Application for Rehearing; Brief in Support of Rehearing
Public Court Documents
April 13, 1981
Cite this item
-
Case Files, Bozeman & Wilder Working Files. Application for Rehearing; Brief in Support of Rehearing, 1981. e3323bf9-ee92-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/86b67cf6-5f2e-4657-a006-8433181d18a4/application-for-rehearing-brief-in-support-of-rehearing. Accessed December 04, 2025.
Copied!
4ti'f t(( i-.(.\-/ /.^-; Lt.,1 ._..-i -i
IN THE COURT OP
MAGGIE BOZEI\IAN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF ALABAMA,
Appellee.
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAMA
SECOND DIVISTON NO. 276
APPLTCATI,ON POR FEHEARING
Appricant respectfully requests that this court grant
rehearing of its Order entered March 3I, 1981 which affirmed the
Order, Judgment and Decree of the Circuit Court of pickens County,
Alabama adjudging the applicant guilty as charged in the indictment
and setting her sentence at four 14) ylars in the penitentiary.
Applicants submits the aLtached brief in support of this
PetiLion.
Respectf u1 Iy .submitted,
t.
GRAY, SEAY & L,$TGFORD
'v'<Yt7\4rvZ/, fV d. CL.'
omon S ; S'eay, Jr -
352 Dexter Avenue
MontgomerY, Alabama 36104
(2os) 269*2563
CERTTFICATE OF' SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing
Application for Rehearing upon the llonorable Charles Graddick,
Attorney General for the State of Alabama, 250 Ad.ministrative
Building, Montgornery, Alabama 35103 and the Honorable P. M.
Johnston, District Attorney for the 24th Judicial Circuit,
LzO 3rd Avenue, N.8., Aliceville, Alabama 35442, by placing a copy
of same in the United States lilail, postage prepaid,, on this 13th
day of April, 1981.
:1..
?.
-2-
IN THE COURT OF CRIMTNAL APPEALS OT' ALABAMA
I4AGGIE BOZEMAN,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF ALABAT4A,
)
)
)
)
) SECoND DIVISIoN No. 276
)
)
)
)Appe1lee.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATTON FOR REHEARING
Appellant, Maggie Bozeman, respectfully requests this court
I
to grant her Application for Rehearing. while apperrant has
carefully reviewed the opinion of this Court, appellant respect-
fulIy disagrees with the Courtts finding that the record. failed
'qto reveal error prejudicial to appellant. To thg. qontrary,
appellant contends that prejudicial error does exiqt in the record,
rrrhich if sustained, witl deny appellant her cons.titutionally
protected rights. This case is the companion case,to the Julia R.
I,Iilder v. Sta_!g:_, 2nd Div. 262 Iu.S. (Ilarch 31, 19BI). Several of
the arguments presented in the Wilder Brief in Support of her
Application for Rehearing are identical to the argument for the
appellantrs Application for Rehearing. Therefore, reference will
be made to the Wilder brief where the argument to be set forth in
thr: ;r.ppe11arrt.rs brief is an iclentical argument.
THE STATUTE
I.
IS VAGUE, INDEFINITE AND
UNCERTAIN; AI.]D THEREFORE UNCONSTTTUTlONAL
This Court found that Section L7-23-1 of
1975, is constitutional. For the reasons set
Brief in Support of Application for Rehearing
appellant incorporates said section as if it
herein
Code of Alabarta,
forth in Wilder
under Section I.,
is ful1y set forth
II.
THE INDICTru mal
The Court found that the indictment
constitutionally valid. For the reasons
Brief in Support of her Application for
II., appellant incorporates siad section
forth herein.
in this case was
set forth in the Wildef
Rehearing under Section
as if it were fully set
tt" I
I
IIT.
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASB ]S ]NSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
E CONVICTION Or THE APPEL T OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED
This Court found that the evidence, although circumstantial
to a large degree, ancl confusing in several instances, was suffi-
cient to support the juryls verdict. For the reasons set forth
in the l,iilder Brief in Support of her Application for Rehearing
under Section fII., appellant incorporates siad section as if it
r,/ere fully set forth herein.
-2-
This Court adnrits that the eviclence in this case is mostly
circumstantial and confusing. A reasonable doubt as to appellantrs
guilt is raised by this circumstantial and confusing eviclence.
lvhere such a reasonable doubt exists, a verdict must be returned
for the defendant. rn reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence, the test to be applied is whether the jury might reasonably
find the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that
of guilt. Dolvin v. stale, 391 so.2d 133, 137 (Ara., 1gB0); cuimbo
v. glate, 368 so.2d gTlt 974 (Ala. crim. App. , !g7g), cert.denied,
368 So.2d. 877. Considering that the evidence in this case $/as
indeed circumstantial and confusing, it is impracticar if not
impossible for a jury to find based on this circumstantial and
confusing evidence that the evidence excluded every reasonable
hypothesis except that of guilt. I
Confused (confusing) is d.efined. in trvebsterrs Third New Inter-
national Dictionary at page 477 as follor,rs: ,,To make uncrear
in mind or purpose." where the evid.ence is in*fact confusing
:1..
