Ricci v DeStefano Writ of Certiorari

    Nos. 07-1428 & 08-328

In The

Supreme Court of the llutteh states

Fr a n k  R ic c i, et al.,

v.
Petitioners,

Joh n  D e Ste f a n o , et al,
Respondents.

On Writs of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NAACP LEGAL 
DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 

IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS

J oh n  Pa yto n  
Counsel of Record 

Jacq u elin e  A. B errien  
D ebo  P. A degbile  
M a tth e w  Colangelo  
R eN ika  C. M oore  
J oy  M illigan  
NAACP L egal  D efense  & 

Edu catio n al  Fu n d , In c .
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 965-2200

J osh ua  Civin  
NAACP L egal  D efense  & 

Ed u catio n al  Fu n d , In c . 
1444 I Street, NW, 10th Floor 
Washington, DC 20005



QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether respondents’ failure to certify the re­

sults of promotional examinations violated the dis­
parate-treatment provision of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

2. Whether respondents’ failure to certify the re­
sults of promotional examinations violated 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(7), which makes it unlawful for employers 
“to adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores 
for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment re­
lated tests on the basis of race.”

3. Whether respondents’ failure to certify the re­
sults of promotional examinations violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.



TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED....................................... i
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................ ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..................................... iv
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE...........................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.................................... 2
ARGUMENT............................................................... 3
I. Fire Departments Nationwide Have a

Long History of Excluding African Ameri­
cans........................................................................4
A. Fire Departments Were Foremost

Among the Workplaces that Prompted 
Congress to Extend Title VII to Public 
Employers in 1972....................................... 4

B. Congress Legislated Against a Back­
drop of Widespread Segregation and 
Discrimination in Firefighting................... 8

II. Egregious Discrimination Persists in Fire
Departments Nationwide, Despite Efforts
to Enforce Title VII’s Mandate.........................13
A. New Haven Has Yet to Eliminate the

Effects of Entrenched Racially Dis­
criminatory Practices in Its Fire De­
partment...................................................... 14

B. Nationally, Overt Discrimination and
Racial Disparities Persist in Fire­
fighter Employment................................... 18

ii



Ill

III. The History and Persistence of Racial Dis­
crimination in Firefighting Should Inform 
the Court’s Resolution of This Case................ 25
A. Title VII Does Not Prohibit Employers

from Declining to Use Selection Proce­
dures that May Perpetuate Racial Dis­
parities in Traditionally Segregated 
Job Categories.............................................25

B. Employer Efforts to Ensure Fair Se­
lection Procedures Do Not Trigger 
Strict Scrutiny.............................................29

C. If Strict Scrutiny Applies, Title VII 
Compliance Is a Compelling Interest 
in Light of the History and Persistence
of Discrimination in Firefighting.............31

CONCLUSION.......................................................... 35



IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).........................................................30-31

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975)............................................................ 1, 3, 34

Alexander v. Bahou, 86 F.R.D. 194 (N.D.N.Y.
1980)........................................................................20

Association Against Discrimination in Em­
ployment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 
F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981)..........................................19

Association Against Discrimination in Em­
ployment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.
Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1979).................................. 19

Bazile v. City of Houston, No. H-08-2404,
2008 WL 4899635 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 12,
2008)........................................................................25

Biondo u. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680 (7th 
Cir. 2004)..............................................................  27

Bombalicki v. Pastore, 804 A.2d 856 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2002)....................................................... 14

Bombalicki v. Pastore, No. 378772, 2001 WL
267617 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2001)........... 14

Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 
1017 (1st Cir. 1974).......................................  19, 22

Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 371 F.
Supp. 507 (D. Mass. 1974)................................... 19

Bradley v. City of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 145 
(D. Mass. 2006)................................................ 22-23



V

Broadnax v. City of New Haven, No.
CV980412193S, 2008 WL 590818 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 2008).....................................  16

Broadnax v. City of New Haven, No.
CV980412193S, 2007 WL 155138 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2007).......................................  16

Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 851 A.2d 
1113 (Conn. 2004)................................................. 16

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).....................................................................8-9

Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.
1972) (en banc)...................  20

Carter v. Gallagher, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 692 (D. Minn. 1971)..................................20

City of Dallas v. Dallas Fire Fighters Asso­
ciation, 526 U.S. 1046 (1999).................................8

City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989).................................................31-32

Coffey v. Braddy, No. 3:71-cv-44, 2009 WL
591280 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2009)........................  25

Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).................. 7
Davis v. City of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438

(9th Cir. 1989)........................................................ 32
Dean v. City of Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448 (5th 

Cir. 2006)........................................................  20, 27
Donaghy v. City of Omaha, 933 F.2d 1448

(8th Cir. 1991)........................................................ 32
Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.

Ohio 1975).............................................................  11
Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 

812 (5th Cir. 1980) 19



VI

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 
(1998)....................................................................

Firebird Society of New Haven, Inc. v. New 
Haven Board of Fire Commissioners, 515 
F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975)........................................

Firebird Society of New Haven, Inc. v. New 
Haven Board of Fire Commissioners, 66 
F.R.D. 457 (D. Conn. 1975).........................  15,

Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. 
City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 
1978).................................................................  11-

Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. 
City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 
1977)..................................................................  9,

Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561 (1984).............................................

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971)..........................................1-3, 14, 29-30,

Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)......................................................................

Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 
1973).......................................................................

Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 
1187 (D. Md. 1973).................................... 9, 12,

Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42 (2d 
Cir. 1999)..............................................................

Headen v. City of Cleveland, No. C73-330 
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 1975)....................................

Henry v. Civil Service Commission, No. 
411287, 2001 WL 862658 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
July 3, 2001).........................................................

34

15

17

■12

20

.. 1

33

.. 9

.. 9

20

30

19

14



Horan v. City of Chicago, No. 98-C-2850,
2003 WL 22284090 (N.D. 111. Sept. 30,
2003)....................................................................... 18

Howard v. McLucas, 871 F.2d 1000 (11th
Cir. 1989)..............................................................  32

Howard v. McLucas, 671 F. Supp. 756 (M.D.
Ga. 1987)...............................................................  32

Hurley v. City of New Haven, No. 054009317,
2006 WL 1609974 (Conn. Super. Ct. May
23, 2006)................................................................  14

In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination 
Employment Litigation, 20 F.3d 1525 (11th
Cir. 1994)..............................................................  18

In re Employment Discrimination Litigation 
Against Alabama, 198 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir.
1999)...................................................................32-33

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)....................  33

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S.
454 (1975).................................................................1

Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa
Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)................26-29

Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584
(6th Cir. 2006)....................................................... 21

Kelly v. City of New Haven, 881 A.2d 978
(Conn. 2005)..........................................................  14

Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527
U.S. 526 (1999)..................................................... 34

Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488 (7th
Cir. 2008)..............................................................  23

Lewis v. City of Chicago, No. 98-C-5596, 2005 
WL 693618 (N.D. 111. 2005)................................. 23

vii



V l l l

Local No. 93, International Association of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501 (1986).............................................................  19

McNamara v. City of Chicago, 138 F.3d 1219
(7th Cir. 1998).......................................................... 9

McNamara v. City of Chicago, 959 F. Supp.
870 (N.D. 111. 1997) .........................................  9, 12

Mems v. City of St. Paul, Department of Fire 
& Safety Services, 327 F.3d 771 (8th Cir.
2003)....................................................................... 13

NAACP v. Town of East Haven, 70 F.3d 219 
(2d Cir. 1995)........................................................  24

New Haven Firebird Society v. Board of Fire 
Commissioners, 630 A.2d 131 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1993)................................................................  16

New Haven Firebird Society v. Board of Fire 
Commissioners, 593 A.2d 1383 (Conn.
1991)........................................................................ 16

Paganucci v. City of New York, 993 F.2d 310
(2d Cir. 1993)........................................................  32

Paganucci v. City of New York, 785 F. Supp.
467 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).............................................  32

Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738 (2007)...........................................................  31

Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989).................................................................1

Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 13 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1475 (E.D. Pa. 1975).......................  19

St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
502 (1993) 26



IX

Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 
1991)......................................................................

