Griffin v. Carlin Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc

    I n  the

§>uprrm? Cflmtrt of luttpfc î tatPB
October Term, 1979 

No. 1729

L awrence A . Uzzell and Robert Lane A rrington,Individually, 
and upon behalf of all others similarly situated, et al.,

v.
Petitioners,

W illiam; C. F riday, Individually and as President 
of the University of North Carolina.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Julius LeV onne Chambers 
Charles B ecton 
James C. F uller, Jr.

Chambers, Stein, Ferguson,
& Beeton

951 South Independence Boulevard 
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202

Jack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, III 
Napoleon B. W illiams, Jr.
Judith Heed 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Counsel for Intervening Respondents

April, 1980



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table o f  Cases and A u th or i t ie s  .......................  i i

Opinions Below ■............................... ............................. 1

Statement o f  the Case ............................................ 2

Argument . ................ ................. .................................... 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT . . . . ____ 2

I .  THE ORDER BELOW IS AN INTERLOCUTORY 
DECREE WHICH SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED 
AT THIS TIME ................................................  3

I I .  WHETHER CONGRESS CAN PRECLUDE A JUDGE 
OF SENIOR STATUS FROM SITTING EN BANC 
IS AN ISSUE WHICH HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY 
DETERMINED BY THIS COURT . . . . . . . ____ 6

I I I .  THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH 
CIRCUIT HAD THE POWER AND DUTY TO 
CORRECT ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
§ 4 6 ( c )  AND TO GRANT REARGUMENT . . . .  13

Page

Conclusion 18



1 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

American Construct ion  Co. v . J ackson v i l l e

Page

T. & K. W. Ry. C o . , 148 U.S. 
372 (1893) ......... .. 4 ,5 ,1 0

B r a n i f f  Airways,  Inc.  v.  C u r t i s s -
Wright C o r p . , 424 F„2d 427 (2nd 
Cir.  1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Bronson v.  Schulten,  104 U.S. 410,
(1882) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Brotherhood o f  Locomotive Firemen and 
Enginemen v. Bangor & Aroostook 
Railroad Company, 389 U.S. 327 
(1967) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Chandler v.  J u d i c ia l  Counci l ,  398 U.S. 
74 (1970) ..................... 12

Conqueror, The 166 U.S. 110 (1897) . . . ____ 4

Denver v. New York Trust C o . ,  229 U.S.
123 (1913) . . . . . . . . . . . . ____. . . . . . . . . . 4

E s t e l l e  v.  Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) . . . . 6

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v.  Wolf
Brothers & Co . ,  240 U.S. 251 
(1916) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ____. . . . . . 4 ,5

Huddleston v.  Dwver, 322 U.S. 232 
0 9 4 4 ) .  . .............................................. .. 6 ,14 ,16

Larson v . Domestic & Foreign Commerce 
Corp. ,  337 U.S. 682 (1949) ......... .. 5

Moody v . Albemarle Paper Co. ,  417
U.S. 622 (1974) ................................ ............. 11,12



- Ill

Page

P ick ford  v.  Talbot ,  225 U.S. 651
(1912) ..................   17

Regents o f  the Univers ity  o f  C a l i f o r n ia  v.
Bakke, 438' U.S. 265 (1978) ................   10,17

R. Simpson & Co. I n c . ,  v . Commissioner 
o f  In ternal  Revenue, 321 U.S. 226 
(1944) .............................................    16

T e x t i l e  M i l l s  S e c u r i t i e s  Corp. v.
Commissioner o f  In ternal  Revenue,
314 U.S. 326 (1943) ......................... ...........

7

Three F r ien ds , The 166 U.S. 1 (1897) . . . . .  4

United States v . American-Foreign 
Steamship C o r p . , 363 U.S 685
0 9 6 0 ) ............................................... . . . . . .  7 , 8 , 10 , 11 ,

12, 13
United States v.  Sentinel  Fire  Ins.

C o . , 178 F .2d 217 (5th Cir .
1949) .............................. ................. .. 11

Western P a c i f i c  Ra i lroad Corp. v.
Western P a c i f i c  Ra i lroad C o . ,
345 U.S. 247 (1953) .............................. .. 7 ,11,14

Other A uthor it ies

Omnibus Judgeship B i l l ,  28 U.S.C.
§ 4 6 ( c )  ............................ ..................... . . .  4 ,7 ,1 0 ,1 1 ,

12,13

Rule 60 (b ) ,  Fed. R. Civ. P..................................  17



IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October Term, 1979 

No. 1729

=s ss ss ss SS S2 ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ssSS

LAWRENCE A. UZZELL and ROBERT LANE 
ARRINGTON, In d iv id u a l l y ,  and upon behal f  
o f  a l l  others  s im i la r ly  s i tu a te d ,  et a l . ,

P e t i t i o n e r s ,

v.

