Taylor v. Louisiana Petition for Writ of Certiorari

    3

IN  THE

Gkmrt of tip Inlt^ Btntm
OCTOBER TERM, 1961

No.................

LEVERT H. TAYLOR, HAROLD L. BETHUNE, DE- 
LORES McG-INNIE, MARIE McGTNNIE, DAVID 
JAMES DENNIS and HARRY BLAKE,

Petitioners,
v.

STATE OF LOUISIANA,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

Carl  R a c h lin ,
J u dith  P. V ladeck ,

2801 Broadway,
New York 7, N. Y. 
Attorneys for Petitioners.

J esse N. S tone , Jr.,
Shreveport, Louisiana, 

of Counsel.



I N D E X

PAGE

Opinions Below ..................................................................  1
Jurisdiction ........................................................................  2

Questions Presented..........................................................  2
Statutes Involved ...................................    3
Statement ............................................................................  4

How F ederal Questions W ere Raised..............................  8
Reasons for Granting the W r it ......................................  9

Conflict W ith A pplicable Decisions of This Court ... 11
Importance of the F ederal Questions...........................  12
Conclusion............................................................... ............  14

A ppendix A —Revised Statutes of Louisiana, §14:103.1 15
A ppendix B—Opinion of Court, 1st Judicial District of 

Caddo Parish ..................................................................  17
Opinion of Supreme Court at Louisiana.....................  19
Motion to Quash ..........................................................  20
Opinion on Motion to Quash........................................... 23
Motion in Arrest of Judgment..................................... 26
Motion for New T r ia l....................................................  30

CITATIONS
Cases :

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S, 219....................... .............  13
Bailey v. Patterson, — U. S. —, Feb. 26, 1962 ...............  11
Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454 (1960) ............. .......... 11
Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M. D. Ala 1956) 

affirmed 352 IT. S. 903 .........................................    11



XI INDEX.

PAGE

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940) ................ 12
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958) ................................. 12

De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937) .......................  12

Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941)...................  11

Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U. S. 157................................... 13

Henderson v. U. S., 339 U. S. 816 (1950) .......................  11

Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 (1920).......................  11

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116 (1958) ......... ...................... 11

McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316 (1819) .................. 11
Mitchell v. IT. S., 313 U. S. 80 (1941) ...............................  11
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 IT. S. 373 (1946) .......................  11

N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, ex rel. Patterson, 357 IT. S.
449 (1958) ......................................... .................. ............  11

Rockwell v. Morris, 10 N. Y. 2d 749, cert, denied 368 
IT. S. 913 (1962)................................................................  12

Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F. 2d 877 (C. A. 8. 1947), cert, 
denied 332 U. S. 851........................................................  12

Strauder v. "West Virginia, 100 IT. S. 303 (1880)...........  12

Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 IT. S. 199 ................ 13

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 IT. S. 356 (1886) ...................  12

S tatutes:

49 IT. S. C. 316(d) ...............................................................  11
49 H. S. C. 3(1) ..........................................................   11
49 U. S. C. 1374 ...................................................................  11
Louisiana Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 10 ...............  8fn
Louisiana Revised Statutes, §14:103.1............................. 3



IN' THE

Huprpmp (tart of tfje Imtpft States
OCTOBER TERM, 1961

No.................

------------------ ^ -------------------

L evert H . T aylor, H arold L . B et h u n e , D elores M cGtn n ie , 
M arie M cGtn n ie , D avid J ames D en n is  and H arry B lak e ,

Petitioners,
v.

S tate oe L ouisiana ,

-------------- f—--------- -
Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

Petitioners respectfully pray that a writ of certiorari 
issue to review the decree of the Supreme Court of the State 
of Louisiana entered in the above-entitled cause on October 
11, 1961 which denied petitioners’ Application for Writs of 
Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition, thus affirming the 
verdicts of conviction rendered by the First Judicial District 
Court of Caddo Parish, Louisiana (herein called the Dis­
trict Court), on August 21, 1961, and entered on August 
23, 1961.

OPINIONS BELOW

The District Court rendered no written opinion. Its 
oral opinion is part of the Record (R. 37-38), and is printed



2

in Appendix B hereto, infra, pp. 17-18. The memorandum 
opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court is unreported and 
appears in Appendix B hereto, infra, p. 19.

JURISDICTION

The verdict of the District Court was rendered on 
August 21, 1961, and entered on August 23, 1961. Peti­
tioners’ motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment 
were overruled and sentences were imposed on the latter 
date. Petitioners’ Application to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Louisiana for Writs of Mandamus, Certiorari and 
Prohibition was denied on October 11, 1961. Petitioners 
thereafter on October 26, 1961 tiled application for rehear­
ing and on November 6, 1961, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
refused to consider the said application.

