Motion for Order of Compliance

    Cv 89-0360977S 

MILO SHEFF, et al SUPERIOR COURT 
: J.D. HARTFORD/NEW 

Plaintiffs NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD 

Ve. 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, et al 

Defendants MAY 14, 1992 

MOTION FOR ORDER OF COMPLIANCE 
  

Pursuant to P.B. § 231 the defendants hereby seek an order 

of compliance requiring the plaintiffs to provide full and final 

answers which are directly responsive to each of the following 

questions in the defendants' first set of interrogatories which 

were served on the plaintiffs on or about July 13, 1990: 

QUESTIONS i1, 2, 3,4, 85, 6,.7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 

15, 16 and 19. 

The answers which the plaintiffs have served upon the 

defendants to date are largely unresponsive and wholly 

incomplete. Furthermore, the objections which the plaintiffs 

have offered in response to questions 8, 9, and 10 are unfounded. 

WHEREFORE, the defendants ask that this motion for order of 

compliance be granted, that the plaintiffs' previous answers to    



      

interrogatories listed above be stricken, that a specific 

deadline be set for the plaintiffs to provide full and final 

answers which are directly responsive to each of the questions 

listed above, and that the court schedule a status conference to 

take place three weeks after the plaintiffs have satisfied their 

obligations under this order of compliance to consider necessary 

modifications is the outstanding scheduling order. 

FOR THE DEFENDANTS 

RIC BLUMENTHAL 
ATTORNEY/GENERAL, 

{ i L/, Lif of ; 

2 A SE 

\ AL Vi 
\, By: 

  

~Johfi R. Whelan 
/ Assistant Attorney General 

/ 110 Sherman Street 
Hartford, Connecticut 06105 
Telephone: 566-7173 

  

 



  

Cv 89-0360977S 

MILO SHEFF, et al SUPERIOR COURT 
J.D. HARTFORD/NEW 

Plaintiffs NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD 

Ve. 

WILLIAM A, O'NEILL, et al 

Defendants May 14, 1992 

ORDER 

The defendants' motion for order of compliance is hereby 

granted and the following orders are entered: 

THAT, the plaintiffs answers to questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 

7, 11,12, 13, '14,. 15, 16'and 19 of the defendants’ first set of 

interrogatories are stricken; 

THAT, the plaintiffs’ objections to questions 3, 10, and 11 

are overruled; 

THAT, that plaintiffs are ordered to provide full and final 

answers which are directly responsive to each of the above noted 

questions in the defendants' first set of interrogatories on or 

before . 
  

THAT, the parties are ordered to appear at a status 

conference at on 1992, at which time the           
 



      

court will consider such modifications to the outstanding 

scheduling order as may be necessary. 

Entered the day of ; 1992. 
  

BY: 
  

Hon. Harry Hammer 

Superior Court 

CERTIFICATION 
  

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
postage prepaid to the following counsel of record on 
May 14, 1992: 

John Brittain, Esq. 
University of Connecticut 
School of Law 
65 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

Wilfred Rodriguez, Esq 
Hispanic Advocacy Project 
Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 
Hartford, CT 06112 

Philip Tegeler, Esq. 
Martha Stone, Esq. 
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union 
32 Grand Street 

Hartford, CT 06106 

Wesley W. Horton, Esq. 
Mollier, Horton & Fineberg, P.C. 
S90 Gillett Street 

  

 



      

Hartford, CT 06105 

Ruben Franco, Esq. 
Jenny Rivera, Esq. 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund 
99 Hudson Street 
14th Floor 
New York, NY 10013 

Julius L. Chambers, Esq 
Marianne Lado, Esq. 
Ronald Ellis, Esq. 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund and 
Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

John A. Powell, Esq. 
Helen Hershkoff, Esq. 
Adam S. Cohen, Esq. 
American Civil Liberties Union 
132 West 43rd Street 
New, Yo i A 

7 /, 
A 4 A 

0 ” / 

A \ fi A    
  

John R. Whelan 
Assistant Attorney General 

  
 



  

ores Hh 
Marcella G. Williams 

 



    

Cv 89-0360977s 

MILO SHEFF, et al SUPERIOR COURT 

J.D. HARTFORD/NEW 
Plaintiffs NEW BRITAIN AT HARTFORD 

Ve 

WILLIAM A. O'NEILL, et al 

Defendants MAY 14, 1992 

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ORDER OF 
COMPLIANCE 
  

  

According to one of the plaintiffs' attorneys the present 

case is "a unique educational lawsuit" which "presents a novel 

theory" and is designed to open up "the opportunity to 

restructure all of education" in the State of Connecticut. 

