Loeffler v. Tisch Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner
Public Court Documents
October 5, 1987
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Loeffler v. Tisch Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 1987. cc4c2e7f-bb9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/8760b486-3b70-406c-844b-0f253767cfed/loeffler-v-tisch-brief-amicus-curiae-in-support-of-petitioner. Accessed November 19, 2025.
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No. 86-1431
'<-/ L $72>A"'
I s r t h e
Buptm? (Emtrt nf % Inttpii Status
October Teem, 1987
T heodore J. L oeppler,
vs.
Petitioner,
P reston R. T isch, Postmaster General
of tlie United States,
Respondent.
ON W R IT OE CERTIORARI TO T H E U N IT E D STATES
COURT OP A PPEALS POR T H E E IG H T H CIRCU IT
BRIEF OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
J ulius L eV onne Chambers
Gail J. W right*
Charles Stephen R alston
16th Floor
99 Hudson Street
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.
^Counsel of Record
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the United States Postal
Service, created by an act of Congress in
1970 and therein authorized "to sue and
be sued," 39 U.S.C. 401(1), is immunized
against an award of pre-judgment interest
in a suit brought pursuant to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.
l
Table of Contents
Page
Question Presented ................. i
Table of Authorities............... ii
Interest of Amicus Curiae ........... 1
Summary of Argument ................. 3
Argument ............................ 5
Introduction ................... 5
I. "Sue And Be Sued" Clauses
Raise A Strong Presumption
Of Waiver of Sovereign
Immunity ................. 8
II. Congress Intended Postal
Service Employees To Be
Treated Like Employees In
Private Firms ............. 27
III. The Inclusion of The Postal
Service In Section 717 Did
Not Diminish The Rights of
Postal Employees ........... 31
Conclusion............................3 6
ii
Table of Authorities
Cases: Page
Airco Speer Carbon-Graphite v. Local
502, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio
and Machine Workers of America,
AFL-CIO, 479 F. Supp. 246
(W.D. Penn. 1979) . ............. 25
Asheville Mica Co. v. CCC, 239 F.
Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) aff'd
360 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1966) . . . 23
Brown V. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976) . . 35
Citizens Savings Bank v. Bell, 605
F. Supp. 1033 (D.R.I. 1985) . . 24
Cross v. United States Postal Service,
733 F .2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1984) . 23
Davis v. Jobs for Progress, Inc.,
427 F. Supp. 479 (D. Ariz. 1976) 31
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
653 F .2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1981)
cert, denied. 454 U.S. 968 (1981) 26
Eazor Exp. Inc. v. International Bro.
of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d
Cir. 1975) cert, denied, 424 U.S.
935 (1976) rehearing denied. 425
U.S. 908 (1976)................. 25
FCIC V . DeCell, 76 So.2d 826 (S.Ct.
Miss. 1955) ............... 23
Federal Housing Administration v.
Barr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940) . . 20, 21
iii
Ferguson v. Union National Bank of
Clarksburg, W. Va., 126 F.2d
753 (4th Cir. 1 9 4 2 ) .............. .24
Franchise Tax Board v. United States
Postal Service, 467 U.S. 512
(1984).......................... 21
Green v. United States Steel Corp.,
640 F. Supp. 1521 (E.D. Pa.
1 9 8 6 ) ............................ 31
In Re Townsend, 348 F. Supp. 1284
(W.D. Mo. 1 9 7 2 ) .................. 25
Industrial Indemnity Inc. v.
Landrieu, 615 F.2d 644 (5th
Cir. 1 9 8 0 ) ..................... 24
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction
Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381
(1939) 8
Kennedy Elec. Co., Inc. v. United
States Postal Service, 508 F.
2d 954 (10th Cir. 1974) . . . . 6
Loeffler v. Tisch, 806 F.2d 817
(8th Cir. 1 9 8 6 ) ................. 23
McCarty v. Gault, 24 F. Supp. 977
(D. Or. 1 9 3 8 ) ................. 25
McCauley v. Thygerson, 732 F.2d 978
(D.C. Cir. 1984) . 15
Milner v. Bolger, 546 F. Supp. 375
(E.D. Cal. 1 9 8 2 ) ................ 22
Muday v. Cleaver, 590 F. Supp. 1209
(W.D. Mich. 1 9 8 4 ) ............... 30
iv
Nagy v. United States Postal Service,
773 F .2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1985) .
National Home for Disabled Volunteer
Soldiers v. Parrish, 229 U.S.
494 (1913)................... 6 >
New York Guardian Mortgage Corp. v.
Cleland, 473 F. Supp. 422
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ........ . . .
North N.Y. Savings Bank v. FSLIC, 515
F .2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1975) . . .
Queen v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
689 F .2d 80 (6th Cir. 1982) . . •
R & R Farm Enterprises v. FCIC, 788
F .2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1986) . . . .
Short v. Central States, Southeast
& Southwest Areas Pension Fund,
729 F .2d 567 (8th Cir. 1984) . .
Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
269 U.S. 76 (1925) .............
Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars,
394 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C.
1975) . . . . . ...............
Taylor v. Phillips Industries, Inc.,
593 F .2d 783 (7th Cir. 1979) . .
United States v. Parkside Court, Inc.
257 F. Supp. 177 (D.N.J. 1966)
aff'd 376 F .2d 853 (3d Cir.
1967) ..........................
Van Lusch v. Hoffmaster, 253 F. Supp.
633 (D. Md. 1966) .............
