 
can the true significance of the involvement of the 
state in private conduct be computed. Beginning on 
page 723, the Supreme Court then began to sift facts: 
and weigh circumstances which brought it to the con­
clusion that the restaurant there involved was a (11 
physically integral part of the public building, (21 
that the public building, its financing and its leasing 
were designed to be a self-contained self-supporting 
unit, the income from the parking operation and the 
income from the leasing of the restaurant being neces­
sarily put together to pay the obligations of the park­



112

ing authority, (3) that the land and the building were 
publicly owned and dedicated to public uses in the 
performance of essential governmental functions. 
There is no allegation in the instant case that the ac­
quisition of or the operation of a golf course is an es­
sential governmental function. The Supreme Court in 
the Willmington Parking Authority Case also noted 
that (4) upkeep and maintenance of the building, in­
cluding repairs, were the responsibility of the lessor 
and paid out of public funds, and (5) that the peculiar 
relationship of the restaurant to the parking facility 
in which it was located conferred upon both the lessor 
and the lessee an incidental variety of mutual bene­
fits and lastly (6) it was the obvious fact that the res­
taurant was operated by the lessee as an integral part 
of the public building devoted to public parking serv­
ices rendered by the lessor.

While the factors pointed to by the Supreme Court 
in the Willmington Parking Authority case could not 
be supposed to be the exclusive factors in determining 
state involvement, not one of said factors exists in the 
instant case with the exception of the lease. The only 
connection between defendant Douglas and defendant 
The City Council of Augusta is the fact that the city 
owns the real estate on which the golf course is located 
and leases it to defendant Douglas. In the absence of 
any joint or integral operation and in the absence of 
lease covenants requiring segregation and in the ab­
sence of state or municipal law requiring segregation, 
the mere leasing of the property is not such signifi­
cant involvement to bring the actions of defendant 
Douglas within the mandate of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution.



113

For the reasons stated, it is hereby Ordered, Decreed 
and Adjudged as follows:

1.

That Luther McDaniel is hereby stricken as a party- 
plaintiff on the ground of misjoinder, there being no 
connection between him and the allegations of the com­
plaint with reference to the plaintiffs Ewing, Thomp­
son and Weston, and,

2.

The complaint is dismissed because it fails to state 
a claim against the defendants upon which relief can 
be granted; and,

3.

All costs of Court are cast upon the plaintiffs.

This 7th day of December, 1964.
F. M. SCARLETT, 

United States 'Judge.

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT.

Filed Dec. 7, 1964.

(Title Omitted.)

This cause came on to be heard on the motion of 
each of the Defendants to dismiss the complaint in the 
above entitled cause, on the ground of its failure to



114

state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and it 
appearing to the Court that the said complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for 
the reasons that:

1. The Lease Agreement from The City Council of 
Augusta to Lawson E. Douglas, which was originally 
executed in 1952, and was amended by three amend­
ments dated May 30, 1956, June 17, 1960, and July 12, 
1963, respectively, does not reserve to The City Coun­
cil of Augusta any control over the leased premises, 
the golf course maintained thereon, or of the manage­
ment or operation thereof; nor does said agreement 
provide for or refer to racial segregation with respect 
to the leased premises; and

2. There is not alleged that The ICity Council of 
Augusta does in fact operate the golf course main­
tained on said leased premises or exercise any control 
over the management thereof; and

3. There is not alleged any collusion or conspiracy
between the Defendants; and

4. There is not alleged that there is any ordinance 
or state law providing either for mandatory or per­
missive racial segregation with respect to the leased 
premises; and

5. There is not alleged any breach on the part of 
Lawson E. Douglas, authorizing The City Council of 
Augusta to terminate the agreement, and dispossess 
Lawson E. Douglas; and



115

6. There is not alleged that Lawson E, Douglas 
is an agent or employee of The City Council of Au­
gusta or of any other governmental entity; and

7. There is not alleged that the leased premises are 
located within or constitute an integral part of any 
facility operated by The City Council of Augusta, nor 
is there alleged that there is any facility operated by 
The City [Council of Augusta within or on said leased 
premises; and

8. There is not alleged that the leased premises 
are needed or required for municipal purposes; or 
that the said premises do not constitute surplus prop­
erty; and

9. Inasmuch as said complaint is lacking in any of 
the allegations above referred to, the Court has con­
cluded and determined that there is no significant in­
volvement by The City Council of Augusta with Lawson 
E. Douglas, or his operation of the leased premises, 
so as to constitute state action within the purview of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con­
stitution;

It is Therefore Ordered that the complaint herein be 
dismissed.

Dated December 7, 1964.
F. M. SCARLETT,

U. S. District Judge,
Southern District of Georgia.



116

NOTICE OF APPEAL.

Filed Dec. 30, 1964.

In the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Georgia, Augusta Division.