Brittain, John C., "Educational and Racial Equity: Towards the 

Twenty-First Century - A Case Experiment in Connecticut," Civil 

Rights Litigation and Attorney's Fees Annual Handbook, Vol. 6, 
  

Clark Boardman Company, Ltd., New York, 1990. If this is true it 

is especially important that the trial record upon which the 

court acts be as carefully developed as it can possibly be. It 

would be foolhardy and reckless to begin considering steps to 

"restructure all of education" based upon a "novel" legal theory    



  

    

    

without the benefit of a record in which the parties have fully 

met on all of the critical issues. l’/ 

Pre-trial discovery is one way to assist in the careful 

development of the trial record. 1f, however, the purposes of 

discovery are frustrated by inadequate, unresponsive, or 

incomplete answers and unfounded objections to legitimate 

discovery requests the likelihood of a misguided decision which 

proves harmful to the educational interests of the children of 

this state becomes greater. 

To do their part to ensure that the record before the court 

1s as complete as possible the defendants submitted a 

comprehensive set of interrogatories to the plaintiffs by way of 

a discovery request dated July 13, 1990. On September 20, 1990 

plaintiffs filed objections to four of the defendants’ 

interrogatories (Nos. 8, 9, 10 and 20). Plaintiffs served their 

first response to the remaining interrogatories on or about 

October 20, 1990. 

  

1/ given the fact that plaintiffs’ legal theory is so "novel" 
there is risk enough in the already apparent uncertainties about 
what 1s and what 1s not a critical issue in the case; e.g., the 
relevance of the state's housing practices. 

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By letter dated November 7, 1990 defendants’ counsel advised 

plaintiffs' counsel that that defendants considered the 

plaintiffs' responses inadequate because, inter alia, the 

plaintiffs' answers were qualified and obviously incomplete. See 

Exhibit A. Plaintiffs responded to this letter by seeking an 

extension of time to provide "more detailed responses". See 

Exhibits B and C. The expressed purpose for seeking this 

extension of time was "to forestall a Motion to Compel". Exhibit 

B. 

On or about February 19, 1991 the plaintiffs provided the 

defendants with "Plaintiffs' Amended Response to Defendants’ 

First Set of Interrogatories.”™ Exhibit D. Virtually all of the 

answers contained in this amended response are qualified and 

incomplete. All of the answers are drafted so as to suggest that 

the plaintiffs would be providing more detailed answers at some 

later date.   
At the same time the defendants were pressing for answers to 

: | 

their interrogatories the plaintiffs were pursuing extensive 

discovery from the defendants. Through their discovery requests | 

the plaintiffs have obtained boxes of documents, computer tapes 

  
 



      

with vast amounts of data on them, and access to thousands of 

additional pages of records maintained by the defendants. 

Presumably this discovery was undertaken for the purpose of 

assisting the plaintiffs in their case. preparation and for the 

purpose of making it possible for the plaintiffs to answer fully 

the defendants' first set of interrogatories. 

Despite the fact that it has been well over a year since the 

plaintiffs provided their amended but still qualified and 

incomplete answers to the defendants first set of 

interrogatories, and despite the fact that the plaintiffs have 

been given virtually unlimited access to the defendants' records, 

the plaintiffs have not provided complete and final responses to 

the defendants first set of interrogatories. 

To the extent that the plaintiffs may at some point in the 

future amend their responses to answer fully the defendants’ 

interrogatories, the defendants will be prejudiced in that they 

will not have sufficient time to prepare appropriate responses to, 

the plaintiffs' new claims unless the deadlines in the 

outstanding scheduling order are appropriately extended.   
 



