Slaton v Chicago Brief and Argument for Appellant
Public Court Documents
June 1, 1954

13 pages
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Slaton v Chicago Brief and Argument for Appellant, 1954. 8cb406a9-c49a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/965e7a0f-f530-41f2-9266-74131029c16b/slaton-v-chicago-brief-and-argument-for-appellant. Accessed June 17, 2025.
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No. 46377 IN THE appella te Court o f Illinois F irst D istrict J u n e T e r m , A.D. 1954 WILBERT K. SLATON, ^ Appellant, VS. CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal cor poration, Appellee.^ > Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County. Honorable John T. Dempsey, Trial Judge. BRIEF AND ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT. F leetw ood M. M cCoy, 35 So. Dearborn Street, Chicago 3, Illinois, M oore, M in g & L e ig h to n , 123 W. Madison Street, Chicago 3, Illinois, Attorneys for Appellant. F leetw ood M. M cCoy, W il l ia m R . M in g , J r ., G eorge N. L e ig h to n , and W alter K. B l a c k , Of Counsel. The Scheffer Press, Inc.— ANdoyer 3-6850 Oral Argument Requested. IN THE A P P E L L A T E C O U R T O F I L L I N O I S F irst D istrict J u n e T e r m , A.D. 1954 WILBERT K. SLATON, Plaintiff, V8. CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corpo ration, Defendant ] Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County. Honorable John T. Dempsey, Trial Judge. BRIEF AND ARGUMENT FOR PLAINTIFF, I . NATURE OF THE CASE. 1. Nature of the Action. This was an action commenced in the Circuit Court of Cook County, against the City of Chicago, under the pro visions of “ An Act To Suppress Mob Violence” Chapter 38, Section 512-515, to recover damages for personal in juries sustained by the plaintiff. At the close of all of the evidence offered on behalf of the plaintiff, the trial Court sustained the defendant’s motion to direct the jury to bring in a verdict of “ Not Guilty” . A motion for a new trial was filed, heard and was overruled by the Court. The trial Court entered judgment upon the directed jury ver dict. This appeal is from the judgment and final order. — 2 — 2. The Pleadings. The Amended Complaint upon which the cause was tried set out that on the 14th day of August, 1947, the de fendant was a municipal corporation, and as such was in the possession and control of public streets and high ways in the City of Chicago; that on the above date a collection of individuals, consisting of a mob of more than twelve persons, assembled at the intersection of 103rd Street and Halsted Street for the purpose of exercising correctional and regulative powers over the plaintiff by violence and without lawful authority; that while plain tiff was lawfully driving his automobile in an easterly di rection on said 103rd Street and turning its direction northward into said Halsted Street, all the while using all due care and caution for his own safety and the safety of the automobile, the said mob of persons viciously, wil fully, wantonly and unlawfully, and with great force and violence, assaulted and attacked the plaintiff with bricks, stones and other missiles, and thereby struck and severely injured the plaintiff, including a fracture of his skull; that as a result of these injuries the plaintiff became sick, sore, lame and disabled, was unable to work and to attend to his business and affairs for a long space of time; ex pended divers large sums of money for medical care; that on the last mentioned date there was in full force and effect a certain valid statute entitled “ An Act To Sup press Mob Violence” , (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1945, Chapter 38, Section 512-517) as follows: “ Sec. 512—Mob defined * * * “ Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illi nois, represented in the general assembly: That any collection of individuals, five or more in number, as sembled for the unlawful purpose of offering violence to the person or property of anyone supposed to have been guilty of a violation of the law, or for the pur — 3 — pose of exercising correctional powers or regulative powers over any person by violence and without law ful authority, shall be regarded and designated as a ‘ mob’.” Sec. 513— Serious injury defined * * * “ The term ‘serious injury’, for the purposes of this act, shall include any injury to property which shall cause damage to the owner thereof, or any injury to the person which shall temporarily or permanently disable the person injured from earning a livelihood.” Sec. 514— Intent to inflict injury, penalty * * * Sec. 515— Damage by violence, penalty, action against municipality * * * “ Any person or persons composing a mob under the provisions of this act, who shall by violence in flict material damage to the property or serious in jury to the person of any other person upon the pretense of exercising correctional powers over such person or persons, by violence and without authority of law, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and shall suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceed ing five years, and any person so suffering material damage to property or injury to person by a mob shall have an action against the county, park district or city in which such injury is inflicted for such dam ages as he may sustain to an amount not exceeding $10,000.00”. Plaintiff’s ad damnum was $10,000. The defendant’s answer was a general denial. 