Richmond School Board v Board of Education of Virginia Brief Amicus Curiae

    In the

©curt of tljT United States
October Term, 1972

Nos. 72-549 and 72-550

Richmond School B oard, et al.,
Petitioners,

T he State B oard of Education of the 
Commonwealth of V irginia, et al.,

Respondents.

Carolyn B radley, et al.,

— V .— :
Petitioners,

The State B oard of E ducation of the 
Commonwealth of V irginia, et al.,

____ _ Respondents.

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals 
for the fourth circuit

BRIEF OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

OF VIRGINIA, AMICUS CURIAE

R ichard F alcon
500 West Baltimore Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 21201

David B ogen
500 West Baltimore Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 21201

Melvin L. W ulf
Sanford Jay R osen

American Civil Liberties Union
22 East 40th Street
New York, New York 10016

P hilip H irschkop 
P. O. Box 234 
110 N. Royal Street 
Alexandria, Virginia 22313

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae



I N D E X

Interest of Amicus Curiae ................................................  2

A rgument ................................................................................  3

I. The children of metropolitan Richmond are de­
nied equal educational opportunity because their 
schools are racially segregated............................... 3

II. The State of Virginia has denied plaintiffs the 
equal protection of the law s.................................  7

A. The State Has Created the Segregated School
System ................   7

B. The School Boundary Lines Are Unconstitu­
tional Because They Operate to Discriminate 
on the Basis of Race and Are Not Justified
by a Compelling State Interest.....................  8

C. The State Cannot Use Political Boundary
Lines to Limit the Federal Courts’ Remedial 
Power Because the State Has Caused the 
Division of the Races by Those L ines...........  13

Conclusion........................      16

Table of A uthorities

Cases:

Brewer v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 397 F.2d
37 (4th Cir. 1968) .................    9

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ....3,4, 6,
8,14

PAGE



II

Clark v. Board of Education of Little Rock, 426 F.2d 
1035 (8th Cir. 1970) ........................................................  9

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) ............................... 15

Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile 
County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) ....... .......................... . 9

Glaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) .... 10
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,

391 U.S. 430 (1968) ......................... ...... ’.......................  4
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) .......10,13

Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 
1971) .................................................................................. 9

Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dis­
trict, 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S.
940 (1969) ........................................................................  9

Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968) ...........  9

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) ............................. 11

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) .....   11
Monroe v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson, 427 F.2d 1005 

(6th Cir. 1970) ................................................................  9

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1 (1971) .................................................7,13,14,15

United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School 
District, 406 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 395 
U.S. 907 (1969) ..............................................................  9

PAGE



United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School
District, 410 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1969) ....................... 15

United States v. Scotland Neck, 92 S. Ct. 2214 (1972) .... 11

Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) ...........  11

Constitutional Provisions:

United States Constitution
Thirteenth Amendment..............................................  2
Fourteenth Amendment .......................... ............. 2, 8,15
Fifteenth Amendment .......    2

Federal Statute

Title AMI of the Civil Plights Act of 1964 ....... ...........  10

State Statute

Ya. Code §22-30 ....... ....................................................... 7

Other Authorities:

Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. Pa. L.
Eev. 1 (1963) ....................................................................  4

Cahn, The Predicament of Democratic Man (1961) .... 4

Ill

PAGE



I n  th e

(Emtrt nf %  Imfrd l&atea
October Term, 1972 

Nos. 72-549 and 72-550

R ichmond School B oard, et al.,

Petitioners,

T he State B oard of E ducation of the 
Commonwealth of V irginia, et al.,

Respondents.

Carolyn Bradley, et al.,

—v.-

Petitioners,

T he State B oard of Education of the 
Commonwealth of V irginia, et al.,

Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 

OF VIRGINIA, AMICUS CURIAE



2

Interest of Amicus Curiae

The American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of 
Virginia have secured the consent of the parties to the filing 
of the attached brief amicus curiae. The letters of consent 
have been filed with the Clerk.

The American Civil Liberties Union is a nation-wide non­
partisan organization of over 180,000 members dedicated 
solely to preservation of the liberties safeguarded by the 
Bill of Rights and the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. The American Civil Liber­
ties Union of Virginia is a state affiliate of the ACLU.

The ACLU and the ACLU of Virginia have been particu­
larly concerned with the pervasive effects of racial discrimi­
nation and segregation on American society. They partici­
pate in numerous law suits challenging racial discrimina­
tion and segregation. They take the position that effective 
racial integration of the public schools is a necessary pre­
requisite to the full and equal protection of the laws for 
Americans of all races and colors.

