Sweatt v. Painter Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
Public Court Documents
January 31, 1950
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Sweatt v. Painter Brief Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 1950. 23173b91-c59a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/83fb2eca-9fc7-4853-9a24-13b1f7c97923/sweatt-v-painter-brief-amici-curiae-in-support-of-petitioner. Accessed November 07, 2025.
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O ctober T erm., 1949.
No. 44.
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em an M ario# Svveatt, Petitioner,
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fiOPHILUS SHfCKEL F a INTKR ET'AL.
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§: On a jpiTrit of Certiorari to the Supreme Court
\ V* of the Slate of -Texas./
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AI .E JC a NI > E R 11. ‘ F RE Y y !-
F.rw$ n N . G r i s w o i d ' : '
R o b e r t I I a,le . '
I I A R.O I I» II AVIC. H UR ST
E dward L evi ...•
FoRjprriE Co m m it t e e .of L a w '.*
T eaI h icrs A <;a i nSt Segregation
in IjEGAi. Education •' ‘ !
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Statement
Summary of 'Argument......... 5..
Page
1
2
4.
i
"• v*i
Argument ' "• {
J. The Equal Protection -^Clause Was Intended to Outlaw
Segregation ..............i ........... .............................. ................:.......... 4
\ 1. The original meaning of equal protection is incom-
V patible with segregated education........ ...................... 5
2. Contemporary rejection of “ separate but equal” in
V Congress, immediately before and after the Four-
teenth Amendment, represents a judgment incom-
> patible with segregated education.............................;...... 11
.*• 3. In . Railroad Co. V; Brown, this Court early decided
• th&t “ separate” could not be “equal”....................... 18
Plessy v. Ferguson, which undid the Brown case and
the legislative history of equal protection, should be
overruled ........... r................................................................... 20
II. The Basic Policies Underlying the Court’s Approval of
Segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson Have, in the Years
Intervening Since That Decision, Proved to Be Not
] Only -Wholly Erroneous But Seriously Destructive of
•' the Democratic Process in the United States..............:..... 22'A ' •; 1. The judgment of ;ilie Court in Plessy v. Ferguson
:? that direct governfnental action to eliminate segre-
f gjation is ineffective to overcome the prevailing cus-
? tonis of the community has proved to be without
foundation ...........IL......................................................... ........ 23
2. Patterns of segregation have not tended to produce
b harmonious relations between races, as the Court
assumed in Plessy sv. Ferguson, but have increased
■f tensions and become progressively destructive of the
democratic processan the United States................ ........ 29
> 3. This Court has ultimate responsibility, under the
•' Constitution, to review the factual and policy judg
ment of the Texasjlegislature in this situation ...... 32
III. ;-Segregation Should Not’;Be Extended to Education.....: 34
1. 4 he. precedents do jnot uphold segregated education 34
y. 2. Under the rule of Reason created by the precedents,
V segregation is unreasonable........................................ ....... 35
IV. . Equal Facilities for Legal Education Flave Not in Fact
Been. Offered to Sweajft and. Indeed, Segregated Legal
Education Cannot Under Any Circumstances Afford
Equal .Facilities. Heqce Petitioner Has Been Denied
v Equal Protection EverfWithin the Broadest Application
) of Plessy v. Fergusori..............-........................................ . 38
.Concjlrjsion ............................ .*................................. ............................ . 47
'•Appendix A„4„L........................... *........................................................... . 49
11
Index Continued
C IT A T IO N S
Page
C ases *
Baylles v. Curry, 128 111. 287, 21^.^1.^595^(1889) 19
Berea College v. K entucky, 211 U- S ; 45^ (1908)....................... ;U
Buchanan v. W orley , 245 U S- 6° (1917)...........•;...................... . 4
Cm*/ Cases, 109 U. S. 542^ (1883) _
Camming v. Richmond County Bd., 1Jo U.
E x parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 ( 1867)
528 (1899)....34, 35
...... 14
Liv parte Lranana, ** vvau. \ * ~ 14
£ * * • * * WcC^ * i ritA alC 6f M (.U86P ................ ... ...................35. 59v. H k m /, 333 U. S. 147 (1948)
ffZPZf.UufdftaYesnnl 2(efoct. Term, United States
Supreme Court) ............ .........."TV'To7p
Jones v. Kehrlein, 47 Cal. App. 646 194 R
M cCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa F e ,2 ^ o U . S. lo l ( LJI J
34, 35
55
..................... 31
(1920 ).............---------- 40
(1
M cP herson v. fltarfeer, 146 U. S. 1 (189*'V " o o f 7 ^ 8 ) 3 5 * 30, 40
M issouri ex rel. Games v. Canada, 305 U . S. 331 0 0 ,
M organ v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946 )
N ew Y ork Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 34o (1321)
P erez v. Sharpe, 32 Cal ^11 P 2d 17 ^.948)
Plcssy v. Ferguson,
2d
163 U
711, 198
S. 537
P. 2d 17 (1948).
(1896)........i:.......3, 4, 14,
23
.. 40
20- 1.
39
22
15
25, 29-30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,*38
Railroad Co. v. Broum, 17 W all / 445 (1873 W (1M 9 V - ^ 4
Roberts v City o f Boston, 5 Cush. (Mass.) * ( < . v
Sipnel v B d \ f R egents, 332 U. S. 631, ,u5 tfom. 7o,/xer v
̂ H u rst, 333 U. S. 147 ( 1 9 4 8 V . - - ’....."........................
S laughtcr-H ouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873)...............
Smithv. Alhvright,321 U . S. 649 ( 1944) ........ -........ T"
State v. M cCann 21 U s l 4 4 0 9 3 « ... 39
United States v. t < * d e n e £ r o d u c t s ,S M a S . ^
United States v. H a m s, 106 U. S. 62.) O 88® >
Virginia State Bd. v. Barnett, 319 U.b.
39
11
21
15
624 (1943)........ 33
S t a t u t e s :
Civil Rights Act of 1866,
Civil Rights Act of 1875,
12 St at. 805 (1863)..........
>37 (1 8 6 5 ).........
14 Stat. 27 (1866).
8 Stat. 335 (1875).
Mass.
Rule 1
Rules
1 1
13 Stat.
16 Stat. 3 (1 8 6 9 )..............
Mass. Acts 1845. c. 2 1 4 -
Rules of Civil Procedure (Vernon l.)42)
Bar of Texas, Art. 3, § 1, 1 d ex-
, Texas
of State
Stat. 696
(Vernon 1947)....
8
11
18
11
13
46
IllIndex:; Continued
V .V v :?• Page
M iscellaneous ': \
% *
Kxec. Order 9981, Fed. Reg.}4313 (1948)....................................... 27
103 A. L. It 713.......................4.............. 40
Arfierican Civil Liberties Union, 29th Annual Rep., In The
Shadow of; Fear (1949)....;:............................................................ ;.... 29
Anierican Freeman, The (1§66 )....................... .......................... ...... 13
Association "o£ American Law Schools, Teachers’ Directory
($1949-50 % y ............................t ............................. 41
Co fig. Globe, |38th Cong., IsCSess. (1804)..... ........................7, 11, 12
Coug. Globe”, -39th Cong., 1st; Sess. (1805-6).......... .-...7, 8, 9, 10, 11
Coflg. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d <5ess. (1867).............................................13
Cong. Globe, 4lst Cong., 2 d ‘Sess. (1.870).........'........................... 13
Cotig. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. (1871).................................... 14, 15
Coug. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. (1871)..... >... ...................... i— 15
Corig. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. (1871-2) ...................14, 15, 17
2 dong. Rec., 43d Cong., 1st ;Sess. (1874).......................... 15, 16, 22
3 Cong. Rec., -143d Cong., 2d Sess. (1,875)............:....;............... 17
Garrison, Address, 8 Am. LaW School Rev. 592 (1936)....... 45
Letter of Salihon Chase to Charles Sumner, dated Dec. 14,
1949 ........ .4 ................. .......... .1... ..... .....-.............. ............ ............. ...... 6
letter of Senator Morrill to Charles Sumner, undated (prob.
Oct. or Noy. 1865)............4-....................................... - .....- ...... —.... 8
Letter to Thaddeus Stevens, dated Nov. 1, 1865_................. ...... 7
Massachusetts'Const. Art. Ill' (1780)...... ....................................,L. 9
Maine Const. Art. I, § 3 (1$19)_...._ ............ ................................. 9
: New Hampshire Const. Art. V I (1792)...... ............. ............... ..... 9
NeW York State Comm’n Against Discrimination, 1948 Report
of Progre?s4-........- ............~..-4_.....- ....—....... .......— .......-............ -..... 28
President’s Cojnmission of Higher Education, Higher Educa
tion for American Democracy (1947)...........!..._.................... ...... 37
, Report of President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure
These Rights (1947)...........i ..............t.............................25, 26, 27, 35
Resolution of Providence, R..T., Union League Club (1865) 7
. Seni Rep. No..131, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1868).......................... 19
Special Report, Commissioner1; of Education on Condition and
Improvement of Public Schools, Dist. Col., H. R. Exec.
Doc. No. 3t5, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1870)................................ 12
United States/Fair Employment Practice Committee, Final
R/eport (1946)....................._..L..............- .............................................. 27
: University of :fTexas, Law School, Catalogue .( Aug. 1, 1948) 42
, University 6f Texas for Negroes, School of Law, Bulletin
(1949-50)- ...:.............................4............. :...............2, 41, 42, 44
• > ;
T reatJses a n d A r t i c l e s : V
Abrams, Race'-►Bias in Housing (1947)............. .......... ................26
Abrams, The Segregation Threat in Housing, 7 Commentary
123 (1949)4................. -......- 4 - ........... ................ - ........................... . 26
4
American Council on Education, Thus Be Their Destiny
American Council on Education, Color, Class and Personality
American Management Association, The Negro Worker
Article,2 U T Institutes Placement Service, 12 Texas Bar Jour
nal 208 (1949)._
■;n
2H
V8
23
Bout well, Reminiscences of Sixty Years (1902)........................
Boyd Some Phases of Educational History in the South Since
Boyer, The Smaller Law Schools, 9 Am. Law School Rev.
1469 (1942)...................................... .................-.................................... '*m
Bowen, Divine White Right (1934) ..--............................................ \
Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education (193.3).............
Comment, 56 Yale L. J. 837 (1 9 4 7 )-..... •...................— —»•— —
Commission on Discrimination in Employment New York
State War Council, Breaking Down the Color lane, 32 Man
Curry, Brief Sketch of George Peabody (1898) _ ........- . !
Curti, The Social Ideas of American Educators (193a)....... 36. . •
Dewey, Democracy and Education (1916) .................................... . ' '
Flack, The Fourteenth Amendment (1908).............
Fleming, Documentary History of Reconstruction (1.306) U L
Frasier and Armentrout, An Introduction to Education (3d
ccl 1033) ..................................................................... * * *
Gifford, The Placement of Law Students and Law Graduates,
9 Am. Law School Rev. 1063 (1941)........... -....... .............. :
Gillmor. Can the Negro Hold His Job?. National As^cmt.on ^
for Advancement of Colored People Bull. (Sept. 1.341)......v ;
Grosvenor, 24 New Englander 268 (1865)
Key, Southern Politics (1949)
Kilpatrick (E d .), The Educational Frontier 0 - 3 3 ) ...... -.... -
Knight, The Influence of Reconstruction on Education m the
South (1913)......................................;t ;v7o’n.......................................' o
Lew in, Resolving Social Conflicts ( 1948 ) .................................. - *
Maclver, The More Perfect Union (1948)... ........ -..................'
McPherson, Handbook of Politics for 1868 (1868)
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Maprfing and Phillibs, Negroes as Neighbors, 13 Common
Sense 134 (1944)4.............../................................................................. 20
May6, Ih e Human;. Problems of an Industrial Civilization
37
M err jam, The Making of Citizens (1931)....................................... 30
Mifier, Thaddeus Stevens (1939)........... ....................... ..................... 10
Mojrjson and Comrriager, The Growth of the American Re
public (1942)........ i ................................ ,....................... ;...;.........................K)
Moyljyn, Selected Li|t of Books for the . Small Paw School
library, 9 Am. Law School Rev. 4 09 (’1939).......................... 12
Murrhy (lid .), The Negro Handbook (1949)............-.................... 23
Myprs and Williams, Education in a Democracy (1942)............. 30
Mytdal, An American Dilemma (1944)........................................... 31
Nason, Life of Henry Wilson (1870)................... .......................... 5
NewlOn, Education for Democracy in Our Time (1939)........... 38
Newman, An Experiment in Industrial Democracy, 22 Oppor
tunity 52 (1944)....:;................................................................................ 28
Northfup, Proving Ground for Pair Employment, 4 Commen
tary 552 (1947).. .1............................ .......................... .................. 28
Note, M9 Col. L. Rev*. 029 (1949)....................................................... 31
Note, -50 Yale L. J. 1059 (1947)................................. 30 31
Note, >8 Yale L. J. 472 (1949)........................................ ................... ’ 31
Ottleyj The Good-Neighbor Policy— At Home, 2 Common
Grohnd 51 (1942^............................................................................... 20
Paterson, The Legal j/Kid Clinic, 21 Tex. L. Rev. 423 (1943) 44
Poundf Social Control Through Law (1942).................................. 40
Rossi, They Did It in St. Louis, 4 Commentary 9 (1947)........ 29
Rossi; Tolerance by L<*w, 195 Harper’s Mag. 458 (1947)........... 28
Rostow, Liberal Education and the Law: Preparing Lawyers
fot* Their Work in Our Society, 35 A . B. A. lour. 020
(1949) ...................... :i ...............................................................1.............44-5
Simon)- Causes and Cure of Discrimination, N. Y . Times May
29, 1949, § 0, p. 1 0 ................................... ........................ ;................. 28
Sumner, Works (1874)........... ............................................................... 0, 8
Sweetland, The CIO apd Negro American, 20 Opportunity 292
O H O .......................1..............„......................... ; ......................... .......... 29
Taylor, Negro Teachers in White Colleges, 05 Sch’l and Soci
ety 369 (1947)........ .,............................... :.........................:.................... 20
Warrtep, The Supreme,;Court in U. S. History (1920)............... 21
Wester-maun, Bet ween- Slavery and Freedom, 50 Am. Hist
Rev. 4 213 (1945).....4........................................................... ................. 4
Williams, The Louisiana Unification Movement in 1873 2 J
So;.' Hist. 349 (19450............ ............................ ................................. 12
Wirth, .Segregation, 13 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 043 (1934).................. 31
“4
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■] • IN T H E
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#«pr««tp (fuurtaif tlj? IUmtrii States
* ■*•'• • V-•• • „
v v •? O c t o b e r T e r m , 1949.
No. 44.«*■ •
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P I e m a n M A R io k S v v e a t t , P etition er ,
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T h e o p h i i .u s S h î c k e e P a i n t e r e t a l .
7 On a. W rit of Certiorari to the Supreme Court
* : of the State of Texas.• * /• ...
