United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education Opinion
Public Court Documents
March 29, 1967
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education Opinion, 1967. a17a0f82-c79a-ee11-be37-000d3a574715. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/8b47b583-55d6-428b-95b9-96e9975b9a24/united-states-v-jefferson-county-board-of-education-opinion. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FIFTH dRCUTT
N o . 2 3 3 4 5
UNITED STATES OF AIVIEKICA and LINDA STOUT, by
her father and next friend, BLEVIN STOUT,
Appellants,
versus
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL,
Appellees.
N o . 2 3 3 3 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
versus
THE BO^ABD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF
FAIRFIELD, ET AL,
Appellees.
N o . 2 3 3 3 5
UNITED STATES OF AJWERICA,
Appellant,
versus
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF
BESSEMER, ET AL.,
Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama.
2 JJ. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
N o . 2 3 2 7 4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
versus
CADDO PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.,
Appellees.
N o . 2 3 3 6 5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
versus
THE BOSSIER PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.,
Appellees.
N o . 2 3 1 7 3
MARGARET M. JOHNSON, ET AL.,
Appellants,
versus
JACKSON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.,
Appellees.
U. S., et al . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 3
N o . 2 3 1 9 2
YVORNIA DECAROL BANKS, ET AL.,
Appellants,
versus
CLAIBORNE PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.,
Appellees.
N o . 2 3 2 5 3
JIMMY ANDREWS, ET AL.,
Appellant,
versus
CITY OF MONROE, LOUISIANA, ET AL.,
Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana.
4 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
N o . 2 3 1 1 6
CLIFFORD EUGENE DAVIS, JK., ET AL.,
Appellants,
versus
e a s t b a t o n r o u g e PAIMSH SCHOOL BOARD, ET
AL.,
Appellees.
Appeal from ike United States District Cmirt for the
Eilstem District of Louisiana.
ON PETITIONS FOE REHEARING EN BANC
(March 29, 1967.)
Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, BROWN, WISDOM,
GEWIN, BELL, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLD
BERG, AINSWORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, and SIMP
SON, Circuit Judges.
P E R CURIAM : 1. The Court sitting en banc
adopts the opinion and decree filed in these cases De
cem ber 29, 1966, sub ject to the clarifying statem ents
in th is opinion and the changes in the decree a ttached
to th is opinion.
2. School desegregation cases involve m ore than
a dispute betw een certa in Negro children and certain
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
schools. If N egroes a re ever to en ter the m a in s tream
of A m erican life, a s school children they m ust have
equal educational opportunities w ith w*hite children.
3. The Court holds th a t boards and officials ad,-
m in istering public schools in th is circuit^ have the af
firm ative duty under the F ourteenth A m endm ent
to b ring labout an in tegrated , unitary school system
in w hich th e re a re no Negro schools and no w hite
schools—^just schools. E xpressions in our ea rlie r opin
ions distinguishing between in teg ra tion and desegre
gation® m ust yield to th is affirm ative duty v/e now
recognize. In fulfilling th is duty it is not enough for
school au thorities to offer N egro children the oppor
tunity to a ttend fo rm erly all-White schools. The neces
sity of overcom ing the effects of the dual school sys
tem in th is c ircu it requ ires in tegration of faculties,
̂ “In the South”, as the Civil Rights Commission has pointed
out, the Negro “has struggled to get into the neighborhood school.
In the North, he is fighting to get out of it,” Civ. Rts. Comm. Rep.,
Freedom to the Free. 207 (1963).
This Court did not “excuse” neighborhood schools in the
North and West which have de facto segregation. No case involv
ing that sort of school system was before the Court.
School segregation is “inherently unequal” by any name and
wherever located. But de facto segregation resulting from resi
dential patterns in a non-racially motivated neighborhood school
system has problems peculiar to such a system. The school
system is already a unitary one. The difficulties lie in finding
state action and in determining how far school officials must go
and how far they may go in correcting racial imbalance. In such
cases Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) may turn out to be
as important as Brown. A broad-brush doctrinaire approach,
therefore, that Brown's abolition of the dual school system solves
all problems is conceptually and pragmatically inadequate for
dealing with de facto-segregated neighborhood schools.
We leave the problems of de facto segregation in a unitary
system to solution in appropriate cases by the appropriate courts.
2 This distinction was first expressed in Briggs v. Elliott,
E.D.S.C. 1955, 132 F. Supp. 776: “The Constitution, in other
words, does not require integration. It merely forbids discrimina
tion.”
6 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
facilities, and activ ities, as well as students. To the
extent th a t ea rlie r decisions of this Court (m ore in
the language of the opinion than in the effect of the
holding) conflict w ith th is view, th e decisions a re
overru led . We re fe r specifically to the cases listed
in footnote 2 of th is opinion.®
4. F reedom of choice is not a goal in itself. I t is a
m eans to an end. A schoolchild has no inalienable
righ t to choose h is school. A freedom of choice p lan
is bu t one of the tools availab le to school officials at
th is stage of the process of converting th e dual sys
tem of sep a ra te schools for N egroes and w hites into
a un ita ry system . The governm ental objective of this
conversion is—educational opportunities on equal
term s to all. The crite rion for determ ining the^ valid ity
of a provision in a school desegregation p lan is w heth
e r the provision is reasonab ly re la ted to accom plish
ing th is objective.
5. The percen tages re fe rred to in the Guidelines
and in this C ourt’s decree a re sim ply a rough ru le of
thum b for m easuring the effectiveness of freedom of
choice as a useful tool. The percen tages a re not a
m ethod for setting quotas or strik ing a balance. If the
p lan is ineffective, longer on prom ises th an p erfo rm
ance, the school officials charged w ith in itiating and
3 Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School District, 1956, 241
F.2d 230; Borders v. Rippy, 1957, 247 F.2d 268; Rippy v. Borders,
1957, 257 F.2d 73; Cohen v. Public Housing Administration, 1958,
257 F.2d 73; City of Montgomery v. Gilmore, 1960, 277 F.2d 364;
Boson V. Rippy, 1960, 285 P.2d 43; Stell v. Savannah-Chatham
County Board of Education, 1964, 333 F.2d 55; Evers v. Jackson,
1964, 328 F.2d 408; Lockett v. Board of Education of Muscogee
County, 1965, 342 F.2d 225.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 7
adm inistering a u n ita ry system have not m e t the con
stitu tional req u irem en ts of the F ourteen th A m end
m en t; they should try o ther tools.
6. In constructing the orig inal a n d rev ised decrees,
the C ourt gave g re a t w eight to the 1965 and 1966 HEW
Guidelines. These G uidelines estab lish m inim um
s tan d ard s c learly app licab le to d isestablishing state-
sanctioned segregation . These Guidelines and our de
cree a re w ithin the decisions of th is Court, com ply
w ith the le tte r and sp irit of the Civil R ights A ct of
1964, and m ee t the requirem ents of the U nited S ta tes
Constitution. Courts in th is c ircu it should give g rea t
w eight to fu tu re HEW G uidelines, when such guide
lines a re applicable to th is c ircu it and a re w ithin law
ful lim its. We express no opinion as to the applicabil
ity of HEW Guidelines in rac ia lly im balanced s itua
tions such as occur in som e o ther c ircu its w here it is
contended th a t s ta te action m ay be found in s ta te tol
erance of de facto segregation o r in such action as
the draw ing of a ttendance boundaries based on a
neighborhood school system .
The Court rea ffirm s the rev e rsa l of the judgm ents
below and the rem and of each case for en try of the
decree a ttached to th is opinion.
The m andate will issue im m ediately .
8 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
CORRECTED D EC R EE.
It is O RD ERED , ADJUDGED and D EC R EED th a t
the defendants, the ir agents, officers, employees and
successors and all those in ac tive concert and par
ticipation w ith them , be and they a re perm anently
enjoined from discrim inating on the basis of race O'r
color in the operation of the school system . As
set out m ore particu la rly in the body of the decree,
they ^ a l l take a ffirm ative action to d isestablish all
school segregation and to e lim inate the effects of the
dual school sy s te m :
I.
SP E E D OF DESEGREGATION
Com m encing w ith the 1967-68 school year, in ac
cordance w ith th is decree, all g rades, including kin
dergarten grades, shall be desegregiated and pupils
assigned to schools in these g rades w ithout reg a rd to
race or color.
II.
EX ERC ISE OF CHOICE
The following provisions Shall apply to all g rades:
(a) Who M ay E xercise Choice. A choice of schools
m ay be exercised by a p a re n t or o ther adult person
serv ing a s th e s tuden t’s parent. A studen t m ay ex er
cise his own choice if he (1) is exercising a choice
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 9
for the n inth o r a h igher g rade, or (2) has reached
the age of fifteen at the tim e of th e exercise of choice.
Such a choice by a s tuden t is controlling unless a dif
feren t choice is exercised for h im by his p a ren t or
other adu lt person serving as his p a re n t during the
choice period o r a t such la te r tim e as the studen t ex
erc ises a choice. E ach refe rence m th is decree to a
studen t’s exercising a choice m eans the exercise
of the choice, as appropria te , by a p a re n t o r such
o ther adult, o r by the studen t himseK.
(b) Annual E xerc ise of Choice. All students, both
white and Negro, shall be requ ired to exercise a free
choice of schools annually.
(c) Choice Period. The period for exercising
choice shall com m ence M ay 1, 1967 and end June 1,
1967, and in subsequent y ears shall com m ence M arch
1 and end M arch 31 preceding the school y ear for
which the choice is to be exercised. No studen t or
prospective student who exercises his choice w ithin
the choice period shall be given any preference be
cause of the tim e w ithin the period w hen such choice
w as exercised.
(d) M andatory E xercise of Choice. A failu re to
exercise a choice w ithin the choice period shall not
preclude any studen t from exercising a choice a t any
tim e before he com m ences school for the y ear w ith
respec t to w hich the choice applies, bu t such choice
m ay be subordinated to the choices of students who
exercised choice before the expiration of the choice
10 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
period. Any studen t wiho h a s not exercised h is choice
of school w ithin a w eek a f te r school opens shall be
assigned to the school n e a re s t his hom e w here space
is available under s tan d a rd s for determ ining avail
ab le space w hich shall be applied uniform ly through
out the system .
(e) Public Notice. On or w ithin a w eek before
the date the choice period opens, the defendants shall
a rran g e for the conspicuous publication of a notice
describ ing the provisions of this decree in the new s
p ap er m ost generally c ircu lated in the com m unity.
The tex t of the notice shall be substantia lly s im ila r to
th e tex t of the explanatory le tte r sen t hom e to paren ts.
Pub lication as a legal notice will not be sufficient.
Copies of th is notice m u st also be given a t th a t
tim e to all rad io and television stations located in the
com m unity. Copies of th is decree shall be posted in
each school in the school system and a t the office of
the Superin tendent of Education.
(f) M ailing of E xp lanatory L e tters and Choice
Form s. On the firs t day of the choice period there
shall be d istribu ted by first-c lass m ail an exp lanatory
le tte r and a choice form to the p a ren t (or o th e r adult
person acting as paren t, if known to the defendants)
of each student, together w ith a re tu rn envelope ad
dressed to the Superintendent. Should th e defendants
satisfac to rily dem onstrate to the court th a t they a re
unable to com ply w ith the requ irem en t of distributing
the exp lanatory le tte r and choice form by first-class
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 11
m ail, they shall propose an alternative m'ethod which
will m axim ize individual notice, i.e., personal notice
to p a ren ts by delivery to the pupil w ith adequate pro
cedures to insure the delivery of the notice. The text
for the exp lanatory le tte r and choice fo rm shall es
sen tia lly conform to the sam ple le tte r and choice
form appended to th is decree.
(g) Extra Copies of the Explanatory Letter and
Choice Form . E x tra copies of the exp lanato ry le tte r
and. choice fo rm shall be free ly available to paren ts,
students, prospective students, and the general public
a t each school in the system and a t the office of the
Superintendent of E ducation during the tim es of the
y e a r w hen such schools a re usually open.
(h) Content of Choice Form . E ach choice form
shall se t fo rth the nam e and location and the g rades
offered a t each school and m ay req u ire of the person
exercising the choice the nam e, address, age of s tu
dent, school and grade currently or m ost recen tly a t
tended by the student, the school chosen, the signa
tu re of one p a ren t or other adult person serv ing as
paren t, or w here appropria te the s ignatu re of the stu
dent, and the identity of the person signing. No state
m en t of reasons for a p a rticu la r choice, o r any o ther
inform ation, or any w itness or other authentication,
m ay be requ ired or requested , w ithout approval of
the court.
(i) R eturn of Choice Form . A t the option of the
person com pleting the choice form , the choice m ay
12 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
be re tu rn ed by m ail, in person, o r by m essenger to
any schoo'l in the school system or to the office of the
Sup er in tenden t.
(j) Choices not on O fficial Form . The exercise of
choice m ay also be m ade by the' subm ission in like
m an n er of any other w riting w hich contains in fo rm a
tion sufficien t to identify the studen t and indicates
th a t h e h a s m ad e a choice of school.
(k) Choice F orm s Binding. W hen a choice form
has once been subm itted and the choice period has ex
pired , the choice is binding for the en tire school year
and m ay not be changed except in cases of paren ts
m aking d ifferen t choices from th e ir children under
the conditions se t fo rth in p a ra g rap h II (a) of th is
decree and in exceptional cases w here, absen t the
consideration of race, a change is educationally
called fo r or w here com pelling hardsh ip is shown by
the student. A change in fam ily residence from one
neighborhood to ano ther shall be considered an ex
ceptional case for purposes of th is p a rag rap h .
(l) P reference in A ssignm ent. In assigning stu
dents to schools, no p re fe ren ces shall be given to any
student fo r p rio r attendance a t a school and, except
w ith the approval of court in ex trao rd in ary c ircum
stances, no choice shall be denied fo r any reason other
than overcrow ding. In case of overcrowding' at any
school, p reference shall be given on the basis of the
proxim ity of the school to the hom es of the students
choosing it, w ithout reg a rd to race or color. S tandards
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al . 13
for determ ining overcrovv^ding ahall be applied uni
form ly throughout the system .
(m ) Second Choice w here F irst Choice is Denied.
Any student whose choice is denied m u st be prom ptly
notified in w riting and given h is choice of any school
in the school system serving h is g rade level w here
space is available. The studen t shall have seven days
from the receip t of notice of a denial of f irs t choice in
which to exercise a second choice.
(n) Transportation. W here tran spo rta tion is gen
erally provided, buses m u st be routed to the m ax i
m um extent feasib le in ligh t of the geographic d is tri
bution of students, so as to serve each studen t choos
ing any school in tlie system . E very student choosing
either the fo rm erly w hite o r the fo rm erly Negro
school n ea res t his residence m ust be transpo rted to
the school to w hich he is assigned under these pro
visions, w hether or not it is his f irs t choice, if that
school is sufficiently d is tan t from his hom e to m ake
him eligible for transpo rta tion under generally appli
cable transpo rta tion rules.
