McLaurin v. City of Greenville, Mississippi Reply Brief of Respondent

    In  T he

Supreme (Ennrt of %  Intitb States
O c to ber  T e r m , 1966 

No. 633

C h a rles M cL aurin,
Petitioner,

vs.

C it y  of G r e e n v il l e , M is s is s ip p i

Respondent,

(Two Cases)

C h a r les E arl C o bb ,

Petitioner,

vs.

C it y  of G r e e n v il l e , M is s is s ip p i

(Two Cases)

Respondent,

REPLY BRIEF OF R ESPO N D EN T  V dC U  CU T U

C h a r les S. T in d a ll , J r . C

J. R obertshaw  ff c  *
P. O. Drawer 99 
Greenville, Mississippi 38702

Attorneys for Respondent



1

I N D E X

PAGE

SU PPLEM EN TA L FACTS ......... ............................ .. 1

REPLY TO  REASONS FOR G R A N TIN G
T H E  W RIT .................................................................

I Petitioners were not engaged in any federally 
protected activity at the time of their arrests . . 12

II There is ample evidence of petitioners’ guilt 
in the record to support their conviction . . . .  15

III §2089.5 of the Mississippi Code, as applied
by the trial court, is constitutional....................  21

IV Petitioner Cobb is not entitled to reversal of 
his convictions because of systematic exclusion 
of Negroes from the jury where the records 
affirmatively show a legitimate basis for exer­
cise of peremptory challenges on the first 
trial, and respondent’s acceptance of all Negroes
tendered as jurors on the second tr ia l ................ 27

C o n c lu sio n  ............................................................................  30

A ppend ix :

A Re-port on Equal Protection in the South, U. S. Civil
Rights Commission (November 1 9 6 5 ) ......................  i

Cases .........................................................................................  ii

Statutes .....................................................................................  iii

Other Authorities.....................................................................  iii



11

C A S E S

PAGE

Adderley v. Florida,----U. S . ----- , 35 LVV 4013, 4015
(14 Nov. 1 9 6 6 ) .................................................  18, 23, 27

Ashton v. Kentucky,----U. S . ----- , 16 LEd2 469
(1966) .................... .......................................................  22

Bolton v. City of Greenville, 253 Miss. 656, 178 So2d 
667 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ................................................... .. 7, 13, 14

Bynum v. City of Greenville, 253 Miss. 667, 178 So2d 
672 (1965) . ...............................................................  13, 14

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965) . . 12, 14, 22, 23, 24

Domhrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 491-492 (1965). . 21

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963) . . .  12, 22

Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315 (1951) . . 25, 26, 27, 30

Greenwood, Mississippi v. Peacock, -----U. S . ----- , 16
LEd2 944, 956 (1966) ...............................................  23

McLaurin v. City of G reenville ,----Miss. — -, 187
So2d 854, 859 ........... ..........................................  13, 16, 25

Schenk v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47, 52-53 ( 1 9 1 9 ) ..................  17

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 ( 1 9 6 5 ) ......................  28

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 ( 1 9 4 9 ) .............  12, 22



Ill

ST A T U T E S

PAGE

Mississippi Code of 1942 (Recompiled), §1202 .............  3

Mississippi Code of 1942 (Recompiled), §2089.5 . . . .  3, 21,
24, 26

O TH ER A U TH O RITIES

PAGE

Code of Ordinances of the City of Greenville (Rev. Ed.,
1938) §252 .....................................................................  3

A Report on Equal Protection in the South, U. S. Civil
Rights Commission (November 1965) . . .  6, 10, 19, 20

Black, Law Dictionary (4th E,d., 1951), 1154 ................ 18



In T he

Supreme (Eimrt of %  lottvb States
O cto ber  T e r m , 1966 

No. 6B3

C h a rles M c L a u r in ,
Petitioner,

vs.

C it y  of G r e e n v il l e , M is s iss ip p i

Respondent,

(Two Cases)

C h a rles E arl C o bb ,

vs.

C ity  of G r e e n v il l e , M is s iss ip p i

Petitioner,

Respondent,

(Two Cases)

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPO N D EN T

S u p p l e m e n t a l  F acts

Respondent’s position in the City Court, in the County 
Court of Washington County, in the Circuit Court of Wash­
ington County, in the Supreme Court of Mississippi, and in 
this Court has been and is, purely and simply, that the peti­
tioners were guilty of conduct calculated to provoke a breach



2

of the peace or which might reasonably have lead to a 
breach of the peace. Stated another way, petitioners were ar­
rested and prosecuted, not because of what they were saying, 
but because of the effect of their speeches upon the crowd— 
a crowd characterized by petitioners’ own attorney as a “mob.” 
(RB 51)

The issue squarely presented by this petition for a writ of 
certiorari is: Have the four state courts which have considered 
the charges against petitioners and which have considered 
whether petitioners’ actions are protected by the First Amend­
ment decided this question in a way probably not in accord 
with applicable decisions of this court?

?
Essentially, this is a question of faot. It may be helpful at 

this point to review briefly the Mississippi procedure under 
which two separate courts and four separate juries held hear­
ings on the merits and found adversely to petitioners.

The City Court is not a court of record. The City Judge, 
appointed by the City Council, sits as an ex officio Justice of 
the Peace. In criminal trials, the City does not utilize the 
services of a city attorney, while defendants may or may not 
be represented by counsel, as they desire. In that court, peti­
tioners were convicted under an affidavit charging that they 

“ * *  *  did then and there use loud and offensive talk 
and other conduct causing a threatened breach of the 
peace *  * * ”

RA 150, 152.

They appealed to the County Court of Washington County.

The County Court, an intermediate court, is a court of 
record, and has limited jurisdiction concurrent with the Cir­
cuit and Chancery Court. On appeal of a criminal case from 
the City Court, there is a complete trial de novo before a



3

judge and jury. §1202, Mississippi Code of 1942 (Re­
compiled), provides drat on trial of an appealed case,

“ *  *  *  the affidavit charging the offense and other pro­
ceedings may be amended at any time before a verdict, 
so as to bring the merits of the case fairly to trial on the 
charge intended to be embraced in the affidavit.”

On appeal, the affidavits were amended to conform with 
§2089.5, Mississippi Code of 1942 (Recompiled) (RA 3, RC 
5), and §252, Code of Ordinances of the City of Greenville 
(Rev. Ed., 1938) (RB 7, RD 5), and the basic charge on 
which petitioners were tried in the County Court was that 
they did

“*  *  *  disturb the public peace by loud or offensive 
language, or by conduct either calculated to provoke a 
breach of the peace, or by conduct which might reason­
ably have led to a breach of the peace.”

