Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

    I n  t h e

(Emtrt nt %  Intted
O cto ber  T e r m , 1978  

No...................

R o bert  L .  J o h n so n , J r ., et al.,

v.
Petitioners,

R y d er  T r u c k  L in e s , I n c ., et al.

PETITION FOR A W RIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

J a ck  G r e e n b e r g  
E r ic  S c h n a p per  

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

J o nathan  W allas 
L o u is  L .  L e s e s n e , J r .
J .  L e V o n n e  C h a m b e r s

Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Becton 
951 South Independence Boulevard 
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202

B arry  L .  G o ld stein

806 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 940
Washington, D.C. 20006

Counsel fo r  Petitioners



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions Below .....................................................................  1

Jurisdiction .............................................................................. 2

Questions Presented .............................................................  2

Statutory Provisions Involved ........................................... 3

Statement of the Case ...................................................... ... 3

Reasons for Granting the Writ .........      5

C o n clu sio n  .......................................................................................  13

A p p e n d ix —

Opinion of Court of Appeals—May 2, 1978 .......  la

Opinion of Court of Appeals—April 1, 1977 .....  13a

Opinion of District Court—January 15, 1976 .... 15a 

Opinion of District Court—November 18, 1975 .. 26a

T a ble  oe A u t h o r it ie s

Cases:

Afro American Patrolmens League v. Duck, 503 F .2d
294 (6th Cir. 1974) ..........................................................9

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) .. 8

Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 16 EPD 8306 
(3rd Cir. 1978) ..................................... ........................... 9

Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.
1976)

PAGE

8



11

County of Los Angeles v. Davis, No. 77-1553 ................11,12

Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 556 F.2d 1334 (9th 
Cir. 1977) .................................................... ........................  9

Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp.
1200 (E.D.Va. 1973) ................ .........................................  10

Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S.
430 (1968) ................     10,12

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) ....... 11,12

Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) ................................10,11

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 
(1975) ....................................................................   7

Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) .... 11

Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 265 (1939) ..............................  11
Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974) 9

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) .... 11

North Carolina Board of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 
(1971) ..............        2

Rock v. Norfolk & Western R.R., 473 F.2d 1344 (4th
Cir. 1973) .... ................... ....................................................  6

Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) ..................7,8,10

Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ............................  11
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed., 402 

U.S. 1 (1971) ................ ..................................................... io

Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) ....5,6,7,
8, 9,12

PAGE



I l l

Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Eecreation Asso., 410 U.8 .
431 (1973) ............................................................................ 10

Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Eecreation Asso., 451 F,2d 
1221 (4th Cir. 1971) .........................................................  10

United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) ...........  6
United States v. East Texas Motor Freight, 564 F.2d 

179 (5th Cir. 1977) .............................. ..........................  9

Washington v. Davis, 476 U.S. 229 (1976) ................. 12
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th

Cir. 1974) ...................................... .................................... . 9
Watkins v. United Steel Workers, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.

1975) ......................................................    9
Williams v. Norfolk & Western E.E., 530 F.2d 339 

(4th Cir. 1975) ................................................................. . .6, 10

Statutes and Constitutional Provisions:

Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution ................ 10,11

28 U.S.C. § 1254 .....................................................................  2

42 U.S.C. § 1981 ............................................................... passim

42 U.S.C. § 1982 .....................................................................  9

42 U.S.C. § 1983 ................................................ ....................  9

42 U.S.C. § 1985 .......................................... ..........................  9

42 U.S.C. § 1988 ....... ..................... ................. ......................  2

42 U.S.C. § 2000a-e ...............................................................  10

42 U.S.C. § 2000e, Title Y II  of the 1964 Civil Eights 
Act ....................................................................    passim

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), Section 703(h) of the 1964 
Civil Eights Act .....................................................3,5, 8, 9,12

PAGE



Other A uthorities: page

Executive Order 11246 .......................   9

110 Cong. Rec. (1964) .........................................................  8

118 Cong. Rec. (1972) .........................................................  8

iv



I n the

g>vcptm$ (Enurt xtf %  Htttfrfc Stairs
O cto ber  T e r m , 1978 

No...................

R o ber t  L . J o h n so n , J r ., et al.,

v.
Petitioners,

R y d er  T r u c k  L in e s , I n c ., et al.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

The petitioners, Robert L. Johnson, Jr ., et ah, respect­
fully pray that a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the 
judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the Fourth Circuit entered in this proceeding on 
May 2, 1978.

Opinions Below

The May 2, 1978 opinion of the court of appeals is re­
ported at 575 F .2d 471, and is set out in the Appendix 
hereto, pp. la-12a. The April 1, 1977 opinion of the court 
of appeals is reported at 555 F.2d 1181, and is set out 
in the Appendix hereto, pp. 13a-14a. The remedial de­
cree entered by the district court on January 15, 1976, 
which is not officially reported, is reprinted in 10 EPD 
ff 10,692, and is set out in the Appendix hereto, pp. 15a-25a. 
The opinion of the district court, dated November 18, 1975, 
which is not officially reported, is reprinted in 10 EPD 
ff 10,535, and is set out in the Appendix hereto, pp. 26a-71a.



2

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on 
May 2, 1978. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 
28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

Questions Presented

1. Does a seniority system which perpetuates the effect 
of past intentional racial discrimination in employment 
violate 42 TJ.S.C. §1981?

2. Where an employer, acting in violation of 42 TJ.S.C. 
§ 1981, intentionally assigns or restricts a black employee 
to a particular job because of his race, does the employer 
remain in violation of § 1981 until it removes obstacles, 
such as seniority rules, which lock that employee into the 
job to which he was assigned or restricted because of his 
race?

3. Where an employer, acting in violation of 42 TJ.S.C. 
§ 1981, intentionally assigns or restricts a black employee 
to a particular job because of his race, should the statute 
of limitations be tolled under 42 TJ.S.C. § 1988 until the 
employer removes obstacles, such as seniority rules, which 
lock that employee into the job to which he was assigned 
or restricted because of his race?1 1

1 In Fourteenth Amendment litigation regarding the perpetua­
tion of past discrimination, this Court has articulated in different 
ways the underlying violation. In Swann  v. Charlott e-Mecklenburg 
B oard  o f E d., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), the defendant was described as 
remaining in violation so long as discriminatory effects continued; 
North Carolina B oard  o f Ed. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (197.1), held 
that practices which perpetuated past discrimination were them­
selves violative of the Constitution. The three questions supra  are 
intended to parallel the various ways of describing the violation 
in the Swann cases; these may be only three ways of describing



3

Statutory Provisions Involved

Section 1981, 42 U.S.C., provides:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, he 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal bene­
fit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per­
sons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, 
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no 
other.

Section 703(h) of Title V II of the 1964 Civil Eights Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), provides in pertinent part:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this sub­
chapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment prac­
tice for an employer to apply different standards of 
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or priv­
ileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority 
or merit system.

Statement of the Case

Plaintiffs commenced this action on January 5, 1973, 
against Ryder Truck Lines, the International Brotherhood 
of Teamsters, and its Local 71, alleging that they had 
engaged in racial discrimination in employment in viola­
tion of 42 U.S.C. §1981 and of Title V II of the Civil 
Eights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The complaint* 
sought injunctive relief including back pay and an award

the same type of violation, but we include them all to avoid any 
dispute as to the scope of the question presented. In the interests 
of brevity we use the first formulation in the body of the petition.



4

On November 18, 1975, the district court found, inter 
alia, that the company had a consistent policy of refusing 
to hire as longline drivers any blacks, wdiether from among 
its own employees in other positions or from among the 
pool of non-employees applying for work. App. 33a-35a. 
Eyder had no black longline drivers as of July, 1965, and 
none of the 63 longline drivers hired from 1966 to 1971 
were black. App. 30a-31a. As of the date when the suit was 
filed, the seniority system established pursuant to the con­
tract between the company and the unions forbade em­
ployees transferring to longline jobs to carry over their 
seniority, thus effectively locking them into the jobs to 
which they had been assigned on the basis of race. App. 
35a, 37a. The district court held that “the collective bar­
gaining agreements in effect at the time of the filing of 
this action perpetuated into the present the effects of past 
discriminatory hiring to the detriment of plaintiffs,” and 
ruled that “the restrictive seniority provisions in the per­
tinent agreements were violative of Title Y II  and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981.” App. 36a.

The district court noted that in 1973, two years after 
the commencement of this action, the defendants had modi­
fied their seniority rules to permit employees to transfer 
to longline jobs without a loss of seniority; because the 
court held that the pre-1973 seniority system was unlaw­
ful, it ordered the defendants to retain in effect this new 
provision for carryover seniority. App. 19a, 37a. The com- 

* pany was directed to offer longline jobs to specified blacks 
who had earlier been denied those jobs because of their 
race, together with appropriate constructive seniority 
dates. The trial court also awarded back pay to blacks 
who had been the victims of the proven demonstration,

of constructive seniority. The case was certified as a
class action, and was tried in August of 1975.



5

which awards included losses sustained when those black 
employees were locked out of longline jobs by the provi­
sions of the pre-1973 seniority system.

On appeal the Fourth Circuit first affirmed the district 
court in a per curiam opinion dated April 1, 1977. App. 
13a. Subsequently the court of appeals granted rehear­
ing to consider the effect of Team sters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324 (1977). The court of appeals on rehearing 
concluded that Team sters required reversal of the deci­
sion of the district court insofar as that court had held 
the pre-1973 seniority system violated Title V II because 
it perpetuated past discrimination. The court of appeals 
also considered at greater length the district court’s deci­
sion that the seniority system violated § 1981. Two mem­
bers of the court concluded that, although such a seniority 
system would have violated §1981 prior to the Teamsters 
decision, the limitation of § 703(h) of Title V II, as con­
strued by Team sters, must be applied to § 1981. The 
third judge also held, for somewhat different reasons, 
that a seniority system which perpetuates the effect of 
past discrimination does not violate § 1981.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

This case presents under § 1981 a challenge to the same 
practice whose legality under Title V II was decided in 
Team sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)—-using a 
seniority system to lock black employees into jobs to which 
they were assigned on the basis of race. In Team sters this 
Court recognized that the question of whether that prac­
tice is lawful was so “significant” as to warrant a grant 
of certiorari, 431 U.S. at 334; the legality of that practice 
under § 1981 is of the same practical import as its legality 
under Title V II, the issue decided in Team sters. A sub­



6

stantial proportion of all black industrial workers over 35 
were assigned prior to 1965 to lower paying jobs because 
of their race and are subject to departmental seniority 
systems; the applicability of § 1981 to such systems will 
determine whether those hundreds of thousands of blacks 
will for the rest of their careers be paid less than younger 
and less experienced whites.2 The availability of relief 
under § 1981 is of equal importance to large numbers of 
minority employees who were assigned to jobs after 1965 
because of their race but who did not immediately after 
those assignments file charges with the EEOC.3

Prior to this Court’s decision in Team sters the Fourth 
Circuit had held that employment practices which per­
petuate the effect of past intentional discrimination vio­
late § 1981.4 Accordingly the district court in this action 
held that the seniority system, which perpetuated past in­
tentional discrimination by locking plaintiffs into jobs to 
which they had been assigned because of their race, was 
unlawful under §1981. App. 36a, 69a. The Fourth Cir­
cuit initially affirmed this decision. App. 13a. After

2 Five of the petitioners were hired prior to the effective date 
of Title V II. All would be entitled to the monetary and injunctive 
relief awarded by the district court if petitioners’ § 198i claims 
were sustained. To what extent these five petitioners would be 
entitled to relief under Title V II, based on continued intentional 
discrimination after 1965, presents issues of law and fact, which 
the court of appeals remanded to the district court.

3 Whether such an employer would remain in violation of Title 
V II  so long as it locked minority employees into such jobs appears 
to have been left unresolved by United A ir Lanes v. Evans 431 
U.S. 553, 558, n,10 (1977).

