Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission Motion and Brief Amici Curiae
Public Court Documents
October 1, 1947
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission Motion and Brief Amici Curiae, 1947. 24e39d59-c69a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/928d5845-e129-4eea-933b-a42804879825/takahashi-v-fish-and-game-commission-motion-and-brief-amici-curiae. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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IN THE
dttprme ©Hurt of the Ittitefc States
October Term, 1947
No. 533
TORAO TAKAHASHI,
v.
Petitioner,
FISH AND GAME COMMISSION, LEE F. PAYNE, as
Chairman thereof, W. B. WILLIAMS, HARVEY E.
HASTAIN, and WILLIAM SILVA, as members thereof.
MOTION AND BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE AND THE NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD AS AMICI CURIAE.
T hurgood M arshall,
Counsel for the National Asso
ciation for the Advancement of
Colored People.
M arian W v x x P erry,
Counsel for National Lawyers
Guild.
E dward R. D udley,
Of Counsel.
I N D E X
Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae______ 1
B rief:
Opinion B elow _____________ .1____________________ 3
Statute Involved _________________________________ 3
Questions Presented_____________________________ 4
Statement of the C ase___________________________ 4
Summary of Argument __________________________ 5
Argument :
I Since there is no rational basis for the discrim
ination embodied in the statute, it comes into
fatal conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment 6
II State legislation excluding aliens from the right
to work is an interference with the national
sovereignty __________________________________ 9
A. The legislation here presented is an attempt
to exclude a class of aliens from residing in
the state__________________________________ 9
B. The right to exclude aliens is vested solely in
the Federal Government__________________ 11
III A state law denying to a racial group the right
to engage in a common occupation violates the
obligations of the United States under the
United Nations Charter______________________ 14
Conclusion_____________________________________ — - — 18
PAGE
11
Table of Cases
AUgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578----------- ---—--------- 15
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511-------------------- 13
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 IJ. S. 60— ---------------- --------- 7
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581--- ---------------------- 11
Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160-------------------- --- 13
Estate of Tetsubumi, 188 Cal. 645--------------------------- -~ 10
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337--------- 7
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536---------------------------------- 7
Oyama v. California, 16 Law Week, 4108------------------10,17
Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 36-------------------------- 11
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192— —̂ 15
Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33-----------------------------9,10,12,15
U. S. v. Curtiss Wright, 299 U. S. 304------------------------- 10
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 IJ. S. 356------------------------------ 6
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 IJ. S. 500--------------------- 7
PAGE!
I l l
Authorities Cited.
Aylsworth, “ The Passing of Alien Suffrage” , Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. X X V (1931) 114 _______________________ 11
Corwin, The Constitution and World Government------- 11
Pinal Report, FEPC, June 28, 1946 --------------------------- 16
Hyde, International Law (2d ed.) _____________ _____ 11
Iehihashi, “ Japanese in the United States” __________ 16
Konvitz, The Alien and the Asiatic in American Law___ 11
McGovney, “ Anti-Japanese Land Laws” , 35 Cal. Law
Rev. 7, 5 1 ________________________________________ 10
State Dept. Publications 2274, European Series, “ Mak
ing the Peace Treaties” ______ ._______________1— 15
4 State Dept. Bulletin 347-451 ______________________ 15
16 State Dept. Bulletin 1077, 1080, 1082______________ 15
United Nations Charter, Articles 55 and 56__________ 14
United States Census, 1940, “ Characteristics of the
Non-White Population” _________________________ 6,14
World Peace Foundation, Documents on Foreign Policy,
Vol. I, 1938-39 ___________________________________ 15
PAGE
ITT THE
i>ttprnttr (tort 0! % Itutrfc Itorn
October Term, 1947
No. 533
T orao T ak ah ash i,
Petitioner,
v.
F ish and G am e C omm ission , L ee F .
P ayne , as Chairman thereof, W. B.
W illiam s , H arvey E. H astain , and
W illiam S ilva, as members thereof.
MOTION AND BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT
OF COLORED PEOPLE AND THE NATIONAL
LAWYERS GUILD AS AMICI CURIAE.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICI CURIAE.