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> BRIEF <PF A M IC I (|uRIAE IN SU PPO RT QF
\ PE T IT IO N E R
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This is a ,brief of amici curiae iii support of petitioner on a
writ’of certiorari to review the judgment, of the Texas Court of
Civil- Appeals-:. ( R. 465) affirming a judgment of the District
Cou?t of Travis County denying petitioner’s request for a writ
of mandamus •'(R. 438-41 ). .* Review was denied by the 4 exas
Supreme Court (R . 466). Certiorari was granted by this Couit
on Nov. 7, r1949. The jurisdictional details are contained in
petitioner’s brief, and the procedural history of the case appeals
at Ra 438-72. i Iy »• v
This brief H filed, with the consent of the parties, on behalf
of tlie Committee of Law Teachers Against Segregation in Legal
f
Education, an organization identified more fully in Appendix A
to this brief.
The essential facts are as follows :
The courts below have denied petitioner’s application for a
writ of mandamus to compel the appropriate officials of the Uni
versity of Texas to admit him to its law school in Austin, Texas.
He is concededly in all respects qualified for admission to that
school except for the disqualification of race, for Texas bars
Negroes from this University (R . 425, 445). The'courts below
have rejected petitioner’s contention that this exclusion and peti
tioner’s consequent relegation to a state colored law school vio
late his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the time the record below was made, the colored school was
located in Austin, Texas. It has since been moved to Houston
(see R. 51-2 ; Bulletin of the Texas State University for Negroes.
School of Law 5 (1949-50)). Petitioner contends that, for the
decision of the issues on which he petitions, the location is im
material except in one important respect: The use of the Univer
sity of Texas (white) faculty members was contemplated while
the school was in Austin (R . 454), but a separate faculty is to
be recruited for Houston (R . 28-9; see Bulletin, supra, at p. 4).
The Texas law school (colored) was set up in response to the
order of the district court at an earlier stage of this same htiga
tion (R . 424-33), and it does not appear in the record that there
have ever actually been any students in it (though doubtless
there are some), either in Austin or in Houston. Sweatt was the
first Negro to apply for admission to the Texas law-school (white 1
(R . 451), and in any case Texas concedes that the colored sclmo
will have very few students (R . 77).
S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T
The basic position of this brief is that segregated legal ecluca
tion in the state institutions of Texas violates the ^qual pi ol e 1 11<"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That position is ap
proached by three different paths.
3v. - ?,
* • ».x* ̂ ̂ ■ •
First, anafyfiis of the origins of “ equal protection” in Arherican
law ihows that, in the form p f “ equality before the law /’ it was
transferred to tjhis country from the French by Charles Sumner as
part bf his attaqk on segregated education in Massachusetts a decade
before the Civil War, and linked by him with the Declaration of
•Independence.-: Popularized i|y Sumner, it or like phrases became
the Sogan oFtfre abolitionists* and it passed into the Constitution
as ai\ important part of the abolitionists’ share o f the Civil W ar. i .« # •
victory. Congress, contemporaneously with the adoption of the
I'oui/teenth Aniendrnent, deafly understood that segregation was
incorjapatible yvith equality, a judgment reflected by this Court in
Railroad C o .'y ., B ro w n , 17 Wall. 445 (1873).
' • ; t '*•
h\'(Plessy yf. B crg u so n , 163$U.S. 537 (1896), this Court aban
doned the original conception-of equal protect ion, adopting instead
the ldgal fiction*that segregation (in that case, in transportation)
is not discriminatory. This tyas a product, in part at least, of a
policy' judgment that the judiciary was incapable of enforcing the
Amendment as.it was written: and that the underlying social evil
* must vbe left to 5th e correction /pf time: The Court erred oil both
counts: the judiciary is not s|> powerless as it supposed, and the
result̂ of its- abdication have* been disastrous. The dissenting
view a) of Mr. Justice Harlan ifo the P lrssy case were correct, and
• should be adopted now. 3
3 i *
Seiiond, we ■■challenge the ^applicability to education of the
"separate but; equal” refinement of the equal protection clause.
\Vhile£we graht-the existence â f troublesome clicta, there is neither
a holding nor even carefully considered dicta by this Court declar
ing that segregation may be enforced.in any phase of education.
In Rl$ssy v. P erg n so n the Court did not say that segregation was
valid in every context in which men could devise ways o f separat-
fing themselves/by color. Orfc the contrary, it made careful dis
tinction between reasonable afid unreasonable segregation/ W e
omtertd that segregation in education, is for this purpose unrea-
Vmablje. • \ ;t
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ilurcl, eveii within the broadest application of P lc ssy v.‘ P c r -
•luson'j petitioner is entitled to absolute equality in education.
4
♦
For reasons set forth in detail in the body of the brief, it is im
possible for petitioner to receive at the improvised colored law '
school a legal education equal to that offered at the well-known
University of 1 exas law school (w hite). Nor,' indeed, can segre
gated legal education ever afford equal facilities.
A R G U M E N T
I.
TH E EQ U AL P R O TEC TIO N CLAUSE W A S IN
T E N D E D T O O U T L A W SEGREGATION.
I }le Court below held (a ) that segregated legal education can
meet the constitutional standard, and (b ) that Texas (colored) '
in fact did so. W e challenge at the outset the entire basis of
any decision which assumes that segregation can meet the stand- '
arc! of the Constitution. The Negro for whom the first section of *
the Fourteenth Amendment was primarily adopted was largely .
read out of that Amendment by nineteenth century decisions.1
The time has come to reconsider the frustration of so much of .
section one of the Amendment as relates to the equal protection •
of the laws.
Society in the past has known intermediate stages of bondage
between the free and the slave. In antiquity, “ between men of
these extremes of status stood social classes which lived outside ’
the boundary of slavery but not yet within the circle of those
who might rightly be called free/’2 The Thirteenth Amendment,
took the Negroes out of the class of slaves. -Section one of the .
1While decisions outside the area of segregation are not directly
involved in this case, the leading segregation decision of Plessy v. .
Ferguson, 1(53 U.S. 537 (189(5), can be understood only as part of
a group of decisions in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
narrowly construing the capacity of the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect Negro rights. Other decisions include the Civil Rights Cases,'"
109 U.S. 542 (1883), and United States v. Harris, 10(5 U S (52!) '
(1883).
2Westermann, Bctzveen Slavery and Freedom , 50 Am Hist Rev
213, 214 (1945). h
4
•f
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to insure that they not be
dropped at some half-way house on the road to freedom. It sought
to bring file ex-slaves within tile circle of the truly free hy obliter
ating l§g*al distinctions based on race.
The ^evidence of intefat to eliminate race distinctions in trans
portation1' and educatioii, relationships which must be considered
together jn the history-;'of equal protection, is particularly clear.
Equal protection first entered American law.in a controversy over
segregated education. r>
1. The original meaning of equal protection is incompatible
with segregated education;
• • * w
It was-, one thing, and a very important one, to declare as a
^political’ abstraction that “ all men are created equal,” and quite
; another-, to attach concrete rights to this state of equality. -.The
^•Declaration of Independence did the former. The latter- was
/Charles; Sumner’s outstanding contribution to American law.
v The great abstractiori|of the Declaration of Independence was
Mhe central rallying point for the anti-slavery movement. W hen
Slavery ;\Vgas the evil to-he attacked, no more was needed. But
iis some; of the New England States became progressively more
'^committed to abolition, the focus of interest shifted from slavery
.̂ Itself to .the status and rights of the free Negro. In the Massa
chusetts1'.; legislature in thfe 1840’s, Henry W ilson, wealthy manu-
Tacturerj abolitionist, anp later ^United States Senator and Vice
president, led the fight A against discrimination, with “ equality”
his rallying cry.3 One/W ilson measure gave the right to recover
-/damages, to any person ^‘unlawfully excluded” from the Massa
chusetts ̂ pbblic schools.4 i\
•v Boston . thereupon established a segregated school for Negro
^children the legality of Which was challenged in R ob erts v. C ity
\pf B oston > 5 Cush. (M ass.) 198 (1 8 4 9 ) . Counsel for Roberts
\------------ _• {
3 For an •'•account of Wflson’s struggles against ant i-miscegenat ii >n
Jaws, against separate transportation for Negroes, and for Negro
^education, see Nason, L ife: o f H en ry W ilson, 48 et seep (187(5).
4Mass. Acts 1845, c. 214*
was Charles Sumner, scholar and lawyer, whose resultant oral
argument was widely distributed among abolitionists as a pamph
let.5 * Sumner contended that separate schools violated the Massa
chusetts state constitutional provision that “ All men are created
free and equal.” 0 He conceded that this phrase, like its counter
part in the Declaration of Independence, did not by itself amount
to a legal formula which could decide concrete cases. Nonethe
less it was a time-honored phrase for a time-honor.ed idea and, in
a broad historical argument, he traced the theory of equality from
Herodotus, Seneca and Milton to Diderot and Rousseau, philos
ophers of eighteenth century France.
A t this point Sumner made his major contribution to the theory
of equality. He noted that the French Revolutionary Constitu
tion of 1791 had passed beyond Diderot and Rotjsseau to a new
phrase: “ Men are born and continue free and equal in their
r ig h ts .” Using a popular French phrase in English for the first
time, Sumner referred to “ egalite devant la loi,” or equality before
the laiv. The conception of equality before the law, or equality
“ in their rights,” was a vast step forward, for this was the firs!
occasion on which equality of rights had been made a legal con
sequence of “ created equal.”
Equality before the law, or equality of rights, Sumner insisted,
was the basic meaning of the Massachusetts constitutional pro
vision. Before it “ all . . . distinctions disappear.” Man,
equal before the law, “ is not poor, weak, humble, or black; nor
is he Caucasian, Jew, Indian, or Ethiopian; nor is he French.
German, English, or Irish; he is a M A N , the equal of all his
fellow men.” 7 Separate schools were unconstitutional because
they made a distinction where there could be no distinction, at
the point of race, and therefore separate schools violated the prin
ciple of equality before the law.
r’Among those active in distributing the pamphlet was Salmon l‘
Chase of Ohio. Diary and Correspondence o f Sainton P. Chn.u .
Chase to Sumner, Dec. 14, 1849, in 2 Ann. Rep. Am. Hist. Ass'n
188 (1902).
ttThe following summary of argument is taken from the complete
argument reprinted in 2 Sumner. If'orks 327 et seq. ( 1874 ).
■Ibid.
6
.V
2
s argu-The Massachusetts court, impersuaded, rejected Sumner
nieq̂ t, and Wal in turn reversed by the state legislature.8 But the
argument outlasted the cas|, and from it the phrase ‘ ‘.equality
before the law,” or its briefer counterpart, “ equal rights,” , became
the tneasuriiigi stick for all proposals’ concerning freedmen.
a. # •> * # r*-
Pjpor to the Civil W ar, the controversy over equality for the
freepmen was'primarily a depute within the States, but national
: emancipation ^brought the isiue to Congress where Sumner kept
“equality’ iti.thc forefront of ( ongressional attention." -Shortly
before the first, meeting of tHe 39th Congress in December, 1865,
the new Black Codes in th-e Southern States had shocked the
North into widespread recognition of the need to secure equality.10
•• Sumner's popularization of ijis equality theory had been so sue-'
cessfcul that it§ echo returned from Radicals everywhere.11 Rep-
■ rese^tative Bingham of Offro offered a proposed Fourteenth
‘ Amendment-in which the keyjphrase was a guarantee to the people
of “6qual protection in their ^rights, life, liberty, and property.” 12
Senator Mop rill of Vermoift, shortly to be a member of the
Join£.Committee on Reconstruction, sent a note to Sumner sug-
gestipg that.-tfie best “ jural’'*phrase*’ for an amendment would
1 be a .'guarantee that citizens £re “ equal in their civil rights, im~
.munfties and,<privileges and Equally entitled to protection in life,
------ *4jt----- ’ ’
, 8Mjass Acts; 1855, c. 250. <
"See, e.g., liis discussion in She Senate of the possible wisdom of
including “equality” in the Thirteenth Amendment. Cong. Globe,
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482 (1884).
1 "Inanely compilations of these Codes are McPherson, Handbook o f
Politics fo r 18(58, 29-44 ( 1808)£ 1 Fleming, Docum entary H istory o f
Reconstruction ic. 4 (1900). y»
’ ’ “Equality.before the law” jjivas the general cry. A Pennsylvania
State-Equal Rights League signed its correspondence “ Yours for
justice and equality before theflaw.” Letter to Stevens of Nov. 1,
pS t evens'-Mss. (1805), Lib. Cong. And see resolution of Provi
dence, R. I., . Union League £lub, ibid, asking “our members in
.Congress” to secure “equal rights of all men before the law.” “ Ab
solut ,̂ equality before the law” jivas demanded in Grosvenor, 24 New
duiglander 20^ (1865). See also James, The Framing o f the Four-
Iccntdx Am endm ent 29 et seq. ,'Jl939), an unpublished Ph.D. thesis
in thq-library of. the University^ of Illinois. On the relative amount
'of attention giyejn the first, as ^bmpared to the other sections of the
.-Amendment, sfeefnote 22 infra. .-
• 12Cbng. Glot?e> 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1805).
«
liberty and property.” 13 Sumner himself introduced a reconstruc
tion plan, an important part of which included “ equal protection
and equal rights.” 14
The first relevant measure actually to he considered by Con
gress was the hill which became the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
This hill was originally introduced by Senator W ilson of Massa
chusetts, the same W ilson who had been so active earlier in the
equality struggles in that state,15 * and we may assume that the
proposal represented the joint policies of W ilson and Sumner.10
The W ilson proposal invalidated all laws “ whereby or wherein
any inequality of civil rights and immunities” existed because.of
“ distinctions or differences of color, race or descent.” 1 his meas
ure, as it passed the Senate, contained a clause forbidding any
“ distinction of color or race” in the enforcement of certain laws,
and assured “ full and equal benefit of all laws” relating to person
and property. Senator Howard, a member of the Joint Com
mittee on Reconstruction, said of the Act, “ In respect to all civil
rights, there is to be hereafter no distinction between the white
race and the black race.” 17
The Civil Rights bill was enacted, but over the protest of one
extreme radical in the House. Representative Bingham of Ohio
opposed the measure on the ground that the Thirteenth Amend
ment gave it an inadequate base. He preferred to wait until
13Morrill to Sumner, undated, prob. Oct. or Nov., 1865, in Sumner
M ss., quoted in James, supra note 11 at 31.
14H) Sumner, W orks 22 (1874). .
ir,Though the measure was introduced by Wilson, actual leadership
on the proposal passed from him to Senator Trumbull of Illinois,
chairman of the Judiciary Committee. The proposal originated with
S.9 in the 39th Cong., introduced by Wilson, from, which the.text
quotations are taken. A few days later, after floor discussion which
revealed that Trumbull was willing to take the lead on the measure.
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865), Wilson introduced a
new bill, S. 55, which retained and enlarged the language of S. 9.
This bill was referred to by Trumbull’s name but retained Wilson's
proposals. S. 61 became the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 14 Stat.
(1866).
10Wilson hinted as much. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3't
(1865).
