Memo RE: Trial Brief Drafts

    JEDF MEMORANDUM 

PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL 

TO: Sheff Team 

FROM: Dennis Parker 

RE: Trial Brief Drafts 

DATE: October 16, 1998 

  

Attached are very rough drafts of sections of the brief dealing with 1) issues of federal 

law (particularly relating to burden, 2) Bill Gordon’s testimony; and 3) a bullet outline of points 

to make re: Sergi. 

I am very uncomfortable about the first section. I'm afraid that I've lost track in my 

mind of precisely what the point we wanted to make regarding the Keyes presumptions, 

particularly since it seems to me that Keyes doesn’t necessarily advance us much beyond where 

we are anyway under the law of the nutmeg state. I look forward to any help in getting back 

on track. 

I elected to do Sergi as bullet points because I don’t have the time to do anything else 

and because I'm not convinced that most of the points have to be in the same section. 

Although I think Sergi must be reckoned with, its not because he said anything substantially 

different from the rest of the state’s witness. His strength seemed to be primarily in packaging. 

I think we can best deal with him by taking apart each of the programs throughout the brief and 

then including a small, more summary section saying that, beneath the surface, what Sergi 

argues is an innovative, carefully thought out approach is actually an unstructured, scatter shot 

reheating of leftover, early 1960’s Southern "remedies." 

At any rate, we can discuss this at greater length on Monday. 

 



  

DRAFT 

APPLICATION OF BURDENS IN FEDERAL 

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 
  

  

Federal Courts, which have a long and involved history of enforcement of cases of 

unconstitutional school segregation, have evolved allocations of burdens of proof and 

production regarding questions of compliance with orders designed to address constitutional 

violations school desegregation cases. Because of similarities in the goals of those cases 

and this one, these cases offer appropriate models for resolution of the issue presented in 

this hearing. As discussed below, federal court unequivocally apply the presumption that 

racial disparities in school districts previously found to have violated the constitution are 

vestiges of that unconstitutional conduct. Defendants, in order to avoid further remedial 

actions must demonstrate that the disparities are not vestiges of the prior unconstitutional 

conditions in order to avoid further liability. 

Case law has long utilized presumptions about racial identifiability in school systems 

which have been found to have operated dual systems of education and applied them 

against the party both responsible for the constitutional violation and in the best position 

to prevent evidence about its actions: 

In a system with a history of segregation the need for remedial criteria of 

sufficient specificity to assure a school authority’s compliance with its 

constitutional duty warrants a presumption against schools that are substantially 

disproportionate in their racial composition. 

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971); see also 
  

Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 512 n.1 (Blackmun J., concurring) (presumption in former 
  

de jure school system that the board’s actions caused the racially identifiable schools and 

board’s obligations to rebut that presumption); Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 
  

 



DRAFT 

Testimony of Bill Gordon 
  

Dr. Gordon, qualified by both thirty-year’s experience in creation, evaluation and 

maintaining of school desegregation plans and his prior testimony in and knowledge of the 

history of this case, testified about his opinion about the adequacy of the state’s response 

to the Connecticut Supreme Court’s direction to the legislative and executive branches to 

put the search for appropriate remedial measures to racial and ethnic isolation at the top 

of their respective agendas. 

In finding the state’s efforts inadequate, Dr. Gordon focused first on the current 

racial and ethnic enrollments in the twenty-two school districts as compared to their 

enrollments at the time of the trial, the Supreme Court’s opinion and in other years prior. 

Dr. Gordon also considered the state actions proffered as a response to the Connecticut 

Supreme Court’s mandate to determine if those actions constituted a plan which would 

have the requisite, likely, effect of reducing racial and ethnic isolation. 

Dr. Gordon’s examination of these two factors was conducted against the general 

backdrop of the Courts injunction and the education and social harm which he believes, 

based upon his experience and expertise, flows from the racial and ethnic isolation endemic 

to the school districts in the Hartford Metropolitan area. Although, the specific effect of 

isolation would be felt differently in the various schools, Dr. Gordon testified that students 

would suffer harm from the absence of racial diversity even if that harm was not reflected 

in deficits in achievement as measured by test scores, graduation rates on any of the other  



quantitative measures typically relied upon.’ 

