Swain v. Alabama Brief and Argument in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari
Public Court Documents
October 22, 1965
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Swain v. Alabama Brief and Argument in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, 1965. 63886866-c59a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/83c96fac-b02b-4abd-b972-7745bcba427e/swain-v-alabama-brief-and-argument-in-opposition-to-petition-for-certiorari. Accessed October 30, 2025.
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1965
No. 600
ROBERT SWAIN,
PETITIONER,
V.
STATE OF ALABAMA,
RESPONDENT.
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ALABAMA.
RICHMOND M. FLOWERS,
Attorney General of Alabama,
LESLIE HALL,
Assistant Attorney General
of Alabama,
Administrative Building,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104,
Attorneys for Respondent.
INDEX
Page
STATEMENT ................... 2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................. 2
ARGUMENT ........................................................................... 3
i
TABLE OF CASES
Baldwin V. Kansas, 129 U. S. 151, 32 L. Ed. 640, 52 S.
Ct. 57 ............................................................ ..................... 4
Dickey V. State, 21 Ala. App. 644, 111 So. 426..................... 7
Dixon v. State, 39 Ala. App. 575, 105 So. 2d 354 ............. 7
Ex parte Spies, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L. Ed. 80, 131
S. Ct. 131 ......................................................................... 4
Fay V. New York, 332 U. S. 289, 290 ............. ..................... . 8
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106,
85 S. Ct.................... ............................... ........ ...,.______... 7
Herndon V. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441, 79 L. Ed. 1530, 55
S. Ct. 794, Rehearing Denied, 296 U. S. 661, 80
L. Ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 82 .................................................. 4
Hoyt V. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 7 L. Ed. 2d 118, 82
S. Ct. 159 ....................................... .................................. 8
Johnson V. United States, 318 U. S. 189, 87 L. Ed.
704, 63 S. Ct. 549, Rehearing Denied 318 U. S.
801, 87 L. Ed. 1164, 63 S. Ct. 826 ................. ................ 4
Littlefield V. State, 36 Ala. App. 507, 63 So. 2d 565,
Cert. Den. 258 Ala. 532, 63 So. 2d 573 ........................... 7
Morrison V. Watson, 154 U. S. 927, 38 L. Ed. 927, 111
S. Ct. 115 __ _____ ________________________________ 4
State V. Emery, 224 N. C. 481, 31 S. E. 2d 858, 157
A. L. R. 4 4 1 ______________________________________ 8
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664___ 8
Swain V. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 13 L. Ed. 2d 759,
85 S. Ct------------- , Rehearing Denied 381 U. S.
9 2 1 _______________________________________________3
Swain v. State, 275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 36S......... ...........__ 7
Thompson V. State. 41 Ala. App. 353. 357-358. 132
So. 2d 386 _____________________ ______________ _ 7
United States v. Classic. 313 U. S. 299. 85 L. Ed.
1368, 61 S. Ct, 1031. Rehearing Denied. 314
U. S. 707, 86 L. Ed. 565. 62 S. Ct. 51 _ _ _ 4
Welch v. State. 263 Ala. 57. 58. 81 So. 2d 901 7
ii
STATUTES
Page
8th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States ................................................................... 5
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States ............................................................ 5, 6, 8
Code of Alabama 1940, Title 15, Section 305, as
amended by Act No. 124, approved June 23, 1949,
Acts 1949, page 150......................................................... 6
Annotation, 68 A. L. R. 1127...............................-................. 8
in
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1965
No. 600
ROBERT SWAIN,
PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF ALABAMA,
RESPONDENT.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA.
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT FOR
RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I .
WHETHER A PETITIONER, WHOSE CASE HAS
BEEN BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT ON A PRE
VIOUS WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND WHOSE CONVIC
TION HAS BEEN AFFIRMED, IS ENTITLED TO A NEW
WRIT OF CERTIORARI ON GROUNDS NOT ASSERTED
IN HIS ORIGINAL PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND
ON GROUNDS WHICH WERE NOT PROVED OR RAISED
IN THE LOWER COURT.