11 Id. at 504.
8
9
a .^ w Am^iidlment might |ass which would eliminate all “ dis
crimination lie tween citizens on account of race or color.” 18 A s
a member of*the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Bingham
wa^ then ^ k . n g on just|such an Amendment. W ith fellow
: Coipmittee members such a§ those extreme equalitarians Stevens
H ° f ard’ aAd jMorrill, there yras no serious obstacle in Committee.’
Bingham:;drafted for the ^Committee the essential language of
sectfon one of.the Fourteenth Amendment..' In the vital equality
■ cause he combined the language of his own earlier proposed
amendment,- equal protection in their rights” and the Civil Rights
b' " benefit.|of all laws” into the concise “equal
protection of the laws.” '" th e prompt adoption of the Amend
ment: earned the aholitionisf theory of racial equality into our
, hast0 document.2" As S en io r Howard, floor leader for the
, moidnient in. the Senate, sa|d of the clause, it “abolishes all class
legislation m.the States and does away with the injustice of sub
jecting one caslte of persons tp a code not applicable to another.” -
i le J ore o i , the clause he deduced to Sumner’s meaning: “ It.
establishes equality before the< law , ” 21
-____JL '1; , 4 * ,
18I3. at 1290, j293. J :
w-Triot f„ref ,S ? co';trib"'i°n J>f the Bingham draft of the clause
nrVrv^i t rWOr.ds he usecU but in‘ those he omitted. Previous
! ' ? ®a S had l^ e tim e s carried words of qualification as to the par- '-
t.ailar types of laws as to whidj equal protection was to be afforded
1 he Cwfi Rights bill in the S^ate had referred to “equal benefits
^ d f c r e d " gS- • -eCurity of I>erson and estate,” andnacl rjtei red iq discriminatiQn in civil rights and immunities”
Bingham saw hbpelcss confusidli in these refinements, see remarks ■
utcd, qupra note •!8, and omittedjthem. He thus brought the language
■ !nto af CPrd w,t.h the broad “equality before the law.” ' * •
do nois ) n tracing th,s history of the phrase “equal nrotec-
lion, qverloolc sporadic earlier jitses of similar language. See e q ;
Me c £ °s tStA r C l H ConSt- Ar«.gV I8 ( ,7 9 8 ).; and• ’ - S r ' •’ ̂ ̂ (1819). *.The context of those Articles deni
mg w.ft freedom of religion, art so aliert to .he subject a hand h
!nenlAfre " ever- r” k'rred tl> «>f>«*ion will, the Fourteenth Ameiuh
l ' V ^ Globe,',39th Cong., tsi Sess. 27CCi f 18G0) Some of the
aS the text "bove,must
L * *
10
Because the primary concern of those who enacted the Four
teenth Amendment was with sections two and three of t e men
meat rather than section one which includes equal protection,
we do not have complete evidence of the views of all the respon
sible men of the time on the meaning of equal protection W c
do know that the clause found its way into the Constitution
through Sumner, through Wilson, through Trumbull and through
the twelve majority members of the Joint Committee on Recon
struction. O f those fifteen at least eight— Sumner, W ilson, Bing
ham, Howard, Stevens, Conkling, Boutwell and M orrill-th ou gh t
the clause precluded any distinctions based on color. lh e
Trumbull, Fessenden, and Grimes— had some mental reservations,
particularly as to miscegenation, although they agreed generally
22Mnrh of the murkiness in the history of “ privileges and lin-
>» ii rcnn ” and “due process,” as well as equal protect > ,
"s produced by the 'fact that what has become the only significant part
nf the Amendment was then the least significant part. iL >
?• . represented a coalescence of certain economic and political
interests along with the abolitionists. Standard references on * *
mtercsts, S f R - r Am crlcan Civilization c. 23
^ d ’ “ Morri^n and C o n n e r , The Growth o f Re-
a n ,u<>\ The pest telling of the manner in which the s<
^ I t i ^ n ^ ^ ' s r ^ t h e i r prohilnis by the ,F ™ rte^th AnienT
„ol the middle sections of the Amendment, while section one was
abolitionists’ share of the victory.
«.vnu. views of Sumner, Wilson, and Howard are apparent from
Pout well are apparent from their consistent support of the Sun n<
civ rights hiil! discussed in detail, infra The case a. to B ingW
• rle-ir since his pre-occupation in the Amendment was argi
wi h !i h " pr’S s ’ an 1 inunu’ ities clan* hi, specia contr iu.,,0
r-f 9 P nut well Ramin sconces o f S ixty Years 41. lluw"
view'was apparently in accord with the others o this> -
evidenced at least hy some phrases. See, c.g., CO g.
Cong., 1st Sess. 121)3 (18GG).
r
IH
V
with;.t:he other*!. Fhe positions of the remainder we do not know,
though somfe,..at least, doubtless agreed with Sumner.25- It was
tliuŝ the dominant opinion *;of the Committee that the clause
eliminated distinctions of cofor in civil rights
• '.r • > ■
.; ; •. V . .
2. Contemporary rejection^ of ’ ’separate but equal” in Con
gress, impiediately before and after the Fourteenth
Amendment, represent^ a judgment incompatible with
segregated, education. 1 ■ '‘ \ 1 . .. • t ■
Congress Repeatedly considered “ separate but equal” in the Re-
construction decade, particularly in connection with transporta
tion. ̂ Railroad".and street carxompanies in the District o f Colum
bia early began to separate '(while and colored passengers, put
ting them in: separate cars oij, in separate parts of the same car,
with quick Congressional response. As early as 1863, Congress ,
amended the charter of the Alexandria and Washington Railroad
to provide tha,t “ No person .Shall be excluded from the cars on.
account of color.” "0 When, irj 1864, the Washington and George
town* street c)ap company attempted to handle its colored passen-
gers Jyy putting them in serrate cars, Sumner denounced the
practice in the . Senate and sjet forth on a crusade to eliminate
street- car segregation in the$District.27 After a series o f skir- '
mishes, he finally carried to passage a Jaw applicable to all District
carriers that .‘up person shall be excluded from any car on account
•of color.” 28 5 • )• / t ••
■' 6 * y
24Ffessenden'a^nd Trumbull believed that the Civil Rights Act and ;
the Atnendmefit did not affect 'jmti-miscegenatiqn legislation. Cong.
Clobe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (ft)5 (180(5) (Fessenden) ; id\ at 322
( 1 rufihbull). In 1864 Grimes tfro light segregated transportation was '
qiuab Cong. Qlobe, 88th Cong., pst Sess. 8133 (1864), with Trumbull
apparently contra on that issuer «/. at 3132. Whether the views of
.brinies changed- is not known. ■%
2BTjiese fouf jnembers, 11 arris, Williams, Blow, and Washburne,
-were conventional radicals andj Harris,-Blow, and Washburne had '
very strong anti-slavery backgrounds. It is therefore highly probable
jliat alt least SQntp of them shared the views of Sumner and Stevens,
but wfe have np direct evidence.;
2012 Stat. 8Of):( 18(53). §
a7Cfcng. Globe;-'38th Cong., IsCSess. 553, 817 (1864)
2813 Stat. 537 X1865). *
i
The discussion of the street car bills, all shortly prior to the
Fourteenth Amendment, canvassed the whole issue of segregation
in transportation. Those who supported the measures did so on
grounds of equality. Senator Wilson denounced the “ Jim Crow
car,” declaring it to be “ in defiance of decency.” 20 Sumner per
suaded his brethren to accept the Massachusetts view, saying that
there “ the rights of every colored person are placed on an equality
with those of white persons. They have the same right with white
persons to ride in every public conveyance in the common
wealth.” * 30 Thus when Congress in 1866 wrote equality into the
Constitution, it did so against a background of repeated judgment
that separate transportation was unequal.31
The history of equal protection and separate schools, though
less clear, suggests a similar interpretation. The close of the War
found public education almost non-existent in the South,32 and
Negro school status in the North ranged from total exclusion from
schools to complete and unsegregated equality.33 Four Southern
Reconstruction constitutions provided for mixed schools, and the
Northern educational aid societies offered unsegregated education
in the South.34 Although these efforts to achieve unsegregated
education were of little practical effect, they indicate the intel
lectual atmosphere from which equal protection emerged. The
abolitionists were absolutely confident that the races both could
12
See rc-
2nCong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3132, 3133 (1864).
30/</. at 1158. .
:nThis was clear even from the conservative viewpoint,
marks of Senator Reverdy Johnson, id. at 1156.
},2One of the many works on the subject is Knight,' The Influence
o f Reconstruction on Education in the South (1913).
3:?An extensive account contemporary with Reconstruction, much
broader in scope than the title indicates, is Spec. Rep., Commissionci
o f Education on Condition and Im provem ent o f Public Schools, Dust.
Col., H R. Exec. Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1870).
•^Materials are collected in 2 Fleming, supra note 10 at 171-212.
Even conservative Southerners, when they sought to give full com
pliance to the Fourteenth Amendment, conceded that equality required
unseeregated education. See Williams, The Louisurna Unification
M ovem ent in 1873, 2 J. South. Hist. 349 (1915), describing the con
cession of mixed schools by a political group headed.by Gen. 1 . 1.
Beauregard.
arid should, -under the principle of equality, mingle in the school
rooms.30 - . |
?The primary responsibility of Congress for education was in
the; District pf Columbia, where a segregated system was a going
operation prior to the endjjof the Civil War. Securing a place
on.; the District of Columbia Committee, Sumner proceeded to
atfĉ ck discriminations in t£e District one at a time.30: Since he
ch&se first:, to eliminate restrictions on Negro office-holding and
jufry service,- he did not r^acli the school question on his own
agenda until 1870.37 He then twice carried proposals through
the Committee to eliminate the segregation,38 and urged his
piqiposal oil the floor of th£ Senate on the grounds of equality:
C^ery child, white or blacfi:, has a right to be placed under pre
cisely the Ratine influences, jwith the same teachers, in the same
school rooffi, without any ̂ discrimination founded on color ” 30
— it-------- •« fr*• *
/ T'he Arrtendment must b© read in the light of this psychology of
optimism. Immediately after’jh e War the abolitionist societies under
took educational work in the fouth on a large scale, fully recorded in
such of their journals as The .American Freeman and the Freem an 'v
Journal The‘Constitution of, the Freeman’s and Union Commission
provided that No schools or Supply depots shall be maintained from
the benefits of-winch any person shall be excluded because of color”
Ih d A m . Freeman 18 (1866)^ Lyman Abbott, General Secretary of
the Commission, published a statement explaining that the policy had
heerj fully considered: “ it isjinherently right. To exclude a child
Irorh a free scliool, because h£ is either white or black, is inherently
wrong . . . i [W e must | lead public sentiment toward its final
goal-, equal justice and equal rights . . . . The adoption of the
leverse principle would really jlend our influence against the progress
of liberty, equality, and fraternity, henceforth to be the motto of the
republic. Id, at 0. 1 he fact is* that few whites attended these schools,
floyd, Some Phases o f Educational H istory in the South since JS65
Studies in Southern History 259 (1914).
30Sumner expounded this seriatim policy in Cong. Globe 10th
tong., 2nd Sess. 39 (1807). 7.
,7The jury and office law was twice pocket-vetoed by President
Johnson, and Sumner, therefore, had to secure its passage three times
nefote it became effective in President Grant’s administration 10 Stat
3 (1809). ..............
,18S. 301, (Joiig. Globe, 41st) Cong., 2nd Sess. 3273 (1870) and
S. 1244, u l at 1053 et seq. :V
™fd. at 10557
14
The most important new voice heard in the District of Colum
bia school debate on Sumner s proposal was that of Senator Matt
Carpenter of Wisconsin, a leading constitutional lawyer of his
time and prevailing counsel in E x parte Garland, A- W all. 333
(1867), E x parte M cC ardle, 7 W all. 506 (1869), and the
S la u g h ter-H ou se C ases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873). Carpenter said:
“ M r. President, we have said by our constitution, *we
have said by our statutes, we have said by our party plat-
foi ms, we have said through the political press, we have
said from every stump in the land, that from this time hence
forth forever, where the American flag floats,[there shall'he
no distinction of race or color or on account of previous
condition of servitude, but that all men, without regard to
these distinctions, shall be equal, undistinguished before the
law. Now, Mr. President, that principle covers this whole
case.” 40
Filibuster, not votes, stalled the District of Columbia school
measure.41 Sumner thereupon terminated his efforts to clear up
discriminations one at a time and determined to make one supreme
effort along the entire civil rights front. He put his whole energy
behind a general Civil Rights bill, which forbade segregation
throughout the Union, in the District of Columbia and outside
it, in conveyances, theaters, inns, and schools.42 The consideration
by the Senate of this measure, which in modified form became
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, represents an overwhelming con-
tempoi ary judgment that separate but equal” schools, wherever
located, violate the equal protection clause.
In the debates on this new civil rights bill, the leading cases
on which this Court relied in R lcssy v. b crgusovi were pressed
upon the Senate and rejected as unsound. R ob erts v. C ity o f
"'Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3rd Sess. 1033 (1871).
41 Hy 1872, the filibuster had come into frequent use in the defense
against radical legislation. By a vote of 35 to 20 Sumner defeated
those who sought to keep his District school measure off the floor
entirely, Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3124 (1872), but his time
was used up before he could bring the matter to final vote.
42 1 he measure was proposed by Sumner both as a bill and as an
amendment to other lulls over a period of years. Its final presenta
tion was in the 43rd Cong., S. 1.
€5 15
Rost on, supra, was quoted without avail 4!l a , . ,
(),f ĉecisioii', State v. M c& am i, 21 Ohio St 198 ( 1 8 7 2 f
f “ “ — is f e 12 a , e qi,ate° t s ! e je(^ :
T ^ S r /L T n ';0 kne* '!,e FoUrtee" th Amendment b e lt -
M a d e A c t i o n s b eT u s f of T J c ag^ 1 ^ at the A mend,nent
u j , . u i . , . v ,,J race. A s Senator Edmunds of
• V 2 ‘ ?r C lalrm;ui ofltbe Senate Judiciary Committee nut
t e° ,e r̂ eC,etl - l « - ‘ efecbo„ls : “ This is a matter A b s ent
■gfit, unless you adopt the Slave doctrine that color and race are
teaspns for; distinction among citizens.” " ' Sumner himself de
.need separate but equag’ in the Senate as he had denounced
* "1 h,S ° ri i n t e n t in R ^ r t s v. C ity o f B oston years W ore
N e n a T a & h ^ T ‘C otfter excusewhich finds Equality in
f %?‘ e,s- sel>arate conveyances, sepmate
• the ? ; T te, ! 1U,,rd,C5' a,lf' ^ r a t e c e m e t e r i^
•• tL coTtrivanr ' fit,a ^ "bstlU,tes for Equality; and this is .the contrivance hy which a transcendent right, involving a
«. transcendent duty, is evaded. ^
Assuming \Vhat is most absurd to assume and
ri at '*. eontradicted b)j all experience, that a substitute can
,be an equivalent, it is .so in form only and not in real v
',s tJZ t Xith’ theem •>‘ t,SJ n )" Kli8 " i,y to : the colored race, im
•'acter Jt L w 1 • <$ slavery, and this decides its char-
acter. U is S lavery m f t s last appearance.” 40
T je bill started its final rqad to passage in the 43rd Congress
As Sumner had died, Senator Frelinglniysen o f New Jersey led
tie debate fertile bill, beginning on April 29. 1874, with an ex
tensive argument that segregation was incompatible with the
. fourteenth Amendment. Ttie bill, he said, sought “ freedom from
all disci mmiatlon before the Jaw on account of race, as one of the
^'Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., gd Soss. .320 1 (1872).
th$ on the McCann case. Id. at! '* th$ time of its hnahconsideration Seminr Tr,-.>i: i
,,, cljarge of; tile bill in the Senate, explained why he 111 "uglCthc
S es?o 's74T .'STl° l " 0t CO" trf • 2 C° " « - Rcc-.34r>a. 43rd Cong., 1st
^’<£ong. Glpl*\ 42nd Cong., Id Sess. 82(10 ( 1872).