  

By way of the present motion the defendants seek (1) an 

: order requiring the plaintiffs to provide directly responsive 

answers to each of the defendants' interrogatories and (2) an 

order directing the plaintiffs to make their answers complete and 

final by a date certain. Only then will the defendants be able 

to complete their case preparation in a way which will insure, to 

the extent possible, that the court has a proper record on which 

to act, 

To prepare their interrogatories in a way which would flush 

out the issues which appear to be critical to this case based on 

the plaintiffs' complaint, the defendants broke their 

. interrogatories down into several sections. Each section 

contains a number of questions designed to elicit responses from 

the plaintiffs which relate to the section topic. For the 

purposes of this motion the important section headings in the 

defendants' first set of interrogatories are as follows: Section 

I," PAST VIOLATIONS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTS"; Section II, "PAST 

VIOLATIONS: OMISSIONS"; Section III, "CURRENT OR ONGOING 

VIOLATIONS"; Section IV, "MINIMALLY ADEQUATE EDUCATION"; Section 

V, "EQUAL EDUCATION"; Section V1, "OTHER"; and Section VIII, 

"DATA COMPILATIONS". The deficiencies in the plaintiffs' answers       
 



  

  

  

  

  

to the questions under each of these section headings are 

discussed below. 

A. 

SECTION 1; "PAST VIOLATIONS: AFFIRMATIVE ACTS" 
  

(OUESTIONS 1-4, EXHIBIT D PAGES 1-22) 
  

Section I of the defendants' first set of interrogatories is 

entitled "Past Violations: Affirmative Acts". This section of 

defendants' interrogatories 1s designed to elicit from the 

plaintiffs a list of the affirmative acts by the defendants 
  

which, according to the plaintiffs, (a) have violated the 

constitution (Question 1), (b) have caused racial and ethnic 

isolation in the Hartford public schools (Question 2), (c) have 

caused socioeconomic isolation in the Hartford public schools 

(Question 3) and (d) have caused a concentration of "at risk" 

children in the Hartford public schools, (Question 4). Details 

regarding each affirmative act identified by the plaintiffs are 

also sought. 

Plaintiffs answers to the questions in this section of 

defendants' interrogatories are not responsive and incomplete. 

See Exhibit D, pg. 1-22. 

  
 



    

Given the position which the plaintiffs have taken in their 

replies to the defendants' motion to strike and motion for 

summary judgment one would expect the plaintiffs to answer 

question 1 of Section I by saying that the plaintiffs make no 

claim that the defendants' violated the constitution by any 

affirmative act. Instead the plaintiffs provide a confusing 

answer that identifies a large number of things which the state 

does or has done but without making any claim that these acts are 

2/ 
unconstitutional. The plaintiffs' answer to question 1 of 

Section I 1s clearly unresponsive. 

The plaintiffs answer questions 2, 3 and 4 in Section I by 

referencing their answer to question 1. The plaintiffs do not 

specifically and separately identify the affirmative acts 

allegedly taken by the defendants which they claim caused the 

racial and ethnic isolation (Question 2), those which they claim 

caused the socioeconomic isolation (Question 3), or those 

affirmative acts which they claim caused the concentration of "at 

    2/ For example, the plaintiffs specifically concede that they 
"are not claiming in this lawsuit that any of the state's housing! 
actions are unconstitutional", but they go on to list various 
housing practices as if that list were somehow responsive to the 
defendants' request that they identify unconstitutional 
affirmative acts. Exhibit D, pp. 18-20. 

-7- 

   



  

    

    
  

risk” students in the Hartford public schools (Question 4). 

Unless the plaintiffs make no claim that the racial, ethnic, and 

socioeconomic isolation and the concentration of "at risk" 

children which they complain about were caused by any affirmative 

acts on the part of the defendants, the defendants need to know 

what it 1s the plaintiffs are claiming they did to cause each of 

the conditions the plaintiffs are complaining about. Without 

this information the defendants cannot prepare their defense. 

