Villanueva v. Wellesley College Brief of Defendant-Appellee
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December 7, 1990

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Mills v. Maryland Affidavit of Ralph Mills, 1987. a89102d0-bd9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/d7f081be-d706-4491-b72d-bf4718e08675/mills-v-maryland-affidavit-of-ralph-mills. Accessed July 12, 2025.
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The Petitioner’s affidavit in support of this Petition is attached hereto. George 'E. Burns, Jr. Assistant Public Defender Appellate Division Second Floor 312 North Eutaw Street Baltimore, Maryland 21201 (301) 333-4842 Counsel for Petitioner 2 Misc. No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1987 RALPH MILLS, Petitioner v . STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondent ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROCEED ON APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS I, Ralph Mills, being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am the Petitioner, in the above-entitled case. In support of my motion to proceed on appeal without being required to prepay fees, costs or give security therefor, I swear that the following facts are true. 1. I am presently indigent and cannot pay the costs of prosecuting this appeal. ■ 2. I have qualified for representation by the Public Defender of the State of Maryland, and remain qualified as a result of my indigency. 3. I am now and have been incarcerated for the past several years, and as a consequence I have not been in a position to obtain the funds necessary to prosecute an appeal. I understand that a false statement or answer to my questions in this affidavit will subject me to penalties for perjury. qX oX lJ . )ARalph/ Mills Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public this day of ■_______ , 1987. 'CJ' & A.NOTARY PUBLIC^ My Commission Expires 7 - Let the applicant proceed without prepayment of costs or fees or the necessity of giving security therefor. JUSTICE Misc. No IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1987 RALPH MILLS, Petitioner v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondent ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND MR. CLERK: NOTICE OP APPEARiiNCE Please enter ray appearance £3 counsel for Peti tioner in the above captioned case. George El Burns, Jr // Assistant Public Defender Appellate Division Second Floor 312 North Eutaw Street Baltimore, Maryland 21201 (301) 333-4842 Counsel for Petitioner QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. May the Maryland Cour-t of Appeals place a strained and unrealistic construction upon the Maryland death penalty statute in order to defeat a contention that the statute is unconstitutionally mandatory in its applica tion? 2. Was the Maryland death penalty statute applied to Petitioner's case in an unconstitutionally mandatory manner? 3. Must Petitioner's sentence of death be vacated because of the admission of victim-impact evidence? NO. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1987 RALPH MILLS, Petitioner v. STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondent ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI Alan H. Murrell Public Defender of Maryland George E. Burns, Jr. Assistant Public Defender Office of the Public Defender Appellate Division 312 North E-taw Street Baltimore, Maryland 21201 (301) 333-4842 OF COUNSEL: Michael R. Braudes Assistant Public Defender Counsel for Petitioner Page OPINION BELOW........................................ 1 JURISDICTION......................................... 2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.....i...................... 2 STATUTES............................................. 2 RULES................................................ 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................ 2 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT........................ 3 CONCLUSION........................................... 10 APPENDIX.......................................... Apx.l TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966).............. 7Booth v. Maryland, ___ U.S. ___, (No. 86-50 20, "riled June 15, 1987).............. 9 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).............4,5 Gardner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)............ 7 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)................ - 4 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)................. 4,5 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).............. 7Ralph Mills v. State of Maryland, No. TF, September Term, 1985.................... 1 Stebbing v. Maryland, 105 S.Ct. 276 (1984)........... 8Sumner v. Shuman, U.S. , 41 Crim. L. 3334 (1987777....................... 4 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)....... 4 Constitution United States Constitution, Amendment VIII.................................. 2 Amendment XIV.......... 2 TABLE OF CONTESTS Statutes Maryland Code, (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.), Article 27, § 413................................2,3 § 414............................... 2 Rule Maryland Rule 4-343...................................2,5 2 Misc. No. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1987 RALPH MILLS, Petitioner v . STATE OF MARYLAND, Respondent ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI Ralph. Mills, 3etitioner, requests that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland entered on June 25, 1987, in Ralph Mills v. State of Maryland, No. 22, September Term, 1985. OPINION BELOW The opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, filed June 25, 1987, is reproduced at App. 16. This opinion is reported and published. Included are an opinion of the Court (per Eldridge, J.), a concurring opinion (per Murphy, C.J.)/ and a dissenting opinion (per McAuliffe) J.). JURISDICTION The opinion of the Court of Appeals of Maryland was filed on June 25, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1257(3). CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULE The following are set forth in the Appendix: CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS United States Constitution,* Amendments VIII and XIV STATUTES Maryland Code, (1957, 1982 Reol. Vol.), Article 27, §§ 413 and 414. RULE Maryland Rule 4-343 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Petitioner was convicted of murder by the Circuit Court for Allegany County; Marylandj and sentenced to death. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, on direct appeal, affirmed the judgment, with one Judge concurring in the result and one Judge dissenting. It was undisputed at trial that Petitioner, while an inmate at the Maryland Correctional Institution at Hagerstown, stabbed to death his cell-mate, Paul Robin Brown, with a "hame-raade" knife. On the basis of this incident, a jury returned a conviction of murder in the 2 first degree. The prosecution timely notified Petitioner of its intention to seek the death penalty. The Maryland death penalty statute, Md. Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol., 1986 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, § 413, mandates that the sentencing authority (a jury in Petitioner's case) first unanimously determine whether certain enumerated aggravating factors exist, and if so to unanimously deter mine whether any mitigating factors exist. In the event that both aggravating and mitigating factors exist, the sentencing authority engages in a process of weighing and balancing to determine the ultimate sentence. Where on the other hand the sentencer finds that one or more aggravating factors exists, but that no mitigating factors exist, the sentence is automatically death. Art. 27, § 413(h)(2). In the present case, the jury returned the aggravating factor set forth in Art. 27, § 413(d)(2) - "The defendant committed the murder at a time when he was confined in any correc tional institution." It did not unanimously find any mitigating factors.^- The sentence was accordingly death. REASONS FOR ISSUING THE WRIT A. Mandatory application of the Maryland death penalty statute and the construction of that statute by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The Maryland death penalty statute operated in an ^The evidence generated as possible mitigating factors Petitioner's youthful age at the time of the offense, his unfortunate childhood, and the failure of the government to provide meaningful treatment. 3 unconstitutionally mandatory fashion, because the finding of a single aggravating factor in the absence of any mitigating factor requires a sentence of death, without any weighing of circumstances and without excluding the possibility that some or all of the members of the jury did not believe that death was the appropriate sanction. As a necessary corol lary, evidence in mitigation which could persuade some but not all of the jurors was effectively excluded from the sentencing process. The operation of the statute to impose a death sentence in this case violates the settled rules that a capital sentencing statute cannot constitutionally operate in a mandatory manner, or in such a way as to exclude from practical consideration evidence in mitigation. See Sumner v . Shuman, ___ U.S. ___, 41 Grim. L. 3334 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court, of Appeals of Maryland, over a dissent and a concurring opinion which rejected its analy is, construed the statute in a way that, according to the Court of Appeals majority, defeated any contention that the statute operated in a mandatory fashion and excluded from consideration relevant mitigating evidence. The Court's construction has no basis in the language of the statute, in precedent, or in the jury instructions propounded in this case and in every other cap_tal case in the State of Maryland. The statute as applied in this case is invalid, 4 and that a strained, artificialand totally unsubstantiated "construction" by an appellate court does not suffice to save it. In order to understand and assess the competing interpretations of the statute, it is necessary to under stand that the sentencing jury fills out a "Findings and Sentencing Determination" form promulgated pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-343 and its predecessor, Rule 772A. See App. 8. Under this Rule, the jury is enjoined to mark "yes" any aggravating or mitigating factor which it unanimously finds has been established, and to mark "no" any aggravating or mitigating factor which "has not been so proved." This language mandates a negative response to any mitigating factor which has not been unanimously agreed to by all of' the 12 jurors. Thus, if six jurors believe that a mitigating factor has been established, but six do not, that mitigating factor is marked 'no." Under these circum stances, the mitigating forcu of the evidence is totally' excluded from the final calc ilus, thereby establishing a clear violation of Lockett .ind Sddings. Moreover, in the common situation where the aefense relies upon more than one mitigating factor, it is entirely possible that each juror will be persuaded that at least one mitigating factor exists1 that no juror will be convinced that the death penalty is appropriate; but that under the mechanical application of the Mary! ?.nd statute the jury will be 5 compelled to return a death sentence. This flaw in the statute renders the entire scheme constitutionally invalid. Under the approach taken by the Court of Appeals, the rejection as well as the acceptance of a mitigating factor requires unanimity, and a divided vote results in leaving the sentencing form blank with respect to the mitigating factor which gave rise to the division. Thus, a "no” does not mean that a juror convinced by mitigating evidence must put it out of his mind. For a number of reasons, this approach simply does not work. First, as the dissent points out it is an historical fact that sentencing forms are not left blank — every mitigating factor on every form resulting in a death sentence in Maryland has received a "yes1* or "no." As a matter of human experience, it is simply not possible that each of these determinations has resulted from a unanimous vote, and that there has never been a divided jury with respect to any mitigating factor. Secondly, the trial.court's instructions did not permit-the jury t3 resolve the matter in this way — there is no hint that, tie available option was to leave the form partially blank. Again, attention is directed to the recitation of the jury instructions in the dissenting opinion. Finally, the sentencing form itself speaks in terms of a unanimous affirmative response, and does not by its terms require a unanimous negative response. In sum, it is entirely possible that the "no's" affixed to the mitigating factors disguise and destroy many decisions by individual jurors 6 that mitigating factors did I in fact; exist. The Court of Appeals majority goes on to posit an individual weighing and balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors in the minds of individual jurors, who must consider whether under all of the facts and circum stances death is an appropriate sanction. While such a decisional process could conceivably occur under a statute, sentencing form, and jury instructions that provide for it, the Maryland statute and rules, and the instructions actually propounded to the jury that sentenced Petitioner to die, do not provide such a decisional process. Although it is generally the province of the state courts to "interpret, and where they see fit, to rein terpret" their own constitutions and statutes, Gardner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 169 (1961), limitations are imposed on judicial reconstruction by considerations of due process. A court may not use its interpretive authority as a "1 obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue.'" Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 696 n. 11 (1975). Moreover, the retroactive application of a novel construction of the statute, which could not have been anticipated, raises serious questions of due process. As this Court wrote in Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 198 (1966), "Where an accused is tried under a broad construc tion of an Act which would make it unconstitutional, the conviction cannot be sustained on appeal by a limiting construction which eliminates the unconstitutional features 7 of the Act....11 As Justice Marshall has recognized in dissenting from denial of certiorari in an earlier case, the Maryland Court of Appeals has used its interpretive authority before to avoid a substantial federal issue by construing language in the death penalty statute in a manner totally at odds with the plain meaning of the words used. Stebbing v. Maryland, 105 S.Ct. 276 (1984). Just as the Maryland Court in Stebbing and related cases construed language which allocated the burden of proof to the defense to mean that the burden is on the government, so the same Court here has construed language which effectively buries probative evidence of mitigation to mean that individual jurors can and must, on an individual basis, give full consideration to anything in the case that they find mitigating. In reality, it is a safe assumption that no Maryland judge propounding instructions and no Maryland juror deliberating a defend ant's fate has ever understood the process to work this - way. 3. Victim Impact Statement. The following victim impact statement, summarizing an interview with Paul Robin Brown's brother and sister-in- law, was introduced in evidence: "Paul and Thomas Brown came from a family of six. At a very young age they were removed from their parents custody because of neglect and placed in separate foster homes. (Removal by the Department ofSocial Services was prompted by Paul being hospitalized, at age 4 for anemia and 8 t i malnutrition.) "Paul was a hyperactive child and hard to handle which resulted in a lot of beatings from his various guardians. He ran away constantly from the various homes in which he had been placed. After a while Paul, at the age of 15, just started living on the streets. He was eventually sent to the Maryland Training School for Boys. Paul never really had a home or a family as such. 'I (Thomas Brown) tried to keep in touch with Paul by writing and visiting him whenever possible. I always had good homes and a good life and always felt so guilty that there was nothing I could do to help Paul. After all, I was only one year older than he.1 "1 Paul was a good person who had a tough life, a lot of bad breaks, no family, no home, nobody to really give him a chance. I sometimes think he felt more.secure in prison, because he had no one on the outside. Sure, he committed crimes, but he wasn't violent. He did what he had to do to survive and he got involved with a lot of bad people." The Maryland Court of Appeals held that this did not constitute proscribed victim impact evidence under Booth v. Maryland, ___ U.S. ___, (No. 86-5020, filed June 15, 1987), reasoning that the document does not describe the- impact of the offense upon the victim's family. (Slip op. at 50, n . 