Slaton v Chicago Brief and Argument for Appellant

    No. 46377

IN THE

appella te Court o f Illinois
F irst  D istrict  

J u n e  T e r m , A.D. 1954

WILBERT K. SLATON, ^
Appellant,

VS.

CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal cor­
poration,

Appellee.^

>

Appeal from
Circuit Court,

Cook County.

Honorable 
John T. Dempsey, 

Trial Judge.

BRIEF AND ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT.

F leetw ood  M. M cCoy,
35 So. Dearborn Street, 
Chicago 3, Illinois,

M oore, M in g  & L e ig h to n , 
123 W. Madison Street, 
Chicago 3, Illinois, 

Attorneys for Appellant.
F leetw ood  M. M cCoy,
W il l ia m  R . M in g , J r .,
G eorge N. L e ig h to n , and 
W alter  K. B l a c k ,

Of Counsel.

The Scheffer Press, Inc.— ANdoyer 3-6850

Oral Argument Requested.



IN THE

A P P E L L A T E  C O U R T  O F  I L L I N O I S  
F irst  D istrict

J u n e  T e r m , A.D. 1954

WILBERT K. SLATON,
Plaintiff,

V8.

CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corpo­
ration,

Defendant

] Appeal from
Circuit Court,

Cook County.

Honorable 
John T. Dempsey, 

Trial Judge.

BRIEF AND ARGUMENT FOR PLAINTIFF,

I .

NATURE OF THE CASE.

1. Nature of the Action.

This was an action commenced in the Circuit Court of 
Cook County, against the City of Chicago, under the pro­
visions of “ An Act To Suppress Mob Violence”  Chapter 
38, Section 512-515, to recover damages for personal in­
juries sustained by the plaintiff. At the close of all of 
the evidence offered on behalf of the plaintiff, the trial 
Court sustained the defendant’s motion to direct the jury 
to bring in a verdict of “ Not Guilty” . A motion for a new 
trial was filed, heard and was overruled by the Court. The 
trial Court entered judgment upon the directed jury ver­
dict. This appeal is from the judgment and final order.



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2. The Pleadings.

The Amended Complaint upon which the cause was 
tried set out that on the 14th day of August, 1947, the de­
fendant was a municipal corporation, and as such was 
in the possession and control of public streets and high­
ways in the City of Chicago; that on the above date a 
collection of individuals, consisting of a mob of more than 
twelve persons, assembled at the intersection of 103rd 
Street and Halsted Street for the purpose of exercising 
correctional and regulative powers over the plaintiff by 
violence and without lawful authority; that while plain­
tiff was lawfully driving his automobile in an easterly di­
rection on said 103rd Street and turning its direction 
northward into said Halsted Street, all the while using 
all due care and caution for his own safety and the safety 
of the automobile, the said mob of persons viciously, wil­
fully, wantonly and unlawfully, and with great force and 
violence, assaulted and attacked the plaintiff with bricks, 
stones and other missiles, and thereby struck and severely 
injured the plaintiff, including a fracture of his skull; that 
as a result of these injuries the plaintiff became sick, sore, 
lame and disabled, was unable to work and to attend to 
his business and affairs for a long space of time; ex­
pended divers large sums of money for medical care; that 
on the last mentioned date there was in full force and 
effect a certain valid statute entitled “ An Act To Sup­
press Mob Violence” , (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1945, 
Chapter 38, Section 512-517) as follows:

“ Sec. 512—Mob defined * * *
“ Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illi­

nois, represented in the general assembly: That any 
collection of individuals, five or more in number, as­
sembled for the unlawful purpose of offering violence 
to the person or property of anyone supposed to have 
been guilty of a violation of the law, or for the pur­



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pose of exercising correctional powers or regulative 
powers over any person by violence and without law­
ful authority, shall be regarded and designated as a 
‘ mob’.”
Sec. 513— Serious injury defined * * *

“ The term ‘serious injury’, for the purposes of this 
act, shall include any injury to property which shall 
cause damage to the owner thereof, or any injury to 
the person which shall temporarily or permanently 
disable the person injured from earning a livelihood.”  
Sec. 514— Intent to inflict injury, penalty * * *
Sec. 515— Damage by violence, penalty, action against 
municipality * * *

“ Any person or persons composing a mob under 
the provisions of this act, who shall by violence in­
flict material damage to the property or serious in­
jury to the person of any other person upon the 
pretense of exercising correctional powers over such 
person or persons, by violence and without authority 
of law, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and shall 
suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceed­
ing five years, and any person so suffering material 
damage to property or injury to person by a mob 
shall have an action against the county, park district 
or city in which such injury is inflicted for such dam­
ages as he may sustain to an amount not exceeding 
$10,000.00”.

Plaintiff’s ad damnum was $10,000.

The defendant’s answer was a general denial.

3. Plaintiff’s Theory of the Case.

The plaintiff’s theory of the case is that a mob, as de­
fined by the statute, formed for the purpose of exercising 
correctional and regulative powers over certain persons,



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including the plaintiff; that plaintiff while exercising all 
due care and caution for his own safety and that of his 
property, was seriously injured about his person by the 
willful and violent action of this mob for the purpose 
of imposing and exercising correctional and regulative 
powers over the plaintiff, all within the meaning of the 
applicable statute above mentioned, and that by virtue of 
the force of that statute the defendant city became and 
is liable to the plaintiff on account of the injuries he 
sustained.



POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.

The evidence in this case showed that the plaintiff was 
seriously injured by a mob within the meaning of the Act 
so that the defendant city was liable for damages. It was 
therefore error for the court below to direct a verdict for 
the defendant.

Sections 1 to 4 of “ An Act to Suppress Mob 
Violence”  approved May 16, 1905 (Ch. 38, Sec. 
512-515, 111. Rev. Stat. 1953).

People ex rel. Davis v. Nellis, 249 111. 12 (1911).
Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Spring Valley, 65 111. 

App. 571.
Barnes v. City of Chicago, 225 111. App. 31, aff’d, 

323 111. 203.
I. “ Preparing and Trying Cases in Illinois” , 447, 

Illinois State Bar Assn., Burdette Smith, Chi­
cago, 1951.



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III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The evidence adduced by the plaintiff at the trial shows:

On the 14th day of August, 1947, the defendant was a 1 
municipal corporation, and as such was in possession and 
control of public streets and highways in the City of Chi­
cago (Abst. 2, Rec. 15). On that date the plaintiff, a 
Negro, accompanied by five Negro companions, was driv­
ing his automobile eastward on 103rd Street, and at the 
intersection of Halsted Street turned the direction of the 
automobile northward into Halsted Street (Abst. 12-13,
Rec. 70, 71). The time was between 11:00 o’clock, P.M., 
and 12:00 o’clock, midnight. As the plaintiff’s automobile 
approached Halsted Street the crowd began hurling epi­
thets at the occupants of the automobile, saying, “ Nig­
gers” , “ Here comes a bunch of niggers” , “ Get that nigger 
driver in that car; what is that black son-of-a-bitch doing 
driving through here? Get that nigger driver of that car.” 
(Abst. 13-14, Rec. 71, 72). As the automobile was turn­
ing northward into Halsted Street, members of the crowd 
started throwing bricks at the car and its occupants, one 
of which struck the plaintiff on the right side of his skull. 
(Abst. 15, Rec. 72) Other bricks struck various parts of 
the automobile, one of which struck a female occupant of 
the automobile, rendering her unconscious. (Abst. 26,
Rec. 109).

The plaintiff, bleeding profusely from this blow on his 
head, was momentarily rendered unconscious, but revived 
to operate the automobile northward along Halsted Street 
(Abst. 15, Rec. 73). When the automobile reached the 
vicinity of 60th Street and Washington Park (60th and 
South Parkway) the plaintiff turned the steering wheel 
over to one of his male companions who drove the car



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to Provident Hospital located on 51st Street and Vin­
cennes Avenue (Abst. 16, Rec. 74), and later to the County 
Hospital for treatment and repair of the head wound with 
stitches.

X-rays subsequently taken and medical examination of 
same revealed that plaintiff sustained a compound com­
minuted depressed skull fracture of the pareital region 
(Abst. 37-39, Rec. 165-181), and obstruction of his speech 
mechanism for which he was under the treatment of a 
physician for an extended length of time. (Abst. 17-18, 
Rec. 76-80).

At and before the time in question there was located on 
Halsted Street between 103rd and 105th Street a public 
housing development known as Fernwood Park Housing 
Development on the east side of Halsted Street; that this 
development consisted of about sixty-seven units, eight of 
which were occupied by Negro families, and the rest by 
white persons. These Negro families moved into the 
project on the 12th day of August, 1947, two days before 
the incident in question, (Abst. 32, Rec. 144). Thereupon, 
for blocks around, mobs gathered and threatened to evict 
the Negro families, (Abst. 32, Rec. 144-145). On the 14th 
day of August, 1947, between the hours of 9:00 o’clock, 
P.M. and 11:00 o’clock, P.M., a crowd of thousands of per­
sons was assembled opposite the housing development in 
question in such density that traffic in Halsted Street was 
impeded and blocked from 105th Street to 100th Street, 
including the intersection of 103rd Street and Halsted 
Street, (Abst. 33-34-35, Rec. 148, 149, 156, 157, 158). Per­
sons in this crowd pounded on the windows and opened the 
doors of a taxicab trying to push it over, some of them 
saying, “ There aren’t any niggers in there, let ’em go. We 
are going to run the niggers out of the project, get ’em 
out of here.”  The mob yelled and screamed at the oceu-



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pant thereof, (Abst. 33-35, Rec. 148). Many policemen 
were on the scene during that time, and the crowd was 
armed with bats and sticks and was throwing stones, 
(Abst. 34, 36, Rec. 148, 159). During this two hour period 
traffic along Halsted Street in this area was delayed for 
a period of two hours, (Abst. 34, Rec. 158); though the 
police did not detour traffic from this stretch of Halsted 
Street during this two hour period, (Abst. 36, Rec. 159).