With respect to the first part of Dr. Gordon’s consideration, the degree of reduction 

of racial isolation as reflected in student enrollment, the state’s performance to date has 

been deficient. Throughout its opinion, the Supreme Court took careful note of the degree 

of racial and ethnic isolation as reflected in the enrollment of school districts in the greater 

Hartford Metropolitan area: the Court observed that Latino and African American students 

accounted for 92.4 percent of student enrollment and that while "enrollment of African- 

American students in the twenty-one surrounding school districts has increased by more 

than 60 percent from 1980 to 1992, only seven of these schools had a minority student 

enrollment in excess of 10 percent in 1992. sheff v. O'Neill, 238 Conn. at 8. 
  

Relying on data supplied by the defendants and using exhibits which graphically 

displayed student enrollment in the twenty-two towns, Dr. Gordon demonstrated that the 

student enrollments were, for the most part, substantially unchanged from the percentages 

which so concerned the Court. Dr. Gordon testified that the current enrollment pattern 

in the region shows continued patterns of extreme isolation in Hartford and in all but the 

  

In recognizing that education involves more than those measured qualitatively and 

that students of disproportionately white school districts were denied the full benefits of a 

diverse education, Dr. Gordon echoed one of the Supreme Court’s concerns: 

Sound principles of public policy support our conclusion that 

the legislature’s affirmative constitutional responsibility for the 

education of all public school children encompasses 

responsibility for segregation to which the legislature has 

contributed, even unintentionally. The parties agree, as the 

trial court expressly found, that racial and ethnic segregation is 

harmful and that integration would likely have positive benefits 

for all children and for society as a whole. Sheff at 33. 

2  



  

443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979)(same). Once the presumption that the school board caused racial 

identifiability has been established, the school board then has the burden of showing that 

its past segregative acts did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition of 

the schools. Keyes v. School District No. 1 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973). 
  

The different standards used in finding federal and state constitutional violations 

do not argue in favor of employing a different burden than that relied upon by the federal 

courts. As an initial matter, the difference is irrelevant because it pertains to the threshold 

question of liability for a constitutional violation. The fact of the state’s liability was 

established definitively by the Connecticut Supreme Court, and, notwithstanding the 

opinion of the state’s expert, Tr __, is beyond dispute at this stage of the proceedings. 

Secondly, the defendants in both the federal and state cases both operate under a similar 

affirmative obligation. The Connecticut Constitution "imposes an affirmative constitutional 

obligation on the legislature to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity for 

all public school children ...", Sheff v. O'Neill, 238 at 23, and, more specifically, imposes an 
  

affirmative obligation to respond to racial and ethnic isolation. Id at 34. Likewise, federal 

jurisprudence has imposed an obligation on defendants which requires more than just the 

cessation of unconstitutional acts. Defendant found liable for constitutional violations were 

"clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to 

covert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and 

  

! Under federal law, plaintiffs seeking to demonstrate an equal protection violation 
must demonstrate show intentional discrimination, see Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 
(1976). No such requirements obtains for a finding of a violation of the Connecticut 
Constitution of this type. See Sheff v. O'Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 17 (1995). 

  

  

2 

 



  

branch." Columbus Board of Education v. Pernick, 443 U.S. 449, 459 (1979) quoting Green   

  

v. County School Board, 391 US. 430, 437-38 (1968). The passage of time has not 
diminished this obligation, recent cases have reaffirmed repeatedly this bedrock principal. 
See Freedman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 486 (1992); Brown v. Board of Education, 978 F.2d 
  

  

584, 592 (10th Cir. 19193), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 204 (1993).   

That this obligation is a dynamic one was also made clear as the Court required the 
defendant to continually rise to the challenge of eliminating the constitutional violation: 
"Each instance of a failure or refusal to fulfill this affirmative duty continues the violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment:" Id, quoting Wright v. City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 460   

  

(1972); United States v. Scotland Neck Board of Education, 407 U.S. 484 (1972). 