RA 3, RC 5.
There were four separate trials in County Court and four 

separate juries. Each of the petitioners was first tried on the 
breach of the peace charge, and then tried upon the resisting 
arrest charge. In the second of these trials, it was first neces­
sary to prove and to have the jury find that there was a law­
ful arrest on the breach of the peace charge, so that in point 
of fact, each petitioner was found guilty of conduct provok­
ing a breach of the peace or which might reasonably lead to 
a breach of the peace by two separate juries.

It is interesting to note that on the first trial, each petitioner 
moved to quash the jury panel on the ground that Negroes 
had been systematically excluded by use of peremptory chal­
lenges (RA 22, RC 25); on each of the second trials, peti­
tioners moved to quash the jury panel on the ground that 
negroes had been systematically included! (RB 23, RD 24)



4

Again, procedure is important, and should be considered by 
this Court in its independent investigation to determine 
whether petitioners’ First Amendment right were violated.

On each breach of the peace charge, the jury was instruct­
ed by the County Court as follows:

“The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from 
the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that 
(Petitioner) *  *  *  did, on or about 1 July 1963, within 
the corporate limits of the City of Greenville, Washing­
ton County, Mississippi, disturb the public peace by 
loud or offensive language, or by conduct either calcu­
lated to provoke a breach of the peace, or by conduct 
which might reasonably have led to a breach of the peace, 
then it is your sworn duty to return the following ver­
dict: W e, the jury, find the defendant guilty as 
charged.”’

RA 6, RC 7.

On each resisting arrest charge, substantially the same 
charge was given except that the last clause was replaced with 
this language:

“*  *  *  in the presence of the arresting officer, and that 
he was thereupon placed under arrest, such arrest was 
lawful.”

RB 9, RD 7.

In each of the four trials, the County Court instructed the 
jury as follows:

“The Court instructs the jury for the defendant that 
if you find that the defendant was arrested for peaceful 
protest against racial segregation, then you cannot find 
the defendant guilty.”



5

RA 9, RB 14, RC 9, RD 14,

In each of the resisting arrest cases, the jury was instruct­
ed:

“The Court instructs the jury for the defendant that 
if you find the arrest itself was illegal then you cannot 
find the defendant guilty of resisting arrest.”

RB 15, RD 12.

These petitioners, then, were given a trial on the merits be­
fore the City Court and found guilty of talk or conduct which 
threatened a breach of the peace; each petitioner was tried 
before two separate juries, and each guilty verdict, under the 
instructions given by the County Court, constituted an af­
firmative finding of fact that: (1 )  petitioners were guilty 
of conduct which might reasonably have led to a breach of 
the peace, and, more important, (2 )  that the petitioners were 
not arrested for a peaceful protest against racial segregation.

Notwithstanding that the City Judge and four separate 
juries (two all-white juries and two bi-racial juries) have 
agreed that petitioners were prosecuted, not for the content 
of their speeches, but for the calculated effect upon the 
“mob”, this Court properly should review the evidence for 
an independent determination of whether petitioners have 
been denied consuturlonally guaranteed rights.

For a proper understanding and evaluation of the evidence 
in this case, it is necessary to examine the setting within 
which the action occurred. It is an unfortunate fact that the 
State of Mississippi, at the time of these occurrences had a 
public image in the field of civil rights which was, to say the 
least, rather shabby. This is not true of the respondent City 
of Greenville.



6

See: A Report on Equal Protection in the South, U. S.
Commission on Civil Rights (November, 1965), pp. 
94-97; RA 154-157; Appendix A.

The cited portion of the Civil Rights Commission report 
must be accepted as an impartial assessment, and because it 
imparts an accurate image of the respondent City of Green­
ville, for the convenience of the Court is as reproduced as 
Appendix A to this brief. Respondent is proud of its record 
of impartiality and fairness and of the fact that each indi­
vidual has been and is accorded his constitutional rights with­
out regard to race, creed, color or national origin, whether or 
no that individual is a resident citizen.

Petitioners are professionals in the civil rights field. They 
are Field Secretaries of the Student Non-Violent Coordinat­
ing Committee (S N C C ) (RA 83, RC 64), which this Court 
judicially knows to be one of the more militant of the civil 
rights organizations, and an advocate of “Black Power.” Peti­
tioner McLaurin had been active as a SN C C  worker in Green­
ville since September of 1962 (RA 82); Petitioner Cobb since 
November of 1962 (R C  63). Respondent never interfered 
with their activities (R C  73). The main thrust of the SN C C  
program was voter registration. When petitioners arrived in 
Greenville, their investigation into voter practices revealed 
that whites and Negroes were treated alike in registration, 
that there was a substantial number of qualified Negro voters, 
that there were no organizations of any kind to hinder or 
keep Negroes from registering or voting, and that poll taxes— 
then a prerequisite to voting—could be paid, not only at the 
county courthouse, but at every bank and branch bank in the 
county and at all outlying communities by white and Negro 
alike. (R C  64, 65)

This being true, petitioners turned their efforts in other 
directions—to sit-ins and park demonstrations. The majority



7

of the residents with whom petitioners worked were under 18 
years of age (RA 85, 86). Petitioners had engineered the 
park demonstrations of the two young girls who were being 
tried in Municipal Court, and that was their interest in being 
present (RD  75, 76, RA 84). These same park demonstra­
tions had very nearly erupted into a riot.

See: Bolton v. City of Greenville, 253 Miss. 656, 178 So2d 
667 (1965).

We think these facts pertinent in that they bolster the jury 
findings that petitioners were not arrested for a peaceful pro­
test against segregation. It is not likely, as a matter of common 
sense, that petitioner McLaurin was making a speech about 
voter registration, and it is significant that even he never- 
testified he actually said anything about registering protest 
with the mayor, or about remedying the situation through 
voter registration; this is what he was “going to say” (RA 77), 
what he “meant by his language” (RA 78), and what he “had 
in mind” (RA 90). He was talking in a “very loud, very 
loud” (RA 26) voice.