3. Plaintiff’s Theory of the Case. The plaintiff’s theory of the case is that a mob, as de fined by the statute, formed for the purpose of exercising correctional and regulative powers over certain persons, — 4 — including the plaintiff; that plaintiff while exercising all due care and caution for his own safety and that of his property, was seriously injured about his person by the willful and violent action of this mob for the purpose of imposing and exercising correctional and regulative powers over the plaintiff, all within the meaning of the applicable statute above mentioned, and that by virtue of the force of that statute the defendant city became and is liable to the plaintiff on account of the injuries he sustained. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES. The evidence in this case showed that the plaintiff was seriously injured by a mob within the meaning of the Act so that the defendant city was liable for damages. It was therefore error for the court below to direct a verdict for the defendant. Sections 1 to 4 of “ An Act to Suppress Mob Violence” approved May 16, 1905 (Ch. 38, Sec. 512-515, 111. Rev. Stat. 1953). People ex rel. Davis v. Nellis, 249 111. 12 (1911). Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Spring Valley, 65 111. App. 571. Barnes v. City of Chicago, 225 111. App. 31, aff’d, 323 111. 203. I. “ Preparing and Trying Cases in Illinois” , 447, Illinois State Bar Assn., Burdette Smith, Chi cago, 1951. — 6 — III. STATEMENT OF FACTS. The evidence adduced by the plaintiff at the trial shows: On the 14th day of August, 1947, the defendant was a 1 municipal corporation, and as such was in possession and control of public streets and highways in the City of Chi cago (Abst. 2, Rec. 15). On that date the plaintiff, a Negro, accompanied by five Negro companions, was driv ing his automobile eastward on 103rd Street, and at the intersection of Halsted Street turned the direction of the automobile northward into Halsted Street (Abst. 12-13, Rec. 70, 71). The time was between 11:00 o’clock, P.M., and 12:00 o’clock, midnight. As the plaintiff’s automobile approached Halsted Street the crowd began hurling epi thets at the occupants of the automobile, saying, “ Nig gers” , “ Here comes a bunch of niggers” , “ Get that nigger driver in that car; what is that black son-of-a-bitch doing driving through here? Get that nigger driver of that car.” (Abst. 13-14, Rec. 71, 72). As the automobile was turn ing northward into Halsted Street, members of the crowd started throwing bricks at the car and its occupants, one of which struck the plaintiff on the right side of his skull. (Abst. 15, Rec. 72) Other bricks struck various parts of the automobile, one of which struck a female occupant of the automobile, rendering her unconscious. (Abst. 26, Rec. 109). The plaintiff, bleeding profusely from this blow on his head, was momentarily rendered unconscious, but revived to operate the automobile northward along Halsted Street (Abst. 15, Rec. 73). When the automobile reached the vicinity of 60th Street and Washington Park (60th and South Parkway) the plaintiff turned the steering wheel over to one of his male companions who drove the car — 7 — to Provident Hospital located on 51st Street and Vin cennes Avenue (Abst. 16, Rec. 74), and later to the County Hospital for treatment and repair of the head wound with stitches. X-rays subsequently taken and medical examination of same revealed that plaintiff sustained a compound com minuted depressed skull fracture of the pareital region (Abst. 37-39, Rec. 165-181), and obstruction of his speech mechanism for which he was under the treatment of a physician for an extended length of time. (Abst. 17-18, Rec. 76-80). At and before the time in question there was located on Halsted Street between 103rd and 105th Street a public housing development known as Fernwood Park Housing Development on the east side of Halsted Street; that this development consisted of about sixty-seven units, eight of which were occupied by Negro families, and the rest by white persons. These Negro families moved into the project on the 12th day of August, 1947, two days before the incident in question, (Abst. 32, Rec. 144). Thereupon, for blocks around, mobs gathered and threatened to evict the Negro families, (Abst. 32, Rec. 144-145). On the 14th day of August, 1947, between the hours of 9:00 o’clock, P.M. and 11:00 o’clock, P.M., a crowd of thousands of per sons was assembled opposite the housing development in question in such density that traffic in Halsted Street was impeded and blocked from 105th Street to 100th Street, including the intersection of 103rd Street and Halsted Street, (Abst. 33-34-35, Rec. 148, 149, 156, 157, 158). Per sons in this crowd pounded on the windows and opened the doors of a taxicab trying to push it over, some of them saying, “ There aren’t any niggers in there, let ’em go. We are going to run the niggers out of the project, get ’em out of here.” The mob yelled and screamed at the oceu- — 8 — pant thereof, (Abst. 33-35, Rec. 148). Many policemen were on the scene during that time, and the crowd was armed with bats and sticks and was throwing stones, (Abst. 34, 36, Rec. 148, 159). During this two hour period traffic along Halsted Street in this area was delayed for a period of two hours, (Abst. 34, Rec. 158); though the police did not detour traffic from this stretch of Halsted Street during this two hour period, (Abst. 36, Rec. 159). The plaintiff’s automobile, northbound on Halsted Street, was detoured by police officers of the City of Chi cago at 107th Street for two blocks west on 107th Street to Peoria Street, where his automobile was again detoured by other police of the City of Chicago north to 103rd Street, where