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).............................

United States v. Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643 (2d 
Cir. 1980)..............................................................

United States v. Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612 
(W.D.N.Y. 1978)...................................................

United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 
1358 (5th Cir. 1980).............................................

United States v. New Jersey, 75 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1602 (D.N.J. 1995).................

United States v. New Jersey, 530 F. Supp.
328 (D.N.J. 1981)..................................................

United States v. N.L. Industries, Inc., 479 
F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973)......................................

United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193 (1979)......................................... 26-27,

Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. u. New Jersey Depart­
ment of Civil Service, 832 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 
1987)......................................................................

Vulcan Society of New York City Fire De­
partment, Inc. v. Civil Service Commission,
490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973).....................  19, 24-

Vulcan Society of Westchester County, Inc. v.
Fire Department, Nos. 78 Civ. 0911, 80 
Civ. 0336, 1996 WL 481066 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
23, 1996)................................................................

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 
U.S. 977 (1988)...... ........................................ 33-

Western Addition Community Organization 
v. Alioto, 369 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1973).......

18

26

19

19

20

32

19

.. 3

30

20

■25

20

34

19



X

Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667
(3d Cir. 1983)....................................................20-21

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 
U.S. 267 (1986).................................................31-32

Statutes and Regulations

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)...................................... 29
29 C.F.R. § 1602.30................................................ 17
29 C.F.R. § 1602.32................................................ 17
29 C.F.R. § 1607.3............................................ 27-28
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C)(1)................................... 27-28

Congressional Materials

110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964).....................................  30
112 Cong. Rec. 6091 (1966)........................................ 5
118 Cong. Rec. 1745 (1972)............................. 6-7, 18
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,

78 Stat. 241 (1964).............................................. 4-5
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,

Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972)............... 6
Equal Employment Opportunities Enforce­

ment Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 2515, S.
2617, & H. R. 1746 Before the Subcommit­
tee on Labor of the Senate Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong.
(1971)........................................................................ 5

Equal Employment Opportunities Enforce­
ment Act: Hearings on S. 2453 Before the 
Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Com­
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare, 91st 
Cong. (1969)............................................................. 5



XI

H.R. Rep. No. 92-238 (1971), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137.....................................6-8

H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(1) (1991), reprinted in 
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549....................................  8, 29

S. Rep. No. 92-415 (1971), reprinted in Sen­
ate Committee on Labor and Public Wel­
fare, 92d Cong., Legislative History of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972 (1972).......................................................... 6

Court filings

Complaint, United States v. City of Dayton,
No. 3:08-cv-348 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2008).........  23

Proposed Consent Decree, United States v.
City of Dayton, No. 3:08-cv-348 (S.D. Ohio 
Feb. 26, 2009).......................................................  23

Complaint, United States v. City of New 
York, No. 07-cv-2067 (E.D.N.Y. May 21,
2007)........................................................................24

Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ Complaint, United 
States v. City of New York, No. 07-cv-2067 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2007)..................................... 24

Other Authorities

Carol Chetkovich, Real Heat: Gender and
Race in the Urban Fire Service (1997)............... 12

City of New Haven, State & Local Govern­
ment Information Report EEO-4 (2007)...........  17

Robert J. Crawford Sr. with Delores A. 
Crawford, Black Fire: Portrait of a Black 
Memphis Firefighter (2007)....................... 9-10, 12



Xll

David A. Goldberg, Courage Under Fire: Af­
rican American Firefighters and the 
Struggle for Racial Equality (Feb. 2006) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer­
sity of Massachusetts Amherst)......................... 10

Denise M. Hulett et al., Enhancing Women’s 
Inclusion in Firefighting in the USA, 8 In­
ternational Journal of Diversity in Organi­
sations, Communities & Nations 189 
(2008)..............................................................  13, 22

Bill Kovach, Race Discrimination Found in 
U.S. Fire Departments, N.Y. Times, June 
5, 1973...................................................................  11

John C. McWilliams, “Men of Colour”: Race,
Riots, and Black Firefighters’ Struggle for 
Equality from the AFA to the Valiants, 41 
Journal of Social History 105 (Fall 2007).......... 10

National Commission on Fire Prevention and 
Control, America Burning (1973).................  10-11

Report of the National Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders (1968)........................................ 5

U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quick- 
Facts, New York (city), New York, 
http ://quickfacts .census. gov/qfd/ states/36/3 
651000.html........................................................... 24

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, For ALL 
the people . . .  By ALL the people: A Report 
on Equal Opportunity in State and Local 
Government Employment (1969)............6-9, 11-13

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, To Elimi­
nate Employment Discrimination, A Se­
quel: The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement 
Effort—1977 (1977) 19



X ll l

Mark Zaretsky, 6 Years After Suit, NAACP 
Says East Haven Should Try Harder, New 
Haven Register, Mar. 1, 2004............................ 24



1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, 

Inc., is a non-profit corporation established under 
the laws of the state of New York to assist African 
Americans and other people of color in securing their 
civil and constitutional rights through the prosecu­
tion of lawsuits that challenge racial discrimina­
tion.1

For six decades, LDF has represented parties in 
litigation before the Supreme Court involving mat­
ters of race discrimination in general, and employ­
ment discrimination in particular. LDF argued 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the 
case in which this Court recognized the disparate 
impact framework for analyzing employment dis­
crimination claims under Title VII. LDF has also 
represented parties in other employment discrimina­
tion cases before this Court, including Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Fire­
fighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 
(1984); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 
(1975); and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 
U.S. 454 (1975).

1 This brief is filed with the consent of counsel for both par­
ties. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for the 
amicus states that no counsel for a party authored this brief in 
whole or in part, and that no person other than the amicus, its 
members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution to the 
preparation or submission of this brief.



2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Employment discrimination has proved more dif­

ficult to eliminate in firefighting than in perhaps any 
other employment sector, public or private. Fire­
fighting is a highly desirable job for many Ameri­
cans. But fire departments throughout the country, 
including in New Haven, have historically and noto­
riously denied employment to African Americans 
and other people of color. The development of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bears out this re­
ality: The pervasive exclusion of blacks from fire de­
partments nationwide was a central basis for Con­
gress’s decision in 1972 to extend that Act to cover 
state and local government employment.

The 1972 extension of Title VII and this Court’s 
1971 holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. have pro­
vided critical mechanisms to challenge both inten­
tional discrimination and the use of “artificial, arbi­
trary, and unnecessary barriers to employment” that 
operate to exclude African Americans from fire­
fighting. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Private and fed­
eral enforcement efforts have yielded some progress 
toward greater inclusion of African Americans in fire 
departments, but racial discrimination and wide­
spread disparities persist. Ongoing efforts by cities 
like New Haven therefore remain necessary to fully 
and finally achieve equal employment opportunity 
for all Americans.

In this case, petitioners seek to establish a rule 
that avoidance of discrimination against African 
Americans necessarily amounts to intentional dis­
crimination against whites. Given the persistence of 
racial discrimination against African Americans in



3

firefighting, this Court should reject petitioners’ at­
tempt to constrain employers’ ability “to self­
examine and to self-evaluate their employment prac­
tices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, 
the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious 
page in this country’s history.” Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (quoting United 
States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th 
Cir. 1973)). Petitioners’ argument would require 
employers to maintain employment practices that 
perpetuate discrimination against minorities, and 
would eviscerate this Court’s holding in Griggs that 
employment practices “cannot be maintained if they 
operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discrimina­
tory employment practices.” 401 U.S. at 430.

ARGUMENT
In 2003, New Haven’s fire department adminis­

tered civil service examinations for promotion to 
lieutenant and captain. All test-takers were re­
quired to meet certain minimum qualifications, in­
cluding experience in the New Haven Fire Depart­
ment. Pet. App. 352a, 365a. Based on the exam re­
sults, although twenty-seven of the 118 test-takers 
for both positions were African American, JA225-26, 
no African Americans would have been eligible to fill 
any vacancies for lieutenant or captain positions. 
After considering its obligations under federal anti- 
discrimination law, New Haven declined to certify 
the exam results.