WILLIAM C. FRIDAY, In d iv id u a l ly  and as 
President o f  the Univers i ty  o f  North 
Carol ina.

ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss =2 ss ss ss ss ssssss ss ss

sss s ss s ss s ;

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ss ss ss = r= ss =5 ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss =2 ss s r  ss ss ss ss ss: ss ss ss ss ss ss ss ss

Opinions Below

The d i s t r i c t  c o u r t 1s op in ion  is  reported  at 
401 F. Supp, 775. The Fourth C i r c u i t ' s  opinions  
are reported at 547 F.2d 801, 558 F.2d 727, and 
591 F . 2d 997. These opinions  are set fo r th  in

p e t i t i o n e r s '  Supplemental Appendix to  P e t i t i o n  fo r  
Writ o f  C e r t i o r a r i . This C our t ' s previous opinion 
in th is  case i s  reported at 438 U.S. 912.



Statement of the Case

S e l f ] }  f o r  the p u rp ose  o f  t h i s  B r i e f  in 

Opposit ion ,  intervening  respondents accept  the 
Statement o f  the Case presented in  the P e t i t i o n  
for  Writ of C e r t i o r a r i .

Argument

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT 
P e t i t i o n e r s  present  in th e i r  p e t i t i o n  f o r  a 

writ of c e r t i o r a r i  the fo l l o w in g  three reasons f o r  
granting the w r i t :

To determine whether Congress has the 
power to  deprive a sen ior  judge o f  the 
CourL o f  Appeals o f  the power to  s i t  en 
banc :

To determine whether Congress has the 
power to  deprive  a sen ior  judge o f  the 
Court o f  Appeals o f  the power to  s i t  en 
banc w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a c a s e  pending" 
be fo re  the en banc court on or be fore  
October 20, 1978; and

To d e te rm in e  whether  a United  S t a t e s  
Court o f  Appeals i s  empowered to  allow 
reargument on a case a f t e r  the time fo r  
p e t i t i o n i n g  f o r  reargument and the 
time f o r  p e t i t i o n i n g  f o r  a w r i t  o f  
cert  i o r a r i  have expired .



3

R e sp o n d e n ts ,  i n t e r v e n i n g  d e fe n d a n t s  b e l o w ,  

oppose  the g r a n t i n g  o f  the w r i t .  They submit 
th a t  each  o f  th ese  i s s u e s  has p r e v i o u s l y  been 

determined by this  Court and that they there fore  
do not present  any issues  o f  pub l i c  importance.  

In a d d i t io n ,  respondents oppose the granting o f  
the wri t  fo r  the reason that the order sought to  

be reviewed i s  an in t e r l o c u t o r y  decree  that f a i l s  
to s a t i s f y  th is  C ourt 's  stated c r i t e r i a  f o r  the 

di scret  ionary revi  ew o f  in t e r l o c u t o r y  orders o f  
the Courts o f  Appeals . For these reasons , respon­

dents request that the p e t i t i o n  be denied.

I.

THE ORDER BELOW IS AN INTERLOCUTORY
DECREE WHICH SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED AT
THIS TIME

The order o f  the Fourth C i r c u i t  below, dated 
November 9, 1979, said that the c o u r t ' s  previous 

mandate in t h i s  c a s e  was r e c a l l e d ,  that  i t s  
op inion  dated February 2, 1979, was withdrawn,

that the case was returned to  the hearing calendar 
f o r  reargument b e fo r e  a properly con s t i tu ted  en 

banc c o u r t , and that the c l e r k  was d i re c te d  to  f i x  
a date f o r  reargument as soon as an en banc court 

could  be convened. Following th i s  determininat. ion 
by the Fourth  C i r c u i t ,  p l a i n t i f f s  f i l e d  their-  

p e t i t i o n  f o r  a wri t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  to  rev i  ew the 
order o f  November 9, 1979 o f  the Fourth C i r c u i t .