(o) O fficials not to Influence Choice. At no tim e
shall any official, teacher, or em ployee of the school
system influence any paren t, o r o ther adult person
serving as a paren t, or any student, in the exercise
of a choice or favor or penalize any person because of
a choice m ade. If the defendant school board em
ploys professional guidance counselors, such persons
shall base their guidance and counselling on the in
dividual s tuden t’s p a rticu la r personal, academ ic,
14 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
and vocational needs. Such guidance and counselling
by te ach e rs as well as professional guidance counsel
lors shall be available to a ll s tuden ts w ithout regard
to race o r color.
(p) Protection of Persons E xercising Choice. W ith
in th e ir authority school officials a re responsible for
the pro tection of persons exercising righ ts under or
otherw ise affected by th is decree. They shall, w ithout
delay, tak e app rop ria te action w ith re g a rd to any stu
dent or staff m em b er who in te rfe res w ith the success
ful operation of the plan. Such in terference shall in
clude harassm en t, in tim idation, th rea ts , hostile words
or acts, and s im ila r behavior. The school board shall
not publish, allow, or cause to be published, the nam es
or add resses of pupils exercising righ ts o r otherwise
affected by th is decree. If officials of the school sys
tem a re not able to provide sufficient protection, they
shall seek w hatever assistance is necessary from
other app ro p ria te officials.
III.
PRO SPECTIV E STUDENTS
E ach prospective new studen t shall be requ ired to
exercise a choice of schools before or a t the tim e of
enrollm ent. All such studen ts known to defendants
shall be fu rn ished a copy of the p rescribed le tte r to
parents, and choice form , by m ail or in person, on
the d a te the choice period opens or as soon th e rea fte r
as the school system learns th a t he p lans to enroll.
U. S., et al. V. Jejj. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 15
W here th e re is no p re-reg istra tion p rocedure for new
ly entering students, copies of the choice fo rm s shall
be availab le a t the Office of the Superintendent and
a t each school during the tim e the school is usually
open.
IV.
TRA N SFERS
(a) Transfers for S tudents. Any student shall
have the righ t a t the beginning of a new te rm , to
tran sfe r to any school from w hich he w as excluded or
would otherw ise be excluded on account of his race or
color.
(b) Transfers for Special Needs. Any student
who requ ires a course of study not offered a t the
school to which he h as been assigned m ay be p e rm it
ted, upon h is w ritten application, a t the beginning of
any school te rm or sem ester, to tran sfe r to another
school which offers courses for his special needs.
(c) Transfers to Special Classes or Schools. If
the defendants operate and m ain ta in special classes
or schools fo r physically handicapped, m en ta lly re
tarded , o r gifted children, the defendants m ay assign
children to such schools or classes on a basis related
to th e function of the special class or school th a t is
o ther than freedom of choice. In no event shall such
assignm ents be m ade on the basis of race or color or
in a m an n er whidh tends to perpetuate a dual school
system based on race or color.
16 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
V.
SERVICES, FACILITIES, ACTIVITIES AND PRO
GRAMS
No studen t shall be seg rega ted or d iscrim inated
against on account of race o r color in any service,
facility , activ ity , or p rog ram (including tran sp o rta
tion, a th le tics , or o ther ex tracu rricu la r activ ity) that
m ay be conducted or sponsored by th e school in which
he is enrolled. A studen t attending school for the firs t
tim e on a desegregated basis m ay not be sub jec t to
any disqualification or w aiting period for p a rtic ip a
tion in activities and p rog ram s, including athletics,
w hich m igh t otherw ise app ly because he is a tran sfe r
or new ly assigned studen t except .that such tra n s
ferees shall be subject to longstanding, non-racially
based ru les of city, county, or s ta te athletic associa
tions dealing w ith the eligibility of tran sfe r students
for athletic contests. All school use or school-spon
sored use of ath letic fields, m eeting room s, and all
o ther school re la ted services, facilities, activities, and
p ro g ram s such as com m encem ent exercises and p a r
ent-teacher m eetings which a re open to persons other
th an enrolled s tuden ts, shall be open to all persons
w ithout reg ard to race or color. All special education
al p ro g ram s conducted by the defendan ts shall be
conducted w ithout reg a rd to. ra c e or color.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd.. of Educ., et al. 17
VI.
SCHOOL EQUALIZATION
(a) In ferior Schools. In schools heretofore m ain
ta ined for Negro students, the defendants shall take
prom pt steps necessa ry to provide physical facili
ties, equipm ent, courses of instruction, and instruc
tional m aterials of quality equal to th a t provided in
schools previously m ain ta ined for w hite students.
Conditions of overcrow ding, as de term ined by pupil-
teacher ra tios and pupil-classroom ratios shall, to the
extent feasible, be d istribu ted evenly betw een schools
fo rm erly m ain ta ined for Negro students and those
form erly m aintained for w hite students. If for any
reason i t is not feasible to im prove sufficiently any
school form erly m aintained for Negro students, w here
such im provem ent would otherw ise be requ ired by
this p a rag rap h , such school shall be closed as soon
as possible, and students enrolled in the school
shall be reassigned on the basis of freedom of choice.
By October of each year, defendants shall rep o rt to
the Clerk of the Court pupil-teacher ra tios, pupil-class
room ratios, and per-pupil expenditures both as to
opera ting and capital im provem ent costs, and shall
outline the steps to be taken and the tim e within
which they shall accom plish the equalization of such
schools.
(b) R em ed ia l Program s. The defendants shall p ro
vide rem ed ial education p rog ram s which p e rm it s tu
dents attending or who have previously attended seg-
18 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
regated schools to overcom e past inadequacies in
th e ir education.
VII.
NEW CONSTRUCTION
The defendants, to the extent consistent w ith the
p roper operation of the school system as a whole,
shall locate any new school and substan tia lly expand
any existing schools w ith the objective of ©radicating
the vestiges of the dual system .
VIII.
FACULTY AND STAFF
(a) F aculty E m ploym en t. R ace or color shall not
be a fac to r in the hiring, assignm ent, reassignm ent,
prom otion, demotion, or d ism issal of teach ers and
other professional staff m em bers, including student
teachers, except th a t race m ay be tak en into ac
count for the purpose of counteracting or correcting
the effect of the segregated assignm ent of facu lty and
staff in the dual system . Teachers, p rincipals, and
staff m em bers shall be assigned to schools so th a t the
faculty and staff is not com posed exclusively of m em
bers of one race. W herever possible, te ach e rs shall
be assigned so th a t m ore th an one teach e r of the m i
nority race (white or Negro) shall be on a desegre
gated faculty . D efendants shall take positive and af
firm ative steps to accom plish the desegregation of
their school faculties and to achieve substan tia l de-
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 19
segregationi of faculties in as m any of the schools as
possible for the 1967-68 ischool y e a r notw ithstanding
th a t teacher con tracts for the 1967-68 or 1968-69 school
y ears m ay have a lready been signed and approved.
The tenure of teachers in the system shall not be used
as an excuse for fa ilu re to com ply w ith th is provision.
The defendants shall estab lish as an objective tha t
the p a tte rn of teach er assignm ent to any p articu la r
school not be identifiable as ta ilo red for a h eav y con
centration of e ither Negro or white pupils in the
school.
(b) D ism issals. T eachers and other professional
staff m em bers m ay not be d iscrim inatorily assigned,
dism issed, dem oted, or passed over for retention,
prom otion, or reh iring , on the ground of race or color.
In any instance w here one or m ore teachers o r other
professional staff m em bers are to be d isplaced as a
resu lt of desegregation, no staff vacancy in the school
system shall be filled through rec ru itm en t from out
side the system unless no such displaced staff m em
ber is qualified to fill the vacancy. If, as a resu lt of
desegregation, there is to be a reduction in the to tal
professional staff of the school system , the qualifica
tions of all staff m em bers in th e syshetrL-shaU.,bemiial--
ua ted in selecting the staff m em ber to be released
w ithout consideration of race or color. A repo rt con
taining any such proposed dism issals, and the re a
sons therefor, shall be filed w ith the Clerk of tiie
Court, serving copies upon opposing counsel, w ithin
five (5) days a fter such dism issal, demotion, etc., as
proposed.
20 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
(c) P ast A ssignm ents. The defendants shall take
steps to assign and reass ig n teachers and other p ro
fessional staff m em bers to elim inate the effects of
the dual school system .
IX.
B EPO R TS TO THE COURT
(1) R eport on Choice Period. The defendants
shall serve upon the opposing p a rtie s and file w ith the
C lerk of tihê Court on or before A pril 15, 1967, and on
or before June 15, 1967, and in each subsequent year
on o r before June 1, a rep o rt tabu la ting by race the
num ber of choice applications and tran sfe r applica
tions received for enrollm ent in each g rad e in each
school in the system , and the' num ber of choices and
transfers granted and the num ber of denials in each
grade of each school. The report shall also s ta te any
reasons re lied upon in denying choice and shall tab
ulate , by school and by race of student, the num ber
of choices and transfers denied for each such reason.
In addition, the rep o rt shall show the percen tage
of pupils actually tra n sfe rre d or assigned from seg-
re giite d : g r a d e s o r tô .schools a ttended predom inantly
by puphs of \a race other than the race of the appli
cant, for a ttendance during the 1966-67 school year,
w ith com parable da ta for the 1965-66 school year.
Such additional inform ation shall be included in the
rep o rt served upon opposing counsel and filed w ith
the Clerk of the Court.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 21
(2) R eport A fter School Opening. The defend
ants shall, in addition to repo rts elsew here described,
serve upon opposing counsel and file w ith th e Clerk
of th e C ourt w ithin 15 days a fte r the opening of
schools for the fa ll sem este r of each y ear, a rep o rt
setting fo rth the following inform ation:
(i) The nam e, address, g rade, school of
choice and school of present a ttendance of
each studen t who h as w ithdraw n or requested
w ithdraw al of h is choice of school o r who has
tra n s fe rre d a fte r the s ta r t of the school year,
together w ith a description of any action taken
by the defendants on his request and the re a
sons therefor.
(ii) The num ber of facu lty vacancies, by
school, th a t h av e occu rred o r been filled
by the defendants since the order of th is Court
o r the la te s t rep o rt subm itted pursuan t to this
sub-paragraph . This rep o rt shall state the race
of the te ac h e r em ployed to fill each such va
cancy landi indicate w hether such te ach e r is
newly em ployed or w as tra n s fe rre d from With
in the system . The tabu la tion of the num ber of
tra n s fe rs w ithin the system shall indicate the
schools from which and to w hich the tra n s fe rs
w ere m ade. The rep o rt shall also se t fo rth the
num ber of facu lty m em bers of each race a s
signed to each school for the cu rren t year.
(iii) The num ber of students by race,
each g rad e of each school.
in
22 17. S., et al. v. Jejj. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
EXPLANATORY LE TT ER
(School System N am e an d Office A ddress)
(D ate Sent)
D ear P aren t:
All g rad es in our school system will be desegre
gated nex t year. Any studen t who will be en tering
one of these g rades nex t year m ay choose to attend
any school in our system , reg ard less of w hether th a t
school w as fo rm erly all-white or all-Negro. I t does
not m a tte r w hich school your child is a ttending th is
year. You and your child m ay select any school you
wish.
E v ery student, w hite and Negro, m u st m ake a
choice of schools. If a child is entering the n in th or
h igher g rade , o r if the child is fifteen years old or old
er, he m ay m ake the choice him self. O therw ise a p a r
ent o r o ther ad u lt serving as p a re n t m u st sign the
choice form . A child enrolling in the school sy stem for
the f irs t tim e m u st m ake a choice of schools before or
at the tim e of his enrollm ent.
The fo rm on w hich th e choice should be m ade is a t
tach ed to th is le tte r. I t should be com pleted and re
tu rned by Ju n e 1, 1967. You m ay m ail it in the en
closed envelope, or deliver it by m essenger or by
hand to any school p rinc ipal or to the Office of the
Superintendent a t any tim e betw een M ay 1 and June
1. No one m ay requ ire you to re tu rn your choice form
before Ju n e 1 an d no p reference is given for re tu rn
ing th e choice fo rm early .
U. S., e t a l . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et a l . 23
No principal, teacher or o ther school official is p e r
m itted to influence anyone in m aking a choice or to
requ ire early re tu rn of the choice form . No one is p e r
m itted to favo r or penalize any studen t or o ther p e r
son because of a choice m ade. A choice once m ade
cannot be changed except for serious hardship .
No child will be denied his choice unless fo r re a
sons of overcrow ding a t the school chosen, in which
case children living n ea res t the school will have p re f
erence.
T ransporta tion will be provided, if reasonably pos
sible, no m a tte r w hat school is chosen. [Delete if the
school system does not provide transporta tion .]
Y our School B oard an d the school staff w ill do
everything w e can to see to i t th a t the rig h ts of all
students a re pro tected and th a t desegregation of our
schools is carried out successfully.
Sincerely yours,
Superintendent.
CHOICE FORM
This fo rm is provided for you to choose a school for
your child to a ttend next year. You have 30 d ay s to
m ake your choice. It does not m atte r w hich school
your child attended la s t y ear, and does not m a tte r
w hether the school you choose w as fo rm erly a w hite
or Negro school. This fo rm m ust be m ailed or brought
24 17. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
to th e p rinc ipa l of any school in the system or to the
office of the Superintendent, [address], by June
1, 1967. A choice is req u ired for each child.
Name of c h i ld ..............................................................................
(Last) (First) (Middle)
A d d ress ..........................................................................................
N am e of P a re n t or o ther
adult serving as parent .............................................................
If child is entering f irs t g rade, date of b irth :
(Month) (Day) (Year)
G rade child is entering . . .
School attended la s t y ea r
Choose one of the following schools by m ark ing an X
beside the nam e.
N am e of School G rade Location
Signature
Date
To be filled in by Superintendent:
School Assigned .
1 In subsequent years the dates in both the explanatory letter
and the choice form should be changed to conform to the choice
period.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 25
GEWIN, C ircuit Judge, w ith whom Judge Bell con
curs, DISSENTING:
The opinioh of the m a jo rity and the proposed de
cree a re long, com plicated, som ew hat am biguous
and ra th e r confusing. The p e r cu riam opinion of the
m ajo rity of the en banc court does not substantia lly
clarify , m odify o r change anything said in the orig
inal opinioh filed D ecem ber 29, 1966. Only m inor and
inconsequential changes w ere m ad e in the proposed
decree.^ In m y view both the opinion and decree con
stitu te an ab ru p t and unauthorized dep artu re from
the m a in s tream of jud ic ia l thought both of this C ir
cuit and a hum ber of o ther C ircuits. I am unable to
ag ree e ither w ith the opinion or the decree, e sp e
cially those provisions dealing w ith the following: (1)
de facto and de ju re segregation ; (2) the guidelines;
(3) the proposed decree; (4) a ttendance percen tages,
proportions, and freedom of choice; and (5) enforced
in tegratioh .