To the Honorable the Chief Justice of the United States
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States:
The undersigned, as counsel for and on behalf of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, and the National Lawyers Guild, respectfully move
that this Honorable Court grant them leave to file the ac
company brief as amici curiae.
2
The issue at stake in the above entitled cause is the
power of a state to discriminate on racial grounds among
persons within its jurisdiction in their exercise of the right
to earn a living in a common occupation. The determina
tion of this issue involves an interpretation of the Four
teenth Amendment which will have widespead effect upon
the welfare of all minority groups in the United States.
Consent of the parties for the filing of this brief has
been obtained for the National Lawyers Guild and has been
requested for the NAACP and will be filed as soon as re
ceived.
T hubgood M arshall ,
Counsel for the National Asso
ciation for the Advancement of
Colored People.
M arian W y n n P erry,
Counsel for National Lawyers
Guild.
E dward R . D udley,
Of Counsel.
IN THE
Bnpvmxt CEmtrt of tho Intteft States
October Term, 1947
No. 533
T oeao T a k a h a sh i,
Petitioner,
v.
F ish and Gam e Comm ission , L ee F .
P ayne , as Chairman thereof, W. B.
W illiam s , H arvey E. H astain , and
W illiam S ilva , as members thereof.
BRIEF FOR THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE AND
NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD AS AMICI CURIAE.
Opinion Below.
Statute Involved.
The opinion below and the statute involved are set forth
in full in the record and in the Petition for Certiorari filed
herein.
3
4
Questions Presented,
1. Whether a statute of the State of California
denying to aliens ineligible to citizenship the right to
earn their living by commercial fishing is consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Whether such statute is an interference with
the supremacy of the Federal government in the field
of international law and in conflict with treaty obliga
tions of the United States.
Statement of the Case.
The petitioner herein is a citizen of Japan who, under
the naturalization laws of the Federal government, is
presently ineligible to citizenship. He has resided in Los
Angeles, California, continuously since 1907 with the ex
ception of that period of time when he was excluded from
California under the Military Exclusion laws adopted dur
ing World War II. From 1915 until the Military Exclusion
laws petitioner earned his living by commercial fishing on
the high seas off California, which activity was carried on
pursuant to a license granted by the Fish and Game Com
mission of the State of California (B. 1-6).
In 1945, just prior to the restoration of freedom of
movement to Japanese aliens who had been excluded from
California, the state legislature amended Section 990 of
the Fish and Game Code (California Stats. 1945, Ch. 181)
to prohibit the issuance of a commercial fishing license to
persons ineligible to citizenship or to corporations the
majority of whose stockholders, or any of whose officers,
were ineligible to citizenship. Upon the face of the stat
ute, no other criterion is applied for the issuance of such
licenses.
5
Upon petitioner’s return to California in October, 1945,
he found himself, in the last years of his life, excluded
from employment as a commercial fisherman after almost
thirty years of gainful employment in that field.
The court of original jurisdiction, the Superior Court
of the State of California, in and for the County of Los
Angeles, found that this statutory restriction was unconsti
tutional and granted a writ of mandamus (R. 7). On ap
peal to the Supreme Court of California, the judgment of
the lower court was reversed and the constitutionality of
the statute was upheld (R. 30-45). Three judges dissented
from this holding. The decision of the Supreme Court of
California is now before this Court on writ of certiorari.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT.
I.
Since there is no rational basis for the discrimina
tion embodied in the statute, it comes into fatal conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment.
II.
State legislation excluding aliens from the right to
work is an interference with the national sovereignty.
A. The legislation here presented is an attempt to
exclude a class of aliens from residing in the state.
B. The right to exclude aliens is vested solely in the
Federal Government.
III.
A state law denying to a racial group the right to
engage in a common occupation violates the obliga
tions of the United States under the United Nations
Charter.
6
A R G U M E N T .
I.
Since there is no rational basis for the discrimina
tion embodied in the statute, it comes into fatal conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment.
That this legislation is directed at Japanese aliens is
conclusively proven by the 1940 Census figures which show
33,569 Japanese ineligible to citizenship residing in Cali
fornia and fewer than 900 others in the entire continental
United States.
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment this
Court has been vigilant in assuring that legislative classi
fication of persons resulting in discrimination should bear
a reasonable relationship to the achievement of legitimate
ends of government. In a long line of decisions legislation
has been declared unconstitutional were classification has
been based on race alone.