4 Williams v. N orfolk & W estern B .B ., 530 F.2d 339, 442 (4th 
Cir. 1975). The continuous violation referred to in W illiams was 
a nepotistic hiring system to fill jobs in an all white railroad yard 
See B ock  v. N orfolk & W estern B .B ., 473 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 
1973). In Teamsters this Court noted that such nepotism was like 
a seniority system in that it “perpetuates the effects of prior dis­
crimination”. 431 U.S. at 349, n.32.



Team sters, however, it reversed the finding of a violation 
of §1981 on the theory that the limitations of § 703(h) 
of Title V II must he applied to § 1981 as well. Notwith­
standing Johnson  v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 
U.S. 454 (1975), which held that § 1981 and Title V II were 
independent statutes, the court of appeals reasoned:

Johnson  emphasized that a party proceeding under 
§ 1981 is not restricted by the administrative and pro­
cedural requirements of Title V II, but nothing in 
Johnson  suggests that a practice lawful under Title 
V II can be held unlawful under § 1981. On the con­
trary, Johnson  recognizes that Congress noted that 
Title V II and § 1981 are “co-extensive” and that they 
“augment each other and are not mutually exclusive.” 
421 U.S. at 459. Johnson  gives no indication, however, 
that Congress intended to create conflicting and contra­
dictory standards for determining what constitutes 
illegal discrimination. App. 6a-7a.

The Fourth Circuit concluded that § 1981 must be con­
strued to permit any employment practice which is legal 
under Title V II.

This conclusion is squarely inconsistent with repeated 
decisions of this Court that the provisions of § 1981 are 
entirely independent of, and were in no manner restricted 
by, the adoption of Title V II. The Court expressly held in 
Johnson  that “Section 1981 is not coextensive in its cover­
age with Title V II,” 421 U.S. at 460, and that Title V II and 
§ 1981 “although related, and although directed to most 
of the same ends, are separate, distinct and independent.” 
421 U.S. at 454. See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160, 174-175 (1976). Both in 1964 and in 1972 Congress 
rejected proposals to make Title V II the exclusive prohibi­



8

tion against employment discrimination.6 In 1972 opponents 
of that proposal expressly referred to the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act and argued it was needed since “employees are not 
fully protected” by Title V II  because of the limitations 
written into Title V II to assure its passage.6 In 1964 the 
same Justice Department memorandum relied on by this 
Court in Team sters, and placed in the Congressional Rec­
ord by Senator Clark, stated “ [TJitle V II is not intended 
to and does not deny to any individual, rights and remedies 
which he may pursue under other Federal and State Stat­
utes”.7 Section 703(h), on which the court of appeals re­
lied, begins “Notwithstanding any other provision of this 
subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment prac­
tice . . .” (emphasis added); Congress could not have 
made it more clear that it did not intend the limitations 
of § 703(h) to apply to any civil rights statutes other 
than Title VII.

Whether § 1981 prohibits seniority systems that perpetu­
ate past intentional discrimination, or has in this regard 
been repealed by the adoption of § 703(h), is a question 
on which the circuits are divided. In addition to the 
Fourth Circuit in the instant case, the Second Circuit has 
held that § 703(h) constitutes such a “repeal by implica­
tion” since “Congress has clearly placed its stamp of ap­
proval upon seniority systems.” 8 The Third Circuit, on 
the other hand, rejected this construction of § 703(h),

6 See 110 Cong. Rec. 13650-52 (1964); 118 Cong. Ree. 3372-73, 
3964-65 (1972); Runyon  v. M cCrary, 427 U.S. at 174-75; A lex­
ander  v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48, n.9 (1974).

6 118 Cong. Ree. 3372 (Sen. Williams), 3962 (Sen. Javits) 
(1972).

7 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964); Team sters v. United States, 431 
U.S. at 352.

8 Chance v. B oard  o f  Exam iners, 534 F.2d 993, 998 (2d Cir. 
1976).



9

holding that, despite Team sters, Congress in adopting 
Title V II did not intend “to circumscribe the remedial 
powers of the federal courts under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 
and 1988,” 0 and the Sixth Circuit has held that § 1981 
forbids the use of a seniority system giving preference 
in promotions to senior employees where whites enjoyed 
greater seniority because of past intentional discrimina­
tion.9 10 11 The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have held that 
the substantive scope of § 1981 and Title V II are the 
same, without elaboration regarding to what extent this 
occurred because Title V II implicitly repealed or expanded 
§ 1981 to produce that congruence.11 The status of this 
issue in the Fifth Circuit is unclear despite several rele­
vant opinions.12 Judge Winter, concurring in the decision 
in the instant case, noted the existence of this conflict.13

9 Bolden  v. Pennsylvania State Police, 16 BPD  ft 8,306 (3rd 
Cir. 1978).

10 A fro Am erican Patrolm ens League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294, 
301 (6th Cir. 1974). See also Long  v. F o rd  Motor Co., 496 F.2d 
500, 505 (6th Cir. 1974).

11 Davis v. County o f Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir.
1977), cert, granted  ------  U.S. — — (1978) ; W aters v. Wisconsin
Steel W orks, 502 F.2d 1309, 1320, n.4 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. den. 
425 U.S. 997 (1976).

12 In W atkins v. United Steel W orkers, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 
1975), the Fifth  Circuit rejected a § 1981 challenge to a seniority 
system. This appears to have been because under the facts of that 
case the system did not perpetuate past discrimination; the court 
suggested that § 1981 and Title V II  were the same, but this was 
before Teamsters and at that time under Fifth  Circuit law a 
seniority system which perpetuated past discrimination violated 
Title V II. See 516 F.2d at 51-52. In United States v. East Texas 
Motor Freight, 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977) the Fifth  Circuit 
held that § 703(h) nullified Executive Order 11246, insofar as the 
Order prohibited seniority systems perpetuating past discrimina­
tion, but did not squarely address the status of § 1981.

13 Among the courts finding no cause of action under § 1981 for 
seniority systems perpetuating past discrimination, there is a 
further conflict as to whether § 1981 never prohibited such systems 
or whether it was repealed in this respect by § 703(h). Judge 
Winter adopted the former line of reasoning, and expressly dis­
approved the implied repeal rationale of Chance. App. 9a, n.2.



10

A related conflict exists among the lower courts as to 
whether § 1981 was repealed pro tanto by the private club 
exemption to Title I I  of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,14 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a(e).

The opinion of the court of appeals suggests, despite 
its earlier decision in Williams, that an employment prac­
tice which perpetuates the effect of past intentional dis­
crimination is nonetheless legal under §1981 if it is neu­
tral on its face. App. 4a. The substantive prohibitions 
of § 1981, however, are at least as broad as the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32-33 (1948). 
This Court has repeatedly held that neutral state prac­
tices which perpetuate the effects of past intentional dis­
crimination are themselves unlawful. A school board 
which earlier assigned students on the basis of race re­
mains in violation of the Constitution if it adopts a policy 
of reassigning students each year to the school they at­
tended previously, subject only to a transfer procedure 
whose burdens are so great as to lock students into their 
original school. Green v. School Board o f New Kent 
County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). A geographic assignment 
plan that “appears to be neutral” is unlawful if it main­
tains in operation “the continuing effects of past school 
segregation.” Swann v. Charlotte-MecMenhurg B oard  o f 
Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971). So long as a past act of in­
tentional discrimination caused the present assignment of 
a worker or student, the “remoteness in time” of the past

14 This Court noted but did not reach that issue in Runyon v. 
M cCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172, n.10 (1976) and Tillman  v. Wheaton- 
H aven Recreation Asso., 410 U.S. 431, 438-39 (1973). The lower 
courts in those eases had divided on this issue. Tillman  v. Wheaton- 
H aven Recreation Asso., 451 F.2d 1221, 1214, 1225 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(repeal by im plication); Gonzales v. Fairfax-B rew ster School, Inc., 
363 F. Supp. 1200, 1205 (E.D. Ya. 1973) (no repeal by implica­
tion).



11

intentional conduct is irrelevant to the legality of pres­
ent practices which perpetuate its impact. K eyes  v. School 
District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210-211 (1973). A state which 
in an earlier period refused to permit blacks to register 
to vote cannot thereafter adopt a “neutral” policy of pro­
hibiting registration now by persons who failed to reg­
ister during that earlier time. Dane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 
265 (1939). A state cannot, even pursuant to a neutral 
policy based in common law of enforcing all real property 
covenants, enforce a racially restrictive covenant executed 
40 years earlier. Shelley  v. K ram er, 334 U.S. 1, 20-22 
(1948); see also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 
163, 178-79 (1972). So long as a state practice perpetu­
ates the effect of past discrimination the state is in vio­
lation of the Constitution, regardless of whether that prac­
tice was adopted in good faith. A seniority system which 
locks black state employees into jobs to which they had 
been assigned on the basis of race would be no more law-*
ful under the Fourteenth Amendment than the discredited 
grandfather clauses and pupil placement plans of earlier 
eras. If, as Hurd indicates, § 1981 prohibits private em­
ployers from taking the action forbidden to public em­
ployers by the Fourteenth Amendment, the decision below 
is inconsistent wTith half a century of constitutional deci­
sions by this Court.

This Court has granted certiorari in County o f Los 
Angeles v. Davis, No. 77-1553, which presents an issue 
closely related to that in the instant case: whether § 1981 
prohibits the use of non-job related employment tests with 
a discriminatory impact even where there was no present 
or past intentional discrimination. If, as the Ninth Cir­
cuit held in County o f Los Angeles, § 1981 prohibits the 
same employment practices forbidden under Title V II by 
Griggs v. Duke Potver Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), then



12

§ 1981 would also forbid tbe use of seniority systems with 
a discriminatory impact; Team sters recognized that such 
seniority systems “fall under the Griggs rationale”, 431 
U.S. at 349-50, and held them lawful under Title Y II  solely 
because of the exception in § 703(h). I t  appears, however, 
that neither possible disposition of County o f Los Angeles 
would definitively resolve the issue in this case. I f  the 
Court holds in County o f Los Angeles that § 1981 contains 
a general prohibition against practices with a discrimina­
tory effect, the question will remain as to whether, as sev­
eral circuits have held, § 1981 was partially repealed by 
§ 703(h). Conversely, should the Court there hold that 
§ 1981 contains no such general bar, that would not re­
solve the legality under § 1981 of a practice, such as a 
seniority system, which perpetuated past intentional dis­
crimination. The difference between a practice which 
merely falls more heavily on blacks, and a practice which 
perpetuates the effect of past intentional discrimination, 
is the difference between Washington v. Davis, 476 U.S. 229* 
(1976) and Green v. School Bd. o f New K ent County, 391 
U.S. 430 (1968). We would therefore suggest, rather than 
hearing these two cases in successive Terms, that certiorari 
be granted now in the instant case and that it be set for 
argument with County o f Los Angeles.



13

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons a Writ of Certiorari should issue 
to review the judgment and opinion of the Fourth Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

J ack  G r een ber g  
E r ic  S c h n a p per  

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

J o nathan  W allas 
L o u is  L . L e s e s n e , J r .
J .  L eV o n n e  C h a m ber s

Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Beeton 
951 South Independence Boulevard 
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202

B arry  L . G oldstein-
806 15th Street, N.W.
Suite 940
Washington, D.C. 20006

Counsel fo r  Petitioners



APPENDIX



Iw  t h e

U n ited  S ta te s  C o u rt  op A p pe a r s  

F or t h e  F o u r th  C ir c u it

Opinion of Court of Appeals— May 2, 1978

No. 76-1293

J o h nson  v . R y d er  T r u c k  L in e s

B e f o r e
May 2, 1978

W in t e r , B u t z n e r , an d  R u s s e l l ,

Circuit Judges.