On January 8,1962, Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black extended 
the time for filing this petition to and including March 10, 
1962. The jurisdiction of this Court is based on 28 U. S. C. 
§1257(3).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The petitioners were convicted of disturbing the peace 
although there was a total absence of evidence of any mis­
conduct on their part. Their convictions were based upon 
a holding by the trial court that the mere presence of 
Negroes in a waiting room customarily reserved for white 
persons in a Shreveport, Louisiana bus station, is sufficient 
evidence of intent to breach the peace.



3

The Federal questions are:

1. Whether the convictions of petitioners, unsupported 
by any evidence of guilt, constitute wholly arbitrary official 
action and thereby violate the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment?

2. Whether the imposition of criminal penalties so as 
to limit the right of Negro passengers to free and unim­
peded interstate travel violates the Interstate Commerce 
Act, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment?

3. Whether the convictions of petitioners, because they 
were Negroes in a “ white”  waiting room, is classification 
by race in violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment?

4. Whether a state may so employ breach of peace 
statutes as to perpetuate racial discrimination, otherwise 
held violative of the 14th Amendment?

STATUTES INVOLVED

Petitioners were convicted of disturbing the peace under 
§14:103.1 of the Revised Statutes of Louisiana, printed in 
Appendix A, infra, p. 15.



4

STATEMENT1

The petitioners were arrested on August 4, 1961. On 
that morning petitioners went by automobile to the Con­
tinental Trailways Bus Station in Shreveport, Louisiana. 
Continental Trailways is an interstate bus carrier. Peti­
tioners David James Dennis and Harry Blake remained in 
the automobile; neither Dennis nor Blake entered the bus 
station at any time on that morning (T. 14, 45, 138). The 
other four petitioners went into the bus station waiting 
room customarily reserved for white people. All of the 
petitioners are Negro. Several police officers were present 
in the bus station at the time the four petitioners entered, 
including the Chief of Police (T. 127). Testimony indicated 
that anonymous phone calls had warned of trouble to be 
expected at the station (T. 17).

The Chief of Police of the City of Shreveport, Harvey 
D. Teasley, approached the four petitioners and asked them 
why they were in the station. The petitioners stated that 
they were waiting for a bus to Jackson, Mississippi, and 
wanted travel information. The Chief of Police directed 
them to the information counter in the other waiting room, 
designated as the colored waiting room. Upon their failure 
to go to the colored waiting room, Chief Teasley ordered 
them to leave or be arrested. The four petitioners did not 
leave and were arrested (T. 180-192, 229-231).

1 References to the Record are designated by the symbol “ R ” . 
Although a transcript of the trial was made by an official court 
stenographer, in accordance with Louisiana practice it was not part 
of the Record before the Louisiana Supreme Court. To supplement 
the Record the transcript is submitted with this petition and refer­
ences to it are designated by the symbol “ T ” .



There was no evidence of any misconduct on the part of 
petitioners. The prosecution offered evidence in an effort 
to show that when the four Negroes walked into the station, 
people became restless and some onlookers climbed onto 
seats (T. 76, 79, 89,123). There was no evidence of violence 
or disorder. Police testimony consistently was the same; 
petitioners were quiet, orderly and polite (T. 21, 22, 47, 57).

Petitioners Blake and Dennis were arrested about two 
blocks away from the bus station and all testimony showed 
that they had not been in the bus station on that day (T. 
38, 42, 44).

No one else was arrested, and so far as appears, none 
of the other occupants of the station was interrogated.

Petitioners were charged with disturbing* the peace. The 
Bill of Information (R. 21) alleged that they did “ with 
intent to provoke a breach of the peace, and under circum­
stances such that a breach of the peace might be occasioned 
thereby, crowd and congregate with others in a public place, 
to wit, inside the . .  . Bus Station . . . and did fail and refuse 
to disperse and move on when ordered to do so by a law 
enforcement officer . .

Petitioners’ motion for a bill of particulars was denied. 
The said motion had sought to require the setting forth of 
sufficient detail of the charged offense so as to permit 
petitioners to prepare a defense. Basically, the motion 
asked that petitioners be advised of the manner in which 
they were alleged to have congregated or crowded and as 
to the specific breach of the peace that could have been 
reasonably occasioned as a result of their acts (R. 27-29). 
The Trial Court denied the motion stating that the “ bill



6

of information gave all of the particulars pertinent to the 
charge against them”  (E. 16).

Petitioners thereafter filed a motion to quash and sought 
leave to adduce evidence in support of the motion which 
the Trial Court denied (R. 30-31).

The petitioners were then, on August 11,1961, arraigned 
and each pleaded “ not guilty.”  Following the trial before 
Judge John A. Dixon, Jr., petitioners moved for a directed 
verdict as to the petitioners, David James Dennis and 
Harry Blake, upon the ground that there had been no evi­
dence adduced which indicated that either of the said two 
petitioners had been present in the bus station at the time 
the alleged incident took place, and that they had been 
charged as principals, the motion was denied (T. 203).