Considering an ordinance fair on its face, hut in practice
discriminatory against the Chinese, this Court said of the
discrimination:
“ No reason for it is shown and the conclusion
cannot be resisted that no reason for it exists except
hostility to the race and nationality to which peti
tioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is un
justified. ’ ’ 1
Of similar classification Mr. Justice H olmes speaking
for this Court said:
“ States may do a great deal of classifying that
it is difficult to believe rational but there are limits,
1 Yick W o v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 374.
7
and it is . . . clear . . . that color cannot be made the
basis of statutory classification. ’ ’ 2
The' Supreme Court of California justified this legisla
tion as based upon “ the broad powers resting in the state
in regard to the regulation of its fish and game” (R. 38).
In the exercise of that power the court said:
“ Obviously if the legislature determines that
some reduction in the number of persons eligible to
hunt and fish is desirable, it is logical and fair that
aliens ineligible to citizenship shall be the first group
to be denied the privilege of doing so” (R. 38).
Even assuming, arguendo, as the petitioners do not con
cede, that these fish are the “ property” of the state, the
issue remains whether the state may condition the grant
ing of licenses solely upon the race of the applicant, with
out establishing any relationship between the object to be
attained, presumably conservation, and the proscribed
group.
The criticism of this theory put forth as fair and logical
which was made by the dissenting opinion completely ex
poses its lack of logic:
“ I can see no logic in depriving resident aliens,
even though they are not eligible to citizenship, of
the means of making a livelihood, including the pur
suit of commercial fishing. They are lawfully in
habitants and residents of the state. Even if it be
assumed that non residents, both alien and citizens
of the United States, may be excluded from game
and fish on the theory that such resources belong to
the people of the state, the fact remains that resident
aliens are a part of the people—the inhabitants and
2 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 541; See also Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U. S. 60; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S.
337; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U. S. 500.
8
residents of this state. Because some believe that
aliens should be punished by such a penalty is no
basis for a reasonable classification. There is no
sound basis for the argument that because the fish
and game belong to the people of the state, the tak
ing of them may be prohibited to all, and that with
such a broad power any group of people may be ar
bitrarily excluded from the right to take any por
tion thereof. On the basis of that reasoning the
Legislature could validly prohibit persons ineligible
to citizenship from using the highways. They be
long to the state and the traffic hazards would be less
if fewer people were using them. The same is true
of the use of the parks, schools and other public
buildings and places. It could be argued that they
are over-crowded and the more people using them
the greater the cost to the public, all to the diminish-
ment of the resources of the state natural or other
wise. While the state may withhold a privilege if
it elects not to grant it, it cannot arbitrarily prevent
any member of the public from exercising it while
granting such privilege to others. To conclude
otherwise would deprive the equal protection prin
ciple of all meaning” (R. 49).
The complete lack of reasonableness of the legislation
becomes apparent when one looks to the end which is sup
posed to be accomplished. There is no limit fixed on the
number of licenses which may be issued, nor does the state
limit the number of fish to be taken or the period during
which fish may be taken. No limits of the size of nets or
the equipment used in commercial fishing are established.
The licenses are not limited to residents of the state, but
persons from throughout the entire country may flock to
California, to get licenses and fish without restriction in the
coastal waters. For every 100 aliens ineligible to citizen
ship who are denied commercial fishing licenses, 500 new
licensees may come in from every other state or country,
9
urged on by the thought of a profitable field of endeavor
from which skilled workers are now barred by statute. No
conservation is achieved.
There being no reasonable relation between the objec
tives claimed as justification for this statute and the means
sought to achieve it, no doubt can be entertained that this
legislation like the statute in Truax v. Raich8 is discrimina
tion against a group of unpopular aliens, as such, in compe
tition with citizens. As such it comes into fatal conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment and must fail.
II.
State legislation excluding aliens from the right to
work is an interference with the national sovereignty.
The present complicated state of international relations
demonstrates the wisdom of the concept that all power in
the field of international law, which includes within its
scope immigration as well as the power to confer citizen
ship, must rest wholly in the Federal government. The
legislation presented to this Court is an unwarranted and
dangerous interference with that power.
