Swain v. Alabama Brief and Argument in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari
Public Court Documents
October 22, 1965

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Swain v. Alabama Brief and Argument in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, 1965. 63886866-c59a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/83c96fac-b02b-4abd-b972-7745bcba427e/swain-v-alabama-brief-and-argument-in-opposition-to-petition-for-certiorari. Accessed April 27, 2025.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1965 No. 600 ROBERT SWAIN, PETITIONER, V. STATE OF ALABAMA, RESPONDENT. BRIEF AND ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA. RICHMOND M. FLOWERS, Attorney General of Alabama, LESLIE HALL, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, Administrative Building, Montgomery, Alabama 36104, Attorneys for Respondent. INDEX Page STATEMENT ................... 2 QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................. 2 ARGUMENT ........................................................................... 3 i TABLE OF CASES Baldwin V. Kansas, 129 U. S. 151, 32 L. Ed. 640, 52 S. Ct. 57 ............................................................ ..................... 4 Dickey V. State, 21 Ala. App. 644, 111 So. 426..................... 7 Dixon v. State, 39 Ala. App. 575, 105 So. 2d 354 ............. 7 Ex parte Spies, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L. Ed. 80, 131 S. Ct. 131 ......................................................................... 4 Fay V. New York, 332 U. S. 289, 290 ............. ..................... . 8 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 S. Ct.................... ............................... ........ ...,.______... 7 Herndon V. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441, 79 L. Ed. 1530, 55 S. Ct. 794, Rehearing Denied, 296 U. S. 661, 80 L. Ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 82 .................................................. 4 Hoyt V. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 7 L. Ed. 2d 118, 82 S. Ct. 159 ....................................... .................................. 8 Johnson V. United States, 318 U. S. 189, 87 L. Ed. 704, 63 S. Ct. 549, Rehearing Denied 318 U. S. 801, 87 L. Ed. 1164, 63 S. Ct. 826 ................. ................ 4 Littlefield V. State, 36 Ala. App. 507, 63 So. 2d 565, Cert. Den. 258 Ala. 532, 63 So. 2d 573 ........................... 7 Morrison V. Watson, 154 U. S. 927, 38 L. Ed. 927, 111 S. Ct. 115 __ _____ ________________________________ 4 State V. Emery, 224 N. C. 481, 31 S. E. 2d 858, 157 A. L. R. 4 4 1 ______________________________________ 8 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664___ 8 Swain V. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct------------- , Rehearing Denied 381 U. S. 9 2 1 _______________________________________________3 Swain v. State, 275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 36S......... ...........__ 7 Thompson V. State. 41 Ala. App. 353. 357-358. 132 So. 2d 386 _____________________ ______________ _ 7 United States v. Classic. 313 U. S. 299. 85 L. Ed. 1368, 61 S. Ct, 1031. Rehearing Denied. 314 U. S. 707, 86 L. Ed. 565. 62 S. Ct. 51 _ _ _ 4 Welch v. State. 263 Ala. 57. 58. 81 So. 2d 901 7 ii STATUTES Page 8th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States ................................................................... 5 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States ............................................................ 5, 6, 8 Code of Alabama 1940, Title 15, Section 305, as amended by Act No. 124, approved June 23, 1949, Acts 1949, page 150......................................................... 6 Annotation, 68 A. L. R. 1127...............................-................. 8 in IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1965 No. 600 ROBERT SWAIN, PETITIONER, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, RESPONDENT. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA. BRIEF AND ARGUMENT FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION QUESTIONS PRESENTED I . WHETHER A PETITIONER, WHOSE CASE HAS BEEN BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT ON A PRE VIOUS WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND WHOSE CONVIC TION HAS BEEN AFFIRMED, IS ENTITLED TO A NEW WRIT OF CERTIORARI ON GROUNDS NOT ASSERTED IN HIS ORIGINAL PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND ON GROUNDS WHICH WERE NOT PROVED OR RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT. II. WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE BY THE TRIAL JURY IS CONTRARY TO THE 8TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS. III. WHETHER THE STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR IN HIS FINAL ARGUMENT THAT NO WORD OF DE NIAL HAD COME FROM THE STAND WAS A COMMENT ON PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO TAKE THE STAND IN HIS OWN DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE 14TH AMENDMENT. IV. WHETHER THE INELIGIBILITY OF WOMEN FOR JURY SERVICE IN ALABAMA IS A DENIAL OF PE TITIONER’S RIGHTS UNDER THE 14TH AMEND MENT. STATEMENT In his original Petition for Certiorari (October Term 1963, No. 1093, later changed to October Term, 1964, No. 64), and his brief on the merits in that case, the Petitioner coiv 2 tended that he was denied due process of law and the equal protection of the laws in violation of the 14th Amendment when indicted, convicted, and sentenced by Grand and Petit Juries in a county where (A), the State always strikes a token number of Negroes on the trial venires, with the re sult that Negroes never serve on trial juries, and (B), Negroes have been summoned for jury duty in only token numbers and the State has offered no explanation for the small proportion called. These questions were decided against the Petitioner in Sivain V. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct. ........... , Rehearing Denied 381 U. S. 921, on the grounds that Petitioner had failed to prove racial discrimination in compiling the jury roll or in se lection of the venires or trial jury panels in violation of the 14th Amendment, and that Petitioner had failed to prove systematic use by the prosecutor of peremptory challenges against Negroes in violation of his Constitutional rights. Nowhere in his original Petition for Certiorari, in his brief on the merits in that case, or in his counsel’s oral ar gument before this Court did he raise the questions now sought to be presented, nor were they raised in the lower court at the time of trial. He now seeks to raise new questions as an afterthought. ARGUMENT I . A PETITIONER, WHOSE CASE HAS BEEN BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT ON A PREVIOUS WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND WHOSE CONVICTION HAS BEEN AFFIRMED, IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW WRIT OF CERTIORARI ON GROUNDS NOT ASSERTED IN HIS ORIGINAL PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND ON GROUNDS WHICH WERE NOT PROVED OR RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT. 3 Matters other than the question of Federal jurisdiction or evidence contained in the record will not be considered by the Court where they were not presented and decided in the lower court. United States V. Classic, 31B U. S. 299, 85 L. Ed. 1368, 61 S. Ct. 1031, Rehearing Denied, 314 U. S. 707, 86 L. Ed. 565, 62 S. Ct. 51. The essential Federal question must have been set up in the Court at the proper time and in a proper manner. Herndon V. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441, 79 L. Ed. 1530, 55 S. Ct. 794, Rehearing Denied, 296 U. S. 661, 80 L. Ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 82. The Court will not permit an accused to elect to pursue one course at the trial and then, when that proves to be unprofitable, insist on review that the course which he re jected at the trial be reopened to him. Johnson V. United States, 318 U. S. 189, 87 L. Ed. 704, 63 S. Ct. 549, Rehearing Denied, 318 U. S. 801, 87 L. Ed. 1164, 63 S. Ct. 826. See, also, Ex parte Spies, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L. Ed. 80, 131 S. Ct. 131; Baldivin V. Kansas, 129 U. S. 151, 32 L. Ed. 640, 52 S. Ct. 57; Morrison V. Watson, 154 U. S. 927, 38 L. Ed. 927, 111 S. Ct. 115. We would like to again point out that the Petitioner has been represented throughout by counsel of his own choosing and that two of such counsel, namely, Orzell Billingsley, Jr., and Peter A. Hall, represented him on the trial, on the ap peal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, on the original Petition for Certiorari in this case, and represent him on the present Petition for Certiorari. As this Court pointed out in its previous opinion in this case, “ . . . we cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws and “ . . . a showing that Negroes have not served during a specified time does not, absent a sufficient showing of the prosecutor’s participation, give rise to the inference of sys tematic discrimination on the part of the State.” 4 The Petitioner did not show such participation at the time of trial or on his Motion for a New Trial. He should not be allowed to reopen the case at this late date to attempt to show what he had an opportunity to bring out at the proper time. If a defendant in a criminal case is allowed to pursue the procedure attempted here, there could never be an end to a criminal prosecution. This statement applies as well to the other questions presented by his new Petition for Certi orari, none of which was raised at the time of trial, on Motion for New Trial, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, or on the previous hearing of this case. II. THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE BY THE TRIAL JURY IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE 8TH AND 14TH AMENDMENTS. While it is true that at common law the jury in criminal proceedings either return a special verdict, setting forth all the circumstances of the case and praying the judg ment of the Court, or a general verdict of guilty or not guilty, and the punishment is fixed by the Court, there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a state from providing for the jury to fix the punishment to be imposed on the De fendant. We are not cited to anything to the contrary. The Petitioner argues that because more Negroes than Whites have been executed for rape, this shows a discrim inatory application of a statute fair upon its face. It is dif ficult to understand the reasoning behind such an argument in view of the fact that in each of the cases cited, the pen alty was imposed by a separate jury or court and since it is axiomatic that no two cases have exactly the same factual basis. If we are to follow the argument of the Petitioner, then the jury system loses its meaning and effectiveness and this Court would be the final arbiter of the punishment to be meted out in each individaul case. This is not in accord 5 with our system of government where the trial courts de termine guilt or innocence and fix punishment within Con stitutional limits. If the statistics cited by the Petitioner as to the racial identification of those executed for crimes of violence prove anything, they prove that Negroes are more prone to com mit such crimes than are Whites. The argument that the majority of the states no longer re tain the death penalty in rape cases and that, therefore, the imposition of the death penalty in such cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 14th Amendment is untenable. It must be borne in mind that seventeen states, plus the Federal Government and the Dis trict of Columbia, still retain the death penalty for rape. Whether such penalty should be retained or abolished is a matter for decision by the several legislative bodies and is not for the courts to determine. If this were not so, the whole structure of our system of government would fall and the legislative functions of the government would be taken over by the courts. Such an argument itself is contrary to the basic concepts of our Constitutional form of government. III. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR IN HIS FINAL ARGUMENT THAT NO WORD OF DENIAL HAD COME FROM THE STAND WAS NOT A COMMENT ON PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO TAKE THE STAND IN HIS OWN DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE 14TH AMEND MENT. Code of Alabama 1940, Title 15, Section 305, as amended by Act. No. 124, approved June 23, 1949, Acts 1949,, page 150, provides as follows: “ On the trial of all indictments, complaints, or other criminal proceedings, the person on trial shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness; 6 and his failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption against him, nor be the subject of comment by counsel. If the solicitor or other prosecuting attorney makes any comment concerning the defend ant’s failure to testify, a new trial must be granted on motion filed within thirty days from entry of the judgment.” As interpreted by the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of Alabama, the statute does not prohibit a prosecutor from drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence presented in a case, and statements to the effect that the evidence is uncontradicted or undenied are not prohibited by the stat ute. See Welch v. State, 263 Ala. 57, 58, 81 So. 2d 901; Thomp- son V State, 41 Ala. App. 353, 357-358, 132 So. 2d 386; Dixon V. State, 39 Ala. App. 575, 105 So. 2d 354; Littlefield V. State, 36 Ala. App. 507, 63 So. 2d 565, Cer. Den. 258 Ala. 532, 63 So. 2d 573; Dickey V. State, 21 Ala. App. 644, 111 So. 426. In Welch V. State, supra, the following was approved as a correct statement of the law: “ It is generally held that a statement by the prosecuting attorney to the effect that the evidence for the State is uncontradicted or undenied is not a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.” In Sivain v. State, 275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 368, the Supreme Court of Alabama specifically held that the prosecutor’s argument in the instant case was not violative of Section 305, Title 15, as amended, supra. This case is not analogous to Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 S. Ct.................. . because that case was based on a provision of the California Constitution which permitted the Court and counsel to comment on the failure of the Defendant to explain or deny any evidence or 7 facts in the case and permit such matters to be considered by the Court or the jury. See, also, Annotation in 68 A. L. R. 1127. IV. THE INELIGIBILITY OF WOMEN FOR JURY SER VICE IN ALABAMA IS NOT A DENIAL OF PETITION ER’S RIGHTS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT. While at common law women were not eligible to serve as jurors, there is no doubt that the states have the power to make them eligible. The 14th Amendment to the Con stitution of the United States does not, in effect, prohibit the states from denying to women the right to serve on jur ies and does not render void a statute providing for the se lection of males alone as jurors. Strauder V. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664; State V. Emery, 224 N. C. 481, 31 S. E. 2d 858, 157 A. L. R. 441. As this Court said in Hoyt V. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 7 L. Ed. 2d 118, 82 S. Ct. 159: “We need not, however, accept appellant’s invitation to canvass in this case the continuing validity of this Court’s dictum in Strauder V. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 310, 25 L. Ed. 664, 666, to the effect that a state may constitutionally ‘confine’ jury duty ‘to males.’ This constitutional proposition has gone unquestioned for more than eighty years in the decisions of the court. See Fay V. Neiv York, supra (332 U. S. at 289, 290), and had been reflected, until 1957, in congressional policy respecting jury service in the Federal courts themselves.” Whether women should or should not be allowed to serve on juries in a particular state is a matter for determination by the Legislature of that state and not for the courts to de cide. 8 The statement made in the last paragraph of the Petitioner to the effect that females certainly possess attitudes with re spect to the crime of rape not possessed by men is pure speculation. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied. LESLIE HALL, Assistan Attorney General of Alabama, Administrative Building, Montgomery, Alabama 36104, Attorneys for Respondent. 9 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Leslie Hall, one of the Attorneys for Respondent, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Courts .Of the United ^ — 7 States, hereby certify that on the —-day of October, 1965, I served the requisite number of copies of the fore going Brief and Argument in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari upon Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III, Michael Meltsner, Frank Heffron and Melvyn Zarr, Suite 2030, 10 Columbus Circle, New York, New York 10019, Or- zell Billingsley, Jr., and Peter A. Hall, 1630 4th Avenue, North, Birmingham, Alabama, and Anthony G. Amsterdam, 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Attorneys for Petitioner, by depositing the same iB''fKe United States mail, first class postage prepaid, amPproperly^addressed to them at the addresses given. / __ ^ LESLIE HALL, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, Administrative Building, Montgomery, Alabama 36104, 10