Even 1f the plaintiffs' single answer to questions 1 through 

4 of Section I were responsive to those questions their answer   
would still be defective. It would still be defective because it 

| 
is facially incomplete. On page 2 of their amended response to | 

the defendants' interrogatories the plaintiffs qualify their | 

answer by saying that the answer provides their response "as best! 

as can be determined at this stage of the case." On page 18 they; 

suggest that the facts which they will rely on at trial "will not, 

be limited to" those facts which are listed. On page 20 the | 

plaintiffs represent that they "are continuing to investigate 

actions taken by the defendants that have contributed to the 

constitutional violations set out in the Complaint" and that 

their investigation into certain matters is not complete. On 

 



      

page 21 the plaintiffs say that "[f]urther details in response to 

this interrogatory will be provided in a timely fashion, in 

advance of trial." 

More than a year has passed since those representatives were 

made. There has been no full and final supplementation of the 

plaintiffs qualified responses to defendants interrogatories nor 

have the plaintiffs requested an extension of time to provide the 

long overdue answers. Unless the plaintiffs seek an extension of 

time to file full and final answers to these and the other 

interrogatories in defendants' first set of interrogatories the 

court should rule that the answers provided to date are full and 

final and the court should limit the evidence which the 

plaintiffs may present at trial accordingly. If the plaintiffs 

seek an extension of time to file full and final answers the 

court should make such adjustments in the outstanding scheduling 

order as are necessary to give if defendants adequate opportunity 

to meet the issues raised by plaintiffs' amended response. 

B. 

SECTION II: "PAST VIOLATIONS: OMISSIONS" 
  

(QUESTIONS 5-7, EXHIBIT D, PAGES 22-32) 
  

  

 



      

At various times throughout the proceedings vilch have taken 

place so far in this case the plaintiffs have represented to the 

court that this case is one in which the plaintiffs claim that 

the defendants have violated the constitution by failing to take 

appropriate action to address the concentration of minority 

children, poor children, and "at risk" children in Hartford 

public schools. Section II of the defendants' first set of 

interrogatories is designed, quite simply, to find out what it is 

the plaintiffs claim the defendants were obliged by the 

constitution to do but 4id not 46. See Exhibit D, pp. 22-32. 

This section contains three questions. The first, question 

5, is designed to elicit what it was the defendants should have 

done "to address the condition of racial and ethnic isolation". 

The second question, question 6, is designed to elicit what it 

was the defendants should have done "to address the the condition 

of socioeconomic isolation." The third question, question 7, 1s 

designed to elicit what it was the defendants should have done 

"to address the conditions created by the concentration of 'at 

risk' children in the Hartford Public Schools." Some detail 

regarding what it was the plaintiffs claim the defendants should 

have done is also requested. 

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On pages 10-11 of "Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 

Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" dated September 20, 

1991, the plaintiffs' attorneys represent that "plaintiffs are 

not complaining about what did or did not happen in the past.” 

Given this statement one would expect the plaintiffs to answer 

the questions in Section II, as well as the questions in Section 

1, by saying that they make no claim that the defendants were 

required by the constitution to address the conditions which they 

complain about in any specific way. But, once again, the 

plaintiffs offer a confusing and unresponsive answer. 

Instead of responding directly to the defendants' questions 

by identifying the specific action which the defendants were 

obliged to take to satisfy the requirements of the constitution, 

the plaintiffs have offered the defendants a list of reports and 

recommendations with the following qualifying language: 

Plaintiffs will not necessarily claim that if 

implemented, the specific programs and 

policies offered in such reports and 

recommendations would have been sufficient to 

address the constitutional violation. 

-11-   
 



  

  

    

Neither will plaintiffs necessarily claim 

that any one particular recommendation was 

required by the State Constitution. 

Exhibit D, pp. 23-24. This qualification to the plaintiffs’ 

answer negates the answer. The plaintiffs are, in effect, 

refusing to answer the defendants' questions. 

If the plaintiffs hope to establish liability in this case 

based upon the defendants failure to carry out an affirmative 

obligation imposed upon them by the constitution, the plaintiffs 

must specifically identify what it was the defendants should have 

done but did not do. Unless it is clear that the defendants 

could have done something specific to address the conditions 

which the plaintiffs complain about, that what they could have 

done would have been effective in preventing or changing the 

conditions the plaintiffs are complaining about, and that the 

defendants could have taken this action without adversely 

affecting other interests in a way which made this action unwise 

or illegal, the plaintiffs cannot ask the court to speculate on 

the existence of some unfulfilled affirmative obligation. The 

court must order the plaintiffs to respond in a direct and 

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comprehensive fashion to Questions 5 through 7. The plaintiffs 

must identify the specific action which they claim the defendants 

should have taken in order to give the defendants the necessary 

opportunity to study the wisdom of the plaintiffs' claim and 

properly prepare the record upon which the court will act. 