A  further motion for directed verdict as to all petitioners 
was denied. The Court in denying the said motion made the 
following statement:

“ The motion for a directed verdict is overruled. 
I believe the State has shown a prima facie case. 
Even a person so far removed from this scene as 
United States Attorney General Kennedy recog­
nizes that when colored people go into a white wait­
ing room in a place like Shreveport, they have com­
mitted an act that is calculated to disturb and alarm 
the public.”  (R. 37)

The Court thereupon found all of the petitioners guilty. 
A  motion for a new trial was made (R. 40) and denied and 
sentences were imposed upon petitioners.

The Court in imposing sentence, made the following 
statement (T. 251-252):



7

. . these sentences are going to be imposed as 
I think the prosecution has been motivated, and the 
arrest has been motivated, not because of what you 
think or the fact that your beliefs are different from 
the beliefs of white people generally in this area, 
and that, although you certainly cannot separate 
this case from the segregation problem, these sen­
tences are motivated, I think, by a desire on the part 
of the Court to do what it can to maintain the rela­
tively harmonious relationships in this community 
that have existed in the past between the races and 
to prevent incidents in Shreveport that can have 
hardly any other conclusion except the destruction 
of the relatively harmonious relationships that have 
existed here. ’ ’

Levert Taylor was sentenced to pay a fine of $150.00 and 
costs or, in default thereof, to serve 30 days in jail, and 
to serve 30 days in jail; Delores MeG-innie and Marie Mc- 
G-innie were sentenced to pay a fine of $150.00 and costs or, 
in default thereof, to serve 30 days in jail, and to serve 15 
days in jail. The Court ordered that the 15 days in jail be 
suspended upon good behavior. Harold L. Bethune was 
sentenced to pay a fine of $200.00 and costs or, in default 
thereof, to serve 45 days in jail, and to serve 3 months in 
jail.

Although the petitioners Dennis and Blake were proven 
not to have been in the station, they were convicted “ as 
principals”  and the heaviest sentences imposed upon them. 
Dennis was sentenced to pay a fine of $200.00 and costs or, 
in default thereof, to serve 45 days in jail, and to serve 3 
months in jail; and Blake was sentenced to pay a fine of 
$200.00 and costs or, in default thereof, to serve 45 days in 
jail, and to serve 30 days in jail.



8

The petitioners sought review of the judgments of con­
viction and sentences by the Louisiana State Supreme 
Court. Under Louisiana law no appeal procedure was avail­
able, since no sentence was for longer than 6 months and no 
fine over $300.00. Review was sought, however, under the 
general supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.2 
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the showing made 
by petitioners did not justify the exercise of supervisory 
jurisdiction.

HOW FEDERAL QUESTIONS WERE RAISED

The Federal questions here presented were specifically 
raised in the District Court by written motion to quash 
prior to arraignment of petitioners (R. 30, 31), by oral 
motions for directed verdicts, again by written motion in 
arrest of judgment (R. 33, 34), and still again by written 
motion for a new trial (R. 40, 41). Each of the said motions 
was overruled; the denial of the motion to quash was accom­
panied by a written opinion (R. 19, 20), and the denial of 
the motion for a directed verdict by an oral opinion (R. 37). 
The written motions and opinions referred to herein appear 
in Appendix B, infra pp. 20-33. In petitioners’ applica­
tion to the Louisiana State Supreme Court for Writs of 
Mandamus, Certiorari and Prohibition, specific reference 
was again made to the Federal questions sought to be re­
viewed (R. 9-14).

2 Article V II Sec. 10, Louisiana Constitution, provides for the 
general supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over all inferior 
courts. No appeal is available in criminal cases unless a sentence of 
more than 6 months or a fine of more than $300.00 has been imposed 
by the lower court.



9

Petitioners’ Federal claims were thus made at the earli­
est opportunity and were renewed at each stage of the 
proceeding below.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

As a preliminary matter it must be stated again that 
the convictions were based on no evidence whatsoever be­
yond the presence of four of the petitioners in a white 
waiting room. That the two petitioners, Dennis and Blake, 
were not even present in the station was conceded by the 
State (T. 34-35). All of the State’s witnesses testified to the 
fact that petitioners were orderly, polite and spoke only to 
one another or to the police officers. Whatever fragmentary 
testimony there was of disorder concerned the conduct of 
persons in the station other than petitioners. Even under 
the broad and vaguely worded legislative prohibition 
against disturbing the peace, there was not a shadow of 
evidence that could have justified the convictions, either of 
the four who were at the station, or of the two who accord­
ing to the prosecution aided and abetted them.

It was not disturbing the peace for petitioners to wait 
for a bus in the Continental Trailways Bus Station. It was 
not disturbing the peace for the petitioners to seek travel 
information in the “ white”  waiting room of the bus station. 
It was not disturbing the peace for petitioners to politely 
advise the police of their unwillingness to move into the 
waiting room reserved for Negroes.