-  L

Pursuant k  the November 9, 1979 o r d e r  o f  

the Iouit.h C ircu it  , the clerk  duly n o t i f i e d  the 
p a r t ie s  here in  that reargument b e fo r e  the court 

wee s cheduled l or January 7, 1980. On that date,  
the pa r t ie s  appeared for reargument b e fo r e  an en 

banc court, proper ly  con st i tu ted  under the Omnibus 
Judgeship B i l l ,  28 U.S.C i 4 6 ( c ) .  Decis ion  on the 

case was reserved and has not yet been, announced 
by the en banc c o u r t .

In the absence of  speci  al c ircumstances , th is  
Court has . r e f u s e d  t o  r e v i e w ,  upon p e t i t i o n  

fo r  a writ ol c e r t i o r a r i ,  in t e r l o c u t o r y  orders o f  
the  c o u r t s  o f  a p p e a l s .  Such o r d e r s  have been 

considered  as "not yet r ipe  f o r  review by this  
C o u r t " .  Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and 

inglnemen v .  Bangor A r o o s t o o k  Railroad Company, 
385 ti. S . 32 7, 328 (1567).  As th is  Court stated in 

Kami 11 on -Brown Shoe Co. y .  Wolf  Brothers & Co. ,  
2d(J U.S. 251 , 258 (1916),  "except  in extraord inary  

cases ,  the wri t  i s  not issued u n t i l  f i n a l  d e c r e e . "  
See a l s o  American Construction Co. v.  Jackson- 

v f l i e ,  T. & K. W. Ry Co . , 148 U .S .  372,  378 
(1893) ;  The Three Fr iends , 166 U.S. 1, 49 (1897);  

The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 113 (1897) ;  Denver v . 
K< w Yor 1 Trust  Co. , 229 U .S .  123, 133 ( 1 91 3 ) .

M oreover ,  the  Court has n o te d  that  the i n t e r -



l o cu tor y  nature o f  a decree  by a court  o f  appeals 

i s  "a f a c t  tha t  o f  i t s e l f  a lon e  f u r n i s h e ( s )  
s u f f i c i e n t  ground fo r  the denia l  o f  the a p p l i ca ­

t i o n "  f o r  a wri t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i . Hamilton-Brown
Shoe Co. v .  Wol f  B r o th e r s  & Co . ,  supra ,  240 
U.S at 258.

Under the ru les  o f  t h i s  Court , in t e r l o c u t o r y  

decrees  are reviewed only i f  " i t  i s  necessary to 
prevent extraord inary  inconvenience and embarrass­

ment in the conduct o f  the ca u s e " , American Con- 
s t r u c t i o n  Co. v,  J a c k s o n v i l l e ,  T & K. W. Ry. Co. , 

s u p r a , 148 U.S.  384,  o r  t o  d e c i d e  im p o r t a n t ,
unreso lved l e g a l  issues  o f  great pub l i c  moment 

t ’n at are  b a s i c  t o  c o n t in u e d  1 i t  i g a t  i o n  o f  the  
c a s e ,  s e e , e . g . ,  Larson  v .  Dome s t i c  & F o r e ig n  

Commerce C o r p . , 337 U.S.  682,  685 n . 3  ( 1 9 4 9 ) .  
Fai lure  to  grant the w r i t ,  however, w i l  not cause 

any s p e c ia l  embarrassment or inconvenience  to  the 
p a r t ie s  in the conduct o f  th i s  case .  Nor does the 

p e t i t i o n  p r e s e n t  any subs t ant i a l , u n r e s o l v e d  
issues  o f  law. Hence, respondents submit, there 

are no substant ia l  reasons warrant ing immediate 
reivew o f  the i n t e r l o c u t o r y  order issued by the 

court below.
The Fourth C i r c u i t ' s order i s  in te r lo c u to r y  

in the purest  sense o f  the word. It  did no more

-  5 -



6

tftsn d i r e c t  the  p a r t i e s  t o  r e a r g u e  the  c a s e ,  

Pe t i t i o n e r s  were f r e e  t o  make upon reargument 
be fore  the Fourth C ir c u i t  whatever arguments they 

intend to present to  th is  Court. Moreover, the 
Fourth C ir c u i t  i s  bound to con s id er ,  while the 

case is pending be fo re  i t ,  any and a l l  appl icable  
legal  p r i n c i p l e s .  See Huddleston v.  Dwyer, 322 

P 'S .  232, 236-37 (1944).  A ccord ing ly ,  respondents 
contend that th is  Court should,  in the present 

instance ,  f o l l o w  i t s  "normal p r a c t i c e  o f  denying 
in t e r l o c u t o r y  review".  E s t e l l e  v.  Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 1 14 (1976) (Stevens,  J. , d i s s e n t in g ) .  
A fter  the Fourth C ir c u i t  has had an opportunity to  

render i t s  d e c i s i o n ,  p e t i t i o n e r s  w i l l  then have 
ample time and opportunity  to  p e t i t i o n  th is  Court 
1 or a writ o f  c e r t i o r a r i  i f  they deem it: e i th er  
necessary or d e s i r a b l e .

