Montero v. Meyer Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amici Curiae

    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 88-2469 and 88-2470

RITA MONTERO, et al..
Plaintiffs-Appellees

x

v. :
NATALIE MEYER, et al.. i

Defendants-Appellants. :
x

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICI CURIAE 
AND BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL 
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. and THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION _____________ OF COLORADO. INC.____________

JULIUS L. CHAMBERS 
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON SHERRILYN A. IFILL
NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900

DAVID H. MILLER
American Civil Liberties

Union Foundation of Colorado Inc.
815 E. 22nd Avenue 
Denver, Colorado 80205 
(303) 861-2258

PAMELA S. KARLAN
University of Virginia School of Law 
Charlottesville, Va. 22901 (804) 924-7810

Counsel for Amici Curiae



TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Table of Authorities..................................... ii
Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae ...........  1
Brief Amici Curiae ....................................... 1
Introduction ............................................. 1
Summary of Argument ..................................... 3
Argument .................................................  4
I. The Voting Rights Act Covers Referenda as Wellas the Election of Public Officials ................  4
II. The Voting Rights Act Protects the Ability of 

Minority Voters to Participate in Every CriticalStage of the Electoral P r o c e s s ....................  8
Conclusion...............................................  12
Certificate of Service ................................... 13

i



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Pages
Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) . . .  5, 7
Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988).......... 2
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) ........  4
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973) ............  8
Haith v. Martin, 618 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.C. 1985)

(three-judge court), aff'd. 477 U.S. 901 (1986)   6
Lucas v. Townsend, 108 S.Ct. 1763 (1988)................... 7
NAACP V. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)...................... 1
NAACP v. Hampton County, 470 U.S. 166 (1985).............. 2
NAACP, DeKalb County Chapter v. Georgia, 494 F. Supp.

668 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (three-judge court)................. 10
Nixon v. Condon 286 U.S. 73 (1932) .........................  11
Pendleton v. Heard, 824 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1987).......... io
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).................... ..
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ..................  9, 11
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ...................... 2,8
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)....................  1, 9
Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309 (1974).................. 11
United States v. McAlveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D.La.

196°)/ aff'd sub nom. United States v. Thomas,362 U.S. 68 (1960) ...............................
United States v. Sheffield Board of Commissioners,435 U.S. 110 (1978) ..................................... ......  9

Woods v. Hamilton, 473 F. Supp. 641 (D.S.C. 1979)(three-judge court) ......................................
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).................... .
Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823(9th Cir. 1986) ..........................................

ii



Statutes p^Q0g
42 U.S.C. § 1971(e) ........................................
42 U.S.C. § 1973 et s e a . ...................................lr3
42 U.S.C. § 19731 (c) (1) ...................................7
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la......................................

Other Materials
28 C.F.R. § 51.17(a) (1987) ............................... 8
28 C.F.R. § 55.19(a)........................................
28 U.S.C. § 51.19(a) (1987) ...............................
H.R. 6400, § 11(c), 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) ........  5
H.R. Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).......... 9
H.R. Rep. No. 97-227 (1982).............................. 4
Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary 

Conun. on H.R. 6400 and Other Proposals To Enforce 
the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)............ 4, 5

S. Rep. No. 94-295 (1975).................................2, 11
S. Rep. No. 97-417 (1982) . ’.............................. 4

iii



IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 88-2469 and 88-2470

RITA MONTERO, et al..
Plaintiffs-Appellees

x

v. :
NATALIE MEYER, et al.. i

Defendants-Appellants. :
x

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF THE NAACP LEGAL 

DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. and 
THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION 

OF COLORADO, INC.
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. ("LDF"), 

is a non-profit corporation that was established to assist black 
citizens in securing their constitutional and civil rights. The 
Supreme Court has noted LDF's "reputation for expertness in 
presenting and arguing the difficult questions of law that 
frequently arise in civil rights litigation." NAACP v. Button. 
371 U.S. 415, 422 (1963).

