Matthews v. Coye Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

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1 JOEL R. REYNOLDS 
JACQUELINE WARREN
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 
617 South Olive Street 
Suite 1210
Los Angeles, California 90014 
(213) 892-1500

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JANE PERKINS
NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM 
2639 South La Cienega Boulevard 
Los Angeles, California 90034 
(213) 204-6010

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BILL LANN LEE 
KEVIN S. REED
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, 
315 West Ninth Street 
Suite 208
Los Angeles, California 90015 
(213) 624-2405

INC.

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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Erika Matthews, et. al.
(Continued on next page)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIKA MATTHEWS, et al., )
)Plaintiffs, )
)vs. )
)MOLLY COYE, )
)Defendant. )

____________________________________)

CIV. NO. C-90-3620 EFL
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DATE: June 21, 1991
TIME: 10:00 a.m.

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1 MARK D. ROSENBAUM
ACLU FOUNDATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

2 633 South Shatto Place
Los Angeles, California 90005

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SUSAN SPELLETICH 
KIM CARD
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF ALAMEDA COUNTY 
1440 Broadway 
Suite 700
Oakland, California 94612 
(415) 451-9261

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EDWARD M. CHEN
ACLU FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA 
1663 Mission Street 
Suite 460
San Francisco, California 94103 
(415) 621-2493
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Erika Matthews, et al.

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Page

INTRODUCTION ..................................................  1
ARGUMENT ....................................................... 2
I. THE MEDICAID STATUTE. AUTHORITATIVELY CONSTRUED.

REQUIRES BLOOD LEAD TESTING OF ALL ELIGIBLE CHILDREN
BELOW AGE S I X ............................................ 2
A. The Manual does not call for physician

discretion, as interpreted by DHS.   4
B. The terms "screening" and "test” are used

interchangeably. ...................................  4
C. The Manual does not support DHS1 expense and

utility arguments. ................................. 7
II. THE HCFA LETTERS ARE ENTITLED TO NO DEFERENCE............  8
III. DHS1 INTERPRETATION DEVIATES FROM ACCEPTABLE MEDICAL

PRACTICE ..................................................  9
C O N C L U S I O N .................................................... 12

TABLE OF CONTENTS



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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CASES
Chandler v. Roudebush.
425 U.S. 840, 96 S.Ct. 1949, 48 L.Ed 2d 416 (1976)
Citizens Action League v. Kizer.
887 F .2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1989) ....................
NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers.
484 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 413, 98 L.Ed.2d 429 (1987)
Pottgieser v. Kizer.
906 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1990) ....................
Sullivan v. Everhart.
494 U.S. 83, 110 S.Ct. 960, 108 L.Ed.2d 72 (1990)

STATUTES 
42 U.S.C. 
42 U.S.C. 
42 U.S.C. 
42 U.S.C. 
42 U.S.C. 
42 U.S.C. 
42 U.S.C.

§ 1396d (r)(1)(B)(i) 
§ 1396(d)r . . . .
§ 247b-l .........
§ 247(C) .........
§ 300k ...........
§ 300m ...........
§ 701(a) .........

OTHER AUTHORITIES 
State Medicaid Manual 

§ 5123.2 . . . . 
§ 5123.2.A . . . 
§ 5123.2.D . . . 
§ 5123.2.F . . . 
§ 5123.2.G . . .

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INTRODUCTION
The Department of Health Services ("DHS" or "Department") 

concedes that "lead poisoning is the most significant environmental 
health problem facing California children today and that early 
detection of elevated blood lead levels in young children is of 
singular importance in preventing or ameliorating a number of 
debilitating conditions which can last a lifetime." DHS' 
Opposition at 1-2. Yet, the Department refuses to do the only 
thing that all of the declarants in this case agree must be done to 
detect whether a child actually suffers from lead poisoning, namely 
perform an initial $7.50 lead blood test. Rather, the Department 
argues that, unlike other laboratory tests which it is specifically 
required to include in the EPSDT screen fe.q.. tuberculosis, sickle 
cell) , the one laboratory test mandated by name by Congress —  lead 
blood level assessment —  is discretionary with the physician. 
Common sense, as informed by the plain meaning of the controlling 
federal authority contained in the State Medicaid Manual ("Manual") 
and the clear purpose of the statute, dictates that DHS must be 
wrong. Otherwise, the federal scheme for early prevention and 
detection of lead poisoning pays only lip service to this 
environmental hazard and allows lead poisoning to go undetected in 
our poorest communities.

