Correspondence from Martin to Hershkoff Re: Summaries and Reviews of Articles by Jencks

    LEGAL RESEARCH MEMORANDUM 

TO: Helen Hershkoff 

FROM: Forrest Martin 

DATE: 17 July 1990 

RE: Summaries of articles by Jencks and articles reviewing 
Jencks' Inequality 
  

FILE: g:\legal\artcls.sum 

Introduction 
Using Lindsey's list, I have summarized articles by Jencks 

or those discussing Inequality. I have not summarized those 
articles which were clearly not relevant to educational issues. 
Also, I did not review those articles which were not available at 
the NY Public Library. 

Some of the articles employed sophisticated statistical 
methods and critiques with which I have little familiarity. I 
have summarized those arguments that I understood. Perhaps, 
Cheris should look at these articles. 

Finally, Part II discusses points made by Jencks and his 
critics that I thought were especially compelling. 

I. Summaries 

Mayer & Jencks, "Growing Up in Poor Neighborhoods: How Much Does 
It Matter?" 243 Science 1141-43 (1989): 

Jencks and Mayer's review of previous studies concludes 
that a socioeconomic mix of high school students has little 
effect on (i) students' chances of attending college or {ii) 
on white students' academic achievement. Evidence about the 
effect of the socioeconomic mix of schools or neighborhoods 
on achievement of elementary school students, on graduation 
rates of high school students, on teenage crime, and on 
early labor market experience is weak. 

Growing up in racially mixed neighborhoods and 
attending racially mixed schools appear to improve black 
men's labor market opportunities. Young blacks who lived in 
racially mixed neighborhoods in the late 1960s had higher 
hourly wages and worked more hours in the 1970s than blacks 
who grew up in predominantly black neighborhoods. But 
racially mixed neighborhoods appear to have decreased wages 
and hours worked for whites. Because of the small sample 
size, however, these findings must be treated cautiously. 

Blacks in the northern U.S who attended all-black high 
schools during the 1960s and early 1970s were more likely to 
plan to attend college than those who attended racially 
mixed schools, but they were slightly less likely to enter 
college and far less likely to remain in college, The same 
was true for blacks who graduated from high school in the 
1940s and 1950s.  



  

Blacks who attended racially mixed schools in the 
Hartford suburbs in the late 1960s were more than twice as 
likely as similar blacks who attended predominantly black 
inner-city Hartford schools to work in white-collar 
occupations in 1982. (I have given this study's citation to 
Adam Cohen.) 

Jencks & Brown, "Research Note: The Effects of Desegregation on 
Student Achievement: Some New Evidence from the Equality of 
Educational Opportunity Survey," 48 Sociology of Education 126-40 
(Winter 1975): 

  

Based on the Equality of Educational Opportunity Survey 
(EEOS) of 1966, Jencks concludes that both black and white 
elementary school children improved their test scores when 
the racial mix of schools ranged from 51-75% white. Black 
students' performance slightly declined if they were in 76- 
100% white schools. Black student test performance stayed 
constant when the mix was 0-50%. Racial composition of high 
schools had no appreciable effect on test performance. 

  
  

Symposium on Jencks' Inequality, 43 Harvard Educational Review 
51-164 (Feb. 1973): 

Jackson, "After Apple-Picking," at 51-60: 

Jackson criticizes Jencks for seeing schools 
merely as factories. Jencks limits the social function 
of education as an investment in securing greater 
earnings in the future ("human capital" perspective). 

However, Jackson's criticism is unfair. Jencks 
does recognize that education has other social 
functions. Jencks wishes only to refute the commonly 
held belief that education is a good investment for 
reaping economic benefits in the future. 

Rivlin, "Forensic Social Science," at 61-75: 

Rivlin's is concerned about the possible political 
fallout from Inequality. Rivlin points out that Jencks!’ 
arguments can be used to undermine educational reform 
and compensatory education programs. Inequality will 
probably weaken the cause for better schools for 
everyone, especially the poor, which the authors 
support. 

She also attacks Jencks' use of "luck" as a device 
in explaining why some students eventually do well 
financially and others do not. This can be explained, 
however, by Jencks' attempt to explain individual (vs. 
group) differences. 