Significantly for the purposes of this case, this affirmative obligation applied with 
equal force to school districts which had been found to violate the constitution by virtue 
of having practiced de jure or de facto segregation. Thus, both the affirmative obligation 

  

and the application of the presumptions described above were as strictly applied to states 
with explicit segregation law as it was for school districts in states which had no statutory 

requirements or authorization to operate segregated schools for nearly a century, Columbus 

Board of Education v. Pernick, 443 US. 449, 455 (imposing obligation on schools in   

Columbus notwithstanding absence of segregation laws after 1888) or, indeed, had never 

required segregation by law. See eg. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 USS. 189, 191   

(1973) (involving Denver schools in state which never required segregation and in fact 

expressly forbade discrimination in its Constitution). 

Also instructive for purposes of this litigation is the federal standard for determining 

 



whether this obligation has been successfully discharged. Under this analysis, motive is 

immaterial. Instead, the benchmark of the efficacy of remedial measures is the degree to 

which it addresses the constitutional violation: "the measure of the post-Brown I conduct 

of a school board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual system is the effectiveness, 

not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing or increasing the segregation caused by the 

dual system. Dayton Board of Education v. Mark Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538. Moreover,   

evaluating the effectiveness of a defendants’ desegregation efforts involved not only the 

likely effectiveness of a particular plan but also the defendant’s choice between existing 

alternatives: 

It is incumbent upon the school board to 
establish that its proposed plan promises 
meaningful and immediate progress toward 
disestablishing state-imposed segregation. It is 
incumbent upon the district court to weigh that 
claim in light of the facts at hand and in light of 
any alternatives which may be shown as feasible 
and more promising in their effectiveness ... Of 
course, the availability to the board of other 
more promising courses of action may indicate a 
lack of good faith; and at the least it places a 
heavy burden upon the board to explain its 
preference for an apparently less effective 
method. 

Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). See also   

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1. Invariably, consideration   

of the effectiveness of a defendant’s remedial plan began, and frequently ended, with an 

analysis of the racial enrollments in the school which the defendant operated. Any plan, 

no matter how well intended or supported by educational justification, was deemed 

insufficient if it failed to alter prevailing patterns of racial segregation resulting from the 

4  



original constitutional violation. See Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 
  

430, 411 (invalidating plan which relied solely on "freedom of choice" which resulted in 

some black students enrolling in formerly white schools but no whites in formerly black 

schools). 

Perhaps most noteworthy for this proceeding is the theme that informs the federal 

jurisprudence relating to school desegregation. While recognizing the existence of 

exigencies and acknowledging the ultimate goal of returning the operation of schools to 

local authorities, the courts uniformly stress the fact of the constitutional violation and the 

need to remedy past violations and assure that vestiges of the prior system do not continue 

to harm future generations. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 485 (1992); Swann v. 
  

  

Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). 

 



  

immediate inner ring towns. Tr __ , Pl. Ex. . Indeed, according to State Department 

of Education data, the isolation in Hartford, the area of primary concern for the Court, has 

experienced the worsening of the racial and ethnic isolation that the Court sought to 

remedy, Sheff v. O'Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 33 increasing from 92 to 94% Latino and African 
  

American. Pl. Ex. 608. As for the overwhelmingly white outer ring suburbs, any changes 

that occurred were insubstantial. Tr _, Pl. Ex. 612. 

Dr. Gordon testified that be believed the examination of full-time enrollment in 

order to determine compliance was appropriate for a number of reasons. The first was his 

belief, based upon experience, that the benefit of desegregation would only be realized by 

students spending substantial time together on a regular basis. Tr. __. Moreover, Dr. 

Gordon testified that he was unaware of even a single case in which a court viewed part- 

time programs as satisfying a defendant’s obligation to desegregate. Tr. _ . 