Petitioner McLaurin knew the temper of that crowd which 
was peacefully dispersing at the conclusion of the trials (RA 
51, RB 28, RC 49, RD 55, 61). To use his own words,

“*  *  *  I felt that if it was a tense situation out there that 
these people would—first of all they knew, some of them, 
that the kids had tried to use the park. They needed 
some kind of idea as to what steps to take. They were 
up-set; they were restless. The expressions on their faces 
characterized by restless energy, that they felt that some­
thing should be done. But, then all it needed was a lead- 
er, and I was going to try and show them where they 
could register their protest with the Mayor, arndHTdidn’t



8

feel that they were going to come up and attack me.”
(Emphasis added) RB 58.

Regardless of what he “meant” or “had in mind” or what 
he was “going to say,” what he actually did say, taken from 
his own testimony, was:

Q. And, you were asking these people, what are you go­
ing to do about it, were you not?

A. I was asking them—first of all I was asking them if 
they were satisfied, and yes, what were they going to 
do about it.

Q. You did ask them what they were going to do about it?

A. I did.

Q. You asked them if they were going to stand for it, did 
you not?

A. Yes, I said are you going to stand for it.

Q. So that the testimony what (sic) the officers gave in 
your presence here in the Courtroom as to what you 
said so far as it went is correct, is it not?

A. As far as they said that they heard. I said—I think that 
what Officer Tackett said that he only caught these 
very two things, I said other things before that and 
after.

Q. Do you deny that you said anything that the officers 
testified in this trial said you said?

A. No.

Q. Do you admit it?

A. I admit that I said, are you 
don, are you going to stam 
take it?

going to stand for segrega- 
[ this, or are you going to



9

Q. Now then, you were making those statements to a 
crowd of people that you knew to be up-set and shock­
ed, is that correct?

A. I was making a statement to people—let it fall on the 
ears of people that would listen.

Q. And, you knew that they seemed to be up-set and 
shocked?

A. Yes.

RB 66.

In their brief, petitioners characterize the speeches as "of 
a vigorous and stirring nature” (p. 15) which “merely 
amounted to a call to action.” (p  16) We submit petitioners 
correctly state the case on page 15 of their brief with the 
statement, “Petitioners intended to stir the persons in the 
crowd to action,

The question is, what action? ,

It is a fair inference that the unusually large crowd attend­
ing the trial of the girls for participation in the park demon­
stration was present as a result of SN C C  efforts and for the 
purpose of giving the defendants support. Petitioners were 
“affiliated” with the girl demonstrators (RA 84). Their inter­
est in the trial as field secretaries of SN C C  was the reason 
for petitioners’ presence (R C  76). It would therefore be fair 
to conclude that the 200-300 members of the crowd were 
citizens with whom petitioners had worked, or at least sympa­
thetic to their cause. Nevertheless, not one single witness was 
produced from that crowd to substantiate petitioners’ conten­
tion that the speech had anything whatsoever to do with en­
couraging voter registration, or lodging a protest with the 
Mayor.



10

We respectfully submit that use of the language admitted 
by petitioners, in a loud, emotional manner, directed at a 
crowd of up-set, emotional shocked persons, charged with a

nearly, it

The officers involved were competent, experienced, impar­
tial, professional law enforcement officers.

See: A Report on Equal Protection in the South, U. S.
Civil Right Commission, (November, 1965), pp.
94-97; RA 154-157; Appendix A.

The arresting officers were Officer Carson, a Negro veteran 
of 13 years on the force (RA 23) with the rank of detective; 
Officer Martin, a Negro veteran of 4 and 1/2 years on the 
force.

Chief Burnley, 17 years experience on the force, a gradu­
ate of the FBI National Academy, and specially trained in 
riot control described the scene as a fast-moving, “erupting” 
situation which could have got out of hand at any second, any 
minute (RD  57). He stated:

“I was of the opinion that the situation was very tense.
That at any minute we could have a riot or some vio­
lence to take place at that particular gathering.”

RA 55.

Captain Tackett, a veteran of 13 years and an FBI gradu­
ate, stated “It seemed as though they were going to try and 
take the situation into their own hands.” (RA 46) As he saw 
it, the temper of the crowd was increasingly worsening, and, 
in his opinion, “if the trend had of kept (up ) there would 
have been some violence there.” (RA 52)

restless energy, was indeed a call to action; more



11

Petitioners’ brief (pp. 11, 19) seems to give the impression 
that after their arrest, the crowd peacefully dispersed. This is 
not in accord with the facts in the record.«After petitioners’ 
arrestTTHidrr time was allowed for a voluntary dispersal of 
the crowd. It did not. Chief Burnley then ordered the crowd 
to disperse. It did not. (R C  44, 45). In point of fact, it be­
came necessary for a detail of 15-18 officers to form a line in 
riot squad formation (RA 56, RB 44), to march into the 
crowd and compress it into a column of two’s and three’s, and 
then to bodily escort that crowd a distance of 12-15 blocks, 
out o f the business district, where it was then dispersed. (RA
47, 48)

On the other hand, the inflammatory language admittedly 
used by petitioners—“Are you going to stand for segregation?” 
“Are you going to take it?” “Are you going to stand for this?” 
“Are you going to let them arrest my buddy?” “This is every­
body’s fight” “Let’s all go to jail”—to a crowd that was upset, 
emotional, shocked, charged with restless energy and “only 
needing a leader,” clearly supports all four jury verdicts find­
ing that petitioners were guilty of conduct calculated to pro­
voke a breach of the peace or reasonably leading to a breach 
of the peace.



12

REPLY TO REASONS FOR G RA N TIN G  T H E  W RIT

I

Petitioners were not engaged in any federally protected 
activity at the time of their arrests.

Petitioners rely principally on three cases to support their 
proposition that they were arrested because of the exercise of 
their “federal constitutional rights of free speech, assembly 
and petition:” Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949); 
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); and Cox 
v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965). All three cases are clear­
ly distinguishable on the facts and in the principles involved.

In Terminiello, the case grew out of an address delivered 
in a capacity auditorium under the auspices of the Christian 
Veterans of America. Outside there was a larger, turbulent 
and angry crowd gathered to protest the meeting. Petitioner 
had been fined for disorderly conduct. The trial court had 
charged the jury that

“ *  *  *  'breach of the peace’ consists of any ‘misbehavior 
which violates the public peace and decorum’; and that 
the ‘misbehavior may constitute a breach of the peace if 
it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about 
a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it 
molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and 
quiet by arousing alarm.’”

