School Board of Brevard County, Florida v. Weaver Brief in Opposition to Certiorari
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1972

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. School Board of Brevard County, Florida v. Weaver Brief in Opposition to Certiorari, 1972. 13c43357-b69a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9a52f0bf-97bd-4e28-a301-81305d85c093/school-board-of-brevard-county-florida-v-weaver-brief-in-opposition-to-certiorari. Accessed October 08, 2025.
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I k the (ftmtrt of tty lutteft States October Term, 1972 No. 72-818 T he S chool B oard op B revard C o u nty , F lorida, Petitioner, — v . — S ylvester W eaver, et al. ON PETITION POE A WRIT OP CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OP APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI J ack Greenberg J ames M . N abrit, III N orman J. C h a c h k in D rew S. D ays , III 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 J erome J . B ornstein 125 South Court Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Attorneys for Respondents 1st the (Emtrt of tlx? Mxutvh JsHatTB October Term, 1972 No. 72-818 T h e S chool B oard of B revard C o u nty , F lorida, Petitioner, —v.— S ylvester W eaver, et al. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO CERTIORARI Question Presented Whether the court of appeals erred in refusing to permit a school board to rely solely upon a majority-to-minority transfer plan to desegregate a virtually all-black elemen tary school where more effective techniques for desegregat ing that school were available to the board. Argument On October 13, 1961, black parents and students (herein after, “respondents” ) filed this lawsuit seeking an end to the dual, racially-segregated school system in Brevard County, Florida administered by the petitioner, the School 2 Board of Brevard County.1 At that time, Poinsett Elemen tary was one of seven facilities in Brevard County at tended exclusively by black students. Poinsett remained all-black until the 1969-70 academic year when petitioner was required by court order to implement a geographic zoning plan to desegregate that facility. As a consequence, 23 white students joined 737 black students at Poinsett, re ducing its enrollment from 100% to 96.9% black. In 1971, petitioner was required to take further steps to desegregate Poinsett. A majority-to-minority transfer plan was ap proved by the district court for 1971-72 implementation. Yet, as of March, 1972, Poinsett remained 97% black, only 100 of the approximately 800 blacks enrolled there having exercised the right to transfer with space available and free transportation. The court of appeals agreed with respondents that the majority-to-minority transfer plan did not represent an effective technique for desegregating Poinsett. Petitioner contends here that it has no affirmative con stitutional duty to desegregate Poinsett further. This is so, petitioner argues, first, because it is not required to achieve racial balance in order to convert its dual system to a unitary one. Second, the existence of one virtually all-black school in its otherwise desegregated system does not, per se, render that system unconstitutional. And third, the majority-to-minority transfer approach constitutes an ac ceptable technique for achieving greater desegregation. Respondents do not quarrel with any of these assertions, considered in the abstract. But there are constitutional principles of equal importance relating to desegregation which must be considered in conjunction with those relied upon by petitioner. Racial balance is not the constitutional 1 Formerly called “the Board of Public Instruction of Brevard County.” 3 objective; but school boards are under an affirmative duty to achieve the “ greatest possible degree of actual desegre gation.” Swann v. Charlotte-MecMenburg Board of Educa tion, 402 TJ.S. 1 (1971). The continued existence of all-blacli or virtually all-black schools can be condoned only where it has been established that no feasible alternatives are avail able to destroy the one-race character of such schools. Swann, supra. School boards may not rely upon majority- minority transfer plans to desegregate one-race schools where other more effective techniques exist, And school boards have a heavy burden to bear in justifying reliance upon manifestly less effective alternatives in dismantling dual systems. Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). The court of appeals correctly applied this second set of principles in rejecting petitioner’s majority-to-minority transfer plan for desegregating Poinsett. For it found that Poinsett was surrounded by at least six virtually all-white elementary schools which could be paired or clustered with Poinsett to desegregate that facility. The distances between Poinsett and these schools are as follows: Grolfview 1.2 miles Cambridge — 2.2 U Mila — 3.0 a Anderson 3.5 Cl Tropical 4.2 cc Audubon 5.6 cc The feasibility of pairing or clustering Poinsett with these schools was established by several facts. Petitioner had previously submitted a desegregation plan for Poinsett that would have converted it to a special education center to which children from not only the nearby six schools mentioned above, but from all the schools in the county, 4 would have been sent on a weekly rotation basis. And, the majority-to-minority transfer plan implemented by peti tioner for the 1971-72 academic year envisioned that Poin sett students would be eligible to attend any of the six schools nearest that facility. Hence that court concluded that petitioner had not achieved the greatest possible degree of actual desegrega tion, that Poinsett remained all-black despite the avail ability of more effective desegregation techniques, and that nothing in the record served to justify petitioner’s prefer ence for a patently less effective desegregation approach. Petitioner has presented nothing to this Court that dis credits in any respect these findings of the court below. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied. Respectfully submitted, J ack Greenberg J ames M. N abrit, III N o r m a n J . C h a c h k in D rew S. D ays, III 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 J erome J . B ornstein 125 South Court Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Attorneys for Respondents MEILEN PRESS INC. — N. Y. C. «SH^> 219