Nor can evidence as to the membership in or participa­
tion by petitioners in the efforts of the Congress of Racial



10

Equality, an organization devoted to the testing and elimi­
nation of segregation in interstate travel, without more, 
constitute proof of intent to disturb the peace (T. 156, 160, 
165).

The convictions here suggest that Negroes cannot wait 
for a bus in a public bus station “without the jeopardy of 
arrest. They also suggest that Negroes so arrested are 
stripped of the presumption of innocence, and although 
they prove beyond any doubt that the charges against them 
are unwarranted, they will nevertheless be found guilty. 
Thus, the decisions of the District Court, buttressed by the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s refusal to review, are not 
simply rulings that petitioners must pay fines or serve 
jail sentences; they are virtually a warning to all Negroes 
in the State of Louisiana that they exercise their constitu­
tional rights to travel and assemble upon pain of criminal 
punishment if their acts conflict with the mores of their local 
community.

This petition is therefore based on more than the fact 
that the convictions were unsupported by evidence. It is 
based also on the manifest purpose of these convictions, that 
of preserving racial segregation under the pretense of pre­
serving the peace. The reasons why the writ should be 
granted are stated below.



11

CONFLICT WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF 
THIS COURT

Free and unimpeded travel has been held to be a natural, 
or constitutionally protected right. Kent v. Dulles, 357 
U. S. 116 (1958); Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 172 
(1941). The right of interstate bus travellers not to be 
subjected to discrimination and segregation is well and long- 
established. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946); 
Henderson v. United States, 339 U. S. 816 (1950); Mitchell 
v. United States, 313 U. S. 80, 97 (1941); Boynton v. Vir­
ginia, 364 U. S. 454 (1960): Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 
903; Bailey v. Patterson, — U. S. —, Feb. 26, 1962.

Interference with these rights is not only proscribed by 
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Con­
stitution, but also violates Article 1, Sec. 8, of the Constitu­
tion of the United States and the laws of Congress and the 
regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission passed 
and adoped pursuant thereto. 49 U. S. C. 316(d); 49 
U. S. C. 3 (1 ); 49 U. S. C. 1374, Mitchell v. U. S., and Hen­
derson v. U. S., both supra.

That the existence of a Federal right necessarily implies 
a federally protected immunity against harassment, reprisal 
or punishment for the exercise of that right is too well 
settled for argument. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 
316 (1819); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U. S. 51 (1920), and 
cases there cited; N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, ex rel. Patter­
son, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).

The question then is whether the exercise of a right may 
be limited because it is expected to arouse violence in others.



12

The law on this issue is settled. Those who exercise con­
stitutionally protected rights can neither he punished nor 
stopped unless they, themselves, are guilty of affirmative 
acts of wrongdoing. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958); 
Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F. 2d 877 (C. A. 8,1947) cert, denied 
332 U. 8. 851; Rockwell v. Morris, 10 N. Y. 2d, 749, cert, 
denied 368 IT. S. 913 (1962).

I f the right involved here was not that of travel, but 
examined only in the context of the testing of legislation by 
peaceful assembly or demonstration, the law is equally clear. 
Such rights are protected by the 1st Amendment. See, 
e.g., De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 IT. S. 353 (1937); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 IT. S. 296, 306 (1940).

IMPORTANCE OF THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS

From the earliest Court interpretations of the Four­
teenth Amendment to the present, there has been a con­
sistent adherence to the view that it prohibits discrimination 
by the States. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 IT. S. 303 
(1880). The law is clear that such discrimination is equally 
repugnant whether it takes the form of legislation or un­
equal administration of the law by public authority. As 
this Court said in Yick Wo v„ Hopkins, 118 IT. S. 356 (1886):

“ Though the law itself be fair on its face and 
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and 
administered by public authority with an evil eye 
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make un­
just and illegal discriminations between persons in 
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the 
denial of equal justices is still within the prohibition 
of the Constitution . . . ”



13

The basic question here, however, is whether a State 
may, under cloak of protecting against breach of the peace 
or guarding the public safety, practice such discrimination. 
The power of the police to effect summary arrests where 
breach of peace appears imminent is not questioned. There 
must, however, be safeguards against the use of such power 
to enforce discriminatory State policies which are not ac­
ceptable in the form of legislative or administrative acts. 
Where a State affirmatively sanctions police incursion into 
the area of protected activity, it is running counter to the 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such summary 
official action must be restrained. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 
U. S. 157, and see Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 
199.

The denial of due process by the arrests here is evident. 
White persons would not be and were not arrested for their 
presence in the same place at the time time. Nor were they 
arrested for their acts, since the only evidence of any dis­
order was as to others in the station. Neither can it be said 
that the trial of petitioners satisfied the due process require­
ments, their convictions being devoid of evidence to support 
them. Perhaps even more significantly, upon their trial 
they were stripped by the Court’s declared attitude as 
quoted earlier, of the presumption of innocence. Bailey v. 
Alabama, 219 U. S. 219.