Cong, dope, 42nd Cone \2d Sess •■iqo aua / iq^ i \ / ,added). "t,-, ĉ.ss> J84 (.18*1) (emphasis
i
16
fundamental rights of United States citizenship.” 47 For this he
found full warrant in the equal protection clause. Segregation
in the schools, he said, could only be voluntary, for the object of
the bill is to destroy, not to recognize, the distinctions of race.” ‘s
There were in the Senate three distinct views on the problem
of segregated schools. A minority thought that ‘ ‘separate but
equal” schools should be permitted. On May 22, 1874, an amend
ment to that effect offered by Senator Sargent o f California was
rejected, 26 to 21. Those 26 included Morrill, Colliding and
Boutwell, who had been on the Committee which had drafted the
Amendment. By voting to reject the “ separate but.equal” school
clause, they necessarily indicated a judgment that Congress had
power to legislate against segregated schools under the equal pro
tection clause. This contemporary affirmative and deliberate
interpretation of the Constitution is entitled to great weight here.
M cP h erson v. Slacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892).
The 26 were not themselves of one mind. Senator Boutwell
represented a small minority view that separate schools neces
sarily bred intolerance and therefore should not be allowed to exist
even if both races desired it.40 However, the dominant Senate
opinion was that separate schools should be forbidden by law, ns
the Amendment and this bill forbade them; but that if the entire
population were content in particular instances to accept separate
schools, it might do so. Senator Pratt of Indiana, one of the
most vigorous supporters of the bill, noted that Congress was con
tinuing separate schools in the District of Columbia because both
races were content with them; and at the same time he pointed
out that where there were very few colored students, they would
have to be intermingled/’0 Senator Howe put it most concretely
when he observed that if, by law, schools were permitted to be * 4
472 Cong. Rec. 3452, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1874). •
4i'“ lf it were possible, as in the large cities it is possible, to estabh-h
separate schools for black children and for white children it is mi l "
highest degree inexpedient to either establish or tolerate siu '
schools.” From speech of Senator Boutwell, id. at 44 lf>.
■•"Id. at 4081, 4082.
4
17
V r t
serrate, thej would never in fact be equal. He believed in pro-
■' ! " t T f SeP7 a ‘ ? Sl!h00lS a" l ,he" People do as they chose:
the individuals and n<rt the superintendent of schools judge
ot the comparative merits <̂ f the schools.” 51 '
' ., I he bin^ f SSed the .Se«4«> but in the House the result was
different. Th.e bill passed, l*ut with the school clause deleted.
this deletion was the product of many factors. The House
had.J>reviouSly voted to require mixed schools,5* but on this occa-
Sion, it was, confronted with- the firm opposition of the George
eabody Fund. Peabody, American merchant who founded
wha{ became. J; P. Morgan &*Co„ established a fund of $3,000,000
to aid education in the Sofith. As abolitionist education aid
: societies ran put o f money# and collapsed, the Peabody p'und
became the only major outside agency aiding Southern education.
Ihe-fund °0P|?sec' mixed sclibols, withdrawing its aid where they
were required.J3 It claimed fredit for inducing President Grant
to '"Struct lriSi House floor leader to abandon the school provi
sion, ̂ Coupled with this pressure were tlireats from Southern
representatives’ that they would end their newly founded-public
schoql systems i f the Senate measure passed.05 In addition, some
■ teprgsentativ.es felt that the courts would protect the Negroes on
tlie sphool issue, and thus as a matter of legislative discretion
waived the right to legislative aid.00 ] 'or whatever combination------1 v ■*’ . *T “ r t '
R,M. at 415i. h -- i
104? Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2074 (1872)
( ouge refused, <4 to 99. to la^bill on table) ; id. at 2270 2271 (en-
* , vS ei a,K! reat?-ll,rcc ,i,,u's’ J<*> «> 78) ; no final action taken
•2 Fleming, supra note 10 at 194. During this period the Fund
was tinder the direction of Dr. ifarnas Sears, later succeeded by I 1
C? rr#. ,l? a volume on: the work of the Fund, introduces
" U t(>eic. of llllx^ schools with the words. “ Some persons, not to ‘the
liannef born , took the lead in organizing a crusade for the co-ecluea-
( IK08°/. ' rry’ B f f SkctCh ° f GcorSc Peabody .10
•'Vf/. at 64, l
\ i S,4 . ^ctission of this IX)int by Representative Roberts, who
slated *hat he preferred to prohibit segregated schools but would vote
o omit the clause for fear thp South would abolish all schools
.1 Con£ Rec. 981; 43rd Cong., 2cJ Sess. (3875).
' Se6 remarks of Representative Monroe, id. at 997 998
r \ » • ’
of reasons, a leading Negro Representative from South Carolina
consented to eliminate the school clause in return for assurance
that the rest of the bill would pass.57 The House result, clearly,
thus represented a political rather than a constitutional judgment:
In summary, ecpial protection as a legal conception originated
before the Civil War in Sumner’s attack on segregated schools.'
It became the abolitionist rallying cry and was brought into the
Constitution by the abolitionist wing of the Republican Party.
Before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, “ equal rights’’
was thoroughly understood to mean identical, and not separate
rights, particularly in transportation. That was the view of the
dominant group among those who actually phrased the Fourteenth
Amendment. Throughout the debate on the Amendment its sup.-
porters acknowledged no doctrine of equal but separate as an
exception to the fundamental concept of equal rights. Contem
porary legislative action confirms this basic position.
3. In Railroad Co. v. Brown, this Court early decided that
“ separate” could not be “ equal” .
In the leading case o f R ailroad Co. v. B row n , 17 Wall. 445
(1873), this Court early decided that separate accommodations,
no matter how identical they might otherwise be, were not equal.
On February 8, 1868, Catherine Brown, colored, attempted to
board a railroad car on a line from Alexandria to ;.Washington.
That road had a “ Sumner amendment” in its charter which pro
vided that “ no person shall be excluded from the cars on account
of color.” ™ The railroad maintained two identical cars, one next
to the other on the train, using one for white and the other for
colored passengers. When Mrs. Brown attempted to sit in the
“ white” car, she was ejected with great violence.
The pertinent legal issue in Mrs. Brown’s case'was whether
segregation amounted to the same thing as “ exclusion from the
cars.” The episode attracted immediate attention. because Mrs.
18
r,7See remarks id. at 1)81, 1)82.
r,s 12 Slat. 805 (18(33).
t ■ •
( .
j t
-f
*« 19
Brdwn was }n charge of gie ladies’ rest room at the. Senate.
A Senate investigating committee concluded that the Company
:• latt vlolab-d dts charter, aijd recommended that the charter be
; reP.?aled ifVMrs. Brown \fere not fully compensated by civil
damages.B0 V i
i -
At the ttfel, the Compariy unsuccessfully asked for a charge
to tpe jury ihat separate but* equal cars complied with the statute,
• and; in the Supreme Court argued that “ making and enforcing
the separation of races in itij cars” was “ reasonable and legal.” 00
, Tjjhe Supreme Court unanimously rejected the “ separate but
equal” argument as “ an ingenious attempt to evade a compliance
with the obViQus meaning o| the requirement.” 01 The object of
the jSumner^aftiendment, said! the Court, was not merely tp let the
Negroes buy transportation,; but to let them do so without “ dis
crimination” :v
> Congress, in the belie£j.that this discrimination was unjust,
.acted, y It told the cojfnpany, in substance, that it could
.road into tlfe District as desired, but that this
^discrimination must cesfcse, and the colored and 'white race,
the *se o f the cars, be placed on an equality. This con
dition it 'had the right;-to impose, and in the temper of
CCongrejjs'.at the time, it As manifest the grant could not have
vbeen m£de without it.” 0?
: y r‘ ••
Thus in its first review of |‘separafe but equal,” this Court held
that 'segregation was “ discrimination” and not “ equality.” We
ask the Court to apply that 6ame principle in the instant case.
------ _------ j z ' ■
50Sen. RepC Jtfo. .131, 40th C$ng., 2d,Sess. (18G8).
fl°The quotatipn is taken frorft the brief on file in the Supreme Court
•t t «■ p
0117 Wall. 445, 452. The sapie approach as that of the Brown case
is taken whenever a statute which requires “equal” treatment is held
[°. X ° - ~ segr€gati°n. See, ela., Baylies v. Curry, 128 111. 287 21
N.E..595 (1889 ) (restricting Negroes to particular theater seats held
violapon of statute) ; Jones v. Kehrlein, 47 Cal. App. G4G 194 P 55
(1920) (same).' '• ’
°“W Wall. 445 at 152, 153 (%niphasis added).
f
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, which undid the Brown case and the
legislative history of equal protection, should be over
ruled.
Twenty years after R ailroad C o. v. B row n , this Court took
a wholly different view of segregation.
The exact issue in P lessy v. F erguson , 163 U.S. 537 (1896),-
was whether a Louisiana requirement of separate railroad ac
commodations denied equal protection. Mr. Justice Brown for
the majority held that this segregation did not stamp “ the colored
race with a badge of inferiority.” If it did so, said he, “ it is'
not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because
the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.” <i:j
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, states our case:
“ It was said in argument that the statute of Louisiana
does not discriminate against either race, but prescribes a
rule applicable alike to white and colored citizens. But this
argument does not meet the difficulty. Everyone knows that
the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not
so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occu
pied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches
occupied by or assigned to white persons . . . .
“ The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in
this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the
law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling
class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal
before the law. The humblest is the peer of the riiost power
ful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. It'
is, therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final
expositor o f the fundamental law of the land, has reached
20
03Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
*4
r.■$
, f ' T ? " ’ the D r o d f c o t t case.” (1 6 3 -U S. at 556-9)
•,. C° re ? f?M r- Justice Brown’s argument is i„ his assunin
• ,v " t a‘ Ŝ g a t i o n is not aSwhite judgment of colored inferior-"
ty ,Th,s would be so palpably preposterous aŝ a statement o f
t e o f ^ e V St aSSUme Jt l 'Ce Brown " ’ ‘ ended it as. a legal
t z s & r f f s t t f . - r * r - « • *
W esj, castes ^ I,lilia ,fj, ” » £ 5 " * ^
. a & s j ? * 11* *...... t * ” 'r « . » - . l a s :
• The real question, thereto*, is why should the Court'have
f t S n l y t o ^ ll fiCti0n? S' ,DWcI the C m ' n have thought
than discrimination? ** Cte'1S<|t,,at segregation is anything other
s i s . ^ ; r nth “ ient- ,,ot
c s s s z z ?
*" ' 1 erve for l" e N- ° 3 ^
nf:d^PourreerTil^Am^dnieilh<:fw e rgtr^nt ” leanjn*’
termination of 'segregation is & t &. • ? ^ ' y m,pl,es- that
rontenrf: that th e * ^s n I •£ W,th traditio"- But we
_ ____ £. ? nothing ,h the tradition of Negro slavery
Me 3 War^em'rfe fi!^ rra !cyCuWrtS ?f /V •l'ec,°’I.struc*,'° n decisions,
(1926) « He lists Brree factors-d i/ " .U m M ,? '«* «* H istory fins
T ,estion': from national politics'- fhe deshe V’ el" / " nate “ ‘ he Negro
"> state authority,- 'and the desh-i ... , ’ r,-eleK:lfe the Negroes
Shuth. O ^ ’ central ^ on£ S i ? " " " " the Court
been sacrifice* for an£ or all fcf Z J L ’S S S ' 8h° UW * *
V v :j { 21
22
that is worth preserving. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fif
teenth Amendments committed the country to the -great experi
ment of making a complete break with that tradition. When
Charles Sumner gave the abolitionists the formula of equality
before the law, he did not mean equality with reservations, equal
ity with segregation. Decisions such as P lessy v. F ergu son turn
the Fourteenth Amendment into a phantom or a grotesque mis
take. A s Senator Frelinghuysen said in presenting the anti-segre
gation Civil Rights Bill of 1875 to the Senate:
“ If, sir, we have not the Constitutional right thus to legis
late, then the people of this country have perpetrated a
blunder amounting to a grim burlesque over which the world
might laugh were it not that it is a blunder over which
humanity would have occasion to mourn. Sir, we have the
right, in the language of the Constitution, to give ‘to all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States the equal
protection of the laws’ .,M1,>
This Court should return to the original purpose of the equal
protection clause, to forbid distinctions because of race. State
enforced segregation is unconstitutional because it makes such a
distinction. A s Senator Edmunds put it, it is “ slave doctrine
to make color and race reasons for distinctions among citizens.
Segregation is discrimination. Railroad Co. v. Brozvn, supra.
II.
TH E BASIC POLICIES U N D E R L Y IN G TH E C O U R T ’S
A P P R O V A L OF SEGREG ATIO N IN PLESSY V . FER
G U SO N H A V E , IN TH E YEARS IN T E R V E N IN G SINCE
T H A T DECISIO N, PROVED T O BE N O T O N L Y
W H O L L Y ERRONEOUS B U T SERIOUSLY" D ESTRU C
TIV E OF TH E D EM O C R ATIC PROCESS IN THE
U N IT E D STATES.
If the meaning of equal protection, whether considered in terms
of historic intent or of the ordinary meaning of words, is clearly
incompatible with segregation, as we say it is, then the further
task confronts us of assessing the underlying bases of P lessy v.
(,r>2 Cong. Rec. 3451, 43rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1874).
23
Fergus o n ., .Concededly ‘a^page of history is worth a volume of
logic.” N ew Y ork Trust. C o. v. E isner, 256 U .S . 345 , 349
( f^ 21) . This Court must deal with the same practical consider
ation that ;faced the Court-tin the nineteenth century. Petitioner,
if fie woul<ji persuade you t$ reconsider E lessy, must persuade you
Ha r lap's dissent had more than a theoretical validity.
jTwo fundamental judgments of fact and policy underlay the
decision of the majority m P lcssy v. F ergu son . One was the
Court’s acceptance of the premise that, since “ [legislation is pow
erless to eradicate racial iititincts or to abolish distinctions based
upon physical d ifferen ces,it is impossible to eliminate segrega
tion founded in the “ usage£, customs and traditions” of the com
munity, arfd hence the Constitution must bow to the inevitable.
