Board of Education of the Little Rock School District v. Clark Brief in Opposition to Certiorari
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1972
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Board of Education of the Little Rock School District v. Clark Brief in Opposition to Certiorari, 1972. f2d39204-ca9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/8ded2030-4fef-438a-9033-77576492c9c9/board-of-education-of-the-little-rock-school-district-v-clark-brief-in-opposition-to-certiorari. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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Olmtrt of tlio Hutted
October Term, 1972
No. 72-739
T h e B oard of E ducation ' of t h e L it t l e
B ock S chool D ist r ic t , et al.,
Petitioners,
ys.
D elores Cla r k , et al.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI
J o h n W . W alk er
P h il ip E . K aplan
Walker, Kaplan & Mays
622 Pyramid Life Building
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
J ack Green berg
J am es M. N abe.it , III
N orm an J . C h a o h k in
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
Attorneys for Respondents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Opinions Below....... ....................................................... 1
Jurisdiction ........ .............. -......................—- ......... -....... 1
Question Presented _............................................. - ....... 2
Statement .......... ................... -...........................—-......... 2
Reasons Why the Writ Should be Denied................ —- 3
1. The issue is failure to desegregate three grades 3
2. The decision below will require neither exces
sive transportation nor inordinate expense ..... 4
3. The principle applied below is well settled
among the lower federal courts ....................... 5
Co n c lu sio n 7
I n t h e
Bnpvm* (£mvt nf % Itutcft States
October Term, 1972
No. 72-739
T h e B oaed of E du ca tio n of t h e L it t l e
B ock S chool D is t e ic t , et al.,
vs.
Petitioners,
D elobes Cla r k , et al.
PETITION FOE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI
Opinions Below
The August 21, 1972 opinion of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is now reported at 465
F.2d 1044. The district court opinion, reprinted at pp.
A-14 to A-31 of the appendix to the Petition, is not re
ported.
Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1254(1).
2
Question Presented
Did the Court of Appeals err in requiring that an ac
ceptable plan of desegregation in Little Rock affect all
elementary grades, and in rejecting the school board’s offer
to desegregate only two of five elementary grades!
Statement
Respondents generally accept the Statement offered by
the Petitioners, but we note the following:
1. The description of the plan offered by the Petitioners,
which the Court of Appeals rejected, is technically correct
but astonishingly fails to mention that as to grades 1-3 in
the so-called “perimeter” elementary schools, the plan
would leave them as segregated as the entire five grades
were in 1971, when the Court of Appeals required further
desegregation. Clark v. Board of Educ., 449 F.2d 493
(8th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972).
2. This action to fully desegregate the public schools
of Little Eock, Arkansas, has been pending since 1965.
See Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661 (8th Cir. 1966);
426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 952
(1971); 449 F.2d 493 (Sth Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405
U.S. 936 (1972). Joined with its predecessor action, it is
one of the nation’s oldest school desegregation cases. See,
e.g., Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956),
aff’d 243 F.2d 361 (Sth Cir. 1957); Norwood v. Tucker, 287
F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1961).
3. With regard to the matters alleged in n. 1 of the
Petition, the former school administrators or school board
members sued in their official capacities are no longer
3
parties to this action even in the absence of a formal
order to that effect. F.R.C.P. 25(d). Compare Bradley
v. School Bd. of Richmond, 324 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Va.
1971).
Reasons Why the Writ Should be Denied
This is the third Petition for Writ of Certiorari in as
many Terms of this Court filed by the Little Rock school
board, seeking to overturn orders requiring effective deseg
regation of the Little Rock public schools. Each of the
prior Petitions was denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971); 405 U.S.
936 (1972), but the board now attempts to raise, in its
present Petition, all of the claims it unsuccessfully sought
to raise before.
1. T h e issue is fa ilu re to d eseg reg a te th re e g rades.
The only issue properly presented in this ease is whether
a plan which desegregates only two grades of five-grade
schools can be said to be adequate compliance with a
school district’s obligation to dismantle its formerly dual
school system. The question whether school segregation
in Little Rock resulted accidentally or whether it is a
vestige of the prior dual school system was determined
adversely to the school district in 1970, 426 F.2d 1035
(8tli Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 952 (1971). See
Brief in Opposition to Certiorari, No. 409, O.T. 1970, pp.
618, 12-15, 19-26. Likewise, the necessity for complete
desegregation at the elementary level was before the Court
of Appeals in 1971, 449 F,2d 493 (8th Cir. 1971), cert,
denied 405 U.S. 936 (1972), and the lower court was re
quired to have submitted to it and to approve for imple
mentation, a plan to complete the desegregation of the
elementary schools using any or all of the techniques
4
validated by this Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of E d u c 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
The plan submitted by the school district would involve
only fourth and fifth grade students in the elementary
schools on the eastern and western extremities of the City
of Little Rock. Pupils in the first three grades would
remain as totally segregated at these schools as were the
entire student bodies in 1970—when the Court of Appeals
explicitly condemned maintenance of the school zones as
vestiges of the dual system. 426 F.2d at 1043-44, notes
18-22 and accompanying text.