B u t z n e r , Circuit Ju d g e:

After affirming the district court’s grant of injunctive 
relief, retroactive seniority, and back pay in this class ac­
tion brought under Title V II of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.] and § 16 of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1870 [42 U.S.C. §1981], we granted rehearing to 
consider the effect of International Brotherhood of Team­
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 14 F E P  Cases 1514 
(1977).1 The principal question to emerge on rehearing 
is whether some employees can obtain relief under § 1981 
that is not available to them under Title V II. We hold 
that in this instance they cannot, and we modify our initial 
opinion and remand the case for further proceedings.

1 Our initial decision is reported as Johnson v. Ryder Truck 
Lines, Inc., 555 F.2d 1181, 17 F E P  Cases 570 (4th Cir. 1977).

l a



2a

Opinion o f Court o f A ppeals—May 2, 1978  

I

Incumbent black employees who were discriminated 
against when hired before the effective date of Title Y II  
in 1965 were subsequently prevented by the company’s 
bargaining agreement from obtaining jobs as line drivers 
while maintaining their full company seniority. The dis­
trict court’s order provided relief to employees who suf­
fered in this way from the present effects of pre-Act 
discrimination. Rehearing disclosed that the relevant pro­
visions of the bargaining contract involved in this case and 
the one considered in Teamsters are virtually identical. 
Both contracts provided that employees could not carry 
their full company seniority for all purposes with them 
when they transferred to line driver positions.

In Teamsters the Court considered the effects of § 703(h) 
of the 1964 Act [42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h)] on the contract’s 
seniority system.2 It said:

[W]e hold that an otherwise neutral, legitimate se­
niority system does not become unlawful under Title 
Y II  simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act dis­
crimination. Congress did not intend to make it illegal 
for employees with vested seniority rights to continue 
to exercise those rights, even at the expense of pre- 
Act discriminatees. 431 U.S. at 353-54, 14 F E P  Cases 
at 1526.

_2 Section 703(h) of the 1964 Act [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)] pro­
vides in p art:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall 
not be unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply 
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or 
merit system. . . . provided that such differences are not the result 
of an intention to discriminate because of race . . . .



3a

Therefore, Teamsters invalidates our affirmance of the 
district court’s conclusion that the company’s seniority sys­
tem violated Title V II.

The employees assert, however, that § 703(h) is expressly 
limited to Title Y II  and that it should not be construed as 
a restriction on § 1981. They therefore insist that the seni­
ority system violates their rights secured by § 1981 and 
that they are entitled to relief under that statute. It  is this 
issue that we now address.

I I

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981, provides:

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit 
of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons 
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall 
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, 
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not repeal by implication 
any part of § 1981. This is firmly established by both the 
legislative history of the 1964 Act and its 1972 amendments. 
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 
457-61, 10 F E P  Cases 817, 819-820 (1975); cf. Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 416 n.20 (1968). Section 
1981 affords a federal remedy against racial discrimination 
in private employment that is “separate, distinct, and inde­
pendent” from the remedies available under Title V II of 
the 1964 Act. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 
supra, 421 U.S. at 461, 10 P E P  Cases at 820. Thus an 
employee “who establishes a cause of action under § 1981

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls— M ay 2, 1978



4a

is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including com­
pensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive dam­
ages.” 421 U.S. at 460, 10 F E P  Cases at 819.

This case therefore presents the question of whether the 
incumbent employees who were discriminatorily hired be­
fore 1965 when Title Y II  became effective have a cause of 
action under § 1981 because the bargaining contract’s re­
striction of carryover seniority perpetuates the pre-1965 
hiring discrimination.3 Of course, each pre-1965 incumbent 
black employee had a cause of action under § 1981 because 
of the company’s discriminatory hiring practices. But all 
parties recognize that this cause of action is barred by 
North Carolina’s three-year statute of limitations, N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 1-52(1), which is made applicable to the § 1981 
claim. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., supra, 
421 U.S. at 462, 10 F E P  Cases at 820.

The seniority provision of the bargaining contract was 
facially neutral, applying to both white and black employees 
if they transferred to the higher paying position of a line 
driver. Both black and white employees were subject to 
loss of their former departmental seniority and had to 
start at the bottom of the seniority list for line drivers 
even though they may have had more employment seniority 
than line drivers higher on the ladder. Consequently, 
§ 1981 does not afford the black employees relief, because 
this statute confers on black persons only the same rights 
possessed by white persons.

3 Applicants refused jobs after 1965 on account of their race are 
entitled to an award of seniority retroactive to the date of applica­
tion. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 762-70, 
12 F E P  Cases 549, 555, 557 (1976). Theoretically, the same mea­
sure of retroactive seniority would be available to pre-1965 incum­
bents who sought linehaul jobs, but it would be of less value to 
them because they could not carry over their full employment 
seniority to their new job assignment.

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls—M ay 2, 1978



5a

Moreover, the application of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does not 
lead to a different conclusion. Section 1988 directs federal 
courts to enforce § 1981 “in conformity with the laws of 
the United 'States, so far as such laws are suitable . . . ” 4 
■ Section 1988 in itself does not create any cause of action, 
but it “instructs federal courts as to what law to apply in 
causes of action arising under federal civil rights acts.” 
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 TJ.S. 693, 703-06 (1973); 
Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1973).

In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 IT.S. 424, 430, 3 P E P  
Cases 175, 177 (1971), the Court held: “Under the [1964] 
Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, 
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained 
if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of piror discrim­
inatory practices.” This concept is essential to the em­
ployees’ suit. However, in Teamsters v. United States, 
supra, 431 U.S. at 349, 14 F E P  Cases at 1525, the Court 
held that the Griggs rationale is not applicable to a seni­
ority system that is lawful under § 703(h). Ordinarily, 
§ 1988 enables a district court to utilize Griggs’s interpre­
tation of Title V II in a § 1981 employment discrimination 
suit, but the court cannot transgress the limitation placed 
on the Griggs rationale in Teamsters with respect to § 703 
(h). A ruling that a seniority system which is lawful under 
Title V II is nevertheless unlawful under § 1981 would dis­
regard the precepts of § 1988. An analogous situation con­
cerning the application of § 1988 is presented by Moor v.

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls— M ay 2, 1978

4 Title 42 U.S.C. §1988 provides in part:
The jurisdiction in civil . . . matters conferred on the district 

courts by the provisions of this chapter . . . shall be exercised 
and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, 
so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect . . . .



6a

County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), dealing with the 
enforcement of a § 1983 claim by utilization of a state law 
which made municipalities vicariously liable for the acts 
of their employees.5 The Court held that such a state law 
could not be utilized to enforce the rights secured by § 1983 
because it was inconsistent with federal law that excludes 
municipal corporations from liability under § 1983. 411 
U.S. at 706.

Our conclusion accords with decisions that have held, 
although in different context, that § 1981 does not invali­
date bona fide seniority provisions. See, e.g., Chance v. 
Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 998,11 F E P  Cases 1450, 
1454 (2d Cir. 1976); Watkins v. United 'Steel Workers 
Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41, 49-50, 10 F E P  Cases 1297, 1304 
(5th Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 
F.2d 1309, 1320 n.4, 8 F E P  Cases 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1974); 
cf. Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270, 
12 F E P  Cases 314, 323-324 (4th Cir. 1976). I t  is also con­
sistent with Supreme Court’s opinion in Johnson v. Rail­
way Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 10 F E P  Cases 817 
(1975). Johnson emphasized that a party proceeding under 
§ 1981 is not restricted by the administrative and proce­
dural requirements of Title V II, but nothing in Johnson 
suggests that a practice lawful under Title V II can be held 
unlawful under § 1981. On the contrary, Johnson recog­
nizes that Congress noted that Title V II  and § 1981 are 
“co-extensive” and that they “augment each other and are 
not mutually exclusive.” 421 U.S. at 459, 10 F E P  Cases at 
819. Johnson gives no indication, however, that Congress

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls—M ay 2, 1978

6 Section 1988 also authorizes resort to state laws for enforce­
ment of the civil rgihts acts if they are not “inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.”



7a

intended to create conflicting and contradictory standards 
for determining what constitutes illegal discrimination.

We therefore withdraw our mandate and direct that, a 
new judgment issue consistent with this opinion. We re­
mand the case to the district court for reconsideration of 
the claims made by those employees who were afforded 
relief on the basis of the seniority system that Teamsters 
later held to be lawful. The parties suggest that additional 
evidence may be necessary, and the district court should 
reopen the proceedings for this purpose. Although the 
union did not appeal from the entry of the injunction 
against it, we direct the district court to permit it to move 
for relief from this order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The 
union’s conduct in agreeing to the seniority system violated 
neither Title V II nor § 1981. Therefore, the judgment 
against it should be vacated. See, Teamsters v. United 
States, supra, 431 U.S. at 356, 14 F E P  Cases at 1527. In 
all other respects we affirm the district court for the reasons 
stated in our initial opinion.

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls— M ay 2, 1978

Concurring Opinion

W in t e r , Circuit Judge, concurring s p e c ia lly :

I  concur in the judgment of the court and in parts of its 
opinion; but since my concurrence rests in part on grounds 
different from those assigned by the majority, I  append 
this statement of my separate views.

I  have no doubt that Teamsters invalidates our affir­
mance of the district court’s conclusion that the company’s 
seniority system violated Title V II, and that we must 
vacate this portion of our judgment and remand, giving 
to affected employees the right to present additional evi-



8a

denee and giving to the union the right to have the judg­
ment against it vacated. Where my reasoning differs from 
that of the majority is with respect to plaintiff’s alleged 
cause of action under § 1981.

I  readily agree that under § 1981, standing alone, the 
plaintiffs’ only cause of action was their initial discrim­
inatory employment. Unlike Title Y II  (42 IT.S.O. § 2000-e- 
2 (a )(1), which proscribes discriminatory hiring or firing 
of an employee and other discrimination with respect to 
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ­
ment,” 1 § 1981 merely guarantees the black employee the 
same right to contract for his services “as is enjoyed by 
white citizens.” The right guaranteed by § 1981 was denied 
when black employees were denied the right to be hired in 
certain classifications of jobs because of their race. But 
having obtained initial employment in classifications in 
which they were accepted, I  find no subsequent violation 
of § 1981 by reason of the seniority provisions of the bar­
gaining contract. After initial employment, the right of 
blacks to contract was not abridged by reason of their race.

As the majority describes, the seniority provision of the 
bargaining contract was facially neutral, applying to both 
white and black employees if they transferred to the higher 
paying position of line driver. Both black and white em­
ployees were subject to loss of their former departmental 
seniority and in the event of a transfer they would be *

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls— M ay 2, 1978

_ 1 Section 2000e-2(a) (2) also proscribes the limitation, segrega­
tion or classification of employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive them of employ­
ment opportunities or adversely affect their status as empolyees 
because of their race.



9a

required to start at the bottom of the seniority list for line 
drivers even though they may have had more employment 
seniority than line drivers higher on the ladder. The con­
clusion that the operation of the seniority provision of the 
bargaining contract to freeze blacks in the less desirable 
jobs for which they had been hired did not violate § 1981 
is supported by Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local 2369, 
516 F.2d 41, 49-50, 10 F E P  Cases 1297, 1304 (5 Cir. 1975).2 
Although Afro-American Patrolmen’s League v. Duck, 503 
F.2d 294, 8 F E P  Cases 1124 (6 Cir. 1974), and Macklin v. 
(Spector Freight Systems, 487 F.2d 974, 5 F E P  Cases 994 
(D.C. Cir. 1973), reach a different result, I  am more per­
suaded by Watkins.