Attorneys affiliated with LDF have litigated many 
significant cases concerning the constitutional and statutory 
rights of black individuals to register, to vote, and to 
participate in the political process. LDF represented the 
prevailing plaintiffs in Thornburg v. Ginales. 478 U.S. 30 
(1986), the first Supreme Court decision to interpret amended 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. LDF has been particularly



involved in cases regarding the scope of the Voting Rights Act, 
see, e.q., NAACP v. Hampton County. 470 U.S. 166 (1985) (changes 
in election dates are covered under section 5 of the Act); Chisom 
v. Edwards. 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988) (judicial elections are 
covered under section 2 of the Act), and cases involving the 
interaction between private and state activity, see, e.q.. Terry
Y - i_Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (private white primaries prohibited
by fifteenth amendment). Because of LDF's long standing 
involvement and experience with voting rights cases, we believe 
our views will be of assistance to the Court in resolving the 
important issues presented by this case.

The American Civil Liberties Union is a nationwide non­
partisan organization of more than 250,000 members dedicated to 
protecting and preserving civil rights and civil liberties 
guaranteed by law. The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 
of Colorado, Inc., ("Colorado ACLU") is a state affiliate of the 
American Civil Liberties Union with over 3,500 members.

Since its creation over 60 years ago, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, along with its affiliates, has worked to promote 

insure the constitutional and statutory operation of state 
and federal electoral systems. In that effort the American Civil 
Liberties Union both nationally and locally has participated in 
many of the nation's leading Voting Rights Act and 
constitutionally based election cases. For example, in the last 
10 years, the ACLU has been in front of the United States Supreme

2



Court on numerous occasions successfully arguing its clients'
rights under the Voting Rights Act. See, e.g.. McCain v.
Lybrand. 465 U.S. 236 (1984); Rogers v. Lodge. 458 U.S. 613 
(1982); Berry v. Doles. 438 U.S. 190 (1978).

In addition to many other cases in federal appellate and 
trial courts, the Colorado ACLU has evidenced a strong commitment 
to protect the electoral rights of the citizens of Colorado. In 
case after case before this court, the Colorado ACLU has pressed 
the rights of those seeking to participate in the electoral
process. See. e.g. . Meyer v. Grant. ____ U.S. ___ , 108 S. Ct.
1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988); Thornir v. Mever. 803 F.2d 1093
(10th Cir. 1986); Baer v. Mever. 728 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1984).

The case before the court raises fundamental issues under 
the Voting Rights Act which have never been addressed in this 
circuit and which sign-if icantly impact the rights of the 
thousands of members of the Colorado ACLU and in fact all voters 
in the state. Accordingly, the Colorado ACLU wishes to be 
allowed to assist this court in its resolution of the matter.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons we move the Court for 
leave to file the attached brief amicus curiae.

CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON SHERRILYN A. IFILL
99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor 
New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900

3



PAMELA S. KARLAN
University of Virginia 
School of Law 
Charlottesville, VA 22901

Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
NAACP Legal Defense and

Educational Fund, Inc.

4



IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 88-2469 and 88-2470

RITA MONTERO, et al..
Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

x

NATALIE MEYER, et al. . :
Defendants-Appellants. :

x

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE 
Introduction

In 1975, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1973 et__seq. to reguire that states and political
subdivisions with a significant number of non-English speakers 
provide "registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, 
assistance, fandl other materials dr information relating to the 
electoral— process" in the language used by those speakers. 4 2 
U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (emphasis added). Pursuant to the triggering 
mechanism provided by the Act, several counties in Colorado are 
subject to the special bilingual provisions.

The legislative history accompanying the 1975 amendments 
made clear Congress' belief that a bilingual electoral process 
was critical to the ability of language minorities to protect 
themselves from continued exclusion from voting, education, 
housing, access to the judicial system, and employment. see,

1



e.g. , S. Rep. No. 94-295, pp. 29-30 (1975). Thus, the 1975 
amendments reaffirmed the Supreme Court's century-old 
characterization of the right to vote as "preservative of all 
rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).