In light of the history and persistence of racial 
discrimination in the New Haven Fire Department, 
the city’s decision here—to forgo making promotions 
based on a selection device that would produce un­



4

justified racial disparities in filling traditionally- 
segregated ranks that continue to exhibit conspicu­
ous imbalances—is entirely permissible under both 
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
I. Fire Departments Nationwide Have a Long

History of Excluding African Americans.
A. Fire Departments Were Foremost Among 

the Workplaces that Prompted Congress 
to Extend Title VII to Public Employers 
in 1972.

There have been few, if any, sectors of public or 
private employment where racial discrimination has 
been more firmly entrenched than it has been in fire­
fighting.2 Widespread racial discrimination in pub­
lic employment generally—and in fire departments 
in particular—was a key reason that Congress ex­
tended Title VII to state and local government em­
ployers in 1972, as the congressional record makes 
clear. Respondents’ efforts more than three decades 
later to eliminate continuing employment discrimi­
nation in filling supervisory positions within New 
Haven’s firefighting force must be viewed in light of 
this legislative history.

As originally enacted, Title VII exempted state 
and local employers from coverage. See Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 
241, 253 (1964) (defining the term “employer” to ex-

2 In addition to African Americans, other minorities and 
women have long been—and continue to be—excluded from 
employment as firefighters. See Br. of Amici National Partner­
ship for Women & Families, et al.; Br. of Amici Asian American 
Justice Center, et al.



5

elude “a State or political subdivision thereof’). Im­
mediately following the enactment of Title VII, the 
exclusion of state and local governments from the 
statute’s reach was identified as a serious shortcom­
ing because it permitted the perpetuation of race dis­
crimination in public sector employment. See, e.g., 
112 Cong. Rec. 6091-94 (1966) (statement of Sen. 
Javits); Equal Employment Opportunities Enforce­
ment Act: Hearings on S. 2453 Before the Subcomm. 
on Labor of the S. Comm, on Labor and Pub. Wel­
fare, 91st Cong. 73 (1969) (statement of Jack Green­
berg, Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educational Fund, Inc.); id. at 167-68 (statement of 
Howard Glickstein, Staff Director, U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights).3

In 1972, Congress amended Title VII and rede­
fined “employer” to include state and local govern­

3 In addition to extensive testimony at congressional hear­
ings in 1969, Congress heard from numerous witnesses at fur­
ther hearings in 1971 who stressed the need to extend Title VII 
to public employers. See Equal Employment Opportunities En­
forcement Act of 1971: Hearings on S. 2515, S. 2617, & H.R. 
1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm, on Labor 
and Pub. Welfare, 92d Cong. 59-61 (1971) (statement of William 
H. Brown, Chairman, EEOC); id. at 197 (statement of Rev. 
Theodore Hesburgh, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights); id. at 230 (statement of the AFL-CIO Executive Coun­
cil); id. at 404 (statement of Paul J. Minarchenko, Legislative 
Rep., AFSCME). In its 1968 report on the underlying causes of 
recent urban disturbances, the Kerner Commission also rec­
ommended extending Title VII. See Report of the National Ad­
visory Commission on Civil Disorders 234 (1968) (“Federal, 
state, and local efforts to [e]nsure equal opportunity in em­
ployment should be strengthened by . . . [ijncluding Federal, 
state, and local governmental agencies as employers covered by 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”).



6

ments, governmental agencies, and political subdivi­
sions. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 
(1972) (the “1972 Act”). In enacting the 1972 Act, 
Congress found that “widespread discrimination 
against minorities exists in State and local govern­
ment employment, and . . . the existence of this dis­
crimination is perpetuated by . . . both institutional 
and overt discriminatory practices.” H.R. Rep. No. 
92-238 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 
2152. Congress further determined that “employ­
ment discrimination in State and local governments 
is more pervasive than in the private sector.” Id.; see 
also S. Rep. No. 92-415, at 10 (1971), reprinted in S. 
Comm, on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 92d Cong., Legis­
lative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Act of 1972, at 419 (1972).

Congress singled out fire departments in particu­
lar as among the most egregious employers that jus­
tified the extension of Title VII: “Barriers to equal 
employment are greater in police and fire depart­
ments than in any other area of State and local gov­
ernment. . . . Negroes are not employed in significant 
numbers in police and fire departments.” 118 Cong. 
Rec. 1817 (1972) (quoting U.S. Comm’n on Civil 
Rights, For ALL the people . . .  By ALL the people: A 
Report on Equal Opportunity in State and Local 
Government Employment 119 (1969) [hereinafter 
1969 USCCR Report]).4

4 Throughout the congressional debates, Congress relied 
heavily upon the 1969 USCCR Report, which detailed perva­
sive discrimination against African Americans in public sector 
employment generally and in firefighting in particular. Sena­
tor Williams, the principal Senate sponsor of the 1972 Act, in­



7

Of particular relevance to this case, Congress 
found that “fire departments have discouraged mi­
nority persons from joining their ranks by failure to 
recruit effectively and by permitting unequal treat­
ment on the job including unequal promotional op­
portunities, discriminatory job assignments, and 
harassment by fellow workers.” Id. Congress also 
cited specific barriers to fair employment in fire de­
partments that included the denial of promotional 
opportunities because of “rel[iance] on criteria unre­
lated to job performance and on discriminatory su­
pervisory ratings,” as well as the use of “selection 
devices which are arbitrary, unrelated to job per­
formance, and result in unequal treatment of mi­
norities.” Id. Congress further found that discrimi­
nation was especially acute at the supervisory level: 
“Negro . . . firemen hold almost no positions in the 
officer ranks.” Id.

Congress was especially concerned that continued 
employment discrimination in firefighting and other 
highly visible jobs impaired government perform­
ance and democratic accountability: “The problem of 
employment discrimination is particularly acute and 
has the most deleterious effect in these governmen­
tal activities which are most visible to the minority 
communities . . . with the result that the credibility 
of the government’s claim to represent all the people

troduced excerpts of the 1969 USCCR Report into the Congres­
sional Record. 118 Cong. Rec. 1815 (1972) (statement of Sen. 
Williams); id. at 1816-19; see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 
440, 449-50 n.10 (1982) (noting Congress’s reliance on the 1969 
USCCR Report in extending Title VII to state and local em­
ployers).



8

equally is negated.” H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2153.

B. Congress Legislated Against a Backdrop 
of Widespread Segregation and Dis­
crimination in Firefighting.

When Congress extended Title VII to state and 
local governments in 1972, racial discrimination was 
widespread in fire departments nationwide.

1. Many fire departments refused to hire African 
Americans before the late 1950s or 1960s, and those 
that were willing to hire African Americans only did 
so in rare instances, assigned them to segregated 
firehouses, and subjected them to severe harass­
ment. For example, the Memphis fire department 
hired its first black employees in 1955, but did not 
integrate any fire stations until 1966. See 1969 
USCCR Report 71. The city of Atlanta first hired 
black firefighters in 1961, and maintained segre­
gated firehouses at least through 1969.5 See id. at 
71, 89. Other fire departments resisted integration 
long after this Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of

5 Other fire departments were even slower to hire blacks. 
Birmingham did not hire its first black firefighter until 1968. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(1), at 52 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 590 (House Report on the Civil Rights Act of 
1991) (“Birmingham’s history of . . . segregation and discrimi­
nation against blacks is well known. Because of such discrimi­
nation Birmingham did not hire its first black police officer un­
til 1966, its first black firefighter until 1968, [and] its second 
black firefighter until 1974.” (alterations in original) (quoting 
testimony of Richard Arrington, Mayor of Birmingham)). Dal­
las did not hire its first black firefighter until 1969. See City of 
Dallas v. Dallas Fire Fighters Ass’n, 526 U.S. 1046, 1046 (1999) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).