Tlp ̂ other^vwps the Court s«assumption that the wiser policy was
to det events /take their course and that governmental intervention
“cffn only result in accentuating the, difficulties of the present situ
ation.” ld3; U .S . at 550-2£• ‘ r* .*
.Over half '.a century has passed since the Court decided P lessy
v. ip erg us of 1, In these ye^rs much that was obscure about the
practice o£ segregation has become clarified. A s events have
unfolded, as', trends have ^become more distinct, as additional
knowledge has been gained,/the impact of segregation upon Am er
ica^ life has ̂ -emerged more clearly. Tn the light of these inter
vening developments, the b£sic judgments made by the Court in
P lessy v. F ergu son have proved to be erroneous. Indeed, far
frofn solving* Or even alleviating the problem of racial segregation
th^-decision of the Court hî s tended to intensify it and to create
conditions that threaten to itndermine the very structure of Am er
ican democratic society. I
V *■ - V
T .^The ju>dgnient of the-Court in Plessy v. Ferguson that
direct governmental intervention to eliminate segrega
tion is ineffective to overcome the prevailing customs of
the com/nunity has proved to be without foundation.
There are severe limitations, of course, upon the effectiveness
of (direct legal.compulsion td wipe out the gap that exists between•• •" ' >* .■
*
24
5
American theory and certain American practices in race relations.
But the fact is that the ideal of racial equality is a deeprooted
moral and political conviction of the American people. Decisions
of this Court upholding that conviction, therefore, cannot fail to
have a profound and far reaching effect upon the constant strug- ^
gle being waged between ideal and practice. And, conversely, j
a decision that fails to give support to that conviction must neces-
sarily have important depressing and retarding consequences. J
Ji
Experience has shown that this Court is not as impotent in the >
field of race relations as the majority in P lessy v. F ergu son
assumed. On the contrary every decision of this Court against v
racial discrimination has made a significant contribution toward' i
the achievement of racial equality.
Concrete evidence is available, for instance, that the decisions |*
of this Court in the white primary cases have not only eliminated 5
the institution of white primaries but have resulted in a substan- .
tial increase in Negro voting. V. O. Key, in his careful study
entitled S outhern P olitics, reports that except in four states of
the Deep South the decision in Sm ith v. A lhvriglit, 321 U.S. 649
(1 9 4 4 )t was accepted “ more or less as a matter of course.” 00 J*
Pointing out that the effect o f the decision was not felt until the- |
1946 primaries, he notes that “ Florida experienced a sharp in-' j.
crease in Negro registration after 1944” ; that “ [i]n 1946 the j'
voting status of Georgia Negroes changed radically,” the number-
of Negro registrants rising to an estimated 110,000; and that in
Texas, “ with a few scattered local exceptions, Negroes voted f.
without hindrance in the 1946 Democratic primaries.” 67 Key j,
reports that four states— South Carolina, Alabama, .Mississippi
and Georgia— made strenuous efforts to avoid the-effect of the
A lh vriglit case, but that these efforts were quickly nullified by the
courts in both South Carolina and Alabama. With respect to. 5
South Carolina he observes :
“ Negroes have encountered stubborn opposition to even t.
a gradual admission to Democratic primaries in South Caro-
« «K ev . Southern Politics (>25 (1049 ).
" ' Id ' at t>25. 519-521.
4
4
t
>i*.
v<• 25
f-r
i
* Ima. The last vestige: of the white primary was 'stricken
f, t,own oy? court action fn that state in 1948. Prior to that
; time virtually no Negroes voted in the primaries. About
> 35,000}-are reported to;have cast ballots in the 1948 prim-
.* ai>- 4
^hus it is iClear that judicial decisions have been a powerful
• influence in^assisting the N^gro to obtain the right of franchise.
I h^.decision of this Court i|i M organ v. V irgin ia , 328 TJ.S. 373
(19^6), has; made an important contribution to racial equality in
the.^ield ofyt^ansportation.°4' And evidence was offered in the
\ i,,st^nt case-showing that where segregation in the University
of $farylan(| Taw School wps ended by judicial compulsion the
subsequent experience was \yholly satisfactory.70
TJiat the majority in P lessy v. F ergu son greatly over-estimated
the practical difficulties of eliminating segregation through gov
ernmental action is likewise; apparent from the accumulation of
evidence in recent years that’discriminatory practices, long rooted
m tbe "usages, customs and traditions" of the community, can
be successfully eradicated. The President’s Committee on Civil
• Pigftts, in opt; of the most significant findings of its well-docu
mented repottc concludes: :
: »’• • f:
? reason and history were not enough to substantiate
pie argument against segregation, recent experiences further
strengthen it. For tlies^ experiences demonstrate that segre
gation i$ an obstacle to Establishing harmonious relationships
.simong groups. They pijove that where the artificial barriers
t hat divide people and groups from one another are broken,
tension and conflict begip to lie replaced by cooperative effort
and an environment in which civil rights"can thrive.’ ’71
___ 1 * /•
.<>8// • a* 522: : For a Till account of Negro voting and the white
primary litigation, see id. at 51 £ 2?. 019-43.' See also Murray (PM )
N ie h c g r o Handbook 48-53 (1949). It has been estimated that the
S n n i l ’° i o ^ ° eS registered| ° vote 1n the -South increased from' *J1.1,0©0 in 1940 Jo over 1.000.000 in 1948. Id. at 53.
<!!>Sye, e.g., uj. ‘at 94. v
This evidence waj excluded by the trial court.
W 'Rt e rt, o f- ? res,’dent’s Committee on Civil Rights To Secure
ThrsHRig/its 82+3 (1947). .1 ° £ r£
26
Specifically in the field of education I. E. Taylor,' after noting
the increase of Negro teachers in white colleges, observes:
“ Reports are coming in that Negro scholars are giving
a good account of themselves, that their students are enthu
siastic and open-minded, and that alumni and parents are
taking the situation calmly.’ ’72 73
The elimination of segregation in public housing raises issues
perhaps more difficult than those involved in its elimination from
higher education. Yet Charles Abrams, one of the country’s fore
most authorities on housing, writes :
“ Where Negroes are integrated with whites into self-
contained communities without segregation, reach daily con
tact with their co-tenants, are given the same privileges and
share the same responsibilities, initial latent tensions tend
to subside, differences become reconciled, cooperation en
sues and an environment is created in which interracial
harmony will be effected.
“ This conclusion is supported by many reports of housing
authorities who have ventured into mixed occupancy.” ™
Experience with the abandonment of segregation in the armed
services, again closely comparable with the situation in higher
education, has been similar. The report of the President’s Com
mittee on Civil Rights cites an illustration involving Negro and
white soldiers during the war :
“ The Negro soldiers were trained and organized into pla
toons, which were placed in regiments in eleven white com
bat divisions. For months the Negro and white.men in these
727aylor, N egro 1 cachcrs in W hite Colleges, (55 School and Society
369 (1947).
73Abrarns, Race Bias in Housing 22 (1947), pamphlet published
jointly by American Civil Liberties Union, National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People, and American Council on Race
Relations. For other accounts of the successful elimination of segre
gation in housing see Ottley, The Good-Neighbor Policy— A t H om e,
Common Ground, Summer 1942, p. 51; Manning and Phillips,
N egroes as Neighbors, 13 Common Sense 134 (1 9 4 4 ); Horne and
Robinson, Adult hducational Program s in H ousing P rojects with
N egro Tenants, 14 Jour. Negro Educ. 353 (1 9 4 5 ); Abrams, The
Segregation Threat in Housing, 7 Commentary 123 (1 9 4 9 ); Report
of President’s Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These Rights
85-7 (1947).
%V
I
27
* (,,v,slo^ s worked and fought side by side. Then, white offi-
■i “ r®;. t?0f C()nim1,SS,0nedI officers, and enlisted men. in seven
f 1 le> ^ V.ejl cilvls|ons' were interviewed. At least two of
£ thes* l ,v,s,1ons vvere composed of men who were predomi-
J nantly^uthern in background. It is surprising how little
• f 16 reS5?11Se ° f * lc‘se s9uthern men varied from that of men
% from cftlier parts of the* country.
f ,, “ T ^ o u t - o f every three white men admitted that at first
; J thfy hK , been «*>̂ vorftble to the idea of serving '.alongside
y ^reCi PIatoo,ls- r hr^e out of every four said that their
j fe.e nig$ toward the Negro soldiers had changed after serving ■ t with th-ehi m combat ” 7*- . eivlllg. H • • ►
following tip the recommendations of his Committee, Presi-
' (,eu| Trum^ii-un July, 1948,;issued an Executive Order '.stating:
K l Z Jt A Snrf by decliare4 to be the policy of the President that
£ there shall be equality-pf treatment and opportunity for all
> pei sons in the armed services Without regard to race color
^religiop or national origin. This policy shall be put into
£ effect as. rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time
£ required to effectuate arty necessary changes without impair
in g efficiency or morale^75 •' . 1
j ** t /. ... .
Experience-with governmental efforts to eliminate segregation
m anploymertt points consistently to the same conclusion. The
hai£ Employnjent Practice Committee, established during the war
to E>fomote Equality of all i»ces in employment, summarizes its
experience of dive years in its final report:
E "Tw o "fundamentally; hopeful facts developed out of the
^ w ork eT ""1 S eff° rtS t0; ° l>e" war ti,,,e opportunities to all
«V ’ , *
1. Employees and workers abandoned discrimination in
•?, most cases where Government intervened.
“ 2. Once the barriers were down, the workers of varying
raqes and religions worked together efficiently and
* learned to accept-each other without rancor ” 7(V
------ I------ ; *
% s r m ' <,cpcmiei,ce a" d —
° r- <f :)98 , » F od - Reg. 4313 (1 3 4 8 ).
n J ; rFair-rFniPl:>yment Practice Committee, Final Report viii
at 3^G 1 °* \KSCUSSIOn of ^ PC experience in the South see id.
28
The history of state fair employment statutes shows the same
results. Says a member of the New York State Commission
Against Discrimination :
“ Critics of fair-employment laws used to claim that long-
established habits o f discrimination could not.be changed by
legislation. Their argument has been unmistakably an
swered today. Nearly four years experience in New York—
and similar experience in New Jersey, Massachusetts, Con
necticut. Washington, Oregon, New Mexico and Rhode Is
land, all of which have passed anti-discrimination legislation
modeled after the New York law— indicates conclusively that
wise legislation creates a climate of opinion, in which dis
crimination tends to disappear.” 77 78
Where private management has seriously undertaken to elim
inate discrimination in employment it has been successful. The
American Management Association reports :
“ In the face of many objections to the use of Negro labor,
there are the incontrovertible evidences of companies, large
and small, which are hiring qualified Negroes for operations
requiring varying levels of skill— and doing so with marked
success . . . .
“ Manv of the plants now making use of colored personnel
have no previous history of Negro employment . . .
These plants are scattered all over the country . . . .
“ It is evident that, irrespective of a company’s past history
or its geographical location, Negro workers can be intro
duced into a plant, or their employment extended, provided
management is sincerely desirous of taking this course.” ,H
77Simon, Causes and Cure o f Discrimination, N. Y . Times, May
25), 15)45), § 0, p. 10 at p. 35. Cf. Ross, Tolerance by Lazo, 15)5 Harp
er’s Mag. 458 ( 15)47): “Two years of state FEPC’s have done
more to end job discrimination than fifty years of private agitation,
good-will conferences and educational campaigning.” See also N. Y.
State Commission Against Discrimination, 1948 R eport o f Progress
11-12; Comment, 50 Yale L. J. 837 (1 9 4 7 ); NoPthrup, Proving
Ground fo r Pair E m ploym ent, 4 Commentary 552 (15)47).
78American Management Association, The N egro W orker 9-11
(15)42). Among many other accounts of successful integration of
Negro and white workers see Commission on Discrimination in
Employment, N. Y. State War Council, Breaking Dozvn the Color
Line, 32 Management Review 174 (1943) ; Newman, A n E xperi
ment in Industrial D em ocracy, 22 Opportunity 52 (1944) ; Gillmor
29
?. Thus,Our present dayjexperience demonstrates that elimination
*>* patterns of segregation is not only feasible but is rapidly going
forward?under government sponsorship. As the American Civil
^Liberties Union has pointed out in its most recent survey o f the
.̂ status of civil liberties inf the United States, “ race equality under
|faw advances steadily.” 7®. And again, “ [t]he gathering momen
tum of tfre-many-sided movements to extend the rights of Negroes
Hvas expressed in numerous court cases, legislation, administrative
jrules, apd; liberalized policies in quasi-public organizations.” 80
fThe assumption of the majority in I?lossy v. F erg u son that strict
Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment in accordance with
its origifial put poses could not be made effective by governmental
fiction has simply not been borne out by the actual developments,
ft is in this new atmosphere of progress that this Court should
f°w reconsider the issues raised1- by the instant case.
*
2; Patterns of segregation hav.e not tended to produce har-
y monibus relations between - races, as the Court assumed
v in Plessy v. Ferguscpi, but have increased tensions and
1 become progressively destructive of the democratic proc-
J. ess in. the United States.
>It was the judgment of (he majority in P lessy v. F ergu son that
tl̂ e institution of segregation was better left .alone, that judicial
iiftei ventibii under the Fourteenth Amendment would accentuate
tlje difficulties. Clearly implied was the notion that harmonious
relations would gradually evolve by a process of mutual adjust
ment. • ;• .
—i?---------- • *.
(presi d c nCof Sperry Gyroscope Co. j. Can the N egro H old'H is Job?
National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peonle
Rulletm 3-4 .(Sept. 1344V; Ross. They Did I, Id SL Louis, 4 Con,-
”]$ntary T ( l l )4 7 ) . With regard to the successful integration of
Nggro and; white workers irt labor unions see Bel Ison, Labor Gains
On the Coast- 17 Opportunity 142 (11)3!)) ; Sweetland, The C IO and
Negro Am erican, 20 Opportunity 21)2 (11)42).
LibertieSi Unbn’ 2nih Ann- ReP- !n the Shadow
*?Id. at 29.: !
30
Mr. Justice Harlan, with remarkable insight, understood that
the majority’s hope could not he realized :
“ The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not
only stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and irritat
ing. upon the admitted rights of colored citizens, but will
encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state
enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes which the
people of the United States had in view when they adopted
the recent amendments of the Constitution . . . . The.
destinies of the two races, in this country, are indissolubly
linked together, and the interests of both require that the
common government of all shall not permit the seeds of race
hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What can more
certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly- create and
perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state
enactments which, in fact, proceed on the ground.that colored
citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be
allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens?"
(163 U.S. at 560).
Events have proved that Justice Harlan was right and the
majority of the Court wrong.