The gravity of the threat implicit here is plain. This 
is not an action involving a dispassionate effort on the part 
of the police to prevent persons whom they consider danger­
ous to the peace from frequenting public places. This case 
involves a broad threat to all Negroes that the State of 
Louisiana will use the police power and the threat of 
criminal penalty to perpetuate practices outlawed by the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States.



14

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for writ of 
certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Gael R a c h lin ,
J u d ith  P . Y ladeck ,

280 Broadway,
New York 7, N. Y.
Attorneys for Petitioners.

J esse N. S tone , J r .,
Shreveport, Louisiana, 

of Counsel.



APPENDIX A

Revised Statutes of the State of Louisiana

14:103.1. Disturbing the Peace.
A. Whoever with intent to provoke a breach of the 

peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the 
peace may be occasioned thereby:

(1) crowds or congregates with others providing how­
ever nothing herein contained shall apply to a bona fide 
legitimate labor organization or to any of its legal activities 
such as picketing, lawful assembly or concerted activity in 
the interest of its members for the purpose of accomplishing 
or securing more favorable wage standards, hours of em­
ployment and working conditions, in or upon a shore pro­
tection structure or structures, or a public street or public 
highway, or upon a public sidewalk, or any other public 
place or building, or in any hotel, motel, store, restaurant, 
lunch counter, cafeteria, sandwich shop, motion picture 
theatre, drive-in, beauty parlor, swimming pool area, or any 
sports or recreational area or place, or any other place of 
business engaged in selling or serving members of the 
public, or in or around any free entrance to any such place 
of business or public building, or to any building owned by 
another individual, or a corporation, or a partnership or an 
association, and who fails or refuses to disperse and move 
on, or disperse or move on, when ordered so to do by any 
law enforcement officer of any municipality, or parish, in 
which such act or acts are committed or by any law enforce­
ment officer of the state of Louisiana, or any other author­
ized person or

(2) insults or makes rude or obscene remarks or ges­
tures, or uses profane language, or physical acts, or indecent 
proposals to or toward another or others, or disturbs or 
obstructs or interferes with another or others, or

[15]



16

(3) while in or on any public bus, taxicab, boat, ferry 
or other water craft or other vehicle engaged in transport­

ing members of the public for a fare or charge, causes a 
disturbance or does or says, respectively, any of the matters 
or things mentioned in subsection (2) supra, to, toward, or 
in the presence of any other passenger on said vehicle, or 
any person outside of said vehicle or in the process of board­
ing or departing from said vehicle, or any employee engaged 
in and about the operation of such vehicle, or

(4) refuses to leave the premises of another when re­
quested so to do by any owner, lessee, or any employee 
thereof, shall be guilty of disturbing the peace.

B. Whoever commits the crime of disturbing the peace 
as defined herein shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than two hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the parish 
jail for not more than four months, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment.

Section 2. If any provision or item of this Act or the 
application thereof is held invalid, such invalidity shall not 
affect other provisions, items or applications of this Act 
which can be given effect without the invalid provisions, 
items or application and to this end the provisions of this 
Act are hereby declared severable.

Section 3. All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith 
are hereby repealed.

Section 4. The necessity for the immediate passage of 
this Act having been certified by the Governor to the Legis­
lature while in session, in accordance with Section 27 of 
Article III of the Constitution of Louisiana, this Act shall 
become effective immediately upon approval by the Gov­
ernor” .
Approved by Gov.: June 22, 1960.



17

APPEN DIX B

Opinion o f First Judicial Court o f Caddo Parish

No. 57,562

S tate of L ouisiana 

vs.

L evert H . T aylor, D elores M cGt n n ie , 
M arie M cG in n ie , H arold L . B e t h u n e , 
D avid J ames D en n is  and H arry B lake

In the First Judicial 
District Court, 
Criminal Section, 
Parish of Caddo, 
State of Louisiana

The Court,: There is not a person in this court room who 
does not know that if white persons go into the colored 
waiting room in Shreveport or if colored persons go into 
the white waiting room at the bus station in Shreveport 
that a breach of the peace is likely and eminent and prob­
able.

The police department and sheriff’s department of this 
city and state are to be commended for taking prompt 
action. Other police and other cities and towns have been 
highly criticized in many places for failing to take action 
when such an incident as this was about to occur.

In this case the attempt, I think, to create a disturbance 
was planned and deliberate. Evidence uncontradicted shows 
that there were meetings at which these defendants perhaps 
with others planned this excursion, and that one of the 
defendants, Dennis, called the police and alerted them. He 
could have only had one of two purposes, or maybe both, 
for such a call. One was publicity, and the other was pro-



18

tection. He received the protection. I think the question 
here is not whether or not the police have the right or the 
authority to direct people who are doing something* that is 
lawful to move on. The question here is purely whether or 
not these people congregated intending to provoke a breach 
of the peace, congregated with the intent to do something 
that was calculated to disturb the peace.