9

Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), outlawed segrega­
tion in public education. See, e.g., Hammon v. Barry, 
813 F.2d 412, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Mikva, J., dis­
senting) (Washington, D.C. maintained all-white and 
all-black fire companies until 1962); McNamara v. 
City of Chicago, 959 F. Supp. 870, 874 (N.D. 111.
1997) (Chicago maintained segregated firefighting 
companies until 1965), aff’d, 138 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir.
1998) ; Harper v. Mayor of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 
1187, 1195 n .ll  (D. Md.) (“Segregation persisted in 
the Baltimore Fire Department for more than a dec­
ade after [Brown].”), aff’d in relevant part sub nom. 
Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); 
1969 USCCR Report 71 (Baton Rouge maintained 
segregated fire stations at least through 1969).

Even after many fire departments were officially 
desegregated, black firefighters were routinely 
barred from using the same shared living and sleep­
ing quarters as whites. For example, after Washing­
ton, D.C. firehouses were desegregated in the 1960s, 
black firefighters were required for more than a dec­
ade to sleep in designated “C” beds and eat from 
separate “C” dishes and “C” utensils, for “Colored.” 
Hammon, 813 F.2d at 434; see also Firefighters Inst, 
for Racial Equal, v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 
514-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (describing all-white “supper 
clubs” that persisted in the St. Louis fire department 
through the late 1970s and required blacks to “cookQ 
and eat|] apart from their white associates”); 1969 
USCCR Report 71, 89 (finding that the only black 
firefighter employed in San Francisco in 1967 was 
required to carry his own mattress between stations 
during his training period); Robert J. Crawford Sr. 
with Delores A. Crawford, Black Fire: Portrait of a



10

Black Memphis Firefighter 64, 69 (2007) [hereinafter 
Black Fire] (black firefighters in Memphis slept in 
designated “Jim Crow” beds through the late 1960s). 
Nor did formal integration end racial hostility and 
discrimination, such as the assignment of blacks to 
the most dangerous positions on the job. See John C. 
McWilliams, “Men of Colour”: Race, Riots, and Black 
Firefighters’ Struggle for Equality from the AFA to 
the Valiants, 41 J. Soc. Hist. 105, 114 (Fall 2007).6

Those fire departments that did not entirely ex­
clude black firefighters frequently manipulated hir­
ing procedures to screen out black applicants. For 
instance, in the same year that the Memphis fire de­
partment eliminated its ban on hiring of African 
Americans, it also instituted—for the first time in its 
history—a high school diploma requirement, and 
then applied this requirement selectively to black 
candidates for more than two decades. See Black 
Fire 52, 105; see also David A. Goldberg, Courage 
Under Fire: African American Firefighters and the 
Struggle for Racial Equality 125-29, 254, 288 (Feb. 
2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Massachusetts Amherst) (describing changes in hir­
ing procedures in New York City, Los Angeles, and 
Baltimore during the 1950s and 1960s that had the 
effect of restricting African American hiring).

In 1973, the National Commission on Fire Pre­
vention and Control found widespread use of hiring 
practices unrelated to successful performance as a 
firefighter, with the result that “ [rjacial minorities

6 As discussed in Part II.B.2, infra, segregation and har­
assment of African American firefighters are by no means his­
torical practices only.



11

are under-represented in the fire departments in 
nearly every community in which they live.” Nat’l 
Comm’n on Fire Prevention & Control, America 
Burning 5, 35-37 (1973); see also Bill Kovach, Race 
Discrimination Found in U.S. Fire Departments, 
N.Y. Times, June 5, 1973, at 30 (quoting a staff 
member of the National Commission stating that 
“our fire departments are correctly called the last 
white man’s country club”).

Hiring barriers were paired with widespread re­
fusal to recruit black candidates. See 1969 USCCR 
Report 87 (“ [F]ire departments have not usually 
tried to recruit minority group members no matter 
how poorly they may have been represented in the 
department.”). Given the historical exclusion of 
blacks from firefighting jobs, reliance on word-of- 
mouth recruiting and nepotism also led to dispropor­
tionately low numbers of black applicants. See, e.g., 
Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836, 841, 849 (S.D. 
Ohio 1975) (holding that informal recruitment meth­
ods perpetuated racial discrimination because 
“whites only drew more whites to a predominantly 
white force”).

2. The exclusion of African Americans from 
meaningful participation in firefighting jobs was also 
perpetuated through discriminatory promotional 
practices. White supervisors often used discrimina­
tory ratings and assignments to keep black firefight­
ers from advancing. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst, for 
Racial Equal, v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235, 241- 
42 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that the St. Louis fire de­
partment’s practice of disproportionately assigning 
temporary supervisory positions to whites deprived 
black firefighters of opportunities for supervisory



12

experience); McNamara, 959 F. Supp. at 875; Black 
Fire 79; 1969 USCCR Report 86. Black firefighters 
were also denied the training and mentoring that 
white firefighters received. See McNamara, 959 F. 
Supp. at 874-75; Harper, 359 F. Supp. at 1194 & n.7 
(describing Baltimore firefighter’s testimony that 
promotion exam materials were made “freely avail­
able to whites” in the firehouse but not shown to 
him); see also Black Fire 47-50, 52; Carol
Chetkovich, Real Heat: Gender and Race in the Ur­
ban Fire Service 84-85, 116-17 (1997). Some fire de­
partments adopted formal or informal quotas that 
prevented qualified blacks from being promoted. 
McNamara, 959 F. Supp. at 875 (finding that in Chi­
cago, until the late 1970s, “a black would not be 
promoted to these upper ranks unless another black 
vacated the position”).

As a result, black firefighters have typically been 
promoted at a much slower rate than white firefight­
ers. See id., 959 F. Supp. at 875 (reviewing promo­
tional statistics in Chicago from 1973 to 1993 and 
finding that “ [t]he length of time it has taken for 
blacks to be promoted from firefighter to lieutenant 
has been significantly longer than that for whites”); 
Black Fire 52.

3. Because firefighters are required to share liv­
ing space while on the job, firefighting has been par­
ticularly resistant to racial integration. The pattern 
of exclusion, segregation, and discrimination de­
scribed above has been reinforced and perpetuated 
by this particular feature of the job. See 1969 
USCCR Report 87 (“[T]he unusual working ar­
rangement of firemen has given rise to many forms 
of prejudiced attitudes and treatment.”).



13

Firefighters are typically assigned to work 
twenty-four-hour shifts, and live, eat, and work at 
their fire station while on duty. See Mems v. City of 
St. Paul, Dep’t of Fire & Safety Servs., 327 F.3d 771, 
775 (8th Cir. 2003); Denise M. Hulett et al., Enhanc­
ing Women’s Inclusion in Firefighting in the USA, 8 
Int’l J. of Diversity in Organisations, Communities & 
Nations 189, 190 (2008) [hereinafter Enhancing In­
clusion]. While these facets of firefighting— 
combined with its prestige, good pay, job security, 
and valuable societal contribution—have made it a 
desirable job for many Americans, they have also 
created an organizational culture that has been par­
ticularly resistant to integration. As the U.S. Com­
mission on Civil Rights found, “ [bjecause firemen 
live together, fire department integration involves a 
greater degree of intimacy . . . [and has] been more 
vigorously resisted.” 1969 USCCR Report 88.

This distinctive firefighting culture is a primary 
reason that fire departments resisted efforts to 
eliminate discrimination longer and more vigorously 
than perhaps any other employer, with the result 
that, as discussed in Part II, infra, discrimination 
persists today despite nearly four decades of en­
forcement efforts.
II. Egregious Discrimination Persists in Fire

Departments Nationwide, Despite Efforts to
Enforce Title VII’s Mandate.
As noted, the 1972 Act extended Title VII’s reach 

to state and local government employers. One year 
earlier, this Court held that Title VII permitted em­
ployees to challenge not only overt discrimination 
but also job-selection procedures “that operate as



14

‘built-in headwinds’ for minority groups and are un­
related to measuring job capability.” Griggs, 401 
U.S. at 432. In the nearly four decades since Griggs 
and the 1972 Act, Title YII enforcement has yielded 
partial, uneven results. While employment practices 
in many fire departments have improved since the 
1970s, discrimination and racial disparities persist, 
both in New Haven and throughout the country.

A. New Haven Has Yet to Eliminate the Ef­
fects of Entrenched Racially Discrimina­
tory Practices in Its Fire Department.