22
25
24
23
23
26
15
12
31
r
. 24
. 21
22
V
Statutes
7 U.S.C. § 942 ....................... 13
7 U.S.C. § 1506 ..................... 13
7 U.S.C. § 1507(a).................... 16
11 U.S.C. § 323 ( b ) .................... 13
12 U.S.C. § 2 4 ( 4 ) .............. 13
12 U.S.C. § 197(b)............... 12, 26
12 U.S.C. § 341(4).................... 12
12 U.S.C. § 341(5).................... 15
12 U.S.C. § 6 1 4 ....................... 13
12 U.S.C. § 635(a) ( 1 ) .................13
12 U.S.C. § 1432 ( a ) ................... 13
12 U.S.C. § 1439 .................. 15
12 U.S.C. § 1452 (b)(7)............ 13
12 U.S.C. § 1702 .................. 13
12 U.S.C. § 1723a ( a ) .............. 13
12 U.S.C. § 1723a ( d ) .............. 16
12 U.S.C. § 1725(c) ( 4 ) ............ 13
12 U.S.C. § 1725(C)(5)............ 15
12 U.S.C. § 1757(2).............. 13
5 U.S.C. § 2 1 0 5 ( e ) ...................... 27
vi
12 U.S.C. § 1789(a)(2)............ 13
12 U.S.C. § 1 7 9 5 f ..................... 13
12 U.S.C. § 1819(4)................... 13
12 U.S.C. § 1819(5)................... 15
12 U.S.C. § 2012(4)................... 13
12 U.S.C. § 2033 ( 4 ) ................ 13
12 U.S.C. § 2072 ................... 13
12 U.S.C. § 2093 ( 4 ) .............. 13
12 U.S.C. § 2093 ( 1 7 ) .............. 15
12 U.S.C. § 2216f (a) ( 3 ) .......... 15
12 U.S.C. § 2216f (a) ( 7 ) .......... 13
12 U.S.C. § 2216f ( c ) .............. 15
12 U.S.C. § 2122(4).............. 13
12 U.S.C. § 2252 (a) ( 1 3 ) ...............13
12 U.S.C. § 2289(1)................ 13
12 U.S.C. § 2289(8)................ 15
12 U.S.C. § 3012(3) 16
12 U.S.C. § 3012(6)................... 13
15 U.S.C. § 77dd .. ................ 16
15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (b) ( 1 ) ...............14
12 U.S.C. § 1766(b) ( 3 ) .............. 13
vii
15 U.S.C. § 146(c)................ 16
15 U.S.C. § 1 5 6 ....................... 17
15 U.S.C. § 504 ( b ) ................ 17
15 U.S.C. § 634 ( a ) ................ 16
15 U.S.C. § 634 (b) ( 1 ) ................. 14
15 U.S.C. § 714b ( c ) ................... 14
15 U.S.C. § 7 1 4 h ................... 16
16 U.S.C. § 19i ... ....................17
16 U.S.C. § 468 (c) ( b ) ................. 17
16 U.S.C. § 8 3 1 b ................... 19
16 U.S.C. § 1103(c)................... 17
16 U.S.C. § 831c ( b ) ................... 17
16 U.S.C. § 1103(d)................... 18
16 U.S.C. § 3702 (g)(2)(a).............18
16 U.S.C. § 3703 (c)(5)............ 17
19 U.S.C. § 2350 ................... 14
20 U.S.C. § 1082 (a) ( 2 ) ............ 14
20 U.S.C. § 1087-2 (i) ( 1 ) .......... 14
20 U.S.C. § 1132d-l(b) ( 2 ) ..............14
20 U.S.C. § 1132g-l(c) ( 2 ) ..............14
15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(b) ( 7 ) ................ 16
viii
20 U.S.C. § 4303 (b)(4)............ 18
20 U.S.C. § 4414(3)................... 17
20 U.S.C. § 4416(a)................... 18
20 U.S.C. § 4465(d)(7)............ 18
20 U.S.C. § 4665(d) ( 3 ) ............ 17
22 U.S.C. § 290(f) (e)(5).......... 17
22 U.S.C. § 290f (e) ( 1 0 ) ...............17
22 U.S.C. § 290h-4 (a) ( 2 ) .......... 17
22 U.S.C. § 290h—4(a)(7).......... 19
22 U.S.C. § 2199(d)................... 14
22 U.S.C. § 3303 (b) ( 7 ) ............ 17
22 U.S.C. § 4604 (j) ................... 17
22 U.S.C. § 4606(b) 19
25 U.S.C. § 505 ..................... 17
25 U.S.C. § 1496(a) . 14
25 U.S.C. § 1725(d)(1)............ 18
26 U.S.C. § 501(c) ( 4 ) ................. 10
28 U.S.C. § 754 ..................... 14
28 U.S.C. § 2679 ................... 18
29 U.S.C. § 185(b)................. 26
20 U.S.C. § 4302 ( a ) .....................17
IX
29 U.S.C. § 205(a)................. y
29 U.S.C. § 402 ( e ) ................. 29
29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1)...........14, 26
29 U.S.C. § 1302 (b)(1)................. 14
29 U.S.C. § 1302 (b) ( 6 ) ................. 14
33 U.S.C. § 984 (a) ( 3 ) .................. 17
33 U.S.C. § 984 (a) ( 7 ) .................. I9
33 U.S.C. § 1517(f) ( 1 ) ............. 14
36 U.S.C. § 2 ....................... 9
36 U.S.C. S 2 0 c ............. 9
36 U.S.C. § 2 2 ........................... 9
36 U.S.C. § 3 2 ........................ 9
36 U.S.C. § 4 6 ..........................11
36 U.S.C. § 5 7 b ...................... 9
36 U.S.C. § 6 3 ...........................9
36 U.S.C. § 67j . . . . .................. 11
36 U.S.C. § 78c(4)......................1°
36 U.S.C. § .......................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 78j ..................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 8 6 ..................... ' 11
36 U.S.C. § 90f ..................' • • X1
x
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
36
10
11
9
9
11
10
11
11
9
11
11
11
11
10
11
11
10
11
11
10
11
u.s.c. § 96 . .
u.s.c. § 98 . .
u.s.c. § 114 . .
u.s.c. § 140b(c)
u.s.c. §§t 230, 2
u.s.c. § 274 (3)
u.s.c. § 280 . .
u.s.c. § 281 . .
u.s.c. § 314 ( j )
u.s.c. § 342 . .
u.s.c. § 346 . .
u.s.c. § 376 . .
u.s.c. § 411 . .
u.s.c. § 434 (3)
u.s.c. § 440 . .
u.s.c. § 441 . .
u.s.c. § 464 (3)
u.s.c. § 471 . .
u.s.c. § 472 . .
u.s.c. § 504(3)
u.s.c. § 510 . .