I f  I  am correct that the plaintiffs’ sole claim under §. 1981 
was their original discriminatory employment, that claim 
was barred by North Carolina’s three-year statute of limi­
tations, as defendants pleaded in their answers to plaintiffs’ 
amended complaint. See North Carolina Gen. Stat. § 1- 
52(1). * I

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls— M ay 2, 1978

2 Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993, 998, 11 F E P
Cases 1450, 1454 (2 Cir.), cert, denied, ------  TJ.S. ------ , 14 F E P
Cases 1822 (1977), and Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 
F.2d 1309, 1320 n.4, 8 F E P  Cases, 577, 585 (7 Cir. 1974), cert, 
denied, 425 U.S. 997, 12 F E P  Cases 1335 (1976), reach the same 
result, Chance by the theory that § 703 (h) was an implied repeal 
of § 1981. Waters is more difficult to fathom because the court 
did not discuss the issue other than to remark that “ [h]aving 
passed scrutiny under the substantive requirements of Title V II, 
the employment seniority system utilized by Wisconsin Steel is 
not violative of § 1981.” I  disagree with the rationale of Chance 
and also with that of Waters if Waters’ rationale is that of im­
plied repeal. I f  the majority’s citation of these cases is intended 
to constitute implied approval of their theory of implied repeal,
I  disassociate myself from this view. Because Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457-61, 10 F E P  Cases 817, 
819-820 (1975), made plain that §1981 and Title Y II  were in­
tended to be supplementary and not mutually exclusive. I  think 
that neither can be an implied repeal of the other.



10a

Unlike the majority, I  think that § 1988 has nothing to 
do with this case. The thesis of the majority is that § 1988 
imports into §1981 both Title V II and the judicial gloss 
which has been placed upon it. The majority says that by 
virtue of § 1988 the discriminatory practices and proce­
dures of the company, including a facially neutral seniority 
system which perpetuates past discriminations, held to be 
a violation of Title Y II  in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 430, 3 F E P  Cases 175, 177 (1971), are now also 
outlawed by § 1981. Stated more simply, § 1981, despite 
the limited scope of its language, now outlaws that which 
was proscribed under Title V II. But, the majority reasons, 
the limitation on Griggs articulated in Teamsters, as a 
result of § 703(h) of Title V II, is also imported into § 1981 
with the result that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief 
under § 1981. With this reasoning, I  disagree.

Section 1988 speaks of the “exercise” of the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts in civil and criminal matters conferred 
on them by the Civil Rights Acts and the “enforcement” of 
those statutes. It  requires that both the exercise of juris­
diction and the enforcement of the substantive law be in 
conformity with the laws of the United States “where such 
laws are suitable to carry the same into effect.” But in all 
cases in which federal laws “are not adapted to the object, 
or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suit­
able rem edies [emphasis added], the common law, as mod­
ified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the 
State wherein the court . . . i s  held . . . shall” be applied 
“so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitu­
tion and laws of the United States.”

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls— M ay 2, 1978



11a

I  would stress that “exercise” of jurisdiction and “en­
forcement” refer to the rem edies available and not to the 
threshold determination of whether a provision of the Act 
has been violated. Of course, I  do not doubt that § 1988 
imports into § 1981 many provisions of federal and state 
law to cover situations in which § 1981 is silent. A good 
example is the North Carolina statute of limitations which 
I  think bars plaintiffs’ recovery under § 1981 in the instant 
case. Incorporation of a state statute of limitations relates 
to remedy nad not to the right to be enforced. In short, 
the provisions of state and federal law which are imported 
into § 1981 do not relate to the substantive proscriptions 
of § 1981; they relate solely to how remedies for acts 
illegal under § 1981, standing alone, are to be redressed.

Support for my view is found in both Sullivan v. Little 
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969), and Moor v. County 
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973). In Sullivan where the 
pertinent issue was the measure of damages to be applied 
for a violation of § 1982, the Court relied on § 1988 to 
authorize resort to the state rule which appeared best to 
serve the policies expressed in the federal statutes. What 
impresses me is the clear implication in both the majority 
and dissenting opinions that the sole effect of § 1998 is to 
provide a rem edy  for violation of the Civil Rights Acts.

Moor is even more specific on the point. There the 
question was whether state law could be invoked under 
§ 1988 to render a municipality liable for its violation of 
§ 1983, notwithstanding that, under federal law, a munici­
pality had been held not to be a “person” amenable to suit 
under § 1983. The Court held that it could not, but signifi­
cantly it rested its view not primarily or solely on the 
language of § 1988 which made inapplicable “inconsistent”

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls— M ay 2, 1978



12a

state rules, but on the ground that § 1988 “was [not] meant 
to authorize the wholesale importation into federal law of 
state causes of action—not even one purportedly designed 
for the protection of federal civil rights.” (Footnote omit­
ted.) 411 U.S. at 703-04.

I  recognize that Moor was concerned with the applica­
tion of state law to expand the scope of one of the Civil 
Eights Acts, while in the instant case we are concerned 
with the use of federal law to give an expanded meaning 
to § 1981. But I  see no ground for distinction in determin­
ing the purpose and effect of § 1988, and I  therefore read 
Moor to hold that % 1988 does not incorporate into and 
expand § 1981 by the provisions of Title V II, with or with­
out their judicial gloss.

In summary, my reason for denying plaintiffs’ recovery 
under § 1981 is that the only causes of action which plain­
tiffs have under § 1981 are time-barred.

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls— M ay 2, 1978



13a

Opinion of Court of Appeals— April 1, 1977

I n  t h e

U n ited  S ta te s  C o u rt  of A p p e a l s  

F or t h e  F o u rth  C ir c u it

No. 76-1293

J o h n so n  v . R y d er  T r u c k  L in e s

April 1, 1977

B e f o r e  :
W in t e r , B u t z n e r  and  H a ll ,

P e r  C u ria m  :
Circuit Judges.

Plaintiffs, black employees, former employees and ap­
plicants for employment at Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 
brought a class action, under Title V II of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., against Ryder and 
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and its affil­
iated local, union representatives of Ryder employees. 
Plaintiffs alleged that blacks were systematically denied 
employment at Ryder and, if employed, were relegated to 
menial jobs with no opportunity for transfer. The district 
court found that defendants had violated the Act, granted 
broad injunctive relief, and awarded certain class mem­
bers equitable reinstatement with back pay. The district 
court further ruled that, while both defendants were guilty 
of unlawful discrimination, the defendant unions had made 
good faith efforts to correct past practices prior to trial;



14a

but, by contrast, Ryder was found to have made none. Ac­
cordingly, back pay awards were assessed against Ryder 
alone.

Ryder has appealed. It  contests only the back pay award 
to some of the plaintiffs and to some members of the 
plaintiff class, and the exoneration of the defendant unions 
from any back pay liability.

Substantial evidence supports the findings of fact made 
by the district court. As such, the judgment cannot be 
overturned as “clearly erroneous.” F.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The 
record indicates that Ryder’s hiring standards, allegedly 
neutral, were applied inconsistently if applied at all. The 
record also suggests that Ryder’s transfer policy (which 
prohibited transfers outright or conditioned them upon the 
loss of seniority rights) had the effect of relegating blacks 
to less attractive tasks. Our analysis of the record dis­
closes a firm evidentiary base for each of the back pay 
awards that was made, including that to employee Winslow. 
Finally, the evidence indicates that defendant unions, who 
previously acquiesced in the unlawful conduct, initiated 
the only efforts directed at compliance with the 1964 Act.

Affirmed.

O pinion o f  C ourt o f  A p p ea ls— A p ril 1, 1977



15a

Opinion of District Court— January 15, 1976

I n  t h e

U n ited  S ta te s  D is t r ic t  C ourt 

W e s t e r n  D is t r ic t  of N orth  Carolina

No. Civ. 73-3

J o h nson  v . R y d er  T r u c k  L in e s , I n c .

January 15, 1976

M cM il l a n , D .J.:

This cause having- come on for a trial before the Court, 
sitting without a jury, and the issues having been duly 
tried, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law having 
previously been entered, it is, H e r e b y  Ordered , A d ju d g ed  
and D ec r eed  :

1. The defendants, Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. (hereinafter 
“Ryder” or the “Company”), the International Brother­
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help­
ers of America (hereinafter the “International”), and Local 
71, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America (hereinafter “Local 
71”) and their officers, agents, employees, successors, ser­
vants and all persons in active concert of participation 
with them shall be and are hereby permanently enjoined 
and restrained from discriminating against the plaintiffs, 
including the intervening plaintiff, and the class of per­
sons represented by the plaintiffs because of their race in 
violation of Title V II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42



16a

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 at the Com­
pany’s facilities located in Charlotte, Mecklenburg County, 
North Carolina. “Company,” as used herein, shall refer 
only to the Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, facilities 
of Ryder.

2. The Company is ordered to offer immediately to Wil­
liam G. Coffey, Jr ., if it has not already done so pursuant 
to this Court’s Order dated September 2, 1975, a longline 
truck driving position with a Charlotte longline seniority 
date and Company seniority date of September 4, 1956.

3. The Company is ordered to offer immediately to 
Willie R. Jackson a longline truck driving position with 
a Charlotte longline seniority date and Company seniority 
date of September 15, 1957.

4. The Company is ordered to offer immediately to 
Clyde Long a longline truck driving position with a Char­
lotte longline seniority date and Company seniority date 
of September 13, 1969.

5. The Company is ordered to offer immediately to 
Vincent Gray a longline truck driving position with a Char­
lotte longline seniority date and Company seniority date 
of September 13, 1973.

6. The Company is ordered to offer immediately to 
Sammie Simms a longline truck driving position with a 
Charlotte longline seniority date and Company seniority 
date of August 4, 1971.

7. The Company is ordered to offer immediately to 
Isaiah Massey a longline truck driving position with a

O pinion o f  D istr ict C ou rt— Ja n u a r y  15, 1976



17a

Charlotte longline seniority date and Company seniority 
date of April 15, 1973.

8. The Company is ordered to offer immediately to 
James Cowen a longline truck driving position with a 
Charlotte longline seniority date and Company seniority 
date of November 1, 1972.

9. The Company is ordered to offer immediately to 
Rueben Winslow a longline truck driving position with, a 
Charlotte longline seniority date and Company seniority 
date of September 30, 1969.

10. The Company is ordered to offer immediately to 
J .  D. Grier a longline truck driving position with a Char­
lotte longline seniority date and Company seniority date 
of August 12, 1969. 11

11. The Company is ordered to pay equitable back pay 
to the persons listed below for the time periods set forth 
below:

O pinion o f  D istrict C ou rt— Ja n u a r y  15, 1976

NAME
DATE BACK PA Y 

BEG IN S
DATE BA CK PA Y 

ENDS

Robert L. Johnson, Jr . 

Ernest McManus 

William Coffey, Jr . 8-18-67

8-18-67

8-18-67

Date of this 
Judgment

Date of this 
Judgment

Date of this 
Judgment

9-6-73

9-6-73

Willie Jackson 8-18-67

Clyde Long 11- 1-71



18a

O pinion o f  D istrict C ou rt— Ja n u a r y  15, 1976

NAME
DATE BACK PA Y 

BEG IN S
DATE BACK PA Y 

ENDS

Vincent Gray 9-13-73 Date of this 
Judgment

Sammie Simms 11- 2-71 Date of this 
Judgment

Tommie Freeman 8-18-67 9-6-73

Isaia Massey 5-11-73 Date of this 
Judgment

James Cowen 11- 1-72 Date of this 
Judgment

Rueben Winslow 9-30-69 Date of this 
Judgment

J .  D. Grier 8-12-69 Date of this 
Judgment

12. The back pay awards set forth above shall be the
difference between what each plaintiff or class member 
would have earned but for the discrimination of the de­
fendants (including all fringe benefits) and that which 
they actually earned (including all fringe benefits), or 
should have earned with due diligence, during the ap­
plicable time periods set forth above. Each back pay award 
should be calculated by comparing earnings on a quarterly 
basis for the applicable time periods for each individual. 
To each principal award, interest at the rate of six per 
cent (6%) compounded annually shall be added.

Ryder is further ordered to pay to Messrs. Coffey, Jack- 
son, Long, Gray, Simms, Massey, Cowen, Winslow and 
Grier equitable monetary relief with interest for any loss 
of earnings suffered after the date of the entry of this



19a

Judgment until such time as each said individual is given 
an opportunity to become a longline driver with the Com­
pany with a seniority date as set forth above.