Petitioners contend that “New Haven and its offi­
cials have a documented history of violating Con­
necticut law to give minorities advantageous treat­
ment in public employment.” Pet. Br. 29; see also id. 
at 5-6. This assertion is false. As respondents them­
selves acknowledge, “the City Fire Department’s liti­
gation history demonstrates discrimination against 
African-Americans, not whites.” Resp’t Br. 38-39.7 
And the historical and present record make clear 
that although New Haven has made some progress

7 Petitioners cite four recent cases in support of their claim 
that New Haven “stood accused in multiple suits of repeatedly 
and intentionally discriminating against whites.” Pet. Br. 5. 
But each cited case deals with a dispute over the interpretation 
of various civil service rules, and not one includes a finding 
that New Haven currently—or ever—discriminated against 
white employees. See Kelly v. City of New Haven, 881 A.2d 978, 
981-82, 986, 1000-01 (Conn. 2005); Hurley v. City of New Ha­
ven, No. 054009317, 2006 WL 1609974, at *l-*5 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. May 23, 2006); Henry v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, No. 411287, 
2001 WL 862658, at *1, *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 3, 2001); 
Bombalicki v. Pastore, No. 378772, 2001 WL 267617, at *1, *9- 
*10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2001), aff’d, 804 A.2d 856 (Conn. 
App. Ct. 2002); see also Resp’t Br. 4-5, 38-39 & n.34.



15

toward inclusion of blacks, principally in entry-level 
firefighting positions, it has never eradicated racial 
discrimination from its firefighting workforce.

1. When the New Haven fire department first 
became subject to Title VII in 1972, it mirrored the 
historical nationwide pattern of black exclusion from 
firefighting. As of the following year, the depart­
ment had barely opened its ranks to minority fire­
fighters: only 18 of 502 firefighters (3.6%) were black 
and none was Hispanic, though New Haven’s popu­
lation was 30% black and Hispanic at the time. See 
Firebird Soc’y of New Haven, Inc. v. New Haven Bd. 
of Fire Comm’rs, 66 F.R.D. 457, 460 (D. Conn.), aff’d 
mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975). The exclusion of 
black firefighters was even more pronounced at the 
supervisory level: “of the 107 officers in the Depart­
ment only one was black, and he held the lowest 
rank above private.” Id.

In 1973, the Firebird Society—an organization of 
black firefighters in the New Haven fire depart­
ment—sued the department to challenge “a pattern 
of willful discrimination” in hiring and promotions. 
Id. at 459-60. The lawsuit challenged “almost all as­
pects of the hiring and promotional practices” of the 
fire department, and alleged that New Haven’s entry 
exam, minimum requirements, promotional exam, 
time-in-grade requirements, and the use of supervi­
sory recommendations in promotions were all dis­
criminatory devices. Id. The suit ended in a consent 
decree requiring the department to increase minor­
ity recruiting, develop job-related entrance and pro­
motional exams, and modify other promotional prac­
tices to diminish the adverse impact of those prac­
tices on black firefighters. Id. at 461-63.



16

In 1989, the Firebird Society again filed suit to 
challenge discrimination against black and Hispanic 
firefighters in promotions. See New Haven Firebird 
Soc’y v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 593 A.2d 1383, 1384 
(Conn. 1991). A Connecticut appellate court upheld 
a trial court finding that the department’s long­
standing practice of disproportionately promoting 
white individuals to positions that were not yet va­
cant, just prior to the expiration of a promotion eligi­
bility list, violated civil service laws. See New Haven 
Firebird Soc’y v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs, 630 A.2d 131, 
134-35 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).

In 1998, black firefighters sued New Haven to 
challenge the practice of using lower-ranked officers 
to fill positions budgeted for a higher rank. See 
Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 851 A.2d 1113, 1118 
& n.2 (Conn. 2004). This practice, known as “under­
filling,” introduced a larger number of white lieuten­
ants into the candidate pool for captain exams, and 
resulted in blacks receiving fewer promotions. Id. at 
1122, 1130, 1138. In 2004, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the prac­
tice violated civil service laws, and reversed the trial 
court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claim of intentional 
discrimination against black firefighters. Id. at 
1131-36, 1138-39. Two of the plaintiffs, John 
Brantley and Christopher Texeira, won sizeable jury 
verdicts and awards of front pay and back pay based 
on those claims of race discrimination. See Broad­
nax v. City of New Haven, No. CV980412193S, 2008 
WL 590818, at *l-*2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 19, 
2008); Broadnax v. City of New Haven, No. 
CV980412193S, 2007 WL 155138, at *1 (Conn. Su­
per. Ct. Jan. 2, 2007).



17

2. Despite these repeated and successful lawsuits 
challenging discrimination against black employees, 
New Haven has made limited progress in promoting 
minority firefighters. Severe shortfalls persist in the 
number of African Americans among the officer 
ranks—the very positions at issue in this litigation.

For example, in 1973, there were no African 
Americans among the thirty-four captains in the de­
partment. Firebird Soc’y, 66 F.R.D. at 460. More 
than three decades later, the department’s im­
provement is marginal: in 2005, just one out of 
twenty-one captains was black. JA217. Within the 
officer ranks as a whole, minorities are similarly un­
der-represented. Of thirty-two officers at the level of 
captain or higher, there were just three African 
Americans and three Hispanics in 2005. JA218.

This significant shortfall is not due to a shortage 
of black entry-level firefighters, where—in contrast 
to the supervisory ranks—New Haven has made 
some progress in hiring people of color. According to 
New Haven’s most recent EEO-4 data,8 in 2007, Af­
rican Americans held 32% of entry-level positions in 
the fire department, but only 15% of supervisory po­
sitions. See City of New Haven, State and Local 
Government Information Report EEO-4 (2007).

This substantial disparity between minority rep­
resentation in entry-level and supervisory positions 
suggests the presence of systematic barriers to ad­

8 An EEO-4 Report is a report that state and local govern­
ments with over one hundred employees are required to submit 
biennially to the EEOC, recording the number of employees by 
race, sex, and job function (including fire protection). See 29 
C.F.R. §§ 1602.30, 1602.32.



18

vancement for minorities, because the skills needed 
to perform effectively as a supervisor are generally 
those learned through observation and performance 
on the job as an entry-level firefighter. See In re 
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment 
Litig., 20 F.3d 1525, 1537-38 & n.18 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(“Training and experience as a firefighter are special 
skills required of those who would become fire lieu­
tenants. As such, to determine if an imbalance ex­
isted . . . the appropriate comparison is between 
black representation in the . . . lieutenant ranks and 
black representation among entry-level firefight­
ers.”).9 This disparity also highlights the distance 
New Haven has yet to travel in redressing the con­
cerns that originally motivated the extension of Title 
VII through the 1972 Act. See 118 Cong. Rec. 1817 
(1972) (finding that “ [promotional opportunities are 
not made available to minorities on an equal ba­
sis. . . . Negro . . . firemen hold almost no positions in 
the officer ranks.”).

B. Nationally, Overt Discrimination and 
Racial Disparities Persist in Firefighter 
Employment.

The experience of black firefighters in New Ha­
ven reflects the experiences of black firefighters 
around the country. Although Title VII enforcement

9 See also Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446, 450-52 (1st Cir. 
1991); Horan v. City of Chicago, No. 98-C-2850, 2003 WL 
22284090, at *53 (N.D. 111. Sept. 30, 2003) (“The work of a fire­
fighter, an engineer, a lieutenant, a captain, and a battalion 
chief is largely learned through observation and on-the-job 
training. . . . The evidence at trial established that on average, 
whites, African-Americans, and Latinos have performed 
equally well in each of these positions.”).



19

efforts have yielded some progress, it has been fitful 
and incomplete.