As in the case of the plaintiffs' answers to the 

interrogatories found in Section I of the defendants' first set 

of interrogatories, the answers given in response to the 

questions in Section II are defective for the additional reason 

that they are facially incomplete. The plaintiffs make it clear 

on page 24 of Exhibit D that the recommendations which they 

suggest the defendants ought to have considered (even though they! 

may not have satisfied the alleged constitutional mandate) "may 

include but are not limited" to those which the plaintiffs have 

listed. On page 28 the plaintiffs make it clear that their 

answers are based on claims and information known to them "at 

this time", i.e. February 1991. (Also see pages 30 and 31 where 

the plaintiffs use the language "at this point".) The plaintiffs 

answers are not the full and final answers required by the rules 

of discovery.    



      

The plaintiffs answers to Questions 5 through 7 in Section 

II of the defendants' first set of interrogatories are defective 

because they are not responsive and they are clearly incomplete. 

Cc. 

SECTION III: "CURRENT OR ONGOING VIOLATIONS" 
  

(QUESTIONS 8-10, EXHIBIT D PAGES 32-33 AND EXHIBIT E) 
  

If it is true as the plaintiffs stated in "Plaintiffs 

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 

Judgment”, pp. 10-11 (September 20, 19391) that "plaintiffs are 

not complaining about what did or did not happen in the past", 

then liability in this case must turn on something other than 

wrongful acts (Section I of defendants interrogatories) or 

wrongful omissions (Section II of defendants' interrogatories).   According to the "novel" legal theory on which the plaintiffs are | 
| 
! 

pursuing this case, liability in this case must turn on the 

existence of a "condition" which, by itself and without regard to] 

how it came about, violates the constitution. | 
| 

Assuming that a "condition" by itself can violate the 

constitution that "condition" must violate the constitution 

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because it stands in contrast to a different "condition" which is 

constitutionally required or acceptable. 

In Section 111 of the defendants' first set of 

interrogatories the defendants ask the plaintiffs to identify the 

conditions as they should be in order for there to be no 

violation of the constitution; i.e. no "CURRENT OR ONGOING 

VIOLATIONS" of the constitution. The necessity of- having this 

information from the plaintiffs should be obvious. The court 

will have no basis upon which to find that the "conditions" which 

exist violate the constitution unless the court first decides 

what "conditions" the constitution requires. To prove their case 

the plaintiffs must show how the existing conditions differ from 

the constitutionally required conditions. They must, therefore, 

have some alternate condition in mind. 

It appears that the condition which is Aegiired by the 

constitution according to the plaintiffs' thinking is one which 

involves a different racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic mix of 

students in the public schools in the Hartford area and some form 

of de-concentration of "at risk" children. The questions in 

Section III of the defendants' interrogatories simply ask the 

-1] 5-   
 



      

plaintiffs to identify the mix that they believe must exist in 

order to satisfy what they believe to be the requirements of the 

constitution. Question 8 asks the plaintiffs to identify the 

constitutionally required racial and ethnic mix. Question 9 asks 

the plaintiffs to identify the constitutionally required 

socioeconomic mix. Question 10 asks the plaintiffs to identify 

the constitutionally required mix of "at risk" children. 

Whether the mixes which the plaintiffs believe are 

constitutionally required are achievable or whether they are 

achievable only at an intolerable cost to other important 

interests is an important issue going to the merits of this case. 

The defendants need to know what the plaintiffs claim the 

conditions must be in order to satisfy the constitution so the 

defendants can bring to the court's attention all of the facts 

which the court needs to be aware of before the court can begin 

to consider whether the conditions which exist should be deemed 

unconstitutional. 

The plaintiffs have responded to the questions in Section 

IIT of the defendants' first set of interrogatories by objecting 

and refusing to answer the questions. Exhibit E. The substance 

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of the plaintiffs' objection is their argument that they are not 

required to answer these questions because the questions relate 

to remedy, not liability. The simple answer to the plaintiffs" 

objection is that they are wrong. 