  

Edmonds, et al., "A Black Response to Christopher Jencks's 
Inequality and Certain Other Issues," at 76-91: 
  

 



Edmonds et al. argue that Jencks falsely assumes 
that compensatory education programs were truly 
compensatory and well executed. Therefore, the failure 
of these programs should not entail that truly 
compensatory educational programs would not work. 
Inequality also fails to consider certain intangible 
factors (e.g., internal life of the school, student- 
teacher relationship) because these factors cannot be 
measured with the tools Jencks employs. Related to this 
is that relationships may not be linear. Jencks relies 
upon path analysis for his method. Also, Jencks uses 
achievement tests as a measure of a pupil's success 
although he recognizes that these tests are too narrow 
a measure. 

Edmonds et al. also fault Jencks' extension of his 
conclusions to blacks when his analysis intentionally 
eliminated data on blacks. This criticism is not quite 
fair. Jencks is interested in explaining individual 
variation--not group variation. Therefore, a homogenous 
survey group (in this case, native born white nonfarm 
men) is appropriate because it eliminates many 
extraneous variables. They also unfairly fault Jencks 
for his use of genetic studies. They claim that Jencks 
implies a genetic basis for the black deficit in IQ. 
This is patently false: Jencks states that difference 
in IQ genotypes is conceivable. 

Finally, Edmonds et al. point out the significance 
of cultural differences among students in discussions 
of equality and the efficaciousness of education. 
Jencks 1s preoccupied with income as the vehicle and 
measure of social equality. For different ethnic 
communities, equality may be defined in terms other 
than income. Also, "objective" measures of cognitive 
skills rests on assumptions that may not be valid for 
culturally different children. Current sociolinguistic 
data suggest that poor children, particularly black 
ones, have developed a different language by the time 
they enter school. Many such children speak a well- 
ordered, highly structured, but different, dialect from 
standard English. 

  

Michelson, "The Further Responsibility of Intellectuals," at 
92-105: 

Michelson also attacks Jencks' limited "human 
capital" perspective. He shares Jencks' commitment to 
socialism as the answer, but thinks that such a 
conclusion from the evidence presented in Inequality is 
a non sequitur. There is no substantial discussion on 
the merits of socialism; rather, the book is devoted to 
demonstrating the inefficacy of education in acquiring 
greater future income. Jencks in his response, below, 
agrees that his discussion on income redistribution is 
inadequate. 

  

   



* * 

Thurow, "Proving the Absence of Positive Associations," at 
106-112: 

Thurow discusses Jencks' use of luck for 
explaining individual income variation. Thurow 
concludes, correctly I believe, that Inequality still 
allows attacks on group income differentials by 
education; it does not allow attacks on individual 
income differentials by education. Thurow adds that 
Jencks is right to argue that education is an end in 
its own right. The only difficulty is that the American 
public has been sold on education as a means to other 
social and economic ends. Thurow also attacks 
Inequality's reliance upon path analysis. 

Clark, "Social Policy, Power, and Social Science Research," 
at 113-121: 

Clark picks up Rivlin's theme of the potential bad 
political consequences of Inequality. Clark claims that 
Jencks has only given ammunition to those opposed to 
desegregation, decentralization of schools, and the 
equalization of expenditures for schools. 

He also states that the evidence presented in 
Inequality is countered by general observation, folk 
knowledge, insight, and our national history. Previous 
groups of European immigrants handicapped by the 
burdens of language and cultural differences used the 
public schools as the chief instrument for their own 
economic and social mobility. 

Duncan, "Comments on Inequality," at 122-28: 

Duncan does not dispute the findings and conclusions of 
Inequality; she merely makes some comments on Jencks' 
use of the role of luck in explaining the evidence in 
Inequality, his focus on explaining inequality between 
individuals rather than groups, the role of opportunity 
in explaining inequality, earning power, and the social 
function of schools. 

Jencks, "Inequality in Retrospect," at 138-64: 

Jencks responds to the above criticisms. I have 
incorporated Jencks responses in the above summaries. 