Proper allowance should be made in calculating monetary 
relief for any plaintiffs or class members who would have 
suffered time out of work due to nondiscriminatory layoff 
under the applicable bargaining agreements.

Counsel for the plaintiffs and the Company are directed 
to meet and confer within forty-five (45) days of the entry 
of this Judgment for the purposes of discussing and agree­
ing upon the back pay awards of each individual as set 
forth above. Absent an agreement among those parties, 
those parties are directed to disclose and exchange per­
tinent documents and records relevant to this subject and 
to submit their respective positions concerning back pay 
to the Court within sixty (60) days of the entry of this 
Judgment. The Court will thereafter enter an order with 
respect to any remaining back pay questions.

13. The defendants, unless otherwise authorized by later 
Order, are ordered to continue to use “carryover senior­
ity,” as it is provided for in the 1973 Road and City Cartage 
contracts.

14. Although the current Shop contract does not pro­
vide for “carryover seniority,” the Court will not order 
relief with respect to that agreement because no plaintiffs 
or class members seek to move from jobs within the Shop 
agreement to jobs within the Road agreement.

15. The defendant Ryder and all of its supervisors, 
foremen, officers, and managerial personnel at its Char­
lotte terminal and all others acting on the Company’s be­
half and in concert with Ryder are hereby permanently

O pinion o f  D istrict C ou rt— Ja n u a r y  15, 1976



20a

enjoined from threatening, intimidating, harassing, giving 
discriminatory job assignments, or using racial epithets 
directed to present or future black employees or applicants 
for employment at Ryder’s Charlotte terminal. The Com­
pany is ordered to conduct, starting immediately, meet­
ings and classes, conducted by employees or, if necessary, 
by outside professional consultants or teachers, for all its 
Charlotte supervisory and managerial personnel, sufficient 
to educate said employes about the laws governing equal 
opportunity employment and to explain to said employees 
the terms of this Judgment and the Company’s respon­
sibilities under this Judgment and applicable laws.

Ryder shall prepare and circulate to counsel for the 
plaintiffs a memorandum to be permanently placed on all 
bulletin boards at the Charlotte terminal. Said memoran­
dum shall emphasize the responsibilities of all supervisory 
and managerial personnel to refrain from any racially dis­
criminatory actions and shall provide the name of a local 
responsible Ryder official to whom aggrieved persons can 
make known the nature of any grievances concerning racial 
discrimination.

16. The Company is enjoined from laying off or other­
wise deleteriously affecting the employment opportunities 
and working conditions of black garagemen in Ryder’s 
Shop because of the change of job duties whereby mechanics 
began performing the jobs, formerly done by garagemen, 
of changing oil and greasing tractors and trailers.

17. Within sixty (60) days from the entry of this Judg­
ment the Company shall develop and implement a train­
ing program for the positions of mechanic and trailer 
mechanic. Said program shall contain a timetable for the

O pinion o f  D istrict C ou rt— Ja n u a r y  15, 1976



21a

training and promotion of employees to the mechanic and 
trailer mechanic positions. For every two trainees, one 
shall be black until at least twenty per cent (20%) of all 
mechanics and trailer mechanics employed by Ryder in 
Charlotte are black. Current employees at Ryder’s Char­
lotte terminal shall be given preference for said training 
and, upon reaching journeyman status, each such employee 
shall be allowed to utilize his Company (hire date) senior­
ity for all purposes.

18. The Court expressly approves and incorporates 
herein those portions of the Partial Consent Decree with 
Respect to Defendant Employers entered in the case of 
United States v. Trucking Em ployers, Inc., et al. (the 
“TED’ case) which are not inconsistent with this Judg­
ment. It  is understood that Ryder is a party to that partial 
consent decree.

19. The Company is enjoined from implementing, main­
taining or giving effect to any criteria or procedure utilized 
for the selection of supervisory personnel which is designed 
to or has the effect of discriminating against black em­
ployees or black applicants for employment.

The Company is ordered to formulate objective criteria 
for the promotion or selection of supervisory personnel. 
Said objective selection criteria for supervisory positions 
shall be prepared by the Company for all supervisory posi­
tions at the Charlotte terminal wTithin sixty (60) days after 
the entry of this Judgment. The Company shall provide 
counsel for the plaintiffs with copies of the criteria for 
the selection of supervisory personnel, and unless the plain­
tiffs object to the selection criteria within thirty (30) days 
after receiving said copies, such selection criteria shall 
be deemed to comply with this Judgment. Copies of the

O pinion o f  D istrict C ourt— Ja n u a r y  15, 1976



22a

selection criteria shall be posted on bulletin boards located 
in conspicuous places throughout the Charlotte terminal.

The Company shall fill vacancies in supervisory posi­
tions at the Charlotte terminal with blacks, except when the 
Company is unable to promote or hire qualified blacks, 
until the percentage of blacks in supervisory positions ap­
proximately equals the percentage of blacks at the Char­
lotte terminal as of January 5, 1973. The Company is not 
required to fill any supervisory position with a person not 
qualified for said position nor is the Company required 
to retain any person in such position, if after a reasonable 
time, said person demonstrates he is unable to perform 
necessary jobs duties adequately.

20. The plaintiffs are hereby awarded their costs in this 
action including reasonable counsel fees and expenses. 
Eyder shall pay said costs and fees.

Counsel for the plaintiffs and Eyder are directed to meet 
and confer within forty-five (45) days of the date of this 
Judgment for the purpose of agreeing upon costs, rea­
sonable attorneys fees and expenses. Absent such an agree­
ment, (1) counsel for the plaintiffs is directed to file with 
the Court a statement of time for which counsel fees are 
claimed and an itemization of costs and expenses, and (2) 
the defendant Company is directed to file a statement with 
the Court setting forth the basis by which the Company 
has compensated its counsel and the total dollar amount 
it has paid and expects to pay its counsel in this action. I f  
the parties are unable to agree on costs, counsel fees and 
expenses, the respective statements, required herein shall 
be filed with the Court within sixty (60) days of the entry 
of this Judgment.

O pinion o f  D istrict C ourt— Ja n u a r y  15, 1976



23a

21. Within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) 
days, after January 1, 1976, and every six months for a 
period of three years thereafter, the Company will serve 
upon plaintiffs’ counsel and the Court reports relating to 
its Mecklenburg County facilities showing data classified 
in each instance by job classifications and race as follows:

(a) The total number of employees as of the end of the 
time period.

(b) The number of persons hired and the number of 
persons terminated during the time period.

(c) The number of applicants for employment whose 
applications were pending as of the end of the time period.

(d) With respect to those applicants for road driver 
jobs, reports shall be made of all black applicants for over- 
the-road positions who are either not considered qualified 
for hire by the Company or not hired by the Company 
during the reporting period. Such reports shall include 
the following:

(i) The applicant’s name, address, phone number;

(ii) The applicant’s age, height and weight;

(iii) The reason(s) for the applicant either not being 
considered qualified for hire or not selected to fill any 
driver vacancy, which is filled during the reporting period;

(iv) The amount of the applicant’s straight truck and 
tractor trailer experience. I f  the applicant is a graduate 
of a truck driver school, the Company shall indicate the 
name and location of such school;

(v) I f  an applicant is not considered qualified for hire 
because of his motor vehicle and/or accident record, a

O pinion o f  D istrict C ou rt— Ja n u a r y  15, 1976



24a

summary of the applicant’s driving record shall be included 
in such reports;

(vi) I f  an applicant is not considered qualified for hire 
because of his police or medical record, the Company shall 
summarize such record; and

(vii) I f  an applicant is not considered for hire because 
of any unfavorable references, the Company shall identify 
to the plaintiffs’ counsel only the character of such refer­
ence.

(e) The name and race of all employees hired or term­
inated as supervisors, foremen or managers at Ryder’s 
Charlotte terminal and the date they were hired or term­
inated. I f  any supervisory employee is terminated during 
a reporting period the report should state the reasons 
for said termination.

22. Ryder is hereby ordered to serve upon plaintiffs’ 
counsel and the Court copies of all reports made pursuant 
to the partial consent decree in the T E I case.

23. The Company will be responsible for the adoption 
and implementation of the employment practices and pro­
cedures required under this Judgment and for the full 
and faithful discharge of the duties enjoined upon its 
officers so as to prevent the development of any pattern 
or practice of discrimination against the Company’s em­
ployees or applicants for employment because of race. The 
union defendants will cooperate to this end. Notwithstand­
ing the remedies provided by law in the event of violations 
of the terms of this Judgment, no individual will be de­
prived of any other lawful remedy which he may have 
against the defendants or any employee, agent or officer

O pinion o f  D istrict C ou rt— Ja n u a r y  15, 1976



25a

thereof on. account of any future individual instances of 
discrimination, but the defendants shall not be deemed to 
be in contempt of court unless the violation relates to a 
duty to be imposed or carried out by an officer of one of 
the defendants under one of the provisions hereinabove 
contained.

24. The collective bargaining agreements now in effect 
between Ryder and Local 71 and all subsequent collective 
bargaining agreements between these deefndants shall not 
be affected by this Judgment except insofar as such agree­
ments are inconsistent with the provisions of this Judg­
ment. Should a conflict arise between the provisions of a 
collective bargaining agreement and the provisions of this 
Judgment, the terms of this Judgment shall prevail.

25. The Company shall give notice of this Judgment 
to all of its employees at the Charlotte terminal by posting 
copies of this Judgment on bulletin boards continuously in 
conspicuous places throughout the terminal for a period 
of ninety (90) days immediately following the entry of this 
Judgment.

26. This Judgment is final and binding on all class mem­
bers who received notice of this action. It  is not binding 
with respect to those individuals who, in writing, have here­
tofore sought exclusion from this case.

27. The Court retains jurisdiction of this matter to issue 
such other orders and to conduct such other proceedings 
as may be necessary to effectuate this Judgment.

O pinion o f  D istr ict C ourt— Ja n u a r y  15, 1976



26a

I n t h e

U n ited  S t a t e s  D is t r ic t  C ourt 

W e st e r n  D is t r ic t  of N o rth  C arolina

Opinion of District Court-—November 18, 1975

No. 73-3

J o h nson  v . R y d er  T r u c k  L in e s , I n c .

November 18, 1975

M cM il l a n , D .J.:

This action was tried on August 19, 20, 21 & 25, 1975 
upon allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendants had 
engaged in policies and practices in violation of Title V II 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. 
(“Title V II”) and 42 U.S.C. §1981 (“Section 1981”) and 
that certain plaintiffs and class members represented by 
the plaintiffs had been denied employment opportunities as 
a result of the racially discriminatory practices of the de­
fendants. The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to remedy 
the claimed discrimination and to provide specific redress 
for each individual who has suffered as a result of defen­
dants’ discriminatory practices. Based on the evidence, the 
Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclu­
sions of Law:

Findings of Fact

A. Parties. 1. Plaintiffs herein, Robert L. Johnson, Jr ., 
Leroy Sloan, Willie R. Jackson, Ernest H. McManus,



27a

Booker T. Alexander and William G. Coffey, Jr ., (an inter­
vening plaintiff) are black citizens of the United States 
residing in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. The 
plaintiffs have brought this case as a class action under 
Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; a class has 
previously been certified by this Court. Notice to potential 
class members by publication and two direct certified mail­
ings were ordered and effected prior to trial. The evidence 
at the trial involved facts relating to a pattern of racial 
discrimination engaged in by the defendants, the individual 
claims of the plaintiffs, and evidence concerning the claims 
of those class members represented by the plaintiffs who 
have responded to the notices of this case ordered by the 
Court and who have presented their claims at trial. The 
rights of W. A. Oauthen, David Irby, Garfield Clanton, 
Robert W. Blair and Arnold H. Hall, Jr ., who requested 
in writing to be excluded from this action, are not affected 
by the Court’s decision in this case.