There is absoluely no question about it. The defense 
has admitted, or offered to admit from time to time that 
these colored people did go into the white waiting room at 
the bus station. The Court does not believe the testimony 
of Blake and Bethune when they say they did not know 
what was planned or what was about to happen or what was 
going to transpire.

I find Blake as a principal and we find all the defendants 
guilty.

* * *



19

Opinion of Louisiana Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA 
New Orleans

S t a t e  oe L o u is i a n a  I October n ,  1951

v. >

L e v e r t  H. T a y l o r  e t  a l . \ no. 45,841

In re : Levert H. Taylor et al applying for writs of man 
damus, certiorari and prohibition

Writ refused. The showing made does not justify the eser 
cise of our supervisory jurisdiction.

/ s /  FWS 
/&/ JBF 
/ s /  JBH 
/ s /  FW H 
/ s /  EHMcC 
/ b/  WBH 
/ s /  JWS



20

Motion to Quash Bill of Information

S tate oe L ouisiana 

versus
L evert H . T aylor, D elores M cG in n is , 

M arie M cG in n ie , H arold L . B e t h u m e , 
D avid J am es D en n is  and H arry B lake

Number: 57,562
First Judicial 
District Court 
Caddo Parish, 
Louisiana

Now into court come LeVert H. Taylor, Delores Mc­
Ginnie, Marie McGinnie, Harold L. Bethume, David James 
Dennis and Harry Blake, appearing herein through their 
undersigned counsel, and reserving all rights under any and 
all motions previously filed herein as well as the right to file 
additional motions including those normally filed to arraign­
ment, and with respect, show:

1.

That the Bill of Information filed herein against them 
should be quashed for the following reasons, to wit:

1.

That the statute defining the offense with which your 
petitioners are charged herein should be quashed for lack 
of clarity in that the language of the statute lacks the clarity 
required by Article one Section ten of the Louisiana Con­
stitution and the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States as it fixes no ascertainable standard of 
guilt that the defendants or would be defendants could be 
aware or appraised of prior to commission of the act or acts 
and prior to a determination by the courts, and particularly



2 1

in reference to the words “ crowd and congregates with 
others.”

2 .
The statute violates the defendants’ rights to peaceably 

assemble as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States and of Article one Section 
five of the Constitution of the state of Louisiana.

3.

The statute under which your petitioners are charged 
violates the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that 
it exacts a penalty from these defendants not exacted from 
Labor Unions and other persons specifically exempted under 
the statute.

4.

The statute under which petitioners are charged violates 
the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Four­
teenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
in that it has for its purpose furthering and maintaining 
the states policy of forced segregation in the state of Louisi­
ana at the places designated in the statute, or in the alterna­
tive, and the alternative only it is being administered in a 
fashion so as to deny members of the Negro Pace rights 
secured to them under the Equal Protection and Due Pro­
cess Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu­
tion of the United States by exacting of the criminal penal­
ties for seeking to use facilities not specifically designated 
for members of their race.



22

5.

That in the alternative and in the alternative only this 
statute makes it possible to exact a penalty from these par­
ticular defendants merely because of their attempt to use 
facilities in interstate commerce in keeping with their rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and particularly the Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses thereof

W h e r e f o r e , p e t it io n e r s  p r a y  that this motion to Quash 
be sustained and that the Bill of Information filed herein 
against them be Quashed and that the charges be dismissed 
and that they be restored to their liberty forthwith and 
that they be relieved from further prosecution herein under 
the statute complained, and for all orders necessary and 
for general and equitable relief.

/ s /  J esse N . S tone, J r . 
J esse N. S tone, J r . 
854% Texas Avenue 
Shreveport, Louisiana 

Attorney for Petitioners



23

Opinion of Judge John J. O’Neal on Motion to Quash

S t a t e  of  L o u is i a n a  1 Number: 57,562
( First Judicial 

V. > District Court
! Caddo Parish,

L e v e b t  H. TAYLOB, ET AL, \ Louisiana * 1 2 3

The defendants in the above and entitled cause, being 
six in number, charged under R. S. 14:103.1 with disturbing 
the peace, filed a motion to quash the bill of information 
on five grounds, which motion has been argued and sub­
mitted.

(1) It is alleged that the statute defining the offense 
under which the defendants are charged should be quashed 
for lack of clarity, as the statute lacks the clarity required 
by the Federal and State constitutions, in that there is no 
standard to apprise the defendants what is prohibited, par­
ticularly in reference to the words “ crowd and congregates 
with others.”

We see no merit to this contention. Two or more make 
a “ crowd.”  We think that when the statute prohibits a 
person congregating with others, etc., the words used are of 
common import, and such person can clearly understand 
same. Furthermore, the charge filed herein charges six 
persons with having “ congregated.”