The effects of segregation upon the group segregated have
recently been summarized :
“ Every authority on psychology and sociology is agreed
that the students subjected to discrimination and segregation
are profoundly affected by this experience . . . . Experi
ence with segregation of Negroes has shown that adjustments
may take the form of acceptance, avoidance, direct hostility
and aggression, and indirect or deflected hostility. In seek
ing self-expression and finding it blocked by the practices of
a society accepting segregation, the child may express hatred
or rage which in turn may result in a distortion of normal
social behavior by the creation of the defense mechanism of
secrecy. The effects of a dual school system force a sense
of limitations upon the child, and destroy incentives, produce
a sense of inferiority, give rise to mechanisms of escape in
fantasy, and discourage racial self-appreciation.” 81
8:1 Note, HO Yale L. j . 1059, 10G1-2 (1947), citing numerous scien
tific authorities in support of the statement.
31
•A1
I
"■ ,hl v e C° nsj ^ e,nces fse^ ation »“ ‘ I'e group that maintains .. Ine Segregation have been described by Myrdal :
x- Segregation and discrimination have had ,
w f e m £ k % h a t WtiiteS’t T 1' H° ° kcr T - Washington's fan,:
Vnh ,e ? 7 7 Witl,OUt in there himself. {,‘L been
1 ierSb° » f 1d -:by n,any white Soother., and Northern observ-
T|e psychological and sociological data showing the effects of-
segregation uppn both group* and the serious tensions it creates'
;n d| community at large hive been presented to the Court in
IN ?2S ^ V e m'"1” 1 St^ S v, United States
:-n 'b ‘ Vi Ĉ °'-er Term ’ I9f J) as well as by petitionee in this
.jj ihere .IS no need tojrovicw these materials here The
P-ntfwe wish to emphasize'is that a satisfactory adjustment
t c T I" ! * T HaS " 0t achieve<1 ‘ hrougb governmental
f . ‘ . ? t0'Var<1 segregation.| On the contrary, the continued
xis ejice of segregation has ^perpetuated and strengthened the
grave>maladjustments inherent in the system.
4
_ Myida! one of the most discerning students of the problem,
has pointed this otit, noting that what was merely segregation
forty ^ears ago is becoming a.CaMc system today: .
whhT earhmSetl'al e5 “ tSf ° f seSregation are accumulating
groups.”8* V w gene,atlor| continuously estranging the two
M fylyrdal, A n American Diltynma G43-4 ( 1 9 4 4 ).
s a r i ly 'i lp T e ^ d i1 h lfer io r itv o T J 0* * " 6 V ? " mt neccs-
( « c i lb e »Pcan in f e c t „ e ^ be group and that separate
referred to. see the a , „ i i ! ' uJt̂ L ', 1,1 <t'?n to the two briefs
Color, 4 2 ) nepna" °^Educatio m
(hlM ) |Note, Yale L. j . 478 f m ! / ) 1 D tvt™ W h t,e R ight
6« - 80^ yrdal’ 4* A m erkm l Dilemma (148 ( 11144). See also id. at* T . S
*
32
The process has recently been described by M aclver:
“ Now let us consider more clearly the manner in which
the conditions that are confirmed or imposed by discrimina
tion operate to sustain it. The discriminating group starts
with an advantage. It has greater power, socially and polit
ically, and usually it has a superior economic position. Thus
it is enabled to discriminate. By discriminating it cuts the
other group off from economic and social opportunities.
The subordination of the lower group gives the upper group
a new consciousness of its superiority. This psychological
reinforcement of discrimination is in turn ratified by the
factual evidences of inferiority that accompany the lack of
opportunity, by the mean and miserable state of those who
live and breed in poverty, who suffer constant frustration,
who have no incentive to improve their lot, and who feel
themselves to be outcasts of society. Thus discrimination
evokes both attitudes and modes of life favorable to its per
petuation, not only in the upper group, but to a considerable
extent, in the lower group as well. A total tipper caste covt-
plex, congenial to discrimination, a complex of attitudes, in
terests, modes of living, and habits of power is developed
and institutionalized, having as its counterpart a lozver caste
com p lex of modes of living, habits of subservience, and cor
responding attitudes.” 85
Thus the problems created by segregation are not solved by
themselves or by the natural processes of the community upon
which it has fastened its hold. Quite the contrary, segregation
tends to feed upon itself and grow increasingly malignant. It is
truly a cancer in our society, progressively threatening the health
and very life of democracy. The real nature of segregation was
not grasped by the majority in P lcssy v. F ergu son .
3. This Court has ultimate responsibility, under the Con
stitution, to review the factual and policy judgment of
the Texas legislature in this situation.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that it could not recon
sider the legal merits of segregation as that topic was “ outside
the judicial function. The people of Texas, through their consti-
8r,Maclver, The M ore P er fec t Union 67-8 (1948).
•;
J-j
hf
*
\ 33
tutional arid;legislative enactments, have determined that policy,
' ^ ses ° £ whicll* are not subjects of judicial review/ RM50. I
. . . . C * V
• ®his is svfong. Texas cannot turn into a matter of fact or of
: lo^l judgment the expressed principle of the federal Constitution
; th$t the rights of citizens of the United States are not dependent
; uP̂ n race>v creed, or colori No subject is more fit foi* judicial
’• ref?ew’ an^ £trict judicial review, than conduct which strikes at
the heart of the democratic process.- Mr. Justice Stone, in United
States v. Carotene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938), sug-
f f j S t,lat flose scrutiny is^necessary in “ the review o f statutes
V directed at .particular religious . . . or national Gr
racial minorities"; for the prejudice against discrete and insular
; mr̂ orit,f s be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtad the pperation of thofe political processes ordinarily to be
. 16 fd upon to protect .n ineties, and which may call for corre-
spQfid.ngly more searching Judicial inquiry." And see W e s t V ir
ginal State.B-d. v. B arnett, 3 19 U .S . 624, 638 (1 9 4 3 )
th e institution of segrega|ion is designed to maintain the N e «ro
T l ” ' 3 |)0S“ '.0n ° [ '"feriovity. It drastically fetards Ids educa-
I t ? ' • T 11 POMtica1 ‘ '^ lop m en t and prevents him from
fc.smg Ins rightful powers as a Citizen. It creates maladjust
ments and tensions which sap the vitality of our society, M „re-
verv e I* t0, ? r lf> ° pera^ S t0 stre" g ‘ h«> and accentuate the
' s u b le t 3 Wjl!ch need to be-combatted. T o this extent it is not
o l ' o r T 7 T n° rma' m ethods:o f ‘ be' political
oqess. Op the other hand; judicial action to wipe out segrern-
hon,:has proved entirely practical and effective. : In the - ligh t^ f
h ^ c i r c u n ^ n c e s , not knofvn to or recognized by the n u ^ n t y
■ V ’ Ferguson ,the Court should not hesitate to strike down
• e practice.as plainly violatfve o f the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of.equal protection;
III.
SE G R EG ATIO N SH O U LD N O T BE E X T E N D E D TO
E D U C A T IO N .
1. The precedents do not uphold segregated education.
P lessy v. F erg u son involved segregation on common carriers
and carefully did not endorse segregation generally. It was urged
in argument that if segregation on carriers were' valid, states
might require white and colored persons to use different sides of
the street, or paint their house or business signs different colors,
on the ground that one side of the street or one color was as good
as another. Such action, the Court said, would be invalid, holding
that even segregation must be “ reasonable.” 163 U.S. at 550.
Though this Court has held that segregation of whites and
Negroes in different blocks in a city is unreasonable, Buchanan v.
IV arIcy, 245 U.S. 60 ( 1917), it has never squarely faced the ques
tion whether segregation in education is unreasonable. If segre
gation laws are to be permitted in the casual affairs of life, such
as i iding on street-cars, but are to be invalidated when applied
to such fundamental matters as establishing a home, the question
becomes whether the undisputed right to equal education falls
within the first category or the second.
This is not to say that the problem of the validity of segrega
tion in education has never been referred to in the opinions of
this Com t, but rather that it has never been seriously argued or
deliberately considered. In B erea C ollege v. K en tu ck y , 211 U.S.
45 (1908), the issue was the validity of a Kentucky statute for
bidding the teaching of Negroes and whites in the same college.
The sole question raised and decided was that such a statute was
not a violation o f due process as an interference Vvith the prop-
erty rights of the educational corporation. The question of the
rights of individuals was carefully put aside (id . at 54) and
the equal protection problem was not involved. In C um m inq v.
R ich m on d C ou n ty B d., 175 U.S. 528, 543 (1899), the Court in
so many words excluded the legality of segregation in education
from its decision. Yet in G on g L u m v. R ice , 275 U.S. 78 ( 1927),
34
'1
"l ■ j
.4
35
*
■J
\1
, H
X v ;
i •
: S r . U ' s i ’ s - c l r i " •• '* « « » - . . . ™ ,,,<
: b a le prob, ^ th“ ‘ ' ! *
: wa|. neither.: involved i„ J >
•■•* t : ™ ^ is co,,sf utio^ -
\ had*been "S ta in e d bv } ’ m - “ T that segregated education• sustained by oundecisions.” But the mcec 1 1 ,
nothin fact considered the precise point and that n” t r
.: inv| ved in- tile G am es case* which decided only whether aV Ir-
lcuar ypevdf separation iij education was “ equal “ Nr 1 •
Stpuel v. A d o f Recants ?3 3? 7 r c n , Nor does/igksn 0 , a y regents, 444 U.S. 631, and 333 l/ S 147
add anything on thfe point ’ ' 4 /> • -v •
2. lender the rule of reason created by the precedent
Ration is hnreasonable.f 7 pWedents? SG8 ^
If we accept arguendo the- P lcsrv case with
tween “ reasonable” and “ unreasonable” [ , T <1,St,nct.,0n he“
niusf place legrefrated erhi V • ypes of. segregation, weVI cxrr, aegicgated education m the catecro,- ̂ nr ' «<sonable ” Sefn-eo-nmn < i . categoiy of the “ unrea-
¥ et,ated transportation is at lea?(■ d ci, * 1■ tion;> and it; is fairly S , least oi shorter dura-
alternatives m :.transportation|re hTfact em r.^Se' T T ' ” ’tion has more severe i , 1 ■ 'Segregated educa-
elfects. . * * * * * *
fact to secure hr police that^uaHtv I * »"
Rights reported : f 1 tsl(lent s Commutee on Civil
. as *<> <*•- p« m4 serv.
|as not been obeyed £
$nce in quality between the erl„,~,f inaiked differ-
White children and N egro d,i WrCn In’ ? ' (?|,R0rt,,n,li“ offered >-l___ : ^ iqc im ciien m (lie separate schools.” 80. t— — ; I , v* v »• v. i n /i /i o,
S Co™nilttee on Civil Rights, To Secure
36
Even beyond this, however, there is compelling reason— a rea
son which goes to the heart of democratic principles of educa
tion— for not extending P lessy v. F ergu son to the field of educa
tion. This may be briefly stated :
( 1 ) A democratic society, like any other, seeks: to transmit
its cultural heritage, traditions and aspirations from generation
to generation.87 W hile there are many instruments (or transmis
sion of culture— the family, the church, business institutions,
political and social groups and the schools88— in our society the
school seems to have emerged as the most important.80 This was
to be expected from the fact that in a democracy citizens from
every group, no matter what their social or economic status or
their religious or ethnic origins, are expected to participate widely
in the making o f important public decisions. The public school,
unlike the family and other narrower institutions, has thus be
come the logical agency for giving to all people that broad back
ground of attitudes and skills which should enable them to func
tion effectively as participants in a democracy.
Indeed, this consideration lay behind the whole movement
for free compulsory public education. Thus Jefferson stated:
“ Even under the best forms [of government] those intrusted with
power have, in time and by slow operations, perverted it into
tyranny; and it is believed that the most effectual means of pre
venting this would be to illuminate, so far as practicable, the
minds of the people at large . . . .” 00 Furthermore, Horace
Mann and many others who fought for free public education
valued it as an instrument for eliminating the class structure
in education, namely the segregation of the rich from the poor,
which bred undemocratic attitudes and habits of life. By the
same token, opponents of free public education were frequently
87P>enedict, Transmitting our Democratic Heritage in the Schools,
48 Am. Jour. Sociol. 722 (1943), reprinted in Lee and Lee, Social
Problem s in Am erica 297 (1949). ;
88Myers and Williams, Education in a D em ocracy 164-227 (1942).
8nMerriam, The M aking o f Citizens 88-89, 211-2, 273-4 (1931).
00Quoted in Curti, The Social Ideas o f Americcm Educators 3
(1935).
s
K*
y
; tho^ who Ueheved in government by the elite and had little faith
' 1,1 the full development of democracy.01
(| ) Just as the principle of free public education' was the
. first| important step in realizing democratic objectives through
v ourjeducatioi>al system, ŝ r completely non-segregated. public
■i ecIû tion is an essential element in reaching that goal. If children
. hav4 race superiority taught them as infants, we ’ cannot
; exp^tt them\li£htly to toss it’aside in later life. .The answer lies
: not, ^however,'in simply indoctrinating them with the principle
of racial equality. Modern educational theory, formulated in an
swer: to the need of our society for self-reliant individuals; volun
tarily cooperating with otherjs to meet the everchanging scene in
our ^dynamic ^civilization,02 ^postulates a more thoroughgoing
solution. Apcprding to this Theory, education “ is a continuous
process from, the beginning to the end of life” , and it is a “ con-
tinuops reconstruction of e?qperience.” 03 That is to say, each
••new ^hing leiarfied is assimilated to some previous thing learned,
■and the new-ip in part conditioned by the old. “ Education in
America must .’be education |pr democracy. If education is life
and growth, : then it must b$ life within a social group
Schools must be democratic ^communities wherein children live
natural, democratic lives with their companions and grow into
■ adulthood wiilv good citizenship a part of their experience.” 04
(3 i This, ihodern educational theory of learning by doing,
clearly implie^ the necessity ©f non-segregated education. The
principle of equality of opportunity regardless of race or creed,
-------------- ‘;4
01/<£ at l()l-g(k). |
: 02s ê RenedW ap. cit. suprek note 87; Kallen, The Education o f
Free M en cc. 40 11, 12, 15 (lfS4‘J ) ; Kilpatrick (E d .), The
ttonal thronHerr c. 2 (1933 ) ; Tire President’s Commission of Higher
iulucalion, 1 H igher Education',for American Dem ocracy 5-9, 101-2
(1947); 2 idA3b 9 ; Brubacher,^M odern Philosophies o f Education
c. 14 (*1939). f t
»^Fmsier and .Armentrout, A n Introduction to Education 3l 33
(3d ed. 1933)... i x
_ 04/rfT; at 32. ; See also Brubacher, op. cit. supra note 92 at 330-1 •
Deweys Dem ocracy and Education (19 If,) ; Mayo, The Human P ro b
lems df an Industrial Civilization (1 9 3 3 ); Lewin, Resolvinq Social
Conflicts c. 5 (1948). if ‘
38
so much a part of our American tradition, can be fully achieved .
only if this element in our cultural heritage is kept alive and
allowed to grow. The school, as has been shown, is the most
important institution through which this heritage can be trans
mitted. But, as has likewise been made clear, proper teaching ?
of the principle of equality of opportunity requires more than
mere inculcation of the democratic ideal. W hat is essential is
the opportunity, at least in the school, to practice it. This requires
that the school make possible continuous actual experience of '
harmonious cooperation between members of various ethnic and
religious groups and thus produce attitudes of tolerance and
mutual sharing that will continue in later life.05 In the segre- .
gated school, this desirable environment does not exist. The
most important instrument for teaching democracy to all people
is thus rendered impotent.