In fact, Dr. Gordon’s reliance on full-time student enrollment figures, and reasons 

for supporting that reliance, is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court opinion. The 

use of full-time enrollment rather than part time figures comports with the decision because 

1) the decision repeatedly frames its discussion of racially and ethnically isolated schools 

exclusively in terms of full-time enrollment, and 2) the Supreme Court specifically included 

part-time efforts at reduction of racial isolation as an example of "a number of laudable 

remedial efforts that unfortunately have not achieved their desired end." Sheff v. O'Neill, 
  

238 Conn. 1, 23 fn. 28. The greatest support in the Supreme Court’s opinion for Dr. 

Gordon’s opinion, however, comes from the fact that the Court’s language appears to be 

a whole-hearted endorsement of Dr. Gordon’s belief that reduction of isolation necessarily 

 



  

involves students having the opportunity to spend substantial time together: 

[S]chools are an important socializing institution, 
imparting those shared values through which 
social order and stability are maintained .... 
When children attend racially and ethically 
isolated schools, these "shared values" are 
jeopardized: If children of different races and 
economic and social groups have no opportunity 
to know each other and to live together in 
school, they cannot be expected to gain the 
understanding and mutual respect necessary for 
the cohesion of our society. 

  

Sheff v. O'Neill, 238 Conn. at 34 (emphasis added) (internal quotation and citation 
  

omitted). 

In addition to testifying about the inefficacy of the state’s response to the Supreme 

Court’s order to date, Dr. Gordon offered an opinion on whether the omnibus legislation, 

touted as a response to Sheff, in fact constituted a remedial plan likely to lead to the 

reduction of racial and ethnic isolation. 

Dr. Gordon's criticism of the state’s efforts were at the most fundamental level. He 

testified that any desegregation effort, no matter what methods it employed, must have 

certain essential components in order to be considered a plan which will have the likely 

result of reducing racial isolation. Tr. __. Chief among these is a quantitative definition 

of desegregation. Tr. __. Dr. Gordon testified that typically this measure is arrived at by 

defining the area to be included in the desegregation area, and using the racial enrollments 

in that defied areas as a goal. Tr. __. Once that goal is established, successful reduction 

of racial isolation would be measured by whether the individual schools or districts were 

within a specified percentage (generally (10-20%) of the area-wide enrollment for each 

 



race. Tr. __. Once this percentage is set, the defendant can then decide how that 

percentage would be met. Tr. __. Included in that determination would be additional 

essential components such as the establishment of time lines. Tr. ___. 

Dr. Gordon faulted the school district for failing to even nod in the direction of 

including any of these essential components in its efforts. Thus, although the state was 

required to reduce racial isolation, it had not ever taken the fundamental steps of defining 

what reduction of racial isolation as desegregation is, or setting specific standards to judge 

what was required of states or school districts in order to successfully reduce segregation 

or in what time period the effort should be achieved. Tr. __. In essence, the state’s effort 

was tantamount to sending the individual school districts on a mission without telling them 

the goal or the date by which it must be completed. As such, the state’s efforts were akin 

to shooting in the dark without a target and clearly not an appropriate approach to achieve 

the vindication of constitutional rights. 

In order to understand the impact of Dr. Gordon’s testimony, it is essential to 

understand the scope of his testimony. First, Dr. Gordon did not seek to question the 

  validity of some of the programs, with regard to their educational value. Tr. __. In fact, 

Dr. Gordon testified that many of the programs were likely to have an educationally 

salutary effect and were ones which he would support. Tr. __. The problem was that 

these programs were not related to the goal of reducing racial isolation and were ones 

which any school district should and would undertake regardless of whether they were 

under court order to remedy unconstitutional condition of racial and ethnic isolation. Tr.  



Secondly, Dr. Gordon’s testimony did not stem from disagreement with a particular 

method of desegregation. Tr. __. Although he testified about some possible approaches 

to desegregation ranging from re-assignment to the use of magnets or controlled choice and 

although he stated that he believed it was possible to create a desegregation plan based 

upon the size of the Hartford metropolitan area’, he did not himself create plan for the 

region. Tr. __. His complaint was not that he disagreed with a plan or its elements but 

that the state had not reached even the threshold level where they could be said to 

constitute a plan. 

  

2 Among the exhibits which Dr. Gordon was Pl. Ex. __, which superemporium 

concertize circles draws at 5, 10, 15 and 20 miles radius from central Hartford. Based on 

the fact that most of the metropolitan area fell within 20 miles of central Hartford, Dr. 