the detouring ended and plaintiff was per mitted to drive his automobile east on 103rd Street to the point of incident, (Abst. 12-13, Rec. 69-70). In addition to the compound comminuted depressed skull fracture, plaintiff’s injuries consisted of an impair ment of speech which lasted for about one year, (Abst. 16, 19, Rec. 74, 80) and a permanent stammering over words when talking fast, (Abst. 19, Rec. 80). Prior to this injury plaintiff enjoyed good health, (Abst. 19, Rec. 81, 82). Defendant offered no evidence. — 9 — IV. ARGUMENT. The evidence in this ease shows conclusively and with out contradiction that the plaintiff, a Negro, was set upon and seriously injured by a mob whose purpose it was to drive the plaintiff, his companions, and all Negroes, from the particular area in the defendant city in which the at tack on plaintiff occurred. Competent medical evidence showed that the mob’s at tack on the plaintiff resulted in his sustaining a compound comminuted depressed skull fracture in the parietal re gion with a resulting obstruction of the plaintiff’s speech mechanism necessitating extended medical care and treat ment. Likewise without contradiction, the evidence showed that the mob which assaulted and injured plaintiff was a continuance of the assembly of similar mobs which had begun two days before the attack on plaintiff. As the evi dence showed, this mob had assembled about a public housing development known as Fernwood Park Housing Development located on South Halsted Street, nearby the intersection of 103rd and Halsted Streets where the at tack on plaintiff occurred. The evidence likewise showed the unmistakable object and intention of this mob in and around the housing development to use physical violence to exclude from that area of the defendant city any and all persons of the Negro race. As pointed out here and before, “ An Act to Suppress Mob Violence” , Ch. 38, Sec. 512-515, HI. Rev. Stat. 1953, and more particularly section 515 of that statute expressly provides: — 10 — Any person or persons composing a mob under the provisions of this act, who shall by violence inflict material damage to the property or serious injury to the person or any other person upon the pretense of exercising correctional powers over such person or persons by violence and without authority of law, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and shall suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary not exceeding five years and any persons so suffering material damage to property or injury to person by mob shall have an action against the county, park district, or city in which such injury is inflicted for such damages as he may sustain to an amount not exceeding $10,000. In the first case construing the statute to come before the Supreme Court of this state, People ex rel. Davis v. Nellis, 249 111. 12, 19-20, the Court said, speaking of this statute: “ It is, we think, too clear for argument that those provisions of said act which provide that persons en gaging in mob violence shall be guilty of a felony and subject to imprisonment in the penitentiary will tend to prevent men from joining mobs when assem bling and will tend to the suppression of mob violence, and it is, we think, equally clear that the imposing of a liability for damages upon the county or city in favor of the victim of a mob whenever mobs are per mitted to assemble, or in case of his death, in favor of his widow or heirs or adopted children, will cause the taxpayers of such county or city to discourage the assembling of mobs within such municipalities and will cause all law abiding men residing in such communities to condemn and denounce mob violence, the result of which must be to create respect for the law and its enforcement and to discourage the as sembling of mobs.” Similarly, in Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Spring Valley, 65 111. App. 571, the Court recognized that this statute is remedial in character and should be liberally construed. To the same effect was Barnes \. City of Chicago, 225 111. App. 31; aff’d, 323 111. 203. The evidence here shows that plaintiff falls into the class of persons for whom this — 1 1 — remedial statute was intended, i.e., “ persons who sustain material damage to property or injury to person by a mob.” Thus the error of the trial court in directing a ver dict was a glaring one. In discussing the motion for directed verdict, “ Prepar ing and Trying Cases in Illinois” , the recent publication of the Illinois State Bar Association, Section on Insurance Law (1951), says at page 447: “ One of the cardinal principles applied to all mo tions for a directed verdict is that the evidence is to be construed in its most favorable light in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed and most strongly against the party making the motion. And in looking at the evidence the court should con sider only the evidence that is favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed.” That this is the applicable rule in Illinois seems never to have been doubted. In the instant case, however, the trial court directed a verdict despite the fact that the evidence which has been described above was not contra dicted. The trial court then proceeded to compound its error by denying a motion for new trial. CONCLUSION. For the foregoing reasons we respectfully urge this court to reverse and remand the cause for a new trial. Respectfully submitted, F leetwood M. M cCoy, Moore, M ing and Leighton, Attorneys for Appellant. F leetwood M. M cCoy, W illiam R. Ming, Jr., George N. Leighton, W alter K. Black, Of Counsel. •** * /