2. Defendant Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., (hereinafter 
“Ryder” or “the Company”) is a corporation doing busi­
ness in Charlotte, North Carolina, with its headquarters 
in Jacksonville, Florida. Ryder is engaged in the business 
of interstate trucking and is a common carrier subject to 
the rules and regulations of the Department of Trans­
portation.

3. Ryder has been operating an interstate common car­
rier trucking operation in Mecklenburg County since 1952. 
On April 1, 1966, Ryder began operation of Harris Motor 
Express (hereinafter “Harris”) under temporary author­
ity. The sale of Harris to Ryder was finalized on January 
1, 1968, and was approved by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission on January 1, 1969. The Harris-Rydcr long-

O pinion o f  D istrict C ourt— N ov em ber  18, 1975



28a

line seniority rosters were dovetailed on May 15, 1968. 
Several of the plaintiffs and class members became Ryder 
employees when Ryder and Harris merged.

4. Defendant International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America (herein­
after the “International”) is an unincorporated labor or­
ganization with its headquarters in Washington, D. C. 
Defendant Local 71 of the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Amer­
ica (hereinafter “Local 71”) is an unincorporated labor 
organization and is an affiliate and agent of the Inter­
national.

5. This action involves only the Mecklenburg County 
facilities of Ryder.

6. Ryder is an employer within the meaning of Title 
V II and the defendant unions are both labor organizations 
within the meaning of Title V II. The plaintiffs have com­
plied with the administrative and procedural requirements 
of Title V II, and this action is properly before the Court- 
under both 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq., and 42 H.S.C. § 1981 
with respect to all defendants.

B. Background Facts. 7. The Mecklenburg County facil­
ities of defendant Ryder are divided into four primary 
departments: City Cartage, Longline, Shop, and Office.

The City Cartage department is the Company’s ware­
housing and local delivery section. Interstate freight is 
sorted by City Cartage employees and loaded for local 
delivery or for further interstate shipping. The jobs in the 
City Cartage department are dockworker (also called steve­
dore, warehouseman, checker, or freight handler), switcher

O pinion o f  D istrict C ourt— N ov em ber  18, 1975



29a

(also called hostler or jockey) and pick-up and delivery 
driver (also called local driver or city driver).

The Longline department is Ryder’s long distance truck­
ing wing. Longline drivers (also called road drivers or 
over-the-road drivers) drive large tractor-trailer rigs in 
interstate commerce.

The Shop department (also known as the Maintenance 
department) is responsible for all mechanical and servicing 
work performed on Ryder’s heavy tractors and trailers in 
Charlotte. The jobs in the Shop are mechanic, mechanic 
helper, trailer mechanic, garageman (also called service­
man) and partsman.

The Office department handles secretarial, clerical and 
billing responsibilities for the Company.

8. At all times pertinent to this action, Ryder and Local 
71 negotiated and had in effect three distinct collective 
bargaining agreements which control, inter alia, questions 
of seniority. These contracts are (1) the National Master 
Freight Agreement and Carolina Freight Council Over- 
the-Road Supplemental Agreement (hereinafter the “Road 
contract”), (2) the National Master Freight Agreement 
and Carolina Freight Council City Cartage Supplemental 
Agreement (hereinafter the “City Cartage contract”), and 
(3) the Carolina Automotive Maintenance Agreement 
(hereinafter the “Shop contract”). The basic Road contract 
and the City Cartage contract are negotiated on a national 
level. Additions and amendments to the national contract 
are made by supplemental agreement between a group of 
regional trucking companies and a group of regional local 
Teamsters unions. Both Local 71 and Ryder are signatories 
to the various pertinent contracts. The International, as 
such, has not signed any of the applicable bargaining

O pinion o f  D istrict C ourt— N ov em ber  18, 1975



30a

agreements, however, the National Master Freight Agree­
ments are negotiated in part by a union negotiating com­
mittee which includes International Teamsters President 
Frank E. Fitzsimmons and other International leaders. 
The International through its officers and agents is actively 
involved in collective bargaining with respect to the City 
Cartage and Road contracts. The Shop contract is appar­
ently more of local flavor although the International (pur­
suant to the provisions of the International Constitution) 
apparently exercises some ultimate control with respect to 
that contract also.

9. The uncontroverted statistical evidence presented by 
the plaintiffs at trial is pertinent and compelling.

With respect to the City Cartage, Longline, and Office 
departments, the racial breakdown of the jobs therein as 
of July 1, 1965, January 1, 1968, January 1, 1970, and Jan ­
uary 5, 1973, was as follows:

O pinion o f  D istrict C ourt— N ov em ber  18, 1975

D ate

July 1, 1965
D ep t, o f  Jo b

Office
B la ck

0
W h ite

4
T o ta l

4

City Cartage (P & D) 4 12 16
City Cartage (Dock) 17 12 29

City Cartage 
(Switchers) 4 2 6

Line (Drivers) 0 102 102

January 1,1968 Office 0 6 6

City Cartage (P & D) 4 12 16

City Cartage (Dock) 17 12 29



31a

O pinion o f  D istrict C ou rt— N ov em ber  18, 1975

D ate D ep t, o f  J o b

City Cartage 

(Switchers) 

Line (Drivers)

B la ck  W hite

4 2 

0 105

T o ta l

6

105

January 1,1970 Office 0 7 7
City Cartage (P & D) 4 12 16

City Cartage (Dock) 

City Cartage

17 12 29

(Switchers) 4 2 6
Line (Drivers) 0 110 110

January 5,1973 Office 1 10 11
City Cartage (P & D) 4 12 16

City Cartage (Dock) 

City Cartage

17 12 29

(Switchers) 4 2 6
Line (Drivers) 5 138 143

10. At the time that Harris merged with Ryder, Harris 
employed no black road drivers.

11. Between November 1, 1966, and November 1, 1971, 
Ryder hired 63 white longline drivers and no black ones. 
Marion Thompson, Ryder’s first black longline driver, was 
hired on November 2, 1971.

12. With respect to the Shop Department the racial 
breakdown of jobs as of January 1, 1968, January 1, 1970, 
and January 5, 1973, was as follows:



32a

O pinion o f  D istrict C ou rt— N ov em b er  18, 1975

D ate D ep artm en t B la ck W h ite T o ta l

January 1,1968 Mechanic 0 11 11

Mechanic Helper 0 2 2

Trailer Mechanic 0 4 4

Garagemen 2 6 8

Partsmen 0 1 1

January 1, 1970 Mechanic 0 10 10

Mechanic Helper 0 2 2

Trailer Mechanic 0 4 4

Garagemen 3 8 11

Partsmen 0 1 1

January 5,1973 Mechanic 0 11 11

Mechanic Helper 1 2 3

Trailer Mechanic 0 3 3
Garagemen 6 2 8
Partsmen 0 1 1

13. The average gross wages (defined as gross wages
not reduced by business related deductions”) paid to full­
time longline drivers by Ryder in the Calendar years 1966 
through 1973 were greater than the average gross wages 
paid to full-time local drivers, dockworkers, switchers, 
checkers and garagemen during those calendar years.

14. With respect to Ryder’s supervisory force in Char­
lotte, the racial breakdown of supervisors as of July 1,



33a

O pinion o f  D istr ict C ou rt— N ov em ber  18, 1975

1965, July 1, 1968, July 1, 1970, and January 5, 1973, was
as follows:

D ate
N um ber o f W hite 

Supervisors
N um ber o f B la ck  

Supervisors

July 1, 1965 ..... . Approximately 28 0

July 1, 1968 ....... Approximately 26 0

July 1. 1970 - ..... 25 0

January 5, 1973 .. 27 0

15. As of April 1, 1975, Ryder had never employed any 
black supervisors, foremen or managers at its Charlotte
facilities.

C. Racial Discrimination with Respect to Road Jobs .
16. The unrebut.ted statistical data demonstrating Ryder’s 
failure to hire blacks for certain jobs (e.g., road drivers, 
mechanics, supervisors) during certain time periods after 
the effective date of Title V II establishes a prim a facie  
case of both past and continuing discrimination on the 
basis of race in violation of Title V II and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., [9 EPD If 10,199] 518 F.2d 
543, 549, 10 F E P  Cases 1057 (4th Cir. 1975); United States 
v. Chesapeake d  0 . Ry, [5 EPD ]f 8090] 471 F.2d 582, 586 
(4th Cir. 1972), cert. den. 411 U.S. 939 (1973); Brown  v. 
Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., [4 EPD ]f 7737] 457 
F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. den. [5 EPD TF 8021] 409 
U.S. 982 (1972); Parham  v. Southwestern B ell Telephone 
Co., [3 EPD § 8021] 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Jon es  v. 
L ee Way Motor Freight, [2 EPD ]f 10,283] 431 F.2d 245 
(10th Cir. 1970), cert. den. [3 EPD If 8139] 401 U.S. 954 
(1971); Rodriguez v. E ast Texas Motor Freight, [8 EPD 
If 9811] 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974); Hairston  v. McLean 
Trucking Co., [6 EPD ]f 8841 and 7 EPD fl 9144] 62 F.R.D.



34a

642 (M.D.N.C. 1974), remanded fo r  additional relie f [10 
EPD 10,353] 520 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1975); Cathey v. 
Johnson  M otor Lines, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 1107, 9 EPD |f 9874 
(W.D.N.C. 1974).

17. This prim a facie  case of racial discrimination es­
tablished by the statistical data demonstrating- that blacks 
hay not been hired for longline driving jobs by Ryder is 
buttresssed by other evidence. A number of incumbent 
black employees of Ryder who were working in jobs under 
the City Cartage contract testified that they attempted to 
get longline driving jobs with the Company after July 2, 
1965 (the effective date of Title V II). These efforts to 
obtain a road driving job were uniformly rebuffed. For 
example, in 1966 Ernest McManus approached Floyd 
Crozier, a Ryder management employee, and attempted to 
get a road job. Crozier refused to give McManus such a 
job, and McManus thereafter was no longer allowed to per­
form as a local driver for Ryder. William Coffey took a 
road test in 1966 administered by Tim Timmons, an em­
ployee in Ryder’s Safety Department. Coffey passed the 
test but was not given a longline job. Similar attempts 
made by incumbent employees and applicants to get road 
driving jobs in 1967 (Tommy Freeman), in 1969 (Coffey, 
Robert Johnson, Willie Jackson, Freeman, Clyde Long, 
J .  D. Grier), in 1970 (McManus), and in 1972 (James 
Cowan) proved unsucessful.

18. Indeed, Ryder had a firm policy prior to 1971 of re­
fusing to allow incumbent employees who worked under the 
City Cartage or Shop contracts to transfer to longline 
driving jobs even if such employees were willing to for­
feit their seniority. This policy perpetuated into the pres­
ent the past discriminatory hiring policies in violation of

O pinion o f  D istr ict C ou rt— N ov em b er  18, 1975



35a

Title V II. Hairston  v. McLean Trucking Co., [10 EPD 
1110,353] 520 F.2d 226, 11 F E P  Cases 91 {4th Cir. 1975).

19. Ryder’s policy was a consistent one. The Company 
refused to hire blacks as drivers either from the pool of 
incumbent employees who desired to transfer to higher 
paying longline jobs or from the pool of applications of 
those blacks who were not employed by the Company.

D. Racially Discriminatory Collective Bargaining A gree­
ments. 20. Moreover, even if Ryder had not maintained a 
policy of refusing to allow those employees holding City 
Cartage and Shop jobs to transfer to longline driving jobs, 
the seniority provisions of the applicable collective bar­
gaining agreements violated Title V II and Section 1981.