De Facto and De jure Segregation
The thesis of the m ajo rity , lik,e M inerva (A thena)
of the classic m yths,^ w as spaw ned full-grown and
̂ “The opinion” and “the decree” as used herein refer to the
opinion and decree filed in these cases by the three judge
panel on December 29, 1966, wherein two of the judges agreed
and one dissented. Of necessity, references to page numbers
of the opinion refer to the slip opinion.
̂ See Gayley, The Classic Myths, (Rev. ed. 1939) page 23
“She sprang from the brain of Jove, agleam with panoply
of war, brandishing a spear and with her battle-cry
awal^ening the echoes of heaven and earth,”
26 U. S., et a l . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et a l .
fu ll-arm ed. I t h as no su b stan tia l legal ancestors.®
We m u st w a it to see w h a t progeny it will produce.
While professing to fashion a rem edy under the
benevolent canopy of the F ed era l Constitution, the
opinion and the decree a re couched in divisive te rm s
and proceed to dichotom ize the union of s ta tes into
two sep ara te and d istinc t p a rts . B ased on such re a
soning the Civil R ights A ct of 1964 is s tripped of its
national ch arac te r, the national policies there in
s ta ted a re nullified, and in effect, the rem edial p u r
poses of the A ct a re held to apply to approx im ately
one-third of the s ta tes of the union and to a m uch
sm alle r p e rcen tage or proportion of the to ta l popu
lation of the country. I am unable to believe th a t
the Congress had any such in tent. If it did, a serious
constitu tional question would be p resen ted as to the
valid ity of the en tire A ct under our concepts of A m er
ican constitu tional governm ent.
The Negro children in Cleveland, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Boston, New York, o r in any o ther a re a of
the nation w hich the opinion classifies u n d e r de facto
segregation , would receive little com fort from the a s
sertion th a t the ra c ia l m ake-up of th e ir school system
does not vio late their constitu tional righ ts because
® However, compare the doctrine of the majority and the
theme of an article in the Virginia Law Review entitled “Title
VI, The Guidelines and School Desegregation in the South”,
by James R. Dunn. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 53, page 42
(1967). According to footnote 85 of the law review article,
the majority opinion was released “as this article was going
to press.” Mr. Dunn is Legal Adviser, Equal Educational
Opportunities Program, United States Office of Education,
HEW, Washington, D.C.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 27
they w ere born into a de facto society, w hile the
exact sam e ra c ia l m ake-up of the school system in
the 17 Southern and bo rder s ta tes vio lates the con
stitu tional righ ts of th e ir coun terparts, o r even their
blood b ro thers , because they w ere born into a de ju re
society. All ch ildren everyw here in the nation a re
p ro tec ted by the Constitution, and tre a tm e n t which
violates their constitu tional righ ts in one a re a of the
country, also v iolates such constitu tional rig h ts m
ano ther a rea . The details of the rem ed y to be applied,
how ever, m ay v a ry w ith local conditions. B asically ,
a ll of them m u st be given the sam e constitutional
protection. Due process and eq u al pro tection will not
to le ra te a low er standard , and su re ly not a double
s tandard . The prob lem is a na tional one.
R egard less of our decrees, in spite of our hopes and
notw ithstanding our disappointm ents, th e re is no in
fallible and certa in process of a lchem y w hich will
e rase decades of h isto ry and tran sm u te a d istastefu l
set of c ircum stances into a utopia of perfection. All
who have studied the sub jec t recognize th a t d iscrim
inato ry p rac tices did not a rise from a single cause.
Such p rac tices had th e ir origin and b irth in social,
economic, educational, legal, geographical and nu
m erous o ther considerations. These fac to rs tend to
be self-perpetuating. We m u st e rad ica te them , and I
have the fa ith th a t they will be e rad ica ted and elim
inated by responsible and responsive governm ental
agencies acting p u rsuan t to the best in te rests of the
com m unity. There is no social antibiotic w hich will
28 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
effect a sudden or overnight cure. I t is not possible
to specifically fix the b lam e or to a ttrib u te the origin
of d iscrim inato ry p rac tices to isolated causes, and
it is su re ly inappropria te to undertake to fa s ten guilt
upon ahy segm ent of the population. In th is a re a of
our n a tion ’s h istory em inent histo*rians still dis
ag ree as to causes and effects. Some studies have
p laced em phasis on the slave tra d e r or the im porter
of slaves, o thers have b lam ed the slave holder, while
o thers have tried to tra ce the guilt back to trib a l
ch ieftans in A frica. P e rh a p s the m ost com m on under
standing am ongst all the h isto rians and students of
the problem is the conclusion th a t causes cannot be
isolated and responsibility cannot be lim ited to a p a r
ticu la r group. W hatever the cause or explanation, it
is c lea r th a t the responsibility rests on m ahy ra th e r
than few.
A t th is tim e, a lm ost 13 y e a rs a fte r the decisions in
Brow n v. Board of Education (1954) 347 U.S. 483, 98
L.ed. 873 (Brow n I) and Brow n v. Board of Education
(1955) 349 U.S. 294, 99 L.ed. 1083 (Brown II), there
should be no doubt in the m inds of anyone th a t com
pulsory segregation in the public school system s of
this nation m ust be elim inated. Negro ch ildren have
a personal, p resen t, and unqualified constitutional
rig h t to a ttend the public schools on a rac ia lly non-
d iscrim inato ry basis.
A lthough espousing the cause of un iform ity and a s
serting th e re m u st not be one law fo r A thens and
ano ther for Rom e, the opinion does Pot follow th a t
thesis o r principle. One of the chief difficulties
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 29
w hich I encounter w ith the opinion is th a t it con
cludes th a t the Constitution m ean s one thing in 17
s ta tes of the nation and som ething else in the rem ain
ing sta tes. This is done by a ra th e r ingenious though
illogical distinction between the te rm s de facto seg
regation and de ju re segregation. While the opinion
recognizes the evils com m on to both types, it relies
heavily on background fac ts to justify the conclusion
th a t the evil will be corrected in one a re a of the n a
tion and not in the other. In m y view the Constitution
cannot be bent and tw isted in such a m an n er as to
justify or support such an incongruous result. The
very subj ect m a tte r under consideration tends to nul
lify the assertion th a t the constitutional prohibition
against segregation should be applied in 17 s ta tes
and not in the re s t of the nation.
Legislative h istory c learly supports the idea th a t
no distinction should be m ade v/ith respect to the
various s ta tes in dealing w ith the problem . Senator
P asto re w as one of the p rincipal spokesm en who
handled this legislation. He gave the follov/ing ex
planation:
“ F ran k ly I do not see how we could have
gone any fu rther, to be fa ir . . . Section 602
of Title VI, not only requ ires the agency to
p rom ulgate rules and regulations, but all
p rocedure m u s t be in accord w ith these
ru les and regulations. They m ust have
broad scope. They m ust be national. They
m ust apply to all fifty states. We could not
30 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
draw one ru le to apply to the S ta te of M issis
sippi, ano ther ru le to apply to the S ta te of
A labam a, and ano ther ru le to apply to the
S ta te of Rhode Island. T here m u st be only one
ru le , to apply to every s ta te . F u rth e r, the
P resid en t m u s t approve the ru le .” (110 Cong.
Rec. 7059, A pril 7, 1964)
“ MR. PASTORE. . . We m ust do w hat Title
VI p rovides; and we could do it in no m ilder
fo rm th an th a t now provided by Title VI. The
Senator from Tennessee says, ‘Let us read
th is title ’. I say so, too. W hen we read these
two pages, we understand th a t the whole phil
osophy of T itle VI is to prom ote volun tary
com pliance. I t is w ritten righ t in the law.
T here shall be the volun tary com pliance as
the firs t step, and then the second step they
m u st inaugura te and prom ulgate , ru les th a t
have a national effect, not a local effect.
They shall apply to Tennessee, to Louisiana,
to Rhode Island, in equal fash ion .” (110 Cong.
Rec. 7066, A pril 7, 1964)
In connection w ith the distinction w hich the opin
ion undertakes to m ake, it is p e rtin en t to observe the
following strong and unequivocal pronouncem ent in
the v e ry beginning of the decision in Brown II:
“All provisions of federal, sta te , or local law
requiring or perm itting such discrim ination
m u st yield to this principle. T here rem ains
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 31
for consideration the m anner in w hich relief
is to be accorded .” (E m phasis added) (page
298)
It should be observed th a t all public school seg reg a
tion w as de ju re in the b road sense of th a t te rm p ri
or to the f irs t Brown decision, in th a t segregation
w as perm itted , if not required , by law.
It is undoubtedly tru e th a t any problem which
reaches national proportions is often generated by
vary ing and different custom s, m ores, laws, habits
and m anners. Such differences in the causes which
contributed to the creation and existence of the
p roblem in the firs t instance, do not justify the appli
cation of a fundam ental constitutional princip le in
one a re a of the nation and a fa ilu re to apply it in an
other.
While all the au thorities recognize the existence
and operation of d ifferent causes in the h isto rica l
background of rac ia l segregation, th e re a re also
m ark ed sim ilarities. This fac t is noted in the recen t
ly re leased study by the U nited S tates Com m ission
on Civil R ights, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE
SCHOOLS, 1967, Vol. I (pp. 39, 59-79). In discussing
the sub ject the following observation is m ade early
in the re p o r t;
“ Today it [racia l isolation or segregation]
is a ttrib u tab le to rem nan ts of the dual school
system , m ethods of studen t assignm ent, re s
idential segregation, and to those discretion-
32 U. S., et al . V. Jejf. County Bd. of Educ., et al .
a ry decisions fam ilia r in the North—site se
lection, school construction, tran sfe rs , and
the determ ination of w here to p lace students
in the event of overcrow ding.” (E m phasis
added)
In its su m m ary the Comimissien notes th a t the causes
of rac ia l isolation or school segregation a re com
plex and self-perpetuating. I t speaks of the N ation 's
m etropolitan a reas and re fe rs to social and eco
nomic fac to rs as well as geographical ones. A ccord
ing to the sum m ary , not only do sta te and local gov
ernm ents sh are the blam e, it is ca tegorica lly a sse rt
ed th a t “ The Federal G overnm ent also sh ares in
this responsib ility .” (E m phasis added) P e rtin en t
s im ilarities in the problem , applicable to the en tire
nation, a re forcefully a sse rted in the final sentence
of the Com m ission’s. S u m m ary ;
“In the North, w here school segregation w as
not generally com pelled by law, these [dis
crim inatory] policies and p rac tices have
helped to increase rac ia l separation . In the
South, w here until the Brown decision in 1954
school segregation w as requ ired by law, s im
ilar policies and practices have contributed to
its perp e tu a tio n .” (E m phasis added)
By a process of syllogistic reasoning based on fa
tally defective m ajo r p rem ises the opinion has dis
to rted the m eaning of the te rm segregation and has
segm ented its m eaning into de facto and de ju re seg
regation. All segregation in the South is classified as
17. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 33
de jure^ while segregation in the N orth is classified
as de facto. D ifferent ru les apply to the different
types of segregation. The South is heavily con
dem ned. The opinion approaches the p roblem on a
sectional basis and fails to consider the sub jec t ex
cept on a sectional or regional basis. T here a re m any
references to “ the eleven” Southern s ta te s and “ the
seven” border sta tes. This a re a of the nation is v a ri
ously ch arac te rized as “The eleven s ta tes of the Con
federacy ,” “ the en tire region encom passing the
southern and border s ta te s” , “w earing the badge of
s lav e ry ” , and “ a rp a rth e id ” . F inally , the opinion
concludes th a t the two types of segregation a re dif
ferent, have different origins, c rea te different
p roblem s and requ ire d ifferent corrective action. It
is suggested th a t there is no p resen t rem edy fo r de
facto segregation but th a t the problem s and questions
arising from de facto segregation m ay som eday be
answ ered by the Suprem e Court.®
* At one place in the opinion pseudo de facto segregation in
the South is mentioned, but it is asserted that any similarity
between pseudo de facto segregation in the South and actual
de facto segregation in the North is more apparent than real
(p. 68)
® The case of Blocker v. Ed. of Educ. of Manhasset, N.Y. (E.D.
N.Y. 1964) 226 F. Supp. 208 cited and relied on by the ma
jority does not support the de facto-de jure distinction. In
fact Judge Zavatt disavows any such distinction. The fol
lowing is from the opinion:
“On the facts of this case, the separation of the Negro
elementary school children is segregation. It is segre
gation by law—the law of the School Board. In the light
of the existing facts, the continuance of the defendant
Board’s impenetrable attendance lines amounts to nothing
less than state imposed segregation.”
* * 4 :
“This segregation is attributable to the State. The
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment ‘have refer
ence to actions of the political body denominated a State,
by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that ac-
34 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
This Court, and the d is tr ic t courts w ithin the six
s ta tes em b raced w ith in ou r ju risd iction like m any
o ther fed era l courts of the nation have given m uch
tim e and a tten tion to the solution of the problem s
aris ing a fte r the Brown decisions. M uch has been a c
com plished, m uch rem ain s to be done. It is not pos
sible fo r m e to jo in in the expressions of pessim ism
contained in the opinion or to approve the insinua
tions th a t the courts have failed in the perfo rm ance
of th e ir duty.® E ven Congress is tak en to ta sk for
fa ilu re to ac t e a r lie r and fo r fa ilu re to recognize
tion may be taken. * * *Whoever, by virtue of public
position under a State government, * * ♦ takes away the
equal protection of the laws, violates the constitutional
inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State,
and is clothed with the State’s power, his act is that of
the State.’ Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346-347, 25
L.Ed. 676,679 (1880). ‘The situation here is in no dif
ferent posture because the members of the School Board
and the Superintendent of Schools are local officials;
from the point of view of the Fourteenth Amendment,
they stand in this litigation as the agents of the State.’
Cooper V. Aaron, supra, 358 U.S. at 16, 78 S.Ct. at 1408,
3 L.ed.2d 5.”
® See for example the following statements from the opinion:
“The courts acting alone have failed.’’ (p. 7)
* * *
“Quantatively, the results were meager.’’ (p. 20-21)* * *
“And most judges do not have sufficient competence—
they are not educators or school administrators—to
know the right questions, much less the right answers.”