Gordon testified that the area was compact and comparable in size or smaller than other 

areas which had implemented successful desegregation plans. Tr. 

6  



Sergi Examination Points 
  

97-290 

eRange of state actions, including parental and community 

involvement, school safety, school readiness and reading takeover 

are educational steps the state would have undertaken regardless of 

Sheff. 

eTakeover of Hartford schools was in process prior to the 

Supreme Court decision and likely would have happened anyway. 

elLanguage in 97-290 regarding "opportunity to interact" 1is 

legislative creation and does not reflect any language 1n the 

decision. Pl. Bx. 601"'and decision. 

Effectiveness of 97-290 is only effective to the degree 

individual towns embrace 1it. 

®8Elements of "plan" were in effect prior to the Supreme Court 
opinion and were specifically found by the Supreme Court to be 
ineffective: interdistrict after school programs, inter and intra 

district choice, interdistrict collaborative programs, minority 
staff recruitment and distance learning all specifically 

referenced. Sheff ac 23, £n 28. 

®eNo guidelines in 97-290 regarding the number of programs a 
district must adopt, the number of students in each program, the 
amount of time spent in program, distribution among grades and 
schools. 

eno definition of what constitutes "desegregated". 

eno timeline for implementation by school districts. 

eState enforcement under 10-4b rare and only 1n cases where 
clear standards were articulated by statute. 

eno requirement that districts address reduction of racial, 

ethnic and economic isolation until 1999, wouldn’t effect schools 
until 2000-2001 school year. 

01998 budget figures are based upon Governor’s figures and do 
not reflect need, in fact no needs assessment done. Def. Ex. 2. 

eDraft of January 1999 fails to include new initiatives or any 

quantitative goals or timelines. Pl. Ex. 753. 

eState has set specific standards and guidelines in areas of 
minimum’ school year length, length of school day, teacher 
certification and curriculum: but ‘not "for. reduction of racial 
isolation.  



Racial Imbalance Act 

®Racial imbalance act only applies intra district. Def. Ex. 39 

eRegulations not implemented for first ten years of act, 

operation suspended for two years in time when West and East 

Hartford out of compliance. 

eUnlike for reduction of interdistrict racial and ethnic 

isolation Imbalance Act and regulations recognized need and 

provided for extremely specific standards and guidelines regarding 

record-keeping, definitions of groups of students covered, 

standards for determining imbalance, levels at which notification 

of non-compliance would occur and creation of plan to address. Def. 

Exe. 39, 40 and Pl. Ex. _ = 4September 19, 1997 Board Minutes). 

eIntradistrict imbalance remedial plan must include proposed 

changes in assignment, proposed construction sites, projections of 

racial enrollments, timetable. 

eThese requirements not present in 97-290. 

eDepartment did not promulgate regs to enforce 97-290 and in 

Commissioner’s opinion does not have authority to do so. 

Record Collection 

®Except for form required for racial imbalance law, none of 

the state vearly reporting forms call for reporting of race, 
ethnicicy or economic status. Def. Ex. 51. 

eData collected from the form would not reveal participation 

by race, ethnicity or economic status. 

Choice Program 

®Roussel comparison between Project Choice and M-to-M programs 
not accurate because of lack of racial controls in Choice Program. 

eOther than broad requirements to reduce racial and ethnic 
isolation in 97-290, no requirement that individual school district 
participate in Project Choice. 

eWith exception of magnet and choice programs, attendance in 
Ct. schools is wandatory both as to district and school. 

eSchool districts are permitted to select schools 
participating in Choice program. 

eNumbers of students participating in Choice this year 1is 
below level of highest point of Project Concern and less than at 
the time of the hearing. 

eNo time line for when level will match past high points.  



  

eState relies on district determination of capacity and sets 

no specific guidelines for districts to report. Does not look at 

other state capacities to compare. Ex. Avon reported 25 times 

availability than state report showed. Def. Ex. 3, 50. 

él.atino representation small and no goals for increasing 

latino participation. 

eno time line for reaching levels of participation recommended 

in Region 9 Guidelines. 