I I .

WHETHER CONGRESS CAN PRECLUDE A JUDGE OF 
SENIOR STATUS FROM SITTING EN BANC IS AN ISSUE 
WHICH HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY DETERMINED BY THIS 
COURT.

This  Court has examined in  a v a r i e t y  o f  
d i f f e r e n t  cont .ex ts  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  the power 

o f  the judges o f  the Courts o f  Appeals to  hear and 
determine cases en banc and the quest ion o f  the

r i g h t s  o f  l i t i g a n t s  w i th  r e s p s e c t  t o  en banc



7

h e a r i n g s . The i s s u e s  were e x p l o r e d  at g rea t  

l e n g t h  in T e x t i l e  M i l l s  S e c u r i t  i e s  C o r p . v . 
Commissioner o f  Internal Revenue, 314 U. „S 326 

( 1943) and Western P a c i f i c  R a i l r o a d  C o r p . v . 
Western P a c i f i c  Railroad Co. ,  345 U.S. 247 (1953).

More r e c e n t l y , the sub ject  came up fo r  review 
in  United  S t a t e s  v .  American-Foreign Steamship 

Corp. , 363 U.S. 684 (1960).  This was a su i t  by 
the Steamship Company against  the United States to 

recover  amounts o f  a l leged  excess ive  charter  h i re  
assessed by the Maritime Commission with respect 

to ships chartered by the Steamship Company from 
the United St a t e s . The act  ion was dismissed by 

the d i s t r i c t  cou r t .  The United States Court o f  
Appeals f o r  the Second C ir c u i t  a f f i r m e d . C ircu i t  

Judge Harold Medina sat on the p a n e l . On December 
19, 1957, the Second C ir c u i t  granted the Steamship 

Company's pe t i  t i on  f o r  r e h e a r  ing en banc and 
o r d e r e d  th a t  "argument  t h e r e o n  be c o n f i n e d  to  

w r i t t e n  b r i e f s  to  be submit ted  w i t h i n  twenty 
d a y s . "  I d . ,  363 U.S.  at 686.  T h e r e a f t e r ,  on 

March 1, 1958, Judge Medina r e t i r e d  and assumed 
sen ior  s t a t u s . Approximately , f i v e  months la te r ,  

on July 28, 1958, the court rendered an en banc 
d e c i  s i o n  in which C i r c u i t  Judge Medina p a r ­

t i c i p a t e d .  Because 28 U.S.C.  § 4 6 ( c )  then pro ­



vided that a " court  en banc sh a l l  c o n s i s t  o f  a l l  

a c t iv e  c i r c u i t  judges o f  the c i r c u i t " ,  judge Clark 
d i s s e n t e d .

The United  St a t e s  pe t i  t i oned  f o r  an o th e r  
rehearing en banc . The p e t i t i o n  was denied on 

the ground that
( s ) in c e  Judge Medina was a member o f  the 
court  en banc which was duly con s t i tu te d  to 
hear and determine the issues  ra ised  by the 
p e t i t i o n  f o r  rehearing ,  we think h is  subse­
quent r e t i r e m e n t  d id  not  a f f e c t  h i s  com­
p e t e n c e  to  p a r t i c i p a t e  in  the d e c i s i o n  
t h e r e a f t e r  reached .

265 F . 2d 136,  154.  Judge C lark  and one o t h e r  
judge d issented .  They he ld  that Judge Medina' s 

p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in the en banc determination was 
barred by the p la in  language o f  the s t a t u t e . This 

Court granted c e r t  i o r a r i  to cons ider  the issue 
which had been ra ised  by judge Medina's  p a r t i c i p a ­

t i o n  in the en banc hearing .
In i t s  d e c i s i o n ,  th is  Court noted that the 

"view that a r e t i r e d  c i r c u i t  judge i s  e l i g i b l e  to  
p a r t i c i p a t e  in an en banc d e c i s i o n  thus f i n d s  
support ne i ther  in the language o f  the c o n t r o l l i n g  
sta tu te  nor in the circums tances o f  i t s  enact ­
ment" . United States v . American-Foreign Steam- 
ship Corp. , supra, 363 U.S. at 689. Quoting judge 
Clark in the opinion below, th is  Court s a i d , "the

-  8 -



evident p o l i c y  o f  the s ta tu te  was to provide  ' that  

the  a c t i v e  c i r c u i t  ju d g e s  s h a l l  d e te rm in e  the 
major d o c t r in a l  trends o f  the future  f o r  th e i r  
c o u r t .  I d . , at  690.  In language  tha t  is

d i s p o s i t i v e  o f  the  i s s u e s  which  p e t i t i o n e r s  
request th is  Court to review, th is  Court sa id .