337 U. S. 1, 3.

As Mr. Justice Douglas succinctly put it, “the pinch of the 
statute is in its application.” (337 U. S. at 6) The Court 
there correctly held that the statute, so construed, seriously 
invaded the province of First Amendment rights.



13

In all four cases presently before this Court, the trial court 
instructed the jury for the defendants (petitioners) that

“*  *  *  if you find that the defendant was arrested for 
peaceful protest against racial segregation, then you can­
not find the defendant guilty.”

RA 9, RB 14, RC 9, RD 14.

Thus (fiejuryAwas squarely presented a factual issue,,, of 
whether petitioners were a r fe ste d ^ d 'pr^ecuted because they 
were advocating unpopular views, or whether they were ar- 
restecf and prosecuted because their conduct  ̂was cafcul&ted 
to oHIltelyto provoke a breach of the peace.

The case of Bolton v. City of Greenville, 253 Miss. 656, 
178 So2d 667 (1965) and Bynum v. City of Greenville, 253 
Miss. 667, 178 So2d 672 (1965) were appeals from convic­
tions of the girls who were being tried at the time petitioners 
were arrested. Their cases argued to the Supreme Court of 
Mississippi on the same day as petitioners’ cases. In Bolton 
and Bymm, the girls’ convictions were reversed in a unani­
mous decision on the reasoning that they were engaged in 
conduct which, although unpopular enough to very nearly 
cause a riot, was not illegal. These cases are alluded to in the 
Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion (Petitioners’ Brief, Ap­
pendix 11a; 187 So2d 854, 859), and this distinction care­
fully drawn.

As stated in the opinion below of the Mississippi Supreme 
Court,

“ *  *  *  This Court is fully cognizant of our duty to con­
strue our statutes in such a manner to be sure they will 
not infringe upon the constitutional rights of any person. 
The statue (§2089.5) as construed by the trial court is 
not unconstitutional.



187 So. 2d at 859; Petitioners’ Brief, Appendix 11a.

We suggest that it is unlikely the same Court which unani­
mously reversed Bolton and Bynum would unanimously af­
firm petitioners’ convictions, had petitioners, like the girls, 
been engaged in the exercise of constitutional rights.

In Edwards,

“ *  *  *  The City Manager testified that he recognized 
some of the onlookers, whom he did not identify, as pos­
sible troublemakers,’ but his subsequent testimony made 
clear that nobody among the crowd actually caused or 
threatened any trouble.”

372 U. S. at 231.

It can be said with some degree of certainty that the facts in 
Edwards establish a situation where the defendants were ex­
ercising First Amendment rights, and where there was no 
clear and present danger of violence.

Similarly, in Cox, this Court stated

“ *  *  *  but our independent examination of the record, 
which,,we are required to make.-.,shows no conduct which 
the State had a right to prohibit as a breach of the peace.”

379 U. S. at 545.

As more fully covered in the Supplemental Statement above, 
and in Point II, below, both Cox and Edwards are distingu­
ishable on the facts. The crucial distinction is that in those 
two cases the defendants were acting peacefully and were 
engaged in activities protected by the First Amendment (Cf. 
Bolton v. City of Greenville, supra). In the case at bar, peti­
tioners had passed the bounds of argument or persuasion, and 
undertaken to incite the crowd to riot. This is not constitu­
tionally protected action.



15

II

There is ample evidence of petitioners’ guilt in the record 
to support their conviction.

As we view this controversy, we are dealing strictly with a 
question of fact. Petitioners’ position is that they were at­
tempting to persuade the crowd to qualify as voters and ex­
ercise rights as citizens. In their petition, they state it thusly:

“ *  *  *  Petitioners intended to stir persons in the crowd
to action, viz., assertion of their federal rights. *  *  * ”

Petition, p. 15.

Respondent’s position is that petitioners’ conduct was in­
tended to (i. e., “calculated to”)  provoke disorder (i. e., a 
breach of the peace), and that petitioners were arrested as 
a necessary step to avert a riot.

In considering this question, this Court will make its inde­
pendent examination of the records to determine whether 
p^^O T ^**PT K r7jtt,!S ^ ^ p m " r ^ t s  have been violated. We 
do not l^ T re T ^ d i^ h i^ w e A v e lc o ^  m em vestigation.

Nevertheless, at the outset of this examination, we feel 
this Court should take note of action at various levels of these 
cases:

(1 )  In the City Court, petitioners were tried on the merits 
without a jury. The City Judge found them guilty.

(2 )  In the county court, petitioners were tried de novo be­
fore four separate juries. Each jury was instructed by the 
County Court that if they believed petitioners were arrested 
for a peaceful protest against racial discrimination, they should 
be found not guilty. Each jury convicted.



1 6

(3 )  Although it is true that two juries were all white, it 
is also true that the other two juries contained enough N e­
groes as jurors to impel petitioners to move to quash the panel 
on the ground Negroes had been systematically included.

(4 )  The resisting arrest cases required a second conviction 
on the breach of the peace charges as a condition precedent 
to a finding of guilty; therefore, both juries found petitioners 
guilty of conduct calculated to provoke a breach of the peace 
independently of the first two jury findings.

n

(5 )  All four cases were reviewed on the record by the 
County Court and Circuit Court of Washington County with 
an exceptionally able judge (Hon. Arthur B. Clark, Jr., Har­
vard Law School, LLB 1948), and the convictions affirmed.

(6 )  All four cases were carefully considered by the Supreme 
Court of Mississippi, which was thoroughly cognizant of peti­
tioners' constitutional rights, but which had no difficulty in 
concluding that “The arrest of appellant (M cLaurin) and 
the subsequent arrest of Charles Cobb enabled the officers to 
control a situation that otherwise might have created a riot 
beyond control.’’

Petition, Appendix 12a; 187 So2d at 859.
In disposing of petitioners’ contention that there was no evi­
dence of guilt, that Court held:

“Appellant’s contention that there was no evidence of 
appellant’s guilt of the charge is without merit. This 
contention is based solely upon the proposition that ap­
pellant’s acts were constitutionally protected, and we hold 
that they were not for the reasons heretofore stated.” 
Petition, Appendix 13a; 187 So2d at 860.

Without restating the detailed facts, let us examine the 
evidence directly bearing upon the evidence of guilt. In so



17

doing, we recall, but cannot locate tbe citation, where Mr. 
Justice Cardozo, considering what was “reasonable,” said 
substantially that it was like a “jewel which varies in color 
and content with its setting.”

