Application for Rehearing; Brief in Support of Rehearing
Public Court Documents
April 13, 1981

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Case Files, Bozeman & Wilder Working Files. Application for Rehearing; Brief in Support of Rehearing, 1981. e3323bf9-ee92-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/86b67cf6-5f2e-4657-a006-8433181d18a4/application-for-rehearing-brief-in-support-of-rehearing. Accessed July 19, 2025.
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4ti'f t(( i-.(.\-/ /.^-; Lt.,1 ._..-i -i IN THE COURT OP MAGGIE BOZEI\IAN, Appellant, vs. STATE OF ALABAMA, Appellee. CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAMA SECOND DIVISTON NO. 276 APPLTCATI,ON POR FEHEARING Appricant respectfully requests that this court grant rehearing of its Order entered March 3I, 1981 which affirmed the Order, Judgment and Decree of the Circuit Court of pickens County, Alabama adjudging the applicant guilty as charged in the indictment and setting her sentence at four 14) ylars in the penitentiary. Applicants submits the aLtached brief in support of this PetiLion. Respectf u1 Iy .submitted, t. GRAY, SEAY & L,$TGFORD 'v'<Yt7\4rvZ/, fV d. CL.' omon S ; S'eay, Jr - 352 Dexter Avenue MontgomerY, Alabama 36104 (2os) 269*2563 CERTTFICATE OF' SERVICE I hereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing Application for Rehearing upon the llonorable Charles Graddick, Attorney General for the State of Alabama, 250 Ad.ministrative Building, Montgornery, Alabama 35103 and the Honorable P. M. Johnston, District Attorney for the 24th Judicial Circuit, LzO 3rd Avenue, N.8., Aliceville, Alabama 35442, by placing a copy of same in the United States lilail, postage prepaid,, on this 13th day of April, 1981. :1.. ?. -2- IN THE COURT OF CRIMTNAL APPEALS OT' ALABAMA I4AGGIE BOZEMAN, Appellant, vs. STATE OF ALABAT4A, ) ) ) ) ) SECoND DIVISIoN No. 276 ) ) ) )Appe1lee. BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATTON FOR REHEARING Appellant, Maggie Bozeman, respectfully requests this court I to grant her Application for Rehearing. while apperrant has carefully reviewed the opinion of this Court, appellant respect- fulIy disagrees with the Courtts finding that the record. failed 'qto reveal error prejudicial to appellant. To thg. qontrary, appellant contends that prejudicial error does exiqt in the record, rrrhich if sustained, witl deny appellant her cons.titutionally protected rights. This case is the companion case,to the Julia R. I,Iilder v. Sta_!g:_, 2nd Div. 262 Iu.S. (Ilarch 31, 19BI). Several of the arguments presented in the Wilder Brief in Support of her Application for Rehearing are identical to the argument for the appellantrs Application for Rehearing. Therefore, reference will be made to the Wilder brief where the argument to be set forth in thr: ;r.ppe11arrt.rs brief is an iclentical argument. THE STATUTE I. IS VAGUE, INDEFINITE AND UNCERTAIN; AI.]D THEREFORE UNCONSTTTUTlONAL This Court found that Section L7-23-1 of 1975, is constitutional. For the reasons set Brief in Support of Application for Rehearing appellant incorporates said section as if it herein Code of Alabarta, forth in Wilder under Section I., is ful1y set forth II. THE INDICTru mal The Court found that the indictment constitutionally valid. For the reasons Brief in Support of her Application for II., appellant incorporates siad section forth herein. in this case was set forth in the Wildef Rehearing under Section as if it were fully set tt" I I IIT. THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASB ]S ]NSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT E CONVICTION Or THE APPEL T OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED This Court found that the evidence, although circumstantial to a large degree, ancl confusing in several instances, was suffi- cient to support the juryls verdict. For the reasons set forth in the l,iilder Brief in Support of her Application for Rehearing under Section fII., appellant incorporates siad section as if it r,/ere fully set forth herein. -2- This Court adnrits that the eviclence in this case is mostly circumstantial and confusing. A reasonable doubt as to appellantrs guilt is raised by this circumstantial and confusing eviclence. lvhere such a reasonable doubt exists, a verdict must be returned for the defendant. rn reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the test to be applied is whether the jury might reasonably find the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. Dolvin v. stale, 391 so.2d 133, 137 (Ara., 1gB0); cuimbo v. glate, 368 so.2d gTlt 974 (Ala. crim. App. , !g7g), cert.denied, 368 So.2d. 877. Considering that the evidence in this case $/as indeed circumstantial and confusing, it is impracticar if not impossible for a jury to find based on this circumstantial and confusing evidence that the evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. I Confused (confusing) is d.efined. in trvebsterrs Third New Inter- national Dictionary at page 477 as follor,rs: ,,To make uncrear in mind or purpose." where the evid.ence is in*fact confusing :1.. {_as is present in this case, the test set forth in dolv_in v. St.ate, lf. supra., and Cumbo, v._..State, s_gprar has not been rnet.'