II.
WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE BY
THE TRIAL JURY IS CONTRARY TO THE 8TH AND
14TH AMENDMENTS.
III.
WHETHER THE STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR
IN HIS FINAL ARGUMENT THAT NO WORD OF DE
NIAL HAD COME FROM THE STAND WAS A COMMENT
ON PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO TAKE THE STAND
IN HIS OWN DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE 14TH
AMENDMENT.
IV.
WHETHER THE INELIGIBILITY OF WOMEN FOR
JURY SERVICE IN ALABAMA IS A DENIAL OF PE
TITIONER’S RIGHTS UNDER THE 14TH AMEND
MENT.
STATEMENT
In his original Petition for Certiorari (October Term 1963,
No. 1093, later changed to October Term, 1964, No. 64),
and his brief on the merits in that case, the Petitioner coiv
2
tended that he was denied due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws in violation of the 14th Amendment
when indicted, convicted, and sentenced by Grand and Petit
Juries in a county where (A), the State always strikes a
token number of Negroes on the trial venires, with the re
sult that Negroes never serve on trial juries, and (B),
Negroes have been summoned for jury duty in only token
numbers and the State has offered no explanation for the
small proportion called. These questions were decided
against the Petitioner in Sivain V. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202,
13 L. Ed. 2d 759, 85 S. Ct. ........... , Rehearing Denied 381 U.
S. 921, on the grounds that Petitioner had failed to prove
racial discrimination in compiling the jury roll or in se
lection of the venires or trial jury panels in violation of the
14th Amendment, and that Petitioner had failed to prove
systematic use by the prosecutor of peremptory challenges
against Negroes in violation of his Constitutional rights.
Nowhere in his original Petition for Certiorari, in his
brief on the merits in that case, or in his counsel’s oral ar
gument before this Court did he raise the questions now
sought to be presented, nor were they raised in the lower
court at the time of trial.
He now seeks to raise new questions as an afterthought.
ARGUMENT
I .
A PETITIONER, WHOSE CASE HAS BEEN BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT ON A PREVIOUS WRIT OF
CERTIORARI AND WHOSE CONVICTION HAS BEEN
AFFIRMED, IS NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW WRIT OF
CERTIORARI ON GROUNDS NOT ASSERTED IN HIS
ORIGINAL PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND ON
GROUNDS WHICH WERE NOT PROVED OR RAISED
IN THE LOWER COURT.
3
Matters other than the question of Federal jurisdiction or
evidence contained in the record will not be considered by
the Court where they were not presented and decided in the
lower court. United States V. Classic, 31B U. S. 299, 85 L.
Ed. 1368, 61 S. Ct. 1031, Rehearing Denied, 314 U. S. 707,
86 L. Ed. 565, 62 S. Ct. 51. The essential Federal question
must have been set up in the Court at the proper time and
in a proper manner. Herndon V. Georgia, 295 U. S. 441, 79
L. Ed. 1530, 55 S. Ct. 794, Rehearing Denied, 296 U. S. 661,
80 L. Ed. 471, 56 S. Ct. 82.
The Court will not permit an accused to elect to pursue
one course at the trial and then, when that proves to be
unprofitable, insist on review that the course which he re
jected at the trial be reopened to him. Johnson V. United
States, 318 U. S. 189, 87 L. Ed. 704, 63 S. Ct. 549, Rehearing
Denied, 318 U. S. 801, 87 L. Ed. 1164, 63 S. Ct. 826. See, also,
Ex parte Spies, 123 U. S. 131, 31 L. Ed. 80, 131 S. Ct. 131;
Baldivin V. Kansas, 129 U. S. 151, 32 L. Ed. 640, 52 S. Ct.
57; Morrison V. Watson, 154 U. S. 927, 38 L. Ed. 927, 111 S.
Ct. 115.