In this brief, the ACLU and the ACLU of Virginia pro­
vide additional focus on the issues in this case which go well 
beyond the facts of the particular case. They hope thereby 
to place these issues in the larger perspective.



3

ARGUMENT

This latest aspect of an old school desegregation snit in­
volves the equitable powers of the federal courts to give 
full and meaningful relief against the continued effects of 
de jure school segregation. Within its record, the case pre­
sents questions concerning the power of federal courts to 
fashion remedies that consolidate school systems that are 
separated by lines drawn by state government to secure 
non-education interests. For in this case, the petitioners 
were ordered by the District Court below to consolidate, for 
the purpose of creating a unitary integrated school system, 
the effectively segregated separate school systems of the 
City of Richmond and the adjacent Chesterfield and Hen­
rico counties. The Court of Appeals reversed. In this brief 
we take the position that the decision of the District Court 
was eminently sound—indeed it is required by the princi­
ples contained in decisions of this Court—and it should 
be reinstated.

I.

The children of metropolitan Richmond are denied 
equal educational opportunity because their schools are 
racially segregated.

“ Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
“ To separate [black students] . . . generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that may 
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be 
undone. . . . Segregation with the sanction of law, there­
fore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental



4

development of Negro children and to deprive them of some 
of the benefits they would receive in a racial [ly] integrated 
school system.”  Id. at 494.

We submit that at the heart of the Brown principle is 
what Edmund Cahn once labeled as the “ consumer perspec­
tive,” Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. Pa. 
L. R ev . 1 (1963); Cahn, The Predicament of Democratic 
Man (1961). The “ consumer perspective” simply insists 
that the most valid judgment which can be given about 
institutions is given by those people whom they are in­
tended to serve—i.e., the “ consumer” of that institution’s 
services; in this case, black students of segregated schools.

If schools are identifiably “black” or “white,” if they 
are more than “ just schools,” Green v. County School 
Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968), the 
injury so zealously to be guarded against under Brown 
occurs. And the identifiability of schools, together with 
the resultant injury occasioned by them, is largely a matter 
of a child’s perception. If a child can say (or see or feel) 
“ This is one of Richmond’s black schools—and this is one 
of Richmond’s white schools,” the school is, within the 
meaning of Brown and its progeny, a segregated school.

Given the factual context of this case, a child attending 
any metropolitan Richmond school knows whether his 
school is a white one or a black one. He also probably 
lives within a half hour of the center of the city. Either 
his parents or his neighbor’s parents work within the city 
limits. No matter where he lives in the metropolitan area, 
the child will go to the hospital in the center of the city 
if he is ill, and his parents are likely to go into the city 
center for entertainment. There are no definite natural



5

geographical boundary lines which divide up the city, and 
the political lines constantly shift with each new annex­
ation. The only clear physical demarcation between vari­
ous parts of the metropolitan area is that people living 
near the center of the city are predominantly black and 
people living further away are predominantly white; or, 
to put it in terms of the child’s perspective—people living 
near the center attend “black” schools, and people living 
further away attend “white” schools.

The population of the metropolitan Richmond area is 
approximately 33% black and 67% white, and this ratio 
has remained fairly constant over the past decade. If a 
child were in a school with a similar proportion of black 
and white students, he would not perceive it as “black” 
or “white” but as reflecting the metropolitan Richmond 
society in which he lives. Thus, if we assume that only 
schools with student bodies of 20-40% black would reflect 
Richmond society and thus would not be identifiable by 
the child as a “white” school or a “ black” school, all the 
high school students and 90% of all elementary and middle 
school students attend schools in the metropolitan Rich­
mond area identifiable by them as “black” or “white.” The 
social cohesiveness of the metropolitan area and physical 
proximity further assure such identification. Often high 
schools with a student body which is more than 75% black 
are located within four miles of high schools which are 
more than 80% white.

The black child, the “ consumer,” who attends schools 
in Richmond perceives well enough that the schools are 
either “black” or “white” schools. And it cannot be said 
that the child’s perception is incorrect. The State of Vir­
ginia has historically used every means within its control



6

to assure whites that their schools will remain white and 
to convince blacks that they will never attend any bnt 
black schools. Given this history, the State’s latest refusal 
to desegregate its schools effectively is hardly surprising. 
Thus, until the remedial hearings in this case were pend­
ing, Virginia could and often did ignore political subdi­
vision boundaries in setting up school districts. And the 
State exercised this power for every reason conceivable, 
including the furthering of segregation. When it was sug­
gested that Virginia again exercise this power, but now to 
aid desegregation, the State responded by legislation pur­
porting to divest itself of authority to act.