xi
36 U.S.C. § 5 4 1 ....................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 542 .................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 580 .................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 5 8 1 ....................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 604(4)................. 10
36 U.S.C. § 640 ................ 11
36 U.S.C. § 6 4 1 ....................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 664(3)................ 10
36 U.S.C. § 670 ..................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 6 7 1 ....................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 694(4) . 10
36 U.S.C. § 700 ..................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 7 0 1 ....................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 764 ( 4 ) .................. 10
36 U.S.C. § 7 7 1 ....................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 772 .................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 800 .................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 8 0 1 ....................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 830 ..................... 11
xii
36 U.S.C. § 5 3 4 ( 4 ) .................. 10
36 U.S.C. § 860 ........................ 11
36 U.S.C. § 8 6 1 ........................ 11
36 U.S.C. § 884 ( 4 ) .................... 10
36 U.S.C. § 890 ....................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 8 9 1 .................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 944(4).................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 950 ....................... li
36 U.S.C. § 9 5 1 ....................... ll
36 U.S.C. § 974(4).................. H
36 U.S.C. § 980 ...................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 9 8 1 ....................... 11
36 U.S.C. § 1 0 1 1 .................... 12
36 U.S.C. § 1 0 1 2 .................... 12
36 U.S.C. § 1044 ( 4 ) ................. 10
36 U.S.C. § 1050 ................. 12
36 U.S.C. § 1 0 5 1 ................... .12
36 U.S.C. § 1074 ( 3 ) ................. 10
36 U.S.C. § 1080 .................... 12
36 U.S.C. § 1 0 8 1 ......................12
36 U.S.C. § 1101 ................... 10
36 U.S.C. § 8 3 1 ........................... 11
xiii
36 U.S.C. § 1 1 0 3 .................. y
36 U.S.C. § 1 1 5 6 .................. 12
36 U.S.C. § 1 1 6 5 .................. 12
36 U.S.C. § 1210 .................. 11
36 U.S.C. § 1 2 1 9 ................... 10
36 U.S.C. § 1304 ................... 12
36 U.S.C. § 3304 ................... 12
36 U.S.C. § 3 4 1 0 .................. 12
36 U.S.C. § 3 4 1 1 .................. 12
36 U.S.C. § 3608(d)............... 12
36 U.S.C. § 3609 .................. 12
36 U.S.C. § 3 6 1 4 ................... 10
38 U.S.C. § 1820(a)(1)............ 14
39 U.S.C. § 1 0 1 ....................... 28
39 U.S.C. § 401(1)................ 17
39 U.S.C. § 409(e)................ 7
39 U.S.C. § 1 0 0 1 .................. 6
39 U.S.C. § 1002 .................. 6
39 U.S.C. § 1003 .................. 29
39 U.S.C. § 1004 .................. 6
39 U.S.C. § 1005 .................. 28
xiv
39 U.S.C. § 1208 ( e ) .............. 18
39 U.S.C. § 1209 ................... 29
39 U.S.C. § 2401(b) ( 1 ) ............ 7
40 U.S.C. § 875(4)................ 17
42 U.S.C. § 294h(a) ( 2 ) ............ 14
42 U.S.C. § 1 4 0 4 a ................. 14
42 U.S.C. § 1456(c) ( 1 ) ............ 14
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2................... 30
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 ( a ) ...............30
42 U.S.C. § 3211(11) . 14
42 U.S.C. § 8104(a) 16
42 U.S.C. § 8105(b)(4) . . . . . . . 14
42 U.S.C. § 8771(a) ( 4 ) ............ 14
43 U.S.C. § 1653 (c) ( 4 ) ............ 14
43 U.S.C. § 1812(a)................... 14
43 U.S.C. § 1842 (a) ( 4 ) ............ 15
45 U.S.C. § 822 (c) ( 5 ) .................14
48 U.S.C. § 733 .................... 17
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII,
Section 7 0 1 ................... 32
39 U.S.C. § 1202 ..................... 6
xv
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title
VII, Section 7 1 7 ............ 31
Other Authorities:
H.R. Rep. No. 1104, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970)............. 5, 7
116 Cong. Rec. 22279 (1970) . . . . 33
116 Cong. Rec. 26956 (1970) . . . . 33
116 Cong. Rec. 26957 (1970).......... 35
116 Cong. Rec. 27597 (1970) . . . 34, 35
xv i
NO. 86-1431
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1987
THEODORE J. LOEFFLER,
Petitioner,
vs.
PRESTON R. TISCH, POSTMASTER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE
AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. AS
AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
PETITIONER
Interest of Amicus Curiae1
The NAACP Legal Defense and
1Letters consenting to the filing of
this Brief on behalf of the petitioner
and the. respondent are on file with the
Clerk of Court.
2
Educational Fund, Inc. is a non-profit
corporation that was established for the
purpose of assisting black citizens in
securing their constitutional and civil
rights. Its attorneys have represented
parties and participated as amicus curiae
in numerous cases before this Court
involving various facets of the law.
The Legal Defense Fund has a
particular interest in the question
before the Court in the present case
because of its representation of
employees of the United States Postal
Service in a number of actions brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.
United States Postal Service Board__of
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983);
Chisholm v. United States Postal Service,
3
665 F . 2d 482 (4th Cir. 1981); Griffin v.
Carlin. 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1985).
The last of these cases is yet to be
resolved, and the right of the members of
the plaintiff class to be fully
compensated for denials of promotions
that allegedly violated Title VII will be
resolved by the decision in the present
case.
Summary of Argument
I.
For many years "sue and be sued"
clauses have been broadly interpreted by
this Court to effect general waivers of
sovereign immunity. Thus, as long ago as
1913 the Court held that pre-judgment
interest could be awarded against a
federally-chartered corporation closely
analogous to the Postal Service. The
lower courts have similarly permitted
4
such awards against a number of the many
c o r p o r a t i o n s and agencies whose
authorizing statutes include a "sue and
be sued" clause.
II.
When it passed the Postal Service
Reorganization Act, Congress clearly
intended Postal Service employees to be
treated, with a few exceptions, like
employees in private firms. Thus, they
do not come within the civil service
system under Title 5 of the United States
Code and they come under the auspices of
the National Labor Relations Board.
Therefore, to disallow such employees
pre-judgment interest on back pay awards
would place them in a disfavored position
vis-a-vis other employees.
III.
When Congress included the Postal
5
Service under Section 717 of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 it did
not intend to diminish the rights of
Postal Service employees to be treated as
employees in the private sector. In
1970, Congress only intended that Postal
Service employees have the benefit of
what were then perceived to be the
superior procedures for administrative
resolution of EEO complaints afforded by
the Civil Service Commission.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
The United States Postal Service was
created out of the old Postal Department
by the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970,
with the intention of creating efficient
and economical mail service.2 This was
2 H.R. Rep. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., (1970) reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 3649, 3650.