This case involves an electoral choice which powerfully 
illustrates the relationship between voting and the preservation 
of other rights. Pursuant to the detailed provisions of Colorado 
law, the defendants in this case prepared a proposed initiate 
amendment to the state constitution which would make English the 
°fficial state language. Such an amendment, if enacted, would 
mark a powerful symbolic exclusion of non-English speakers from 
the official life of the state. Moreover, it could have 
important practical consequences for non-English speakers as well 
if it resulted in the provision of government services only in 
English. Cf. Reitman v. Mulkev. .387 U.S. 369 (1967) (state 
constitutional amendment passed by initiative invalidated under 
fourteenth amendment because it placed state's imprimatur on 
encouragement of private discrimination). The ability of the 
Hispanic community to mobilize itself to respond to this proposed 
amendment, as well as its ability to communicate its concerns 
effectively to the non-Hispanic majority is obviously critical.

It is hardly surprising that a movement designed to begin 
the process of minimizing the role of Spanish in Colorado itself 
used only English. The decision of the state to sanction this 
behavior, by issuing notice of the state-required hearing only in 
English and by approving the use of petition forms using only

2



English, denied the Hispanic community information, in a form 
reasonably calculated to give it notice, of the potential 
emergence of this issue, until after the ballot access process 
had been completed. Moreover, the entire episode had a further 
invidious twist: the appearance of English-only materials subtly 
suggested the propriety of such monolinguism in the political 
process— and by extension in public life generally. Had 
potential voters been confronted with a bilingual petition, they 
might well have reflected on the wisdom of an amendment that 
might prevent such inclusion of Hispanic voters in the future. 
Thus, bilingual petition materials might well have resulted in a 
mobilization of both Spanish- and English-speaking voters before 
the initiative was placed on the ballot, thereby forestalling at 
the outset the adoption of an amendment that might impair the 
ability of non-English speaking persons to•participate fully in 
public life in Colorado.

Summary of Argument

In passing the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973
et seq., Congress intended to prohibit racial discrimination with 
regard to any election in which registered voters could 
participate. Moreover, it recognized the interaction between 
state election rules and the activities of private parties, and 
intended to prevent states from giving effect in their election 
systems to racially discriminatory actions of private parties.

In light of Congress' broad purposes, elections at which
3



voters decide issues of public policy directly through referenda 
are covered by the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, petitions to get 
items on the ballot and other private activity can play a central 
role in the political process and thus the Act protects the 
ability of minority group members to participate effectively in 
pre-general election activity.

Argument

I. The Voting Rights Act Covers Referenda as Well as theElection of Public Officials

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was intended "to counter the 
perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive voting discrimination," 
City of Rome v. United States. 446 U.S. 156, 182 (1980), and to
"create a set of mechanisms for dealing with continued voting 
discrimination, not step by step, but comprehensively and 
finally," S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 5 (1982) ["Senate Report"].
Congress hoped that once the right to vote was secured,' "many 
forms of discriminaion fsic] which now exist will dissipate and 
ultimately disappear." Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the 
House Judiciary Comm, on H.R. 6400 and Other Proposals To Enforce 
the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 456 (1965) (statement of Rep. Jonathan
Bingham) [hereafter House Hearings] ; see also H.R. Rep. No. 97- 
227, p. 14 (1982) (discussing the "observable consequence[s]" to 
minority citizens of exclusion from government). In short, the 
Voting Rights Act was intended to give minority citizens the

4



right to protect a range of interests by participating 
effectively in the political process.