14.) This reasoning construes Booth too narrowly. This Court made clear in Booth that victim impact evidence can improperly focus the sentencer's attention not only upon the victim’s family, but also upon "the character and reputation of the victim." Slip op. at 8. The Court went cn to write that the issue of whether the victim's character was 9 11 sterling" or "questionable" is not a proper consideration in selecting those few defendants who deserve to die. (Id. at 9.) Accordingly, evidence tending to .show that Paul Brown was a sympathetic individual was equally inadmissible as evidence that his relatives were deeply affected by his death would have been. For this reason as well, the judgment must be reviewed and reversed. Respectfully submitted, Alan H. Murrell Public Defender Appellate Division Second Floor 312 North Eutaw Street Baltimore, Maryland 21201 (301) 333-4842 Of Counsel: Michael R. Braudes Assistant Public Defender Appellate Division Second Floor 312 North Eutaw Street Baltimore, Maryland 21201 (301) 333-4869 Counsel for Petitioner lv 8/12/87 10 f A P P E U D I X A P P E N D I X Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.) Art- 27, Secs. 413—414 provide; Section 413- Sentencing procedure upon finding of guilty of fir3t degree murder. (a) Separate sentencing proceeding required. — If a person xs found guxlty or murder xn the first degree, and if the State had given the notice required under Sec. 412(b), a separate sentencing proceeding shall be conducted as soon as practicable after the trial has been completed to determine whether he shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for life. (b) Before whom proceeding conducted. — This proceeding shall be conducted: (1) Before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or (2) Before a jury impaneled for the purpose of the proceeding if: (i)' The defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; (ii) The defendant was convicted after a trial before the ccurt sitting without a jury; (iii) The jury that determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged by the court for good cause; or (iv) Review of the original sentence of death by a court of can.patent jurisdiction has resulted in a remand for resentencing; or (3) Before the ccurt alone, if a jury sentencing proceeding is waived by the defendant. (c) Evidence; argument; instructions. — (1) The following type of evidence Is admissible in this proceeding: (i) Evidence relating to any miti gating circumstance listed in subsection (g) of this section; (ii) Evidence relating to any aggravating circumstance listed in subsection (d) of this section of which the State had notified the defendant pursuant to Section 412(b); (iii) Evidence of any prior criminal convictions, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere, or the absence of such prior convictions or pleas, to the same extent admissible in other sentencing procedures; (iv) Any presentence investigation report. However, any recommendation as to sentence contained in the report is not admissible; and (v) Any other evidence that the court deems of probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements. (2) The State and the defendant or his counsel may present argument for or against the sentence of death. (3) After presentation of the evidence in a proceeding before a jury, in addition to any other appropriate instructions permitted by law, the court shall instruct the jury as to the findings it must make in order to determine whether the sentence shall be death or imprison ment for life and the burden of proof applicable to these findings in accordance with subsection (f) or subsection of (h) of this section. (d) Consideration of aggravating circum stances . — In determining the sentence the court or jury, as the case may be, shall first consider whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, any of the following aggravating circumstances exi.it: (1) The victim was a law enforcement officer who was murdered while in the performance of his duties. (2) The defendant committed the murder at a time when he was confined in any correctional institution. (3) The defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an escape or an attempt to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or by an officer or guard of a correctional institution or by a law enforcement officer. 2 (4) The victim was taken or attempted to be taken in the course of a kidnapping or abduction or an attempt to kidnap or abduct. (5) The victim was a child abducted in violation of § 2 of this article. (6) . The defendant committed the murder pursuant to an agreement or contract for remunera tion or the premise of remuneration to commit the murder. (7) The defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract, for remuneration or the premise of remuneration. (3) At the time of the murder, the defendant was under sentence of death or imprison ment for life. (9) The defendant committed more than one offense of murder in the first degree arising out of the same incident. (10) The defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit a robbery, arson, rape, or sexual offense in the first degree. (e) Definitions. — As used in this section, the following terms have the meanings indicated .unless a contrary meaning is clearly intended from the context in which the term appears: (1) The terms "defendant" and "person", except as those terms appear in subsection (d)(7), include only a principal in the first degree. (2) The term "correctional institution" includes any institution for the detention or confinement of persons charged with or convicted of a crime, including Patuxent Institution, any institution for the detention or confinement of juveniles charged with or adjudicated as being delinquent, and any hospital in which the person was confined pursuant to an order of a court exercising criminal, jurisdiction. (3) The term "law enforcement officer" has the meaning given in § 727 of Article 27. However, as used in subsection (d), the term also includes (i) an officer serving in a probationary 3 status,' (ii) a parole and probation officer! and (iii) a law enforcement officer of a jurisdiction outside of Maryland. (f) Finding that no aggravating circum stances exist. — It the court or jury does not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more • of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall state that conclusion in writing, and the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. (g) Consideration of mitigating circum stances . — It the court or jury rinds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall then consider whether, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following mitigating circumstances exist: (1) The defendant has not previously (i) been found guilty of a crime of violence, (ii) entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; or (iii) had a judgment of probation on stay of entry of judgment entered on a charge of a crime of violence. As used in this paragraph, “crime of violence" means abduction, arson, escape, kidnapping, manslaugh ter, except involuntary manslaughter, mayhem, murder, robbery, or rape or sexual offense in the first or second degree, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses, or the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or another crime of violence. (2) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act which - caused the victim'si death. (3) The defendant act id under substan tial duress, damir.. ition or provocation of another person, but no so tubstantial an to constitute a complete defense to the prosecution. (4) The murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substan tially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental disorder, or emotional disturbance. (5) The youthful age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 4 (6) The act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim's death. (7) It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society. (8) Any other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case. (h) Weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances. — (1) If the court or jury finds that one or more of these mitigating circumstances exist, it shall determine whether, by a preponder ance of the evidence, the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. (2) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentence shall be death. (3) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circum stances , the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. (i) Determination to be written and unani mous . — The determination of the court or jury shall be in writing, and, if a jury, shall be unanimous and shall be signed by the foreman. (j) Statements required in determination. — The determination of the court of jury snail state, specifically: (1) Which, if any, aggravating circum stances it finds to exist; (2) Which, if any, mitigating circum stances it finds to exist; (3) Whether any mitigating circum stances found under subsection (g) outweigh the aggravating circumstances found under subsection ( d ) ; (4) Whether the aggravating circum stances found under subsection (d) are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances found under subsection (g ); and 5 (5) The sentence determined in accordance with subsection (f) or (h). (k) Imposition of sentence. — (1) The court shall impose the sentence determined by the jury under subsection (f) or (h). (2) If the jury, within a reasonable time is not able to agree as to sentence, the court shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. (3) If the sentencing proceeding is conducted before a court without a jury, the court shall impose the sentence determined under subsection (f) or (h). (l) Rules of procedure. — The Court of Appeals may adopt rules of procedure to govern the conduct of a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, including any forms to be used by the court or jury in making its written findings and determinations of sentence. (1978, ch. 3, §§ 1,2; 1979, ch. 521.) Section 414. Automatic review of death sentences. (a) Review by Court of Appeals required. — Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and the judgment becomes final, the Court of Appeals shall review the sentence on the record. (b) Transmission of papers to Court of Appeals. — The clerk of the'trial court shall transmit to the Cleric of the Court of Appeals the entire record and transcript of the sentencing proceeding within tea days after receipt of the transcript by the tr-.al court. The clerk also shall transmit the written findings and determina tion of the court or jury and a report prepared by the trial court. The report shall be in the form of a standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by the Court of Appeals of Maryland and shall include a recommendation by the trial court as to whether or not imposition of the sentence of death is justified in the case. (c) Briefs and oral argument. — Both the State and the defendant may submit briefs and present oral argument within the time provided by the Court. 6 (d) Consolidation of appeals. -- Any appeal from the verdict shall be consolidated in the Court of Appeals with the review of sentence. (e) Considerations by Court of Appeals. — In addition to the consideration of any errors properly before the Court on appeal, the Court of Appeals shall consider the imposition of the death sentence. With regard to the sentence, the Court shall determine: (1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; (2) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or court's finding of a statutory aggra vating circumstance under § 413 (d); (3) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or court's finding that the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by mitigating circumstances; and (4) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. (f) Decision of Court of Appeals. — (1) In' addition to its review pursuant to any direct appeal, with regard to the death sentence, the Court shall: (i) Aifirm the sentence; (ii) S t aside the sentence and remand the case for ti e conduct of a new sentenc ing proceeding under i 413; or (iii) Set aside the sentence and remand for modification of the sentence to imprisonment for life. (2) The Court shall include in its decision a reference to the similar cases which it considered. (g) Rules of procedure. — The Court may adopt rules of procedure to provide for the expedited review of all death sentences pursuant to this section. (1978, ch. 3, §§ 1,2.) 7 RULES INVOLVED Maryland Rules of Procedure, Rule 4—343: Rule 4—343. Sentencing —— Procedure In Capital Cases. (a) Applicability. — This Rule applies whenever sentence is imposed under Code, Article 27, Sec. 413. (b) Statutory Sentencing Procedure. — When a defendant has been found guilty of murder in the first degree and the State has given the notice required under Code, Article 27, Sec. 412(b), a separate sentencing proceeding shall be conducted as soon as practicable after the trial pursuant to the provisions of Code, Article 27, § 413. (c) Judge. — Except as provided in Rule 4-361, the judge who presides at trial shall preside at the sentencing proceeding. (d) Allocution. — Before sentence is determined, the court shall afford the defendant the opportunity, personally and through counsel, to make a statement. (CAPTION) FINDINGS AND SENTENCING DETERMINATION Section I Based upon the evidence, we unanimously find that each of the following aggravating circumstances tha* is marked "yes'* has been proven BEYOND A REASONABLE DOIBT. Each of the aggravating circumstances that has not been so proven is marked ''no.1' 1. The victim was a law enforcement officer who was murdered while in the performance of the officer's duties. Yes No 2. The defendant committed the murder at a time when confined in a correctional institution. Yes No 3 3. The defendant committed the murder in further ance of an escape from or an attempt to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest, or detention of or by an officer or guard of a correctional institution or by a law enforcement officer. Yes No 4. The victim was taken or attempted to be taken in the course of a kidnapping or abduction or an attempt to kidnap or abduct. Yes No 5. The victim was a child abducted in violation of Code, Article 27, Sec. 2. Yes No 6. The defendant committed the murder pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration to commit the murder. Yes No 7. The defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the murder and the murder was committed pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration. Yes No 8. At the time of the murder, the defendant was under the sentence of death or imprisonment for life. Yes No 9. The defendant committed more than one offense of murder in the first degree arising out of the same incident. Yes No 10. The defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery, arson, rape in the first degree or sexual offense in the first degree. Yes No (If one or more of the above are marked "yes," complete Section II. If all of the above are marked "no," do not complete Sections II and III.) Section II 3ased upon the evidence, we unanimously find that each of the following mitigating circumstances that is marked "yes" has been proven to exist by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. Each mitigating circumstances that has not been so proved is marked "no." 1. As used in this paragraph, "crime of violence" means abduction, arson, escape, kidnapping, mayhem, murder, robbery, rape in the first or second degree, sexual offense in the first or second degree, manslaughter other than involuntary manslaughter, an attempt to commit any of these offenses, or the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or another crime of violence. The defendant previously (i) has not been found guilty of a crime of violence; and (ii) has not entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; and (iii) has not been granted probation on stay of entry of judgment pursuant to a charge of a crime of violence. Yes No 2. The v .ctim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consentiid to the act which caused the victim's death. Yes No 3. The defendant acted under substantial duress, domination, or provocation of another person, but not so substantial as to constitute a complete defense to the prosecution. Yes No 10 4. The murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental disorder, or emotional disturbance. Yes No 5. The defendant was of a youthful age at the time of the crime. Yes No 6. The act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim’s death. Yes No 7. It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Yes No 8. Other facts specifically set forth below constitute mitigating circumstances: Yes No (Use reverse side if necessary) (If one or more of the above in Section II have been marked "yes," complete Section III. If all of the above in Svction II are marked "no," do not complete Section III.) Section III Based on the evidence, we unanimously find that it has been proven by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE that the mitigating circumstances marked "yes" in Section II outweigh the aggravating circumstances marked "yes" in Section I. Yes No 11 DETERMINATION OP SENTENCE Enter the determination of sentence either "Life Imprisonment" or "Death" according to the following instruc tions : 1. If all of the answers in Section I are marked "no," enter Life Imprisonment." 2. If Section III was completed and was marked "yes," enter "Life Imprisonment." 3. If Section II was completed and all of the answers were marked "no," then enter "Death." 4. If Section III was completed and was marked "no," enter “Death." We unanimously determine the sentence to be Foreman Juror 2 Juror 3 Juror 4 Juror 5 Juror 6 Juror 7 Juror a Juror 9 Juror 10 Juror 11 Juror 12 JUDGE (f) Advice of the Judge. — At the time of imposing sentence, the judge shall advise the defendant of the right of appeal and the time allowed for the exercise of this right. The judge shall also advise a defendant who receives a sentence of death that (1) the sentence only will be reviewed automatically by the Court of Appeals, and (2) the sentence will be stayed pending review of the sentence by the Court of Appeals and any appeal which the defendant may take. (g) Report of Judge. — After sentence is imposed, the judge promptly shall prepare and send to the parties a report in the following form: 12 (CAPTION) REPORT OP TRIAL JUDGE I. Data Concerning Defendant A. Date of Birth B. SexC. Race D. Address E. Length of Tine in Community F. Reputation in Community G. Family Situation and Background 1. Situation at time of offense (describe defendant's living situation including marital status and number and age of children) 2. Family history (describe family history including pertinent data about parents and siblingsH. EducationI. Work Record J. Prior Criminal Record and Institutional History (list any prior convictions, disposition, and periods of incarceration) K. Military History L. Pertinent Physical or Mental Characteristics or History M. Other Significant Data About Defendant. II. Data Concernirg Offense A. Briefly describe facts of offense (include time, plate, and manner of death; weapon, if any; other participants and nature 12 £ participation) B. Was there any evidence that the defe idant was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense? If so describe.C. Did the defendant know the victim pitor to the offense? Yes No________ 1. Ir so, describe relationship. 2. Did the prior relationship in any way precipitate the offense? If so, explain. D. Did the victim's behavior in any way provoke the offense? If so, explain. E. Data Concerning Victim1. Nam 2 2. Date of Birth 3 . Sex4• Race 13 5. Length of time in community 6. Reputation in community F. Any Other Significant Data About Offense III. A. 3. C. D. E. Plea Entered by Defendant: Not guilty guilty____;.not guilty by reason of insanity ____ Mode of Trial: Court__________ Jury__________ If there was a jury trial, did defendant challenge the jury selection or composition? If so, explain. Counsel 1. Name 2. Address 3. Appointed or retained (If more than one attorney represented defendant, provide data on each and include stage of proceeding at which the representation was furnished.) Pre-Trial Publicity — Did defendant request a mistrial or a change of venue on the basis of publicity? If so, explain. Attach copies of any motions made and exhibits filed.Was defendant charged with other offenses arising about of the same incident? If so, list charges? state whether they were tried at same proceeding, and give disposition. IV. Data Concerning Sentencing Proceeding A. List aggravating circumstance(s) upon which State relied in the pretrial notice. B. Was the proceeding conducted before same judge as trial? ____ before same jury? If the sentencing proceeding was conducted -before a jury other than the trial jury, did the defendant challenge the selection or composition of the jury? If so, explain. C. Counsel — If counsel at sentencing was different from trial counsel, giv<_ information requested in III C above. D. Which aggravating and mitigating circumstances were raised by the evidence? E. Cn which aggravating and mitigating circumstances were the jury instructed? F. Sentence imposed: Life imprisonment Death V. Chronolog*”Date of Offense Arrest Charge 14 Notification of intention to seek penalty of death Trial (guilt/innocence) -- began and ended Post-trial Motions Disposed Of Sentencing Proceeding — began and ended Sentence Imposed VI. Recommendation of Trial Court As To Whether Imposition of Sentence of Death is Justified. VII. A copy of the Findings and Sentencing Determination made in this action is attached to and made a part of this report. Judge CERTIFICATION I certify that on the ______ of _________________ 19____ I sent copies of this report to counsel for the parties for comment and have attached any comments made by them to this report. Judge Within five days after receipt of the report, the parties may submit to the judge written comments concerning the factual accuracy of the report. The judge promptly shall file with the clerk of the trial court, and in the case of a life sentence with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals the report in final form, noting any changes made, together with any comments of the parties. 