"Symposium Review: Inequality, Jencks et al," 46 Sociology of 
Education 427-70 (Fall 1973) 

  

Miller, "On the Uses, Misuses and Abuses of Jencks' 
Inequality," at 427-32:  



% * 

  

Miller makes three good points: 
1. Jencks' contention that schools and 
specific programs have little effect on IQ 
scores is based on little data. The data on 
compensatory education comes from a period 
before there was much research on the topic. 
(429) 
2. Miller agrees with Jencks that students 
should not be regarded as human capital and 
education as investment. Rather, education 
should be regarded as amenities or utilities: 
things which make life easier or better for 
its recipients. Education should not be 
considered in instrumental terms. (431) 
3. Jencks conclusion that education cannot 
effect certain socioeconomic benefits is 
probably because he fails to focus on 
statistically significant differences among a 
variety of variables. Rather, in his attempt 
to explain total variance, he looks for one 
key variable and finds nothing. A variety of 
variables acting together would probably 
explain the total variance. (428) 

Taylor, "Playing the Dozens with Path Analysis: 
Methodological Pitfalls in Jencks et al., Inequality," at 
433-50: 

This article is statistically abstruse; I 
cannot understand most of it. However, there are 
some significant points which I was able to glean 
from it. Jencks employs path analysis, and every 
path analysis which he employs leaves out blacks 
altogether because the study's pool employs only 
native white nonfarm males who took an armed 
forces IQ test. (439) Jencks admits that curently- 
used IQ tests carry a heavy culture-bias, but he 

nonetheless uses these tests in his own analysis 
without employing newer test especially designed 
for minorities. (447) Finally, Taylor faults 
Jencks for his failure to consider institutional 
racism, the omission of which in a book 
"presumably analyzing 'inequality' in society is 
an omission almost beyond conception." (448) 

Jencks, "The Methodology of Inequality," at 451-70. 

Again, the statistical discussion is impossible 
for me to follow. As to Taylor's criticisms noted 
above, Jencks notes that since blacks constitute 
only 11% of the population, their omission is not 
a serious distortion of his conclusions. Also, 
Jencks does devote certain chapters of Inequality 

  

to racism as a determinate of economic success. 

 



  

+ » 

Jencks & Brown, "Effects of High Schools on their Students," 45 
Harvard Educational Review 273-324 (Aug. 1975): 
  

Again, the statistical discussion is impossible for me 
to follow. Jencks turns his attention to the quality of high 
schools and their effects on test scores, eventual 
educational attainment, and occupational status. He finds 
few relationships and concludes that high schools should 
concentrate on eliminating intramural inequities. 

Most importantly for our purposes, he makes clear that 
his study says nothing about the effects of racial 
desegregation because he excluded schools with more than 24% 
black enrollment. 

Jencks, "Whom Must We Treat Equally for Educational Opportunity 
to be Equal?" 98 Ethics 518-33 (April 1988): 

Article categorizes five common ways of thinking about 
educational opportunity: (i) democratic equality, (ii) 
moralistic justice, (iii) weak human justice, (iv) strong 
human justice, and (v) utilitarianism. Jencks finds that 
each prescriptive paradigm taken to its logical conclusion 
can conflict with the other. Relative weight of each 
principle varies from situation to situation. Presence of 
each paradigm in educational context explains why everyone 
supports equal educational opportunity in principle. 

Jencks, "Affirmative Action for Blacks: Past, Present, and 
Future," 28 American Behavioral Scientist 731-60 (July/Aug. 
1985) : 

Article discusses history and future of affirmative 
action for blacks. Article adds nothing new to literature on 
affirmative action. 

Jencks, "Heredity, Environment, and Public Policy Reconsidered," 
45 American Sociological Review 723-36 (Oct. 1980): 
  

Article not relevant for our purposes. 

II. Conclusions 

1. If the Sheff defendants decide to use Inequality for 
buttressing their arguments against desegregation, they 
would face a very serious counterargument: the study is 
irrelevant because it eliminated blacks from its data. 

2. Inequality attempts to explain individual differences-- 
not group or racial differences. 
  

3. Thurow, Taylor, and Edmond et al's arguments against 
Jencks' use of path analysis is important. The relationships 

 



# Re 

  

between certain variables may not reflect a path analysis 
model. 

4. Rivlin and Edmonds et al. point out that attacks on 
compensatory education made on the basis of the history of 
alleged compensatory programs should not be made because 
those programs were hardly compensatory. 

5. Although Inequality says nothing about the effects of 
school desegregation, Jencks' 1975 article in Sociology of 
Education does address the beneficial effects of 

  

  

  

desegregation on elementary school student test performance. 

 



        

U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 58 L Ed 2d 

(439 US 1380) 
BUSTOP, INC., Applicant, 

v 

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al. 

439 US 1380, 58 L Ed 2d 88, 99 S Ct 40 

[No. A-249) 

September 8, 1978. 