(p. 24)
♦ * ♦
“In some cases there has been a substantial time-lag be
tween this Court’s opinions and their application by
the district courts. In certain cases—^which we consider
unnecessary to cite—there has even been a manifest
variance between this Court’s decision and a later dis
trict court decision. A number of district courts still
mistakenly assume that transfers imder Pupil Placement
Laws—superimposed on unconstitutional initial assign
ment—satisfy the requirements of a desegregation plan,”
(p. 36)
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 35
school desegregation “ as the law of the lan d ,” ̂ In
the Brown cases the Court c learly and w isely recog
nized the fa c t th a t those decisions had changed the
law w hich had been in effect for decades. Due notice
w as taken of the fa c t th a t the new o rd e r of the day
would “ involve a varie ty of local problemjs.” The
court recognized “ the conaplexities arising from the
transition to a system of public educatioh freed of
rac ia l d iscrim ination .” M oreover, the C ourt stated ,
“ F ull im plem entation of these constitutional p rinc i
ples m ay requ ire solution of varied local school p rob
lem s.” The courts w ere instructed to be “ guided by
equitable p rinc ip les ,” to give consideration to “ p ra c
tical flexibility in shaping rem ed ies” and observed
th a t equity courts have a pecu liar “ facility for ad
justing and reconciling public and p riv a te needs.”
The Brown decisions em phasized the concept th a t
courts of equity a re p a rticu la rly qualified to shape
such rem edies as would “ call for elim ination of a
v a rie ty of obstacles in m aking the transition to
school system s operated in accordance w ith the con
stitutional p rinc ip les” pronounced in the firs t Brown
decision. C ontrary to the tone and expressions of the
m ajo rity opinion, the Suprem e Court early announced
the policy of heavy reliance on the d istric t courts and
tha t policy has continued to this date.
’’ See item (5), page 24 of the opinion:
“(5) But one reason more than any other has held
back desegregation of public schools on a large scale.
This has been the lack, until 1964, of effective congres
sional statutory recognition of school desegregation as
the law of the land.”
36 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
II
Guidelines
W ith re sp ec t to the guidelines, it should be noted
th a t they w ere not an issue p resen ted to the D istric t
Court. The cases h e re involved had been tried in the
respective d is tric t courts, appeals tak en to th is Court
and w ere pending on the docket of this Court before
the 1966 Guidelines w ere p rom ulgated . G uidelines
w ere not m ade an issue by the p leadings or otherw ise
in the d is tric t courts and no evidence w as taken w ith
respect to them . The issue of the guidelines a re be
fore th is Court because the Court, sua sponte,
brought the issue before it.** In m y v iew their valid
ity is not an issue to be decided in th is Court. See
United S ta tes v. Petrillo (1947) 332 U.S. 1,5,6; United
S ta tes V. International Union (1957) 352 U.S. 567,590;
ConnoT V. N ew Y o rk T im es (5 Cir. 1962) 310 F.2d 133,
135; Gibbs v. B lackw ell (5 Cir. 1965) 354 F.2d 469,471.
In its f irs t approach to the question the C ourt in
d icated th a t it would not p ass upon the constitu tional
ity of the guidelines bu t would give w eight to or rely
upon them as a m a tte r of jud icia l policy. When con-
® See opinion, page 10, footnote 13.
It should be noted that v/hen the panel which originally
heard this case invited briefs no mention was made of any
constitutional question or issue with respect to the HEW
guidelines. Rather, the questions posed related to whether
it was “permissible and desirable” for the court to give
weight to or rely on the guidelines; and if so, what practical
means or methods should be employed in making use of the
guidelines. From the questions raised by the court, counsel
could not have gained the impression that the court was to
make a full scale determination of the constitutional ques
tions involved.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 37
fronted w ith the fa c t th a t the guidelines w ere not ap
proved by the P resid en t a s req u ired by the Civil
R ights A ct of 1964, the opinion then concluded th a t
they do not constitu te o r pu rp o rt to be rules or reg u la
tions or o rders of general application. I t w as then
sta ted th a t since they w ere not a rule, regulation o r
order, they constitu te “ a s ta tem en t of policy” , and
while HEW ‘‘is under no s ta tu to ry com pulsion to issue
such s ta tem en ts” it w as decided th a t it is “ of m an i
fest ad v an tag e” to the general public to know the
basic considerations which the Com m issioner uses
“ in determ ining w hether a school m eets the requ ire
m ents fo r eligibility to receive financial a ss is tan ce .”
Im m edia te ly the opinion recognizes the inherent un
fa irness and vices of such pronouncem ents of adm inis
tra tiv e policy w ithout an ev identiary hearing . “ The
guidelines have the vices of all adm in istra tive policies
established un ila te ra lly w ithout a h earin g .” * Finally ,
the opinion concludes th a t the guidelines a re fully con
stitutional, recognizing as it is bound to do, th a t a fa il
u re to com ply w ith them cuts the purse strings and
closes the tre a su ry to all who fail to com ply:
“The g re a t bulk of the school d is tric ts in this
c ircu it have applied for federa l financial as
sistance and therefore opera te under volun
ta ry desegregation plans. A pproval of these
p lans by the Office of Education qualifies the
schools for federal aid. In th is opinion we
have held tha t the H EW G uidelines now in
ef fect are constitutional and are w ith in the
sta tu tory authority created in the Civil R ights
See opinion page 30.
38 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
A c t of 1964. Schools therefore, in com pliance
w ith the G uidelines can in g enera l be re g a rd
ed a s d ischarg ing constitu tional obligations.”
(E m phasis added) (p. 112)
W hether view ed from a substan tive o r p rocedural
point of view, due process and sound jud ic ia l ad
m in istra tion requ ire , a t the very least, an eviden
tia ry hearing on a m a tte r so v ita l to so m any people.^®
Not only a re num erous people affected , bu t those
m ost affected a re the school children of the nation.
The m ost v ita l segm ent of our dem ocratic society is
our school system . The operation and adm in istra tion
of th e public school system s of th is nation a re essen
tia lly a local business. I t is unthinkable th a t m a tte rs
th a t so v ita lly affect th is phase of the national w elfare
should be decided in such su m m ary fashion. In the
The 1966 Guidelines were promulgated on March 7, 1966, after
these cases were docketed in this Court. The fact that the
appellees had no opportunity to have a hearing and that the
guidelines were unilaterally issued without receipt of evi
dence from the numerous school districts was called to the
attention of this Court by one of the briefs for appellees:
“As pointed out in detail below, the Constitutional and
legi-slative principles applicable to the expenditures of fed
eral funds, the legislative and administrative discretion
placing conditions upon the receipt and use thereof, the lack
of due process in the adoption thereof and the lack
of any opportunity to be heard by those affected thereby
all render such Guidelines inapplicable to the pending
“The 1966 Guidelines (as well as the 1965 Guidelines)
were not approved by the President. They were issued
by the Office of Education unilaterally without an op
portunity for the representatives of the thousands of
school districts affected thereby to be heard. As
unilateral directives they have not been subject to
judicial review.”
See consolidated brief Jefferson County Board of Education,
pp. 76-77.
U. S., e t a l . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., e t a l . 39
two m o st recen t pronouncem ents by the Suprem e
Court dealing w ith the p roblem of segregation as re
la ted to facu lty and staff, th a t C ourt refused to ac t
w ithout an ev iden tiary hearing . In both decisions the
cases w ere rem anded to the d is tric t court “ fo r eviden
tia ry h earin g s .” B radley v. School Bd. of R ichm ond
(1965) 382 U.S. 103, 15 L.ed.2d 187; R ogers v. Paul
(1965) 382 U.S. 198, 15 L.ed.2d 265. S im ilarly , in Cal
houn V. L a tim er (1964) 377 U.S. 263, 12 L.ed.2d 288, the
Court h ad for consideration a desegregation p lan of
the A tlan ta B oard of Education. D uring the a rgum en t
before the Suprem e C ourt counsel for the B oard of E d
ucation inform ed the Court th a t subsequent to the de
cision of the low er court, the B oard had adopted addi
tional provisions authorizing “ free tra n s fe rs w ith cer
ta in lim ita tions in the city high schools” . The petition
ers contended th a t the changes did not m eet constitu
tional s tan d ard s and a sse rted th a t w ith resp ec t to ele
m en tary students the changed p lan would not achieve
desegregation until som etim e in the 1970’s. The Su
p rem e C ourt did not “ g rasp the n e ttle ” bu t vaca ted
the o rd e r of the lower court and rem anded the case to
“ be ap p ra ised by the d is tric t court in a p roper eviden
tia ry hearing.” (E m phasis added)
III
D ecree
I now com e to a consideration of the decree o rdered
to be en tered and its re la tion to the opinion. I t is im
possible to consider the decree and the opinion sep-
40 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
ara te ly ; they a re inex tricab ly interw oven. N either
takes into account “ m ultifarious local difficulties” ,
and therefore, any p a rtic u la r or p ecu liar local p rob
lem s a re subm erged and sacrificed to the ap p aren t
determ ination , evident on the face of both the opin
ion and the decree, to achieve percen tage enrollm ents
w hich w ill re flec t the kind of ra c ia l ba lance the
opinion seeks to achieve.
The opinion a sse rts th a t uniform ity m ust be
achieved forthw ith in everyone of the six s ta tes em
braced w ithin the F ifth C ircuit. No consideration is
given to any distinction in any of the num erous school
system s involved. U rban schools, ru ra l ones, sm all
schools, la rg e ones, a reas w here ra c ia l im balance is
la rg e or sm all, the re la tiv e num ber of N egro and w hite
children in any p a rtic u la r a rea , or any of the other
m y riad problem s w hich a re known to every school
ad m in is tra to r, a re taken into account. All th ings m ust
yield to speed, uniform ity , p e rcen tages and propor
tional rep resen ta tion . T here a re no lim itations and
there a re no excuses. This philosophy does not com
p ort w ith the philosophy w hich has guided and been
inheren t in the segregation problem since Brown II.
As the C ourt th e re s ta te d :
“ B ecause these cases arose under d ifferen t
local conditions and th e ir disposition will in
volve a v a rie ty of local problem s, we requ ired
fu rth e r argum ent on the question of re lie f.”
(p. 298) (E m phasis added)
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 41
See also D avis v. Bd. of Com m, of Mobile Co., A la.,
322 F.2d 356 (5 Cir. 1963) -wherein this Court m ade a
distinction in the ru ra l and u rban schools of Mobile
County, A labam a. We held;
“The D istric t C ourt m ay m odify th is o rder
to defer desegregation of ru ra l schools in
M obile County until Septem ber 1964, should
the D istric t C ourt a fte r fu rther hearing con
clude th a t special planning of adm in istra tive
problem s fo r ru ra l schools in the county m ake
it im prac ticab le for such schools to s ta r t de
segregation in Septem ber 1963.”
The effectiveness of the d is tric t courts h a s been
seriously im paired , in a re a l sense, co n tra ry to the
teachings of all the decisions of the Suprem e Court
since Brow n II. U nder the opinion and decree a
U nited S ta tes D istric t Judge serves essen tially as a
referee, m a ste r, or hearing exam iner. Now his only
functions a re to o rder the enforcem ent of the de
tailed, uniform , stereotyped fo rm al decree, to super
vise com pliance w ith its detailed provisions as th e re
in o rdered and directed , and to receive periodic re
ports m uch in the sam e fashion as reports a re re
ceived by an o rd inary clerk in a la rge business es
tablishm ent.
Such a detailed decree on the appellate level not
only v io la tes sound concepts of jud ic ia l ad m in is tra
tion, bu t it v io lates a longstanding philosophy of the
federal jud ic ia l system , and indeed all jud icia l sys
tem s com m on to this country, w hich vest wide dis-
42 17. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
cretion and au thority in tr ia l courts because of their
closeness to and fam ilia rity w ith local problem s. See
the opinions in Brown II, B radley, Rogers, and Cal
houn. F o r exam ple, in Brow n II the Court s ta ted :
“F u ll im plem entation of these constitu tional
p rinc ip les m a y requ ire solution of varied local
school problem s. School au thorities have the
p rim ary responsibility for elucidating, a ssess
ing, and solving these p rob lem s; courts w ill
have to consider w hether the action of school
au thorities constitutes good fa ith im p lem en ta
tion of the governing constitu tional principles.
B ecause of their p roxim ity to local conditions
and th e possible need for fu rth er hearings,
the courts w hich originally heard these cases
can best perform th is judicia l appraisal. Ac
cordingly, we believe it app rop ria te to rem an d
the cases to those courts.
“ In fashioning and effectuating the decrees,
the courts w ill be guided by equitable p rin
ciples. T raditionally , equity h a s been char
acterized hy a practical flex ib ility in shaping
its rem ed ies and by a fac ility for ad justing
and reconciling public and p riv a te needs.
T hese cases call for the exercise of these tra
ditional a ttribu tes of equity power. At stake is
the personal in te rest of the p lain tiffs in adm is
sion to public schools as soon as p rac ticab le
on a nondiscrim inatory basis. To effectuate
th is in te re s t m ay call for elim ination of a va
rie ty of obstacles in m aking the transition to
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 43
school system s opera ted in accordance w ith
the constitu tional principles set fo rth in our
M ay 17, 1954, decision.” (E m phasis added)
The opinion a sse rts th a t “m ost ju d g es” do not
possess the necessa ry com petence to deal w ith the
questions p resen ted , and do not “ know the righ ts
questions, m uch less the rig h t an sw ers .” N otwith
standing the foregoing assertion , the judges of the
m ajo rity , acting on the appellate level, p roceed to
fashion a decree of such m inu te detail and specificity
as to rem ove all d iscretion and au thority from the
d is tric t judges on w hom the Suprem e Court has relied
so heavily . In m y view the d istric t judges a re in m uch
b e tte r position to know the questions and the answ ers
than appellate judges who necessarily function som e
d istance aw ay from an evidentiary hearing and a re
rem oved fro m the “m ultifarious local p rob lem s” and
“ the v a rie ty of obstac les” inheren t in the solution of
the issues p resen ted .
IV
Percentages, Proportions and Freedom of Choice
F reed o m of choice m eans the unrestric ted , unin
hibited, u n restra in ed , unhurried , and u n h arried righ t
to choose w here a studen t will a ttend public school
sub jec t only to adm in istra tive considerations w hich
do not tak e into account or a re not re la ted to con
siderations of race . If there is a free choice, free in
every sense of the word, exercised by students or by
th e ir p a ren ts , or by both, depending on the c ircum
stances, in accordance w ith a p lan fa irly and ju stly
44 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
adm in istered fo r the purpose of elim inating segrega
tion, the dual school system as such w ill u ltim ate ly
d isappear. Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683
(1963); B radley v. School Board, 345 F .2d 310,318 (4
Cir. 1965), vaca ted and rem anded on o th er grounds,
382 U.S. 108 (1965 per cu riam ). See also Clark v.
Board of Educ. of L ittle R ock, 369 F .2d 661 (8 Cir.