In examining this precise question, this Court should be 
governed by the ground rules laid down by Mr. Justice 
Holmes in Schenk v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47, 52-53 (1919), 
where he said:

“*  *  *  The most strigent protection of free speech would 
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater, 
and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from 
an injunction against uttering words that may have all 
the effects of force. (Citation omitted) The question in 
every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a 
clear and present danger that they will bring about the 
substantive evils that Congress has a right to protect. It 
is a question of proximity and degree.”

The question here, therefore, is whether the words used 
by the petitioners are used in such circumstances and are of 
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger of a 
riot or breach of the peace.

Let us first examine the circumstances. This was an ab­
normally large crowd for the Municipal Court (R D  54), 
assembled for the trial of two girls arrested for a park dem­
onstration. It is a fair inference that petitioners’ activities were 
responsible for the size of that crowd. After the trial, where 
both girls had been convicted, the crowd quietly leaving the 
courtroom and dispersing. The crowd was tense, upset, shock­
ed. As described by petitioner, McLaurin, “They were upset: 
they were restless. The expressions on their faces characterized 
by restless energy, that they felt something should be done.



18

But, then all it needed was a leader.” (RB 58, emphasis add-

ed) f.1 jOA^
Petitioners’ coifnsel inadvertently correctly and aptly des­

cribed the crowd as a “mob.” (RB 51) This designation was 
used by a skillful and capable lawyer. It means:

“MOB. An assemblage of many people, acting in a 
violent and disorderly manner, defying the law, and 
committing or threatening to commit, depredations upon 
the property or violence to persons. (Citations omitted)

“The word, in legal use, is practically synonymous 
with ‘riot’ but the latter is the more correct term.”

Black, Law Dictionary (4th Ed., 1951), 1154.

Taking petitioners’ language in this context, regardless of 
what they “meant” or “intended to say” , what they actually 
said can only be construed to be inflammatory. As petitioners’ 
counsel puts it,

“ *  *  *  What petitioners did succeed in saying merely 
amounted to a call to action; but nowhere in the record 
is there any indication that it was a call to unlawful ac- 

jio n .”

Petition, p 16.
Under the circumstances then and there existing, with an 

emotional, upset, shocked crowd, with the “expressions on 
their faces characterized by restless energy” , the language used 
by McLaurin (What are you going to do about it? Are you 
going to stand for this?”), and the language used by Cobb 
(Are you going to let them arrest my buddy? This is every­
body’s fight! Let’s all go to jail!1)  is the precise equivalent to

i) Cf. Adderley v. Florida, ---- U. S. ----, 35 LW 4013, 4015 (14 Nov. 1966)
where some of the petitioners “apparently wanted to get themselves put 
into jail too.”



19

shouting “fire” in a crowded theater.

The undisputed testimony is that before petitioners’ har­
angues, the crowd was peacefully dispersing and departing 
from the area. After the harangues, they disobeyed the orders 
of the Chief of Police to disperse, and it became necessary to 
form 15-18 officers into a riot formation, compress the crowd 
into a column of two’s and three’s, and to march them 12-15 
blocks out of the business district.

We respectfully suggest that the affirmative findings of the 
City Judge and of four separate juries may not be lightly dis­
missed. They have the advantage of having heard the testi­
mony viva voce, and of having had an opportunity to observe 
the demeanor and manner of speech of the witnesses, and to 
better judge the truth where there is a conflict.

We submit that the evidence in this record compels a find­
ing that there was a clear and present danger of civil disorder 
which could be averted only by removal of petitioners from 
the scene.

Petitioners argue:

“*  *  *  Nor can this Court accept at face value the un­
supported assertions of police witnesses that an imminent 
danger of breach of the peace existed.”

Petition, p. 19.

We respectfully suggest that this Court cannot ignore police 
testimony merely because it is police testimony. This is par­
ticularly true here. As appearances for petitioners disclose, 
their defense is provided by the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc. In A Report on Equal Protection in 
the South, supra, the U. S. Civil Rights Commission quotes



20

?

James Edwards, chairman of the local NAACP as follows:

“*  *  *  When Negro leaders from Greenville appeared 
before the Commission, they were unanimous in express­
ing confidence in their local law enforcement officials. 
James Edwards, chairman of the local NAACP, testified 
that the attitude of the Negro community towards law 
enforcement was ‘good’ and that Negroes believed ‘we 
have one of the best police forces in the State, one of the 
best police forces you will find. . .’

“The confidence of the Negro community in Green­
ville police can be attributed to the determination of 
city officials to have impartial and professional law en­
forcement."

Id. at 94-95; RA 154-155 (Emphasis added).

We submit this suggests that testimony of the officers, which 
petitioners do not deny (RB 66), should be accepted at face 
value.

Looking at the other side of the coin, whether petitioners’ 
testimony is worthy of belief, we understand their contention 
to be that the content of their speeches was encouragement 
of voter registration, and that they were arrested for present­
ing these views to the crowd, and unpopular views.

We should like to make two observations we believe perti­
nent:

(1 )  Presumably the crowd of 200-300 persons, having been 
brought to the trial in support of the SN C C  efforts, would 
have been favorably disposed towards petitioners. YgL n ot one 
single witness, otlier ,|han themselves*^camgjforward to, 
roboratetheirversions oTthe speeches.

(2 )  Petitioners’ testimony shows that Negroes applying to 
register for voting were meticulously given the same treat­



2 1

ment as whites; a substantial number of Negroes were quali­
fied electors; not only was there no impediment to Negro 
qualification, but it was actually encouraged and facilitated 
by making poll tax payment possible at all banks, branch 
banks, and major communities in the county outside Green­
ville. Voter registration in the respondent city was not and 
is not a controversial issue. There would, therefore, be no 
reason why respondent’s police would seek to prevent speeches 
aimed at encouraging registration and qualification as voters. 
It is also significant that petitioners, paid field secretaries for 
SN C C , had been active in the respondent city for about nine 
and one-half months without interference of any sort from 
respondent.

On the merits, and on the basis of any reasonable examina- 
tion* of the record in this cause, petitioners’ arrest and con­
viction was justified.

Ill

§2089.5 of the Mississippi Code, as applied hy the trial 
court, is constitutional.

Criminal statutes are no more and no less than rules adopted 
by a civilized society to establish a minimum standard neces­
sary to preserve an ordered life. They provide a framework 
within which individuals may form a community without 
loss of basic individual rights.