Hereinafter House Report.
6
accomplished in several ways, including
making the Postal Service independent of
politics3 and the restructuring of the
organization in a more business-like
manner.4 5 One important aspect of the new
Postal Service is that it is to be
financially independent of the federal
government.̂ House Report, at 3659.
3 Id.; 39 U.S.C. § 1002 (1980).
4 For example, the management of the
Post Office was reorganized to be more
business-like. House Report, at 3660; 39
U.S.C. §§ 1001(c), 1004. Executives,
although not politically appointed,
cannot be included in a collective
bargaining unit. 39 U.S.C. § 1202(1).
5 If the funds from a suit would be
taken from the United States Treasury,
then sovereign immunity usually applies.
But see National Home for Disabled
Volunteer Soldiers v. Parrish, 229 U.S.
494 (1913). But where an organization
has been empowered to sue and be sued,
and the judgment is paid out of the
organization's own funds, then sovereign
immunity may not be a bar. Kennedy Elec.
Co.. Inc. v. United States Postal
Service, 508 F.2d 954 (10th Cir. 1974).
7
This extends to any "judgment against the
Government of the United States arising
out of activities of the Postal Service"
since it must be "paid by the Postal
Service out of any funds available to the
Postal Service." 39 U.S.C. 409(e).
As much as the Congress wished the
Postal Service to be business-like and
independent of the government, it could
not be entirely freed from its previous
role because of the importance of mail
delivery in the United States. For this
reason the prohibition against strikes
was applied to Postal employees,6 and the
federal government subsidizes the Postal
Service to the extent that it is mandated
to operate inefficient Post Offices. 39
U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1) .
6 House Report, at 3662.
8
"SUE AND BE SUED" CLAUSES RAISE A STRONG
PRESUMPTION OF WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
The words "sue and be sued" do not
have a magical meaning since Congress can
situate a federal entity into the private
marketplace such that sovereign immunity
is waived even though the organization
lacks a "sue and be sued" clause. Keifer.
& Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.,
306 U.S. 381 (1939). However, Congress's
selective use of the clause has created a
family of organizations which are
primarily private in nature. When
Congress placed the Postal Service within
this family in 1970, it intended the
Service to be treated like other private
organizations.
The phrase "sue and be sued" is
I.
9
found 124 times in the U.S. Code
Annotated, and a review of these statutes
indicates that these organizations ŵ ere
meant to be on the same footing as their
private sector counterparts. The largest
category of these statutes are those
creating Patriotic Societies in Title 36
of the U.S. Code.7 These societies are
c o n s i d e r e d private c o r p o r a t i o n s
established under federal law. 36 U.S.C.
§ 1101. Although these corporations must
submit reports to Congress,8 and many are
7 In addition to the statutes listed
in footnotes 8-11, see 36 U.S.C. § 2
(American National Red Cross); 36
U.S.C. § 20c (Sons of the American
Revolution); 36 U.S.C. § 22 (Boy Scouts
of America); 36 U.S.C. § 32 (Girl Scouts
of America) ; 36 U.S.C. § 57b (Marine
Corps League); 36 U.S.C. § 63 (Belleau
Wood Memorial Association); 36 U.S.C. §
114 (Veterans of Foreign Wars) ; 36
U.S.C. § 140b(c) (Service Clubs); 36
U.S.C. § 205(a) (Civil Air Patrol); 36
U.S.C. 314 (j) (Military Chaplains Association) .
8 36 U.S.C. § 1103 (1980).
10
tax-exempt,9 they are able to choose
employees as they require,10 they are
non-political, and they are liable for
9 36 U.S.C. § 96 (American War
Mothers); 36 U.S.C. § 1219 (United States
Capitol Historical Society); 36 U.S.C. §
3 6 1 4 ( P e a r l H a r b o r S u r v i v o r s
Association) ; and see generally, 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(4).
10 36 U.S.C. § 78c (4) (Ladies of the
Grand Army of the Republic); 36 U.S.C. §
274(3) (Future Farmers of America); 36
U.S.C. § 434(3) (National Conference on
Citizenship); 36 U.S.C. § 464(3)
(National Safety Council); 36 U.S.C. §
504(3) (Board for Fundamental Education);
36 U.S.C. § 534(4) (Sons of Union
Veterans); 36 U.S.C. § 604(4) (National
Fund for Medical Education); 36 U.S.C. §
664(3) (National Music Council); 36
U.S.C. § 694(4) (Boys' Clubs of America);
36 U.S.C. § 764(4) (Veterans of World War
I of the United States of America); 36
U.S.C. § 884(4) (Big Brothers— Big
Sisters of America); 36 U.S.C. § 944(4)
(Blue Star Mothers); 36 U.S.C. § 974(4)
(Agricultural Hall of Fame); 36 U.S.C. §
1044(4) (Naval Sea Cadets); 36 U.S.C. §
1074(3) (Little League Baseball, Inc.);
36 U.S.C. § 3404(4) (American Symphony
Orchestra League).
11
the actions of their officers.11 On the
11 36 U.S.C. § 46 (American Legion);
36 U.S.C. § 67j (AMVETS) ; 36 U.S.C. §§
78 i, 78j (Ladies of the Grand Army of the
Republic); 36 U.S.C. § 86 (United States
Blind Veterans of World War I); 36 U.S.C.
§ 90f (Disabled Army Veterans); 36 U.S.C.
§ 98 (American War Mothers); 36 U.S.C. §§
230, 232 (Reserve Officers Association);
36 U.S.C. §§ 280, 281 (Future Farmers of
America); 36 U.S.C. §§ 342, 346 (American
Society of International Law); 36 U.S.C.
§ 376 (United States Olympic Committee);
36 U.S.C. § 411 (Conference of State
Societies, Washington, D.C.); 36 U.S.C.