A. The legislation here presented is an attempt to
exclude a class of aliens from residing in the state.
The amendment to the Fish and Game Code prohibiting
aliens ineligible to citizenship from engaging- in the com
mon occupation of commercial fishing was enacted in 1945
in the midst of an anti-Japanese hysteria on the west coast
which exhibited itself in acts of violence which were ex
tended even to honorably discharged veterans who had
fought in the American army against the Japanese govern- 3
3 239 U. S. 33.
1 0
ment. While on its face this statute makes no mention of
race, the dissenting opinion in the court below, viewing the
historical background of this legislation and of court de
cisions on anti-alien legislation in California, found that
the law in the instant case is aimed solely at the Japanese
(R. 53). See also D. 0. McGovney, “ Anti-Japanese Land
Laws” , 35 Cal. Law Review 7, 51. The concurring opin
ions of Mr. Justice M u r p h y and Mr. Justice B rack in
Oyama v. California* rest in large part upon the fact that
legislation against land ownership by aliens ineligible to
citizenship in our western states has been “ designed to
effectuate a purely racial discrimination” . . . “ is rooted
deeply in racial, economic, and social antagonism” . . .
and is the result of “ racial hatred and intolerance.” Like
the Alien Land Law, the California law here under review
is designed to “ discourage the coming of Japanese into
this State.” 4 5 6
That the power to exclude aliens from the right to earn
their living was also the power to exclude them from en
trance and abode was recognized by this Court in Truax
v. Raich, where it was stated:
“ The assertion of an authority to deny to aliens
the opportunity of earning a livelihood when law
fully admitted to the state would be tantamount to
the assertion of the right to deny them entrance and
abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where
they cannot work. . . . ” e
When this fundamental purpose of the law is recognized,
it becomes clear that the statute is an interference with the
sovereignty of the Federal government in the field of immi
gration, naturalization, and international law.
4 16 Law Week 4108,-------U. S . --------.
5 Estate of Tetsubumi Yano, 188 Cal. 645.
6 239 U. S. 33, 42.
1 1
B. The right to exclude aliens is vested solely in the
Federal Government.
The Chinese Exclusion Case7 established and United-
States v. Curtiss W right8 reaffirmed that the investment
of the Federal government with the powers of “ external
sovereignty” in the field of international affairs was “ a
necessary concomitant of nationality.” Indeed, in “ The
Constitution and World Organization” , Professor Corwin
has concluded from these cases that in the field of inter
national relations the Federal government does not operate
under constitutional restraints.9 As late as 1945, the law
of nations was not viewed as placing any restriction upon
the discriminations which a sovereign might practice in
establishing tests of undesirability for aliens seeking ad
mission.10 Thus, the Federal government, and it alone,
can admit or exclude aliens, without restriction or limita
tion under the law today.
Despite the confused state of the law as to citizenship
prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,11 today
the power to grant or withhold citizenship in our nation is
also vested in the Federal government. However, the states
continued to vest aliens within their respective boundaries
with certain privileges of state citizenship, and it has been
said that it was not until 1928 that an election was held in
which no alien voted.12 Their power to do so is not chal
lenged.
7 130 U. S. 581.
8 299 U. S. 304.
9 Pp. 6, 19, 29-30. See also M. R. Konvitz, The Alien and the
Asiatic in American Law, Chapter 1.
10 C. C. Hyde, International Law (2d Ed.) I, 217.
11 See the opinion of this Court in Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S.
36, where it is stated, at page 73, that prior to 1866: “ It had been
said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the United States
except as he was a citizen of one of the states composing the Union.”
12 Aylsworth, “ The Passing of Alien Suffrage” , Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
X X V (1931) 114.
1 2
But a far different problem is presented when, after the
admission of an alien by the Federal government, the state
seeks, as here, to place additional and unreasonable burdens
upon him. Though the Federal government may be un
restrained by constitutional protections of private rights in
determining whether to admit or exclude an alien, once
admitted, even though denied national citizenship by Con
gressional action, the alien is a person clothed with those
constitutional guarantees of life, liberty and property and
the protection of equal laws which form the basis of a de
mocracy. The states inherit no such unrestricted power in
relation to a resident alien as is possessed by the Federal
government in regard to an alien seeking entry.