Persuasive arguments could be advanced 
that an except ion  should be made to  permit a 
r e t i r e d  c i r c u i t  judge to  p a r t i c ip a t e  in en 
banc determinat ion o f  cases where, as here"," 
he took  part  in  the o r i g i n a l  t h r e e - j u d g e  
hearing ,  or where, as here ,  he had not yet 
r e t i r e d  when the en banc hearing was 
o r i g i n a l l y  o r d e r e d .  In d e e d ,  the  J u d i c i a l  
Conference o f  the United States has approved 
s u g g e s t e d  l e g i s l a t i v e  changes  that  would 
p r o v i d e  such an e x c e p t i o n ,  and a b i l l  t o  
amend the sta tu te  has been introduced in the 
Congress.  But th is  only serves  to  emphasize 
that i f  the sta tute  is  to  be changed, i t  is  
f o r  C o n g r e s s ,  no t  f o r  u s ,  t o  change i t .

We conclude f o r  these reasons that under 
e x i s t i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n  a r e t i r e d  c i r c u i t  
judge i s  without power to p a r t i c ip a t e  in an 
en banc Court o f  Appeals determination,  and 
a c c o r d i n g l y  th a t  the  judgment must be se t  
a s i d e .

I d . , at 690-691.

The issues  which p e t i t i o n e r s  seek to present 
to  t h i s  Court in  t h e i r  p e t i i o n  f o r  wr i t  o f  

c e r t i o r a r i  are thus i d e n t i c a l  to  those resoved in



U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  A m e r i c a n - F o r e i g n  Steamship 

Corp. , supra. In th e ir  p e t i t i o n ,  the p e t i t i o n e r s  
r e c i t e  t h a t  p r i o r  t o  the time o f  t h i s  C o u r t ' s  

previous grant of  c e r t i o r a r i  in t h i s  c a s e , Seni or 
C ir c u i t  Judge Eryan p a r t i c ip a t e d  in an en banc 

hearing o f  th i s  case ,  that f o l l ow in g  the remand 
by t h i s  C o u r t ,  438 U.S.  912,  t o  c o n s i d e r  the 

i s s u e s  h e r e i n  in  l i g h t  o f  Regents  o f  the  Uni­
v e r s i t y  o f  C a l i f o r n i a  v .  Bakke , 438 U.S.  265 

(1978),  the Congress amended 28 U.S.C.  § 4 6 ( c )  to 
prov ide f o r  the exc lus ion  o f  sen io r  judges from 

p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in en banc h e a r in g s , that th e re a f te r  
argument b e f o r e  an o th e r  en banc c o u r t  o f  the 

Fourth C ir c u i t  was scheduled,  and that judge Bryan 
again p a r t i c ip a te d  in the en banc h e a r in g . There 

i s  n o t h i n g  in  t h i s  r e c i t a t i o n  o f  f a c t  s which 
d i f f e r s  in any substant ia l  way from the f a c t s . in 

American Foreign Steamship Corp■, other  than that 
in the present case ,  unlike  the l a t t e r ,  the Court 

o f  Appeals recognized i t s  mistake and sought to  
c o r r e c t  i t  by r e c a l l i n g  i t s  mandate and w i t h ­

drawing i t s  o p i n i o n  r a t h e r  than r e l y  upon the 
p a r t i e s  t o  seek  a r e v e r s a l  pursuant  t o  a w r i t  

o f  c e r t i o r a r i .
In bringing th is  p e t i t i o n ,  p e t i t i o n e r s  have 

not only f a i l e d  to examine the app l i cab le  p re c e -



1 i -

dents of this Court but they have a l so  f a i l e d  to 
pay heed to th is  C ourt 's  admonition that "§ 4 6 ( c )  

is  not addresssed to  l i t i g a n t s ,  I t  i s  addressed 
to the Court of Appea ls . "  Western P a c i f i c  R a i l ­

r o a d  C o r p o r a t i o n _v . Western P a c i f i c  Company,
supra, 345 U.S. at 250. In that op in ion ,  th is  