The legislative history and language of the Act show that it 
was intended to protect the ability of minorities to vote in 
elections involving referenda. The Act originated as H.R. 6400, 
a bill drafted by the Johnson Administration and considered 
during extensive hearings before the House Judiciary Committee. 
The Supreme Court has given Attorney General Katzenbach's 
testimony concerning the scope of the Act great weight "in light 
of the extensive role [he] played in drafting the statute and 
explaining its operation to Congress." United States v, Sheffield 
Board of Commissioners. 435 U.S. 110, 131 & n. 20 (1978); see
Allen v. State Board of Elections. 393 U.S. 544, 566-69 (1969);
Senate Report at 17 & n. 51.

H.R. 6400 adopted by reference a definition of "voting" that 
Uu^rariteed the right to cast an effective ballot "with respect to 
. . . propositions for which votes are received in an election,"
see H.R. 6400, § 11(c), reprinted in House Hearings at 865
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1971(e)). In response to questions from 
Members of Congress, the Attorney General made clear that
"Te1very election_in which registered electors are permitted to
vote would be covered" by the Act, House Hearings at 21 (emphasis 
added), whether it involved the selection of public officials or 
a referendum on public policy.1 As one court has noted, "the Act

1*’or example Rep. Kastenmeier noted that one alternative bill had defined "election" to include

5



applies to all voting without any limitation as to who, or what, 
is the object of the vote." Haith v. Martin. 618 F. Supp. 410

"any general, special, primary election held in any 
State or political subdivision thereof solely or 
partially for the purpose of electing or selecting a 
candidate to public office, and any election held in 
any State or political subdivision thereof solely or 
partially to decide a proposition or issue of public law. "

The following exchange then occurred:
"Mr. KASTENMEIER. First, I am wondering if you would accept that definition.
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes.
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Secondly, I am wondering if you 

feel it might aid to put a definition of that sort in 
the administration bill or whether it is unnecessary.

Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't think it is necessary. Congressman, but I cannot think of anv objection that I 
would have to using that definition or something very similar to it."

House Hearings at 67 (emphasis added). Katzenbach had a similar colloquy with Rep. Gilbert:
"Mr*. GILBERT. ... You refer in section 3 of the bill [which dealt with tests and devices] to Federal,

State and local elections. Now, would that include election for a bond issue?
Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes.
Mr. GILBERT. Now, my bill, H.R. 4427. I have a 

definition. I spell out the word 'election7 on page 5 subdivision (b). I say:
"Election" means all elections, including 
those for Federal, State, or local office and 
including primary elections or any other 
voting process at which candidates- or 
officials are chosen. "Election" shall also 
include any election at which a proposition or issue is to be decided.
Now, I have no pride of authorship but don't you 

think we should define in H.R. 6400 [the 
Administration's bill] the term 'election'?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I would certainly have no objection to it and I think it should be broadly defined.
House Hearings at 121 (emphasis added).

6



(E.D.N.C. 1985) (three-judge court) (emphasis omitted), aff'd.
477 U.S. 901 (1986).

The definitional provision of the Act, section 14(c)(1),
further shows the Act's broad coverage:

The terms "vote" or "voting" shall include all action 
necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, 
special, or general election, including, but not 
limited to, registration, listing pursuant to this
subchapter, or other action prerequisite to voting, 
casting a ballot, and having such ballot counted 
properly and included in the appropriate totals of 
votes cast with respect to candidates for public or 
party office and propositions for which votes arereceived in an election.

42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, Congress
intended for minority voters to have the same ability to 
participate effectively in referendum elections that they had to 
participate in elections for the selection of representatives.