1. Shortly after Congress passed the 1972 Act, 
private litigants as well as the United States De­
partment of Justice, through its Civil Rights Divi­
sion, began challenging discrimination by fire de­
partments against minorities and women. See U.S. 
Comm’n on Civil Rights, To Eliminate Employment 
Discrimination, A Sequel: The Federal Civil Rights 
Enforcement Effort— 1977, at 270 (1977). These en­
forcement actions resulted in judicial findings of 
unlawful discrimination against African Americans 
by fire departments in all regions of the country, in­
cluding Cleveland, Birmingham, St. Louis, New 
York City, Newark, Bridgeport, Buffalo, Philadel­
phia, Massachusetts (state-wide), San Francisco, 
Baltimore, and Minneapolis.10 11

10 See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of 
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 506 (1986) (citing Headen v. City of 
Cleveland, No. C73-330 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 1975)) (Cleveland); 
Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812, 814, 816-22 
(5th Cir. 1980) (Birmingham); Firefighters Inst., 549 F.2d at 
509-15 (St. Louis); Vulcan Soc’y of N.Y. City Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. 
Civil Serv. Comm’n, 490 F.2d 387, 391-98 (2d Cir. 1973) (New 
York City); United States v. New Jersey, 530 F. Supp. 328, 334- 
38 (D.N.J. 1981) (Newark); Ass’n. Against Discrimination in 
Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F. Supp. 101, 104-
11 (D. Conn. 1979) (Bridgeport), aff’d in relevant part, 647 F.2d 
256 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 
621-23, 627-29, 639 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (Buffalo), aff’d in relevant 
part, 633 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Pennsylvania v. 
Rizzo, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1475, 1480 (E.D. Pa. 
1975) (Philadelphia); Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 371 
F. Supp. 507, 513-17 (D. Mass.) (Massachusetts state-wide), 
aff’d, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); W. Addition Cmty. Org. v. 
Alioto, 369 F. Supp. 77, 79 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (San Francisco);



20

Other fire department lawsuits were resolved 
through settlement agreements negotiated after em­
ployers were confronted with compelling evidence of 
segregation of black employees, deliberate exclusion 
of blacks from the workforce, and gross racial dis­
parities caused by non-job-related selection devices. 
See, e.g., Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Civil 
Serv., 832 F.2d 811, 813 (3d Cir. 1987) (covering 
twelve fire departments in New Jersey); United 
States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1365-66 
& n.14 (5th Cir. 1980) (approving a consent decree in 
light of egregious racial disparities in forty-five local 
fire and police departments in Louisiana), abrogated 
on other grounds as recognized in Dean v. City of 
Shreveport, 438 F.3d 448, 452 n.l (5th Cir. 2006); 
Vulcan Soc’y of Westchester County, Inc. v. Fire 
Dep’t, Nos. 78 Civ. 0911, 80 Civ. 0336, 1996 WL 
481066, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1996) (describing 
1981 consent decrees covering four fire departments 
in Westchester County, New York); Alexander v. Ba- 
hou, 86 F.R.D. 194, 196, 198-204 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(entering consent decree covering Syracuse fire and 
police departments).

In many cases, however, consent decrees proved 
insufficient to root out persistent discrimination. 
For instance, the Third Circuit in 1983 described 
“the tenacious grasp of discrimination” in the Wil­
mington, Delaware fire department, notwithstand­
ing a prior consent decree. See Wilmore v. City of 
Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667, 668, 675 (3d Cir. 1983)

Harper, 359 F. Supp. at 1194-1212 (Baltimore); Carter v. Gal­
lagher, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 692, 693, 695-700, 708 
(D. Minn. 1971) (Minneapolis), aff’d in relevant part, 452 F.2d 
315 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc).



21

(noting that minorities made up 48% of Wilmington’s 
labor force but only 15% of the firefighter force and 
4% of the officer ranks, and explaining that impor­
tant training opportunities were assigned exclu­
sively to whites because of the “personal preferences” 
of superior officers).

2. As a result of these private and federal en­
forcement efforts, there has been some progress, if 
uneven, in firefighter employment, but discrimina­
tion and racial disparities persist.

Explicit, intentional discrimination endures. As 
late as 2004, most black firefighters in Cleveland 
were assigned to station houses within one battalion 
that was “pejoratively labeled ‘Monkey Island.’” 
Jordan u. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 589 & n.6, 
597 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting also that one predomi­
nantly white firehouse featured “a ‘Wall of Hate,’ a 
partition erected by white firefighters with deroga­
tory comments directed toward black firefighters . . . 
[that] remained in place until 1999”). These are not 
isolated incidents. Minority firefighters nationwide 
continue to experience disparate treatment: Accord­
ing to a recent survey, 44.7% of firefighters of color 
reported that they have been treated differently be­
cause of their race during their careers. See Enhanc­
ing Inclusion 195.

Disparities in hiring and promotions also persist. 
Census data reveal significant under-representation 
of African Americans and other minorities in fire de­
partments at the national and local levels. A recent 
study of 2000 census data concluded that nation­
wide, racial and ethnic minorities accounted for 
16.7% of the firefighter workforce, compared to



22

30.1% of benchmark occupations.11 Id. at 193. Ac­
cordingly, persons of color were employed at just 
over half of their expected rate compared to bench­
mark jobs. Id.

Recent findings of liability for Title VII disparate 
impact discrimination against black firefighters bear 
out these national figures. Entrance examinations 
continue to produce gross and unjustified disparate 
impact in firefighter hiring, even in municipalities 
that have long been subject to enforcement efforts 
aimed at opening the firefighter ranks. For example, 
the state of Massachusetts was recently found to 
have violated Title VII by using state-wide fire­
fighter hiring exams in both 2002 and 2004 that had 
an unjustified adverse impact on minority candi­
dates. See Bradley v. City of Lynn, 443 F. Supp. 2d 
145, 167-75 (D. Mass. 2006). The district court con­
cluded that the multiple-choice exams in question 
were not job-related because they did not test for 
important skills that were predictive of an appli­
cant’s future success on the job. See id. at 172-73. 
The state’s continuing discriminatory testing prac­
tices occurred notwithstanding enforcement efforts 
begun over thirty years ago to eradicate hiring dis­
crimination in firefighter jobs throughout Massachu­
setts. See Boston Chapter, NAACP u. Beecher, 504 
F.2d 1017, 1018, 1026-28 (1st Cir. 1974); see also 
Bradley, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 150-51, 175-76 (describ­
ing the Beecher litigation and noting that “ [tjhirty

11 The study defined benchmark occupations to include 184 
jobs that share with firefighting the characteristics of being 
“demanding, dirty, or dangerous.” Enhancing Inclusion 193.



23

years later, not much has changed.”).12
Fire departments have also been subject to recent 

enforcement action for imposing hiring standards 
that disproportionately screen out black candidates 
and bear no relationship to the job of firefighting. 
The Department of Justice entered into a settlement 
agreement last month with the city of Dayton, Ohio, 
where the past twenty-five years have seen a dra­
matic decline in African Americans in the city’s fire 
department, from 7.0% in 1984 to 2.4% in 2008. See 
Proposed Consent Decree, United States v. City of 
Dayton, No. 3:08-cv-348 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2009); 
Complaint f  f  6, 8, United States v. City of Dayton, 
No. 3:08-cv-348 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2008) (blacks 
make up only 2.4% of firefighters compared to 36.8% 
of the city’s civilian labor force). The settlement re­
quires the city to eliminate a certification require­
ment it imposed on entry-level applicants that dis­
proportionately screened out black candidates. See 
Proposed Consent Decree flf 9-11, United States v. 
City of Dayton.

Towns in the New Haven metropolitan area also 
continue to have egregious problems in firefighter 
hiring. East Haven, which is adjacent to New Ha­
ven, has been particularly slow to hire black employ­

12 Other jurisdictions have recently been found to discrimi­
nate against black applicants in firefighter hiring as well. See, 
e.g., Lewis v. City of Chicago, No. 98-C-5596, 2005 WL 693618, 
at *8-*15 (N.D. 111. Mar. 22, 2005) (holding that Chicago dis­
criminated against black applicants in firefighter hiring be­
tween 1996 and 2001 by using exam results that had an unjus­
tified racially disparate impact), rev’d on other grounds, 528 
F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2008), petition for cert, filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 
3449 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009) (No. 08-974).