Even for those who believe in the policy behind P lcssy v. Per- '
guson , that it is impractical to eliminate segregation in all areas
of our culture at once, education has usually been the logical step
for achieving our ideal of true equality. Since segregated educa
tion cannot be effective education for equality, the principle <>f
P lessy v. F erg u son should not be extended to the schools.
IV .
EQUAL FACILITIES FOR LEGAL E D U C ATIO N HAVE
N O T IN FAC T BEEN OFFERED TO S W E A TT AND,
INDEED, SEGREGATED LEGAL E D U C ATIO N CANNO T .
U ND ER A N Y CIRCUMSTANCES AFFORD EQUAl
FACILITIES. HENCE PETIT IO N E R HAS BEEN DENIED
EQUAL PR O TE C TIO N EVEN W IT H IN TH E BROADEST
A P P L IC A T IO N OF PLESSY V. FERGUSON.
Up to this point we have challenged the legality of segregai'n-n.
generally, and particularly in education. But it is perhaps no •
necessary to go so far. Petitioner wants to go to the Universe \
or,See Knllen. The Fducation o f Free M en 182-4 ct passim ( HUM1
Maclver, Flic M ore P erfect Union c. 9 (1!)48) ; Ncwlon, Fnhicnti-'" • .
fo r Dem ocracy in Our Time 92-103 (1939).
39
.*r
. >
s f
V I
r<
f
■ftt
v
>
*4
*
*
f % ■
*»
rt<r
l
. •* ; /
of Te^as Law School. The courts u '■
the segregated school is “ separate but equal” a n ^ t h T l1' ^ ! ‘ 'lat
imate, We contend that Texas his nri i r ’ t-lerefore/ Ie8'»t-
gated.’ law school for rNegroes which is ” T Cr̂ ated a se£'*e-
schooj, - and indeed that it is • s .-equal to ;its white law
school to afford opportunities * *
unseg^ated school. } ** education, equal to an
Wer a ,e sa fe,r w i t h in tire boundaries
nort -Tn ■ y V- I ^becomes ou r d irect s „ „
0 P°t J " 7 ,n terP re*?tion , that case requ ires enuahtv i f ‘
• gatlorti «?. to be permitted, and w e contend that T ■ ^
1 could not possib ly be Q u a lit y here. 18 " 0t and
I c - d J c a S a r never S t T T n 'T - ^ UCat,'° n ^ d s '- e q u a .
i case. 305 U S . 3^7 n 9381 1 7 th’? C° Urt' 111 *he
l Negroes ‘ in Missouri, ihd th e 'c o iu -r ^ h e -^ f^ 1 educati° n offered
7 hold otily as it did ’ lei e ôre- was required to
l T J ... w' M04«V;- vi • • -■ ̂tate- f ’1 the S ipu e l case 332 17 9 \
t l T ^ L 7 i0 n ty * * " " ,hat " ,e 'll*estion w h e t h e r " ™ ’
f a t : WOS ° r Cf " d be was not properly presented
?.«3 u M ’147 °i 5? fU4 ‘eirCT ,<,er 1 SUb n ° W' F 'SKer V'
.Jbretlirerif on the p 'rw edukM w R" t'7 Jge; disagreed with his
ewe have: here. Mr Justice Rnrt f lus reached the question
?tr<|i,iredlis. “equality in I , gC ° bserved ‘ hat the equality• - . y ̂ inct, not in leeal fiction n t ■ i
*c|>orate;1a,w school coultf he established e ls e t 0b v ,m '-sly no
Able of gliding petitioner i . elsewhere overnight cap-
k S S K C E S ft .fS u ’ s t " ‘ “ •* "•
f ....« ^ ^ E ^ y r n K S & 5 3 i"::-;:
♦
Its lack of the attributes of equality is shown particularly by the
testimony of former Dean Earl Harrison of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School (R . 216-23) and Professor Malcolm
Sharp of the University of Chicago Law School (R .. 341-51).
Petitioner’s right to a completely equal legal education is not
met if at some future time some other Negro might be able to
get equal education in Texas. The decisions establish that peti
tioner’s right is “ a personal one.” State o f M issou ri e x rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 351 (1938). “ The equal protection
clause of the United States Constitution does not refer to rights
of the Negro race, the Caucasion race, or any other race, but
to the rights o f individuals.” P eres v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711,
716, 198 P. 2d 17, 20 (1948). See also M cC a b e v. A tch ison ,
T opeka & Santa. F e, 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
The application o f this familiar principle means that Texas
must give Sweatt the opportunity for education “ in conformity
with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other
group.” Sipuel v. Bd. o f R eg en ts , 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948).
Sweatt cannot possibly obtain the equal education to which he
is entitled in the special institution set up under the pressure of
this case.
This judgment requires us to compare law schools, a very
special kind of educational comparison. Grade schools and high
schools perhaps can be compared on the basis of physical plant,
or teachers’ salaries, or types of plumbing, or number of students
in the class, or variety of courses offered;96 but these mechanical
approaches to legal education tell only a partial story;. The neces
sary inequality of Texas (colored) is accentuated by;factors pecu
liar to legal education and the standards applicable to grade schools
or high schools have little relevance in such comparison. Some
of the inequalities in the instant case are also the product of the
°'iIrnr a collection of cases decided for and against Negroes in
terms of size of school, value of school property, location of school,
length of term, number of teachers, etc., see 103 A.L.R. 713. bor
a similar approach by Texas in this case, see R. 78.
40
\extremely small size of the School which Texas would require
Sweactt to attend (R . 7 7 ) .
(1|) Faculty size is not the exclusive measure of a law school,
certainly not-where the number of teachers is reasonably large!
:.But f^e sizeyhas great relevance when it is very small. 'Texas
Tont^nplates^a faculty of only four at Texas (colored) (R ' 454)
.•but ipts 28 - faculty members for the current year at Texas
.(whife).07 Although fewer faculty members'may. be able to give
;fewe^-students-at the Negro school a greater proportion of time,
. 't w ij be the.'-time of a jack-6f-all-trades— not a specialist.- Nor
will the studeht have the benefit of the different faculty viewpoints
•so beneficial to; the law studeiit
;; 5 ; . •. > <
' ( 2) Apa^t .from the faculty size, faculty quality at Texas
•.(colofed) wigj hot be equal, .fl'he primary and secondary school
•rases *ci ted a|ove compare teachers as so many .interchangeable
units pf educational machinery^Assuming arguendo the validity of
that approadhto grade schools* law teachers are not thus fungible,
justice Jackson put it well when lie said, “ Nothing, not even an
alluripg new Curriculum, can it a ke the place-of a sagacious and
imaginative teacher. He can impart a. sense of the- movement and
function o f la>v'which is needed as part of the study of each field
of law-.’’08 ’ r- .;
**• . / . •
Ver̂ y srnalh schools lack the inducements of those somewhat
largeiito obtain professors o f equal distinction. There is little
possibility of encountering a number of interested and interesting
Students in sd small a school., l ienee, the range, of educational
experimentation desired by the able teacher is virtually non-exis-
t-ent. ^-Development of the teacher’s professional reputation turns
upon fis achievement of recognition as an authority in a special
--------£— -4 - ..
P nm ?nC\iatTiri;'of American Law Schools, Teachers’ D irectory 2!)
•H* 4’r?,V '- mim,\er vvas 21 this record was made ( R. 309).
Lhe Bulletin of the Texas State University for Negroes, School of
Law 4; (1949-50) lists six faculty members, including the librarian
at 1 exas (colored). It does not appear whether these are full-time
nr part-time faculty members. V
.. "8JaCkson, T h e Product o f Our Present-D ay Lazo Schools, 9 Am
Law School Rev. 370, 375 (1939.).
*
field. The small library and the elimination of an opportunity
for sufficient specialization keeps the best prospective teachers—
.— usually— from staying in the smallest schools if they go to them
at all.09 The University of Texas has many professors with
names great in legal education. It is beyond belief that Texas
(colored) can at any time in the predictable future acquire the
services o f their equals. Certainly it will not be done within a
period of time meaningful to Sweatt.
(3 ) A minimal faculty results in minimal course offerings at
the colored school. Well-staffed Texas (white) offered 75 courses
for the two semesters of the current academic -• year; Texas
(colored) can offer no such variety.100
(4 ) All these inequalities are accentuated by the lack of other
facilities inevitably resulting from the exorbitant cost of attempt
ing to furnish duplicate opportunities. This is well exemplified
by differences in the library, the heart of the modern law school.
The Austin School has 65,000 volumes of which 30,000 to 35,000
are not duplicates (R . 455-6). Texas is obtaining for its colored
school 10,000 volumes, the bare minimum permitted by the Amer
ican Law School Association (R . 456).101 On the basis of pre-war
price standards it would cost the state of Texas something over
$100,000 to obtain a library for the colored school equivalent in
size to the non-duplicate list of the white school.102 This- is
$100,000 which Texas shows no present intention of spending,
’“'These problems are well discussed by Dean B. F. Boyer, Uni
versity of Kansas City Law School, The Smaller Laav Schools, 9 Am.
Law School Rev. 1499 (1942). '
’ “"University of Texas L w School Catalogue 2o et seq. (Aug. 1.
1948). The Bulletin of the Texas State University for Negroes.
supra note 97 at 14-17. lists 39 courses for the two semesters. In
making this calculation we have taken the course headings, as listed
in the catalogues, as constituting a “course."
101The Bulletin of the Texas State University for Negroes, supra
note 97 at 5. states that the library of Texas (colored) now contains
23.000 volumes. The number of duplicates does not appear.
1,1-The calculation is based on Moylan. Selected List o f Books . for
the Small Laic School Library, 9 Am. L w School Rev. 469 ( 1939).
and the testimony of Hargraves, librarian of the University of Tcx.o
law school (R. 142).
42
•ft
1
.
*■
t.
43
and is a practical matter onl| a large staff o f diligent librarians
rou!(£ find such'a collection o f books in any short, time. Without
: suchja library,-the kind and Quality of research experience given
Sweitt will he far inferior to that given the white citizens of
. Tex£$. i i: .
s v•j, • • I
( >) bex^s (colored) giv£s its graduates an economic oppor
tunity inferior to that of the graduates of the University at Austin,
tn addition tetany economic^ difficulties Sweatt .may meet as a
: he wquld acquire an unequal professional standing by grad-'
’ uatidft from 3; segregated law'School. Professional careers are seri
ouslŷ ’affected-by the repute pi which the school is held by the
: profession at large. Moreover, Texas (colored) is a raw, new in-'
•; stitufion not Only without prestige but without alumni. Texas thus
deprives SwCaft of placement Opportunities given to the graduates
-of the old, established school.*08 Assistance of this kind is most
yimportant in.; the present situation o f the Texas bar for ,:-in the’
worc^ of the Assistant Dean; of Texas (w hite): “ It is obviOus
that the existing firms will not be able to absorb the great number
of m^n being;graduated from;'.the law schools in Texas.” 104 The
placement efforts of 1 exas (white) based, as they must be, upon
• the loyalty o f alumni and the established reputation o f the institu
tion Emphasize, the inequality, o f opportunity Texas would give
Sweatt. • >
(6;) Work.'on a law review is considered a desirable part of the
training o f good law students. The University at Austin has
an excellent review on which its students rnay aspire to, seiWe.
Texag (colored) cannot have:'a law review for lack of a sufficient
number of tbfi'notch student^ to man it. (Cf. R 105 310-3
M 7 . f ^ *
■
Associate Dean James P. -Gifford, Columbia University :School
-.of LaW, in an. extensive report on placement method observed,. “ Prac
tically all schools use their alumni as sources of information about
openings.” 9-Am. Law School.Rev. 1063. 1066 (1941). Dean Gif
ford .also discussed the value df moot 'courts, dinners, and speeches
as pl^yement aids. ’
104l2 Texas.-IJar Journal 208 f 1949).
•t
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(7 ) The training of moot court work depends in great mean-
lire on the quality of competition among groups of students. iVbw.t
court activities at Austin are based on such competition (R . HU)
Substantial numbers are necessary to create satisfactory competi
tive groups.
(8 ) Finally, that part of a legal education which results from
doing lawyer’s work in a legal aid clinic requires for successful
operation a sufficient number of competent students to manage
and supervise the novices.1011
And yet, if by some miracle Texas could surmount all these
obstacles, it would still not create an equal opportunity for legal
education. If it assembled a staff of the greatest teachers in Amer
ica ; if it spent a large sum to create an equal library;.if it afforded
equal placement opportunities for every graduate; if it overcame
every other difficulty, Texas (colored) would still not be equal.
For the segregated plan misses the whole purpose o f a modern
law school.
The lawyer, to meet the responsibilities of his profession, must
have a vital sense of the culture of the community in which lie
lives and works. “ Lawyers are perpetually engaged in trying to
anticipate, prevent, mediate, settle or win human disagreements
involving alleged rights recognized at law. Their thinking, plan
ning and action are framed and limited by what they understand
to be the prevailing principles and doctrines of law— what the
judges, or legislatures have decided in like situations before or,
more accurately, what they guess judges or legislatures would
decide in like situations tomorrow.” * 100 The knowledge required
for these tasks can in part be obtained from books; but a major
share must come from intimate knowledge of the ways of thought
o f the community. “ Tie (the lawyer) is literally lost unless he
10r,For a description of the work of the Texas (white) legal aid
program see Patterson, The Legal Aid Clinic, 21 Tex. L. Rev. 423
420-9 (1943). The Bulletin of the Texas State University for
Negroes, supra ̂note 97 at 7, states that a legal aid clinic has been
established at Texas (colored).
100Rostow, Liberal Education and the Laws: Preparing Lawyers for
Their W ork in Our Society, 35 A.B.A. Jour. 626, 628 (1949).
44
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.•45
f . " 4 S e ‘ hH aWves, interests* (and weaknesses) of those ̂ with
^ “X ^ ’F Whe‘her “ Wit ’eSSeS’ 'leKOtiat0rS- Clients,
r ,,c*ce Jt isiimportant that .{he lawyer receive hi, ft- • •
ll'.- group with Which he is toSlive and to practice I , / ' " " ? -
of 1 railing in,- legal ethics, which is one part of this
proceŝ , LloydJOarrison ha., c u r v e d : ‘ ^ n,n*
! t& ' sfudel; f e T ’to ' ' ‘{ f t a" d P1̂ 5"* fields
i fS lfe H llI? = 3
i Ip s p & s s s ii
ai|j characttji shine the most luminously.” 108 ^
: The|student: at Texas (white) will hnhihe the lessons' not
■ mly o f character, hut of the knowledge of human beings fr6m a
p ,aT r portP ' of that "cross-section of his contemporaries"
' c^ 'cl anyjstndent at a segregated school. In classifying the
■ indents at the,two schools by the test of color, Texas effectively
t immates much o f the cross-fertilization of ideas. When a laW
Student,,s forced, to study and talk the shop talk q { justice and
equity with a segregated handful, he is circumscribed in the effort
fe'T 1«Srf %ny ?'e?1 u,lderstancl"ljt of justice or equity. At Texas
(colore^) Sweaty will lose the (opportunity of exchanging ideas
t -com plete .variety of felfcw students. He will thus lose
ius icei ef 0ff ? ntm,ty t0 ^ sp rb those received traditions of
justice-^nd fairness on which Texas law, like the rest of the Anglo*
i07/c/.'at G29.