In light of this language and Congress' "intention to give 
the Act the broadest possible scope," Allen. 393 U.S. at 566-67, 
courts have repeatedly applied the Act to elections involving 
voter approval of propositions. Most recently, in Lucas v.
Townsend, 108 S.Ct. 1763 (Kennedy, Circuit Justice 1988), Justice 
Kennedy enjoined an upcoming bond referendum in Bibb County, 
Georgia, because the county had not complied with the 
preclearance requirement of section 5 before changing the date of 
the referendum. See also, e.g.. Woods v. Hamilton. 473 F. Supp. 
641, 644-45 (D.S.C. 1979) (three-judge court) (statute
authorizing localities to conduct referenda concerning the form 
of local governments was subject to preclearance). Similarly, 
the Attorney General's regulations, to which the Supreme Court

7



has given substantial deference, see, e.q.. Georgia v. United
States, 411 U.S. 526, 536-42 (1973), require preclearance of
changes connected to referenda and special elections, 28 C.F.R. § 
51.17(a) (1987), and provide that jurisdictions covered by the
language minority provisions provide "informational materials" 
and "petitions" in such languages, id. § 55.19(a).

Since referenda are covered by the Voting Rights Act, 
minority voters must enjoy the same "opportunity [as] other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process," Voting Rights Act § 2(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). In this 
case, the failure to provide either notice of upcoming hearings 
or petitions in Spanish excluded Spanish-speaking voters from a 
significant part of the process, the activity preceding 
certification of the initiative and its placement on the general 
election ballot.

II. The Voting Rights Act Protects the Ability of Minority
Voters To Participate in Every Critical Stage of theElectoral Process

At least since Terry v. Adams. 345 U.S. 461 (1953), which
struck down racially exclusive pre-primaries conducted by private 
clubs, courts have recognized that practices that exclude 
minority voters from a critical "stage of the local political 
process," id̂ _ at 484 (Clark, J., joined by Vinson, C.J., Reed & 
Jackson, JJ. , concurring), abridge the right to vote guaranteed 
by the Fifteenth Amendment. In this case, the right to vote 
protected by the Voting Rights Act was impaired because

8



minorities were effectively shut out of an integral, state- 
sanctioned and state-regulated part of the process during which 
the choices available in the actual election were shaped and 
developed.

The legislative history of the 1965 Act expressed a clear 
concern with the ability of private parties to exploit state 
election procedures to deny minority voters an ability * to 
Par"ticipate effectively in the political process. See H.R. Rep.
No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., p. ___ (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S. Cong. Code & Ad. News 2437, 2441.2 After the 1982
amendments, the disparate impact of the interaction of private 
and governmental action need no longer be ascribed to an 
invidious motivation.3 In-light of amended section 2's focus on 
"indigenous political reality," Thornburg v. Ginales. 478 U.S. at

The House Report noted that "even where some registration has been achieved, Negro voters have sometimes been 
discriminatorily purged from the rolls." Id. In support of this 
proposition it cited United States v. McAlveen. 180 F. Supp. 10 
(E.D.La. 1960), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Thomasr 362 U.S. 
68 (1960), which involved a wholesale challenge, by members of
the Citizens Council of Washington Parish, La., a segregationist 
group, to the qualification of black voters in the Parish. The 
McAlveen court invalidated the challenges, holding that the 
actions of the individual, private defendants were taken under 
color of state law because they "formed the basis of the removal 

_ citizens  ̂from the registration rolls by the defendant 
Registrar acting in his official capacity," 180 F. Supp. at 13, citing Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

The 1982 amendments of the Voting Rights Act were intended, among other things, to prohibit practices which, "in 
the context of the total circumstances of the local electoral 
process, ha[ve] the result of denying a racial or language 
minority an equal chance to participate in the electoral process" 
regardless of whether they are designed or maintained for 
discriminatory reasons. Senate Report at 16; see Thornburg v Gingles. 478 U.S. at 35.

9



79 and its emphatic rejection of a requirement that courts 
scrutinize the racial animus of private participants in the 
political system, see id. at 70-73 (opinion of Brennan, J.), the 
question must now be whether organized private political activity 
that excludes a protected class from a critical stage of the 
electoral process has denied that protected class an equal 
opportunity to participate.