As shown below, DHS essentially makes three arguments in 
support of its position. First, it attempts to tar plaintiffs as 
overreaching because they seek "universal lead blood testing," DHS' 
Opposition at 3. This simply misstates plaintiffs' position that 
the plain language of the Manual requires blood lead testing only 
for Medicaid-eligible children below age six. Second, DHS cites

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two facially inconsistent HCFA letters it has procured as evidence
that its policy adheres to the federal requirements. Id. at 6.
Plaintiffs will show, however, that these letters are meaningless
to this case. Finally, the DHS relies upon the American Academy of
Pediatrics to argue that its position is consistent with acceptable
medical practice. Id. at 7-8. This argument, however, is rebutted
by the very authors of the report. As noted by Dr. Philip J.
Landrigan, Chairperson of the American Academy of Pediatrics
Committee on Environmental Hazards, which drafted the Academy's
1987 Statement on Childhood Lead Poisoning:

Particularly as applied to Medicaid-eligible children —  
virtually all of whom exhibit one or more of the risk 
factors identified in the Academy's Statement —  blood 
lead testing is essential, and it would be a serious 
misreading of the Academy's Statement to suggest that, in 
the Academy's view, such testing is not a reguired 
element of any minimally adequate lead screening program 
for, all such children.

Landrigan Dec. at 5 5. (Emphasis added.) (Exhibit X hereto).

ARGUMENT
THE MEDICAID STATUTE. AUTHORITATIVELY CONSTRUED. REQUIRES
BLOOD LEAD TESTING OF ALL ELIGIBLE CHILDREN BELOW AGE SIX
DHS argues that the Medicaid statute's direction to conduct 

blood lead level assessments should, in essence, be set aside 
because the "appropriate for age and risk factors" limitation 
leaves responsibility for performing the test entirely to the 
discretion of the physician. DHS' Opposition at 3. This 
construction, in which the limiting language swallows whole the 
statutory requirement for blood lead testing, is completely at odds 
with the remedial purpose of the 1989 EPSDT amendments to expand 
preexisting federal regulatory recommendations for routine blood

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lead testing of all young EPSDT children. It also has the absurd 
result of watering down, rather than strengthening, the prior 
regulatory recommendations. See Plaintiffs* Memorandum 12-13.1

The Manual plainly states: "Screen all Medicaid eligible 
children ages 1-5 for lead poisoning." Manual. § 5123.2.D.l 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit N) . The only way this provision has any 
meaning is if it requires physicians to provide something more to 
children aged 1-5 than they provide to older children aged 6 to 21, 
who are also eligible for the EPSDT Program. Since all EPSDT 
eligible children —  regardless of age —  must, under the EPSDT 
statute have their age and risk factors measured for the threat of 
lead poisoning, the Manual must mean that young children receive 
additional attention, specifically through routine administration 
of a lead blood assessment generally using the erythrocyte 
protoporphyrin (EP) test.

In fact, DHS' position garners no support from the language, 
design, or structure of the Manual as a whole. See Sullivan v. 
Everhart. 494 U.S. 83, 108 L.Ed.2d 72, 80 (1990)("'In ascertaining 
the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look to the

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In fact, a recent publication of the Congress and Boards of 
the 101st Congress, Office of Technology Assessment characterizes 
the screening requirements of the EPSDT program as including 
"laboratory tests, such as an anemia test, sickle cell test, 
tuberculin test, and lead toxicity screening." U.S. Congress, 
Office of Technology Assistance, Children's Dental Services Under 
the Medicaid Program-Background Paper. OTA-BP-H-78 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1990) (emphasis 
added). (Exhibit Y hereto).