108G a
,r
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American law, is based.100 The attorney uncultivated in the
traditions of justice and fairness is handicapped in advising clients
or in dealing with attorneys and judges who are a part of the
broad stream of Texas jurisprudence deepened as a result of the
years of group association at the Austin school.
This lack of opportunity for full discussion with a group of
completely divergent views has other and more technical aspects.
Classes themselves must be large enough for presentation and
discussion of divergencies. This does not mean that classes must
be large in an absolute sense, but Texas (colored) cannot measure
up for two reasons: (a ) there must be at least enough students
to make a sample large enough to include a few good ones; and
(b ) there must be in the group a divergency of points of view.
The method of legal education depends entirely upon that thrust
and parry of diverse ideas which cannot exist among a handful
o f segregated students.
If Texas denies Sweatt an education which is in fact com
pletely equal, it also denies him an opportunity to develop the
respect for law essential to the lawyer. Texas cannot make its
colored school equal in the eyes of the law without contradicting
plain facts. Were such a legal fiction adopted—-were Sweatt
compelled to live with such an assumption— he would be living
falsely. Three years of such living must tend to deprive him
of those attributes characteristic of the young lawyer fresh from
school, “ the humility and perspective, the courage and disinter
estedness, the devotion to honest craftsmanship and, above all,
the deep feeling that the government should serve all and serve
justly.” 110
_ 109“The common law grew up as a taught tradition in the Inns of
Court on the basis of the tradition of the courts. It was a tauglil
tradition handed down from lawyer to apprentice from the seven
teenth centry and is now coming to be a taught tradition of academic
law school.” Pound, Social Control Through Law 50 (1942). Sec
Rules o f the State Bar o f Texas, Art. 3, § 1, 1 Tex. Stat. 696 (Ver
non 1947) and Rule 1, T exas Rules o f Cizhl Procedure (Vernon
1942).
110Jackson, The P roduct o f O'Ur Present-D ay Law Schools, 9 Am.
Law School Rev. 370, 371 (1939).
46 ■:
47
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T? , al1 th? s* elements of Inequality there must he added the
T * r ° ^ : deVel° Ped in f aHier sections of this brief,, and in
olhej briefs filed with the Court— that segregated legal education
• ,7 T r " 'lth,eVery f° rm Pf segregation, perverts and distorts
t le Healthy development of Human personality in the group sub-
: jected to such'discrimination! •’ *•* ••• y '■
■■ " ’ escapable inequalityjof Texas (colored) lies in the fact-
t fegal education is not a mere matter of cubic feet of classroom'
) Spafj* or th<=-possession of a few thousand books, or the presence
'of four lawyers recently become teachers. If, instead, legal edu
cation is something alive and vital, if the. measure is not cubic
.feet Of air s p c c but the intellectual atmosphere within the walls •
if law teachers are appraised as individual men of varying degrees
o talent, if education is in large part ass. elation, if research and
.prac^ce are part of the job oftlegal training, if segregation in law
school warps apd corrupts the mind a. . personality of man— if
.any of these things is true, th in certainly this Texas Negro insti-
W th|lav^mT kery ° f ,Cgal e<̂ UCation a,,d ° f , e q u a l protection
%
i ~ •
S CONCLUSION.i? *
• Evjh-y branch of the government, in its own way, lias the duty
m<̂ tlng f challenge of ourjtimes that Democracy is unreal a
prom^e without fulfillment, fliis requires more than words It '
requires that we bring our practices up to our pretensions.' The
account y enaral Bedell Smith of his experiences as Ambassador
° ^ S,a; afT?Prmted in the! N e w T im es, dealt at-some
eng -wit t the publication A nierika , which our country distributes
m Russia. In the T im es Gerferal Smith reprinted two pictures
from flm ertk a as samples of bur message to Moscow. One of '.
lose pictures was of an unsegregated school room. Is this rcaUv
our mjssage » (he world, or must we send a postscript that there
is a special exception for young men studying the Constitution
of the^Jmted States in the State of Texas ? The Texas legislature i
has nd.authority to answer that question for the rest of America
I he equal protection clause has answered it
ft '■ *■
We respectfully submit that the judgment below should be
reversed.
48
T h o m a s I. E m e r so n
Jo h n P. F r a n k
A l e x a n d e r H . F rey
E r w in N. G r isw o l d
R obert H a l e
H aro ld H a v ig h u r s t
E d w a r d L evi
F or t h e C o m m it t e e of L a w
T e a c h e r s A g a in s t S e g r e g a t io n
in L e g a l E d u c a t io n
January, 1950.
*uV
if
49
i
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•t:
| 'i- f a p p e n d i x a .
0f Law T?achers Against Segregation in Legal
dltcation was formed for the purpose of expressing the convic-
of mariy,law teachers tjiat segregation in legal education is
unconstitutional. The menjbers of the Committee support the
general legal positions taken in this brief, but responsibility for
the (detailed;:argument rests'exclusively with the signers. The
merfjbers of the Committee are as follows:
P^Cck4mor̂ J.F- Cambridge. Mass.* r-â i ?̂ lpnian •'■Andrews, Syracuse N Y
Sg ^Uecrbachi’. Madison, W,s ’ Ŷ’
HdnrvdW Minneapolis, Minn. '
R^irdT’ na|iâ tmf’ Berkeley, Calif..: Jt” B«keley, Calif Hil Ŝ u!?hcr- Madison, Wis. Fr̂ enck K. &etrtei. Lincoln, Neb.
r: B'B'S* Washington, D. C. ’•
chT i X‘ rBlô crL ^ cw Haven, Conn » WflfifmLwB r̂ -4r'• New York, N. Y.
IWm Ann Arbor, Mich "^ I ]? R- Bookstaver, Washington D C Wihiam J Br̂ ckclbank. Moscow! IdaQo
???b S• Browp, New Haven. Conn “ Charles Bunn, iMaUison, Wis
ri0*^^ Bnur5,c* Chicago. 111.£!?J& M TByse> pJriiadefphia, Pa.
V Citf' ■Chicago, IU.
« Cr-Ief?ir Cambridge, Mass.
FliŜ CI Si CbcCk̂ p‘«sburgh. Pa.
HnIL.?Hk>'|N<iW ;Haven- Conn.Horijer H Clark. Jr.. Missoula. Mont
Aniftew V Clements. Albany. N. Y ’
b,l^r'rCf ey' Ano Arbor, Mich. ’ '*•/“I* s Cohen, Lincoln, Neb
Chiles E. Corker/,Stanford, Calif.
H»£SSU' r̂yrâ 'VNew Haven, Conn. '• Hattj M. Cross, Seattle, Wash
tt:.YerC% .Washington, D. C.
i 'lT p 9c Bktvw, .'Bloomington, Ind. JohO«P. Dawson, Ann Arbor. Mich
Hn Desskn, New Haven. Conn. ,
r1 nw/ cyh 9ncmnati’ ° hioi % DcWitt, Madison. Wis.
Air'll ^KDu,8anr Washington, D. C. r i ll,PnvPlI"l1amr. Ijlew York, N Y
hdg«i N Ourfei-i Ann Arbor, Mich
Richtrd W Effland Madison, Wis Mor̂ mer Eisner,- Newark, N J
Thoaias I. Emerson; New Haven Conn
SamS M pSt5P;-IA.I,n Arbor. Mich. 7Samflfl M. Fahr, . Iowa City, Iowa
J rfc«an- JPadtington, D. C *B. Feinstnger. Madison, Wis. -
V; p nlecV-; Cambridge, Mass. -••VincajtE. Fiordalisi, Newark N I •
fcn'rt Bo,kcrti 1 Columbus. Ohio J' ' I'r"tf r̂l Foster, Narrnan, Okla.
iVitcfifl'l Btank N’ew- Haven. Conn.Frank 111 ̂ New Orleans, La.
Vi ' 3P. A- Freeman,-, Irhaca. N. Y. :
R d^FCrFHh Ft$X’: pfl'lade|phia. Pa.( Jr W 'pr?jhsV? 90,13lnet°n, Ind., 1 P- Fulda, Nfcwtirk, N J
fJtnVM c rTTJJnuA,boquerque' N- M.“(»f,ntT • i ' Gav|t.-̂ oomington. Ind.Net/ Haven, Conn
t ^bridge. Mass,t’ ■ • Goble>iLTrhana, III.
iwioVN. C.nswoM, Cambridge, Massi..
P;..
XtC!’v
David Haber, New Haven, Conn.Robert L. Hale, New York, N Y
Fowler V. Harper. New Haven', Cttnn George S. Harris, Newark, N. J’
Alfred Harsch, Seattle. Wash. c
lienr7j *£■ b̂art> Jr*> Cambridge, Mass. Harold C. Havtghurst, Chicago, 111
Joseph W. Hawley, Seattle. Wash. 'Paul R. Hays, New York, N Y '
C. Willard Heckel, Newark, N J
Samuel M. Hesson, Albany. N. Y ’ i Elmer E. Hilpert. Sc. Louis, Mo.
John O. Honnold, Philadelphia. Pa.‘ Harvey S. Hoshour, Albuquerque* N. M, Leo A. Huard, Washington, D. C.
Robert M. Hunter, Columbus, Ohio.
J. Willard Hurst, Madison, Wis. •
Jacob D. Hyman, Buffalo, N. Y.
Louis L. Jaffe, Buffalo, N. Y. t
Howard Jenkins. Jr., Washington! D. C.
Richard W. Jennings,- Berkeley, Calif.
George M. Johnson, Washington, D. C.' Robert H. Jones, Albany, N. Y. ••
Harry Kalven, Chicago, 111.
Benjamin Kaplan, Cambridge. Mass.-
Wilbur G. Katz, Chicago, III.
Paul G. Kauper. Ann Arbor, Mich“.
Frank Kennedy, Iowa City, Iowa •
Friedrich Kessler, New Haven. Conn. Ralph E. Kharas, Syracuse, N. Y.
Spencer Kimball, Salt Lake City. Utah.
Stanley V. Kinyon, Minneapolis. Mipn.
David R. Kochery, Kansas City, Mo. ' /
Robert F. Koretz, Syracuse, N. Y.
Heinrich Kronstein, Washington, t>. C. Phillip B. Kurland, Bloomington, Ind.
Harold D. Lasswell, New Haven, Cohn.
Franklin C. Latcham. Cleveland, Ohio
Norman D. Lattin. Cleveland, Ohio ' Charles W. Leaphart, Missoula, Monr
Noyes E. Leech, Philadelphia, Pa.
Arthur Lenhoff, Buffalo, N. Y.
Edward H. Levi, Chicago, 111. \
A. Leo Levin, Philadelphia, Pa.
Arthur R. Lewis, Newark, N. J.
William B. Lockhart, Minneapolis, Minn. r Louis Loss. New Haven. Conn.
Robert B. Lowry, Cincinnati. Ohio John W. MacDonald, Ithaca, N Y '
Douglas B. Maggs', Durham, N. C. '
W Howard Mann. Bloomington, Ind.-
Robert E. Mathews, Columbus. Ohio '
G- McClure, Minneapolis, Mina.Philip Mechem, Philadelphia, Pa Bernard Melrzer, Chicago, III.
James W. Moore, New Haven, Conn.*
Cornelius J. Moynihan, Boston. Mass. •
Addison A. Mueller, New Haven, Conn
Albert R. Mugel. Buffalo, N. Y.
Joseph H. Murphy, Syracuse. N Y
Nathaniel Nathanson, Chicago, III." t
50
Albert F. Neumann, Ann Arbor, Mich.
C. Newman, Berkeley, Calif.Vai Nolan, Jr., Bloomington, Ind.
Filmer S. C. Northrop, New Haven, Conn. Charles B. Nutting, Pittsburgh, Pa Covey T. Oliver, Berkeley, Calif.
John D. O Reilly, Boston, Mass.
George E. Palmer, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Monrad G. Paulsen, Bloomington, Ind. Willard H. Pedrick, Chicago, 111.
John dcj. Pemberton, Jr., Durham, N. C
Maynard E. Pirsig, Minneapolis, Minn
Ervin H. Pollack, Columbus, Ohio Charles W. Quick, Washington, D. C.
Joseph F. Rarick, Minneapolis, Minn.
Horace E. Read, Minneapolis, Minn.
John Wesley Reed, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Willis L. Reese, New York, N. Y.
Herbert O. Reid, Washington, D. C.
Charles Rcmbar, Newark, N. J.
Frank J. Remington, Madison, Wis.
Charles A. Reynard, Baton Rouge, La. Ralph S. Rice, Cincinnati, Ohio
William Gorham Rice, Madison, Wis. Luvern V. Riekc, Seattle, Wash.
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Minneapolis, Minn. William R. Roalfe, Chicago, 111.Fred Rodell, New Haven, Conn.
Eugene V. Rostow, New Haven, Conn. Walter V. Schaefer, Chicago, 111.
Morris M. Schnitzer, Newark, N. J.
Oliver C. Schrocder, Cleveland, Ohio
Franklin M. Schultz, Bloomington, Ind.
Louis B. Schwartz, Philadelphia, Pa.Burke Shartel, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Conrad J. Shearer, Madison. Wis.John B. Sholley, Seattle, Wash.
Harry Shulman, New Haven, Conn.Emil Slizewski, Boston, Mass.
Allan F. Smith, Ann Arbor, Mich.
Russell A. Smith, Ann Arbor, Mich.T. Bryant Smith, Newark, N. J.
Carl B. Spaeth, Stanford, Calif.
Roland J. Stanger, Columbus, Ohio David Stoffer, Newark, N. J.
Wesley A. Sturges, New Haven, Conn.
Richard S. Sullivan. Boston, Mass.Russell Sullivan, Urbana. 111.
Clyde W. Summers, Buffalo, N. Y.
Stanley S. Surrey, Berkeley, Calif.
Malcolm D. Talbott, Newark, N. J.
Floyd E. Thomas, Tucson, Ariz.
John R. Thompson, New .Haven, Conn.
Lehan K. Tunks, Iowa City, Iowa
Harry W. Vanneman, Columbus, Ohio Marlin Volz, Madison, Wis.
John B. Waite. Ann Arbor, Mich.
Leon H. Wallace, Bloomington, Ind.
James A. Washington, Jr.,. Washington, D. C. David Watts, Cambridge. Mass.
Marshman S. Wattson, Bloomington, Ind.
Henry Weihofen, Albuquerque, N. M.W. Willard Wirtz, Chicago, III.
Donald Wollett, Seattle, Wash.
L. Hart Wright, Ann Arbor, Mich.