SUMMARY 

After the Supreme Court of California had vacated a supersedeas or stay 
issued by the Court of Appeal of California, staying an order of the Superior 
Court of Los Angeles County which prescribed a desegregation plan for the 
schools in the Los Angeles Unified School District, an organization repre- 
senting students who would be bused under the plan applied to an individ- 
ual Justice of the United States Supreme Court, as Circuit Justice, for a 
stay of the California Supreme Court's order, pending the filing of a petition 
for certiorari or an appeal. 

Rennquisr, J., as Circuit Justice, denied the application for a stay for the 
reasons stated in headnote 1 below. 

Briefs of Counsel, p 975, infra. 

HEADNOTES 

Classified to U. S. Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers’ Edition 
Appeal and Error § 913 — stay order Justice, will deny an application for a 

— individual Justice stay, pending the filing of a petition for 
la, 1b. An individual Justice of the certiorari or an appeal, of an order of a 

United States Supreme Court, as Circuit state's highest court which had vacated 

  

ANNOTATION REFERENCES 

Supreme Court's views as to what constitutes appropriate relief under provisions of Federal 
Constitution in school desegregation cases. 53 L, Ed 2d 1228. 

Considerations affecting grant or vacation of stay or injunction by individual Justice of 
Supreme Court. 24 L Ed 2d 925. 

Racial discrimination in education. 24 L Ed 2d 765. 

Relief against school board's “busing” plan to promote desegregation. 50 ALR3d 1089. 

88 

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BUSTOP, INC. v BOARD OF EDUCATION 
439 US 1380, 58 L Ed 2d 88, 99 S Ct 40 

an intermediate state appellate court’s 
supersedeas or stay of a state trial 
court's school desegregation order that 

apparently required the reassignment of 

over 60,000 students in a school district 
and the busing of some students involv- 

ing a one and one half hour ride to 

school—the applicant urging on behalf of 
students who would be transported pur- 

suant to the desegregation order that the 

order of the state's highest court was 

contrary to recent school desegregation 

decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, and that a state could not use the 
doctrine of independent state grounds to 

ignore the federal rights of its citizens to 
be free from racial quotas and extensive 

pupil transportation which destroy fun- 

damental liberty and privacy rights— 

where (1) the state's highest court prem- 

ised its decision not on the equal protec- 

tion clause of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment, but on the state constitution, 

which it had construed to require less of 

a showing on the part of plaintiffs who 

seek court-ordered busing than the 
United States Supreme Court had re- 

quired of plaintiffs who sought similar 

relief under the Federal Constitution, (2) 

thus, it was not probable that four Jus- 
tices of the Supreme Court would vote to 
grant certiorari, (3) even if the applicant 
was viewed as having a stronger federal 

claim on the merits, the fact that the 

schools were scheduled to open in four 
days was an equitable consideration 
counselling against once more upsetting 
the expectations of the parties in the 

case, and (4) the school board raised no 
objection to the plan and the state's 
highest court had apparently placed its 
imprimatur on it, the complaints of the 
parents and children being complaints 

about state law, and it being in the 
forums of the state that such questions 
must be resolved. [Per Rehnquist, J., as 
Circuit Justice.) 

Civil Rights § 8 — school desegrega- 
tion — busing 

2. The only authority that a federal 
court has to order desegregation or bus- 
ing in a local school district arises from 
the Federal Constitution, but state 
courts are free to interpret the state 

constitution to impose more stringent 
restrictions on the operation of a local 
school board. [Per Rehnquist, J., as Cir- 
cuit Justice.) 

OPINION 

[439 US 1380) 

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, Circuit 
Justice. 

Applicant Bustop, Inc., supported 
by the Attorney General of Califor- 
nia, requests that I stay, pending the 
filing of a petition for certiorari or 
an appeal, the order of the Supreme 
Court of California. That order va- 
cated a supersedeas or stay issued by 
the California Court of Appeal, 
which had in turn stayed the en- 
forcement of a school desegregation 
order issued by the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County. 

The desegregation plan challenged 
by applicant apparently requires the 
reassignment of over 60,000 stu- 

dents. In terms of numbers jt is one 

of the most extensive desegregation 
plans in the United States. The es- 
sential logic of the plan is to pair 
elementary and junior high schools 
having a 70% or greater Anglo ma- 
jority with schools having more than 
a 70% minority enrollment. Paired 
schools are often miles apart, and 
the result is extensive transporta- 
tion of students. Applicant contends 
that round-trip distances are gener- 
ally in the range of 36 to 66 miles. 
Apparently some students must 

(439 US 1381] 

catch buses before 7 a. m. and have 
a 1%-hour ride to school. The objec- 
tive of the plan is to insure that all 
schools in the Los Angeles Unified 
School District have Anglo and mi- 
nority percentages between 70% and 
30%. 