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2All parties agree that the statutory direction must be read 
in light of the State Medicaid Manual § 5123.2.D. (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit N) . Compare Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 8-9 with Defendant's 
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at 2.

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design of the statute as a whole'").
A. The Manual does not call for physician discretion, as

interpreted by DHS.
The purpose and effect of the laboratory testing section 

§ 5123.2D(1), are to enumerate the laboratory tests which are 
minimally "appropriate," not to endorse unfettered medical 
discretion. The introductory paragraph of the section
unequivocally directs the states to "identify as statewide 
screening requirements, the minimum laboratory tests or analysis to 
be performed by medical providers for particular age or population 
groups." Manual § 5123.2.D (Plaintiffs' Exhibit N). Notably, the 
qualifying introductory language upon which DHS so heavily relies, 
namely the statement that physicians providing EPSDT services must 
use their medical judgment to determine which tests are 
appropriate, must be read in context with the very next sentence 
which emphasizes that, if a laboratory test is medically 
contraindicated at the time of the screen, it should be provided 
when "no longer medically contraindicated." Thus, a physician may, 
at the time of the screen, decide to postpone an enumerated test; 
the Manual does not, however, stand for the proposition that the 
test need not be provided at all.
B. The terms "screening" and "test" are used interchangeably.

DHS also makes much of the Manual's use of the phrase "lead 
toxicity screening" to suggest that use of a screening test was not 
intended This distinction, however, is too fine. In the section 
entitled "appropriate laboratory tests," the Manual is plainly 
using the terms "screen" and "test" interchangeably. This is clear 
enough from the last paragraph of the laboratory testing section,

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§ 5123.2D(1)(5), which expressly characterizes the preceding 
subparts, including the lead screening paragraphs, as dealing with 
"tests" and refers to several other procedures —  clearly 
laboratory tests —  using the term "screen," i.e. . "urine" 
screening ... drug dependency screening and HIV screening." 
Moreover, as the Department has admitted, the term "screen" is also 
used in related § 5123.2.F and G to refer to vision, hearing and 
dental screening tests. See Range Dec. 69-71. The "screen" in the 
lead toxicity screening section, then should be read in pari 
materia as the same term elsewhere in § 5123.2. See Everhart. 108 
L.Ed.2d at 82.

Logic dictates that if the lead screening requirement 
consisted of a physician's oral history-taking, it would have been 
included in that part of the Manual that deals with the oral 
history. However, neither the Manual. nor the statute for that 
matter, discuss lead testing in provisions dealing with history­
taking. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(1)(B)(i); Manual § 5123.2.A.

Moreover, if DHS' artful reading of the term "screen" is 
correct, the Manual would result in the following anomaly: The 
Department defers to physician discretion the only test that the 
EPSDT statute specifically requires —  blood lead testing —  yet it 
does not recognize physician discretion in the administration of 
other tests, such as tuberculin skin tests, which are not 
specifically required by the statute but which DHS admits are 
nevertheless mandatory. DHS' Opposition at 5. See. e.q.. Chandler 
v. Roudebush. 425 U.S. 840, 848 (1976) ("The plain, obvious and 
rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any 
curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a

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hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful
. 3intellect would discover") .

Notably, the Manual's use of the term "screen" to refer to 
laboratory tests used for screening is consistent with Congress' 
use of the term in other parts of the Social Security Act. E. g. 4 2 
U.S.C. § 701(a) ("screening of newborns for sickle cell anemia, and 
other genetic disorders"); 42 U.S.C. § 300k (programs "to screen 
women for breast and cervical cancer as a preventive health 
measure"); 42 U.S.C. § 300m ("the screening procedure known as a 
mammography;" "the screening procedure known as a pap smear"); and 
42 U.S.C. § 247(c) ("mass diagnostic screening").