At the time this action was filed, neither the Road con­
tract, the City Cartage contract nor the Shop contract 
allowed an employee working under the jurisdiction of 
an agreement to transfer to a job under the jurisdiction 
of another agreement and carry with him his total terminal 
seniority for all purposes. Thus, an employee who was 
hired in Charlotte by Ryder at a time when Ryder abso­
lutely refused to hire black longline drivers and who was 
working under the City Cartage contract was unable to 
move to a job under the Road contract without forfeiting 
his accumulated seniority for job bidding and lay-off pur­
poses. Similar restrictive seniority carryover provisions 
which put “roadblocks” in the way of blacks seeking equal 
opportunity have been consistently condemned in other 
cases involving similar issues and facts in the trucking 
industry. See, e.g., H airston  v. McLean Trucking Co., [10 
EPD H 10,353] 520 F.2d 226, 11 F E P  Cases 91 (4th Cir. 
1975); Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, supra;

O pinion o f  D istrict C ourt— N ov em b er  18, 1975



36a

Cathey v. Johnson  M otor Lines, Inc., supra; Barnett v. 
W. T. Grant Co., supra.

21. The defendants have failed to demonstrate that the 
restrictive seniority provisions contained in the applicable 
collective bargaining agreements were mandated by busi­
ness necessity. See Robinson  v. Lorillard  Corp., [3 EPD 
If 8267] 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); cert, dismissed, 404 
U.S. 1006 (1971); 404 U.S. 1007 (1972). United States v. 
Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, supra, at 588. 
To the contrary, Ryder Management employees Bradfield, 
Woodson, and Briggs testified that they were aware of no 
reasons why carryover seniority from City Cartage or 
Shop jobs to Road jobs would not be feasible.

22. Thus, under the facts of this ease, in light of the 
pervasive discriminatory hiring, transfer and promotion 
practices of Ryder, the collective bargaining agreements 
in effect at the time of the filing of the Complaint in this 
action perpetuated into the present the effects of past 
discriminatory hiring to the detriment of the plaintiffs. 
The Court finds that the restrictive seniority provisions 
in the pertinent agreements were violative of Title V II and 
42 U.S.C. § 1981.

23. In November, 1971, Ryder, making an exception to 
its theretofore consistent policy of refusing to allow trans­
fers from City Cartage jobs to Road jobs, offered to all 
Company employees working in City Cartage and Shop 
jobs the opportunity to transfer to road driving jobs. The 
transfers offered, however, required the transferring em­
ployees to forfeit all seniority accumulated in their City 
Cartage or Shop positions for all job bidding and layoff 
purposes. Several incumbent blacks (e.g., Johnson, Me-

O pinion o f  D istrict C ou rt■—N ov em ber  18, 1975



37a

Manus, and Freeman) considered this job transfer offer 
but refused to transfer because they faced a loss of se­
niority. Ryder’s transfer offer of November, 1971 with­
out carryover seniority for all purposes did not purge the 
Company of its previous discriminatory history. Black 
employees, who had previously suffered as a result of 
Ryder’s discriminatory hiring and transfer policies, were 
entitled, if qualified, to receive Long-line jobs with full 
carryover seniority for all purposes including job bidding 
and, especially, protection from lay-off. Other courts have 
consistently recognized that blacks who have suffered pre­
vious discrimination should not be forced to commit “se­
niority suicide” by forfeiting important seniority rights 
which they would have accumulated absent discrimination. 
See, e.g., Hairston  v. M cLean Trucking Co., [10 EDP 
1110,353] 520 F.2d 226, 11 F E P  Cases 91 (4th Cir. 1975); 
Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., supra; Rodrigues v. East 
Texas Motor Freight, supra.

24. In the summer of 1973, the collective bargaining 
agreements in effect at the time of the filing of the Com­
plaint in this action (the Complaint was filed January 5, 
1973) expired and new collective bargaining agreements 
were negotiated. Under the Road contract and the City 
Cartage contract effective from 1973 to 1976, employees 
working under one contract may, during any established 
time period every year, sign a posting for jobs within 
the other contracts and move from the Road contract to 
the City Cartage contract or from the City Cartage con­
tract to the Road contract with their full terminal senior­
ity for all purposes when vacancies occur. Under the 
present pertinent collective bargaining agreements there

O pinion o f  D istrict Court-—N ov em ber  18, 1975



38a

still are no provisions for “carryover seniority” out of or 
into the Shop contract.

25. While the 1973 changes in the seniority provisions 
in the Road and the City Cartage contracts have made 
certain relief requested by the plaintiffs unnecessary, the 
Court in determining Title V II liability must review the 
contractual situation as of the time EEOC charges and 
the Complaint in this action were filed. See, e.g., Parham  
v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra at 426; Brown 
v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Company, supra; and 
Cathey v. Johnson  Motor Lines, Inc., supra. The Court 
concludes that, under the facts of this case, the pertinent 
collective bargaining agreements as they existed when 
this aciton commenced constituted a violation of the appli­
cable statutes.

E. Participation o f the International and Discrimina­
tion by the Union Defendants. 26. The International has 
contended throughout these proceedings that it has not 
been involved in any of the discriminatory hiring and 
promotion demonstrated herein and that it is not a party 
to any of the pertinent collective bargaining agreements. 
While the International is not a signatory party to any 
of the pertinent collective bargaining agreements, Inter­
national officials play an integral and important role in 
the negotiation of the National Master Freight Agree­
ments including the seniority provisions at issue here. 
W. C. Barbee, President of Local 71, testified in his depo­
sition which was admitted into evidence as to the Inter­
national’s role in collective bargaining (p. 8 ):

“ [With respect to negotiations of the National Mas­
ter Freight Agreements] it is coordinated and we are

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39a

assisted in negotiations by representatives of the In­
ternational . . . . ”

Local 71 receives monthly dues from its members and 
pays to the International a per capita assessment of $2.15 
per month for each Member.

27. Moreover, the Constitution of the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and 
Helpers of America (adopted July, 1971) demonstrates 
that the International has significant control over the daily 
business of its local unions, including Local 71. Specifi­
cally, the Constitution establishes Joint Councils of local 
unions (Local 71 is in a Joint Council with five other 
Locals) and four Area Conferences of local unions. All 
collective bargaining agreements must eventually be sub­
mitted to the International for review of the “working 
conditions or earnings” contained in said agreements. 
The General Executive Board of the International, if it 
deems it necessary, can direct local unions to refrain from 
executing such an agreement. In addition, the General 
Executive Board maintains the power to remove local 
union officers for cause.

28. Thus, the International is deeply involved in the 
negotiation and approval of collective bargaining agree­
ments and maintains considerable control over local unions. 
While local unions apparently retain some autonomy, the 
International maintains a broad widely-defined supervis­
ory and veto power. I f  the International had insisted, as 
it had authority to do pursuant to its Constitution, the 
collective bargaining agreements involved in the case which 
did not allowT carryover seniority from City Cartage to 
Road and which, under the facts of this case, were in vio­

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40a

lation of Title V II and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 would not have 
become effective. The International’s failure (as well as 
that of Local 71) to take steps to assist its black mem­
bers who had been the victims of racial discrimination 
makes the International, at least with respect to its rati­
fication of past collective bargaining agreements, a party 
to the violation of the applicable statute. Cathey v. John ­
son Motor Lines, Inc., supra.

29. Indeed, while neither the International nor Local 71 
is engaged in hiring or selection of supervisory personnel, 
the results of the Company’s hiring practices are so blatant 
that the unions, especially by allowing perpetuation of 
discrimination in the applicable collective bargaining- 
agreements, have become participants in the Company’s 
discriminatory conduct by means of their “passivity at 
the negotiating table.” Hairston  v. M cLean Trucking Co., 
[6 EDP 8841 and 7 EDP If 9144] 62 F.E.D. 642 (M.D. 
N.C. 1974) (fn. 10); Cathey v. Johnson  Motor Lines, Inc., 
supra.

30. The union defendants have simply failed to carry 
out their responsibility to represent their black members 
by combating the Company’s discriminatory hiring, trans­
fer, and promotion practices. In this regard, as well as 
with respect to maintenance of the restrictive seniority 
provisions in the collective bargaining agreements, the 
union defendants have violated Title V II and Section 1981.

F. Affirmative Action Taken by the Unions. 31. While 
the union defendants have violated the applicable stat­
utes, they, in contrast to the actions of Ryder, did take 
serious steps to attempt to alter the discriminatory col­
lective bargaining agreements. The evidence with respect

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41a

to efforts made by the anions to amend the pertinent con­
tracts is helpfal in deciding the proper allocation of mone­
tary relief and costs in this action.

32. Local 71 is represented during collective bargaining 
negotiations by the Carolina Freight Council (the “Coun­
cil”). The Council bargains with the Carolina Motor Car­
riers Labor Negotiating Committee (the “Committee”) 
which represents, among others, the Carolina Transporta­
tion Association, Inc., of which defendant Ryder is a 
member.

Beginning in 1967, Local 71, through the Council, began 
to attempt to liberalize the seniority transfer provisions 
of the various collective bargaining agreements pertinent 
to this action. In that year, the Council proposed to the 
Committee, but did not obtain, a provision to allow garage- 
men to fill mechanic helper positions in preference to new 
hires. During the next negotiations in 1970, the Council 
proposed and obtained a contract provision allowing 
garagemen to bid on mechanic helper vacancies. On Feb­
ruary 8, 1972, the unions proposed seniority provisions 
that would permit employees to transfer across depart­
mental lines within the Shop contract and carry their 
seniority with them. They also proposed that maintenance 
employees be permitted to transfer to jobs within the 
bargaining unit covered by the City Cartage and Road 
contracts.

33. On September 21, 1972, after being informed that 
the employers’ signatory to the Shop contract was not 
interested in bargaining on the seniority issues, the unions 
filed charges against the employers with the National 
Labor Relations Board. These charges were subsequently 
dismissed by the NLRB’s Regional Director, and the dis­

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42a

missal was upheld on appeal by the NLRB’s General Coun­
sel. During 1973 negotiations, the unions proposed and 
were successful in obtaining contract provisions enabling 
maintenance employees to transfer across departmental 
lines and carry with them their full garage seniority. The 
issue of tranfer between the Shop and Road and City 
Cartage Contracts was not pressed during the 1973 nego­
tiations because the Unions were advised by counsel that 
under the National Labor Relations Act they could not 
compel the employers to negotiate across bargaining unit 
lines.

34. Beginning in 1969, the unions also began efforts to 
liberalize the seniority provisions of the City Cartage and 
Road contracts.

In 1970 the Council proposed and obtained provisions 
allowing City Cartage employees to move between classi­
fications covered by the City Cartage contract and retain 
their full terminal seniority. During the 1970 negotiations, 
the unions attempted unsuccessfully to obtain cross-over 
bidding between Road and City Cartage jobs. Under the 
unions proposal, City Cartage employees would have been 
entitled to transfer to the bottom of the Road board and 
retain the seniority they had accrued in their City jobs. 
While the transferees under the 1970 proposal would not 
have been entitled to use their seniority accrued under 
the Road contract, transferring employees could have 
used such seniority to return to City Cartage positions 
in the event of layoff from Road jobs.

35. In February, 1972, the unions abandoned this bump- 
back seniority position, proposing instead that employees 
be permitted to transfer between City Cartage and Road 
jobs with full terminal seniority for all purposes. This

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43a

proposal was not accepted by the employers in 1972 and 
became part of the anions’ negotiating package daring the 
1973 contract, negotiations. The seniority issae was the 
last to be resolved daring sach negotiations, and, as dis- 
cassed above, the 1973-76 City Cartage and Road contracts 
provide for annaal bidding with fall seniority carry-over 
between City Cartage and Road jobs.

36. Thas, the evidence indicates that the anion defen­
dants periodically made serioas efforts to alter the restric­
tive seniority provisions of the pertinent collective bar­
gaining agreements. There is no evidence that Ryder, 
either acting alone or throagh the Committee, made any 
similar efforts.