On their face the defendants' questions relate to "CURRENT 

OR ONGOING VIOLATIONS" of the constitution, not remedy. 

Furthermore, the discussion in the preceding paragraphs should 

make it evident that the questions in Section III bear a direct 

relationship to the issue of liability in this case. It is the 

defendants' position that the plaintiffs cannot prove that 

current conditions violate the constitution without first | 

establishing what the constitutionally required conditions are. 

Given this position the defendants are entitled to discovery on 

these points as they are with any other matter that bears on the 

issue of liability.   Finally, it should be noted that even if the defendants’ | 

questions in this section of their interrogatories did relate to 

remedy, the plaintiffs' objection would be unfounded. Pre-trial 

discovery which relates to the remedy of damages is readily 

available; Susman v. The Hamden Chronicle, 17 Conn. Sup. 40 
  

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(1949); and there is no reason to treat a case which seeks 

discovery regarding other remedies any different. 

Recently the plaintiffs have disclosed two expert witnesses 

who they intend to rely on, in part, to offer testimony in regard 

to remedy. It appears that the plaintiffs now have the 

information they need to answer the questions in Section 111 of 

the defendants' interrogatories. There is no good reason to 

allow the plaintiffs to hide their proposed remedy in the closet 

until the court, at the plaintiffs invitation, has moved down a 

road that has never been travelled before and that has no certain 

end. 

Plaintiffs' objections to questions 8, 9, and 10 should be 

overruled and the plaintiffs ordered to submit full and final 

answers to each of these questions by a date certain. 

-18- 

  

 



D, 

SECTION IV: "MINIMALLY ADEQUATE EDUCATION" 
  

(QUESTIONS 11 AND 12, EXHIBIT D PAGES 33-36) 
  

In Sections 1V and V of the defendants' first set of 

interrogatories the defendants ask the plaintiffs to specify the 

basis for two separate claims made by the plaintiffs; i.e. the 

claim that Hartford school children are being denied a "minimally 

adequate education" and the claim that Hartford school children 

are not being provided with an "equal education" in comparison to 

other children. The plaintiffs answer the interrogatories in   
these separate sections as 1f they asked same thing. The 

plaintiffs' responses to the defendants' two questions in the 

section regarding "minimally adequate education” simply 

incorporate their answers to the questions in the section 

regarding "equal education". 

The error in the plaintiffs response is evident from the 

Court's decision on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

In that decision the Court points to the plaintiffs' claim that 

Hartford schoolchildren are being denied a "minimally adequate 

education” and says that, as a result of that allegation, the        



  

  

    

plaintiffs are "entitled to a judicial determination of whether 

the constitution requires a particular substantive level of 

education in the school districts in which they reside." 

Memorandum of Decision on the Defendants' Motion for Summary 

Judgment, p. 11 (February 24, 1992). Clearly this issue is very 

different than the plaintiffs' claim that Hartford schoolchildren 

are not being treated equally. 

Questions 11 and 12 in Section IV of defendants' first set 

of interrogatories focus directly on the issue of whether 

Hartford schoolchildren are being afforded a constitutionally 

3/ 
required minimum substantive level of education.” ’ To answer 

destions 11 and 12 the plaintiffs must define for the court and 

the defendants what they believe to be the constitutionally 

required minimum substantive level of education in terms of both 

"inputs" (Question 11) and "outputs" (Question 12). and then list 

the specific facts they will rely on in their attempt to prove 

  

3/ 1t should be noted that the defendants do not agree that the 
constitution establishes any judicially recognizable minimum 
substantive level of education. The constitution leaves it to 
the General Assembly to set minimum standards for education. 
This allows for the flexibility necessary to serve the problems 
and needs of the time. 

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that Hartford schoolchildren are not receiving this minimum 

substantive level of education. 

The plaintiffs have wholly failed to answer the questions in 

this Section IV of the defendants first set of interrogatories. 

Their reference to the answers they give to questions 13 and 14 

is irrelevant since the limited information provided in response 

to those questions deals with "disparities and inequities" when 

Hartford schoolchildren are compared to other schoolchildren. 