15 IN THS COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Nos. 22 and 79 September Term, 1985 RALPH WILLIAM MILLS v. STATE OF MARYLAND Murphy, C.J . *Smith Eldridge Cole Rodowsky ♦Couch McAuliffe, JJ. Opinion by Eldridge, J. Murphy, C.J., concurs in Che Judgmen McAuliffe, J., concurs and dissents. Filed: June 25, 1937 ♦Smith, J., and Couch, J., now retire participated in the hearing and con ference of this case while active members of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Con3titutic Article IV, Section 3A, they also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. J fS In March 1985 Ralph William Mills was triad for first decrae murder cetera a jury in the Circuit Court for Allegany County. ills appeal challenges the resulting conviction and death sentence. We snail affirm. The parties have agreed pursuant to Maryland Rule 328(g) that the following facts are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. Mills shared cell number 20 on "C-Ono" tier at the Maryland Correctional Institution in Hagerstown with Raul Robin 3rown. At 10:47 p.m. on August 6, 1984, correctional officers were called to the cell to investigate a disturbance. When the officers arrived, Mills demanded to be released from his cell, saying, "vv cell buddy is dead." The cell doer was opened and Mills emerged, carrying a blood-covered "manic'," or home-made knife, at his side. Mills seated several times that he had "killed hi3 call buddy." Brown's body was found Lying on his bunk, stabbed six times in the chest and thirty-nine times in the back. About three weeks before this homicide, Mills had written to the warden, threatening to kill his call mate (who it that time was not Raul Robin Brown) if certain complaints, primarily concerning visitation, were not satisfactorily 2 resolved. At the trial another innate, David Gallahan, testi fied for the defense that Brown had lent him the murder weapon prior to the homicide, and had asked for and received it back on the day of the incident. Mills presents as with numerous questions for review, seme relating to the guilty verdict and some relating just to the sentence of death. The first two questions presented concern the denial of Mills's motions to strike two prospective jurors for cause. Mills's counsel conceded in this Court that Mills had exercised only sixteen of his allotted twenty peremptory challenges.* Neither of the prospective jurors whom Mills moved to strike for cause was impanelled to serve as a juror or to serve as an alternate. Assuming for curposes of armament that the trial\ judge should have dismissed the two veniremen for cause, it is difficult to understand how his failure to do so could have prejudiced Mills when the defendant's peremptory challenges Maryland Buie 4-313(a) provides that defendants in cases such as this are permitted twenty peremp tory challenges plus two additional peremptory challenges for each alternate juror. were not exhausted and the two veniremen were not seated. We have previously stated that when an accused has not exhausted his peremptory strikes, failure co disqualify a prospective juror for cause is not reversible error. Wn ize y. Szzze, 2 00 Md. 719, 723, 431 A.2d 201 (1934), zevz. denied, 470 a.S.1062, 105 S.Ct. 1779, 34 L.£d.2d 337 (1935). See Sooz'n y. Szzze, 306 Md. 172, 135, 507 A.2d 1093 (1936), 'ja.c.J-Zzd on aikzt g-uu/icu, C.3. , S.Ct. , L.Zd.2d (1937). We have also repeatedly held that a claim of error in the inclusion or exclusion of a prospective juror is ordinarily abandoned when the defendant or his counsel indicates satisfac tion with the jury at the conclusion of the jury selection pro cess. zoazr. •?. Szzze, euzzz, 306 Md. at 135; Soszer y. Szzze, 304 Md. 439, 450-451, 499 A.2d 1236 (1935), denied, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 2310 , 92 L.Zd.2d 723 (1936); Shs.nzs J. Szzze, 301 Md. 294, 310, 433 A.2d 5 (1934), zerz. denied, U.S. , 105 S.Ct. .356 , 35 L-2d.2d 153 (1935); V> -j ze :. •jurru, 300 Md. at 729, 731; Szlhzxn. z. 297 Md. 563 , 579- 530 , 463 A.2d 45, 52 (1933); vrr. denied, 456 U.S. 393, IQ4 S.Ct. 2374, 30 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984). In this case, after the voir dire and peremptory strikes, the defense was asked if the jury panel was acceptable to the defendant. After checking the iden tity of one juror, defense counsel stated: "Your r-'cr.or, the Jury as impaneled is acceptable to the Cefer.se." Under these circum stances it would be idle for us to consider whether or not the trial court should have struck the two veniremen for cause. - d - II. Mills contends that the trial court should not have admitted into evidence two color photographs of the victim, shewing his stab wounds and blood. At trial this issue developed as follows. The first chctograpn admitted into evidence (State's Exhibit 3) was a color photograph of the prison cell wail above the victim's bumk. The photograph depicts three words fingerpainted in blood as well as a portion of the victim's body. Counsel for the defendant objected that the phonograph ”[sI hows seme bias being a color photograph like it is,™ and argued that the Stat should produce a black and white photograph. The trial judge asked: "You concede that the fact that it's color doesn't automatically exclude it?" Counsel for the defendant re sponded, "I agree." The judge then ruled that if the State could establish that the colors were accurate , the photograph would be admitted into evidence, and afterwards it was so admitted. The next photographs in evidence (State's Exhibits Nos. 5, 5, 7, 3, 9, 10) were admitted one after another, and resembled the first photograph in sice, and coloration. Ex hibit 3 depicted the feet of the victim, in socks; no bleed was apparent. There was no objection to Exhibit 3 from de fense counsel. Exhibit 3 shewed the r* * 7 - 1 1 7 - l - 1 -. n .-II,l — ̂3 3 ~ — - 3 - as it appeared when the homicide was first investigated, with red stained pieces of whits cloth or paper visible in the toilet bowl. Defense counsel objected to Exhibit 6 . Exhibit 7 showed a corner of the cell, including the window, a cabinet, seme clothes drying from a string, and 'the hand of the victim. No objection was made to the admission of this photograph. Exhibit 3 showed the back of the victim with bleed draining from standings scattered from the shoulders to the waist level. Defense counsel objected to the admission of Exhibit 3. Exhibit 9 showed the face and chest of the victim, with blood draining from wounds, and there was no abjection to this photograph. Exhibit 10 shewed the victim lying face up on has bunk and shewed part of the wall containing three words fingerpainted in blood. Blood could be seen, but net specific wounds. Thera was no abjection with respect to Exhibit 10 . The trial court admitted Exhibits 5, 7, 3 and 10 into evidence, there bei.ng no objection to them. The court pest- poned consideration of Ex limits 5 and 3, which were objacted to, until after the completion of the testimony of the witness who identified and vouched for the accuracy of all six nheto- graphs. With the jury excused from the courtroom, the court turned to the two challenged photographs. hills moved to ex clude the.photograph of the toilet (Exhibit 5) and the photo graph of the victim's back (Exhibit 3), arguing that the .photo graphs would needlessly prejudice the jury, ss the cicturss / 6 reflected facts which were not disputed and which, id was claimed, could have been easily established by testimony and less vivid photographs. The State pointed to testimony that all of the photo graphs were fair and accurate. With respect to the picture of the toilet, the State contended that it would not "unduly in flame" the jurors and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial value. As to the picture cf the victim's back wounds, the State argued that It "completes the picture" by shewing to the jury wounds not visible in the previously ad mitted pictures of the victim lying face up, and that it was the only photograph of the back wounds. The trial judge admitted the challenged photographs, ruling as follows: "Well, the purpose of the . . . intro duction of photographic evidence is to en.ble the side which offers it to offer pcibative evidence to the triers of fact, to the jurors. I know of no rule of evi dence that requires me to guard the sensi bilities of jurors whether we know what tiny are or not. I think the issue is whether or not that photograph would tend to inflame the jurors to in any way provide an exhibit or a bit of evidence in a sensa tional way. I think if the State sought to introduce eight photographs taken from slightly different angles, or to a series of photographs one of each area where there’s a wound, than yes I think it would be potentially inflammatory. 3ut to offer cne single photegraph of the . . . [victim] as he was found, be it in color cr black and whits, I don’t think is ur.duiy. preju dicial and designed to inflame, and I don't think it will inflame. 7 "I'll overrule the objection and permit all the exhibits to come in." On appeal, Mills contends: "Over objection, the trial court admitted State's Exhibits Eight and Mine." (Brief, p. 12). The actual objection was, "We would abject to the Mo. 3 [the back wounds], Your Honor, along with Mo. 5 [the toilet bowl]. As to the others we have no objection." Accordingly, the present contention of error in the acmission of the State's Exhibit 9, showing the face and chest of the victim, was clearly waived. 5aa Rule 4-3 22. Moreover, even if Mo. 9 had been objected to, it is much less bloody and had much less potential for prejudice than Mo. 3. As we shall conclude than the admission of Mo. 3 furnishes no ground for reversal, the same conclusion is applicable to the admission of Mo. 9. Mills and the State agree that the admissibility of photographs turns upon a balancing of their probative value against their potential for prejudice, and that the application of this test is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Saa, a. 2 ., Szzza v. TizhnelZ, 3G6 Md. 423, 463, 3G9 A.2d 1179 (1936); Grandisor,. -j. SzaZa, 303 Md. 633, 729, 306 A.2d 33G, zazz. dandad, U.S. , lQ7 S.Ct. 33 , 93 1.Ed.2d 174 (1936); .-.adz v. SZ<zZa3 305 Md. 9, 20 , 501 A.2d 436 (1935); Gz-vzazz Irzza, III Md. 437, 502-504, 495 A.2d 1 (1985), zazz. iaziai, J.S. 106 S.Ct. 363, 33 l.Ed.2d 907 (1935), and cases there acted. The standard was set forth in -S zhzazn Szzza, s\z:?-z, where thcs Court found no error in the admission of a color photograph and black and white photographs of a homicide victim. Me there stated as follows (303 Md. at 502): 8 "We have consistently held that whether or not a photograph is of practical value in a case and admissible at trial is a matter best left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Sauers y.*Stats, 298 Md. 115, 135-36, 468 A.2d 101, 111-12 (1983), quoting Cook v. Szzze, 225 Md. 503 , 608 , 171 A.2d 460 , 463 (1961), zerZ. denied, 363 U.S. 970 , 32 S.Ct. 445, 7 L.Sd.2d 398 (1962). A court's deter mination in this area will net be disturbed unless plainly arbitrary. Id. Under this standard, we have permitted the reception into evidence of photographs depicting the condition of the victim and the location of injuries upon the deceased, Clarke j . Szzze, 233 Md. 11, 21-22, 207 A.2d 455, 461-62 (1965); the position of the victim's body at the murder site, 3rize y. SzzZe, 264 Md. 352, 368-69, 236 A.2d 132, 140 (1972); and the wounds of the victim, Uadi3an. v. Szzze, 200 Md. 1, 7-3, 37 A.2d 593, 595 (1952). On certain occasions, photographs have also been admitted to allow the jury to visualize the atrociousnes3 of the crime - a circum stance of much import where the factfinder must determine the degree of murder. See Fuller y. Szzze, 45 Md.Aop. 414, 420-21, 413 A.2d 111, 230-31 (1980) .' * It * We have previously held that photographs of the deceased are admissible even where the location of injuries was previously described y and conceded by the defendant. S~ri:n y. Szzze, 132 Md. 176, 137, 32 A.2d 363, 367 (1943); Snzuden y. Szzze, 133 Md. 524, 531, 106 A. 5, 3 (1919). The Court reasoned that since the photographs were mere representa tions of what was already in evidence, their introduction could not be held to have in jured the accused. Irizh, 132 Md. at 137, 32 A.2d at 367." Mills contends than "the more shocking the photo, the more important must be its contribution to the case in order for admission to be justified." (3rief, ?. 13). He 9 argues that Exhibit 9 added nothing of substance to the State's case, because the medical examiner and other witnesses testified as to the standings and because this testimony was never contr.o- verted. The State responds that any prejudice caused by the photograph was justified by its probative value on the issues of premeditation and provocation. We are unable to conclude that Exhibit 3 was likely to so distort the jury's deliberations that its admission was "plainly arbitrary," Johnson, jurru, 303 Md. at 502. When the State sought to admit the photograph, no stipulation had been offered that the victim had been stabbed six times in the chest and thirty-nine times in the back. Mills does not contend that the photograph in any way misrepresented facts. We have examined Exhibit Wo. 3 and do not find it particularly gory or gruesome. Compare the photograph at issue in Sni-h v. 132 Md. 175, 137, 32 A.2d 353, 367 (1943) (upholding the admission of a photo graph snowin', th*. victim's body partially exhumed one week after fatal axe blows to the head, even though the facts represented were already in evidence without objection and were not disputed). In this Court, Mills also contends that the trial judge should not have allowed Exhibits 3 and 9 to be reintroduced in evidence at the sentencing proceeding. 3efore the jury was returned for this phase of the trial, the State announced than it would move to reintroduce all trial testimcny and exhibits. 10 Counsel for defendant made sure that two exhibits narked for identification but not introduced would be kept from the jury, tut, when asked by the court if he had any objection to the reintrocuction of the trial exhibits and documents, counsel replied: "No, Your Honor." Mills has obviously waived the point. Rule 4-322(a). III. Next, Mills argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim's character and reputation. As we recently pointed out in Mack, v. Szazs, 300 Md. 532, 603-604, 479 A.2d 1344 (1985), whether the exclusion of evidence constituted reversible error is ordinarily not pre served for review "unless there has been a formal proffer of what the contents and relevance of the excluded testimony would have been." Z22 Zurejay v. V -2 $ z 3 m '-isL. . ?. . 7c. , 202 Md-. 203, 209, 95 A.2d 367 (1953). The record shews that no such proffer was made in this case. Conceding the absence of a proffer, Mills surmises on appeal that trial counsel made "an apparent effort to establish that 3 rown was the aggressor in the altercation with appellant" and "sought to elicit evidence that Brown had both assaultive and homosexual tendencies" of the sort that "could well have Lad the jury to believe that appellant's act was not premeditated __C/T and unprovoked." (Brief, op. 15, 17, 13). Even now, however, Mills dees not contend that zr.u of the witnesses would have testified that Mills struck at 3rcwn in seif defense or retalia tion because of homosexual advances. We are left with appellate counsel's mere speculation in his brief that "seme aspect of the victim's character and personality led to his demise." [Id., p. 20).^ Something more than this type of vague speculation is required before we can conclude that the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence. The principle that ordinarily the record must contain a "proffer to shew precisely what the testimony, if admitted, would have established," does have an exception "where the tenor of the questions and the replies they were designed to elicit is clear," lerecoy -j. '.Jescam 'id. .7. .7. C:., cup re, 202 Md. at 209. In the instant case, it is far from clear that anything relevant might have been established by defense counsel's ques tions at trial concerning the victim's character. Moreover, appellate counsel's speculation in this Court 'that the homicide might have been in seif defense or in retaliation for a homosexual advance, in addition to not being - 11 - With regard to the evidentiary foundation which must be laid before evidence of a victim's character is admissible to support a claim of self defense, c-za Thomas v. State, 201 Md. 294, 206-307, 433 A.2d 6 (1984), :>’r:. denied, U.3. , 105 5 . C t. 1356, 35 1.Ed.2d 153 (1935). 12 reflected in a proffer or the tenor of the questions, is squarely contrary to all of the evidence. 