§§ 440, 441 (National Conference on
Citizenship); 36 U.S.C. §§ 471, 472
(National Safety Council); 36 U.S.C. §§
510, 511 (Board for Fundamental
Education); 36 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542 (Sons
of Union Veterans); 36 U.S.C. §§ 580, 581
(Foundation of the Federal Bar
Association); 36 U.S.C. §§ 640, 641
(Legion of Valor); 36 U.S.C. §§ 670, 671
(National Music Council); 36 U.S.C. §§
700, 701 (Boys' Clubs of America); 36
U.S.C. §§ 771, 772 (Veterans of World War
I); 36 U.S.C. §§ 800, 801 (Congressional
Medal of Honor Society); 36 U.S.C. §§
830, 831 (Military Order of the Purple
Heart); 36 U.S.C. §§ 860, 861 (Blinded
Veterans Association); 36 U.S.C. §§ 890,
891 (Big Brothers--Big Sisters of
America); 36 U.S.C. §§ 919, 920 (Jewish
War Veterans); 36 U.S.C. §§ 950, 951
(Blue Star Mothers); 36 U.S.C. §§ 980,
981 (Agricultural Hall of Fame); 36
12
whole, these patriotic societies are not
considered a part of the government. In
Stearns v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, 394
F.Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1975), for example,
the court held that a discriminatory
membership policy does not implicate
state action although Congress created
the VFW and its membership requirements.
The next largest group of statutes
concern banks, insurance, loans,
U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012 (National Woman's
Relief Corps, Auxiliary to the Grand Army
of the Republic); 36 U.S.C. §§ 1050, 1051
(Naval Sea Cadets); 36 U.S.C. §§ 1080,
1081 (Little League Baseball, Inc.); 36
U.S.C. §§ 1156, 1165 (Paralyzed Veterans
of America); 36 U.S.C. § 1210 (United
States Capitol Historical Society); 36
U . S . C . § 1304 (United Service
Organizations); 36 U.S.C. § 3304
(American National Theater and Academy);
36 U.S.C. §§ 3410, 3411 (American
Symphony Orchestra League); 36 U.S.C. §§
3608(d), 3609 (Pearl Harbor Survivors
Association).
13
investments, and receivers.12 In
12 Rural Telephone Bank, 7 U.S.C. §
942; Federal Crop Insurance Corporation,
7 U.S.C. § 1506; bankruptcy trustees, 11
U.S.C. § 323(b); national banks, 12
U.S.C. § 24(4); receivers of national
banks, 12 U.S.C. § 197(b); Federal
Reserve Banks, 12 U.S.C. § 341(4);
corporations which do international or
foreign banking, 12 U.S.C. § 614; Export-
Import Bank of Washington, 12 U.S.C. §
635(a)(1); Federal Home Loan Banks, 12
U.S.C. § 1432(a); Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, 12 U.S.C. §
1 4 5 2 (b) (7) ; H o u s i n g and Urban
Development, 12 U.S.C. § 1702; Government
National Mortgage Association and Federal
National Mortgage Association, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1723a(a); Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation, 12 U.S.C. §
1725(c)(4); federally chartered credit
unions, 12 U.S.C. § 1757(2); National
Credit Union Administration Board, 12
U.S.C. §§ 1766(b)(3), 1789(a)(2), 1795f;
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 12
U.S.C. § 1819(4); Federal Land Bank, 12
U.S.C. § 2012(4); federal land bank
associations, 12 U.S.C. § 2033(4);
Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, 12
U.S.C. § 2072; Production Credit
Associations, 12 U.S.C. § 2093(4); banks
for cooperatives, 12 U.S.C. § 2122(4);
Farm Credit System Capital Corporation,
12 U.S.C. § 2216f(a)(7); Farm Credit
Administration, 12 U.S.C. § 2252 (a) (13);
Federal Financing Bank, 12 U.S.C. §
2289(1); National Consumer Cooperative
Bank, 12 U.S.C. § 3012(6); Securities
14
Investor Protection Corporation, 15
U.S.C. § 78ccc(b)(1); Small Business
Administration, 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(1);
Commodity Credit Corporation, 15 U.S.C. §
714b(c); Secretary of Commerce (loans to
private firms), 19 U.S.C. § 2350;
Secretary of Education (student loans),
20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(2); Student Loan
Marketing Association, 20 U.S.C. § 1087-
2(i)(l); Secretary of Education (loans
for building educational facilities), §§
20 U.S.C. § 1132d-l(b) (2) , 1132g-
1(c)(2); Overseas Private Investment
Corporation, 22 U.S.C. § 2199(d);
Secretary of the Interior (loans to
Indian organizations), 25 U.S.C. §
1496(a); property receivers in different
district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 754; ERISA
benefit plans, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1);
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, 29
U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1); Deep Water Liability
Fund, 33 U.S.C. § 1517(f)(1); VA
Administrator (home loans), 38 U.S.C. §
1820(a)(1); Secretary of HHS (loans to
graduate students in the health
professions), 42 U.S.C. § 294h(a)(2);
United States Housing Authority, 42
U.S.C. § 1404a; Secretary of HHS (urban
renewal loans), 42 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1);
Secretary of HHS (public works loans), 42
U.S.C. § 3211(11); Neighborhood
Reinvestment Corporation, 42 U.S.C. §
8105(b)(4); United States Synthetic Fuels
Corporation, 42 U.S.C. § 8771(a)(4);
Trans Alaska Pipeline Fund, 43 U.S.C. §
1653(c)(4); Offshore Oil Pollution
Compensation Fund, 43 U.S.C. § 1812(a);
15
general, these organizations are
proprietary, and are meant to be as
liable as their private counterparts.
See e.g. Standard Oil Co. v. United
States. 269 U.S. 76 (1925). In terms of
employment p olicy, most of these
organizations fall outside of the Civil
Service system,* 13 such that the employees
Fishermen's Contingency Fund, 43 U.S.C. §
1842(a)(4); Railroad Rehabilitation and
Improvement Fund, 45 U.S.C. § 822(c)(5).
13 Within the statutory framework of
an organization, the Code does not always
specify the status of its employees. The
status has been specified in the
following organizations.
Not in Civil Service; Federal
Reserve Banks, 12 U.S.C. § 341(5);
Federal Home Loan Banks, 12 U.S.C. §
1439; Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, McCauley v. Thygerson. 732
F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984); FSLIC, 12
U.S.C. § 1725(c)(5); FDIC, 12 U.S.C. §
1819(5); Federal Intermediate Credit
Banks, 12 U.S.C. § 2072(15); Production
Credit Associations, 12 U.S.C. §
2093(17); Farm Credit System Capital
Corporation, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2216f(a)(3),
2216f(c); Federal Financing Bank, 12
U.S.C. § 2289(8); National Consumer
16
are treated like employees in the private
sector.