89 

   

  

   
   
   
   
   
   
   

          

   

      

   

    

    
   

   
   
   
   
   
    

    

      

   

        

   
   

    

   

   

    
   

    

   

  

   
   
    

  



  

Applicant urges on behalf of stu- 
dents who will be transported pursu- 
ant to the order of the Superior 
Court that the order of the Supreme 
Court of California is at odds with 
this Court’s recent school desegrega- 
tion decisions in Dayton Board of 
Education v Brinkman, 433 US 4086, 

53 L Ed 2d 851, 97 S Ct 2766 (1977), 

Brennan v Armstrong, 433 US 672, 
53 L Ed 2d 1044, 97 S Ct 2907 (1977), 
and School District of Omaha v 
United States, 433 US 667, 53 L Ed 
2d 1039, 97 S Ct 2905 (1977). The 
California Court of Appeal, which 
stayed the order of the Superior 
Court, observed that the doctrine of 

these cases “reflects a refinement of 
earlier case law which should not 
and cannot be ignored.” The major- 
ity of the Supreme Court of Califor- 
nia, however, in a special session 

held Wednesday, September 6, va- 
cated the supersedeas or stay issued 
by the Court of Appeal and denied 
applicant’s request for a stay of the 
order of the Superior Court. 

[1a] Were the decision of the Su- 
preme Court of California premised 
on the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, I would 
be inclined to agree with the conclu- 
sion of the California Court of Ap- 
peal that the remedial order entered 
by the Superior Court in response to 
earlier decisions of the Supreme 
Court of California was inconsistent 
with our decisions cited above. But 
the earlier opinion of the Supreme 
Court of California in this case, 
Crawford v Board of Education, 17 
Cal 3d 280, 551 P2d 28 (1976), and 
Jackson v Pasadena City School Dis- 
trict, 59 Cal 2d 876, 382 P2d 878 

(1963), construe the California State 
Constitution to require less of a 
showing on the part of plaintiffs who 
seek court-ordered busing than this 

90 

U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 

   

  

    

  

58 L Ed 2d 

Court has required of plaintiffs who 
seek similar relief under the United 
States Constitution. Although the 
California Court of Appeal is of the 
view that this Court’s cases would 
require a different result 

[439 US 1382) 

from that 
reached by the Supreme Court of 
California in Crawford, and although 
the order of the Supreme Court of 
California issued Wednesday was not 
accompanied by a written opinion, 
in the short time available to me to 
decide this matter I think the fairest 
construction is that the Supreme 
Court of California continues to be 
of the view which it announced in 
Jackson and adhered to in Crawford. 
Quite apart from any issues as to 
finality, it is this conclusion which 

effectively disposes of applicant’s 
suggestion that four Justices of this 
Court would vote to grant certiorari 
to review the judgment of the Su- 
preme Court of California, which in 

effect overturned the order of the 
Court of Appeal and reinstated the 
order of the Superior Court. 

[2] Applicant relies upon my ac- 
tion staying the judgment and order 
of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in Columbus Board of Educa- 
tion v Penick, ante, p 1348, 58 L Ed 

2d 55, 99 S Ct 24 but that case is, of 
course, different in that the only 

authority that a federal court has to 
order desegregation or busing in a 
local school district arises from the 
United States Constitution. But the 
same is not true of state courts. So 
far as this Court is concerned, they 
are free to interpret the Constitution 
of the State to impose more strin- 
gent restrictions on the operation of 
a local school board. 

Applicant phrases its contention 
in this language: 

  

  

  

 



  

   
   

  

  

  

“Unlike desegregation cases 
coming to this Court through the 
lower federal courts, of which 
there must be hundreds, if not 
thousands, here the issue is novel. 
The issue: May California in an 
attempt to racially balance schools 
use its doctrine of independent 
state grounds to ignore the federal 
rights of its citizens to be free 
from racial quotas and to be free 
from extensive pupil transporta- 
tion that destroys fundamental 
rights of liberty and privacy.” Ap- 
plication for Stay 16.11. 