Indeed, the Lead Contamination Control Act of 1988 includes a 
provision giving the Centers for Disease Control authority to make 
grants to state and local governments to "screen infants and 
children for elevated blood lead levels." 42 U.S.C. § 247b-l. 
Like § 5123.2. D.l of the Manual. the face of the provision
indicates that "screen" necessarily refers to screening tests 
because the purpose of the screening is to determine if "elevated 
blood levels" exist. The legislative history, makes this 
absolutely clear. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-1041, Lead Contamination 
Control Act of 1988 at 17 (1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S. Code Cong.

3DHS also highlights the Manual's use of the phrase "in 
general" when referring to use of the EP test. DHS' Opposition at 
5. It is unclear what the Department means to infer from this 
highlighting. The Manual plainly endorses the general use of the 
EP test as "the primary screening test" and the use of the venous 
blood level measurements on children with elevated EP levels. 
There is no mention of history-taking as a threshold or primary 
screening test. If DHS' position in this case were correct, one 
would expect the Manual to designate history-taking as the primary 
screening test to be performed in all cases. There is no such 
language; rather, only two blood tests, consistent with plaintiffs' 
construction, are specified as "screening tests."

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& Admin. News 3793, 3805 (Exhibit Z hereto)("[T]he Committee
believes that testing infants and children for lead poisoning will 
do little good if those who test positive are not given access to 
sources of medical treatment and environmental intervention for the 
disease"). Thus, in the context of the Social Security Act as a 
whole —  as well as the EPSDT statute and Manual —  the plain 
meaning of "screen" is a screening test. Because this consistent 
administrative construction of the EPSDT statute contained in the 
Manual is "rational and consistent with the statute", Everhart. 108 
L.Ed.2d at 80, quoting NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers. 
484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987), it is dispositive.
C. The Manual does not support DHS1 expense and utility arguments

The Manual explodes DHS' wholly specious claims that it is 
avoiding "a considerable price tag" and unduly invasive, "useless 
blood tests." Opposition at 5-6; Decs, of Gregory and Range at 
5 2 .  In fact, the Manual requires that the very same EP test be 
used to screen for iron deficiency, noting that it is a "simple, 
cost-effective tool for screening." Manual § 5123.2A.2
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit N) . Unless DHS is also violating the law by 
failing to require EP testing to screen for iron deficiency, the 
incremental cost of blood lead testing for lead poisoning is 
minimal and wholly acceptable because the more costly venous blood 
measures are required only for children whose EP levels are in the 
danger zone.

Moreover, DHS is hardly in a position to complain about lead 
screening tests since it admits that "early detection of elevated 
blood lead levels in young children is of singular- importance in 
preventing or ameliorating a number of debilitating conditions

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which can last a lifetime." DHS' Opposition at 2. As Dr. 
Landrigan, Chairperson of the American Academy of Pediatrics 
Committee which drafted the 1987 Academy Statement, that DHS has 
proffered, put it:

It is simply nonsense to suggest that the benefits of 
early lead poisoning detection by a blood lead level test 
are outweighed by the costs of the tests or the 
invasiveness of the testing procedure. Not only is the 
drawing of blood a common practice in a typical medical 
examination, but the long-term benefits of early 
detection and treatment are incalculable. Although an 
oral examination may perhaps be cheaper and less 
invasive, it is an unreliable screening tool and 
inevitably will result in lead-exposed children going 
undetected and untreated.

Landrigan Dec. at J 6. As against the $7.50 EP finger prick test 
and the $22.50 venous test, the most recent federal study has found 
that $4,631 is avoided for every child who does not have to be 
treated for lead poisoning and that preventing a single deciliter 
increase in blood lead level correlates with an increase in a 
person's average expected wage of $1,147. Needleman Dec. Exhibit 
A, Strategic Plan for the Elimination of Childhood Lead Poisoning 
at xiv (Feb. 1991) (elimination of lead poisoning avoids $62 
billion of medical care, special education, institutionalization, 
loss of productivity, and loss of lifetime earnings) (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit B).