Charters 

enot originally intended for reduction of racial isolation. 

eIncluded six million for charters as targeted for reduction 

even when there was nothing requiring charters to consider this. 

Pl. Bx. 709, Def. Ex. 6. 

eNo estimate prepared showing number of charters necessary to 

reduce racial isolation. 

Interdistrict Magnets 

initiated by school district, not required by state. 

®No determination of number of schools required to reduce 

racial and ethnic isolation, no goals. 

®No specific consideration of race for admissions. 

Bilingual Education 

enothing new relating to bilingual anticipated in 1999 report. 

eNot likely Latino student needing bilingual services would 
attend schools in outer ring. 

Can not state when level of racial isolation in Hartford will 

be reduced or if it will be reduced. 

 



  

  

*% TX STATUS REPORT AS OF OCT 16 'S8 17:19 PAGE.D1 

NAACP LEGAL DEF FUND 

DATE TIME TO/FROM MODE MIN/SEC PGS CMDH STATUS 
@9 18/16 15:4@ 713 313 1049 EC--S 96°13" 017 156 OK 
10 18/16 15:47 915164967934 G3--S ©@6°55" O11 156 INC 
11 18/16 15:56 2124314276 EC--S @4’'26" 017 156 OK 
12 18/16 16:01 2127304652 EC--S 22'17" 217 156 OK 
14 18/16 16:28 98825968 EC--S ©6°56" B17 156 OK 
15 18/16 16:36 283 541 5050 EC——S 26°48" B17 156 OK 
16 18/16 16:43 527 3305 ECS ©5'54" B17 156 OK 
18 18/16 16:51 860 728 @287 ECS @7'21" 017 156 OK 
21 18-16 17:03 8607280401 EC--S ©4’'41" 917 156 OK 
22 10/16 17:08 918605705256 EC--S ©4’36" 917 156 OK 
26 10-16 17:19 915164967934 --—-S5 ©2’0@" 911 156 BUSY 

TO: John Brittain 713/313-1049 
Sandy DeValle 516/496-7934 
Juan Figueroa 212/431-4276 
Chris Hansen 212/549-2651 
Wes Horton 860/728-0401 
Marianne Lado 212/802-5968 
Willy Rodriguez 860/541-5050 
Elizabeth Sheff 860/527-3305 
Martha Stone 860/570-5256 
Phil Teleger 860/728-0287 

FROM: Dennis Parker 

RE: Trial Brief Drafts 

DATE: October 16, 1998 

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THE COVER SHEET) 16 

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE THE NUMBER OF PAGES INDICATED ABOVE, 
PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY AT 212\219-1900. 

 



  

FAX COVER SHEET 

TO: John Brittain 713/313-1049 

Sandy DeValle 516/496-7934 

Juan Figueroa 212/431-4276 

Chris Hansen 212/549-2651 

Wes Horton 860/728-0401 

Marianne Lado 212/802-5968 

Willy Rodriguez 860/541-5050 

Elizabeth Sheff 860/527-3305 

Martha Stone 860/570-5256 

Phil Teleger 860/728-0287 

FROM: Dennis Parker 

RE: Trial Brief Drafts 

DATE: October 16, 1998 

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THE COVER SHEET) 16 

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE THE NUMBER OF PAGES INDICATED ABOVE, 

PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY AT 212\219-1900. 

 



  

FAX COVER SHEET 

TO: John Brittain 860/570-5242 

Sandy DeValle 516/496-7934 

Juan Figueroa 212/431-4276 

Chris Hansen 212/549-2651 

Wes Horton 860/728-0401 

Marianne Lado 212/802-5968 

Willy Rodriguez 860/541-5050 

Elizabeth Sheff 860/527-3305 

Martha Stone 860/570-5256 

Phil Teleger 860/728-0287 

FROM: Dennis Parker 

RE: Trial Brief Drafts 

DATE: October 16, 1998 

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING THE COVER SHEET) 16 

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE THE NUMBER OF PAGES INDICATED ABOVE, 

PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY AT 212\219-1900.