Nineteen years after Brown, not only today’s black 
school children but their parents who were themselves 
school children in 1954 cannot help but understand full 
well the State’s position when they take their children to 
one of “ Richmond’s” black schools. Despite promises, 
claims and hopes to the contrary, nothing can more elo­
quently remind them of “ their place” than escorting their 
child to a school that remains what it always was—a black 
school designed to serve black children.

When almost every school in an area can be seen to be 
a “ black”  school or a “ white” school, it is obvious that the 
schools are segregated. That this segregation is caused 
by the state’s maintenance of evanescent boundaries does 
not alter the child’s perception, his injury or the segre­
gation. Indeed, plaintiffs produced a number of witnesses 
to testify to the actual educational harm done by this 
separation of the races. However, such evidence should 
not have been necessary because this Court has recognized 
for almost two decades that “ Separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal.”  Brown v. Board of Education, 
supra, 347 U.S. at 495.



7

The State of Virginia has denied plaintiffs the equal 
protection of the laws.

A. The State Has Created the Segregated School System.

State law creates and defines the boundaries of cities 
and counties. Such boundaries are often useful for the 
administration of many matters, but they need not coincide 
with school division boundaries. In fact, when this suit 
was instituted, there were a number of school divisions 
which included several political units in Virginia, and Vir­
ginia law permitted the State Board to consolidate school 
districts even if consolidation overlapped such political 
lines. Metropolitan school districts overlapping political 
lines are not uncommon elsewhere. For example, the City 
of Charlotte, North Carolina, and the County of Mecklen­
burg comprise a single school system. See Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 
(1971). Nevertheless, after institution of this litigation, 
Virginia state law was changed and now requires the State 
Board to divide the state into school divisions according 
to county and city boundary lines, unless the school boards 
and governing bodies of the political units affected agree 
to a joint school division. Va. Code sec. 22-30. To the 
extent that the State has delegated to local officials the 
power to determine the boundaries of the administrative 
units for schools, the exercise of those powers is still the 
State’s responsibility and they must be exercised in con­
formity with the state’s constitutional obligations. Regard­
less of the legal mechanism, the result of that exercise 
of power in this case is clear—segregated schools. Having

II.



8

created a segregated school system and having refused to 
exercise that power in a manner that would desegregate 
it, the State of Virginia and the Counties of Henrico and 
Chesterfield and the City of Richmond have violated their 
constitutional duty under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The question in this case, therefore, is not whether state 
action has resulted in a segregated school system—that 
clearly has occurred. Rather, the question is, having acted 
in such a manner as to segregate the races in fact, can the 
State demonstrate justification of a sufficiently compelling 
nature so as to excuse the effects of its actions? If such 
justification does not exist, then the school system is 
segregated within the meaning of Brown and the equity 
powers of the District Court below were properly applied 
to remedy the resultant segregation.

The Court of Appeals did not discuss this question. Ap­
plying the wrong legal rules, they instead deemed the rele­
vant question to be the existence or non-existence of “ racial 
motivation” or “ segregative intent”  as an explanation for 
the Respondents’ behavior. This was error.

B. The School Boundary Lines Are Unconstitutional Because 
They Operate to Discriminate on the Basis of Race and 
Are TSot Justified by a Compelling State Interest.

Although there are sometimes no obvious criteria for 
drawing lines, it is still useful to draw a line. This is the 
case with the political boundary lines in the Richmond area. 
There are no natural geographical boundaries dividing the 
area, and the lines which are imposed are flexible and sub­
ject to constant change through annexation proceedings. 
These lines are drawn to facilitate various political and 
social functions. But the criteria on which the lines are



9

based are arbitrary, at least in the sense of whimsical. 
Such arbitrary lines are properly viewed with suspicion 
when their effect is to disadvantage blacks. Thus, courts 
have not permitted school attendance lines to be drawn 
around a residentially segregated neighborhood when other 
attendance zones are just as feasible. Brewer v. School 
Board of City of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968). 
Even attendance zones which follow natural or historical 
boundaries have been struck down when they operate to 
separate the races. See Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal 
■Separate School District, 409 F.2d 682 (5th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 396 U.S. 940 (1969); United States v. Greenwood 
Municipal Separate School District, 406 F.2d 1086 (5th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969); Clark v. Board of 
Education of Little Bock, 426 F.2d 1035 (8th Cir. 1970); 
and Monroe v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Jackson, 427 F.2d 1005 
(6th Cir. 1970). See also Davis v. Board of School Com­
missioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971).