24

ees—as of 1996, East Haven had never hired a single 
black police or fire department employee. See 
NAACP v. Town of E. Haven, 998 F. Supp. 176, 178, 
185-88 (D. Conn. 1998) (ruling that East Haven 
must alter its recruitment efforts to overcome the 
“perception in the black community that the Town is 
closed to black employment, unwelcomingly hostile, 
and resistant”); see also Mark Zaretsky, 6 Years Af­
ter Suit, NAACP Says East Haven Should Try 
Harder, New Haven Reg., Mar. 1, 2004 (noting that 
by 2004, East Haven had three black volunteer fire­
fighters but not a single paid minority firefighter).

In addition to these recent findings and settle­
ments, there are numerous disparate impact law­
suits pending around the country that challenge un­
justified racial disparities in black firefighter em­
ployment. For example, a pending lawsuit in New 
York City challenges disparate impact in two fire­
fighter hiring exams and notes that New York City’s 
fire department is currently made up of only 3% 
black firefighters, in a city that is nearly 27% 
black13—evidencing only marginal progress in the 
decades since 1973, when the Second Circuit held 
that the New York fire department’s selection proce­
dures impermissibly discriminated against black and 
Hispanic applicants. See Complaint f f  1, 6, United 
States v. City of New York, No. 07-cv-2067 (E.D.N.Y. 
May 21, 2007); Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Complaint 
I f  1-2, 30-31, United States v. City of New York, No. 
07-cv-2067 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2007); Vulcan Soc’y of

13 See U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts, 
New York (city), New York, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ 
states/36/3651000.html.

http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/


25

N.Y. City Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 490 
F.2d 387, 391-98 (2d Cir. 1973).14

The volume and nature of this ongoing litigation 
make clear the continuing extent of racial discrimi­
nation in firefighting jobs not only in New Haven but 
throughout the country.
III. The History and Persistence of Racial 

Discrimination in Firefighting Should In­
form the Court’s Resolution of This Case.

The persistence of discrimination in firefighting 
provides justification for a municipal employer to 
suspend promotions based on a selection device with 
significant racial disparities, especially where, as 
here, the employer reasonably believed that the test­
ing procedures were flawed and that less discrimina­
tory alternatives were available.

A. Title VII Does Not Prohibit Employers 
from Declining to Use Selection Proce­
dures that May Perpetuate Racial Dis­
parities in Traditionally Segregated Job 
Categories.

Past and present context is critically relevant in 
assessing both New Haven’s effort to comply with 
Title VII and petitioners’ challenge to New Haven’s 
actions.

14 See also Coffey v. Braddy, No. 3:71-cv-44, 2009 WL 
591280, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2009) (reopening lawsuit chal­
lenging discrimination against black applicants in Jacksonville, 
Florida firefighter hiring); Bazile v. City of Houston, No. H-08- 
2404, 2008 WL 4899635, at *2-*6 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2008) (de­
nying motion to dismiss black firefighters’ Title VII claims re­
garding promotional exams).



26

In justifying its decision to reject racially dispa­
rate results from an employee selection practice, an 
employer need not prove that use of the practice 
would violate Title VII or even amount to an “argu­
able violation.” Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa 
Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 630 (1987) (quoting 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 
212 (1979)). Rather, an employer “need point only to 
a ‘conspicuous . . . imbalance in traditionally segre­
gated job categories,’” and demonstrate that its ac­
tions to address that imbalance do not “unnecessar­
ily trammel” the interests of any adversely affected 
employees. Id. at 630 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 
208-09).

Petitioners argue that respondents’ decision to 
suspend the 2003 promotions was motivated by ille­
gal discrimination against white firefighters. Pet. 
Br. 18-20, 23-27, 45-47. But in light of the record in 
this case and New Haven’s ongoing efforts to over­
come the legacy of discrimination in its fire depart­
ment, petitioners cannot meet their burden to show 
a dispute of material fact to support their allegation 
that New Haven’s non-discriminatory rationale— 
compliance with Title VII—is a pretext for unlawful 
discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502, 506-08 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55 (1981).

Respondents easily satisfy the standard set forth 
in Johnson and Weber. As described in Part II.A, 
supra, there is presently a conspicuous imbalance 
within New Haven’s firefighter ranks, especially 
within the lieutenant and captain positions that are 
at issue in this case. Petitioners themselves concede 
that if minority firefighters had challenged the pro­



27

motional exams at issue here, the test results would 
have constituted prima facie evidence of a disparate 
impact violation, see Pet. Br. 50-51, a showing that 
this Court has held is far more than sufficient to 
meet the conspicuous imbalance requirement. John­
son, 480 U.S. at 632-33 & n.10.

In addition, the historical record makes clear that 
firefighting—both in New Haven and throughout the 
country—is a “traditionally segregated job category.” 
Id. at 632. Indeed, New Haven has a long history of 
discrimination against African Americans in its fire­
fighting force, and especially in the supervisory 
ranks. See Part II.A, supra.

Finally, New Haven’s actions did not unnecessar­
ily trammel petitioners’ interests. New Haven did 
not create an “absolute bar” to petitioners’ advance­
ment, and did not impose any racial quotas. John­
son, 480 U.S. at 637-39. New Haven simply decided 
not to certify the racially-disparate results of promo­
tional tests, having determined that there would be 
equally effective ways to select candidates for promo­
tional positions with less adverse impact.15 See 29

15 There have been some instances where efforts to redress 
discrimination against minorities in firefighting have been suc­
cessfully challenged by white employees. See, e.g., Dean, 438 
F.3d at 452-53, 462-63 (holding that part of the city of Shreve­
port’s firefighter hiring process, adopted to comply with a 1980 
consent decree, violated Title VII by establishing different cut­
off scores—and therefore different hiring lists—by race); 
Biondo v. City of Chicago, 382 F.3d 680, 682-85 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that Chicago violated Title VII and the Equal Protec­
tion Clause by creating separate promotions lists by race and 
then promoting from each list in strict proportion to the racial 
make-up of all test-takers). However, respondents’ actions here 
did not involve anything like the quotas or other aggressive



28

C.F.R. §§ 1607.3, 1607.4(C)(1) (EEOC Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures). All 
of the petitioners retained their current jobs and 
have not even alleged that they will be unable to 
compete with all other eligible firefighters when new 
promotional exams are developed and implemented. 
See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 638.

As the United States explains in its amicus brief, 
petitioners cannot show that New Haven’s non- 
discriminatory reason is pretextual unless petition­
ers can demonstrate that the city’s concerns about 
Title VII compliance were “unreasonable.” Br. of 
United States 17. Petitioners fail to meet that bur­
den. The reasonableness of New Haven’s actions is 
amply supported by the gross racial disparity in the 
test results, see Resp’t Br. 27-28, the substantial 
doubts regarding the tests’ job-relatedness that 
emerged during the Civil Service Board hearings, see 
Resp’t Br. 28-32, and the evidence of less discrimina­
tory alternatives, see Resp’t Br. 32-35.16

The history and persistence of discrimination in 
New Haven’s fire department further undercut any

remedial plans that have been successfully challenged by white 
firefighters in the past; rather, the city’s efforts represented a 
modest attempt to ensure compliance with the core principles 
of Title VII. See Resp’t Br. 5-10.

16 The amicus brief of well-reputed industrial psychologists 
makes clear that New Haven’s promotional tests fell well short 
of the standard set by other fire departments around the coun­
try in developing selection processes that are better able to 
identify candidates with the knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
other personal characteristics needed to perform successfully as 
fire lieutenants and captains. See Br. of Amici Industrial- 
Organizational Psychologists.



29

contention that the city’s stated motives were pre- 
textual. Given New Haven’s uneven and incomplete 
efforts to eliminate the longstanding barriers to pro­
motion of minority firefighters, it is surely reason­
able for the Civil Service Board to engage in a trans­
parent review process when faced with promotional 
tests that produce unexpectedly large racial dispari­
ties. “[V]oluntary employer action can play a crucial 
role in . . . eliminating the effects of discrimination 
in the workplace, and . . . Title VII should not be 
read to thwart such efforts.” Johnson, 480 U.S. at 
630.