The questions in this Section relate to the alleged deprivation 

of a constitutionally mandated minimum substantive level of 

education. The questions call for a comparison between what 

Hartford schoolchildren get and whatever it is the plaintiffs 

claim the constitutional mandates as a minimum substantive level 

of education, not a comparison between what Hartford 

schoolchildren get and what some other group of schoolchildren 

get. 

The court should order the plaintiffs to provide full and 

complete responses which directly and separately address 

questions 11 and 12. 

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E. 

SECTION V: "EQUAL EDUCATION" 
  

(QUESTIONS 13 AND 14, EXHIBIT D PAGES 34-36) 
  

In their complaint the plaintiffs identify a group of cities 

and towns which they refer to as "suburbs" of Hartford. Since 

this group includes towns that are geographically more distant 

from Hartford then other towns which are not among the group 

(e.g. New Britain), the criteria the plaintiffs used to identify 

these suburban towns is not clear. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs 

rely, at least 1n part, on alleged inequalities between the 

Hartford public schools and the public schools in these cities 

and towns to state their case. The questions in Section V of the 

plaintiffs' first set of interrogatories are designed to force 

the plaintiffs to identify the specific inequalities between 

Hartford and the suburbs which the plaintiffs intend to rely on 

to prove their case. 

The plaintiffs have been provided with tremendous amounts of 

information from the defendants’ records and, presumably, have 

looked elsewhere for information upon which to make their 

comparisons. Clearly the defendants need to know what 

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comparisons the plaintiffs will use to attempt to establish 

constitutional inequalities, what the plaintiffs' comparisons 

show, and how the plaintiffs made those comparisons long before 

trial if the parties are to properly meet on these issues. The 

defendants need to examine plaintiffs’ comparisons to determine 

whether they were properly done and whether they are reliable. 

If they were not properly done or they are not reliable 

defendants may need to conduct their own comparative studies to 

give the court the proper picture. 

Plaintiffs answers to questions 13 and 14 are no answers at | 

all. In these answers the plaintiffs indicate that they are 

"compiling data and information on disparities and inequalities" 

and suggest some of the areas of comparison the "may" be looking 

into. They make it clear that their list of areas in which they 

"may" be looking for comparisons does not necessarily include all 

of the areas in which they will be looking for comparisons. 

The fact that the defendants submitted their interrogatories 

to the plaintiffs 22 months ago and that the plaintiffs have 

made no serious effort to answer the basic questions which the 

defendants have posed regarding disparities and inequities 

-23-   
 



    
  

  

between Hartford and the suburbs, demonstrates the inappropriate 

and abusive way in which the plaintiffs have responded to 

virtually all of the defendants' interrogatories. 

In order to comply with Connecticut Practice Book § 224 the 

plaintiffs must answer the defendants interrogatories, ask for 

more time in which to answer them, or file objections to them. 

It is not acceptable to file interim answers as the plaintiffs 

have done. The obligation imposed by Connecticut's rules of 

practice is to file the answer, upon which the defendants may 

rely. Conn. Practice Book § 232 which requires supplementation 

of answers under certain circumstances, neither contemplate nor 

allow a party to file an answer which it concedes from the start 

is incomplete. If the defendants cannot rely on information 

obtained through discovery as being full and complete, a major 

purpose of discovery, that is, to make a trial a fair contest 

with basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practical 

extent, 1s totally defeated. Sturdivant v. Yale-New Haven 
  

Hospital, 2 Conn. App. 103, 476 A.2d 1074 (1984). Lacking 
  

responses which are complete and final, the defendants cannot 

prepare a defense, they can only shadow box with issues and 

information which may change before trial. 

-24- 

  

 



      

It is worthy of note that information relating to the public 

schools in this state (other than personally identifiable student 

information and other privileged material) is generally available 

to the public under the state's Freedom of Information Act 

(FOIA). In fact the plaintiffs' attorneys used this FOIA to 

obtain information before they filed this suit. Now this suit is 

more than three years old and the defendants interrogatories 

asking the plaintiff to identify the comparisons upon which they 

base their conclusory allegations that Hartford schoolchildren 

are being denied an equal educational opportunity are almost two 

years old. But the plaintiffs have yet to disclose the specific 

comparisons they will rely on to support their allegations of 

unequal education. 