1966); Deal v. C incinnati Bd. of E duc., 369 F.2d 55,59
(6 C ir. 1966); Lee, et al. v. M acon County Board of
Education, et al. (D.C. M.D. Ala. 1967) C.A. 604-E,
. . . . F . Supp...........If the com pletely fi^ee choice is a f
forded and neither the students nor th e ir p a re n ts de
sire to change the schools the students h ave hereto
fore attended, th is C ourt is w ithout au thority under
the Constitution or any enactm en t of C ongress to com
pel them to m ake a change. Im plic it in freedom of
choice is the rig h t to choose to rem a in in a p a rtic u la r
school, pe rh ap s the school hereto fore attended . T h a t in
itself is the exercise of a free^ choice. The fac t th a t
N egro children m ay not choose to leave th e ir asso
ciates, friends, or m em bers of the ir fam ilies to a ttend
a school w here those associates a re elim inated does
not m e an th a t freedom of choice does not w ork or is
not effectively afforded. The assertion by the m ajo rity
th a t “ the only school desegregation p lan th a t m eets
Constitutional s tan d ard s is one th a t w orks’’ as in te r
p re ted by th a t opinion, sim ply m eans th a t students
and p a ren ts w ill not be given a free choice if the re
sults envisioned by the m a jo rity a re not actually
achieved. T here m u st be a m ixing of the races ac
cording to m a jo rity philosophy even if such m ixing
can only be achieved under the lash of compul-
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 45
sion. If the percen tage of Negro and w hite chil
dren attending a p a rticu la r school does not con-
fornn to the percen tage of N egro and white
school population p reva len t in the com m unity, the
m ajo rity concludes th a t the p lan of desegregation
does not work. A ccordingly, w hile professing to vouch
safe freedom and liberty to Negro children, they have
destroyed the freedom and liberty of a ll students,
Negro and w hite alike. T here m ust be a m ixing of the
races, or in tegra tion a t all costs, or the p lan does not
w ork according to the opinion. Such has not been
and is not now the sp irit or the le tte r of the law.
The a im and a ttitude of the m ajo rity is reflected
by the following s ta te m e n t:
“ In review ing the effectiveness of an ap
proved p lan it seem s reasonable to use som e
so rt of y a rd stick or objective percen tage
guide. The percen tage requ irem en ts in the
G uidelines a re m odest, suggesting only th a t
system s using free choice p lans for a t leas t
two y e a rs should expect 15 to 18 p e r cent of
the pupil population to have selected desegre
gated schools.”
F u rth e r the Court equates the percen tage attendance
test w ith p e rcen tag es in ju ry exclusion^ cases and
One of the leading and most recent cases on jury exclusion
is Swain v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 202, 13 L.ed.2d 759.
With respect to proportional representation on juries the
Court concluded:
“Venires drawn from the jury box made up in this
manner unquestionably contained a smaller proportion
46 U . S., e t a l . V. J e f f . County Bd. o f Educ., e t a l .
voter reg istra tion cases. I t should be pointed out th a t
such cases had no e lem ent of free choice in them ,
and therefore, the com parison is inapposite. In the
in s tan t cases the m a jo rity condem ns a free choice
p lan unless it achieves the percetitage re su lt w hich
suits the m ajo rity . A ccordingly, the opinion con
cludes ;
“ P ercen tages have been used in o ther civil
righ ts cases. A s im ila r inference m ay be
d raw n in school desegregation cases, when
the num ber of N egroes attending school w ith
w hite children is m an ifestly out of line w ith
the ra tio of N egro school children to w hite
school ch ildren in public schools. Common
sense suggests th a t a gross d iscrepancy be
tween the ra tio of N egroes to w hite children
in a school and the HEW p ercen tag e guides
ra ise s an inference th a t the school p lan is not
working as it should in providing a un itary ,
in teg ra ted sy stem .”
T here is no constitu tional requ irem ent of p ropor
tional rep resen ta tion in the schools according to race.
of the Negro community than of the white community.
But a defendant in a criminal case is not constitutionally
entitled to demand a proportionate number of his race
on the jury which tries him nor on the venire or jury
roll from which the petit jurors are drawn.” (p. 208)
Further, the Court; in Stvain quoted with approval the fol
lowing statement from Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-
287, 94 L.ed. 839, 847:
“Obviously the number of races and nationalities appear
ing in the ancestry of our citizens would make it im
possible to meet a requirement of proportional representa
tion. Similarly, since there can be no exclusion of
Negroes as a race and no discrimination because of color,
proportional limitation is not permissible.”
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 47
F u rth erm o re , sihce th e re can be no exclusion based
on race , proportional lim itation is likewise im perm is
sible under the Constitution.
We should be concerned w ith the elim ination of
d iscrim ination on account of race, and freedom of
choice is one m ean s of accom plishing th a t goal. I t is
not our function to condem n the children o r the school
au thorities because the free choices actua lly m ade do
not com port w ith our own notions of w hat the choices
should have been. When our concepts as to p ropor
tions and p ercen tages a re im posed on school system s,
notw ithstanding free choices actually m ade, we have
destroyed freedom and liberty by jud icia l f ia t; and
even w orse, we have done so in the v e ry nam e of
th a t liberty and freedom we so avidly c laim to es
pouse and em brace. Our duty in seeking to elim inate
rac ia l d iscrim ination is to vouchsafe to all children,
regard less of race , a full, com plete and tim ely free
choice of schools in appropria te cases in keeping w ith
sound adm in istra tive p rac tices w hich take into con
sideration p roper c rite ria . Both proportional rep resen
tation and proportional lim itation a re equally uncon
stitutional.
Enforced Integration
The opinion seeks to find a C ongressional m andate
requiring com pulsory or enforced in tegration in the
public schools as distinguished from the elim ination
of segregation. Throughout the opinion th e re appear
48 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
a tangled conglom eration of w ords and ph rases of
various shades of m eaning, all of w hich a re equated
w ith each other to reach the conclusion desired by
the m a jo rity th a t school boards in th is C ircuit m ust
adopt and im plem ent a p lan of forced integration.
I t seemis app rop ria te to re tu rn to the Civil R ights
A ct of 19'64 and the leg islative h isto ry w hich spaw ned
its enac tm en t in o rder to ascerta in the true C ongres
sional intent. Section 401(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000c(b)
defines desegregation in unequivocal term*s:
“ ‘D esegregation’ m eans the assignm ent of
students to public schools and w ithin such
schools w ithout reg a rd to th e ir race, color,
religion, or national origin, but ‘desegrega
tion’ shall not m ean the assignm ent of stu
dents to public schools in order to overcom e
rac ia l im b a lan ce .”
Section 407(a)(2) of Title IV, Title 42 § 2000c-6(a) (2)
provides as follows:
‘‘. . .provided th a t nothing herein shall em
power any official or court of the U nited
S tates to issue any o rder seeking to achieve
a rac ia l balance in any school by requiring
the tran sp o rta tio n of pupils or students from
one school to ano ther or one school d is tric t to
ano ther in order to achieve such racial bal
ance, or otherwise enlarge the existing power
of the court to insure com pliance w ith consti
tutional standards.” (E m phasis added)
17. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 49
It should be noted th a t the portion of the language of
the proviso w hich is underscored is om itted in the
co u rt’s opinion. As to enforced in teg ra tion the follow
ing s ta tem en t by Senator H um phrey is exactly in
point:
“ Mr. H um phrey. . .1 should like to m ake one
fu rth e r reference to the G ary case. This case
m akes it quite c lear th a t w hile the Constitu
tion p rohib its segregation, it does not require
in tegration . . .The bill does not a ttem p t to
in teg ra te the schools but it does a ttem p t to
elim inate segregation in the schools. . .The
fac t th a t there is a rac ia l im balance p e r se is
not som ething w hich is unconstitutional. T hat
is why we have attetm pted to clarify it w ith
the language of Section 4.” (110 Congression
al R ecord 12717)
Likewise w ith respect to Section 407(a)(2) Senator
H um phrey’s s ta tem en t clarifies and m akes p lain
the Congressional in tent by re fe rring to the Gary
case.^^
The following additional excerpts from the leg isla
tive h isto ry serve to clarify the in ten t of Congress.
C ongressm an Celler, C hairm an of the Ju d ic iary
C om m ittee of the House and F loor M anager of the
bill;
“T here is no authorization for e ither the At
torney G eneral or the Com m issioner of Edu-
Bell V. School City of Gary, Indiana, 213 P. Supp. 819 (1963).
50 17. S., et al . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Edue., et al.
cation to w ork tow ard achieving rac ia l ba l
ance in given schools.” (110 C ongressional
R ecord 1519, Jan u a ry 31, 1964)
Senators Byrd and H um phrey :
‘‘MR. BYRD of W est V irginia. B ut would the
Senator from M innesota also indicate
w hether the w ords ‘provided th a t noth
ing herein shall em pow er any official
or court of the United S tates to issue
any order seeking to achieve a rac ia l
balance in any school by requ iring the
tran sp o rta tio n of pupils or students
from one school to ano ther or one school
d is tric t to ano ther in o rder to achieve
such rac ia l ba lance’ would p rec lude the
Office of Education, under section 60'2 or
Title VI, from establishing a req u ire
m ent th a t school boards and school dis
tric ts shall take action to relieve rac ia l
im balance w herever it m ay he deem ed
to exist?
‘‘MR. HUM PHREY. Yes, I do not believe in
duplicity. I believe th a t if we include
the language in Title IV, it m u st apply
throughout the A ct.” (110 Congressional
R ecord, P age 12715, June 4, 1964).
Senator Jav its ;
‘‘MR. JAVITS. . .Taking the case of the
schools to which the Senator is referring ,
and the danger of envisaging the ru le or
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 51
regu la tion re la ting to ra c ia l im balance,
it is negated expressly in the bill, w hich
would com pel ra c ia l balance. Therefore
there is no case in w hich the th ru s t of
the s ta tu te under w hich the m oney would
be given would be d irected tow ard re
storing or bringing about a rac ia l ba l
ance in the schools. If such a ru le w ere
adopted or prom ulgated by a b u reau cra t,
and approved by the P residen t, the Sen
a to r’s S ta te would have an open and shut
case under Section 603. T h a t is why we
have provided for jud icia l review . The
Senator knows as a law yer th a t we never
can stop anyone from suing, nor stop any
G overnm ent official from m aking a fool
of him ’self, or from try ing to do som ething
th a t he has no righ t to do, except by re m
edies provided by law. So I believe it is
th a t se t of w ords w hich is opera tiv e .”
(110 C ongressional R ecord, P age 12717,
June 4, 1964).
Senators B yrd and H u m p h rey :
“MR. BYRD of W est V irginia. . .C annot the
Office of Education, pu rsu an t to c a r ry
ing out this regulation, deny assis tance
to school d is tric ts w herein rac ia l im bal
ance exists?
MR. HUM PHREY. Let m e read from the
substitu te: Provided, th a t nothing h ere
in shall em pow er any official or court
of the U nited S tates to issue any order.
52 17. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
MR. BYRD of W est V irginia. ‘To issue any
o rd e r’, bu t does it provide th a t the Office
of E ducation shall not cu t off F edera l
assistance?
MR. HUM PHREY. But in order to cu t off
F ed e ra l assistance, the P resid en t would
have to issue the o rder, if the Senator
will read Section 602.
MR. BYRD of W est V irginia. The w ords are:
No such rule, regulation, or o rder shall
becom e effective unless and until ap
proved by the P residen t.
MR. HUM PHREY. T hat is correct.
MR. BYRD of W est V irginia. W hat a ssu r
ance does the Senator give m e th a t the
P resid en t will not approve such a re
qu irem en t ?
MR. HUM PHREY. B ecause I do not be
lieve the P residen t will vio late the law .”
(110 Congressional Record, P age 12715,
June 4, 1964).
In o rder to escape the c lear m eaning of the quoted
sta tu tes and the unquestioned intent of C ongress as
illu stra ted by the legislative history, the opinion sum
m arily ob lite ra tes any distinction betw een desegre
gation and in tegration . W ithin the context of the opin
ion in tegration m eans forced or enforced integration.
A gain the te rm in tegration: Is applied only to de jure
segregated_seh:6ols. An analysis of the opinion demon-
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 53
s tra te s th a t the process of reasoning used am ounts
to an unauthorized insertion of the w ord “ de ju re ”
to achieve land m ain ta in the de facto and de ju re dis
tinction w ith w hich I dealt ea rlie r. By m ean s of th is
device the opinion converts the Civil R ights A ct of
1964 into a new and different concept en tirely foreign
to its tru e m eaning. I quote sev era l typ ica l excerp ts
from the opin ion:
“W e use the te rm s ‘in teg ra tio n ’ and ‘desegre
gation’ of fo rm erly seg rega ted public schools
to m ean the conversion of a de jure seg re
ga ted dual sy stem to a un itary , non rac ia l
(nondiscrim inatory) system —lock, stock, and
b a rre l: students, faculty , staff, facilities,
p rog ram s, and ac tiv ities.” (E m phasis added)
(footnote 5, page 6)
“The national policy is plain: fo rm erly de
jure segregated public school sy s te m s based
on dual attendance zones m u st sh ift to uni
ta ry nonrdcial sy s tem s— w ith or w ithou t fed
eral funds.” (E m phasis in orig.) (page 14)
* * *
‘‘A lthough the leg islative h isto ry of the s ta t
u te shows th a t the floor m an ag ers for the
A ct and other m em bers of the Senate and
House cited and quoted these two opinions
they d id so w ithin the context of the p roblem
of de facto segregation .” (E m phasis added)
(P ag e 39) [The two cases m entioned a re
Briggs and Bell.]
54 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
“A s used in the Act, therefo re , ‘deseg rega
tion’ re fe rs only to the d isestab lishm ent of
seg rega tion in de jure segregated schools.”
(E m phasis added) (page 74)
♦
“S enato r H um phrey spoke sev era l tim es in
the language of Briggs bu t h is references to
Bell ind icate th a t the restric tions in the A ct
w ere pointed a t th e G ary, Ind iana de facto
type of segregation .” (E m phasis added)
(page 80)
A gain it should be said th a t it is not easy to under
s tan d the reasoning by w hich the m a jo rity concludes
th a t the F e d e ra l C onstitution req u ires in teg ra tion
of fo rm erly de jure school system s bu t does not re
qu ire the in teg ra tion of de facto system s. A pparently
faced w ith th is d ilem m a the m a jo rity realized th a t
it m u s t challenge the ju risp rudence estab lished by
Briggs v. E llio tt (E .D . S.C. 1955) 132 F . Supp. 776, and
Bell V. School City of G ary (N.D. Ind. 1963) 213
F . Supp. 819, a ffirm ed 324 F.2d 209 (7 C ir. 1963). The
opinion re fe rs to these cases as “ two glosses on
B row n’’. The rep eated assertions of Senators show
ing th e ir re liance upon the two decisions in question
give em phasis to the m eaning of the teach ing of those
two cases. S ena to r H um phrey ac tua lly s ta ted th a t
the th ru s t of Ju d g e B eam er’s opinion in th e G ary case
w as incorpora ted into the Civil R ights A ct of 1964.̂ ®
The m a jo rity disposes of Senator H um phrey’s com
m en t and the G ary case by asserting th a t the school
IS See opinion page 81.
17. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 55
d is tric ts w ere d raw n w ithout reg a rd to race. The fol
lowing is from the opinion;
“S enato r H um phrey spoke sev era l tim es
in the language of Briggs bu t h is refe rences
to Bell indicate th a t the res tric tio n s in the
A ct w ere pointed a t the G ary, Ind ian a de fac
to type of segregation .” (opinion page 80)
While it m ay be tru e th a t the fac ts in G ary showed
good fa ith on the p a r t of the school board , it is like
w ise tru e th a t the G ary school sy stem involved de
ju re segregation w ith in the m eaning of the m a jo rity
opinion. We quote from Judge B eam er’s opinion, 213
F . Supp. a t 822:
“ P rio r to 1949, G ary had seg rega ted schools
in w hat is com m only known a s the P u lask i
Complex. Two schools w ere built on the sam e
cam pus, one w as called P u lask i-E ast and the
other Pulaski-W est. One w as occupied by N e
gro studen ts and the o ther by w hite students.
This w as in accordance w ith the sep a ra te bu t
equal policy, then p erm itted by Ind iana law,
(B urns Ind iana S ta tu tes A nnotated, 1948 R e
p lacem ent, Section 28-5104)”
The difficulty of the m a jo rity is fu r th e r in creased
by v irtu e of the fa c t th a t Judge B eam er cited cases
w hich uphold the Briggs doctrine. M ore im portan t,
w hen the case w as a ffirm ed by the Court of A ppeals
of the Seventh C ircuit, the so-called B riggs d ictum
'56 17. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
w as cited as au thority for the co u rt’s holding, 324
F .2d a t 213.
If the alleged Briggs d ic tum is so c learly erroneous
and constitutionally unsound, it is difficult to believe
th a t i t would have been accepted fo r a period of a l
m ost twelve y e a rs and quoted so m an y tim es. E ven
the m a jo rity concedes th a t the court in Briggs w as
com posed of d istinguished ju ris ts . Judges P a rk e r,
Dobie and T im m erm an . If the m ajoirity is correct,
it is en tire ly likely th a t n ev er before have so m any
judges been m isled, including judges of th is Court,
fo r so long by such a c lear, understandab le , d irec t
and concise holding a s the language in B riggs w hich
the opinion now condem ns. The language is s tra ig h t
fo rw ard and sim ple: “The Constitution, in o ther
w ords, does no t requ ire in tegration . I t m ere ly forbids
d iscrim ination . ’ ’
I t is in teresting also to observe th a t the Suprem e
Court h as n ev er d istu rbed the Briggs language, al
though it h as h ad num erous opportunities to do so.
As a m a tte r of fac t, it h a s com e v e ry close to approv
ing it; if it h as not ac tua lly done so. In the case
of Shuttlesioorth v. B irm ingham (N.D. Ala. 1958) 162
F . Supp. 372,378, the d is tric t court speaking through
Judge R ives quoted the B riggs opinion. The Suprem e
Court a ffirm ed the judgm ent. Shuttlesw orth v. B ir
m ingham , 358 U.S. 101.
The m a jo rity ru le requ iring com pulsory in teg ra
tion is neAV and novel, and it has not been accepted
See the very clear dissenting opinion of Judge Cox.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 57
by the Supremie C ourt or by the o ther C ircuits. The
ra tiona le of Briggs has been approved. Brow n de-
cisions, supra; Goss v. Bd. of Educ. of K noxville , su
pra; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,498; P ennsyl
vania V. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230,231; Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (p a s s im ); Scull v. V irginia, 359 U.S.
344,346; W olfe v. N orth Carolina, 364 U.S. 177,182;
GomilUon v. L ightfoot, 364 U.S. 339,349; G arner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157,178; Turner v. City of M em
phis, 369 U.S. 350,353; Johnson v. V irginia, 373 U.S.
61,62; W right v. R ockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57-58;
Springfield v. Barksdale (1 Cir. 1965) 348 F.2d 261;
B radley v. School Board of R ichm ond, Va. (4 Cir.
1965) 345 F .2d 310; Sw ann v. C harlotte-M ecklenburg
Board of Educ. (4 Cir. 1966) 369 F .2d 29; Deal v. Cin
cinnati Board of Educ. (6 Cir. 1966) 369 F .2d 55; Bell
V. School C ity of Gary, Indiana (7 Cir. 1963) 324 F.2d
209; C lark v. Board of Educ. of L ittle R ock (8 Cir.
1966) 366 F.2d 661; Downs v. Board of Educ. o f K an
sas C ity (10 Cir. 1964) 338 F.2d 988, cert, den., 380
U.S. 914.
Conclusion
I t is m y judgm ent th a t the de facto-de ju re d istinc
tion c rea ted in the opinion can not be supported as a
m a tte r of law . P e rcen tag e o r p roportional enrollm ent
requ irem en ts based on race , and enforced in teg ra
tion a re in violation of well established constitu tional
concepts in m y opinion.
While it cannot be denied there has been recalc i
tran ce and resistance to desegregation as requ ired
58 U, S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
by the Brow n decisions in num erous a reas , I cannot
sh are in the pessim ism expressed in the opinion.
Throughout th e country a su b stan tia l effort h a s been
m ade to elim inate segregation and su b stan tia l prog
ress h a s been m ade. The Brow n decisions contem
p la ted som e difficulties and com plexities. A review
of the h isto ry of the difficulties involved strongly in
dicate th a t the g rea test p roblem s arise w hen a s ta r t
or “ b reak th rough” is initiated. R eca lc itran ce and re
sistance w hich ap p eared in itially in m any a re as have
now subsided o r d isappeared . I t is also tru e th a t the
em phasis has shifted p roperly fro m “ d e lib e ra te” to
“ speed” . I continue to have confidence in the local
school boards of the nation. While som e of them have
perform ed slowly and a few have not perfo rm ed a t
all, the v a s t m a jo rity of school boards a re com posed
of conscientious, civic m inded, sincere people who a re
undertak ing to do w h a t is best for the school children
of the nation. We should not in te rfe re w ith them un
duly.
F u rth erm o re , I continue to have confidence in the
judicia l sy stem of the country and hold the firm be
lief th a t the reco rd of the courts in achieving com
pliance w ith the Brow n decisions d em onstra tes th a t
th e courts h av e given th e ir prom pt, carefu l and dili
gent a tten tion to the p roblem s as they h av e arisen .
In m y view the heav iest bu rden has been on the dis
tr ic t courts, and inevitab ly the best solutions will
com e a t the d is tric t court level w here the judges a re
in close con tac t w ith local com plexities, obstacles
and problem s. The p rim ary responsib ility should be
left w here the Brow n decisions p laced it, w ith the
boards of education under the supervision and guid-
17. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 59
ance of the d is tric t courts. This is not to say th a t the
courts should not accord full consideration to the ex
pertise of the D epartm en t of H ealth , E ducation and
W elfare; and w.e should give due consideration to
HEW G uidelines w hen it is app rop ria te to do so.
However, the provisions of the Civil R igh ts A ct of
1964 should not be by-passed. R ules, regu lations and
orders of genera l application should be enacted in
accordance w ith the requirem ents of due p rocess
and school system s should not be penalized by such
rules, regu lations or o rders whiich a re not approved
by the P res id en t as provided by the Act. I t is no an
sw er to say th a t the guidelines a re in terp re tive reg u
la tions o r “housekeeping” rules. They a re being used
and applied as general rules, regu la tions o r o rders.
Due to developm ents in the ju risprudence, p a rticu
la rly w ith resp ec t to desegregation of facu lty and
staff, the o rders of the d is tric t courts should be v a
cated and the causes rem anded for fu rth e r considera
tion and fo r ev iden tiary hearings in the d is tric t courts.
In effect the appellees recognize the fa c t th a t th is
m ust be done. We should not rev erse the d is tric t
courts on questions w hich w ere not issues before them
and fashion our own decree w ith respec t to such is
sues w ithout any ev iden tiary basis or w ithout afford
ing an opportunity for the p resen ta tion of evidence
re la ting to such issues in the d is tric t courts.
Judge BELL, w ith whom Judge GEWIN joins, DIS
SENTING:
I respectfully dissent. The two-judge or original opin
ion of December 20, 1966 is what the majority has
60 U. S., et a l . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et a l .
adopted. T h a t opinion seriously erodes the doctrine of
separa tion of pow ers as betw een the E xecu tive and
the Ju d ic iary . M oreover, m uch of its language is
in the n a tu re of overreach and, as such, adds confusion
and luirest to the already troubled area of school de
segregation. The overtones of compulsory integration
and school racial balances in the original opinion can
only chill the efforts of school adm inistrators to complete
the task of eliminating dual school systems of the South.
In addition, the other side of some of the more important
holdings of the majority opinion should be considered
and those propositions stated which m ilitate against their
validity.
The plain in tent of the two opinions is to establish a
uniform law for the school systems of th is circuit. Thus,
the opinions must be tested as laws. Their validity and
efficacy as laws should be considered in the frame of
reference of need, fairness, clarity and what is constitu
tionally permissible.
I t is fundam ental in law making th a t laws should be
fair as between people and sections. The requirem ent
tha t laws be clear in meaning is also a fundamental.
We cannot be expected to obey the law if we cannot
tmderstand it. Caligula kept the meaning of the laws
from the Romans by posting them in narrow places
and in small print^—it is no different today when the
law is couched in vagueness.
̂ Suetonius, The Lives of the Tvs''elve Caesars, (Random House,
1959), p. 191, 192.
17. S., et al. V. Jejj. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 61
Then there is the m atte r of personal liberty. Under
our system of government, it is not to be restricted
except where necessary, in balance, to give others th e ir
liberty, and to attain order so tha t all may enjoy liberty.
History records that sumptuary laws have been largely
unobserved because they failed to recognize or were
needlessly restric tiv e of personal liberty . Our experi
ments w ith sumptuary-like laws are exemplified by the
Dred Scott decision, 19 How. 393, Reconstruction, and
the prohibition laws. All failed.
The m ajority opinions, considered together, fail to
meet the tests of fairness and clarity. The advance ap
proval given to a requirement of compelled integration
exceeds what is constitutionally permissible under the
Fourteenth Amendment. They cast a long shadow over
personal liberty as it embraces freedom of association
and a free society. They do little for the cause of educa
tion.
It is important, however, that this dissenting opinion
not mislead any person having responsibility in the area
of school desegregation. The dual system of education
must be eliminated. This was ordered in 1955. Brown
V. Board o f Education o f Topeka, 1955, 349 U.S. 294, 75
S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083. School boards were told to
convert the dual segregated school systems into racially
nondiscriminatory school systems. The court pointed to
problems tha t might arise in the transition w ith respect
to the physical condition of school plants, transportation,
personnel, and in the revision of school districts and
62 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
attendance areas into compact areas. This order followed
reargum ent of the question of remedy after the 1954
decision holding segregated education xmder the separate
but equal doctrine unlawful. Brown v. Board of Educa
tion, 1954, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873. A fter
full argument, the transition was ordered. The separate
but equal doctrine was already lost and the tim e for
remedy was at hand. Transition was the rem edy pro
vided.
Transition to date has in the main consisted of follow
ing a freedom of choice plan for pupil assignment. But
freedom of choice without faculty desegregation and the
elimination of discrimination in buildings, equipment,
services and curriculum will not suffice to convert a dual
system into a unitary nondiscriminatory system. The
slow progress to date toward eliminating dual systems
is what has brought about the majority opinions, and is
also at the root of the disturbance betw een the Health,
Education, and Welfare Department and many school
boards. The objective m ust be, as the Departm ent of
Justice contends, that there be no white schools— n̂o
Negro schools—just schools. But this is all tha t is re
quired and it can be accomplished without the open-end
compulsory integration language of the majority opinions,
or the geometric progression guidelines® of HEW which
the majority opinion approves.
2 Even v/hile these cases were pending after en banc argument,
HEW announced new guidelines. Now for a school
system to receive approval without further investigation,
it must show that the number of minority group students
in integrated schools within the system in the school
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 63
The mandate of the Supreme Court in Brown II can
be carried out by the assignment of faculty and students
w ithout regard to race, and by affording equality in
educational opportunity from the standpoint of build
ings, equipment, and curriculum. W here freedom of
choice in student assignment is ineffective to the extent
tha t a dual system continues, it can be implemented
by a neighborhood assignment plan. Assignments should
then be made by the school board to the school nearest
the home of the student, whether form erly w hite or
Negro. Then the child would be given the option im der
a freedom of choice plan of attending another school
w ith priority to attend being based on proximity of
residence to school. This m ethod of student assignment
is comparable to what is being used in Charlotte. Cf.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
4 Cir., 1966, 369 F.2d 29 (En banc).
We should order the school boards in these cases,
which they and the entire court agree must be reversed,
to forthw ith complete the conversion from dual to
unitary systems by the use of these minimum but manda
tory directions. School boards and the public would
understand the objective—to convert dual school systems
into im itary nondiscriminatory systems just as the Su
prem e Court directed twelve years ago. School boards
and the public would also understand the method to be
followed in the conversion. But this approach is too
simple for the majority. Their view is th a t something
year 1967-68 will be double the number present in 1966-
67 and in some instances triple the number. New
Orleans Times-Picayune, March 16, 1967, page 1, Column
4, Associated Press.
64 U. S., et al . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
more is required—a result which brings about substantial
integration of students. The mandatory assignment of
students based on race is the method selected to achieve
this result. This is a new and drastic doctrine. I t is a
new dimension in constitutional law and in race rela
tions. It is new fuel in a field where the old fire has
not been brought under control.
PROCEDUEAL B U E PROCESS AND THE APFROV-
A L OF THE GUIDEUNSS
The scope of the m ajo rity holding as to the binding
force on the fed era l courts of the HEW guidelines in
the a re a of school desegregation posed a serious sep
a ra tio n of pov/ers question. T hat fa c t alone should
have indicated th a t the valid ity of the HEW guidelines
w as of p rim ary concern. One of the m a jo r p rem ises
of the original or panel opinion is th a t HEW excuses
those school system s w hich a re under court order
from com pliance w ith its guidelines; hence, the neces
sity of the court setting the guidelines as m inim um
stan d ard s to p reven t the. courts from being used as an
escape route. The orig inal HEW R egulation prom ul
gated in 1964 m akes this possible. T itle 45A, C FR , §
80.4(c). The HEW sta tem en t of policy of 1965, T itle 45,
CFR, § 181.4, receded from this position but the la t
est HEW policy supersedes the 1965 sta tem en t which
includes § 181.4, s u p r a . See HEW M arch and De
cem ber 1906 S ta tem en ts—not reported in CFR.
The HEW S tatem ents of Policies for School D eseg
regation a re refe rred to generally in the school de-
17. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 65
segregation w orld as guidelines. A t le a s t th ree such
s ta tem en ts have been issued; one in 1965, one in
M arch 1966, and ano ther in D ecem ber 1966. There
ap p aren tly have been am endm ents. Footnote 2, supra.