2. T h e decision below w ill re q u ire n e ith e r excessive
tra n s p o r ta tio n n o r in o rd in a te expense.
The crosstown transportation of elementary students to
which Petitioners refer is the result of their own design
of a plan. In Little Rock, as is generally true, two basic
approaches are available to desegregate groups of racially
identifiable schools located generally on the opposite sides
of town. The shortest bus rides can be achieved if the
central city schools are included in a pupil transportation
plan, although a larger number of students would have to
ride the buses. Petitioners chose the other approach, which
minimizes the number of students who must travel but
enlarges the distance which those students must go, by
desegregating the center city schools as a single unit with
virtually no transportation (Petition, pp. 4-5) and ex
changing students among the schools at either extremity.
The expense to the school district of which Petitioners
complain is insubstantial in comparison to the enormous
unnecessary past expenditures through which the school
district constructed additional segregated facilities at the
extreme ends of the city and which it now finds so difficult
5
to desegregate. See, e.g., Clark, v. Board of Educ., 401 U.S.
971 (1971).
3. T h e p rin c ip le a p p lie d below is w ell se ttled am o n g
th e low er fe d e ra l co u rts .
The Petitioners misrepresent the Eighth Circuit’s deci
sion in Yarbrough v. Hulbert-West Memphis School Dist.,
457 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1972) in their effort to develop some
conflict among the lower courts. That case did not involve
desegregation only of some grades, but rather a compre
hensive plan for a small school district, within which
projected student enrollments at each school would vary
by 20% on either side of the system-wide racial ratio.
See 339 P. Supp. 1059 (E.D. Ark. 1971). Plaintiffs’ com
plaint was that traditionally black schools remained black
and traditionally white schools white. In light of the
specific factual circumstances (an exception to this pattern
had been projected but failed to materialize), the Court of
Appeals declined to reverse, although it did authorize the
district court to modify the plan.
Indeed, the law is clear in all of the Circuits which have
decided the question: desegregation plans must affect all
grades absent compelling justification for specific exemp
tion. E.g., Flax v. Potts, 464 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.), cert,
denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3274 (November 13, 1972); Thompson
v. School Bd. of Newport Neivs, 465 F.2d 83 (4th Cir.
1972), cert, pending; Jackson v. Marvell School District
No. 22, 425 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1970); Moore v. Tangipahoa
Parish School Bd., 304 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. La.), aff’d 417
F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Graves v. Walton County Bd. of
Educ., 403 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1969); cf. Moses v. Washing
ton Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir.), cert,
denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3274 (1972).
6
There may be some differences of opinion among the
Courts of Appeals in school desegregation cases, but not
with respect to the issue in this case.* Contrary to Peti
tioners’ claim, granting the Writ in this case would hardly
assist the Court in reaching its decision in the Denver
case, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, No. 71-507 (argued Oc
tober 11, 1972), or any other school desegregation case
which is presently pending before the Court. Denial of
the Writ, on the other hand, will assure effectuation in
Little Rock of the same constitutional standards which have
been applied in Fort Worth, Charlotte, Augusta, Jackson,
Pontiac, San Francisco** and countless other school
districts.
* One of the decisions relied upon by Petitioners to indicate such
differences, but which they failed to identify as the source of the
quotation at the top of p. 13 of the Petition, is Mapp v. Board of
Educ. of Chattanooga, No. 71-2006 (6th Cir., Oct. 11, 1972). On
November 28, 1972, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
ordered that that matter be reheard en banc on December 14, 1972.
** Flax v. Potts, supra; Swann v. Charlott e-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., supra; Acree v. County Bd. of Educ., 458 F.2d 486 ̂(5th
Cir.), cert, denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3274 (November 13, 1972) ; Single-
ton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 432 F.2d 927 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971) ; Davis v. School Dist.
of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734 (B.D. Mich. 1970), aff’d 443 F.2d 573
(6th Cir.), cert, denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971) ; Johnson v. San Fran
cisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971),
appeal pending.
7
CONCLUSION
W h e r e fo r e , for the foregoing reasons, Respondents
respectfully pray that the Writ be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
J o h n W . W a lk er
P h il ip E. K aplan
Walker, Kaplan & Mays
622 Pyramid Life Building
Little Rock, Arkansas 72201
J ack G reen berg
J am es M. N abrit , III
N orm an J . C h a c h k in
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
Attorneys for Respondents
MEILEN PRESS INC. — N. Y. C. 219