II. THE HCFA LETTERS ARE ENTITLED TO NO DEFERENCE
Notwithstanding the Department's admission that only Health 

Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") regulations and the HCFA 
Manual are controlling, Defendant's Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts at 2, DHS offers two letters from the local HCFA 
office as support for its statement that HCFA would find DHS in

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compliance with federal law whether or not it used lead tests. DHS 
Opposition at 6. Under both Citizens Action League v. Kizer. 887 
F.2d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 1989) and Pottqieser v. Kizer. 906 F.2d 
1319, 1323 (9th Cir. 1990), the letters from the HCFA employee
(Plaintiffs' Exhibits V and W) are of no legal consequence and 
entitled to no deference. Each "lack[ed] the indicia of 
deliberative administrative review" and "appear[ed] to have been 
written for the purposes of this litigation only." Pottqieser. 906 
F.2d at 1323 (quoting Citizens Action League). Here, the letters 
were drafted solely for purposes of this litigation. Ruth Range 
testified that as to the second letter, in which the DHS procedure 
is finally described correctly, she spoke to a HCFA representative 
for "two minutes." Range Depo. at 65 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J). The 
HCFA representative asked no questions concerning procedures 
utilized to assess for risk or the number of eligible children 
receiving some sort of blood lead level test. Id. Range said the 
representative "seemed to indicate that [the procedure] was fine," 
but "[n]ot in so many words." Id. Under these circumstances, 
neither of these letters is of any consequence or entitled to any 
deference.

III. DHS' INTERPRETATION DEVIATES FROM ACCEPTABLE MEDICAL PRACTICE 
DHS erroneously claims that its position is "consistent with 

acceptable medical practice" because it parallels recommendations 
of a 1987 Statement by the American Academy of Pediatrics. Exhibit 
A to Gregory Dec. ("1987 Academy Statement"). DHS, however, does 
not dispute that the American Academy of Pediatrics has 
specifically recommended since 1977 that all children ages 1-5 in

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the EPSDT program, namely young children who live under conditions
of poverty, should be tested for lead poisoning, see Plaintiffs'
Memorandum at 12. Nor does DHS dispute that, unlike the Manual.
the 1987 Academy Statement is not focussed on poor children but
addressed to children of all incomes and all age groups.
Significantly, the 1987 Academy Statement finds that "[lead
poisoning] is particularly prevalent in areas of urban poverty" and
"[p]revalence rates for elevated blood levels are highest among
families . . . with incomes of less than $15,000 per year." 1987
Academy Statement, Exhibit A to Gregory Dec. at 457, 458. As Dr.
Landrigan, Chairperson of the Pediatric Committee which drafted the
1987 Academy Statement, stresses:

Even as currently written, however, the Academy's 
Statement reflects the Academy's view that periodic 
testing of all preschool children is medically necessary. 
Particularly as applied to Medicaid-eligible children —  
virtually all of whom exhibit one or more of the risk 
factors identified in the Academy's Statement —  blood 
lead testing is essential, and it would be a serious 
misreading of the Academy's Statement to suggest that, in 
the Academy's view, such testing is not a requirement of 
any minimally adequate lead screening program for all 
such children.

Landrigan Dec. at 5 5 (Exhibit X hereto). Indeed, Dr. John Rosen, 
an acknowledged resource for the Statement, points out that over 
90% of the young children he treats for lead poisoning are Medicaid 
recipients. Rosen Supplemental Dec. at 5 4 (Exhibit AA hereto). 
He adds:

[I]t would be a gross distortion of the Academy's 
Statement to interpret it as recommending anything less 
than mandatory testing of young Medicaid-eligible 
children, both because they are as a class unquestionably 
at increased risk of lead exposure and lead poisoning and 
because of the vastly different circumstances that 
affluent children may face.