3efore the killing Mills wrote to the Warden threatening to kill his cell oats if his visitation privileges were curtailed. Some weeks later Mills took his cell mate 1 s "shank," put on a glove to inprova his grip, and stabbed the cell mate forty-five times on his chest and back as he lay on his bunk. The call showed no sign of any struggle. Before being let out of the cell, Mills fingerpaintsd the words "Helter Skelter's Son" in blood on the ceil wail. Gn being let out, Mills told the guards that he killed his ceil mare. In the absence of a proffer, it would appear beyond doubt that Paul Brown's character was irrelevant and that testimony on this subject was properly excluded. IV. The defendant Mills also argues that the trial judge erred in sustaining objections to certain questii ns which defense counsel asked the witness James Mills, who was the defendant's- uncle and was a fellow inmate. The recoct on this point reads as follows: "Q Well first before I get into that let me ask you something else. Tcu indicated that you saw Mr. Mills on the tier on an almost daily basis? "A Tes. ___________ V - 13 "q Hew would you characterize his conduct in the institution? "PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Objection. "BY THE COURT: Objection sustained. "Q During the time that you were on G cell with Mr. Mills, do you know whether or net he had any trouble with the guards or other inmates? "PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Objection. "A None at all. "BY THE COURT: Just a minute, Mr. Mills. When you hear an objection, please don’t answer the question. "Objection sustained. "Q Did you ever personally see any alterca tion with Ralph Mills between Ralph Mills and any of the guards? "PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Objection. "BY THE COURT: Objection sustained. "Q Did you ever personally see any alterca tion between Ralph Mills and any of the other inmates? "PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Object .on. "BY THE COURT: Objection sustained." The defendant asserts in this Court that the purpose of the cuestions was to elicit evidence concerning the dezendant's nonviolent character and reputation. J-z-2 Maryland Coda (197 4, 1934 Repi. Vol.), “ 9-115 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, allowing a witness to give his personal opinion oz / / - 14 - another person's character where character evidence is relevant; 3 Our kin v. Seize, 234 Md. 445 , 397 A.2d 500 .(1979) . Sea <zlao Socle y. Seize, 295 Md. 157, 131, 453 A.2d 1213 (1983); Comi y. Seize, 202 Md. 472, 473-479, 97 A.2d 129, cert, denied, 346 U.S. 393, 74 S.Ct. 223, 98 L.Sd. 399 (1953). The defendant, however, frankly acknowledges that the above questions were "not couched . . . in . . . terns . . . [of] the character and reputation of Appellant for violence." (Brief, p. 22). As the questions were not worded in tens of character evidence, as the witness was not asked to give an opinion con cerning the defendant's character or reputation, and as there was no proffer or explanation given to the trial judge by defense counsel, we cannot conclude that the trial judge committed error in sustaining the objections. Furthermore, even if it be assumed arguendo that the trial court did err in sustaining the objections, such error would be harmless. In light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt and the nature of his crime, it is Section 9-115 states as follows: "Where character evidence is otherwise relevant to the proceeding, no person offered as a character witness who has an adequate basis for forming an opinion as to another person's character shall hereafter be ex cluded from giving evidence based on personal opinion to prove character, either in person or by deposition, in any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court or before any judge, or jury of the State." & 15 virtually inconceivable that the view of a fellow inmate, who was the defendant's uncle, that the defendant has previously been nonviolent in the institution, might have changed the guilty verdict. We are convinced, "beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict," Jersey y. Szzze, 275 Md. 623, 639, 350 A.2d 565, 573 (1975). "[T]here is no reasonable possibility chat the [exclusion of the] evi dence . . . may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict." Ibid. V. Mills's next contention is that the trial court .erred in denying his motion to impanel separate juries for the guilt or innocence phase and the penalty phase of his trial. Mills's argument is identical to that rejected by the Supreme Court in Jzakharz y. '-iaCres, Q.S. , 105 S.Ct. 1753, 90 L.Cd.2d 137 (1936) , and rejacted by this Court in several cases. S 2 i Szz.ee y. 75 r"in a Z Z , supra, 306 Md. at 453; Soczi y. * vH -• 53 swere, 306 Md. at 192; Svar.s y. Szzze, 304 Md. 437 , 522, 499 A.2d 1251 (1935) , zerz. deeded, U.S. , 106 ~ im 2 • S> • 3 310 92 l.Ed. 2d 722 (1936); Tester y. Szaze, swrpa, 304 Md. at 453-455. These cases are dispositive of the issue. 71. A. The defendant's principal argument as chat che Maryland capital punishment statute, as applied, as uncon 15 stitutionally mandatory. Mills's analysis begins with Code (1957, 1932 Real. Vol.), Art. 27, § 413(h) f2), which provides as follows: "If it (the court or jury]- finds that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentence shall be death." Former Maryland Rule 772A, in affect at the time of the de fendant's trial, implemented the statutory provision by giving the jury a form to fill cut. The instructions on the form told the jury that if one or more aggravating circumstances were present, and if no mitigating circumstances were found, the jury should enter "Death" on the part cf the form for the sentence. In the present case, the jury found that one aggra vating factor had been established, namely that Mills was an inmate in a correctional ir.stituticr at the time he committed the murder. The jury found no mitigating circumstance, and it determined that the sentence should be death. Relying primarily on «co *0*. j . ,7c re* 423 U.3. 230, 96 S.Ct. 2973, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976), and v. it:lisiznc, 423 CJ.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 D.Sd.2d 974 (1975), Mills maintains that "any statutory scheme which requires the return of a death sentence without providing the sentencer with an option to impose a life sentence is invalid." (Brief, ?. 47). In this case, according to Mills, cnce the jury found 17 ng circ'instance anc ecuired the jury to ,s that, aithough noMills suggests that, although no mitigating factors were found, "there is nothing in the record to indicate that had the jurors teen civen a choice, any one of them would have considered the ultimate sanction appropriate." (Ibid.). Because, in the defendant's view, the Maryland statute may mandate a death- sentence under circumstances where the sentencing authority is net convinced that death is the appropriate punishment, at is claimed that the statute violates the Eighth and "ourteenth Amendments. This Court has rejected arguments like that set forth above on several occasions. I n > J- ■ I • > -• zi 71:''.:-:, , I " J- , , • - ■»a, 305 Md. at 59, 337, 3 0 C A.2d 272 (1933 t. 3313, ■} 2 L.Ed.2d “43 Md. at 4 “ 3 -473 ; J <2 . : 2 K 2 1 , vj . 3 . , L u o a (1935) ; *. r̂ * . - . — . ̂ , 3 _ a ur rc, 297 Md. at 3 3 7 ; 3 . 723, 415 A. 2d 330 (1990) . he have held that the Marylar. capital punishment statute does net require the teats, se if the jury believes death to be inappropriate and that not a mandatory death penalty statute. As explained m •03--Z? case (304 Md. at 474-473), a . n A *• — 3 r* / i Ul 13 "§ 413(g)(3) includes as mitigating circum stances '[a]ny other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets forth, in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case.' We held in rij'nnall ' that, be cause of this provision, the Maryland statute 'is not a mandatory death penalty statute,’ and satisfies the standards of Vccdzan j . .'lorn* Carolina, 423 O.S. 230, 96 S.Ct. 2973 , 49 L.Zd.2d 944 (1975) , and r.cbarzs v. Lsuizi- 423 O.S. 323 , 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Zd.2d 974 (1976). 237 Md. at 723, 413 A.2d 330. We reiterated this holding in Czlhcun, point ing out that under the Maryland statute 'the sentencing authority may articulate una fzc- :jr it finds in mitigation.' 297 Md. an 537 463 A.2d 43. "Therefore, the defendant erroneously argues that 'if the defendant fails to meet his burden of proof and persuasion' con cerning mitigating circumstances, death 'may be mandated where the sentencer is uncon vinced that death is the appropriate punish ment. ' . . . A sentencing authority, uncon vinced that death is appropriate, may list as a mitigating circumstance whatever factor or factors may have led to this conclusion, irrespective of what the defendant produced or argued. If the sentencing authority per ceives anything relating to the defendant or the crime which causes it to believe that death may net be apnropriate, it may treat such factor as a mitigating circumstance and decide that it outweighs the aggravating circumstances." The defendant Mills responds by indicating that the abave-guoted holding may be accurate if all twelve jurors can agree upon the same mitigating factor and can agree that it out weighs the aggravating factor. (Reply brief, p. IS). Mills asserts, however, that "[tlhe defense adduced evidence of a num ber of such [mitigating] factors, and indivadual jurors may well have been persuaded' of their existence. Again, any number of jurors 19 -ay have concluded . . . that the litigating factors outweighed che agcravating . . . . Nevertheless, the mechanical operation of the statutory scheme permitted no choice - the jurors were required to return a death sentence whether they believed it justified . . . or net." . under the defendant's construction of the statute, unless all twelve jurors can agree than seme mitigating factor or factors exist, and further, unless all twelve jurors can agree on the existence of the sews mitigating factor or fac tors, the jury must conclude that there are no mitigating factors and that, if an aggravating circumstance has teen found, the sentence must be.death. Additionally, according to the defendant, all twelve jurors must agree that the same mitigating factor or factors outweigh the aggravating circum- stances in order for the penalty to be other than death. For example, under Hills ’ s view, in a hypothetical case six jurors might believe that the accused was of " /outhful age," that this factor outweighed the aggravating circumstances found, but that there were no other mitigating factors. Six other jurors might disagree concerning youthful age but might believe that the accused suffered from an unfortunate childhood, that this was a mitigating factor, and that it outweighed the aggravating 1 While raised in the briefs, this contention by the defendant was developed more extensively during oral argument before this Court. __________ _______ __ 2J?-.______________________ 20 factors. Yet because it could not u.na.yu.mo(î iy mark "yes'* to any one mitigating circumstance, according'to Mills's theory the jury would be required to find that no mitigating circum stance existed and, therefore, would be required to return a sentence of death. Like other challenges to the validity of the Maryland death penalty statute that have been made, 3 the defendant's argument is premised upon an erroneous construction of the statute. Nothing in the pertinent language of the death penalty statute purports to abolish the traditional common law and Maryland requirement that, absent waiver, jury deter minations of critical issues must be unanimous. This requirement of unanimity generally extends to all matters submitted to the jury; it applies to the entire jury determination. As stated by this Court long ago, a "'verdicu is the a,t<x/ii/ncu4 decision made by the jury . . . on the matters lawfully submitted to [it] in the course of the trial.' Unca/uLn-i-Cy is indispensable to the sufficiency of the verdict . . . .'* raxd v. Tkz S-Cxit, 12 Md. 514, 549 (1359) (emphasis in original).° The Maryland Szz, z.g., coster v. State, a, 304 Md. at 471-430. Szz, g znz'ia.ZZy, z.g., Articles 5 and 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; Smith v. State, 299 Md. 153, 153-155, 472 A.2d 933 (1934); State v. McKay 5 21 death penalty statute refers to "the jury" as a single entity, maJcinc its findings and determinations concerning the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances, the existence of mitigating circumstances, and the weighing of one set against the other. Art. 27, § 413, subsections (d), (f), (g) and (h). 6 (Ccnt’d) 230 Md. 353, 551-352, 556-574, 375 A.2d 223 (19/7); Coby v. State, 225 Md. 293, 297-299, 170 A.2d 199 (1961); 2 Pee, PZzzdi.ng and Pxa.cZi.cz § 333 (1925 ed.). These provisions, in relevant part, are as follows: "(d) CoyiAi.dzxzZi.cn o3 zqgxzvxZing ci.X- cumcZznczA. - In determining the sentence, the court or jury, as the case may be, shall first consider whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, any of the following aggravating circumstances exist: # * * "(f) Fi.ndu.nig ZnzZ no zggxzvzZi.ng c-ix- c'cmAZxnczA zx-icZ. - If the court or jury dees not find, beyond a reasonable doubc, that one or more of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall state that conclusion in writing, and the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. "(g) CaiLAi.dzxtzZi.an. a 3 miZi.gxZi.ng cix- czmAZxnczA . - If the court or jury finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall then consider whether, based upon a preponderance of the evi dence, any of the following mitigating circumstances exist: ★ * * "(h) rJJzi.gni.ng mi.Zt.gcZi/ig end egg-ta- \jtzZing ci.zcxmAHzneza • - (I) If the court or jury finds that one or more of these 22 The jurv is required to set forth its decisions on these natters on a fora which, while relating to/the sentence, is gessentially a verdict sheet. The death penalty statute expressly reflects the traditional requirement of unanimity, as it provides in § 413(i) as follows (emphasis added): "(i) VzizxmZnaHZan Ha bz M.zZHHzn and. a/ia/tx.- - The determination of the court or jury shall be in writing, and, if a jury, ikaZl bz u/ian̂ jrrouu and shall be signed by the foreman." Szz Hevt,vU v. SHcuHz, 295 Md. 329 , 339-340, 455 A.2d 979 (1933). Consequently, the defendant Mills correctly argues that for the jury Ha dzHzxmZnz that the sentence is to be lZ$z imprisonment, the decision that there are mitigating circum- -stances not outweighed by aggravating circumstances must be arrived at unanimously. 3ecause of the same statutory re quirement of unanimity, however, for the jury Ha dzHz’mZnz 7 (Cant’d) mitigating circumstances exist, it shall determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. "(2) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the aggra vating circumstances, the sentence shall be death. "(3) If it finds that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, the sentence shall be » imprisonment for life." Szz farmer Rule 772A, which governed the instant capital sentencing proceeding. a 23 that the sentence is to be dzz£k, the decision that there exists at least one aggravating circumstance which outweighs whatever mitigating circumstances may exist must also be arrived at unanimously. Thera is utterly no basis in the statutory language or in logic for Mills1s conclusion that whenever the jurors cannot unanimously agree on the same mitigating circumstance or circumstances, the result will always be a sentence of death. As long as one juror believes that there exists a mitigating factor, and that this factor is not outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, and if such juror continues to adhere to his or her position, the sentence will not be .death under the statutory scheme. It is true that, if there is ultimate disagreement amcng the jurors, there may. be no jutz/ determination of a life sentence. In this situation, however, there will also be no jury deter mination of a death sentence. Instead, the sentence will be life imprisonment under Art- 27, 5 413(k)(2), which stages: "(2) If the jury, within a reasonable time, is not able to agree as to sentence, the court shall dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life." Thus, in the hypothetical case described earlier, where six jurors found the existence of the statutory miti gating factor of youthful age and believed that it was not outweighed by aggravating circumstances, but found no other mitigating factors, while the other six jurors refused to 24 find the existence of youthful age but found the existence of a different mitigating factor, the jury as a-'single entity would not be able to indicate on the sentencing form that any particular mitigating factor existed because of the lack of unanimity among jurors. But, contrary to the defendant's argument, the same lack of unanimity would preclude the jury from indicating that no mitigating factors were present. And, as long as at least one of the jurors adhered to the view that there was a mitigating circumstance not outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, the sentence would ultimately be life imprisonment. Even if the other eleven jurors became convinced that there were no mitigating factors, it would nevertheless be improper for the jury to decide that no mitigating factors exist and that the sentence should' be death. This would be "majority rule," contrary to the traditional Maryland requirement of jury unanimity which is expressly embodied in § 412(i) of the Maryland death penalty statute. To reiterate, as long as one juror perceives any factor relating to the crime or the defendant which he regards as a mitigating factor and which he -believes is not outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, the jury will net be able to determine that the sentence shall be death. Moreover, as pointed out repeatedly in our cases, if a juror does not believe that death is the appropriate punishment, whatever 4 a 25 factor relating to tie crime or tie defendant tiat led to suci belief nay be regarded by tiat juror as a mitigating cir cumstance not outweighed by aggravating circumstances. Assuming tiat suci juror dees net ciange his mind after jury deliberations for a reasonable time, tie sentence in tie case will be life imprisonment under § 413(k) (2) . While no issue has been raised by tie defendant Mills concerning tie sentencing form or tie jury instructions in this regard, it is notewortiy tiat both tie form and tie instructions were entirely in accord with tie requirement tiat tie critical jury determinations be reached by tie unanimous vote of tie jurors. Tie sentencing form, with tie jury's answers, was in part as follows (emphasis added): "3ased upon tie evidence we unanimously find tiat each of tie following aggravating circumstances which is marked 'yes' has bean proven 3EY0ND A REASONABLE C0U3T and each . aggravating circumstance which is narked 'no* has not been proven .3EYCND A REASONABLE SOUBT: "1. The officer who formance of victim was a law enforcement was murdered while in tie per- his duties. _____ X yes no "2. The defendant committed tie murder at a time when he was confined in a correc tional institution. X ___yes no * * * V / 26 "10. The Defendant committed the murder while committing or attempting to commit robbery, arson or rape or sexual -offense in the first degree. _____ X yes no "(If one or more of the above are marked 'yes', complete Section II. If all of the above are marked 'no', do not complete Sections II and III.) "SECTION II "Based upon the evidence wz u./ia./u.nrou.