The plaintiff’s automobile, northbound on Halsted 
Street, was detoured by police officers of the City of Chi­
cago at 107th Street for two blocks west on 107th Street 
to Peoria Street, where his automobile was again detoured 
by other police of the City of Chicago north to 103rd 
Street, where the detouring ended and plaintiff was per­
mitted to drive his automobile east on 103rd Street to the 
point of incident, (Abst. 12-13, Rec. 69-70).

In addition to the compound comminuted depressed 
skull fracture, plaintiff’s injuries consisted of an impair­
ment of speech which lasted for about one year, (Abst. 
16, 19, Rec. 74, 80) and a permanent stammering over 
words when talking fast, (Abst. 19, Rec. 80). Prior to 
this injury plaintiff enjoyed good health, (Abst. 19, Rec. 
81, 82).

Defendant offered no evidence.



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IV.

ARGUMENT.

The evidence in this ease shows conclusively and with­
out contradiction that the plaintiff, a Negro, was set upon 
and seriously injured by a mob whose purpose it was to 
drive the plaintiff, his companions, and all Negroes, from 
the particular area in the defendant city in which the at­
tack on plaintiff occurred.

Competent medical evidence showed that the mob’s at­
tack on the plaintiff resulted in his sustaining a compound 
comminuted depressed skull fracture in the parietal re­
gion with a resulting obstruction of the plaintiff’s speech 
mechanism necessitating extended medical care and treat­
ment.

Likewise without contradiction, the evidence showed 
that the mob which assaulted and injured plaintiff was 
a continuance of the assembly of similar mobs which had 
begun two days before the attack on plaintiff. As the evi­
dence showed, this mob had assembled about a public 
housing development known as Fernwood Park Housing 
Development located on South Halsted Street, nearby the 
intersection of 103rd and Halsted Streets where the at­
tack on plaintiff occurred. The evidence likewise showed 
the unmistakable object and intention of this mob in and 
around the housing development to use physical violence 
to exclude from that area of the defendant city any and 
all persons of the Negro race.

As pointed out here and before, “ An Act to Suppress 
Mob Violence” , Ch. 38, Sec. 512-515, HI. Rev. Stat. 1953, 
and more particularly section 515 of that statute expressly 
provides:



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Any person or persons composing a mob under the 
provisions of this act, who shall by violence inflict 
material damage to the property or serious injury to 
the person or any other person upon the pretense 
of exercising correctional powers over such person 
or persons by violence and without authority of law, 
shall be deemed guilty of a felony and shall suffer 
imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five 
years and any persons so suffering material damage 
to property or injury to person by mob shall have an 
action against the county, park district, or city in 
which such injury is inflicted for such damages as he 
may sustain to an amount not exceeding $10,000.

In the first case construing the statute to come before the 
Supreme Court of this state, People ex rel. Davis v. Nellis, 
249 111. 12, 19-20, the Court said, speaking of this statute:

“ It is, we think, too clear for argument that those 
provisions of said act which provide that persons en­
gaging in mob violence shall be guilty of a felony 
and subject to imprisonment in the penitentiary will 
tend to prevent men from joining mobs when assem­
bling and will tend to the suppression of mob violence, 
and it is, we think, equally clear that the imposing of 
a liability for damages upon the county or city in 
favor of the victim of a mob whenever mobs are per­
mitted to assemble, or in case of his death, in favor 
of his widow or heirs or adopted children, will cause 
the taxpayers of such county or city to discourage 
the assembling of mobs within such municipalities 
and will cause all law abiding men residing in such 
communities to condemn and denounce mob violence, 
the result of which must be to create respect for the 
law and its enforcement and to discourage the as­
sembling of mobs.”

Similarly, in Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Spring Valley, 
65 111. App. 571, the Court recognized that this statute is 
remedial in character and should be liberally construed. 
To the same effect was Barnes \. City of Chicago, 225 111. 
App. 31; aff’d, 323 111. 203. The evidence here shows that 
plaintiff falls into the class of persons for whom this



—  1 1  —

remedial statute was intended, i.e., “ persons who sustain 
material damage to property or injury to person by a 
mob.”  Thus the error of the trial court in directing a ver­
dict was a glaring one.

In discussing the motion for directed verdict, “ Prepar­
ing and Trying Cases in Illinois” , the recent publication 
of the Illinois State Bar Association, Section on Insurance 
Law (1951), says at page 447:

“ One of the cardinal principles applied to all mo­
tions for a directed verdict is that the evidence is to 
be construed in its most favorable light in favor of 
the party against whom the motion is directed and 
most strongly against the party making the motion. 
And in looking at the evidence the court should con­
sider only the evidence that is favorable to the party 
against whom the motion is directed.”

That this is the applicable rule in Illinois seems never 
to have been doubted. In the instant case, however, the 
trial court directed a verdict despite the fact that the 
evidence which has been described above was not contra­
dicted. The trial court then proceeded to compound its 
error by denying a motion for new trial.

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons we respectfully urge this 
court to reverse and remand the cause for a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

F leetwood M. M cCoy,
Moore, M ing and Leighton, 

Attorneys for Appellant.

F leetwood M. M cCoy,
W illiam R. Ming, Jr.,
George N. Leighton,
W alter K. Black,

Of Counsel.



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