{_as is present in this case, the test set forth in dolv_in v. St.ate,
lf.
supra., and Cumbo, v._..State, s_gprar has not been rnet.'.'
The evidence of record is incleed insufficient. to support a
verdict of guilty. The verdict was therefore \./rong, unjust, and
patently against the weight of the evidence and the Court should
not affirm such a verdict.
It is respectfully submitted that the failure of this Court
to find that the evidence was insufficient to support the convic-
tion of the appellant of the offense charge<I was error and because
-3-
of the lack of such finding, the courtrs order was mistakenly
taken. Therefore, this Court should grant appellantts Application
for Rehearing, set aside the judgment affirrni-ng the conviction of
appellant, and enter a judgment in favor of appel-Iant consistent
with the reasons outlined. above.
rv.
TIIB PROSECUTORIS USE OF HIS PEREIVIPToRY CHALLENGES To
STRIKE E\IERY QUALTFIED MEMBER OF THE APPELLANTIS
RACE FROM THE JURY PANEL CONSTITUTED DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS AIID EQUAL PROTECTION, ABSEIiIT
EXPLANATION ON NON-RACTAL GROUNDS
Appellant is fully cognizant that the Supreme Court of the
United States in Swain v.. A1abams., 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 924,
13 L.Ed.2d 759, held that the fact that the prosecutor used,
his preemptory challenges to strike "rrJry quarified member of
the defendant!s race from the jury panel does not constitute a
denial of due process and equar protection, where there is no
'q
sufficient showing of a historical pattern of eixslgsion. we
would submit, however, that the rationale underlyin_g Swain,
supra, has perhaps become dated and is inapprop::.iate1y applied
to circurnstances which evidence a new sophisticated and ingenious
approach to discrirnination.
Srvain poses an insurmountabl-e burden in those cases where the
while onprosecutor selectively discriminates by reason of race,
other occasions doning the garb of irnpartiality.
A very well reasoned concurring opinion in the case
of Lor.risiana rr. Raymond Bames, 365 So.2d 1361, addresses
of State
itself
-4-
/
\
to this issue. There the court said:
. A presumption should exist during the selection
of the jury that individual peremptory challenges by
the prosecution are being properly used. Once it
becomes evident, however, that the prosecution has
used a disproportionate number of challenges against
members of one race or has eliminated a dispropro-
tionate number of members of a certain race considering
the proportionate number of that race included within
the venire after excuses, exceptions and removals for
cause, in my opinion, a prima facie case of d,iscrimina-
tion because of race has been established, and the
burden of proof should shift to the prosecutor to
show that his challenges were not exercised on the
basis of race. The state may sustain its burden by
offering evidence that its reasons for individual
challenges were not because of race. Although the
reasons need not be sufficient to ground a charlenge
for cause, they should appear to have been applied
consistently to simitarily situated jurors of other
groups and they should be reasonably relevant to theparticular trial or to non-racial characteristics-
In the case at bar, the prosecution used substantially all
of his strikes to eliminate all of the rblacks from the venire.
Absent explanation, a presumption of racial discrimination arises
and the conviction in this case ought to be set aside.
It is respectfully submitted that the failoure of the Court
trst.
+to find that the prosecutor committed reversible error in using
1.,
his peremptory challenges to strike every qualifiedl'member of
appellant's race from the jury was error. Thereior", this
1-
Court should grant appellantrs Application for Rehearing, set
aside the judgrnent confirming the conviction of appellant, and
enter a judgment in favor of appellant consistent with the
reasons outlined above.
-5-
SUI\4IqARY
It is respectfully submitted that this Brief in Support of
Appellantrs Application for Rehearing has demonstrated errors
of law committed by this court, in that this court found that
the statute uncler vrhich appellant is charged is constitutional;
that the indictment in this case is constitutional; that there
is sufficient evidence of record, to support the conviction of
the appellanL; and that appellantrs constitutional rights were
not violated. when the state used its peremptory strikes to
exclude all blacks from the jury panel. Therefore, after careful
review of the arguments presented, this Court should grant
appellantr s Application for Rehearing.
RespectfulJ-y submitted,
I
GRAY, SEAY & LANGFORD
i
CERTIFTCATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I have served a copy of''the foregoing
Brief in Support of Application for Rehearing upon the llonorable
Charles A. Graddick, 250 Administrative Building, Montgromery, Alabama
36103, and the Honorable P. M. Johnston, District Attorney for the
24th Judicial Circuit, 120 3rd Avenue Northeast, Alicevil1e, Alabama
35442, by placing a copy of same in the United States Mai-l-, postage
prepaidr or this 13th day of Apri1, 1981.
oJ.omon S. Seay, Jr.
352 Dexter Avenue
I{ontgomeri}. }labama 35}04
(205) 269:2563