̂ Zy ji/id thauC each of the following mitigating circumstances which is marked 'yes' has been proven to exist by A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE and zzjza m-iii gating cXt cunts-fane 2. mtz.ia.zd ' ao ' kcu> a at bzzn psiavzn by A PRE PONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE: "1. The defendant previously (i) has not been found guilty of a crime of violence; and (ii) has not entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; and (iii) has not been granted probation on stay or entry of judgment pursuant to a charge or a crime of violence. As used in this paragraph, 'crime of violence' means abduction, arson, escape, kidnapping, manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter, mayhem, murder, robbery, or rape or sexual offense in the first or second degree, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses, or the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or another crime of violence. _____ X yes no "2. The victim was a participant in the defendant’s conduct or consented to the act which caused the victim's death. ____ __X_ yes no V i 27 "3. The defendant: ached under substantial duress, domination or provocation of another person, but not so substantial as to consti tute a complete defense to the prosecution. _____ X yes no "4. The murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was sub stantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental disorder or emotional disturbance. _____ X yes no "3. The youthful age of the defendant at the time of the crime. _____ X yes no "5. The act of the defendant was not the sola proximate cause of the victim's death. _____ X yes nc "7. It is unlikely that the dafindant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society. yes no ”3. Other mitigating circumstances exusm, as set forth below: Mone_____________________________________ (Use reverse soda if necessary) "We a/ic/t-i/nou-4iu determine the sentence io be Oeath_____ [Signatures of all twelve jurors!" 23 It is clear that the fora required the jurors to agree unanimously that there were no mitigating factors in order for the jury to mark "no” with respect to ail statutory or other possible mitigating factors. Despite the suggestion to the contrary in the dissenting opinion, there is no ambiguity in the language of Section II concerning unanimity. The words are: "we unanimously find that each of the following mitigating circumstances which is marked 'yes' has been proven to exist . . . and each mitigating circumstance marked 'no' has not been proven . . . ." In addition to the clause referring to each mitigating circumstance marked "yes," the clause referring to each mitigating circumstance marked "no" is also the object of "we unanimously find that." The sen tencing form or "verdict sheet," as completed in this case, demonstrates that not a single juror found the existence of any mitigating circumstance. The trial judge's instructions in the present case similarly emphasized that jury determinations must be unanimous. After the court clerk handed the jurors copies of the sen tencing form, the trial judge instructed the panel as fol lows: "let me remind you that in reaching your determination as to any of the issues raised by the case and prssencec to you on this sentencing form your verdict must be unanimous; .,-LdT. - 29 that is, all twelve of you trust agree. ' 1 When the trial judge explained mitigating circumstances to the jury, he said: "Again I stress that your finding as to mitigating circum stances must be unanimous, that is you must all agree." At the end of his instructions the judge said: "Again 1st me remind you of . . . the requirement than vcur verdict or your decision with regard to any of these items must be unanimous. 1 After closing arguments, just before the jury recired to deliberate, the judge added: "Let me remind you that . . . as you consider each of the circumstances you must indicate •jzi> ax no , however your unu/ti/nous decision falls. You must indicate either yes or no as to each of those circumstances." (Emphasis added). The jury was fully instructed that it must be unanimous in finding that no mitigating circumstances existed. In.light of the verdict sheet and the trial judge's instructions, there is no basis for Mills's speculation that seme of the jurors might have believed, that seme mitigating factors existed. Finally, we are aware of no Maryland authority which would support the apparent view of che defendant and of Judge McAuliffe that, if jurors are unable to agree unanimously in favor of one party or one side of an issue submitt,ed, but rsmain in disagreement, the resu. is somehow a verdict or determination in favor of the party or the n I* ■? *» t- « i n O? tb a L 5 S U ® . Judes McAuliff i - 30 suggests in his dissenting opinion that when a jury is asked if a particular circumstance exists or has .'been proven, unanimity is required for the jury to answer the question in the affirmative but not in the negative. The dissent states that "[i]f one juror believes it has been so proven, but eleven do not the jury answers ’no’ to the question . . . ." This is not, however, how the jury system and the burden of proof traditionally function. For example, in many ordinary tort cases, the only disputed issue is whether the plaintiff has met the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. The ultimata question regarding liability presented to the jury is: "has it been proven that the defendant was negligent?" If ail twelve jurors agree that the plaintiff has proven negligence, there will be a verdict for the plaintiff. If all twelve jurors believe that the plaintiff has failed to prove negli gence, there will be a verdict for the defendant. But, any other alignment will result in a hung jury. Thus, if one juror believes that the plaintiff has proven that the de fendant was negligent, and if eleven jurors believe that the plaintiff has failed to prove negligence, the result is not a verdict for the defendant. In this situation, the jury is unable to answer the question "was the defendant negligent?" The fact that the plaintiff has the burden of proof dees not result in some form of majority or plurality rule. 31 Rather, the burden of proof operates with respect to each juror individually. The sane is true in a criminal case. As previously pointed out, the jurors must be unanimous one way or the other an all issues submitted, Fatd v. Tkz Sbuba, iap̂ ia, 12 Md. at 549. If one juror believes that the State has met its burden of proving the defendant's guilt, but the other eleven jurors are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt, the result is not an acquittal but a hung jury. Otherwise, there would be no need for modified 411in-type instructions to jurors who are unable to reach 'unanimous agreement. Szz, a. 3 ., Uaui+zld v. Sbnba, 302 Md. 524, 490 A.2d 537 (1985); GaadmiUh. v. Sbaba, 302 Md. 513, 490 A.2d 532 (1935); Sutnebba v. Sbaba, 230 Md. 33, 371 A.2d 553 (1977); Kaily v. Sbuba, 270 Md. 139, 310 A.2d 333 (1973). The dissenting opinion, at another point, seams to agree that the jury's "determination of any ulb-irnaba i-uiaa essential to the verdict must be unanimous." The dissent gees on to state, however, that "where alternative findings of historic facts are advanced in support of a single con clusion the better rule is that the jurors need not agree on any single alternative fact provided they all agree on seme alternative fact than leads them to a single conclusion an the ultimate issue." We shall assume than this is the "better rule" with regard to alternate findings of historical % 32 facts in support of a single conclusion. Nevertheless, the presence ax xbzzncz of aggravating and .-litigating circumstances, and the weighing of aggravating against mitigating circuit- - stances, ail fail into the category of ’’ultimate issues." The General Assembly by statute has made them the critical issues to be submitted to and determined by the capital sentencing jury. Not only are they "ultimate issues essential to the verdict," but, under the statute and rule, the jury's deter minations of the presence or absence of aggravating and miti gating circumstances constitute part of the "verdict" itself. As such, unanimity is contemplated under Maryland law. Art. 27, § 413 (i); 2m.U'x v. 2ZzZz, 299 Md. 153 , 163-155 , 472 A.2d 933 (1984); Faxd a. Tkz 2ZaXz, iapxa, 12 Md. at 549 . The defendant Mills's contention, concerning the effect of juror disagreement on an issue, is also contrary to the position taken generally throughout the country. The cases regularly point out that unanimity is required fr.r -a jury determination on either side of an issue,, that th.i burden and standard of proof operate upon each juror individually and not upon the jury collectively on a majority basis, aid that the failure to achieve unanimity on either side of an issue ordinarily results in a hung jury. Sit ] zxzm.xL'..j , z.a., 3a iZ v. 2ZzZz, 29 Ala.App. 152, 193 So. 560 (1940); Sxoxn v. SZxZz, 369 A . 2d 632, 53 4 (Del. 1976); Cui Zt z a . ■ 'i Z S Cr C <1 , 7 3 -nd. 145 (1331); Shihc v. Thz SZxZZ, 104 Ind. 359, 352-353, 4 N.3. 4 * 33 145 (1385); Gcuidzrt v • Moaxz, 174 Iowa 376, 156 N.W. 410, 411 (1916); Tfiz 3-t̂ Cz u. SZz:o<z.l£, 52 Iowa 284,;2S6-237 (1379); Ecu-Ct-t v. 3-Cut £, 191 Miss. 651, 4 So. 2d 227, 137 A.L.R. 391 (1941); Comma nutzaZXk v. !Jlz£Z, 93 Pa. Super. 446 , 448-449 (1923); Siaia v. HcuuUA; 39 R.I. 202, 206-207, 152 A.2d 106 (1959); Cu-i-iiaven-i v. Taxt-i i ?. Zu . C 3 .. , 119 Tex. 455, 32 3.VI. 2d 537, 533 (1930); S-tmta a. t, 94 W.Va. 224, 113 S.2 . 139, 141 (1923); Sinia u. McCauaid/id, 32 w.v a. 525, 96 S.S. 933, 941 (1913); .Anno., Zza^anah-Lz 0au.aZ Jj l a<LL\i zdixaJ. Ju.A.o\, 137 A.L.R. 394 (1942); 1 Un.dz-iliJ.ZZ' i C/ulmi/tc-d Evida/tca, § 30 (6th a d . ) ; 1 Wha-tia/t’<i Ctimi/tui cvzdznzz 5 11 (13th ad.). This principle of unanimity has specifically teen applied to jury determinations of the penalty in capital cases. Thus, in Ancitti v. U/u.-Czd ZZsXz-i, 333 U.S. 740, 746-7 49, 63 S.Ct. 330, 92 L.Sd. 1055 (1943), a statute provided that the jury in a murder case could qualify its verdict by adding "without capital punishment," that if the jury sc qualified its verdict the punishment would be life imprisonment, but that "[i]f a qualified verdict is not returned, the death penalty is mandatory." 333 U.S. at 746. The government’s argument, somewhat like the defendant's argument in the instant case, was that the jurors were required to be unanimous in order for the jury to add the qualification but that unanimity was not required to reject the qualificaticn. In the government's 34 view, if the jurors remained in disagreement, there would be no qualification, and the sentence would be death. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument, holding "that unanimity of the jury was required both as to guilt and the refusal to qualify the verdict by the words 'without capital punishment. ' " Ii. at 746-747. The Supreme Cour-i in Xndxzz agreed with the Ninth Circuit and disagreed with the govern ment:, stating as follows (ii. at 743-749): "Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply. In criminal cases this requirement of una nimity extends to all issues - character or degree of the crime, guilt and punishment - which are left to the jury. . . . [W]e con clude that the construction placed upon the statute by the lower court is correct - that the jury's decision upon both guilt and whether the punishment of death should be imposed must be unanimous. This construction is more consonant with the general humani tarian purpose of the statute and the history of the Anglo-American jury system than that presented by the Government." Numerous caS' s are in accord with the position taken in XncLzz± concerning tie jury's finding of mitigation or deter mination of the penalty in a capital .case. Szz, z.i., Smi-Ck u. UnUZzd S-Cataa, 47 r.2d 313 , 319-520 (9th Cir. 1921); Pzopiz v. GsiZZ/i, 47 Cal.2d 209, 302 ?. 2d 307, 313-322 (1956); Pzapiz v. Mali, 199 Cal. 451, 249 ?. 359 (1925); Stzzz v. Pz'.jnai±z, 41 N.J. 163, 137, 195 A.2d 449 (1963); Pzaplz v. Hiit4, 237 N.Y. 165 , 170-171, 174, 33 N.Z.2d 432 (1941). Szz -ill a,: ii v. SZJJIZ, 51 Okla.Cr. 336, 339-390, 393-397, 1 ?.2d 324, 2 9.2d s x 35 965 (1931); Anno., L'/tixnJ.mA.iu A-i To Pnn-î kmzndl Lti Cxd.mx.AoJ. Ca.4Z 'JJkzxz Jllxlj Can Pzzommznd Lznzx Pzao. H u , l_A.L.R.3d 1461 (1965). CoajZx x : Comma amzoJZ'a a. SZzmo^H, 359 Mass. 671, 270 N.Z.2d 311, 314-315 (1971), MizoiZzd, 403 U.S. 345 , 92 S.Ct. 2845 , 33 L.Zd.2d 744 (1972).9 Consequently, we reject the defendant's argument that whenever the jurors cannot unanimously agree on the same miti gating circumstance or circumstances, they must return a death sentence. 3. The foregoing discussion disposes of the defendant's contention that the Maryland death penalty statute, as applied 10to the facts of this case, i3 unconstitutionally mandatory. * S With regard to the requirement of unanimity in cases under recvnt death penalty statutes, izz Whalen v. State, 492 A.2d 552, 562 (Del. 1935); State v. Loyd, 439 So.2d 493, 503 (La. 1984); State v. Williams, 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 490 N.S.2d 906, 913 (1986); State v. Jenicins, 15 Chio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264. 306- 307 (1934); Evans v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 463, 323 S .£. 2d 114, 121 (1984), CZ-H. dzxJzd, 471 *J.S. 1025, 105 S.Ct. 2037, 35 L.Sd.2d 319 (1935); State v. Mak, 105 Wash.2d 592, 713 ?.2d 407, 442, 445, zzxC. dz>Uzd, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986). The only case of which we are aware supporting the defendant Mills's argument under a recent death penalty statute (although not supporting his view as to consti tutionality) is State v. Eirklev, 308 W.C. 196, 302 S.E. 2d 144, 155-157 (1983) .. The Worth Carolina court cited no authority in support of its conclusion. The defendant also asserts that the Maryland death- penalty statute is unconstitutional with regard to ....____________ :........... .................................._ .............................. _ ____ __________________________ 36 nevertheless, considering the defendant's misconstruction of the statute and the views expressed in the-dissenting opinion, we believe that it would be useful for future guidance to comment generally upon the required jury determinations under Art. 27, §§ 413(d)(f)(g) and (h) in light of the traditional requirement of unanimity which is expressly embodied in § 413(i) In the usual criminal trial, of course, involving the issue of whether the defendant committed the offense charged, the result of a hung jury is ordinarily a mistrial and, at the state's option, a new trial on the issue. It is clear from Art. 27, § 413 ()<) (2), however, that the General Assembly did" not intend for juror disagreement in a capital sentencing proceeding to result in a mistrial and a new sen tencing proceeding. As previously pointed out, § 413(k)(2) provides for dismissal of the jury and a court-imposed life sentence "[if] the jury, within a reasonable time, is not able* to agree as to sentence." One difficulty in applying 5 413 (3c) (2) is that the General Assembly has required more of the jury than the single determination of what the sentence should be. Under §§ 413(d). IQ (Cont'd) the allocation of the burden of proof. The identi cal argument has repeatedly been rejected by this Court. Sea coster, Ivans and Huffingtcn v. State, 305 Md. 306, 503 A.2d 1326, ce-tf. denied, O.S. , 106 S.Ct. 3310, 3315, 92 L.Td.2d 722, 723, 745 (1936); Faster v. State, iapna, 304 Md. at 471-430, and cases there cited. 37 (f) (g) and (h), the jury must sake decisions concerning the existence or non-existence of aggravating circumstances, the existence or non-existence of mitigating circumstances, and the weighing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances. More over, analytically (if not always practically) these decisions are to be made in sequential stages. The matter which the statute does not fully address is what happens where the jurors are unable to achieve entirely the contemplated unanimity and there is juror disagreement at different stages and with respect to different types of issues. Section 413(d) first requires the jury to determine whether or not any of ten statutorily specified aggravating circumstances exist. Section 413(f) states that if the jury "does not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or mere of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall state that conclusion in writing, and the sentence shall be imprisonment for life." Section 413(g)' then provides that if the "jury finds beyond a .reasonable ioubt, that one or more of these aggravating circumstances exist," the jury must go on to a consideration of mitigating circumstances. Under these pro visions, a finding that at least one aggravating circumstance exists is clearly a precondition for the jury to consider mitigation, weighing and the possibility of a death sentence. Consequently, absent a finding of an aggravating factor, a life sentence is to be imposed at the conclusion 33 of the proceedings under subsection (d) and (f). If the jurors unanimously find the absence of any statutory aggravating circum stance, the jury under subsection (f) completes the verdict *sheet accordingly and a life sentence is imposed. If the jurors are in disagreement and, after a reasonable period of time, unable to determine unanimously (as required by 5 413(D) that at least one aggravating circumstance is present, § 413 C<) (2) comes into operation, the jury is dismissed, and the court imposes a life sentence. The situation may also arise in connection with ag gravating circumstances where the jurors unanimously agree that one or more aggravating circumstances exist, unanimously agree that several aggravating circumstances do not exist, but, after a. reasonable time, remain in disagreement over the existence of one or more other possible aggravating circumstances listed in the statute. It is obvious that 5 413(k)(2) does not operate in this situation to terminate che proceed, ng, b icause § 413(g) makes it clear that, upon a finding of only one statutory aggravating circumstance, the jury is oc proceed and consider possible mitigating circumstances. Thus, in the hypothetical situation posed, the jury should mark "yes" on the form or verdict sheet as to the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it finds present, should mark "no" as to the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it finds absent, should not give any answer as to the presence or absence of the aggravating circumstance or circumstances over 39 which it remains in disagreement, and should proceed to consider the oresence or absence of mitigating circumstances under § 413(g) . stances, § 413(g) requires the jury to decide "whether . . . any of the following (eight statutorily specified] mitigating circumstances exist." The eighth one is any fact which the jury relieves is mitigating. Therefore, as discussed in Part A above, under the statute and implementing form prescribed by farmer Rule 772A, the jurors are expected to reach a unani mous decision concerning the presence or absence of each miti gating circumstance, as the jurors in the instant case did. The statute then provides in § 413(h) that "Ci]f the court or jury finds that one or more of these mitigating circumstances exist, it" shall weigh the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating, determine which outweighs the other, and enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death depending on which outweighs the other. (h), however, contains substantial gaps. There is no provision, comparable to § 413(f) (regarding the absence or aggravating circumstances), telling the court or jury what to do if it finds no mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, there is no complete determination. The Language or §§ 413(g) and (h) Turning to the consideration of mitigating circum- The express language of the statute in §5 413(g) and provision specifying what happens if the jurors are divided over some mitigating circumstances and thus cannot reach a 40 deals only with the situation where the court or jury deter mines that one or more mitigating circumstances exist. Nevertheless, the General Assembly obviously did not intend that the sentencing proceedings should end in a stalemate and that § 413(k)(2) should be invoked ii the jury failed to fi-d any mitigating circumstance. This would result in a life sen tence for a defendant where there is no finding of mitigation. In contrast, § 413(h) would require a death senmence for the de fendant where there is a finding of mitigating circumstances but they are deemed outweighed by aggravating circumstances. Such construction of the statute would be entirely unreasonable. The General Assembly, however, did provide that pro cedural gaps in the statute could be filled by the Court of Appeals. Section 413(1) states: "The lourt of Appeals may adopt rules of procedure to govern the conduct of a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, - including any forms to be used by the crurt or jury in taking its written findings ard deter minations of sentence." Pursuant to subsection (1), this Court in former Pule 772A provided for the situation where the court or jury determined that no mitigating circumstance existed. The sentencing form specifies that, where there is a determination of no mitigating circumstances, the sentence is to be death. This is logical and in accord with the General Assembly's purpose that miti gating and aggravating circumstances be weighed. If there St 41 are no mitigating circumstances, there is nothing to weigh against the aggravating factors? one side o'f the scale is zero. Consequently, a death sentence is appropriate under the statu tory scheme. The sentencing form under former Rule 772A does not, however, deal with the situation where there is no jury agree ment cn the existence of any particular mitigating circumstance but where there also is no ’unanimous jury determination that no mitigating circumstance existed. This situation could take a variety of forms. For example, all of the jurors might agree that several very weighty mitigating circumstances are present, but there may be no unanimity concerning the existence of any one particular mitigating circumstance. At the other extreme, eleven jurors might believe that no mitigating circumstance exists, but one juror might insist that one mitigating circum stance exists although it is outweighed by the aggravating circumstances. It would not be consistent with the legislative scheme for che sentencing proceeding to be aborted under § 413 (k) (2) in this situation. In our view, where the jurors after a reasonable period of time cannot agree on any particular mitigating circumstance or circumstances, but also cannot agree that no mitigating circumstances exist, the jurors should pro ceed to the weighing process ’under § 413 (h) . Each juror should weigh the mitigating circumstance which ha or she / 7 42 finds, if any, against the aggravating circumstances which the jurv under § 413(d) has unanimously found to exist. In this manner, a jury might well arrive at a unanimous determination cn the sentence even though there was underlying disagreement on the presence or absence of seme mitigating circumstances. This process comports with the general legislative intent that the imoositicn of the penalty in these cases should depend upon the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances. In sun, with regard to mitigating circumstances, the jury should mark the sentencing form "yes" for each mitigating circumstance which is unanimously found to exist, mark the form "no" for each mitigating circumstance which is unani mously found not to exist, and leave the form blank with regard to those mitigating circumstance (if any) as to which there is disagreement. Then, unless there is unanimity that no mitigating circumstance exists (such as in the -instant case), the jurors should engage in the weighing proo-ss. VII. Mills next argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it must find that he was a principal in the first degree in order for the death penalty to be a possible sentence. Preliminarily, we note that Mills made no request for such instruction, and made no objection to one trial court's failure to give the instruction iuu ipa/t-ti. * - , r 43 Furthermore, under the facts of this case, the absence of the instruction could not have prejudiced Mills- There could be no doubt concerning the defendant's status as a principal in the first degree. Mills and the victim were isolated in a locked jail cell. Mills emerged with a bloody "shank" in his gloved hand and confessed to killing his cell mate, as previously described. He concedes in his brief "the absence of any factual dispute raised by the evidence" regarding the matter. (3rief, ?. 53). Accordingly the omission in the trail court's instructions, even if error, was clearly harmless. VIII. Mills makes two additional complaints concerning the sentencing hearing. Neither matter, however, was preserved far appellate review. Rules 4-322, 4-325(e) and 335. Fitab, the defendant claims that the trial court's instruction to the-jury on the possible mitigating circumstance of the youthful age of the defendant provided insufficient "guiiance" and was "oversimplified." (3rief, pp. 53-54). Ne need not explore this question, as Mills never requested an instruction on the mitigating circumstance of youthful age, did not abject to the instruction given, and defense counsel expressly stated at the conclusion of the trial judge's jury instructions: "The defense has no objection to the instructions given to the jury, your honor. S'? 44 Szzond, the defendant asserts that the jury was remitted to hear "a great deal of inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence." (3rief, p. 56). Not only was there no defense objection to this evidence, but some of the evidence complained of was apparently introduced by the defense. The defendant on appeal obviously cannot challenge the admissi bility of this evidence.-1 IX. The defendant contends that the death sentence in this case is excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.^ Mills cites six allegedly "similar cases" from the circuit courts involving homicides in correctional i n s t i t u t i o n s I n all six cases, the To the extent that trial counsel's tactics in deciding to present certain evidence may relate to the constitutional adequacy of counsel, the matter is not appropriate for resolution on direct' appeal. It can be raised in a cost conviction traces, cing. Harris v. State, 299 Md. 511, 517-519, 474*A.2d9?0 (1994), and cases there discussed. Art. 27, § 414(e)(4) requires that this Court de termine "(4)[w]hether the sentence of death is ex cessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." They are State v. Parker, No. 25,113, Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County* State v. Holt, No. 5215, Circuit Court for Washington County; State v. Appleby, No. 19429601, Circuit Court for Balti more City; State v. Sllison and Little, Nos. L3403101 and 13403103, Circuit Court for Baltimore City; State v. Gee, No. 13321503, Circuit Court for Baltimore City; State v. Mack, No. 5.737, Circuit Court for Washington County. 6 # 45 dafer.car.ts either were convicted of first degree murder and received life sentences or were convicted of second degree murder and received a term of years. The defendant Mills asserts that his "research has disclosed *10 cases in which murder perpetrated by an inmate has resulted in a death sentence." (Brief, ?. 63). Preliminarily, we note that because no person has previously been sentenced to death for a particular type of murder, under a recently enacted death penalty statute, dees not mean that the first death sentence for that type of murder is necessarily disproportionate or excessive. Other wise, no one would ever receive the ultimate penalty under a capital punishment statute requiring proportionality review. For a detailed discussion of proportionality review under the present Maryland capital punishment statute, as well as under similar statutes in other states, sss TichnalZ v. Jeers, 297 Md. 432, 457-473 , 46a A.2d 1 (1933), rsrr. 466 U.5. 993, 104 S.Ct. 2374, 30 L.£d.2d 346 (1934). We have examined the six cases relied upon by the defendant Mills, and we conclude that the death sentence in the present case is not disproportionate or excessive in light of the sentences imposed in those cases. In only one of those cases was there a capital sentencing proceeding (Jrcis y. ?cr<sr), and there the sentencing authority found 46 as a mitigating factor that the defendant had a significant mental impairment. In the other cited cases there were factors or circumstances distinguishing them from the instant case. For example, in one case there was evidence that the defendant had been physically and verbally abused by the victim and in another cited case the jury could not determine whether the accused were principals in the first degree. The record before us shows that Mills brutally stabbed his ceil mate to death. There was neither evidence of provocation nor of a struggle; there was express evidence of long premeditation. Mills fingerpaintsd a slogan with the victim's blood, and he acknowledged the deed as soon as it was discovered. The jurors unanimously found no mitigating factors, and our review of the record confirms that the jury's action was warranted. Mills was serving-a sentence for second degree murder at the time of this offense. Cor. sidering the crime and the c.efendant, and com paring the penalty in this case to the death sentences im posed in cases such as 3cozr. y. iurrc, 206 Md. 172; v. surra, 304 Md. 439; and Cclvin y. Jtors, 299 Md. 33, 472 A.2d 953, csrr. daniad, 469 U.5. 373, 105 S.Ct. 226, 33 L.2d.2d 155 (1934), where the defendants also brutally and without provocation stabbed their victims oo death, we do not believe that the sentence here was dispro portionate or excessive. 47 X. Mills's final argument is that Art- 27, § 413(d)(2), specifying as an aggravating circumstance that '* [t]he defendant committed the murder at a time when he was confined in any correctional institution," is unconstitutional. The gist of his contention is as follows (Brief, p. 66): "It is a fundamental constitutional requirement that 'an aggravating circumstance must genuine ly narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.' lent y. Sizvhensj 462 U.S. 362, 77 L.£d.2d 235 , 249-250 '(1933). Applying the foregoing standard to § 413(d)(2) it is clear that this aggravating factor fails to meet the constitutional standard. 3cth of the tradi tional, presumably rational, concerns in dealing with prisoners — escape and deterring ’lifers' — are specifically provided for by other ag gravating factors. Article 27, § 413(d)(3) & (3) ." In addition, Mills asserts that § 413(d)(2) is overly broad, covering some "individuals . . . no more culpable than members of society at large . . . ." (Ibid.). In our view, the Maryland General Assembly was not constitutionally prohibited from listing as an aggravating circumstance the commission of a murder while an inmate in a correctional institution. This aggravating factor closely resembles one of the aggravating factors proposed by the Model Penal Code, and cited with approval in .7 race r. Zscvcia, 43 423 U.S. 153/ 153-195 n. 44, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2935 a. 4, 49 L.Sd.2d 359 (1976), namely that "[t]he murder was committed 'ey a convict under sentence of imprisonment." Moreover, it seems plain to us that this circumstance does genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Finally, the General Assembly is entitled to treat inmate status as an aggravating factor to deter inmates from murdering each other and those who come in contact with them. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Arizona in Sects v. Sillies, 135 Ariz. 500 , 662 P .2d 1007, 1019 (1933), the "legis lative intent of this . . . [aggravating factor] is to protect the guards and other inmates at such institutions where a defendant is confined and to discourage violence by incar cerated persons." We cannot conclude that this legislative purpose is irrational. Furthermore, this purpose is net en tirely met by other aggravating factors such as § 413(d)(3) and (3), concerning those sentenced to life imprisonment or death and those who escape or attempt to escape, neither of which would have been applicable .to Mills. We reject, therefore, the defendant’s assertion that § 413(d)(2) is unconstitutional.A* In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Booth v. Maryland. rJ.S. , ■ S.Ct. ,L.£d.2d (1937), we note chat in the instant case no "Victim Impacn Statement" was introduced in 49 JUDGMENT AfTIRMED. 14 (Cont'd.) evidence or even proffered. There was attached to the Division of Parole and Probation's investigation report a memorandum from Jane Christy of the victim/ witness assistance program zo the State's Attorney, summarizing an inter’/iew with the victim'3 brother and sister-in-law. This memorandum was admitted into evidence after Mills's counsel expressly in formed the Court that he had read it and did not object to its admission. The memorandum stated in its entirety as follows: "Paul and Thomas Brown came from a family of 3ix. At a very young age they were removed from their parents custody because of neglect and placed in separate foster homes. (Removal by the Department of Social Services was prompted by Paul being hospitalized at age 4 for anemia and mal nutrition. ) "Paul was a hyperactive child and hard to handle which resulted in a lot of beatings from his various guardians. He ran away constantly from the various homes in which he had been placed. After a while Paul, at the age of 15, just started living on the streets. He was eventually sent to the Maryland Training School for 3oys. Paul never really had a home or a family as 3ucii. 'I (Thomas Brown) triad to keep in touch with Paul by writing and visiting him whenever possible. I always had good homes and a good life and always felt so guilty that there was nothing I could do to help Paul. After all, I was only one year older than he.' "'Paul was a good person who had a tcugh life, a lot of bad breaks, no family, no home, nobody to really give him a chance. I sometimes think he felt more secure in prison, because he had no one on the out side. Sure, he committed crimes, but he wasn't violent. He did what he had to do 4 (Coat'd) to survive and he got involved with a lot of bad people."' This memorandum did not purport to b » and did not fall within the statutery recuiremei'.;s of a victim impact statement'. S&z Code (*1957, 1986 Repl. Voi.), Art. 41, § 4-609(c). The memorandum did net describe the impact of the crime on the victim's family or the "family members' opinion and characterizations" of the crime .and the defendant. 3coth v. Maryland, iupta. As defense counsel recognized at the sentencing proceeding in this case, the content of this statement would not inflame a jury or otherwise prejudice Mills. Consequently, the memorandum did not- constitute the "victim impact evidence" found constitutionally inadmissible in 3ooth v. Maryland, -sujatc. /. /. THE COURT C? Tuna 23 , 133 7 / "7 M urphy , I am in L — ^ ̂ it s 0 rr. 0 n ̂ with the Court's 3 r» ̂ C 0 of Mills' S*. *+ i r ■* <^ +• ■* ,“ v m ^ * ^ ■*•* >» w 1 * V .*. W >* _ U«< 4 . — W _ f4 rst dssr',,‘32 nurdsr - ,cu: uu*~0r.w ̂i.rTiir.g "he - i . = -■ .» * — 2 a_oneu rn no ■ concur j w ̂. s o: 2 and io lng as; . j. v; v _ o: IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Nos. 22 and 79 September Term, 198S RALPH WILLIAM MILLS v . STATE OF MARYLAND Murphy, C.J. ■"Srai th Eldr idge Cole Rodowsky Couch McAuli££e, JJ. Concurring ind Dissenting Opinion by McAuliffe, J. Filed: June 25, 1937 * Smith and Couch, JJ., now retired, participated in the hearing and con ference of thus case while active members of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution Article IV, Section 3A, they also participated in tne decision and adoption of thus opinion. I concur in the decision to affirm the conviction. 3ecause I am unable to agree with Part VI o£ the majority opinion and because I believe the sentencing procedure employed in this case was constitutionally unfair to t-he Defendant, I dissent from the affirmance of the sentence of death. At the threshold of my disagreement with the majority lies a question of statutory construction. The majority holds chat the Legislature intended to make the non-existence (as well as the existence) of aggravating and mitigating circumstances an ultimate issue in a capital sentencing proceeding, and therefore intended to require a unanimous verdict of existence or non-existence. I believe the Legislature intended to require unanimity for a finding of the existence of a circumstance, but did not intend to mandate a unanimous finding that any individual circumstance does not exist. I further believe it is probable, or at least reasonably possible, that this jury understood the language as the Legislature intended it, and that the answers of ”noM given on the sentencing form represented their failure to unanimously find the existence of a circumstance, rather than a unanimous determination that the circumstance did not exist. This is no mere semantic difference, for if I am correct, it means that the procedure followed in this case impermissibly and unconstitutionally precluded the ultimate consideration of mitigating factors that may have been proven. Moreover, even if I were to accept the majority's interpretation of the statute, I would find it intellectually difficult to accept the rather extraordinary,.and I think illogical, "filling of the gaps" accomplished by Section VI.3 of the majority opinion. Finally, if this newest creative interpretation o'f our capital punishment statute is entirely correct there should nonetheless be a new sentencing proceeding in this case. It is clear to me that no one at the trial could have understood the law to be as it is announced today, and the trial judge’s instructions were to the contrary. I turn to a more detailed examination of these several problems. Our death penalty statute mandates that the jury "shall first consider whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, any of the [enumerated] aggravating circumstances exist." Maryland Code, Art. 27, 5 4.13(d). Combining that with the requirement of unanimity which appears elsewhere in the statute, I interpret the question presented to the jury as to each enumerated aggravating circumstance to be: Do the jurors unanimously determine that this aggravating circumstance has been proven to exist beyond a reasonable doubt? If one juror believes it has been so proven, but eleven do not the jury answers "no" to the question, and that particular aggravating factor cannot be considered in the ultimate weighing process. Every relevant section of the statute speaks to whether the jury finds that an aggravating circumstance - 3 - ejcis_ts--no thing therein suggests the jury must also be unanimous in determining that an aggravating circumstance does not exist. Consider the language of these sections: (d) [T]he court or jury, as the case may be, shall first consider whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, any of the following aggravating circumstances exist: * * * (f) If the court or jury does not find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall state that conclusion in writing, and the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. (g) If the court or jury finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or mere of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall then consider whether, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following mitigating circumstances exist: * * * Ch) If the court or jury finds that one or more of these mitigating circumstances exist, it shall determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, litigating cirtumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances . ̂ We have Interpreted this language tc mean that the jury shall determine whether, by a prepondeiance of the evidence, aggravating circumstances outweigh the mi tigatins circumstanc Foster v. state, 304. Md. 439, 499- A.2d 1 2 3 6 i. i 9 3 o") , cert. denied, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 3310 (1986). /.