They fall into two broad categories: (1 )  those forbidding 
acts which are malum per se, and (2 )  those which are malum 
prohibitum. This Court hints at this distinction in Dombrow- 
ski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 491-492 (1965), in referring 
to “the sort of ‘hardcore’ conduct that would obviously be 
prohibited under any circumstances.”



22

Thus, under the first category, murder, rape, robbery, riot­
ing, provoking public disorder and similar acts would be a 
firm basis for criminal prosecution no matter how loosely: 
worded the statute. The second category, where acts which: 
were formerly acceptable conduct in the community become' 
prohibited, requires that the statutes be spelled out with suf­
ficient certainty to give fair warning to citizens of the shift 
in classification from legal to illegal. The “void for vague­
ness’- doctrine should be limited in its application to statutes 
which are in the category of malum prohibitum, with the 
qualification always that an otherwise valid statute not be so 
applied as to impinge upon rights guaranteed by the constitu­
tion.

As Mr. Justice Douglas so aptly put it, “The pinch of the 
statute is in its application.”

Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 ,6  (1949).

Thus in Terminiello, this Court reversed because the trial 
court had given an overly broad interpretation o f. the statute 
there involved to permit conviction for speech which invited 
dispute. In Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229 (1963), 
this Court reversed a conviction for breach of the peace where 
there was no violence or threat of violence. In Ashton v. Ken-'
tucky,------U. S . ------- , 16 LEd2 469 (1966), this Court
reversed a conviction for criminal libel on the ground that the 
overly broad and vague construction of the crime given , the 
jury by the trial court could not be cured by a more limited 
construction of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. In Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536 (1965), this Court reversed a 
breach of the peace conviction where the statute, as construed 
by the trial court, allowed punishment for peacefully express­
ing unpopular views. However, significantly, in Cox, this 
Court held:



23

“From these decisions certain clear principles emerge. 
The rights of free speech and assembly, while funda­
mental in our democratic society, still do not mean that 
everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address 
a group at any public place and at any time. The con­
stitutional guarantee of liberty implies the existence of 
an organized society maintaining public order, without 
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of an­
archy.”

379 U. S. at 554 (Emphasis added).

Cox was followed by Greenwood, Mississippi v. Peacock,
------U. S . ------- , 16 LEd2 944, 956 (1966), where the
Court stated:

“*  *  *  First, no federal law confers an absolute right on 
private citizens — on civil rights advocates, on Negroes, 
or on anybody else — to obstruct a public highway, to 
contribute to the delinquency of a minor, to drive an 
automobile without a license, or to bite a policeman. 
Second, no federal law confers immunity from state 
prosecution on such charges.”

These examples, hardcore offenses, would surely include, in 
principle, provoking a breach of the peace, inciting to riot, 
or precipitating violence.

The latest pronouncement of this Court is in Adderley v.
Florida,----U. S . ----- , 35 LW  4013, (14 November 1966),
which involved trespass convictions arising out of demon­
strations at the jailhouse where it was argued:

“ *  *  *  that they (petitioners) had a constitutional right 
to stay on the property, over the jail custodian’s objec- 
ions, because this ‘area chosen for the peaceful civil 
rights demonstration was not only “reasonable” but also



24

particularly appropriate . . Such an argument has as 
its major unarticulated premise the assumption that 
people who want to propagandize protests or views have 
a constitutional right to do so whenever and wherever 
they please. That concept of constitutional law was vig­
orously and forthrightfully rejected in two of the cases 
petitioners rely on, Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at 554-555 
563-564. We reject it again.”

35 LW  at 4016.

In the cases at bar, petitioners argue they were convicted 
for peaceful protest against racial discrimination, and that their 
convictions therefore violate their First Amendment rights. 
The record clearly discloses that the trial court gave a limited 
and narrow construction to the statute by specifically instruct­
ing the jury that if they believed petitioners were arrested for 
such a peaceful protest, they must be found not guilty. The 
Supreme Court of Mississippi, in affirming, held:

“Appellant also urges that section 2089.5 is so vague 
and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the exer­
cise of the right of free speech guaranteed by the Four­
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. His argument is based upon the contention that 
as applied here the term ‘breach of peace’ reaches fed­
erally protected activities that create unrest in others. 
The statute as drawn is in broad terms, but is not un­
constitutional on its face. It is true that it could be con­
strued in such a manner that it would reach federally 
protected activities, but we are well aware of the fact 
that neither this statute nor any other statute may be 
construed so as to infringe upon the state or federally 
protected constitutional rights of appellant or any other 
person.”



25

McLaurin v. City of Greenville,----M iss.-----, 187 So2d
854, 859, Petition, Appendix 11a.

In affirming, the Mississippi Supreme Court specifically 
held that the statute, as construed by the trial court, is not 
unconstitutional.

Thus the cases before this Court are instances where peti­
tioners were convicted for conduct calculated to provoke a 
breach of the peace, or which might reasonably lead to a 
breach of the peace, and specifically not for a peaceful pro­
test against discrimination which would be constitutionally 
protected. We submit, respectfully, that this appeal is gov­
erned by the decision of this Court in Feiner v. New York, 
340 U. S. 315 (1951).

In Feiner, where this Court made its independent exami­
nation of the evidence to determine whether First Amend­
ment rights had been violated, it stated:

“x- x- x- Qur appraisa} 0f the facts is, therefore, based 
upon the uncontroverted facts and, where controversy 
exists, upon that testimony which the trial judge did 
reasonably conclude to be true.”

340 U. S. 316.

Here, the controversy is centered on whether petitioners 
were making a peaceful protest, or whether their conduct was 
calculated to or might reasonably have lead to a breach of 
the peace. The triers of fact were four separate juries, and 
the testimony reasonably supports their conclusions of guilt.

In Feiner, the offense charged was disorderly conduct, but 
the language of the statute involved is strikingly similar to 
that involved here. As set out in footnote 1 (340 U. S. at 318), 
the conduct condemned was that “with intent to provoke a



26

breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace may be 
occasioned.” §2089.5 of the Mississippi Code condemns pre­
cisely the same conduct, and with substantially the same 
language.