We would like to again point out that the Petitioner has
been represented throughout by counsel of his own choosing
and that two of such counsel, namely, Orzell Billingsley, Jr.,
and Peter A. Hall, represented him on the trial, on the ap
peal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, on the original
Petition for Certiorari in this case, and represent him on the
present Petition for Certiorari.
As this Court pointed out in its previous opinion in this
case, “ . . . we cannot hold that the striking of Negroes in
a particular case is a denial of equal protection of the laws
and “ . . . a showing that Negroes have not served during a
specified time does not, absent a sufficient showing of the
prosecutor’s participation, give rise to the inference of sys
tematic discrimination on the part of the State.”
4
The Petitioner did not show such participation at the time
of trial or on his Motion for a New Trial. He should not be
allowed to reopen the case at this late date to attempt to
show what he had an opportunity to bring out at the proper
time. If a defendant in a criminal case is allowed to pursue
the procedure attempted here, there could never be an end
to a criminal prosecution. This statement applies as well to
the other questions presented by his new Petition for Certi
orari, none of which was raised at the time of trial, on Motion
for New Trial, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama,
or on the previous hearing of this case.
II.
THE IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE BY THE TRIAL
JURY IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE 8TH AND 14TH
AMENDMENTS.
While it is true that at common law the jury in criminal
proceedings either return a special verdict, setting forth
all the circumstances of the case and praying the judg
ment of the Court, or a general verdict of guilty or not guilty,
and the punishment is fixed by the Court, there is nothing
in the Constitution which prevents a state from providing
for the jury to fix the punishment to be imposed on the De
fendant. We are not cited to anything to the contrary.
The Petitioner argues that because more Negroes than
Whites have been executed for rape, this shows a discrim
inatory application of a statute fair upon its face. It is dif
ficult to understand the reasoning behind such an argument
in view of the fact that in each of the cases cited, the pen
alty was imposed by a separate jury or court and since it
is axiomatic that no two cases have exactly the same factual
basis. If we are to follow the argument of the Petitioner,
then the jury system loses its meaning and effectiveness and
this Court would be the final arbiter of the punishment to
be meted out in each individaul case. This is not in accord
5
with our system of government where the trial courts de
termine guilt or innocence and fix punishment within Con
stitutional limits.
If the statistics cited by the Petitioner as to the racial
identification of those executed for crimes of violence prove
anything, they prove that Negroes are more prone to com
mit such crimes than are Whites.
The argument that the majority of the states no longer re
tain the death penalty in rape cases and that, therefore, the
imposition of the death penalty in such cases constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 14th
Amendment is untenable. It must be borne in mind that
seventeen states, plus the Federal Government and the Dis
trict of Columbia, still retain the death penalty for rape.
Whether such penalty should be retained or abolished is a
matter for decision by the several legislative bodies and is
not for the courts to determine. If this were not so, the whole
structure of our system of government would fall and the
legislative functions of the government would be taken over
by the courts. Such an argument itself is contrary to the
basic concepts of our Constitutional form of government.
III.
THE STATEMENT OF THE PROSECUTOR IN HIS
FINAL ARGUMENT THAT NO WORD OF DENIAL HAD
COME FROM THE STAND WAS NOT A COMMENT ON
PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO TAKE THE STAND IN
HIS OWN DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE 14TH AMEND
MENT.
Code of Alabama 1940, Title 15, Section 305, as amended
by Act. No. 124, approved June 23, 1949, Acts 1949,, page
150, provides as follows:
“ On the trial of all indictments, complaints, or other
criminal proceedings, the person on trial shall, at his
own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness;
6
and his failure to make such a request shall not create
any presumption against him, nor be the subject of
comment by counsel. If the solicitor or other prosecuting
attorney makes any comment concerning the defend
ant’s failure to testify, a new trial must be granted
on motion filed within thirty days from entry of the
judgment.”