= <0 n 4 Unfortunately, the form initially approved by this Court for use in capital sentence proceedings did not make clear that the requirement o£ unanimity with respect to consideration of an aggravating circumstance applied only to the question of whether that circumstance had been proven to exist. Rather, Maryland Rule 772A(d), effective January 1, 1979, approved the following language: Based upon the evidence we unanimously find that each of the following aggravating circumstances which is marked Wes' has been proven 3EY0ND A REASONABLE DOUBT and each aggravating circumstance which is marked 'no' has not been Droven BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT___ Although this language can accommodate the interpretation I believe to be correct, it also can accommodate the interpretation placed upon it by the majority--that the jurors must be unanimous in their determination that the aggravating circumstance does not exist in order to answer "no." A change in this language was made by the adoption of Rule 4-343(c) which supplanted Rule 772A(d), and which became effective July 1, 1984. That section now reads: Based upon the evidence we unanimously find that each of the fallowing aggravating circumstances that is marked 'yes' has been proven BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. Each of the aggravating circumstances that has not been so proven is marked 'no.' This change, intended to be one of style and not substance, more accurately reflects the intent of the Legislature. Unfortunately, the new language is not so clear in its meaning 7 J 3 that it docs not require explanation by means o£ careful instruction, and in any event the revised form was not used in ithis case. Had the sentencing form simply used the language of the statute by providing that "we unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the following aggravating circumstances exist" and then listed the aggravating factors with a box to be checked as to each found to exist, I believe jurors would have had no difficulty in concluding they were to mark only those circumstances they unanimously found to have been proven to exist. They simply would not mark those about which they disagreed. 3ecause the jurors are specifically instructed that they may consider only the aggravating factors they have unanimously found to exist, the defendant is fully protected. Thus there is no need, much less any legislative mandate, for a jury to unanimously find that a particular aggravating circumstance does not exist before it may continue delibe'*ition. Mot only is the legislative scheme for consideracion and determination of aggravating circumstances adequate for the ̂ The form actually used in this case tracked Rule 77’A(d), rather than Rule 4-343(c). The latter rule was applicable and should have been followed, but that change alone would not have cured the deficiencies present in this sentencing procedure. I have reviewed other differences between the form actually used and that which should have been used, and I find no indication of possible prejudice to the Appellant. 6 protection of an accused, it may well grant him more protection than is constitutionally required. The Supreme Court of Virginia has held, for example, that the requirement of unanimity extends to the ultimate question of whether death is the appropriate sanction and to the question of existence of any statutory enumerated aggravating factors that justify the imposition of the death penalty, but not to the existence of each individual aggravating circumstance. Clark v. Commonwealth, Z19 Va. 237, 257 S.c.Zd 734, 791-92 ( 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980). See also Brilev v. 3ass, 334 F.Supp. 307, 319 (E.D. Va.) (United States Constitution does not require that jury be unanimous as to aggravating factors relied upon in imposing death penalty), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 393 (1984); Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292, 236 S.E.2d 637 (jury conclusion that sufficient aggravating circumstances exist cannot be impeached by showing that part of the jury proceeded upon one interpretation and part upon another), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 960 (1977) In State v. Kirklev, 308 N.C. 196, 3G2 S.E.Zd 144 (1933), the Supreme Court of North Carolina ccrsidered and rejected a defendant’s claim that the requirement of unanimity extended not only to the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but to their non-existence as well. That Court said, id. at 137: Defendant contends, however, that even if it is proper that a mitigating circumstance exist only when there is unanimous agreement by the jury, the trial judge erred when he 7 instructed the jurors that a mitigating circumstance must be deemed not to exist in the absence of a unanimous agreement on its existence. Defendant impose the following order for a jury to f factor does not exist unanimously agree it unanimous agreement i contends, the result automatic imposition Although novel, the s unworkable and contra principles of unanimi * * * urges this Cour.t to requirement: that in ind that a mitigat ing it mus t first does not exist. If no s reached , defenda nt is a hung jury and the of life impri sonment. ugges ted approach is ry to the general cy. * The unanimity requirement is only placed upon the finding of whether an aggravating or mitigating circumstance exists. The mandate of our statute that the jury specifically and in writing determine ”[w]hich, if any, aggravating circumstances it finds to exist" obviates consideration of the above approach and the thorny subject of unanimity as it relates to the existence of aggravating circumstances. With this language the Legislature has made it clear that there must be unanimity as to each individual aggravating circumstance before it can be considered. Still, I shalL return to the question of unanimity and a consideration of the levels at which it must be applied in the adjudicative process, when I turn to analysis of the proper function of the jury with respect to the consideration of mitigating circumstances. 3 Under Appellant's interpretation of the statute, with which I agree, a split o£ six-six on whether an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance has been proven to exist simply means that the answer or the jury should be "no", i.e. the jury cannot unanimously determine by the appropriate standard of persuasion that the particular circumstance has been proven to exist. As previously stated, this conclusion causes no difficulty with respect to aggravating circumstances. it is well within the province of the Legislature to determine that an aggravating circumstance cannot be considered unless all jurors agree that it has been proven to exist, even though that result is not constitutionally required. Legislature to impose as a condition precedent to the collective consideration of relevant mitigating circumstances the requirement that all twelve jurors agree on the existence of each mitigating circumstance to be considered. As Appellant points out. the result of such a restriction not only would be illogical, but unconstitutional. Following Appellant's hypothetical situation and interpretation of the statute to a logical conclusion demonstrates the point. 3ecause of the six-six split on the two mitigating circumstances, these circumstances have not been unanimously found to exist, and the form will be marked "no” as to each. If no enumerated or It is quite a different matter, I suggest, for the 9 separately articulated mitigating circumstance has received the unanimous vote of the twelve jurors, the answers to each of the eight paragraphs of Section II (the mitigating circumstances section) will be "no." The consequence of that situation is as automatic as it is deadly--the jurors are not permitted to engage in the weighing-process or any deliberation on the appropriateness of the penalty of death, but are instructed chat ”[i]f Section II was completed and all of the answers were marked 'no', then enter 'Death'." Assuming there was a single aggravating circumstance in the hypothetical situation we have considered, and assuming that the six jurors who were not persuaded as to the existence of the first mitigating circumstance were the same six who were persuaded of the existence of the second mitigating circumstance in dispute, we are presented with twelve jurors who believe that relevant mitigating circumstances have been proven to exist and yet they are absolutely precluded from engaging in their principal function--the weighing of the aggravating against the mitigating circumstances to determ:ne the appropriate sanction. It is entirely conceivable that if allowed to engage in appropriate deliberation on the ultimate question, the jurors may not be persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating circumstance that each juror is convinced exists. To prohibit 10 che jury from considering relevant mitigating circumstances is to effectively sever the constitutionally indispensible "link between contemporary community values and the' penal system" chat the jury is intended to provide. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 29S, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Hd.2d 944 (1976) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 310, 319, 38 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 77 6 ( 1963))-. Drawing on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from any other sentence, the Supreme Court said in Woodson, 423 U.S. at 304: [I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. Other hypothetical situations provide more dramatic evidence of the potential dangers of requiring a unanimous verdict on the question of the existence of each individual mitigating factor. If the vote of the jury if; eleven to one for the existence of each of three mitigating circumstances and the dissenting vote is cast by a different juror in each instance, we can be certain that all twelve jurors have been convinced .by a preponderance of the evidence that at least two relevant mitigating circumstances exist. Yet, because they do not agree on which two exist, the procedure employed in this case would 11 foreclose their consideration o£ any mitigating circumstances, even though they unanimously believe that some relevant mitigating factor has been proven to exist. .■ To understand the evolution of the Maryland death penalty statute into its present fora, and to place in sharp focus the exact nature of the problem as it relates to the required consideration of mitigating circumstances, a brief history of legislative enactments and relevant case law may be helpful.0 From 1903 until 1972 trial courts of general jurisdiction were vested with discretion to sentence a person convicted of first degree murder to either death or life imprisonment. In 1972 the United States Supreme Court held that the grant of such unfettered discretion to impose the sentence of death violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. Furman v. Georgia. 403 U.S. 233, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Responding to Furman, this Court promptly declared Maryland's death penalty statute unconstitutional. Bartholomey v. State, 267 Md. 173, 297 A.2d 636 (1972). Unfortunately, we read Furman as holding "that the death penalty is unconstitutional when its imposition is not mandatory.” 3artholomev. 267 Md. at 134. The Legislature responded by passing a mandatory death penalty statute in 1975. Chapter 232, Acts of 1973, codified at Art. 27, § 413 of the Maryland Code (1937, 1976 Repl. Vol.). Within a /ear the J A more detailed history may be found in Tichnell v. State, 237 Md. 693, 720-29, 415 A.2d 330 (1980). 1 Z United States Supreme Court held that mandatory death penalty statutes for first degree murder were unconstitutional because they did not permit the sentencing authority .to consider mitigating circumstances involving the accused and the character of the offense before deciding whether the imposition of the death penalty was appropriate. Woodson v. Morth Carolina, supra; Roberts v. Louisiana, 423 U.S. 3ZS, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 49 L.Ed.Zd 974 (1976). We then held the Maryland mandatory death penalty statute unconstitutional. Blackwell v. State. 273 Md. 466, 363 A.2d 343 (1976), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977). At the same time it decided Woodson, however, the Supreme Court upheld the capital punishment statutes of Georgia, Texas and Florida, finding that the discretion of the sentencing authority had been -adequately directed and limited so as to minimire the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action, but retained sufficiently to permit consideration of appropriate mitigating factors and thus to maintain the essential link with contemporary community values. Gre<zg v. Georgia, 423 U.S. 133, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.Zd 339 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 423 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2930, 49 L.Ed.Zd 929 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 423 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.Zd 913:(1976). Our Legislature then returned to the drawing board and produced a death penalty statute that it 13 believed consonant with the several views expressed in the joint opinions by which Greg?, Jurek and Proffitt were decided". Senate Bill 374 was enacted on March 10, 1973, as Chapter 3 of the Laws of 1973, and became effective July 1 of that year. That act established as conditions precedent for the imposition of the death penalty the same eight aggravating circumstances (with minor language changes) that had been contained in the 197S mandatory death penalty law, but also added seven specific mitigating circumstances that could be considered by the sentencing authority in the ultimate determination of whether death was the appropriate sanction. Two days after the new statute went into effect the Supreme Court held that, with the possible exception of the-.rarest kind of capital case, a sentencing authority could "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Lockett v. Ohio, J-33 U. 5. 3 36, 304, 93 S.Ct. Z95d, 37 L.Ed.Zd 973 (1973). Our Legislature responded to Lockett by enacting Chapter 3Z1 of the Laws of 1979 to'add the following paragraph to the list of mitigating circumstances to be considered by the sentencing authority (3) Any other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case. 6 14 This serpentine path of evolution has been aptly described as the "product of a considerable history reflecting the law's effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and. principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual." Sddinzs v. Oklahoma, 453 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 369, 71 L.Ed.Zd 1 (1982). From the earlier concept that only mandatory death sentences would cure the problem of unbridled discretion condemned in Furman we have proceeded to an understanding that although the sentencer’s discretion must be restricted to ensure that the penalty of death will not be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the sentencer must be free to Consider any relevant mitigating evidence regarding the character or record of the the defendant and any of the circumstances of the offense. Sumner v. Shuman, U.S. , S.Ct. , L.Ed.Zd [Mo. 36-246 decided June 22, 1937]; Hitchcock v. Dugger, 431 U.S. , S.Ct. , L.Ed.Zd [53 U.S.L.fc. 4567] ( 1987); California v. Brown, U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 337, L.Ed.Zd (1987); Skipper v. Sjuth Carolina, U.S. , 106.S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.Zd 1 (1936). 'Ye now know that room must be left for interposition of societal judgments of mercy and sympathy that may be engendered by a consideration of relevant mitigating evidence. Id. In my view, the Maryland process for jury determination'1 of punishment in a capital case, consisting as it does of the requirements of both statute and Problems created by an improper and mechanical application of the requirement of unanimity are not present when the defendant elects to be sentenced by a judge. 13 rule, retains too much of the vestiges of the mandatoriness and fails to permit meaningful consideration of relevant mitigating c ircums tances . The majority seems to suggest that no other application of the requirement of unanimity is possible--that the mandate of unanimity- controls not only the verdict but also every subordinate predicate finding. Certainly where unanimity is required, the verdict must be unanimous. State v. McKay, 230 Md. 333, 373 A.2d 223, 97 A.L.R.od 1233 (1977); Ford v. State, 12 Md. 514 (13S9). Furthermore, the determination of any ultimate issue essential to the verdict must be unanimous. However, the determination of historic facts presents a different question, and where alternative findings of historic facts are advanced in support of a single conclusion the better rule is that the jurors need not agree on any single alternative fact provided they all agree on some alternative fact that leads them to a single conclusion on the ultimate issue. For example, in an action for damages arising out of an automobile accident, the jury must be unanimous in its finding on the ultimate questions of duty, breach, causation and damages, and of course on the verdict. Still the jurors need not agree on the historic facts supporting their common conclusion on an ultimate question. If the plaintiff has advanced alternative theories of negligence, e.g. the defendant was speeding, failed to keep a proper lookout, or failed to 16 sound his horn, the jurors may be unanimous in their conclusion that the defendant was negligent, but for different reasons. The Supreme Court of Illinois, writing nearly a century ago, stated the applicable law succinctly: The common law requires that verdicts shall be the declaration of the unanimous judgment of the 12 jurors. Upon all matters which they are required to find, they must be agreed. 