In a variety of contexts, courts have recognized the 
importance of giving full effect to minority participation in 
pre-election activities. For example, NAACP. DeKalb Countv
Chapter v._Georgia. 494 F. Supp. 668, 677-78 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(three-judge court), held that a decision by a county board of 
registrars not to continue permitting private organizations to 
conduct voter registration drives constituted a change in an 
integral part of the voting process of DeKalb County and thus 
required preclearance. The decision in Pendleton v. Heard. 824 
F* 2d 448 (5th Cir. 1987), is particularly illuminating. There, 
local officials decided to withdraw a bond issue rather than go 
forward with a referendum brought about by a successful petition 
drive conducted in large part in the black community. The Court 
of Appeals found this refusal to conduct a petition—initiated 
election to be a potentially discriminatory change in voting 
requiring section 5 preclearance. Id. at 451.

The legislative history of the 1975 amendments also shows a 
concern with the ability of Hispanic citizens to participate 
effectively in pre-Election Day activity. In explaining the

10



scope of the requirement that "bilingual election materials" be 
provided to non-English-speaking voters, Congress relied on the 
observation in Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), that "[i]t is simply fundamental that voting instructions 
and ballots, in addition to any other material which forms part 
of the official communication to registered voters prior to an 
election, must be in Spanish as well as English, if the vote of 
Spanish-speaking citizens is not to be seriously impaired." id. 
at 312, quoted in S. Rep. No. 94-295, p. 33 (1975). Accordingly, 
the Torres court required the defendant there— the New York City 
Board of Elections— to disseminate information through the non- 
English media in order fully to include language minorities in 
the political process. Similarly, the Attorney General's 
regulations clearly contemplate the provision of bilingual 
information regarding pre-election activities, expressly included 
"petitions." 28 C.F.R. § 55.19(a).

The fact that this case involves petitions actually 
circulated by private citizens cannot immunize it from scrutiny 
under the Voting Rights Act. The private groups involved here 
used a state-created process and received state approval to 
circulate the monolingual petitions. Thus, like the private
actors in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (finding state
action in statutory authorization for executive committees of 

parties to define parties' memberships to exclude 
blacks) and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (finding state 
action in use of courts to enforce racially restrictive

11



covenants), the private actors here are imbued with state 
authority. Cf. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles. 780 F.2d 823, 
833 (9th Cir. 1986).

Conclusion

The language, legislative history, and judicial 
interpretations of the Voting Rights Act clearly show that 
Congress intended for minority voters to be guaranteed an equal 
opportunity to participate in the political process, broadly 
defined. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the judgment of 
the district court that the failure to comport with the bilingual 
election materials requirements of the Voting Rights Act must 
prohibit Colorado from conducting the upcoming referendum.

October _____, 1988

Respectfully submitted

rULIUS L. CHAMBERS 
CHARLES STEPHEN RALSTON SHERRILYN A. IFILL

99 Hudson Street, 16th Floor New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900
DAVID H. MILLER
American Civil Liberties 

Union Foundadation 
of Colorado, Inc.815 E. 22nd Avenue 

Denver, Colorado 80205 (303) 861-2258
PAMELA S. KARLAN
University of Virginia School of Law 
Charlottesville, Va. 22901 (804) 924-7810

Counsel for Amici Curiae
12



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Amicus Curiae 

Brief was served this 6th day of October, 1988 by depositing the
same in the United States Mail, 
addressed to the following:

Kenneth A. Padilla, Esq. 
1753 Lafayette Street Denver, CO 80218
Henry J. Feldman, Esq. 
899 Logan Street, Suite 
Denver, CO 80203
Shannon Robinson, Esq. 
1441 Eighteenth Street Second Floor 
Denver, CO 80202

first class mail, post paid

Barry D. Roseman, Esq. 
1634 Emerson Street 
Denver, CO 80218
James Kreutz, Esq.

03 5655 S. Yosemite #200
Denver, CO 80128
Cathryn A. Baird, Esq. 
1560 Broadway #200 
Denver. CO 80202rJUk<;-

-J

v