The remainder of the "sue and be
sued" statutes contain a variety of
organizations, some more private than
others. Many of these are meant to
encourage or organize a specific
activity,14 some concern governments,15
Cooperative Bank, 12 U.S.C. § 3012(3);
S e c u r i t i e s I n v e s t o r Pro t e c t i o n
Corporation, 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc(b)(7);
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, 42
U.S.C. § 8104(a).
Mixed Civil Service: Government
National Mortgage Association and Federal
National Mortgage Association, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1723a(d)(1), (d)(2); Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation, 29 U.S.C. §
1302(b)(6).
Within Civil Service: Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation, 7 U.S.C. §
1 5 0 7 ( a ) ; National Credit Union
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Central Liquidity
Facility, 12 U.S.C. § 1795f(a)(2); Small
Business Administration, 15 U.S.C. §
634(a); Commodity Credit Corporation, 15
U.S.C. § 714h.
14 Corporation of Foreign Security
Holders, 15 U.S.C. § 77dd; China Trade
Act corporations, 15 U.S.C. §§ 146(c),
17
and others deal with services that could
be provided by private companies*16
156; Textile Foundation, 15 U.S.C. §
504(b); National Park Foundation, 16
U.S.C. § 19i; National Trust for Historic
Preservation in the United States, 16
U.S.C. § 468(c)(b); Roosevelt Campobello
International Park Commission, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1103(c); National Fish and Wildlife
Foundation, 16 U.S.C. § 3703(c)(5);
Institute of American Indian and Alaska
Native Culture and Arts Development, 20
U.S.C. § 4414(3); National Trust for Drug
Free Youth, 20 U.S.C. § 4665(d)(3);
Inter-American Foundation, 22 U.S.C. §
2 9 0 f (e ) (10) ; African Development
Foundation, 22 U.S.C. § 290h-4(a)(2);
United States Institute of Peace, 22
U.S.C. § 4604 (j) ; Saint Lawrence Seaway
Development Corporation, 33 U.S.C. §
9 8 4 ( a ) (3); P e n n s y l v a n i a Avenue
Development Corporation, 40 U.S.C. § 875(4).
15 Taiwan, 22 U.S.C. § 3303(b)(7);
Puerto Rico, 48 U.S.C. § 733.
16 Tennessee Valley Authority, 16
U.S.C. § 831c(b); United States Postal
Service, 39 U.S.C. § 401(1).
There is a final group of statutes
that are not readily classifiable.
Gallaudet University, 20 U.S.C. §
4302(a); Indian cooperative associations
in Oklahoma, 25 U.S.C. § 505; settlement
agreement between Maine and Passamaguoddy
Tribe, Penobscott Nation, and Houlton
18
Although each of these organizations
pursue a governmental objective, none of
them compare with other federal agencies.
These organizations are not rule-making
in nature, and where the organization has
its own employees, they are most likely
not within the Civil Service System.* 17
Band of Maliseet Indians, 25 U.S.C. §
1725(d)(1); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2679; labor unions, 29 U.S.C. §
185(b); unions of the USPS, 39 U.S.C. §
1208(e).
17 N o t in C i v i l S e r v i c e :
Corporation of Foreign Security Holders,
15 U.S.C. § 7 7 dd; Roosevelt Campobello
International Park Commission, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1103(d); National Fish and Wildlife
Foundation, 16 U.S.C. § 3702(g)(2)(a);
Gallaudet University, 20 U.S.C. §
4303(b)(4); Institute of American Indian
and Alaska Native Culture and Arts
Development, 20 U.S.C. § 4416(a);
National Trust for Drug Free Youth, 2 0
U.S.C. § 4465(d)(7); Inter-American
Foundation, 22 U.S.C. § 290f(e)(5);
African Development Foundation, 22 U.S.C.
19
Congress has used the "sue and be
sued" clause over many years, in
circumstances where the organization has
been meant to act and be treated like
other private organizations. By charging
the Postal Service with the power to "sue
and be sued," Congress included the
Postal Service in the family of private
like organizations, and intended it to be
subject to the same liability as private
employers.
Recognizing this, the courts have
construed "sue and be sued" waivers of
§ 290h-4(a)(7).
Mixed Civil Service: Tennessee
Valley Authority, 16 U.S.C. § 831b;
United States Postal Service (a full
discussion follows in Part II) .
Within Civil Service: United States
Institute of Peace, 22 U.S.C. § 4606(b);
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development
Corporation, 33 U.S.C. § 984(a)(7).
20
sovereign immunity broadly. In Federal
Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S.
242 (1940), the Supreme Court stated:
[W]e start from the premise that
such waivers by Congress of
governmental immunity in case of
such federal instrumentalities
should be liberally construed. This
policy is in line with the current
disfavor of the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit, as
evidenced by the increasing tendency
of Congress to waive the immunity
w h e r e f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t a l
corporations are concerned....
Hence, when Congress established
such an agency, authorizes it to
engage in commercial and business
transactions with the public, and
permits it to "sue and be sued," it
cannot be lightly assumed that
restrictions on that authority are
to be implied. Rather if the
general authority to "sue and be
sued" is to be delimited by implied
exceptions, it must be clearly shown
that certain types of suits are not
consistent with the statutory or
constitutional scheme, that an
implied restriction of the general
authority is necessary to avoid
grave interference with the
performance of a governmental
function, or that for other reasons
it was plainly the purpose of
Congress to use the "sue and be
sued" clause in a narrow sense. In
21
the absence of such showing, it must
be presumed that when Congress
launched a governmental agency into
the commercial world and endowed it
with authority to "sue and be sued,"
that agency is not less amenable to
judicial process than a private
enterprise under like circumstances
would be.
309 U.S. at 245. Moreover, the waiver of
Postal Service immunity is even broader
than that found in Burr.
In passing the Postal Reorganization
Act of 1970, 84 Stat 719, Congress
not only indicated that the Postal
Service could "sue and be sued," 39
USC § 401(1), but also that it had
the power "to settle and compromise
claims by or against it," § 401(8),
and that " [t]he provisions of
chapter 171 and all other provisions
of title 28 relating to tort claims
shall apply to tort claims arising
out of activities of the Postal
Service." § 409(c). Neither of
these provisions would have been
necessary had Congress intended to
preserve sovereign immunity with
respect to the Postal Service.
Franchise Tax Board v. United States
Postal Service. 467 U.S. 512, 519 (1984).