(2) The second point is without merit as the statute does 
not prohibit persons from “ peaceable assembly.”  The 
statute prohibits breaches of the peace as defined therein.

(3) The third ground of the motion to quash alleges 
that the defendants are denied the “ equal protection”



24

clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, for the reason that labor unions are ex­
empted under the statute.

Labor unions are regulated by a different law and, as 
we understand the jurisprudence, reasonable exceptions 
may be made in a statute without rendering the statute 
unconstitutional.

(4) Defendants allege that the statute under which 
defendants are charged violates the “ due process”  and 
“ equal protection”  clauses of the 14th Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, in that it has for its pur­
pose furthering and maintaining the State’s policy of 
forced segregation in the state of Louisiana at the places 
designated in the statute; and in the alternative, that it is 
being administered in a fashion to deny members of the 
negro race rights accorded to them under the “ equal pro­
tection”  and “ due process”  clauses of the Constitution, 
by exacting of the (defendants) criminal penalties for 
seeking to use facilities not specifically designated for mem­
bers of their race.

The statute applies to all persons, whether white or 
colored, and has no reference whatever to the segregation 
of the races. While the statute may be used to prosecute 
those who attempt to individually enforce desegregation or 
violate segregation statutes, it applies to white as well as to 
colored people and (so far as we recall) the statute applies 
to places not covered by any segregation statute. It pro­
hibits persons congregating with others with the intent to 
provoke a breach of the peace . . .  in or upon . . .  a public 
street or public highway or upon a public sidewalk.



25

(5) The allegations contained in paragraph five are 
inapplicable to the present law, as the segregation statutes 
are not involved in this proceeding. The complaint in this 
section might be applicable to a statute providing for a 
segregation of the races if the defendants were charged 
with violating1 such law. The defendants are not charged 
with violating the segregation laws. They are charged with 
disturbing the peace. A  person may have the legal right 
to go to his church or walk upon the streets, but he cannot 
do it if he breaches the peace in so doing.

Under the terms of the statute, if six white persons did 
the same thing that these six defendants were charged with 
having done, they would be subject to prosecution for the 
same offense.

For the reasons assigned the motion to quash is over­
ruled.

(Seal)

/ s /  John J. O’Neal 
District Judge



26

Motion in Arrest of Judgment

S tate, of L ouisiana 

versus
L evert H . T aylor, D elores M cG in n ie , 

M arie M cG in n ie , H arold L. B e th u m e , 
D avid J am es  D ennis and H arry B lake

N ow  into Court, through their undersigned counsel, 
come all of the defendants herein, reserving all rights under 
any and all motions and/or exceptions and under all Bills 
of Exceptions previously reserved, and with respect moves 
the court to arrest, nullify and set aside the judgment 
rendered herein against them for the following reasons 
patent upon the face of the record, to wit:

1.
That the statute under which these defendants are 

charged and the Bill of Information charging them in this 
cause were both so vague and indefinite that the defendants 
were not sufficiently apprised of the charges against them, 
and hence could not adequately prepare their defense, and 
that despite the fact that they filed a Motion for a Bill of 
Particulars in which they sought the necessary information, 
the same was refused, and hence the defects complained of 
were not cured.

3.

That the statute itself is patently defective in that it 
lacks sufficient clarity so as to apprise an offender or a 
would be offender of the specific act or acts that would 
constitute the crime or offense set forth in the statute.

Number: 57,562
First Judicial 
District Court 
Caddo Parish, 
Louisiana



27

4.
That the statute and the Bill of Information used words 

susceptible of various and sundry meaning and therefore 
were not sufficiently clear so that guilt could be ascertain­
able by an offender or a would be offender, and here your 
petitioners make particular reference to the words crowded 
and congregated.

5.
That in reference to all of the above and foregoing your 

petitioners, the defendants in this cause, show that the 
statute and the affidavit are therefore in violation of Article 
One Section Ten of the Constitution of the state of Louisi­
ana and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.

6.

That there are statements patent upon the record of 
this cause made by this Honorable Court in connection with 
the rendition of its judgment to the effect that when colored 
people go into a white waiting room in a place like Shreve­
port, Louisiana, they have committed an act that is calcu­
lated to disturb and alarm the public.

7.
That the statement by this court to the effect set forth 

in the previous paragraph shows that this court found as 
a matter of fact that these defendants went into a white 
waiting room and thereby breached the peace, or caused a 
breach of the peace by their mere presence and for the court 
to so find is recognition by this court of, and is giving sanc­
tion to a policy of separation of races in public facilities 
under state law, under color thereof or in accordance with 
local custom and tradition, all in violation of the Equal



28

Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

8.