If the effect of the line drawing is racial segregation 
and the justification is weak, there is no need to probe 
the psychological motivation of a legislature and determine 
whether there was in fact a racial purpose. Anyone in­
volved in such a classification will readily perceive that 
they are treated unequally, and courts will agree with the 
perception. See Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529 (5th 
Cir. 1968); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th 
Cir. 1971).

Where the effect of a classification is to separate the 
races, persons subject to the classification are likely to be 
severely harmed regardless of whether the classification 
was overtly on racial grounds or not. They should not be 
put to the burden of demonstrating an actual racial mo­



10

tive7 intent or purpose. Further, it may prove impossible 
to prevent deliberate racial discrimination if the discrimi­
nator need only cite some rational basis not directly and 
obviously connected with race to support his action. Indi­
viduals and states then need only search for a slight ap­
parent nonracial basis to continue segregation as before. 
Unless the state is forced to demonstrate substantial rea­
sons for action which has a racial effect adverse to minority 
group members, the state can continue a policy of segre­
gation behind a facade of neutrality.

This Court has construed statutes prohibiting racial 
discrimination in voting and employment from this per­
spective. See Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 
285 (1969). In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971), an employer used a standardized test for hiring 
and promotion decisions. The district court found there 
was no racial purpose or invidious intent in adopting the 
test although whites generally did better than blacks in 
taking it, and by a split decision the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals affirmed. Nevertheless, this Court found that 
the use of the test violated Title YII of the Civil Eights 
Act of 1964 which made it unlawful for an employer “ to 
limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which 
would deprive . . . any individual of employment oppor­
tunities . . . because of such individual’s race.” The Court 
ruled that an employment test could be used only if it was 
in fact related to performance of the job, and that the 
employer’s motive in using the test was not the significant 
question.

The issue in cases of racial discrimination thus at least 
becomes whether the classification or boundary line that 
operates to discriminate against blacks is justified by a



1 1

compelling non-racial state interest. See e.g., Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184 (1964).

In the instant case, when effect rather than “ intent” is 
considered, and when Virginia’s professed “ justifications” 
are weighed to determine their compelling nature, it be­
comes clear that consolidation of these school districts is 
not beyond the remedial powers of a federal district court. 
Indeed, as Judge Winter pointed out in dissent below, this 
case is but the “ obverse of the same coin” presented in 
the companion cases of Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 
U.S. 451 (1972) and United States v. Scotland Neck, 92 
S. Ct. 2214 (1972). There, as here, the Court of Appeals 
below applied the incorrect test—“ segregative intent.”  In 
those cases the Court of Appeals permitted one district to 
be “ split” into two school districts, ignoring all the while 
the segregative effects of such splitting. There, as here, 
focus on “ segregative intent” rather than on “ effect” led 
the Court of Appeals to conclude that no constitutional 
deprivation resulted despite demonstrable segregative ef­
fect. This Court reversed, holding that effect, not intent, 
was the proper test and that choice of a less effective 
alternative to desegregate schools in the face of available 
and proven effective alternatives placed a heavy burden 
of justification on the state. There, as here, no such com­
pelling justification can be professed.

Whatever the State of Virginia’s interest in maintaining 
the political boundary lines of Richmond City, Henrico 
County and Chesterfield County, it has no compelling in­
terest in utilizing those lines for school administrative 
zones which result in segregated schools.



12

First, the State ignored political boundary lines to im­
plement its earlier policy of segregation. From 1940 
through 1968 at least four regional all-black schools were 
operated in the State. During this period many Virginia 
children were bused across county lines because the near­
est school of their race was located in another county. 
Further, the State’s tuition grant system enabled children 
to transfer out of their county school into one elsewhere, 
even in another state, where the children were of the same 
race.

Second, political boundary lines have often been ignored 
in the past to further other educational purposes. Bieh- 
mond, Henrico and Chesterfield have cooperated in a train­
ing center for mentally retarded children and, with two 
other counties, in operating a mathematics-science center. 
On January 3, 1968, the State Board of Education resolved 
that “ effective consolidation of school divisions is a pre­
requisite to quality public education in many areas of the 
state.” Bedford County and Bedford City were thus al­
lowed to form a single school division. Fairfax City and 
Fairfax County, while remaining separate school divisions, 
operate together under a contract with the County edu­
cating the city children.