The broad waiver effected by a "sue
22
and be sued" clause was held as long ago
as 1913 to permit an award of pre
judgment interest against a federally-
chartered corporation carrying out
government related functions. National
Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers_v^
Parrish, 229 U.S. 494 (1913). Thus,
lower courts have upheld awards of pre
judgment interest against a number of
federally created organizations with the
power to sue and be sued. The Postal
Service and the Tennessee Valley
Authority are the two agencies against
whom Title VII plaintiffs have been
awarded pre-judgment interest. See Nagy
v. United States Postal Service, 773 F.2d
1190 (11th Cir. 1985) and Milner v.
Bolder, 54 6 F.Supp 37 5 (E.D.Cal. 1982)
Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Authority./
35 E.P.D. 11 34,713, and generally, Queen
23
v. Tennessee Valley Authority. 689 F. 2d
80 (6th Cir. 1982).18 In non-Title VII
actions, pre-judgment interest has been
awarded against the Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation,19 the Commodity
Credit Corporation,20 the Federal Savings
18 By a sharply divided court, the
8th Circuit has reached the opposite
conclusion. Cross v. United States
Postal Service. 733 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir.
1984) (aff'd en banc by an equally
divided court); Loeffler v. Tisch. 806
F . 2d 817 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc,
decided 6-5).
19 FCIC v. DeCell. 76 So.2d 826
(S.Ct. Miss. 1955) (pre-judgment interest
allowed on insurance claim when the FCIC
refused to cover 1947 crop damage); but.
R & R Farm Enterprises v. FCIC. 788 F.2d
1148 (5th Cir. 1986) (pre- and post
judgment interest immunity not waived
since FCIC is a non commercial venture
where FCIC refused to pay entire claim
for allegedly lost crops).
20 Asheville Mica Co. v. CCC. 239
F.Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) aff'd 360
F .2d 931 (2d Cir. 1966) (pre-judgment
interest granted where CCC breached
contract concerning imported mica and
stockpiling).
24
and Loan Insurance Corporation,21 the
Department of Housing and Urban
D e v e l o p m e n t ,22 the Secretary of
E d u c a t i o n ,23 and the Veter a n s
21 worth N-V. Savings Bank v_̂ _FSLIC,
515 F2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (pre
judgment interest granted on bank
reserved held by FSLIC).
22Ferguson v. Union National Bank of
Clarksburg. W.Va.. 125 F.2d 753 (4th Cir.
1942) (interest allowed where Federal
Housing Administrator, now Secretary of
HUD, guaranteed loan to an industrial
corporation) ; Industrial Indemnity ,— IrtciiJL
v. Landrieu, 615 F .2d 644 (5th Cir. 1980)
("sue and be sued" is a waiver of
sovereign immunity for purposes of a
c o n t r a c t o r seeking payment for
construction work on housing project
insured by the Secretary under a program
authorized by the National Housing Act),
United States v. Parkside Court,— Inc. ,
257 F.Supp. 177, 179 (D.N.J. 1966) afflA
376 F . 2d 853 (3d Cir. 1967) ("Congress,
having launched its agency into the world
of commerce, endowed it with both the
right to sue and be sued as any other
private enterprise").
23Citizens Savings Bank v. Bell, 605
F.Supp. 1033 (D.R.I. 1985) (lender is
owed pre-judgment interest on guaranteed
student loan).
25
Administration administrator.24 25 The "sue
and be sued" clause has also allowed
interest against bank receivers,^ labor
unions,26 and ERISA benefit plans,27 all
24 New York Guardian Mortgage Coro,
v. Cleland, 473 F.Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (sovereign immunity not a bar to
pre-judgment interest in regards to home
loan guarantees); see also In re
Townsend. 348 F.Supp. 1284 (W.D.Mo. 1972)
("sue and be sued" waives immunity so
that a bankruptcy injunction prevents the
VA from foreclosing on a lien.).
25McCartv v, Gault. 24 F.Supp. 977
(D.Or. 1938) (stockholder awarded pre-
and post-judgment interest on his
assessment from bank receiver).
26Airco Speer Carbon-Graphite v.
Local 502, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio
and Machine Workers of America, AFL-CIO.
479 F.Supp. 246 (W.D.Penn. 1979) (pre
judgment interest allowed where union
breached no-strike clause of collective
bargaining agreement entitling employer
to damages) ; Eazor Exp. Inc. v.
International Bro. of Teamsters. 520 F.2d
951 (3d Cir. 1975) cert, denied 424 U.S.
935 (1976) rehearing denied 425 U.S. 908
(1976) (in action for unauthorized
strike, pre-judgment interest available
when the damages are ascertainable with
precision).
26
in cases where rights have been
statutorily created.28
On the basis of Congress's inclusion
of the Postal Service within the category
of "sue and be sued" agencies, and the
case law that developed both before and
after the adoption of the Postal
Reorganization Act, the Postal Service
should be subject to pre-judgment
interest. 27
27Short v. Central States. Southeast
& Southwest Areas Pension Fund. 729 F.2d
567 (8th Cir. 1984) (in order to make
plaintiff whole, tractor owner-operator
is entitled to pre-judgment interest from
the time of the denial of his
application); Dependahl v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp. , 653 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir.
1981) cert, denied 454 U.S. 968 (1981)
(pre-judgment interest is appropriate
equitable relief to executives dismissed
without cause).
2 8 See 12 U.S.C.A. 197(b), 29
U.S.C.A. 185(b), 29 U.S.C.A. 1132(d)(1).
27
CONGRESS INTENDED POSTAL SERVICE
EMPLOYEES TO BE TREATED LIKE EMPLOYEES IN
PRIVATE FIRMS
Unlike most other federal employees,
the workers at the Postal Service are not
within the usual civil service
program; 29 rather, they are within the
postal career service created by chapters
10 and 12 of Title 39 of the U.S. Code.
These chapters place the postal employees
within only a few procedures of the Civil
Service, viz., adverse actions,
preference eligibility, pay allowances
based on living costs, compensation for
w o r k injuries, and retirement.
II.
29 "Except as otherwise provided by
law, an employee of the United States
Postal Service or of the Postal Rate
Commission is deemed not an employee for
purposes of this title." 5 U.S.C.A. §
2105(e).