In Feiner, where the defendants were tried before a 
judge without a jury, there was evidence supporting and 
contradicting the judgment of the police officers that a clear 
danger of disorder was threatened. His conclusion that the 
police officers were justified in taking action to avoid a breach 
of the peace was approved by two courts on review. Here, 
the City Judge reached the same conclusion. His judgment 
is supported by the verdicts of four separate juries, by the 
judgment of the County Court denying a motion for a directed 
verdict, by the review of the Circuit Court of Washington 
County, and by the review of the Supreme Court of Missis­
sippi.

In Feiner, this Court pointed out that these judgments and 
reviews supported the proposition that the officers were moti­
vated solely by a proper concern for the preservation of order 
and the protection of the general welfare,

“ *  *  *  and that there was no evidence which could lend 
color to a claim that the acts of the police were a cover 
for suppression of petitioner’s views and opinions. Peti­
tioner was thus neither arrested nor convicted for the 
making or content of his speech. Rather, it was the re­
action which it actually engendered.”

340 U. S. at 319-320.

Here, there is no shred of evidence that petitioners were 
arrested or that the arrests were sanctioned because the police 
objected to what was being said or because they disagreed 
with petitioners’ views on voter registration.



27

Cf. Adderley v. Florida,----U. S . ----- , 35 LVV at 4015.
Here, there had been no interference with petitioners’ activi­
ties in the voter registration field, and there were no obstruc­
tions to Negro registration-—if anything Negroes’ qualifica­
tion as electors is seen to be encouraged and facilitated. The 
issues petitioners now claim they were raising are not con­
troversial issues in the respondent city; in fact such issues 
do not exist.

We respectfully submit that Feiner is on all fours with the 
cases here under consideration. Petitioners contentions are 
not supported by any independent evidence from members 
of the crowd or mob, nor by any evidence which remotely 
suggests that the respondent city has ever attempted to sup­
press unpopular views.

IV

Petitioner Cobb is not entitled to reversal of his convictions 
because of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the jury 
where the records affirmatively shows a legitimate basis for 
exercise of peremptory challenges on the first trial, and res­
pondent’s acceptance of all Negroes tendered as jurors on the 
second trial.

On the first trial, for breach of the peace, petitioner Cobb 
moved to quash the petit jury panel for systematic exclusion 
of Negroes. Following this motion, the record discloses this:

“By Mr. Robertshaw:

“Comes now the City of Greenville and shows for the 
record that eleven Negroes were served with summons 
for jury duty at this time; that one was exempted being 
a principal of a school, that one could not be found, 
that of the nine who were present in the Courtroom,



28

one was excused at his request for hardship reasons hy 
the Court, and another was excused after having dis­
qualifying (sic) himself for the reason that he could not 
read or write. The City would further show that of N e­
groes actually placed in the box, peremptory challenges 
were used for the reason that in the best judgment of the 
City in the light of the extensive publicity, it was the 
feeling that such jurors would be biased.”

RC 25-26.

This statement discloses that a substantial proportion of 
Negroes were summoned for jury duty, and that the Negroes 
actually placed in the jury box were peremptorily challenged 
because of possible bias related to their group affiliations, not 
because of their race. This is an entirely proper use of per­
emptory challenges.

S%vain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965), which controls 
on this point, specifically so held. Mr. Justice White, after 
pointing out that counsel must decide, not whether a juror 
of a particular race is in fact partial, but whether one from 
a different group is less likely to be, concluded:

“ *  *  *  Hence veniremen are not always judged solely as 
individuals for the purpose of exercising peremptory 
challenges. Rather they are challenged in light of the 
limited knowledge counsel has of them, which may in­
clude their group affiliations, in the context of the case 
to be tried.”

380 U. S. at 221.

The pattern, if any, established by prosecutorial use of 
peremptories during part of a single week, is certainly not 
the “period of time” referred to by Justice White (380 U. S. 
at 227). In the second trial of petitioner McLaurin, the de-



2 9

fense moved to quash the panel on the ground of systematic 
inclusion of Negroes, and the defense exercised a peremptory 
challenge against a Negro juror (RB 23). In petitioner Cobb’s 
second trial, he moved to quash the panel because of the 
systematic “inclusion and/or exclusion’ (RD  25) of Negroes.

Thus the records before this Court affirmatively disclose 
that there was no systematic exclusion of Negroes on racial 
grounds. What transpired in the two cases against this peti­
tioner is of far greater probative value than what may have 
happened in other cases.

Petitioner Cobb’s position is entirely without merit. He 
seeks to travel in diametrically opposed directions at the same 
time. In the one case, he complains that peremptory chal­
lenges were exercised against Negroes for a perfectly proper 
reason; in the second case, he complains because respondent 
accepted Negro veniremen as they were called to the box 
where there was no valid challenge for cause.



CONCLUSION

Whether certiorari should be granted in this case is entirely 
within the discretion of this Court. What the petition pre­
sents to this Court is a pure question of fact, not a question 
of law. If the arrests were used by respondent for the<gurpos^ 
of suppressing a peaceful protest against racial discrimination, 
then we would agree that the convictions should be reversed 
and petitioners discharged. On the other hand, if the arrests 
were made for the sole grflrpoae of averting civil disorder, 
then the case is governed by Turner v. New York, supra, and 
certiorari should not be granted for the reason there is no 
new principle of law involved.

We respectfully submit that the findings of the City Judge 
in the initial trial, and of four separate juries in the County 
Court to the effect that petitioners were not arrested for any 
such peaceful protest, reviewed in turn by the County Judge, 
by the Circuit Judge, and by the Supreme Court of Missis­
sippi, are amply supported by the evidence, and should not 
be disturbed.

Respectfully submitted,

C h a rles S. T in d a l l , Jr .
J. R obertshaw  
P. O. Drawer 99 
Greenville, Mississippi 38702

Attorneys for Respondent



31

T H E  STA TE OF M ISSISSIPPI 
C O U N TY  OF W A SH IN G TO N

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority 
in and for the state and county aforesaid, J. ROBERTSHAW , 
who, being first duly sworn, states on oath that he has this 
date mailed three copies, each, of the foregoing Reply Brief 
for Respondent, via United States airmail, postage prepaid, to 
attorneys for petitioners addressed as follows:

J ack G r e e n b e r g , E sq . 
M e lv y n  Zarr , E sq .
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

A n th o ny  G . A m st er d a m , E sq . 
3400 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

R. J e ss  Brow n , E sq . 
125-1/2 North Farish Street 
Jackson, Mississippi 39201

O

J. R obertshaw

SW ORN TO  AND SU BSCRIBED  before me this 5th 
December, A. D. 1966.