As interpreted by the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
of Alabama, the statute does not prohibit a prosecutor from
drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence presented
in a case, and statements to the effect that the evidence is
uncontradicted or undenied are not prohibited by the stat
ute. See Welch v. State, 263 Ala. 57, 58, 81 So. 2d 901; Thomp-
son V State, 41 Ala. App. 353, 357-358, 132 So. 2d 386; Dixon
V. State, 39 Ala. App. 575, 105 So. 2d 354; Littlefield V. State,
36 Ala. App. 507, 63 So. 2d 565, Cer. Den. 258 Ala. 532, 63
So. 2d 573; Dickey V. State, 21 Ala. App. 644, 111 So. 426.
In Welch V. State, supra, the following was approved as
a correct statement of the law:
“ It is generally held that a statement by the prosecuting
attorney to the effect that the evidence for the State
is uncontradicted or undenied is not a comment on the
defendant’s failure to testify.”
In Sivain v. State, 275 Ala. 508, 156 So. 2d 368, the Supreme
Court of Alabama specifically held that the prosecutor’s
argument in the instant case was not violative of Section 305,
Title 15, as amended, supra.
This case is not analogous to Griffin v. California, 380 U.
S. 609, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106, 85 S. Ct.................. . because that
case was based on a provision of the California Constitution
which permitted the Court and counsel to comment on the
failure of the Defendant to explain or deny any evidence or
7
facts in the case and permit such matters to be considered
by the Court or the jury.
See, also, Annotation in 68 A. L. R. 1127.
IV.
THE INELIGIBILITY OF WOMEN FOR JURY SER
VICE IN ALABAMA IS NOT A DENIAL OF PETITION
ER’S RIGHTS UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT.
While at common law women were not eligible to serve
as jurors, there is no doubt that the states have the power
to make them eligible. The 14th Amendment to the Con
stitution of the United States does not, in effect, prohibit
the states from denying to women the right to serve on jur
ies and does not render void a statute providing for the se
lection of males alone as jurors. Strauder V. West Virginia,
100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed. 664; State V. Emery, 224 N. C. 481,
31 S. E. 2d 858, 157 A. L. R. 441.
As this Court said in Hoyt V. Florida, 368 U. S. 57, 7 L.
Ed. 2d 118, 82 S. Ct. 159:
“We need not, however, accept appellant’s invitation to
canvass in this case the continuing validity of this
Court’s dictum in Strauder V. West Virginia, 100 U. S.
303, 310, 25 L. Ed. 664, 666, to the effect that a state
may constitutionally ‘confine’ jury duty ‘to males.’ This
constitutional proposition has gone unquestioned for
more than eighty years in the decisions of the court.
See Fay V. Neiv York, supra (332 U. S. at 289, 290), and
had been reflected, until 1957, in congressional policy
respecting jury service in the Federal courts themselves.”
Whether women should or should not be allowed to serve
on juries in a particular state is a matter for determination
by the Legislature of that state and not for the courts to de
cide.
8
The statement made in the last paragraph of the Petitioner
to the effect that females certainly possess attitudes with re
spect to the crime of rape not possessed by men is pure
speculation.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
LESLIE HALL,
Assistan Attorney General
of Alabama,
Administrative Building,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104,
Attorneys for Respondent.
9
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Leslie Hall, one of the Attorneys for Respondent, and
a member of the Bar of the Supreme Courts .Of the United
^ — 7
States, hereby certify that on the —-day of October,
1965, I served the requisite number of copies of the fore
going Brief and Argument in Opposition to Petition for
Certiorari upon Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit, III,
Michael Meltsner, Frank Heffron and Melvyn Zarr, Suite
2030, 10 Columbus Circle, New York, New York 10019, Or-
zell Billingsley, Jr., and Peter A. Hall, 1630 4th Avenue,
North, Birmingham, Alabama, and Anthony G. Amsterdam,
3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Attorneys
for Petitioner, by depositing the same iB''fKe United States
mail, first class postage prepaid, amPproperly^addressed to
them at the addresses given. / __
^ LESLIE HALL,
Assistant Attorney General of
Alabama,
Administrative Building,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104,
10