No guidelines w h a tev er w ere in issue in the low er
courts.® The guidelines of M arch 1966 h ad not been
prom ulgated w hen the cases w ere there . Indeed the
guidelines of D ecem ber 1966 had not been prom ulgated
w hen the cases w ere subm itted a fte r a rg u m en t to the
orig inal panel of th is court. The fa c t th a t they had not
been in issue did not de ter the court in the orig inal
opinion. T here it w as held th a t the “ . . . HEW guide
lines now in effect a re constitu tional and a re w ithin
the s ta tu to ry au thority c rea ted in the Civil R ights Act
of 1964” This p e rh ap s m ean t all guidelines prom ul
gated up to the date of the opinion, D ecem ber 29,
1966, Any doubt as to the inclusion of the D ecem ber
1966 guidelines w as resolved when the m ajo rity
in the en banc p e r cu riam opinion s ta te d th a t
the 1965 and 1966 HEW guidelines a re w ithin
the decisions of this court and comply w ith the le tte r
and spirit of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and m eet the
requirements of the United States Constitution. This is
adjudication without any semblance of due process of
law. It is an unprecedented procedure and a shocking
® The practice of hearing appeals in school cases on old
records is very unsatisfactory. We do not know what
changes in desegregation plans may have been made in
the interim. It is a rapidly changing public area where
plans as well as the law are in flux. Cf. Calhoun v.
Latimer, 1964, 377 U.S. 263, 84 S.Ct. 1235, 12 L.Ed.2d
288, where the court took note of a supervening plan and
remanded for an evidentiary hearing in the District
Court.
66 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
departure from even rudim entary due process.'* Approval
of future guidelines is limited by the m ajority to those
. -within lawful limits.”
The theory of the court escape route and the necessity
to hold all guidelines valid is apparently developed in
the in terest of supporting the national policy, as ex
pressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of eliminating
discrimination in public education. The general them e
of the majority is tha t HEW has the carrot in the form
of federal fxmds but no stick. A stick is needed in those
situations w here a school board may not take federal
fimds. The aim is to make a stick out of the federal coiuts.
The courts should cooperate w ith HEW but they cannot
be made to play the part of any stick tha t HEW may
formulate and th is is the tenor of the original opinion.
Courts are restricted to acting w ithin the limits of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the school desegregation area.
I t may or may not be proper for a court to act within
the limits of what the HEW policy may be in allocating
federal school funds. Sometimes there may be a dif
ference. A decent respect for the judiciary dictates that
we make this plain.
* Section 602 of Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
USCA, § 2000d-l provides that no rule, regulation or
order of HEIW shall become effective unless and until
approved by the President. Whether the guidelines are
such rtiles or regulations cannot be decided without an
evidentiary hearing concerning their meaning through
application. This question has never been put in issue
in these cases.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 67
THE STANBAUD EEQUIEED BY THE E-IAIOBITY IS
UNCONSTiTUTIONAELY VAGUE
The original opinion states in two places tha t the
only satisfactory p lan for desegregating a school system
is one tha t works. One looks in vain for a definition of
“one that works”. This is manifestly a vague standard.
It cannot be followed. Moreover, it is subject to selec
tive enforcement and a statute couched in such language
would be patently unconstitutional.
In another place in the original opinion the statem ent
is made that substantial integration must be achieved
in disestablishing dual school systems. This is not clear.
What is substantial? Is the reference simply to a system,
or to each school, or to each class room?
The en banc per curiam opinion may have attem pted
to improve the standard by saying that the criterion for
determining the validity of a provision in a school de
segregation plan is w hether the provision is reasonably
related to accomplishing the objective of educational
opportunities on equal terms to all. Who knows the
meaning of this? There is no mention of result.
These vague standards are perhaps the most mis
chievous parts of the majority opinions. They place
unfettered discretion in HEW in the area of school
desegregation. No school board will ever know when it
has perform ed its duty to eliminate the dual school
system. No school board will ever know w hether federal
funds will be made available. This type of standard
68 U. S., et a l . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et a l .
places school systems under m en and not laws. School
boards and school patrons are entitled to a clear and
definite standard. The problem of desegregation will not
be solved absent a clear standard.
THE BE JUEE-DE FACTO DOCTEINE IS INFAIR
The unfairness which inheres in the majority opinion
stems from the new doctrine which the original
panel fashioned under the concept of classifying segrega
tion into two types: de jure segregation, called apartheid,
for the seventeen southern and border states formerly
having legal segregation; and de facto segregation for
the other states of the nation. This distinction, which
must be without a difference and somewhat hollow to
a deprived child w herever located, is used as a beginning.
The original opinion then goes on to require affirmative
action on the part of the school authorities in the de
jure systems to integrate the schools. The neighborhood
school systems of the nation w ith their de facto segrega
tion are excused. The Constitution does not reach them.®
This reasoniag is necessary to reach the end of com
pulsory integration in the so-called de jure states. It is
the counterpart to overruling the settled construction of
the Fourteenth Amendment, to be next discussed, that
integration is not commanded. The restrictions in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 against requiring school racial
balances by assignment and transportation are written
® The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does
not show that Congress acted on a de jure-de facto
basis. I would not attribute such a form of sectionalism
to the Congress.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 69
out of the law w ith respect to the de jure states by
using the de ju re-de facto theory. Title IV, §§ 401(b),
407(a), 42 USCA, §§ 2000c(b), 2000c-6. The overruling
of the constitutional lim itation removes the other im
pediment to compulsory integration. The way is thus
cleared for the new dimension. The only question left
is when, and to what extent. The authority to HEW is
ca rte blanche. We should disavow the de jure-de facto
doctrine as being itself violative of the equal protection
clause. It treats school systems differently. I t trea ts
children differently. It is reverse apartheid. I t poses the
question w hether legally compelled integration is to
be substituted for legally compelled segregation. I t is
unthinkable tha t our Constitution does not contemplate
a middle ground—no compulsion one way or the other.
The de jure-de facto doctrine simply is without basis.
Segregation by law was legal until the Brown decision
in 1954. Such segregation should hardly give rise to
pimitive treatm ent of those states employing what was
then a legal system. The Supreme Court has never so
indicated. Moreover, the Supreme Court holding in
Brown was based on the finding that segregated educa
tion was unequal. How can it be unequal in one section
of the country and not another? Does Brown interdict
only segregation imposed affirm atively by law, or does
its rationale also include the state action of holding to
neighborhood assignments thereby perpetuating de facto
segregation? The majority decision limits the rationale
to the southern and border states type of segregation
formerly imposed affirmatively by law. In such event
compelled integration may be required in the de jure
?0 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
states but the logic of reaching this point, because of
the restrictions in the 1964 Act to the contrary, excuses
the de facto states from the Act and the Constitution.
The real answer is tha t no such new doctrine or theory
is necessary. The schools of the South and border states
must do what the Supreme Court has ordered—convert
dual school systems into unitary nondiscriminatory school
systems. The constitutional power already exists in the
courts to see that this is done. This newly discovered
source of power tends only to disturb settled doctrine.
Its purpose can only be to require racial balances in the
de jure states.
THE BRIGGS DICTUM
It is a settled constitu tional principle th a t the F o u r
teenth A m endm ent does not requ ire com pulsory in
teg ra tion but only p roscribes segregation. I t is the
s ta te action segregation w hich violates the equal p ro
tection clause. We have so stated in the following
cases; A very v. Wichita Falls Independent School
District, 1956, 241 F.2d 230; Borders v. R ippy, 1957,
247 F.2d 268; R ippy v. Borders, 1957, 257 F .2d 73;
Cohen v. Public Housing Administration, 1958, 257
F.2d 73; City of M ontgom ery v. Gilmore, 1960, 277 F.2d
364; Boson v. Rippy, 1960, 285 F.2d 43; Stell v. Savan-
nah-Chatham County Board of Education, 1964, 333
F.2d 55; E vers v. Jackson, 1964, 328 F.2d 408; Lockett
V. Board of Education of Muscogee County, 1965, 342
F.2d 225.
U. S., et al. V. Jejj. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 71
This princip le is euphoneously re fe rred to in the
orig inal tw o-judge opinion as the Briggs d ictum . I t
w as s ta ted in Briggs v. E llio tt, E.D .S.C., 1955, 132 F.
Supp. 776, but no court, un til now, h as ever held
the F o u rteen th A m endm ent to m ean otherw ise. The
A m endm ent is en tirely negative in c h a rac te r. The
orig inal panel, as a p a r t of its tw o-pronged approach
to com pulsory in tegration , overru led th is principle
suh silentio.
The court, sitting en banc, could overru le th is set
tled p rincip le and the m ajo rity h a s now done so to
an unknown ex ten t in p a ra g ra p h 3 of the p e r cu riam
opinion. We will not know the ex ten t until the ques
tion of ra c ia l p e rcen tages is squarely presented . H ere,
as I understand the p e r cu riam opinion, the question
is tan g en tia l except as it re la te s to converting to a
u n ita ry school system . In the f irs t sentence of p a r
ag rap h 3 the m a jo rity holds th a t school boards have
the affirm ative duty under the F ou rteen th A m end
m en t to bring about a un ita ry school sy stem in w hich
there a re no Negro or w hite schools—^just schools. We
can all ag ree on th is statem ent. The opinion does
aw ay w ith any distinction betw een the te rm s “ in te
g ra tion” and “ segregation” in the field of school de
segregation law insofar as the distinction in te rfe res
w ith the a ffirm ativ e duty to b ring about u n ita ry
school system s. We can all ag ree on this. I t is then
said th a t in fulfilling th is duty it is not enough for
school au thorities to offer Negro children the oppor
tunity to a ttend fo rm erly all w hite schools bu t th a t
such opportunity m u st be coupled w ith the in tegra-
72 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
tion of faculty , facilities, and activ ities. Then, w ith
out m ore , the decisions of th is court setting out this
p rincip le a re overru led to the ex ten t th a t they con
flict w ith the view of the m ajo rity . I am left in doubt
as to w hether th is is a re tren ch m en t from the panel
decision. T im e will tell.
I t m ay be added th a t if the court is overruling this
settled constitu tional principle, it b rings th is c ircu it
into conflict w ith the F irs t, F ourth , Sixth, Seventh,
E ighth , and Tenth C ircuits. Springfield v. Barksdale,
1 Cir., 1965, 348 F .2d 261; B radley v. School Board of
R ichm ond, V irginia, 4 Cir., 1965, 345 F .2d 310; Sw ann
V. Charlotte-M ecklenburg Board of Education, 4 Cir.,
1966, 369 F .2d 29; Deal v. Cincinnati Board of E duca
tion, 6 Cir., 1966, 369 F.2d 55; Bell v. School, C ity of
Gary, Indiana, 7 C ir., 1963 , 324 F.2d 209, cert, den.,
377 U.S. 924, 84 S.Ct. 1223, 12 L .Ed.2d 216; Clark v.
Board of Education of L ittle Rock, 8 C ir., 1966, 366
F.2d 661; and Downs v. Board of Education of K ansas
City, 10 Cir., 1964, 336 F.2d 988, cert, den., 380 U.S.
914, 85 S.Ct. 898, 13 L .Ed.2d 800. The case of Taylor
V. Board of E ducation of N ew Rochelle, 2 C ir., 1961,
294 F.2d 35 is not to the con tra ry . T here the rem edy
fashioned w as freedom of choice im posed on neigh
borhood assignm ents. The case of Board of E duca
tion of O klahom a City v. Dowell, 10 Cir., 1967, . . . . F .
2d ____ [slip opinion dated Ja n u a ry 23, 1967], does
not ap p ea r to be to the con tra ry . The court distin
guished Downs by pointing out th a t Dowell involved
a finding of bad fa ith on the p a r t of the school board
in carry ing out the orig inal o rder of the D istric t Court
to d isestab lish the dual school system .
U. S., et a l . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 73
It is h a rd to know ju s t w h a t the court has held as
betw een the panel decision and the en banc per cu ri
am decision. The labored effort to estab lish the de
jure-de facto concept and to overru le th is consti
tu tional princip le h ard ly seem s ca lcu la ted as an ex
ercise in sem antics. I t is m ore in the n a tu re of ju
dicial lagniappe for use on ano ther day. We w ill know
the full im port of the opinions w hen a m otion is p re
sented to assign children on the basis of race so as
to com ply w ith w hat each p a rticu la r m ovant m ay
deem to be, in his view, a desirab le ra c ia l com posi
tion for the p a rtic u la r school or schools. This leaves
the law in a v e ry unsatisfac to ry s ta te and portends
of u tte r confusion for school boards.®
A good example of the problems to be encountered in eliminat
ing the dual school system is to be seen in the Taliaferro
County, Georgia school system. See Turner v. Goolslry,
S.D. Ga., 1965, 255 F.Supp. 724, for background. There
were only two schools in the system and the board
desegregated, effective in September 1966, on the basis
of converting the white school into an elementary school
and the Negro school into a high school. A perfect
racial balance would be accomplished under the plan.
In 1965 there were approximately 600 Negro children and
200 white children enrolled in the system. The records
of the Georgia State Department of Education as of
January 19, 1967 indicate that there are now 527 Negro
students enrolled in the Taliaferro County school system
and no v,rhite students. This result raises serious ques
tions. How is a “plan that works” to be formulated for
this school system? What number of white students
will be needed to make it work? Where will they come
from? How will they be selected? Will a lottery system
be used? Will they be compelled to attend the Taliaferro
County school system? If so, how? Will the taxpayers
of the system be compelled to pay for educating chil
dren brought in from outside the system? Will the court
ignore system lines although the laws of Georgia provide
for separate school systems? What measures will be em
ployed to avoid resegregation through families removing
their residences from the school system? Granted this
is an extreme example but it is nevertheless a factual
situation.
74 U. S.) et al. v. Jejj. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
TH E D E C R E E
The use of a uniform decree, as the m a jo rity points
out, is not novel. O ur school desegregation decisions
have tended tow ard uniform ity in the freedom of
choice m ethod of assignm ent and in the ad m in is tra
tion of such plans. A uniform decree v/ithin the lim its
of m in im um s tan d a rd s would aid school boards and
the d is tric t courts but the uniform decree en tered in
this case can be faulted because of its detail. This
com es about through the unbounded a im of the court
to tra c k the HEW guidelines. I t m u st be rem em b ered
th a t decrees m ay have to be enforced by the court
and a court should guard against being pu t in the un
feasible position of having to h e a r m otions based on
the alleged b reach of some m inor and insubstan tia l
provision of its decree. I t is also not c lear to m e th a t
sufficient la titude is left to the d is tric t courts to ad
ju s t such p rac tica l difficulties as m ay a rise under
the detail of the decree.