But another and equally serious restriction on the power
of states to harry, persecute and, if possible, drive from
their border aliens legally admitted to the country, arises
from the fact that though we are a federation of sovereign
states, the component parts may not isolate themselves and
restrict the freedom of persons to establish residence or
travel freely in the states.
Such was the reasoning which led this Court to hold
unconstitutional an Arizona law restricting the right of
aliens to work in common occupations, thereby excluding;
them from residence. In Truax v. Raich, this Court found
that the attempt to exclude aliens from residence in certain
states by state action would be derogatory of the power of
Congress under which those aliens had been lawfully ad
mitted to the country. In that decision, this Court spoke
of the right of aliens, without the interference of the states,
to enjoy “ in their full scope the privileges conferred by
admission.”
13
In the words o f Mr. Justice Cardoza, our Constitution
was “ formed upon the theory that the peoples of the several
states must sink or swim together and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.” 13
Attempts by the states to isolate themselves from the
economic disasters of other sections of the country by limit
ing the right of citizens to travel freely within the country
have been struck down by this Court as subversive of the
welfare of the nation on much the same basis, though re
liance was placed on the commerce clause in so doing.14
Political and ecomonic reality in a world of shrinking
dimensions give added emphasis to the legal requirement
that the states of our nation must form a unit for the pur
pose of determining the right to live within the states, which
is, of course, contingent upon the right to earn a living
within the states.
The ultimate result of laws such as that here challenged,
if valid, would be to vest in the Federal government the
right to make only an empty legal determination of the right
of an alien to enter the United States while granting to the
forty-eight states the power, by forty-eight individual laws,
to exclude such persons from the United States. Viewed in
that light, the interference with an inherent and necessary
power of Federal sovereignty is clear and for that reason
alone, this law is invalid.
13 Baldwin v. G. A . F. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 523.
14 Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160.
14
III.
A state law denying to a racial group the right to
engage in a common occupation violates the obliga
tions of the United States under the United Nations
Charter.
While the statute on its face purports to have a certain
impartiality by describing the proscribed group as “ persons
ineligible to citizenship, ’ ’ the 1940 Census Eeport18 19 shows
only 48,158 aliens ineligible to citizenship in the country,
of which 33,569 were Japanese aliens residing in California.
By the same census only 853 aliens ineligible to citizenship,
other than Japanese, resided in the entire United States.
These figures conclusively establish that the legislation be
fore this Court is aimed at one racial or national group
and one alone—the Japanese.
Whatever the protections furnished in the Federal Con
stitution against state legislation unreasonably discriminat
ing on racial or natonal grounds, it is clear today that the
Federal government has pledged itself, with the other mem
bers of the United Nations, to fulfill in good faith an obliga
tion to promote “ universal respect for and observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 16
The United Nations Charter, as a treaty duly executed
by the President and ratified by the Senate 17 is declared
to be the supreme law of the land by Article VI, Section 2
of the Constitution and any laws of any state to the con
trary must fall before this non-discriminatory provision
of a treaty obligation.
18 U. S. Census, 1940, “ Characteristics o f the Non-White Popula
tion,” p. 2.
19 United Nations Charter, Articles 55 and 56.
17 51 Stat. 1031.
15
There can be no doubt that the right to work is one of
the fundamental freedoms to which the United Nations
Charter refers. It has been so declared by numerous de
cisions of this Court. As was stated by this Court in
Truax v. Raich, supra,
“ It requires no argument to show that the right
to work for a living in the common occupations of
the community is the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose
of the (14th) Amendment to secure.”
This principle has been reiterated under many different
circumstances, and the right to work has been protected
against action only indirectly that of the government.18
While the interest of nations in foreign affairs was
originally confined to the treatment of their own nation
als in other countries, the scope of international negoti
ations has been constantly broadening. At the close of the
First World War treaties signed between many nations
provided for the protection of civil rights of national
minorities in no way related to the parties signatory. More
recently our government included such provisions in
treaties of peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Eou-
mania.19 That Japan is not yet a member of the United
18 See Allgeyer v. State of Louisiana, 165 U. S. 589; Steele v. Loui
siana & Nashville R. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192.