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It is obvious that DHS is unable to present one shred of 
medical support, other than its two employee declarants, on behalf 
of its claim that history-taking is .a recognized and bona fide 
method of blood lead screening. And, as to these declarants, Ruth 
Range testified that she had received no specialized training in 
the area of lead poisoning, had done no writing on the subject, and 
did not consider herself an expert in terms of lead toxicity. 
Range Dec. at 13 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit J). Dr. Gregory similarly 
acknowledged that she lacked special expertise in the area of lead 
or lead toxicology, had done neither writing nor research and did 
not consider herself an expert on lead or lead poisoning. Gregory 
Depo. at 12 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit K) .4

By contrast, the Manual and all the other authority cited by 
plaintiffs, see Plaintiffs' Memorandum 10-13, recognize only blood 
lead testing as the accepted screening method for young Medicaid- 
eligible children. The reason for unanimity about the need for 
blood level testing to screen for lead poisoning is obvious: Lead 
poisoning is often asymptomatic. No amount of verbal interview can 
detect an elevated blood lead level. Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 4; 
1987 Academy of Pediatrics Statement, Exhibit A to Gregory Dec. at 
457 ("[T]here are many asymptomatic children with increased 
absorption of lead in all regions of the United States" and

4Dr. Gregory's declaration reports a telephone conversation to 
Raymond Koteras, at the American Academy of Pediatrics, purportedly 
to the effect that the Academy's 1987 Statement remains the 
position of the Academy. Gregory Dec. at 5 7. However, Mr. 
Koteras stated to plaintiffs' counsel that he is "certainly not a 
lead toxicity expert" but rather a "staff person" with 
responsibilities to several Academy committees. Rosenbaum Dec. at 
5[ 2 (Exhibit BB hereto) . He repeatedly stated that it was
inappropriate for him to "confirm or refute" any Academy position. 
Id. at  ̂ 4.

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"[Njeuropsychologic dysfunction, characterized by reduction in 
intelligence and alternation in behavior has been shown 
conclusively to occur in asymptomatic children with elevated blood 
lead levels.").

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in plaintiffs' memorandum of 

points and authorities, plaintiffs' motion, for partial summary 
judgment should be granted.

Dated: June 13, 1991 Respectfully submitted,
Natural Resources Defense Council 
National Health Law Program 
ACLU Foundation of 
Southern California
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund 
Legal Aid Society of Alameda County 
ACLU Foundation of Northern California

By: J \M l fkjJlVMOffL________JoelL. Reynolds '
Natural Resources Defense Council

By: (VrM;f PoaIhAW ij?__________Jane Perkins
National Health Law Program

By: LLoMi j 2̂ 5m JocuimMark D. Rosenbaum
ACLU Foundation of Southern 
California

By: 'Bill / am IjiBill Lann Lee 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 
Fund

By** kjJVl C&id fl9_Kim Card
Legal Aid Society of Alameda County

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DECLARATION OF SERVICE BY U.S. MAIL
I, HALIMA GIDDINGS, declare:
I am a resident of the County of Los Angeles, California; I 

am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the 
within cause of action; I am employed in the County of Los 
Angeles, California; and my business address is 633 South Shatto 
Place, Los Angeles, California 90005-1388..

On June 14, 1991 I served the foregoing document (s)
described as: PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the parties of 
record in said cause, by delivering a true and correct copy 
thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:
HARLAN E. VAN WYE 
Deputy Attorney General 
Department of Justice 
2101 Webster Street 
Oakland, CA 94612-3049

I am "readily familiar"

LINDA JANE SLAUGHTER 
State of California 
Department of Health Services 
Office of Legal Services 
714 "P" Street, Room 1216 
Sacramento, CA 95814

with the office's practice of
collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that
practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal service on that 
same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, 
California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that
on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if 
postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one
day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the 
State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. 
Executed on June 14, 1991 at Los Angeles, California.

28 Halima Giddings