School Board of Brevard County, Florida v. Weaver Brief in Opposition to Certiorari
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1972
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. School Board of Brevard County, Florida v. Weaver Brief in Opposition to Certiorari, 1972. 13c43357-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9a52f0bf-97bd-4e28-a301-81305d85c093/school-board-of-brevard-county-florida-v-weaver-brief-in-opposition-to-certiorari. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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I k the
(ftmtrt of tty lutteft States
October Term, 1972
No. 72-818
T he S chool B oard op B revard C o u nty , F lorida,
Petitioner,
— v . —
S ylvester W eaver, et al.
ON PETITION POE A WRIT OP CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI
J ack Greenberg
J ames M . N abrit, III
N orman J. C h a c h k in
D rew S. D ays , III
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
J erome J . B ornstein
125 South Court Avenue
Orlando, Florida 32801
Attorneys for Respondents
1st the
(Emtrt of tlx? Mxutvh JsHatTB
October Term, 1972
No. 72-818
T h e S chool B oard of B revard C o u nty , F lorida,
Petitioner,
—v.—
S ylvester W eaver, et al.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI
Question Presented
Whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to permit
a school board to rely solely upon a majority-to-minority
transfer plan to desegregate a virtually all-black elemen
tary school where more effective techniques for desegregat
ing that school were available to the board.
Argument
On October 13, 1961, black parents and students (herein
after, “respondents” ) filed this lawsuit seeking an end to
the dual, racially-segregated school system in Brevard
County, Florida administered by the petitioner, the School
2
Board of Brevard County.1 At that time, Poinsett Elemen
tary was one of seven facilities in Brevard County at
tended exclusively by black students. Poinsett remained
all-black until the 1969-70 academic year when petitioner
was required by court order to implement a geographic
zoning plan to desegregate that facility. As a consequence,
23 white students joined 737 black students at Poinsett, re
ducing its enrollment from 100% to 96.9% black. In 1971,
petitioner was required to take further steps to desegregate
Poinsett. A majority-to-minority transfer plan was ap
proved by the district court for 1971-72 implementation.
Yet, as of March, 1972, Poinsett remained 97% black, only
100 of the approximately 800 blacks enrolled there having
exercised the right to transfer with space available and
free transportation. The court of appeals agreed with
respondents that the majority-to-minority transfer plan did
not represent an effective technique for desegregating
Poinsett.
Petitioner contends here that it has no affirmative con
stitutional duty to desegregate Poinsett further. This is so,
petitioner argues, first, because it is not required to achieve
racial balance in order to convert its dual system to a
unitary one. Second, the existence of one virtually all-black
school in its otherwise desegregated system does not, per
se, render that system unconstitutional. And third, the
majority-to-minority transfer approach constitutes an ac
ceptable technique for achieving greater desegregation.
Respondents do not quarrel with any of these assertions,
considered in the abstract. But there are constitutional
principles of equal importance relating to desegregation
which must be considered in conjunction with those relied
upon by petitioner. Racial balance is not the constitutional
1 Formerly called “the Board of Public Instruction of Brevard
County.”
3
objective; but school boards are under an affirmative duty
to achieve the “ greatest possible degree of actual desegre
gation.” Swann v. Charlotte-MecMenburg Board of Educa
tion, 402 TJ.S. 1 (1971). The continued existence of all-blacli
or virtually all-black schools can be condoned only where it
has been established that no feasible alternatives are avail
able to destroy the one-race character of such schools.
Swann, supra. School boards may not rely upon majority-
minority transfer plans to desegregate one-race schools
where other more effective techniques exist, And school
boards have a heavy burden to bear in justifying reliance
upon manifestly less effective alternatives in dismantling
dual systems. Green v. School Board of New Kent County,
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
The court of appeals correctly applied this second set
of principles in rejecting petitioner’s majority-to-minority
transfer plan for desegregating Poinsett. For it found that
Poinsett was surrounded by at least six virtually all-white
elementary schools which could be paired or clustered with
Poinsett to desegregate that facility. The distances between
Poinsett and these schools are as follows:
Grolfview 1.2 miles
Cambridge — 2.2 U
Mila — 3.0 a
Anderson 3.5 Cl
Tropical 4.2 cc
Audubon 5.6 cc
The feasibility of pairing or clustering Poinsett with these
schools was established by several facts. Petitioner had
previously submitted a desegregation plan for Poinsett
that would have converted it to a special education center
to which children from not only the nearby six schools
mentioned above, but from all the schools in the county,
4
would have been sent on a weekly rotation basis. And, the
majority-to-minority transfer plan implemented by peti
tioner for the 1971-72 academic year envisioned that Poin
sett students would be eligible to attend any of the six
schools nearest that facility.
Hence that court concluded that petitioner had not
achieved the greatest possible degree of actual desegrega
tion, that Poinsett remained all-black despite the avail
ability of more effective desegregation techniques, and that
nothing in the record served to justify petitioner’s prefer
ence for a patently less effective desegregation approach.
Petitioner has presented nothing to this Court that dis
credits in any respect these findings of the court below.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted
that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
J ack Greenberg
J ames M. N abrit, III
N o r m a n J . C h a c h k in
D rew S. D ays, III
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
J erome J . B ornstein
125 South Court Avenue
Orlando, Florida 32801
Attorneys for Respondents
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