19 “ Making the Peace Treaties,” Dept, of State Publications, 2274,
European Series; 16 State Dept. Bulletin 1077, 1080, 1082. See also
Resolution No. 51 of the International American Conference on Prob
lems of W ar and Peace, Mexico City, 1945; Department of State
Bulletin No. 4, March 18, 1945, pp. 347-451. See also the Resolution
adopted by the Eighth International Conference of American States
at Lima, Peru, in 1938, reading in part as follows: “ That the demo
cratic conceptions of the state guarantees to all individuals the condi
tions essential for carrying on their legitimate activities with self-
respect.” Document on Foreign Policy, Vol. I, 1938-1939, World
Peace Foundation, p. 49.
16
Nations in no way diminishes the obligation of this country
to treat Japanese aliens resident here fairly and in a non-
discriminatory manner. Our failure to do so has serious
implications for world peace.
The passage of such laws as have existed in this coun
try discriminating against the Japanese, including the
congressional action depriving them of the possibility of
becoming American citizens and their exclusion under the
Quota Act, does not pass unnoticed in other nations. Even
in 1924 when means of communication were much less de
veloped, word of the Japanese Exclusion Act caused anti-
American demonstrations and denunciations of our coun
try in Japan.20 Today the Japanese press and the press
of all nations follow more closely than in 1924 the practices
with which we implement our protestations of democratic
principles. As was stated by Mr. Dean Acheson on May
8, 1946, when he was Acting Secretary of State: 21
“ the existence of discrimination against minority
groups in this country has an adverse effect upon
our relations with other countries. We are reminded
over and over by some foreign newspapers and
spokesmen, that our treatment of various minorities
leaves much to be desired. While sometimes these
pronouncements are exaggerated and unjustified,
they all too frequently point with accuracy to some
form of discrimination because of race, creed, color,
or national origin. Frequently we find it next to im
possible to formulate a satisfactory answer to our
critics in other countries; the gap between the things
we stand for in principle and the facts of a particular
situation may be too wide to be bridged. An atmos
phere of suspicion and resentment in a country over
20 Y. Ichihashi, Japanese in the United States (Stanford University
1932, p. 315).
21 Final Report, FEPC, June 28, 1946, p. 6.
17
the way a minority is being treated in the United
States is a formidable obstacle to the development
of mutual understanding and trust between the two
countries. We will have better international relations
when these reasons for suspicion and resentment
have been removed.”
As stated b y Mr. Justice B lack in his concurring opinion
in Oyama v. California, supra:
“ How can this nation be faithful to this inter
national pledge if state laws which bar land owner
ship and occupancy by aliens on account of race are
permitted to be enforced!”
Within the framework of a federal form of government
there may be many fields in which the United Nations Char
ter will require specific enabling legislation before it be
comes an effective obligation upon the people of the United
States. Yet certain aspects of the Charter are by force of
American law sufficiently clear to constitute the supreme
law of the land as a self-executing obligation and thus to
supersede state laws which violate them.
That the law here presented for review must fall before
the supremacy of a treaty obligation of the United States
was recognized by the concurring opinion in the Oyama ease.
Indeed, Mr. Justice M u r p h y said of the Alien Land Law
that it
“ does violence to the high ideals of the Constitution
of the United States and the Charter of the United
Nations . . . Human liberty is in too great a peril
today to warrant ignoring that principle in this case.
For that reason I believe that the penalty of un
constitutionality should be imposed upon the Alien
Land Law.”
1 8
Conclusion.
I f at other times in our history there were moral grounds
for the protection of unpopular minorities, there are today
compelling practical reasons for the revitalizing of the
practices of democracy within our borders. The statute
here challenged not only vitiates constitutional guarantees
of personal freedom, but weakens our nation in a field in
which the Federal government is supreme. For these rea
sons it is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
Supreme Court of California be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
T hubgood Ma r sh a ll ,
Counsel for the National Asso
ciation for the Advancement of
Colored People.
M arian W y n n P erry,
Counsel for National Lawyers
Guild.
E dward R. D udley,
Of Counsel.
[6558]12
L awyers Press, I nc., 165 William St., N. Y . C. 7 ; ’Phone: BEekman 3-2300