Court e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  that  § 4 6 ( c )  " d e a l s ,  
not with r i g h t s ,  but with power", I d . at 259, and 

noted that "Because I 4 6 ( c )  i s  a grant o f  power, 
and n o t h i n g  more,  each Court o f  Appeals  i s  

v e s t e d  w i th  a wide 1 at i  tud e o f  d i s c r e t i o n  t o  
decide for i t s e l f  just  how that power s h a l l  be 

e x e r c i s e d . "  I d . at 259.
In the  p a s t , s e n i o r  c i r c u i t  ju d g e s  were 

d e n ie d  the p r i v i l e g e  o f  s i t t i n g  en b a n c , see  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  v .  A m e r i c a n - F o r e i g n  Steamship 

Co r p . , supra ; Western P a c i f i c  Railroad Corp. v.  
Western P a c i f i c  Railroad Co. ,  supra ; United States 

v.  S e n t i n e l  F i r e  I n s .  Co . ,  178 F .2d 217,  239 
(5 th  Ci r . 1 9 4 9 ) ( d i s s e n t i n g  op in i o n s  o f  ju d g e s  

Holmes and McCord) .  R e c e n t ly , however, they were 
able to  e x e rc i s e  the p r i v i l e g e  fo r  a b r i e f  per iod  

o f  t im e .  See Moody v .  A lbem ar le  Paper Co . ,  
417 U.S. 622 ( 1974). This is  no longer p o s s ib le  

s i n c e  the amendment o f  28 U .S .C .  § 4 6 ( c )  by 
Congress on October 20, 1978. The denia l  o f  th is  

p r i v i l e g e  i s  not u n c o n s t i tu t i o n a l .  This was the



12

h o l d i n g s  in t h i s  C o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n s  in  United  
S t a t e s  v .  American-Foreign Steamship Corporat ion , 
supi a , and Moody v.  Albemarle Paper Co. supra.

Moreover, the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y  o f  Congress ' 
powers to  enact s ta tu tes  prov id ing  f o r  the conduct 

o f  business by i n f e r i o r  fed er a l  courts  created by 
i t  was examined at great length by J u s t i c e  Harlan 

in h is  concurring  opinion in Chandler v.  Judi c i a l  
C ou n c i l , 398 U.S. 74, 95-126 (1970).  A lso ,  th is  

Court said  in United States v.  Amer ican -Fore ign  
Steamship Corp. , supra, that "Congress may well  

have though t th a t  i t  would  f r u s t r a t e  a bas i c  
p u rp ose  o f  the l e g i s l a t i o n  not  t o  c o n f i n e  the  
power o f  en banc d e c i s i o n  to the permanent a c t iv e  
membership o f  a Court o f  Appeals . "  363 U.S. at 

689. Congress ' e x c lu s io n  o f  sen ior  judges from en 
banc hearings i s  l o g i c a l l y  re la t e d  to  and com­

mensurate  w i th  the C o n g r e s s i o n a l  p u rp o s e  o f  
permitt ing  each Court o f  Appeals " t o  maintain i t s  

in t e g r i t y  as an i n s t i t u t i o n  by making i t  p o s s ib le  
fo r  a m a jor i ty  o f  i t s  judges always to  c o n t r o l  and 

thereby to  secure uni formity  and con t in u i ty  in i t s  
d e c i s i o n s . . . . "  Id .  363 U .S .  6 8 9 -6 9 0 .  This 
purpose i s  leg i t imate  and can be c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  
e f f e c t u a te d  by § 4 6 ( c ) .



I I I .

THE COURT Of APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
HAD THl POWER AND DUTY TO CORRECT ITS FAILURE 
TO COMPLY WITH § 4 6 ( c )  AND TO GRANT RE­
ARGUMENT.

P e t i t i o n e r s '  arguments in support o f  t h e i r  
p e t i t i o n  for  a writ o f  c e r t i o r a r i  are u lt imately  
based upon a claim that the Fourth C ir c u i t  was 

d isab led ,  once i t  d is covered  i t s  noncompliance 
with 2£ U .S .C .  § 4 6 ( c ) ,  from c o r r e c t i n g  i t s
mistake and order ing  reargument simply because the 

time f o r  r e s p o n d e n t s  t o  p e t i t i o n  e i t h e r  f o r  
rehearing or f o r  a wri t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  had expired .  