That in support of this Motion in Arrest of Judgment 
your petitioners wish to file herein a transcript of the ruling 
of this court both in connection with the defendants motion 
for a directed verdict and in connection with the findings 
of the court in reference to the defendant’s guilt or inno­
cence in this cause and that the same is annexed hereto 
and made part hereof, and which transcript shows that the 
ruling of the court on the question of guilt and in which the 
court made the statements aforesaid was timely excepted

W h e r e f o r e , y o u r  p e t it io n e r s  p r a y  that their Motion in 
Arrest of Judgment be sustained as to each of these de­
fendants and that all of the proceedings under the above 
and foregoing statute and/or Bill of Information be nulli­
fied and that further proceedings be suspended and p e t i ­

t io n e r s  f u r t h e r  p r a y  in the alternative and in the alterna­
tive only that if for any reason this court should find this 
motion in arrest of judgment should not be sustained as to 
all of them, which is denied by all of your petitioners, then, 
and in such event, your petitioners pray that it be sustained 
as to such party or parties as the court shall deem entitled 
to such relief, and for all orders necessary and for general 
and equitable relief.

/ s /  J esse N. S tone , Jr.
Jesse N. Stone, Jr. 
Attorney for Petitioners, 
Defendants in this cause 
854% Texas Avenue 
Shreveport, Louisiana



29

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Jesse N. Stone, Jr., do hereby certify that this Motion 
in Arrest of Judgment is filed in good faith, and is in my 
personal opinion, well grounded in law and in fact, and that 
the same is not filed for mere purpose of delay.

I further certify that a copy of the above and foregoing 
motion has been served on Honorable John A. Richardson, 
District Attorney in and for Caddo Parish, Louisiana.

DONE AND SIGNED THIS 2 3 e D DAY OP AUGUST, A. D. 1961.

/ s /  J esse N. S tone , J e . 
J esse N. S tone, J e .

(Seal)



30

Motion for a New Trial

S tate of L ouisiana 

versus
L evebt H. T aylor, et a l .

Number: 57,562
First Judicial 
District Court 
Caddo Parish, 
Louisiana

The defendants, LeVert H, Taylor, Delores McGinnie, 
Marie McGinnie, Harold L. Bethume, David James Dennis 
and Harry Blake, reserving all rights under any and all 
motions and/or exceptions previously filed herein, move 
the Court for a new trial herein for the following reasons, 
to wit:

That as can be seen from the Bill of Information filed 
herein, and the ruling of the court in reference to the Bill 
of Particulars filed herein by these defendants David Dennis 
and Harry Blake had no way of knowing that testimony 
would be offered by the prosecution to show that they in 
any way aided and abetted the remainder of your defend­
ants in their alleged unlawful acts.

That David James Dennis and Harry Blake, along with 
the other defendants sought by Motion for a Bill of Par­
ticulars to ascertain the manner in which they allegedly 
violated the law and that the same was denied them.

1.

2.



31

3.

That David Dennis and Harry Blake were thus required 
to go to trial without knowing- under what specific act or 
acts they were alleged to have committed in violation of 
the law.

4.

That the verdict of guilty rendered by this court as 
against all of the defendants is contrary to the law and the 
evidence, in that the evidence offered to the effect that the 
presence of four of these defendants in a white -waiting room 
in Shreveport, Louisiana caused a Breach of the Peace, 
and the court’s statements to the effect that the presence 
of colored people in a white waiting room in a place like 
Shreveport, Louisiana is an act calculated to disturb and 
alarm the public, present no legal basis to support a verdict 
of guilty, in that such evidence and findings by the court 
presuppose that the defendants had no lawful right to act 
in the manner that they did, and that this is contrary to 
the law of the state of Louisiana of the United States, and 
particularly the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States.

5.

That the verdict is against the law and the evidence 
particularly as the same applies to Delores McG-innie, 
Marie McGinnie, LeVert Taylor, David James Dennis and 
Harry Blake for the reason that the evidence does not show- 
that any statement by any police officer wras ever made to 
either of them that could be calculated to have been an order 
for them to move on or to disperse.



32

6.

That the evidence is without contradiction.

7.

That the Chief of Police of Shreveport, Louisiana di­
rected his remarks and his order to Harold Bethume.

W herefore, petitioners pray that this Motion for New 
Trial be sustained and that a new trial be ordered by this 
court and that the verdict he set aside, and for all orders 
necessary and for general and equitable relief.

/ s /  J esse N. S tone, Jr.
Jesse N. Stone, Jr. 
Attorney for Petitioners 
854% Texas Avenue 
Shreveport, Louisiana



33

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Jesse X. Stone, Jr., do hereby certify that this Motion 
for New Trial is filed in good faith, and is in my personal 
opinion well grounded in law and in fact, and that the same 
is not filed for mere purposes of delay.

I further certify that a copy of the above and foregoing 
motion has been served on Honorable John A. Richardson, 
District Attorney in and for Caddo Parish, Louisiana.

D one a n d  signed t h is  2.3rd d a y  of A ugust , A. D. 1961.

/ s /  J esse N. S tone, J r .
J esse N. S tone, J r .



( g p— 2986)