If the amount of time which it has taken the plaintiffs so 

far make the comparisons they will rely on to support their claim 

of unequal education is any indication of the time and effort the 

defendants will need to put into analyzing the plaintiffs' as yet 

undisclosed comparisons and preparing alternate comparisons, it 

ought to be clear that trial in this case is considerably further 

off than the outstanding Scheduling Order would lead one to 

suspect. It should also be clear that, unless trial is delayed 

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to give the defendants a proper opportunity to prepare evidence 

responsive to the answers which the pIBinLiiEs will ultimately 

offer to the defendants' interrogatories, the plaintiffs will 

have successfully subverted the discovery process by providing 

incomplete answers and failing to ask for more time to provide 

full and final answers. The plaintiffs gamesmanship will leave 

the court to decide this important case on a seriously 

underdeveloped record unless the court steps in now and makes 

those orders which are necessary to ensure proper responses to 

the defendants' interrogatories and a fair opportunity for the 

defendants to prepare their defense. 

MISCELLANEOUS INTERROGATORIES 
  

(QUESTIONS 15, 16 AND 19, EXHIBIT D PAGES 36-37, 39-41) 
  

In Questions 15, 16 and 19 of the defendants' first set of 

interrogatories are general questions designed to obtain facts 

and information which the plaintiffs will rely on at trial that 

may not fall within the more specific questions found in earlier 

interrogatories and facts and information the defendants need to 

know to properly analyze any data compilations plaintiffs intend 

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to rely on at trial. As with their other answers, it 1s clear 

from the plaintiffs' responses to questions 15, 16 and 19 that 

those responses are incomplete. Since the plaintiffs have not 

been given an extension of time to provide complete and final 

answers to these interrogatories the court should issue an order 

requiring full and final answers by a date certain. 

G. 

CONCLUSION 
  

The plaintiffs' answers to the defendants' first set of 

interrogatories are largely unresponsive and wholly incomplete. 

The defendants answers to questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.6 2.:311,712, 

13, 14, 15, 16 and 19 should be stricken and the plaintiffs 

ordered to provide full and final answers which are directly 

responsive to each of those questions by a date certain. The 

plaintiffs' objections to questions 8, 9 and 10 are unfounded and 

should be overruled with the plaintiffs being ordered to provide 

full and final answers which are directly responsive to each of 

those questions by a date certain as well. After the plaintiffs 

have provided full and final responses to each of the defendants’ 

interrogatories and the defendants have had an opportunity to 

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review these answers to determine what they need to do to respond 

at trial the court should schedule a status conference for the 

purposes of considering necessary changes in the outstanding 

scheduling order. 

By: 

FOR THE DEFENDANTS 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 

Bernard F. McGovern, Jr. 
a General 

: ff 

fd of 9 74 

Johh R. Whelan’ 
Assistant Attorney General 
110 Sherman Street 

Hartford, Connecticut 06105 
Telephone: 566-7173 

  

CERTIFICATION 
  

This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
postage prepaid to the following counsel of record on 
May [4 1992: 

John Brittain, Esq. 
University of Connecticut 
School of Law 
65 Elizabeth Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

Wilfred Rodriguez, Esq 
Hispanic Advocacy Project 
Neighborhood Legal Services 
1229 Albany Avenue 

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Hartford, CT 06112 

Philip Tegeler, Esq. 
Martha Stone, Esq. 

Connecticut Civil Liberties Union 
32 Grand Street 
Hartford, CT 06106 

Wesley W. Horton, Esq. 
Mollier, Horton & Fineberg, P.C. 
90 Gillett Street 
Hartford, CT 06105 

Ruben Franco, Esq. 
Jenny Rivera, Esq. 
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund 
99 Hudson Street 
14th Floor 
New York, NY 10013 

Julius L. Chambers, Esq 
Marianne Lado, Esq. 
Ronald Ellis, Esq. 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund and 
Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 
New York, NY 10013 

John A. Powell, Esq. 

Helen Hershkoff, Esq. 
Adam S. Cohen, Esq. 
American Civil Liberties Union 
132 West 43rd Street 
New re k, NY 10036 

ry a 
ned 

nr R. Whelan 
Assistant Attorney General 

  

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