3ut it has never been held that they must all reach their conclusions in the same way and by the same method of reasoning.... To require unanimity ... not only in the result, but also in each of the successive steps leading to such result, would be practically destructive of the entire system of jury trials .Chicago S N.W. Ry . Co . v . Dunleavv, 129 111. 132, 22 N.e. 15 ,' 17-13 1 13 39 J . The Court of Special Appeals acknowledged the applicability of this principle to criminal prosecutions in Craddock v. State, 64 Md. App. 269, 273, 494 A.2d 971, cert. denied, 304 Md. 297 (198S): Generally, jurors are not required to uniformly accept all of che evidence presented in order to arrive at a unanimous verdict. Some jurors unquestionably reject evidence that others accept in determining guilt or innocence. In short, the law requires unanimity only in the verdict, not in the rationale upon which the verdict is based". In the case sub judice, the statute sets forth various acts tnat constitute the crime of theft. As long as jurors unanimously agree that theft in some form was committed, nothing more is required. Compare U.S Gipson, 333 F.2d 433 (3th Cir. 1977). See also 17 State v. Smith, 136 Aria. 273, 665 P.2d 995 (1933), (where jurors are unanimous in finding first degree murder they need not agree on whether it was premeditated or felony murder); 31ake v. State, supra, (if a verdict may be justified upon either of two interpretations of the evidence the verdict cannot be impeached by showing that a part of the jury proceeded upon one interpretation and part upon another); Claric v. Commonwealth, supra, (aggravating circumstances are treated as a single unit and jurors need not specify which portion of the unit they find in order to satisfy requirement of unanimity); State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis.Zd 532, 335 N. W. 2 d S33 (1933) (where a single crime is charged, jury unanimity on the particular alternative means of committing the crime is not required if the acts are conceptually similar); State v. Carey, 12 Wash. App. 310, 711 P.2d 703 (1986) (jurors need not be unanimous on determination of premeditated or felony murder so long as they are unanimous that one or both have been proved). Contra, State v. Kir^lev, supra, 302 S.5.2d at 157 (jury must unanimously agree that a mitigating circumstance exists before it may be considered). Although the question of unanimity may arise in connection with instructions to be given in cases where a general verdict is to be returned, the problem will be seen more frequently where the case is submitted to the jury on 13 special verdicts or interrogatories. As Dean McCormick pointed out in his article, Jurv Verdicts Coon Special Questions in Civil Cases, 2 F.R.D. 176 (1941), the impetus' in several states for resort to special questions may have been to provide a check on jury nullification of the law, and in some cases to avoid tedious instructions on the law. Dean McCormick concluded that submission on special questions had worked well where a few ultimate questions stated in simple form were submitted, but that submission on multiple subordinate facts and issues had caused difficulty. The particular problems of jury unanimity in cases involving special verdicts is also discussed by Professor Ruth Ginsburg in Special Findings and Jury Unanimity in the Federal Courts, 63 Colum.L.Rev. 236 (1963). As Professor Ginsburg cogently observes, the definition of what constitutes an ’’ultimate question" and the precise formulation of the question to be put to the jury are matters of considerable importance. [Wjhen separate fact allegations, each supported by evidence, would independently permit the jury to reach a conclusion on an ultimate issue, appropriate definition of the elements of the case on which the jury must agree poses a problem of more than academic significance. In close cases, the chance of a verdict for one side or the other may be enhanced or restricted depending upon the 3 Additional problems resulting from the failure of one or more jurors to join in the answer to a special interrogatory or special verdict are collected in an annotation, Annot., Failure To Join In Special Verdict, 133 A.L.R. 336 (1943). 19 detail or the general ity of the propo siti ons upon which agreement is requ ired • Id. at 262. After discussing two alternat ives to a proper def inition of the requirement of unanim ity, Professor Gins burg cone ludes: A def ini tion of unanimity in terms of particular facts corresponds to a theoret ical image of the jury as a singu lar. body- -twe 1 ve men who, through the alchemy of the deliberative process , become as one. In reality, however, perfeet harmony, even if it were desirabl e, is not to be ant icipa ted. A formal requirement of accord on independent particulars, each of which standing alone would support an ultimate finding, impels formal agreement. If each juror subscribes to at least one of the independent particulars, but no particular is subscribed to by all, it seems improbable, that the jury would--and out of tune with common-sense notions of justice that the jury should--report itself ’’hung" rather than proceed to decision. In such a case, if particular fact questions were -subraitted to the jurors, agreement to'answer the ’’right way" by reporting unanimity on one or more of the particulars would be the more likely course. The alternative def ini tiorx--unanimi ty upon ultimate issues--appears the more desirable. It takes into account the collective nature of the jury and does not purport to carry the image of a composite individual beyond practical limits. In’short, unanimity defined in terms of ultimate issues strikes a balance between two extremes: failure to define the objects of unanimity and "particular fact" definition. The latter, rigidly and unrealistically, equates the collective judgment of twelve with the individual judgment of a single trier. The former, although it would provide maximum leeway for the "equitable dispensing power" of the jury as a palliative for archaic rules of law, would also constitute an abdication of the judicial function. Id. at 163 (footnotes omitted). FT Having concluded chat the requirement of unanimity is properly applied to the ultimate questions presented by a given case, I turn to the more specific problem of what constitutes the ultimate question or questions in a capital sentencing proceeding. The absolute ultimate question is, of course, whether death is the appropriate penalty. To reach that question the jury must determine whether one or more of the statutory enumerated aggravated circumstances exist in the case. If one or more aggravating circumstances are found to exist, the jury must determine whether one or more relevant mitigating circumstances exist. The verdict is then determined by the jury weighing the aggravating against the mitigating circumstances and determining whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the aggravating outweigh the mitigating. Clearly, the ultimate verdict must be unanimous. In addition, I enterta-.n no doubt that the jurors must be ur.animous in their determination that one or more enumerated aggravating circums :ances have been proven to exist. As noted earlier, I am not persuaded that there is a constitutional requirement that all jurors agree as to the existence of each aggravating circumstance to be considered, but that question is not before us. The Legislature has imposed that requirement by statute, and the requirement does not in any way contravene rights of the defendant. 21 Mot quite as clear, but acceptable to me for the purposes o£ this case, is the proposition that in order to engage in the ultimate weighing process each-'juror must determine that one or more relevant mitigating circumstances exist.6 I do not agree, however, that the Legislature may constitutionally require unanimity as to each individual mitigating circumstance before it may be given consideration in the final weighing process. As I have taken some pains to point out, this is a position that extends the requirement of unanimity beyond the ultimate question of whether all jurors believe some relevant mitigating circumstance or circumstances exist, and therefore it is out of step with currently accepted principles of law. More important, however, che requirement may mechanically exclude from consideration by the jury substantial historical facts and mitigating circumstances :hat might well tip che balance in che Of , th e 0 A strong argument can ?e made that even in che absence a finding that one or nor.* mitigating circumstances exist jury must be free to reject che sanction of death as the appropriate penalty. Th-? rationale is that although an aggravating circumstance determined by the Legislature to be sufficient to support the the, penalty of death has been proven, che jurors may agree that che facts of the particular offense are not so egregious as to warrant imposition of the death penalty in a particular case. I agree that this option must open to the jury, but I conclude that it is under Maryland death sentencing proceedings, and chat the problem is one of semantics. Where twelve jurors agree that the circumstances the offense, although crossing the legal threshold so as to justify consideracion of che death penalty, do not in fact warrant death in che particular case, that jury has in fact found a mitigating circumstance even though it may be difficult to articulate. Trial judges and counsel should make this Clear to che jury through appropriate instructions and argument. be at zz final weighing process, and thus it is constitutionally infirm. Unfortunately, our Legislature has imposed precisely that requirement. Read together, subsections' (i) and (j) of $ 413 require a written determination by the jury, stating "specifically ... [wjhich, if any, mitigating circumstances it finds to exist." Returning to the original hypothetical situation, if six jurors believe one mitigating circumstance has been proven to exist and six others believe another has been proven to exist, under the procedure followed in this case none of them can consider either mitigating circumstance in the final weighing process. Indeed, no matter how many jurors believe how many mitigating circumstances exist, no one will be allowed to consider any of them unless all twelve happen to agree on a single one. Nor does the presence of a "catchall" provision cure the def:ciency, at least as it appears in the statute and the rule. After listing seven mitigating factors the jury . should consiler, subsection (g)(3) of the statute adds "(alny other facts which the jury ... specifically sets forth in writing thar it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case." (emphasis added). Manifestly, this language excludes the possibility that individual judgments concerning the seven circumstances previously considered could somehow be worked into this section. Moreover, by requiring in the same format that the jury state specifically and in writing any other facts 23 that it finds as mitigating circumstances, the statute and rule perpetuate tile requirement for specific unanimity as to historical facts rather than unanimity on the collective •j existence of relevant mitigating circumstances. I appreciate the fact that entirely legitimate concerns about the need to impose limitations on "unbridled discretion" and the need to provide as much information as possible for proportionality review have prompted the extraordinary requirements for precision and written findings. But we have gone too far. In an attempt to cure one problem we have caused another--not, as we have seen, an unusual occurrence in the difficult process of reaching an acceptable middle ground between important but conflicting interests in this area of the law. The process must be as simple and as fair as we can mak.e it. He must be strict in the requirement that no person be considered for the death penalty unless and until there has 7 One could argue that there is nothing to stop a jury from writing in as a "catchall" mitigating circumstance that- "we unanimiously conclude from a consideration of the aggi :..vating and mitigating circumstances disclosed by the evidence that death is not the appropriate penalty" or words to that effect. The difficulty is that the form and the statute direct the jurors away from, instead of toward that type of determination. In the absence of a specific instruction from the judge informing the jury that they would be permitted to make such an entry if they so found, I have no confidence that the jury could reach that conclusion on its own. 2-1 been a unanimous finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the existence of one or more statutory enumerated aggravating circumstances. 3ut we must be liberal in all-owing the jury to consider evidence of any relevant mitigating circumstance and in allowing every juror to utilize in the ultimate weighing process every mitigating circumstance proved by a preponderance of the evidence satisfactory to that juror. If any individual juror is not persuaded of the existence of any relevant mitigating circumstance, there will of course be no weighing of circumstances, and the verdict will either be death, or the jurors will be unable to agree. However, if all twelve jurors believe there are mitigating circumstances, the ultimate weighing process must be allowed to take place. To briefly summarize the foregoing discussion, I conclude as follows. First, that the statute requires and the Legislature intended to requiie as a condition precedent to the consideration of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance., the unanimous agreement of th<? jurors as to the existence of that circumstance. Second, that the statute does not require, nor die. the Legislature intend to require, any finding by the jury that a particular circumstance does not exist, either unanimously or otherwise. Third, that because of the imposition of an artificial and wholly unnecessary requirement of unanimity as to each mitigating circumstance, the statute unconstitutionally precludes jury consideration of relevant collective mitigating circumstances. 25 Applying these principles to the case before us persuades me that the sentence of death must be reversed. It is entirely possible, and indeed I suggest very probable, that this jury answered ’’no” as to certain aggravating and mitigating circumstances because they were not unanimous in their belief that the circumstance had been proven to exi'st, and not because they unanimously agreed that it did not exist. The trial judge's instructions were entirely consistent with the interpretation of the statute that I believe to have been intended by the Legislature. After referring to the sentencing form that had been distributed to the jurors, and discussing the requirement of unanimity with respect to a finding of the existence of aggravating circumstances, the trial judge said: Let me, before we begin the enumeration of the items of aggravating circumstances, remind you that in order to answer any of those questions yes you must be unanimously satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of one of those aggravating circums tances. The judge then defined the burden of persuasion, and said: If, after consideration and comparison ov the evidence you have heard this morning, ycr. cannot find an abiding conviction to a a.cral certa-inry of the existence of an aggravating circumstance, then reasonable doubt does exist and you must answer no. The trial judge then pointed out that the State had given notice only as to aggravating circumstance number two, and he said: Mow in considering these natters, you must consider whether aggravating circumstance number two has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. If you unanimously- conclude that it has been so proven, you should answer that question yes. If you are not so satisfied, then of course vou must answer no. (emphasis aacedj. Concerning the requirement of unanimity with respect to the existence of mitigating circumstances, the trial judge instructed in the language of the form that was before the jury. If, as I suspect, the jury followed logic and the trial judge's instructions rather than the strained interpretation of the meaning of a "no” vote put forth by the majority, it follows that a number of the jurors may have been persuaded of che existence of certain mitigating circumstances, but agreed to marking them "no" because the jury did not unanimously find cheir existence. Moreover, because the trial judge instructed in accordance with the statute, there was no opportunity tor che jurors to incorporate within the "catchall" section any individual judgments they may have reached concerning the enumerated mitigating circumstances. Judge Sharer instructed them: Mow number eight indicates, other mitigating circumstances exist as set forth below. Should you find any other mitigating circumstances not specifically enumerated in the first seven that we have just reviewec wnicn nave oeen raised by the evidence and proved to you by a preponderance of that evidence you may so indicate.... If you find no other mitigating circumstances then you make no entry upon those lines under number eight. (emphasis added). The jury unanimously found one aggravating circumstance to exist, but was unable to agree unanimously on the existence of . . . . * 3any particular mitigating circumstance. Thus, the hypothetical posed by Appellant comes to life. This jury was precluded from a consideration of mitigating circumstances that should have been permitted. It was precluded from engaging in any weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors by the draconian instruction that '’if Section II was completed and all of the answers were marked "no" then enter "Death." The majority’i conclusion that when the jury answers "no" it means that every juror agrees that the circumstance in question does not exist (or perhaps more precisely, that every juror agrees the circumstance has not been proven to exist by the requisite standard of persuasion) solves the problem of mandatoriness--if every answer with respect to mitigating circumstances is "no" there cannot be a single juror who believes that a single mitigating circumstance exists. 3uc this poses another prjblem. If "yes" meanr. all jurors agree that the circumstanor does exist, and "no’ means all jurors agree that the circumstance does not exist, what is to happen when there is disagreement? According to the interpretation ̂ The possibility that the jury could have fashioned some'type of collective mitigating circumstance under the "catchall" provision was further diminished by the trial judge's instruction that if the jurors found any "other" mitigating circumstances, they "must write them in the space provided and number them so that they may be distinguished one from the other."