Herman Ewing, Luther McDaniel, H. M. Thompson, 
and iR. S. Weston, Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 1186.
The City Council of Augusta, and Lawson E, Douglas,

Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that Herman Ewing, Luther 
McDaniel, H. M. Thompson and R. S. Weston, plain­
tiffs above named, hereby appeal to the United States, 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the Order 
Dismissing Complaint entered on December 7, 1964 
and from Order entered December 7, 1964 striking Luth­
er McDaniel as party-plaintiff on the ground of mis­
joinder and dismissing the complaint.

This 30th day of December, 1964.
RUFFIN & WATKINS,

By J. H, RUFFIN, JR.,
(J. H. Ruffin, Jr.).

1007 Ninth Street,
Augusta, Georgia.

JACK GREENBERG,
JAMES M. NABRIT, III,
FRANK H. HEFFRON.

10 Columbus Circle,
New York, New York 10019.



117

BO'ND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL.

(Title Omitted.)

Know All Men By These Presents, that we, Her­
man Ewing, Luther McDaniel, H. M. Thompson and 
>R. S. Weston as principals and B. L. Dent, as surety, 
are held firmly bound unto The City Council of Au­
gusta and Lawson E. Douglas, defendants, in the true 
and just sum of Two Hundred Fifty and no/100 
($250.00) Dollars to be paid to the defendants, their 
successors and assigns, to which payment well and 
truly to be made we bind ourselves and our successors, 
jointly and severally, by these presents.

Whereas on the 7th day of December, 1964 an order 
was signed and entered whereby a judgment was ren­
dered in favor of the defendants dismissing the plain­
tiffs’ complaint and striking Luther McDaniel as a 
party-plaintiff, and plaintiffs having filed a Notice of 
Appeal from said judgment to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit;

Now the condition of this obligation is such that if 
the said plaintiffs shall prosecute their appeal and 
shall be bound to pay the costs if the appeal is dis­
missed or the judgment is affirmed, or such costs as 
the said: Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit may 
award against the said plaintiffs, then this bond is to 
be in full force and effect. If the judgment is reversed 
or modified, then this obligation is to be void, other­
wise to remain in full force and effect. The said surety 
named herein hereby certifies that he has unen­
cumbered property in excess of the amount of Two 
Hundred Fifty and no/100 ($250.00) Dollars.



118

Witness our hands and seals this 28th day of December, 
1964.

H. M. THOMPSON,
Principal.

Witness:
CARLENE HEYWARD.

JOHN D. WATTS,
Notary (Public, Richmond 

County, Ga.
Comm exp. 4-2-68.

B. L, DENT,
Surety.

Witness:
ALBERTA D. JOHNSON.

JOHN D. WATTS,
Notary Public, Richmond 

County, Ga.

Comm exp. 4-2-68.

ADDITIONAL DESIGNATION OF THE RECORD 
BY DEFENDANT, THE CITY COUNCIL OF AU­
GUSTA.

Filed Jan. 8, 1965.

(Title Omitted.)

Pursuant to Rule 75 (a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and within ten days of the service of 
Plaintiffs’ designation of the record, The City Council 
of Augusta, one of the Defendants herein, designates



J19

the following portions to be contained in the record on 
appeal in the above-entitled cause, to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:

1. Motion to Dismiss filed by the City Council of 
Augusta.

This 6th day of January, 1965.
SAMUEL C. WALLER,

(Samuel C- Waller),
City Attorney.

PLAINTIFFS*1 DESIGNATION OF THE RECORD.

Filed Jan. 13, 1965.
(Title Omitted.)

Pursuant to Rule 75 (a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs hereby designate for 
inclusion in the record on appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, taken by Notice 
of Appeal filed December 30, 1964, the whole record 
and proceedings in this action.

This 13th day of January, 1965.
RUFFIN & WATKINS,

By J. H. RUFFIN, JR.,
(J. H. Ruffin, Jf.).

1007 Ninth Street,
Augusta, Georgia.

JACK GREENBERG,
JAMES M. NABRIT, III, 
FRANK H. HEFFRON.

10 Columbus Circle,
New York, New York 10019.



120

CLERK’S CERTIFICATE.

In the District Court of the United States for the South­
ern District of Georgia, Augusta Division.

United States of America,
Southern District of Georgia, ss.

I, EUGENE F. EDWARDS, Clerk of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of 
Georgia, do hereby certify that the above and fore­
going 84 (eighty-four) pages, numbered 1 through 84, 
inclusive, is the original record specified in the des­
ignation of record on Appeal, Civil Action 1186, where­
in Herman Ewing, Luther McDaniel, H. Maurice 
Thompson and R. S. Weston is the Appellant, and The 
City Council of Augusta and Lawson E. Douglas is the 
Appellee, which is of record in my said Office at Au­
gusta in the said Southern District of Georgia, Au­
gusta Division.

Witness my official signature and the seal of said 
Court at Augusta in said Southern District of Georgia, 
this January 18, 1965.

EUGENE F. EDWARDS,
Clerk,

By P. A. BRODIE, JR.,
(P. A. Brodie, Jr.),

(Seal) Deputy Clerk.



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