B. Employer Efforts to Ensure Fair Selec­
tion Procedures Do Not Trigger Strict 
Scrutiny.

Petitioners’ contention that constitutional strict 
scrutiny should be triggered by New Haven’s actions, 
Pet. Br. 21-27, is fundamentally an attack on Title 
VH’s disparate impact standard as articulated by 
this Court in Griggs and codified by Congress in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 
429-30, 436; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A). As de­
tailed above, since the extension of Title VII to states 
and localities, the disparate impact standard has 
played a key role in enforcement actions to root out 
pervasive discrimination in firefighting by disman­
tling tests that are unrelated to job performance.17

17 In fact, in codifying the disparate impact standard in the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress again relied specifically on 
evidence of discrimination in firefighting and recognized the 
importance of the disparate impact standard in challenging 
ongoing discrimination in firefighter employment. See H.R. 
Rep. No. 102-40(1), at 99-100 (1991), reprinted, in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 637-38.



30

This Court recognized in Griggs that Title VII re­
flected Congress’s intent to impose upon employers 
an affirmative obligation “to achieve equality of em­
ployment opportunities and remove barriers that 
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable 
group of white employees over other employees.” 
401 U.S. at 429-30. This obligation is especially im­
portant where, as here, racial discrimination has en­
dured in a particular workforce. See Weber, 443 U.S. 
at 197-99, 203-04 (“[T]he crux of the problem [ad­
dressed by Title VII was] to open employment oppor­
tunities to Negroes in occupations which have been 
traditionally closed to them.” (quoting 110 Cong. 
Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey))).

Petitioners do not suggest that there was a need 
for heightened constitutional review of New Haven’s 
efforts to design promotional tests that complied 
with Title VII. See Pet. Br. 6-10, 41; cf. Hayden v. 
County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1999). 
The level of constitutional scrutiny should not be in­
creased simply because New Haven determined— 
after its new promotional tests yielded even greater 
racial disparities than prior tests, see Resp’t Br. 6— 
that additional steps were necessary to avoid per­
petuating discrimination in the fire department’s ra­
cially-stratified promotional ranks. The City’s addi­
tional steps here (including the decision to investi­
gate further, the identification of possible flaws in 
the test design, the consideration of less discrimina­
tory alternatives, and the conclusion that the test 
results should not be certified) did not involve the 
allocation of specific positions to particular individu­
als or any other “dispositions based on race.” Ada- 
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239



31

(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring). Even assuming that 
compliance with a civil rights statute is a race­
conscious measure, strict scrutiny does not apply to 
such “race-conscious measures to address [a] prob­
lem in a general way.” Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2792-93 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment).

C. If Strict Scrutiny Applies, Title VII Com­
pliance is a Compelling Interest in Light 
of the History and Persistence of Dis­
crimination in Firefighting.

If strict scrutiny applies, this Court should find 
that New Haven had a compelling interest in com­
plying with Title VII. As an initial matter, notwith­
standing petitioners’ suggestion to the contrary, Pet. 
Br. 28-33, none of this Court’s precedents in any way 
suggest that a public employer does not have a com­
pelling interest in avoiding a violation of Title VII’s 
disparate impact proscription. As demonstrated in 
Part I.A, supra, when Congress decided in 1972 to 
extend Title VII to state and local employers, it had 
before it a record filled with evidence of egregious 
racial discrimination by public employers generally 
and fire departments in particular.

The central dispute with respect to petitioners’ 
constitutional claim focuses on the amount of evi­
dence that New Haven was required to present to 
show a “strong basis in evidence” that its actions 
were necessary to advance a compelling interest. 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 
500 (1989) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion)). Under



32

this Court’s precedents, it is clear that the requisite 
showing is something less than proof of prior dis­
crimination. Id,.; see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 211-IS 
(plurality opinion); id. at 290-92 (O’Connor, J., con­
curring). In Croson, this Court indicated that the 
“strong basis” requirement is satisfied by evidence 
“approaching a prima facie case of a constitutional or 
statutory violation.” Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. On 
the facts of this case, the Court need not resolve 
whether, as Croson suggests, something less than a 
prima facie case may suffice, because petitioners ac­
knowledge that the evidence of adverse impact in the 
promotional tests at issue would suffice to establish 
a Title VII prima facie case. Pet. Br. 50-51.

The rationale behind and historical development 
of the Title VII disparate impact framework compel 
the conclusion that the “strong basis” test is satisfied 
by a prima facie showing of disparate impact.18 One 
of the primary purposes of the disparate impact 
standard is to screen out subtle or surreptitious in­
tentional discrimination. See In re Employment Dis­
crimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1322

18 Applying Croson’s standard, a number of federal courts 
have held that the demonstration of a prima facie case of Title 
VII disparate impact is sufficient to satisfy the “strong basis in 
evidence” requirement. See Donaghy v. City of Omaha, 933 
F.2d 1448, 1458-60 (8th Cir. 1991); Davis v. City of San Fran­
cisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1442-44, 1446-47 (9th Cir. 1989); Howard 
v. McLucas, 871 F.2d 1000, 1007-08 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing 
Howard v. McLucas, 671 F. Supp. 756, 760-61 (M.D. Ga. 1987)); 
United States v. New Jersey, 75 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 
1602, 1611, 1614-15 (D.N.J. 1995); Paganucci v. City of New 
York, 785 F. Supp. 467, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 993 F.2d 
310, 312 (2d Cir. 1993) (adopting the district court’s reasoning).



33

(11th Cir. 1999). As Eleventh Circuit Judge Tjoflat 
has noted:

[A] prima facie finding of disparate impact 
by the court means that the plaintiff has 
demonstrated that the challenged practice 
(and not something else) actually causes the 
discriminatory impact at issue. Though the 
plaintiff is never explicitly required to dem­
onstrate discriminatory motive, a genuine 
finding of disparate impact can be highly 
probative of the employer’s motive since a 
racial “imbalance is often a telltale sign of 
purposeful discrimination.”

Id. at 1321 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 339-40 n.20 (1977)). In other 
words, the Title VII disparate impact framework 
provides a powerful evidentiary tool in cases where 
discrimination may otherwise be difficult to prove; it 
proceeds by countering ordinary explanations other 
than discriminatory intent for an employment policy 
or practice with a demonstrably adverse impact.

Equally important, the disparate impact frame­
work is also intended to eliminate employment prac­
tices that may be neutral on their face but neverthe­
less perpetuate racial disparities without business 
justification, thereby “freezing” in place the status 
quo created by prior racial discrimination. Griggs, 
401 U.S. at 430; see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (“ [T]he necessary 
premise of the disparate impact approach is that 
some employment practices, adopted without a de­
liberately discriminatory motive, may in operation



34

be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimina­
tion”).

Accordingly, a prima facie case of disparate im­
pact is tantamount to evidence of either surrepti­
tious intentional discrimination or self-perpetuating 
racial hierarchy in the workplace. Prohibiting public 
employers from taking remedial action in such con­
texts—especially in a job category like firefighting 
that is characterized by both past and present dis­
crimination—would severely undermine Title VII’s 
goal of encouraging voluntary compliance. See Kol- 
stad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) 
(“Dissuading employers from implementing pro­
grams or policies to prevent discrimination in the 
workplace is directly contrary to the purposes under­
lying Title VII.”). Voluntary compliance is particu­
larly essential because Title VII “aims, chiefly, ‘not 
to provide redress but to avoid harm.”’ Id. at 545 
(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 
775, 806 (1998)).

New Haven should not be penalized for heeding 
Congress’s clear directive that employers “self­
examine” their employment practices and voluntar­
ily cease those practices that perpetuate discrimina­
tion. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 417-18.



35

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those out­

lined by respondents, the decision below should be 
affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

John Payton 
Counsel of Record 

Jacqueline A. Berrien 
Debo P. Adegbile 
Matthew Colangelo 
ReNika C. Moore 
Joy Milligan 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 965-2200

Joshua Civin 
NAACP Legal Defense & 

Educational Fund, Inc. 
1444 I Street, NW, 10th Floor 
Washington, DC 20005

March 25,2009