— <r—

N otary P u b lic

My commission expires 5-31-67



la

APPENDIX A

Extract from A Report on Equal Protection in the South, 
U. S. Civil Rights Commission (November 1965).

G R E E N V IL L E —A  C O N T R A S T

The contribution that community support for impartial law 
enforcement, a professional police force, and firmly expressed 
intentions to enforce the law can make towards preventing 
racial violence was revealed in the Commission’s study of 
Greenville, Mississippi. Greenville is the county seat of Wash­
ington County and the fourth largest city in Mississippi. 
When Negro leaders from Greenville appeared before the 
Commission, they were unanimous in expressing confidence 
in their law enforcement officials. James Edwards, chairman 
of the local NAACP, testified that the attitude of the Negro 
community towards law enforcement was “good” and that 
Negroes believed “we have one of the best police forces in 
the State, one of the best police that you will find. . , .”43 44 45 46

The confidence of the Negro community in Greenville 
police can be attributed to the determination of city officials to 
have impartial and professional law enforcement.

The chief of police, William C. Burnley, Jr., had served as 
a law7 enforcement officer in Greenville for 25 years and is a 
graduate of the FBI National Academy. Members of extremist 
groups were not permitted to join the police department, and

43 The prosecuting attorney is elected by the county or the district. Miss. 
Code §§3910, 3920 (1956).

44 Miss. Code §§ 3836-41 (1956); Brookings Institution, op. cit. supra note 
9, at 821-23. See also Highsaw and Fortenberry, op. cit. supra note 25, at 
162-64.

45 Brookings Institution; op. cit, supra note 9, at 471.
46 T. 283. Edwards added, “We are sorry we can’t say the same for the 

sheriff’s force , , . Ibid.



2 a

this policy was enforced by means of FBI checks of recruits 
and lie detector tests. Burnley’s entire immediate staff (seven 
officers) have attended the FBI National Academy. Other 
officers have received training as detectives. Unlike other police 
forces in Mississippi, since 1950 the Greenville police force 
has included Negro officers. At the time of the Commission’s 
hearing there were seven Negro police officers and several 
Negro crossing guards. 47

In the spring of 1964, when many Mississippi communities 
feared violence because of the announced arrival of civil rights 
workers, officials in Greenville took steps to prevent trouble. 
The mayor and the city council issued statements which under­
lined the city’s determination that law and order would pre­
vail.48 Mayor Dunne told the Commission, “This we meant 
and the people knew that we meant it.” 49 The city’s position 
was supported bv public statements from citizens’ groups in 
Greenville and by the local newspaper.50

The police displayed a similar attitude. Police Chief Wil­
liam C. Burnley, Jr., began a program of orientation and 
training for his officers in which he stressed their duty to 
enforce the law fairly and to prevent incidents of violence. 
The chief told his men that the policy would be, “Arrest no 
person regardless of who they are or what group they belong to 
unless they violated the law.”5' Those who felt they could not 
accept this policy were invited to leave the department. The 
police chief and other officials also took steps to advise them­
selves fully of the membership and activities of the Klan and 
similar organizations.52

47 Testimony of Chief Burnley, T. 299.
48 T. 294.
49 Ibid.
50 T. 284, 289.
51 T. 297.
52 Ibid.



3a

The community was apprised in April 1964 of police de­
termination to prevent violence. When the Ku Klux Klan, in 
a show of strength, burned crosses in communities throughout 
Mississipi, Greenville was the only place where the persons 
responsible for cross-burnings were arrested and prosecuted. 
Later, when civil rights workers arrived in the community, 
there were no incidents of violence against them, nor was a 
single worker arrested by the Greenville police on any charge.53

On August 10, 1964, a white attacked a Negro, and, in a 
separate incident, a Negro attacked a white. Arrest were made 
almost immediately in both cases and identical fines imposed.54 
Following these incidents, Police Chief Burnley issued a 
statement:

The issue with us is not which race assaults the other, 
but rather the idea of professional law enforcement.
We intend to enforce the laws of the state and city 
as written without regard to one’s station in life. This 
is the only way that peace and order can be obtained 
and continued.55

Chief Burnley testified at the hearing that his policy receiv­
ed “tremendous support from the community,” and that with­
out such support he believed his effectiveness would have been 
greatly diminished.56 Two leading members of the white com­
munity, Albert Lake and Leroy Percy, testified that they 
thought that the business and professional community contri­
buted to the quality of law enforcement in the city of Green­
ville. As Mr. Lake commented, “Voluntary groups . . . have

53 T. 298.
54 Ibid.
55 Delta Democrat-Times (Greenville, Miss.), August 12, 1964, p. 4.
56 T. 298.



4 a

basically operated to give support to tbe governing body of tbe 
city and to the police force and to see that law and order was 
maintained.”57 Mr. Percy expressed a similar view:

I think the basic reason for Greenville being the com­
munity that it is, is this: there has been a long history 
of responsible citizens willing to participate in local 
government, not only to involve themselves in voting 
and getting the vote out, but to serve as city council- 
men, as members of the school board and so forth. I 
think that is basic.58 59

In other parts of the State local citizens did not publicly 
express their opposition to violence and their support of im­
partial law enforcement until extensive violence had already 
occurred. In McComb, violence continued for five months 
before local citizens issued the “Statement of Principles”50 In 
Natchez, although a statement wras prepared shortly after a 
series of whippings in February 1964, it was not published 
until October.60 In February 1965 the Mississippi Economic 
Council (the State’s chamber of commerce) issued a statement 
urging compliance with Federal law.61

57 T. 288.
58 Ibid.
59 See pp. 38-41, supra.
60 See pp. 20-21, supra.
61 T. 379. Mr. Brumfield, of McComb, testified that the Mississippi Man­

ufacturers Association, the Mississipp Association of Supervisors, and the Mis­
sissippi Sheriffs Association issued statements similar to the one in McComb. 
T. 49.



5a

C O N C L U S I O N S

In many areas of Mississippi the failure of law enforcement 
officials to curb racial violence is largely attributable to tbe 
racially hostile attitudes of sheriffs, police chiefs, and prosecut­
ing attorneys.

Law enforcement officers openly displayed racial hostility in 
many communities. In addition, failure to make prompt arrests, 
to take a firm stand against violence, and to announce an inten­
tion to punish law violators undoubtedly encouraged vigilantes 
to feel they could operate with impunity.