The historic practice of combining several political sub­
divisions into one school division demonstrates that there 
is no compelling reason to maintain separate school dis­
tricts and that the State of Virginia has not in the past 
considered the reasons offered in this case to be “ com­
pelling.”  Separate districts are clearly not necessary to 
give residents a voice in the education of their children. 
Nor are they necessary to assure the taxpayer that his 
money is being used for schools which his children attend.



13

The contract method of joint operation would also assure 
the taxpayer that his moneys went to the education of his 
children. Since there is no compelling reason to maintain 
these school boundary lines which separate children by 
race, they should be struck down.

C. The State Cannot Use Political Boundary Lines to Limit 
the Federal Courts’ Remedial Power Because the State Has 
Caused the Division of the Races by Those Lines.

Virginia has for many years operated a dual system in 
all the schools of the state. “Because they are Negroes, 
petitioners have long received inferior education in seg­
regated schools, and this Court expressly recognized these 
differences in Gaston County v. United States.” Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 430. As the trial judge 
pointed out in this case, inferior education leads to re­
stricted job opportunities; unskilled employment leads to 
restricted ability to choose a home. Thus, the segregated 
schools of the past started a pattern which largely re­
stricts blacks to the center of the urban area. Assuming 
therefore that there was no significant racial distinction 
when the boundary lines were drawn, the state policy of 
segregated education throughout most of this century has 
helped create the racial division which the lines now mark.

Segregated schools also contributed to the present pat­
terns of residential segregation in other ways. “People 
gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are lo­
cated in response to the needs of people. The location of 
schools may thus influence the patterns of residential de­
velopment of a metropolitan area and have important im­
pact on composition of inner city neighborhoods.” Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 
at 20-21.



14

The State of Virginia contributed to the creation of resi­
dential segregation in many other ways as well. The State 
for many years enforced restrictive covenants, thereby 
encouraging people to impose them on the land to such an 
extent that much of the land in the metropolitan Richmond 
area today has restrictive covenants in earlier deeds. No­
tation of such a covenant was still common in title searches 
until within the last few years, even though the covenant 
could not be constitutionally enforced. Public housing was 
sited and occupied on the basis of race until recently. The 
counties provided schools, roads, zoning and development 
approval for the rapid growth of the white population in 
the county at the expense of the city, without making any 
attempt to assure that the development it made possible 
was integrated.

Even when state law no longer required absolute racial 
separation in the schools, and the massive resistance of 
Virginia to the court orders in Brown v. Board of Educa­
tion had diminished, schools were still sited to produce 
segregation. As the trial judge found, “ Construction in 
both counties has tended to correspond with the develop­
ment of white and black residential areas, and in fact was 
so intended. . . . New construction was planned for black 
schools in the county without regard to the possibility of 
accommodating an expanding black pupil population in 
white schools.” These acts in furtherance of segregated 
schools are within the power of the district court to correct. 
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
supra.

The State ignored the boundary lines dividing the city 
from the counties in pursuing a policy of school and resi­



15

dential segregation which ultimately drove the blacks into 
the city and the whites into the counties. It should not be 
permitted to use a boundary ignored to create segregation 
in order to frustrate remedial measures for the earlier 
segregation. See United States v. Indianola Municipal Sep­
arate School District, 410 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1969).

It is encouraging to the principles of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that the state has not by its policies made 
integration impossible. The order of the trial judge demon­
strates that feasible remedial measures can be implemented. 
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg Board of Education, 
supra. The area involved is not so great nor is the addi­
tional transportation so significant as to hamper the educa­
tion process if this Court affirms the consolidation order. 
Indeed, it is noteworthy that the strongest resistance to this 
order comes from the counties (the City of Richmond is 
a party plaintiff) where busing is commonplace because of 
the lower population density. But State-created segregation 
should not be tolerated, especially where its justification 
lies in arbitrary lines whose specific location serves only to 
mark off areas according to race. Nor should the mandate 
of the Constitution be circumvented because of any public 
outcry over court orders. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 
(1958).



1 6

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this brief, as well as in the 
opinion of the district court below, the judgment of 
the court below should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

R ichard F alcon
500 West Baltimore Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 21201

David B ogen
500 West Baltimore Street 
Baltimore, Maryland 21201

Melvin L. W ule 
Sanford Jay R osen

American Civil Liberties Union
22 East 40th Street
New York, New York 10016

P hilip H irschkop 
P. O. Box 234 
110 N. Royal Street 
Alexandria, Virginia 22313

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

March 1973



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