Such a ru le ,  however,  has nothing to  commend i t .  
I f  f o l low ed ,  i t  would cause grave damage to  the 

a b i l i t y  o f  a Court o f  Appeals to "maintain i t s  

i n t e g r i t y  as an i n s t i t u t i o n " ,  United States v.  
American-Fore ign  Steamship C o r p . , supra, 363 U. S . 
at 689.

Furthermore, th is  Court has s tated ,  that in

" r e o e g n i z  ing  the  v a lu e  o f  an e f f i c i e n t  
use of  the en banc power, the court should 
adopt such means as w i l l  determine whether 
the c o u r t ' s administrat ion o f  the power i s  
achieving  the f u l l  purpose o f  the sta tu te  so 
that the court w i l l  b e t t e r  be able  to  change 
i t s  ers_ banc procedure , should i t  deem change 
a d v i s a b l e . "



14 -

Western P a c i f i c  Ra i lroad Corp. v.  Western P a c i f i c  

C o . , supra, 345 U.S. at 261.
More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  p e t i t i o n e r s ' c l a i m  i s  

contrary to  a century o f  precedents  o f  t h i s  Court 
and the  low er  f e d e r a l  c o u r t s . As e a r l y  as 

1882, thi  s Court announced that
I t  i s  a general  ru le  o f  the law, that 

a l 1 the judgments, decrees  or other orders o f  
the  c o u r t s , however  c o n e l u s i v e  in  the i r  
c h a r a c t e r ,  a re  unde r the  c o n t r o l  o f  the  
court  which pronounces them during the Term 
a t wh i c h  t h e y  a r e  r e n d e r e d  o r  e n t e r e d  
o f  r e c o r d ,  and may t h e n  be s e t  a s i d e ,  
vacated,  modi f ied  or annulled by that c o u r t .

Bronson v.  Schulten , 104 U.S. 410, 415 (1882).  
The power t o  re v i se  the judgment, however,  did  
not ex is t  once the term had expired  except by a 

" w r i t  o f  e r r o r  coram v o b i s . . . a l l o w e d  t o  b r i n g  
be f o r e  the same c o u r t  in wich  the  e r r o r  was 

committed some matter o f  fa c t  which had escaped 
a t t e n t io n ,  and which was mater ial  in the proceed­

ing .  "  Id.  at 416.
The issue  came be fore  the Court again in  1944 

in Huddleston v .  Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944).  In 
Huddleston, pet i  t i on ers  sought a second rehearing

in the Second C i r c u i t  s i x  months a f t e r  entry o f  a 
previous  judgment. The request was based upon an



15 -

in terven ig  s ta te  court d e c i s i o n  which was rendered 
a l t e r  the  time fo r  r e h e a r i n g  had p a s s e d .  The 

Second Circu i t  denied the req u es t . The Supreme 
Court vacated the d e c i s i o n  o f  the Second C i r c u i t .  

I t  h e l d  that  " u n t i l  such t ime as the  case  i s  
no longer sub ju d i c e ,  the duty re s t s  upon fed er a l  

c o u r t s  t o  apply  s t a t e  law under the R ules  o f  
D e c i s  i on  s t a t u t e  in  a c c o r d a n c e  w i th  the  then  

c o n t r o l l i n g  d e c i s i o n s  o f  the h ighest  s ta te  c o u r t . "  
322 U.S. at 236.

In 1970, a case s im i la r  to  Huddleston came 
aga in  b e f o r e  the Second C i r c u i t . In a pane l  

c o n s i s t in g  o f  judges F r i e n d ly , Hays, and Kaufman, 
the Second C i r c u i t  , t a k i n g  c o g n i z a n c e  o f  the 

e a r l i e r  d e c i s i o n  by the Supreme Court in Huddle- 
ston,  said

I t  seems c l e a r  to  us that we have the 
power t o  e n l a r g e  the  time to  p e t i t i o n  f o r  
rehearing,  F.R.A.P.  2 6 (b ) ,  40, and to  modify 
an e r r o n e o u s  d e c i s i o n  a 1 1 h ou gh t h e  
time f o r  r ehe ar in g  may have e x p i r e d . . . .

This  C i r c u i t  has l o n g  shown cons  i d e r a b l e  
w i l l in g n e s s  to  c o r r e c t  what i t  be l ie v e d  an 
e r r o n e o u s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the l a w . . . .