.' The evidence of record is incleed insufficient. to support a verdict of guilty. The verdict was therefore \./rong, unjust, and patently against the weight of the evidence and the Court should not affirm such a verdict. It is respectfully submitted that the failure of this Court to find that the evidence was insufficient to support the convic- tion of the appellant of the offense charge<I was error and because -3- of the lack of such finding, the courtrs order was mistakenly taken. Therefore, this Court should grant appellantts Application for Rehearing, set aside the judgment affirrni-ng the conviction of appellant, and enter a judgment in favor of appel-Iant consistent with the reasons outlined. above. rv. TIIB PROSECUTORIS USE OF HIS PEREIVIPToRY CHALLENGES To STRIKE E\IERY QUALTFIED MEMBER OF THE APPELLANTIS RACE FROM THE JURY PANEL CONSTITUTED DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AIID EQUAL PROTECTION, ABSEIiIT EXPLANATION ON NON-RACTAL GROUNDS Appellant is fully cognizant that the Supreme Court of the United States in Swain v.. A1abams., 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 924, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, held that the fact that the prosecutor used, his preemptory challenges to strike "rrJry quarified member of the defendant!s race from the jury panel does not constitute a denial of due process and equar protection, where there is no 'q sufficient showing of a historical pattern of eixslgsion. we would submit, however, that the rationale underlyin_g Swain, supra, has perhaps become dated and is inapprop::.iate1y applied to circurnstances which evidence a new sophisticated and ingenious approach to discrirnination. Srvain poses an insurmountabl-e burden in those cases where the while onprosecutor selectively discriminates by reason of race, other occasions doning the garb of irnpartiality. A very well reasoned concurring opinion in the case of Lor.risiana rr. Raymond Bames, 365 So.2d 1361, addresses of State itself -4- / \ to this issue. There the court said: . A presumption should exist during the selection of the jury that individual peremptory challenges by the prosecution are being properly used. Once it becomes evident, however, that the prosecution has used a disproportionate number of challenges against members of one race or has eliminated a dispropro- tionate number of members of a certain race considering the proportionate number of that race included within the venire after excuses, exceptions and removals for cause, in my opinion, a prima facie case of d,iscrimina- tion because of race has been established, and the burden of proof should shift to the prosecutor to show that his challenges were not exercised on the basis of race. The state may sustain its burden by offering evidence that its reasons for individual challenges were not because of race. Although the reasons need not be sufficient to ground a charlenge for cause, they should appear to have been applied consistently to simitarily situated jurors of other groups and they should be reasonably relevant to theparticular trial or to non-racial characteristics- In the case at bar, the prosecution used substantially all of his strikes to eliminate all of the rblacks from the venire. Absent explanation, a presumption of racial discrimination arises and the conviction in this case ought to be set aside. It is respectfully submitted that the failoure of the Court trst. +to find that the prosecutor committed reversible error in using 1., his peremptory challenges to strike every qualifiedl'member of appellant's race from the jury was error. Thereior", this 1- Court should grant appellantrs Application for Rehearing, set aside the judgrnent confirming the conviction of appellant, and enter a judgment in favor of appellant consistent with the reasons outlined above. -5- SUI\4IqARY It is respectfully submitted that this Brief in Support of Appellantrs Application for Rehearing has demonstrated errors of law committed by this court, in that this court found that the statute uncler vrhich appellant is charged is constitutional; that the indictment in this case is constitutional; that there is sufficient evidence of record, to support the conviction of the appellanL; and that appellantrs constitutional rights were not violated. when the state used its peremptory strikes to exclude all blacks from the jury panel. Therefore, after careful review of the arguments presented, this Court should grant appellantr s Application for Rehearing. RespectfulJ-y submitted, I GRAY, SEAY & LANGFORD i CERTIFTCATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have served a copy of''the foregoing Brief in Support of Application for Rehearing upon the llonorable Charles A. Graddick, 250 Administrative Building, Montgromery, Alabama 36103, and the Honorable P. M. Johnston, District Attorney for the 24th Judicial Circuit, 120 3rd Avenue Northeast, Alicevil1e, Alabama 35442, by placing a copy of same in the United States Mai-l-, postage prepaidr or this 13th day of Apri1, 1981. oJ.omon S. Seay, Jr. 352 Dexter Avenue I{ontgomeri}. }labama 35}04 (205) 269:2563