But this is not the traditional argu- 
ment of a local school board contend- 
ing that it has been required by 
court order to implement 

[439 US 1383] 

a pupil assignment plan 
which was not justified by the Four- 
teenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. The argument is 
indeed novel, and suggests that each 
citizen of a State who is either a 
parent or a schoolchild has a “fed- 
eral right” to be “free from racial 
quotas and to be free from extensive 
pupil transportation that destroys 
fundamental rights of liberty and 
privacy.” While I have the gravest 

BUSTOP, INC. v BOARD OF EDUCATION 
439 US 1380, 58 L Ed 2d 88, 99 S Ct 40 

        

   

          

   

   

    

   
   

    

   

        

   

  

   

    

   

    

     
    
    
    

doubts that the Supreme Court of 
California was required by the 
United States Constitution to take 
the action that it has taken in this 
case, I have very little doubt that it 
was permitted by that Constitution 
to take such action. 

[1b] Even if I were of the view 
that applicant had a stronger federal 
claim on the merits, the fact that 
the Los Angeles schools are sched- 
uled to open on Tuesday, September 
12, is an equitable consideration 
which counsels against once more 
upsetting the expectations of the 
parties in this case. The Los Angeles 
Board of Education has been ordered 
by the Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County to bus an undoubtedly large 
number of children to schools other 
than those closest to where they 
live. The Board, however, raises be- 
fore me no objection to the plan, and 
the Supreme Court of California has 
apparently placed its imprimatur on 
it. I conclude that the complaints of 
the parents and the children in 
question are complaints about Cali- 
fornia state law, and it is in the 
forums of that State that these ques- 
tions must be resolved. The applica- 
tion for a stay is accordingly denied. 

 



  

  

   
     

U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 58 L Ed 2d 

[439 US 1384) 

BUSTOP, INC., Applicant, 

v 

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al. 

439 US 1384, 58 L Ed 2d 92, 99 S Ct 44 

[No. A-249) 

September 9, 1978. 

SUMMARY 

After Rehnquist, J., as Circuit Justice, had denied an application by an 
organization representing certain school students for a stay, pending certio- 
rari or an appeal, of an order of the Supreme Court of California (Bustop, 
Inc. v Board of Education (1978) 439 US 1380, 58 L. Ed 2d 88, 99 S Ct 40)— 
the California Supreme Court having vacated a supersedeas or stay issued 
by the Court of Appeal of California, staying an order of the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County which prescribed a desegregation plan for the schools 
in the Los Angeles Unified School District—the organization applied to 
another individual Justice of the United States Supreme Court for a stay of 
the California Supreme Court’s order. 

PoweLL, J., as individual Justice, being in accord with the reasons 
advanced by the Circuit Justice, also denied the application for a stay. 

Briefs of Counsel, p 975, infra. 

HEADNOTE 

Classified to U. S. Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers’ Edition 

Appeal and Error § 913 — stay order States Supreme Court will deny an ap- 
— individual Justice plication for a stay, pending the filing of 

An individual Justice of the United a petition for certiorari or an appeal, of 

ANNOTATION REFERENCES 
  

Supreme Court's views as to what constitutes appropriate relief under provisions of Federal 
Constitution in school desegregation cases. 53 L Ed 2d 1228. 

Considerations affecting grant or vacation of stay or injunction by individual Justice of 
Supreme Court. 24 L Ed 2d 925. 

Racial discrimination in education. 24 L Ed 2d 765. 

Relief against school board's “busing” plan to promote desegregation. 50 ALR3d 1089. 

92 

  
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BUSTOP, INC. v BOARD OF EDUCATION 
439 US 1384, 58 L Ed 2d 92, 99 S Ct 44 

an order of a state's highest court which 
had vacated an intermediate state appel- 
late court's supersedeas or stay of a state 
trial court’s school desegregation order 

that apparently required the reassign- 

ment of over 60,000 students in a school 
district and the busing of some students 

involving a one and one half hour ride to 
school, where the individual Justice was 
in accord with the reasons advanced by 
another individual Justice of the Su- 
preme Court who, as Circuit Justice, had 
previously denied the application for a 
stay. [Per Powell, J., as individual Jus- 
tice.] 

OPINION 

[439 US 1384) 

Mr. Justice Powell. 

The application for a stay in this 
case, denied by Mr. Justice Rehn- 
quist by his in-chambers opinion and 
order of September 8, 1978, ante, p 

1380, 568 LL Ed 2d 88, has now been 
referred to me. 

As I am in accord with the rea- 
sons advanced by Mr. Justice Rehn- 
quist in his opinion, I also deny the 
application.