Even more t e l l i n g  was the Court ' s a c t ion  in 
H udd les ton  v .  Dwyer. . .  where i t  v a c a t e d  a 
Court o f  A ppea ls  d e c i s i o n  f o r  f a i l i n g  t o  
consider  a new s ta te  court opinion t h a t . . .  
was handed down a f t e r  the time fo r  rehearing 
had e x p i r e d . . .  I n s t e a d  o f  r e v e r s i n g  the 
court o f  appeals . . .  the Supreme Court there 
v a c t e d  the c o u r t  o f  a p p e a ls  d e c i  s i o n ,  and



16

remanded t o  that  c o u r t  t o  perm it  i t  t o  
de te rm in e  the  i s s u e s  o f  s t a t e  law in  the 
f i r s t  i n s t a n c e  . . . For us t o  r e f u s e  to  
cons ider  p e t i t i o n s  f o r  rehearing under the 
circumstances present  here merely because a 
p e t i t o n  f o r  c e r t i o r a r i  has been f i l e d  would 
be,  i t  seems to  us,  w as te fu l ,  f o r  under the 
Huddleston procedure the Supreme Court would 
not reach the merits o f  the controversy ,  but 
would  v a c a t e  our  d e c i s i o n  and o r d e r  us t o  
r e c o n s i d e r . . .

B r an i f f  Airways, I n c . v .  Curtiss-Wright  Corp. , 424 
F .2d 427, 429-430 (2d Cir .  1970).

The only cases in which th i s  Court has denied 

e i th e r  i t s e l f  o r  a lower fed er a l  court  the power 
to  r e v i s e  i t s  judgment beyond the time p e r i o d  

s p e c i f i e d  f o r  rehearing have been fed er a l  income 
tax cases where there e x i s t s  a f e d e r a l  s tatute  
which  s p e c i f i c a l l y  p r e s c r i b e s  the  time p e r i o d  
a f t e r  which a judgment i s  f i n a l  and beyond the 
power o f  a court to  r e v i s e . See R. Simpson & Co. 
v .  Commissioner o f  In ternal  Revenue, 321 U.S. 226, 

227-230 (1944).  No such s ta tu te  e x i s t s  in this  
case and none i s  suggested by p e t i t i o n e r s .

These cons iderat ions  show that the Court o f  
Appeals below had s u f f i c i e n t  author i ty  and reason 
to  r e v i s e  the  e a r l i e r  judment which had been



17

rendered by i t  in v i o l a t i o n  o f  e x p l i c i t  f edera l  

s ta tu tory  law and to  schedule th e r e a f t e r  the case 
anew fo r  reargument. In e x e r c i s in g  th is  power, 

the Court o f  Appeals did no more than i t s  duty.  
C er ta in ly ,  i t  did not exceed the powers granted to  

i t  by law. Nor did i t  do anything d i f f e r e n t  from 
that which d i s t r i c t  courts  do when they set aside 

a judgment pursuant to  Rule 60(b)  o f  the Fed. R. 
C iv .  P . o r  a l l o w  an independent  act  ion  to  s e t  

as ide a judgment. See P ick ford  v,  Ta lbo t , 225 
U•S. 651 (1912).  The cases c i t e d  here in  show that 

the issues  upon which p e t i t i o n e r s  request this  
Court to  grant c e r t i o r a r i  are issues  wich have 

long been s e t t l e d  by th is  Court and which there for  
do not need  t o  be  r e v ie w e d  upon c e r r i o r a r i .  

A ccord ing ly ,  respondents contend that the p e t i t i o n  
should be denied so that the Fourth C ircu i t  can 

dec ide  the merits o f  th i s  case in l i g h t  o f  the 
d e c i s i o n  in Bakke, surpa, as prev ious ly  ordered by
th is  Court.  438 U.S. 912.



-  18 -

CONCLUSION

For the fo rego in g  reasons,  the p e t i t i o n  f o r  a 
wri t  o f  c e r t i o r a r i  should be denied.

R e sp e c t fu l ly  submitted,

JULIUS LeVONNE CHAMBERS 
CHARLES BECTON 
JAMES C. FULLER, JR.

Chambers, S te in ,  Ferguson,
& Becton

951 South Independence 
Boulevard

Charlotte ,  North Carolina 28202 
(704) 375-8461

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I  
NAPOLEON B. WILLIAMS, JR.
JUDITH REED 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus C ir c l e  
New York, New York 10019 
(212) 586-8397

Counsel f o r  Intervening Respondents

A p r i l ,  1980



M EUEN  PRESS INC. —  N. Y. C  219