HEW has an advan tage over the d is tric t courts,
as the court has now re s tric ted them , in the execu
tion of school desegregation plans. HEW m ay delay,
excuse, and change. HEW m ay v a ry its requ irem ents
as betw een system s. The m ajo rity has left no such
pow er in the d is tric t courts. They a re adm onished
to follow HEW but it is a sad day for the d is tric t
courts, and fo r the entire jud ic ia ry as w ell as for the
p rincip le of separa tion of pow ers w hen the only dis
cretion left them is w ithin the lim its to be set by HEW.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 75
It also would ap p ea r im proper to constitu te the
courts as overlords of the school system s of this c ir
cuit to the extent done in the uniform decree. The dis
tr ic t courts m u st require school equalization to the
extent set out in p a ra g ra p h VI of the decree, i ts scope
is only a short step from taking over curricu lum . The
building im provem ent provision m oves the courts in
the d irection of levying local taxes. O rdering school
boards to discontinue the use of buildings could
am ount to taking property vdthout due process and
ju s t com pensation. Tliese a re d ras tic m easu res and
th e re a re no fac ts before the court to dem onstrate
the necessity for them . It is en tirely p ro p er for the
D istric t Court to d isapprove new construction w here
it w ill p e rp e tu ate the dual school system but th is is a
m a tte r for com plaint and hearing ra th e r than for ad
vance supervision as is requ ired under § VII of the
decree.
By w ay of sum m ation, I re ite ra te th a t the m ajo rity
opinions a re unfair to the ex ten t th a t they d iscover or
estab lish and then re ly upon the de jure-de facto divi
sive sectional theory. The opinions expand, without
constitutional authority , the requ irem en t th a t dual
school system s be converted into som ething m ore
than u n ita ry school sy s te m s : to-wit, th a t substan tia l
in tegration be achieved in the respective school sys
tem s. This added requ irem en t is itself im perm issi
bly vague as a s tan d a rd w ithout fu rth er delineation.
The opinions unduly re s tr ic t personal liberty to the
ex tent th a t com pelled in tegration is approved or re-
76 U. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
quired, and in this reg a rd im properly overtu rn and
expand the settled m eaning of the F o u rteen th A m end
m ent. The court e r rs in p rem a tu re ly holding th a t the
guidelines issued by HEW a re constitutional and w ith
in the scope of the Civil R ights Act of 1964. No guide
lines w hatever w ere considered, by the d istric t courts.
Some of those approved had not been w ritten .
My owm view is th a t the law m akes no such requ ire
m en t as the m a jo rity of the court im poses. No such
rad ica l d ep artu re is necessary to accom plish w hat
the Suprem e Court has d irected the lower courts to
accom plish—the elim ination of the dual school sys
tem . The Suprem e Court has not said th a t every
school m ust have children from each race in its s tu
dent body, or th a t every school room m ust contain
children from each race , or th a t there m u st be a
rac ia l balance or a n ear rac ia l balance, or th a t there
be assignm ents of children based on race to accom
plish a resu lt of substan tia l in tegration . The Consti
tution does not requ ire such. We would do w ell to
“ stick to our la s t” so as to ca rry out the Suprem e
C ourt’s p resen t direction. It is no tim e for new no
tions of w hat a free society em braces. In teg ra tion
is not an end in itself; a fa ir chance to a tta in person
al dignity through equal educational opportunity is
the goal. My view, however, is now lost in this
court; hence this DISSENT.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 77
COLEMAN, C ircuit Judge. SEPA RA TE OPINION.
These cases rem ind m e of w hat Mr. Chief Ju stice
Chase said in Texas v. W hited
“We a re ve ry sensible of the m agnitude and
im portance of this question, of the in te re st it
excites, and of the difficulty, not to say im pos
sibility, of so disposing of it as to satisfy the
conflicting judgm ents of m en equally enlight
ened, equally upright, and equally patrio tic .
But we m eet it in the case, and we m ust de
term ine it in the exercise of our best judg
m ent, under the guidance of the C onstitution
a lone.”
This Court, exercising only such appellate ju risd ic
tion as Congress has seen fit to confer upon it, con
fron ted solely by a question of how best to p reserve
an a lread y settled C onstitutional right, should be
guided by the Constitution alone and by nothing else.
No one denies tlia t to an incalculable degree the
fu tu re of th is C ountry depends inescapably upon the
continued, constantly im proved education of all its in
habitants. Nor can it very successfully be denied tha t
the best p rac tica l hope of a tta in ing this objective is
to be found and m ain tained in the public schools. It
becam e p lain over a hundred y ears ago th a t p riva te
schools did not and could not reach the m asses of the
people.
Com pulsory d iscrim ination in the public schools,
founded on race or color, is Constitutionally dead. No
1 74 U.S. 700,720; 7 Wall 700; 19 L. Ed. 227 (1868).
78 U. S., et al . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., e t al.
Judge would dispute this. E x isten tia lly it is like the
wounded an im al Vv''hicfa bounds on for awhile a fte r it
has been fa ta lly shot. The c ritica l p roblem now is th a t
we m ust not w reak irrep a rab le in ju ry upon public
schools while executing the sentence of death against
com pulsory segregation. Thoroughly realizing this, the
Suprem e C ourt left the details of the erad ication to
the sound jud icia l d iscretion of the D istric t Courts,
sub ject only to appellate review . To this day this as
signm ent h as not been changed. I do not suppose in
our fo rm of governm ent th a t it could be changed.
Courts alone m ake binding adjudications on questions
of Constitutionality, and litigation m ust begin a t the
D istric t level.
The public schools of the Nation, not ju s t those of a
p a rtic u la r section, a re now caught up a t the second
battleground, legal and political, not about the death
of unlaw ful d iscrim ination bu t about who and how
m any of any p a rtic u la r race shall go to any p a rticu la r
school w ith how m any m em b ers of som e other race.
If one looked only a t the g rea t volum e of litigation
and its accom panying strife and publicity he would
jum p to the conclusion th a t nothing m a tte rs bu t the
rac ia l com position of any educational facility. This is
pursued reg ard less of the rea l preferences, exercised,
in genuine freedom , of those d irectly involved, th a t is,
those who m ust have an education. In the u ltim ate
th is could becom e a g re a t tragedy for those m ost af
fected. An educational house divided against itself
m ay have trouble standing. I t certa in ly cannot oper
a te w ith m axim um effectiveness.
U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 79
In the light of these considerations, as one who w as
able to secure an education solely because there w as
a public school in w hich th e re w as an opportunity to
obtain it, I shall now express m y views, as one Judge
of th is Court, individually, as to the decision now
about to be rendered .
In doing so, I proceed upon the thesis th a t th e re is
nothing a t all inconsistent about being, a t the sam e
tim e, both a loyal A m erican and a Southerner. I think
A ndrew Jackson conclusively settled th a t point over a
cen tury ago.
I t is p a rticu la rly unfortunate if our decision in these
cases is in any w ay to be grounded on old scores
against the S ta tes of this Circuit. This is con tra ry to
A m erican legal trad ition ; it opens old wounds, re
kindles old fires, and lends itself as a w eapon to the
futile cause of fu r th e r in transigency. P rio r to 1954,
rac ia lly sep ara te , if equal, schools had not been con
dem ned as im constitutional. One is not to be punished
or h a ra ssed for an ac t which w as law ful w hen it w as
done’. Indeed, such condem nation in th is instance
would inferen tia lly include some of the m ost highly
respected Judges who ever g raced the Suprem e Court.
They had opportunities to condem n the system but, in
the exercise of p e rfec t jud icia l in tegrity , did not. As
I understand it, an O m nipotent God does not change
yesterday when it is p a s t and gone. C ertain ly this
Court cannot do it. We a re now concerned w ith rec ti
fying the e rro rs of the p resen t and forestalling , if we
can. the an tic ipated e rro rs of the fu tu re. I decline to
p a rtic ip a te in any ex post facto condem nations. I pre-
80 U. S., et a l . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et a l .
fe r to believe th a t this Court is not de liberate ly doing
so.
I fu rth e r believe th a t w hatever the F ou rteen th
A m endm ent requ ires of any S tate it requ ires of all
States. If w e a re requ iring som ething h ere in the en
fo rcem ent of F ourteenth A m endm ent righ ts th a t
should not be requ ired of all fifty S ta tes then we
have exceeded our au thority and we have m isap
plied the Constitution. I ag ree w ith the action of the
m a jo rity opinion in disclaim ing any in tention of
passing on the valid ity of educational operations in
o ther C ircuits. T hat m a tte r is not and cannot be be
fore us.
I t is out of reg a rd for the desirability of C onstitu
tional uniform ity th a t I agree, in principle, w ith the
a ttem p t to fo rm ulate a decree for the fu tu re guid
ance of D istric t Courts in this C ircuit. It is obvious
th a t such a decree cannot ad jud icate cases in ad
vance of a hearing in the D istric t Court, nor can it be
applied in the absence of fac tual justification.
The decree speaks for itself, of course, but I in te r
p re t it to deal a t th is point w ith m aking freedom of
choice a rea lity instead of a prom ise. I do not under
stand th a t this C ourt has abandoned freedom of
choice, if th a t choice is rea l instead of illusory.
Nor do I understand it to d irect th a t there shall be
a specified percen tage of the various races in any
p a rtic u la r public school or th a t there shall be p ropor
tional representation of the races brought about by
17. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al. 81
a rb itra ry o rder. I ag ree w ith Ju dges Gewin and Bell
th a t the opinion strongly portends such a possibility.
But p a ra g rap h 5 of the en banc opinion certa in ly dis
claim s any such intention. The D is tric t C ourts a re
left free to consider all the evidence, including rac ia l
a ttendance percen tages, in determ in ing w hether the
children of any p a rtic u la r school d is tric t have been
offered a reality instead of a shadow. I t is to be an
tic ipa ted th a t the bridge will la te r have to be crossed
when we come face to face w ith a situation w herein
th e re can be no doubt of the freedom but the resu lts
a re displeasing and a re a ttack ed solely for th a t re a
son.
I think it all boils down to this. We once had the
doctrine of sep a ra te but equal. We did not, I am
so rry to say, pay m uch atten tion to the “ equal” . We
now have freedom of choice. As Judge Bell so splen
didly s ta tes it, we a re now going to have to m ake ce r
ta in of the “ freedom ” . To fail in th is is to invite other
action w hich a t th is tim e I reg a rd as unconstitution
al bu t w hich could soon be m ade Constitutional.
The decree is not as I would have w ritten it had I
been charged w ith sole responsib ility for the effort.
No offense is intended w hen I doubt th a t it is perfect.
F o r exam ple, the en hanc opinion says th a t “ boards
and officials adm inistering public schools in th is c ir
cuit have the a ffirm ative duty under the F ourteen th
A m endm ent to bring about an in tegrated , u n ita ry
school sy stem ” . Yet II (o) of the decree prohibits
any official from influencing p a ren ts o r students in
82 U. S., et al. V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
the exercise of a choice. In o ther w ords, if the offi
cials feel th a t N egro ch ildren should be encouraged
to apply for adm ission to a fo rm erly w hite school
they a re prohib ited from doing so. They a re to be
condem ned, on appearances, if no N egro child
chooses to a ttend a fo rm erly w hite school; they a re
not allowed, in the exercise of o rd inary freedom of
speech, to discuss the m a tte r w ith N egro children
w ith a view to th e ir exercising a preference in favor
of a ttending a school they have not fo rm erly a ttend
ed. The school official cannot win. In one b re a th he
is told to ac t; in the nex t he is im m obilized.
E xperience will hone aw ay these inconsistencies
and im possibilities. This Court h as d rafted uniform
decrees on p rio r occasions. These a re now speedily
outm oded, if not abandoned. Judges, like o ther hu
m an beings, do not alw ays w rite in g ran ite ; they
often find th a t they have only m ark ed in the sand.
Since the HEW guidelines w ere not the subject of
a hearing in the Courts below I do not d iscuss them
here . In m y view, they a re not now before this Court.
The focal point of the whole m a tte r is the action of
the en banc opinion repudiating Briggs v. E llio tt
and over-ruling our p rio r opinions w hich followed
the sam e rationale, see Footnotes 1 and 2 for the ci
tations.
I t is m y view th a t these p rio r cases w ere correctly
decided. O ther C ircuit C ourts in th is C ountry appear
U. S., e t a l . V. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., e t a l . 83
to feel likewise. If the reasoning in these over-ruled
cases is in co rrec t then we sim ply face the following:
The freedom of the N egro child to a ttend any pub
lic school w ithout reg a rd to his race or color, firs t
secured in the Brow n cases, is again lost to h im a fte r
a short life of less th an th irteen years. He is left open
to a fu tu re ad judication th a t although he does not
w ish to a ttend School A and has in fac t expressed a
desire to go elsew here th is is of no im portance. Be
cause of his race he can be assigned to a p a rticu la r
school to achieve a resu lt sa tisfac to ry to som eone
who probably does not even live in the d is tric t but
who w ishes to m ake a rac ia l point. Thus the child re
enters the sam e rac ia l d iscrim ination from w hich he
escaped so short a tim e ago. He rem ains bogged in
race . M oreover, w hen Negro children a re to be se
lected by som eone, we know not who, to com ply w ith
such a rac ia l assignm ent, on w hat basis will the se
lection be m ade? How will the wishes of som e be re
spected and others re jec ted , solely because they
happen to be of the Negro race? We a re not freeing
these children of rac ia l chains. We a re com pounding
and prolonging the difficulty.
The tru e answ er rem ains, give h im absolute free
dom of choice and see to it th a t he gets th a t choice
in absolute good faith.
In conclusion, I w ish to say th a t in m y own case a
burning desire to obtain an education in the face of
im possible c ircum stances is not a theoretical experi
ence encountered only by others. I did not have an
84 17. S., et al. v. Jeff. County Bd. of Educ., et al.
opportunity to a tten d school until I w as eight y ears
of age. The delay w as quite unavoidable; th e re sim
ply w as no school to a ttend a t th a t p a rtic u la r tim e.
My m other taugh t m e how to read and w rite , to add
and su b trac t. My to ta l sym path ies a re w ith the
cause of education free ly availab le to all. This, of
course, under the C onstitution requ ires no special
p riv ileges for any group or segm ent of the popula
tion. I re g re t th a t w here once the concern w as for
schools to a ttend we now have so m uch strife about
the details of utilizing those so read ily availab le.
W hat I have said h ere in is w ith the g re a te s t defer
ence for m y B re th ren who th ink otherw ise. We m ust
and shall continue to w ork together according to our
individual judgm ents of the law . The en banc deci
sion m ay portend m ore problem s ahead th an we
have heretofore encountered.
I concur in the rev e rsa l of the Judgm en ts below,
but m y views of the issues generally a re as here in
set forth.
GODBOLD, C ircu it Judge, d issen tin g :
I respectfu lly dissent. I w ish not to delay appellate
p rocedures if any of the p a rtie s desire to pursue them .
Therefore, I am recording m y d issen t a t th is tim e
and w ill file a d issenting opinion a t a la te r date.
Adm. Office. U. S. Courts—E. S. Upton Printing Co., N. O., La.