28
Everything else is subject to collective
bargaining.30
In terms of compensation, Congress
clearly intended that Postal Service
employees have salaries competitive with
the private sector. Among the policies
of the reorganized postal system is that
"As an employer, the Postal Service shall
achieve and maintain compensation for its
officers and employees comparable to the
rates and types of compensation paid in
the private sector of the economy of the
United States." 39 U.S.C. § 101 (1980).
Pay encompasses more than an employee's
salary; it also includes intangible
benefits. This was recognized by
Congress explicitly when it stated that
"It shall be the policy of the Postal
Service to maintain compensation and
30 See 39 U.S.C.A. § 1005 (1980).
29
benefits for all officers and employees
on a standard of comparability to the
compensation and benefits paid for
comparable levels of work in the private
sector of the economy." 39 U.S.C. § 1003
(1980) (emphasis added).
In addition to the benefits provided
Postal employees, labor-management
relations are also patterned on the
private sector. The Postal Service is
the only federal organization which falls
under the auspices of the National Labor
Relations Board, 39 U.S.C. § 1209(a), and
for the purposes of labor-management
reporting and disclosure procedures the
Postal Service is specifically considered
a private employer. 39 U.S.C. § 1209(b),
29 U.S.C. 402(e). Congress intended to
"bring postal labor relations within the
same structure that exists for nationwide
30
enterprises in the private sector."
House Report, at 3662, quoted in Mudav v.
C l e a v e r . 590 F.Supp. 1209, 1210
(W.D.Mich. 1984).
One important component of an
employee's working conditions is
protection from discrimination. For
individuals who feel that they may be
subject to discrimination on account of
race, sex, religion, or national origin,
it would be natural for them to prefer
companies with non-discriminatory
policies and grievance procedures over
other companies. While both private
employers and the Postal Service are
subject to Title VII,31 the remedies
available to aggrieved employees differ
if Postal workers cannot obtain pre
31 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-
16(a).
31
judgment interest on back pay awards.32
Thus disallowing pre-judgment interest to
postal Service employees would result in
a lower compensation package than is
provided by the private sector of the
economy.
III.
THE INCLUSION OF THE POSTAL SERVICE IN
SECTION 717 DID NOT DIMINISH THE RIGHTS
OF POSTAL EMPLOYEES
The main basis for the government's
argument that Postal Service employees
should be treated like other federal
employees is that the Postal Service is
included in Section 717 of Title VII
along with other federal employees,
32 pre-judgment interest awards are
available against private employers.
Taylor v. Phillips Industries. Inc,. 593
F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1979); Davis v. Jobs
For Progress. Inc.. 427 F.Supp. 479
(D.Ariz. 1976); Green v. United States
Steel Corp., 640 F.Supp. 1521 (E.D.Pa.
1986) .
32
rather than Section 701, which includes
private employees. Contrary to the
government's suggestion, this was not
done to indicate that Postal Service
employees are like other federal
employees, rather, it simply reflects
that the Postal Service was not
previously under Title VII, and that the
Title VII provisions were simultaneously
made available to Postal employees and
other federal employees.
A review of the legislative history
of the Postal Reorganization Act
clarifies that Postal workers are to have
anti-discriminatory procedures at least
as good as those provided the public
sector. On June 30, 1970, Senator Cook
introduced an amendment to the Postal
Reorganization Act which would subject
the Postal Service to the provisions of
33
Title VII. The amendment was quickly
adopted by a 93-0 vote, 116 Cong. Rec.
22279-80 (1970), but the conference
committee deleted the amendment. The
floor manager, Senator McGee, explained
to the Senate that the deletion
was less a concession to the House
and its insistence than it was to
the persuasion of the conferees in
consultation with the legal minds
involved in the interpretation of
the law and in consultation with the
Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission that, indeed, in this
instance a very strong case was made
that the equal rights provision
would redound in more equal terms
and more forceful terms under the
Executive order that is now on the
books than going through the EEOC.
It was on that ground that the
Senate conferees decided that
because of the absence of similar
language on the House side, we were
really making a stronger case
procedurally, because we were
achieving the goals that the 93-to-0
vote spelled out on the Senate side.
116 Cong. Rec. 26956 (1970) . In other
words, the conferees adopted the Civil
34
Service Commission procedures since they
believed those procedures were superior
to those of the EEOC.33 Indeed, Senator
McGee stated that if this proves not to
be the case, the Senate would take
appropriate action.34
33 Representative Daniels explained:
"Mr. Speaker, I would like to say to the
distinguished chairman of our committee
and to the gentleman from California that
as a conferee I requested the Senate to
reconsider its position [°n Title VII].
The Senate reconsidered and receded and
agreed to accept the House version which
permits any charge or complaint of
discrimination by virtue of age, sex,
national origin and so forth to still be
heard by the Civil Service Commission
where as I pointed out the procedures
with reference to the hearing of such
complaints is much more adequate and
affords much more protection to the
person who is complaining." 116 Cong.
Rec. 27597 (1970).
34"Mr. McGEE.... The conferees
believe we will, indeed, achieve the
laudable purpose that the Cook amendment
intended. If it does not, if we discover
that the conferees were proven to be
wrong in their expectation and that the
fears of the Senator from Kentucky [Cook]
are warranted by subsequent decision or
35
Since the intent was to give Postal
Service employees procedural protections
as great or greater than those enjoyed by
private employees, no intent to afford
them inferior relief can be inferred from
Congress' decisions in 1970 and 1972 to
leave administrative enforcement in the
hands of the Civil Service Commission.35
it follows that sovereign immunity was
waived as to pre-judgment interest.
action, then I can guarantee to him that
this body would proceed at once with the
urging of members of the Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service to
legislate appropriately without delay.
We believe it is not necessary. That is
our judgment." 116 Cong. Rec. 26957
(1970).
35 The fact that Congress later, in
1978, concluded that its confidence in
the Civil Service Commission was
misplaced and it acquiesced in the
transfer of federal EEO authority to the
Egual Employment Opportunity Commission
can not be retroactively used to re
interpret its intent when it passed the
Postal Reorganization Act in 1970. Cf.
Brown V . GSA. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
3 6
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the
decision of the court below should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
JULIUS LeVONNE CHAMBERS
GAIL J. WRIGHT*
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON
16th Floor
99 Hudson Street
New York, N.Y. 10013
(212) 219-1900
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc.
* Counsel of Record
Hamilton Graphics, Inc.— 200 Hudson Street, New York, N.Y.— {212) 966-4177