G. Discrimination in the Jo b  o f Mechanic. 37. The evi­
dence with respect to the job of mechnic at Ryder demon­
strates an anrebatted prim a facie  case that the Company 
has refased to hire or promote blacks to mechanic jobs be- 
caase of their race. See, Brown  v. Gaston County Dyeing 
Machine Co., supra; Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., supra. 
This evidence with respect to hiring is compoanded by the 
restrictive seniority provisions of the Shop contract which, 
nntil 1973, did not allow intradepartmental transfer with- 
oat loss of seniority and which, to this date, does not allow 
for seniority transfer to City Cartage or Road jobs.

H. Discrimination in the Selection o f Supervisors. 38. 
The statistical data also is persuasive with respect to the 
hiring and promotion of supervisory personnel. Barnett v. 
W. T. Grant Co., supra. While Ryder did offer three blacks 
supervisory jobs between 1965 and 1975, those job offers 
were made in the racially discriminatory atmostphere 
created by the Company’s biased policies. Moreover, Ryder

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44a

maintains no objective criteria for the selection of super­
visory personnel. Supervisory vacancies are not posted. 
Given the evidence in this case, the failure of the Company 
to utilize objective criteria in the selection of supervisors 
constitutes a violation of Title V II. Rowe v. General 
Motors Corp., [4 EPD H 7689] 457 F . 2d 348 (5th Cir. 
1972); Russell v. American Tobacco Co., [5 EPD ^ 8447] 
374 F. Supp, 286 (M.D.N.C. 1973) modified, [10 EPD
[[ 10,412] -—— F .2 d ------ (4th Cir. 1975) (issues discussed
are not here pertinent).

I. Additional Discriminatory Practices. 39. In addition 
to the racially discriminatory hiring, promotion, and trans­
fer policies maintained by the Company, racial discrimi­
nation with respect to other terms and conditions of em­
ployment of blacks was demonstrated by the evidence. In 
1966 Ryder, as is customary in the Charlotte area, planned 
Christmas festivities for its emloyees. The Company, how­
ever, decided to have two Christmas parties, one for its 
white employees and one for its black workers. When the 
black employees at Ryder learned that the Company was 
going to alocate more money for the party for the whites 
they objected to that scheme and suggested that one party 
for all employees be held. The Christmas parties were 
eventually cancelled.

40. As a result both of the Company’s refusal to hire 
blacks for certain jobs and of the Company’s other dis- 
erimiatory conduct, Ryder developed a reputation in the 
Charlotte black community of discriminating against blacks 
in employment opportunities.

J .  Criteria and Policies fo r  Hiring Road Drivers. 41. 
Much of the evidence at trial consisted of attempts by the

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45a

defendant Company to establish its hiring standards for 
the position of longline drivers and to demonstrate that 
the plaintiffs and class members did not meet the Com­
pany’s alleged neutral non-discriminatory requirements. In 
this regard, Ryder maintained during the trial that it hired 
road drivers based on a careful review of each applicant’s 
driving record, accident record, experience, training and 
professional background. The evidence, however, indi­
cates that the asserted criteria were exercised subjectively, 
arbitrarily and discriminatorily and that whites have been 
hired as longline drivers since 1966 with driving and acci­
dent records, training, experience and background that 
were no better than (and in many cases considerably in­
ferior to) the comparable records of black applicants for 
longline and driving jobs.

42. Contrary to the Company’s contention that certain 
criteria were consistently and even-handedly used, Ryder 
hired during the period 1966 to 1973 white drivers whose 
records indicated serious deficiencies with respect to the 
standards allegedly established by the Company to select 
drivers. For example:

(a) White drivers were hired who had numerous traffic 
convictions prior to their date of hire, (e.g., W. S. K id d -  
13 convictions; Don Jenkins—14 violations including at 
least eight speeding tickets while driving a truck; and R. E. 
Hendrickson—6 convictions in less than three years).

(b) White drivers were hired who had records of mul­
tiple accidents prior to their date of hire, (e.g., B. F. 
Clontz—at least four accidents while driving a truck; Don 
Jenkins—four accidents; C. L. Melton—four accidents).

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46a

(c) White drivers were hired even though there were 
substantial variations in the number of convictions and/or 
accidents listed on their applications for employment and 
the accidents and convictions they actually had received 
as indicated on driving record checks obtained from the 
pertinent state department of motor vericles. (e.g., W. S. 
Kidd, C. L. Melton, Don Jenkins, H. L. Overcash, D. A. 
Wiseman).

(d) White drivers were hired for permanent road jobs 
without the Company obtaining copies of their driving 
records from the pertinent state department of motor ve­
hicles. (e.g., J .  A. Merritt, W. D. Bynum, J .  H. Green, 
W. C. Andrews, W. D. Harris, B. F. Clontz, W. C. Helms, 
J .  L. Shannon, C. J .  Wise).

(e) White drivers who had driving licenses and a pre­
vious history of driving in states other than North Caro­
lina were hired by the Company as road drivers even though 
copies of their out-of-state driving records were never 
obtained, (e.g., B. F . Clontz, R. E. Crosby, J .  E. Danner, 
J .  H. Green, C. 0 . Ingle).

(f) White applicants for road driving jobs who had a 
history of previous medical disorders were allowed to take 
the physical examination required by the Department of 
Transportation and administered by Ryder’s company doc­
tor and, if they passed that physical, were put to work. 
At least one similarly situated black was treated differently 
to his detriment. [Compare, e.g., the applications showing 
the medical histories of whites C. E. Wimberly (high blood 
pressure corrected by medication) and R. J .  Gwaltney (two 
hernias corrected by surgery) with that of black James 
Cowen (a back injury from which he had “completely re­
covered”)].

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47a

(g) At least one white driver was allowed to “force on” 
the permanent longline seniority roster by staying on the 
job as a road driver for over 30 days (Don Jenkins) while 
blacks, allegedly hired only on a casual basis, were not 
allowed to get on the board as permanent drivers (Leroy 
Sloan and Sammie Simms). See Sabala  v. W estern Gil­
lette, Inc., [10 EPD H 10,360] 516 F. 2d 1251, 1258-59 (5th 
Cir. 1975).

(h) The Company hired a number of whites as road 
drivers who had little or no over-the-road driving ex­
perience (e.g., James Tucker, Frank Walters, Gary Beaver, 
Rufus Freeman, J .  W. Hyde, L. K. Swanger, L. K. Sham- 
burg, R. E. Crosby). These drivers apparently preformed 
as well as other drivers hired who had greater experience.

43. The Company’s chief witness, D. T. Bradfield, who 
was responsible for hiring over-the-road drivers for Ryder 
in Charlotte from about 1967 to the fall of 1974, admitted 
that a number of the plaintiffs and class members had 
talked to him at numerous times about becoming road 
drivers. A number of these black applicants (e.g., Robert 
Johnson, Wiliam Coffey, Clyde Long, Wilie Jackson) testi­
fied that they had filed written application for longline 
jobs. The fact that the Company was unable to produce 
their applications at trial is explained by the facts that 
Ryder simply did not consider blacks for Road jobs and 
that until about 1972 or 1973, Ryder’s policy was to destroy 
most applications for employment after retaining them 
for about one year.

44. Ryder hired one black road driver in 1971, and 
hired others in late 1972 and 1973. This change in policy 
occurred only after a number of EEOC charges had been 
filed against the Company alleging racial discrimination

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48a

and after the filing of this lawsuit. This Court is required 
to give careful scrutiny to policy changes made in the face 
of impending and pending litigation. See e.g., Parham  v. 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra.

K. Summary o f Discriminatory Practices. 45. Thus, the 
evidence with respect to Ryder indicates a systematic and 
pervasive policy of racial discrimination. The Company 
maintained a practice of refusing to hire blacks as long- 
line drivers, mechanics and supervisors. Moreover, Ryder 
perpetuated into the present the effects of past discrimina­
tion by maintaining an unjustifiable no-transfer policy and 
by refusing to alter collective bargaining agreements which 
contained seniority provisions consistently condemned in 
similar Title Y II  litigation. Despite the obvious futility 
faced by a black man attemptng to get a white job, certain 
of the plaintiffs and class members made overt attempts to 
better themselves. Their applications and inquiries were 
met by obstinate refusals, retaliation and discouragement 
as well as by settled transfer and seniority policies which 
made attempts by the black employees and applicants to 
better their lot both futile and perilous.

L. Evidence o f Discrimination with Respect to Indivi­
duals. While the Court finds that defendants have engaged 
in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination, the ques­
tion with respect to whether or not specific individuals have 
suffered from the racially discriminatory policies and the 
proper remedies, if any, depends on the specific facts re­
lating to each individual case.1

1 Questions of discrimination against specific individuals and 
the appropriate relief often depend on resolving issues of credi­
bility. In  deciding the individual cases herein the Court relies on 
all the background evidence presented at trial as well as the credi­
bility of individual witnesses, including their demeanor, and the 
records and documents contained in the record of this case.

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49a

In this light, the Court, finds, with respect to the indivi­
duals who claimed they were injured by the defendants’ 
racial discrimination and who testified at trial as follows:

46. R o bert  L. J o h n so n , J r . Plaintiff Johnson was orig­
inally hired by Harris on September 20, 1952, as a steve­
dore under the City Cartage contract. Johnson became an 
employee of Ryder with the Harris-Ryder merger.

In 1969, Johnson filed a written application to become a 
road driver with Ryder and turned it in to a Company 
longline dispatcher by the name of Whitlow. He later 
talked to D. T. Bradfield, the Ryder employee in charge 
of hiring road drivers at the time, who told him that it 
was against Ryder policy to transfer employees from the 
dock to the road and that Johnson would have to forfeit 
all of his seniority even if he was allowed to transfer. 
Johnson had been encouraged to file an application for road 
driver in 1969 by George Moore, a federal government 
official.

Johnson had not applied for a Road job in 1966, 1967 
or 1968 because he knew that all of Ryder’s road drivers 
were white, that it would be futile to make such an ap­
plication, and that Ryder was then running many double 
teams (i.e., runs requiring two drivers) which would re­
quire the hiring of two blacks to drive together.

In 1971, Johnson, like all other Ryder employees in 
Charlotte, was given an opportunity for the first time to 
transfer from his City Cartage job to a Road job if he 
was willing to forfeit all of his accrued seniority (with 
the exception of vacation and other fringe benefits). John­
son originally signed a document indicating his desire to 
make that transfer but decided against transferring on the 
advice of his attorney because he would have been forced 
to lose all of his accrued seniority. Since he had signed

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50a

up for the 1971 transfer, Johnson was required to sign a 
letter dated November 5, 1971, stating that he refused to 
transfer because of his “lack of experience” in order to 
obtain his old job under the City Cartage contract. The 
Court finds as a fact that Johnson did not dictate the No­
vember 5, 1971, letter that he signed and that he did not 
lack driving experience in 1971.

In 1973, after the pertinent collective bargaining agree­
ments were amended to allow carryover seniority, John­
son transferred to a road driving job, took two trips to 
Hagerstown, Maryland, and then decided that he would 
return to his job under the City Cartage contract. John­
son decided to reject the Road job opportunity in 1973 
because he had gotten older and because he had assumed 
increased responsibilities with his church in Charlotte 
which required him to be in town.

Johnson’s truck driving experience consisted of signifi­
cant driving experience for Harris and Ryder as a local 
driver during the twenty or more years he has worked in 
the trucking industry. He also took a trip to Ohio over 
the road in 1971 for the American Cyanamid Company. 
Moreover, Johnson passed the road test and drove for 
Ryder in 1973 without accident.

Johnson filed his first charge of discrimination with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) 
on August 18, 1969. This charge was investigated and, to­
gether with additional EEOC charges filed by Johnson and 
other plaintiffs, formed the basis for satisfying the pro­
cedural requirements of Title V II. All such requirements 
of this type have been met.

The Court finds as a fact that Johnson was fully qual­
ified to be a road driver for Ryder in 1966 and thereafter 
and that he was denied a job as an over-the-road driver

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51a

with the Company from 1966 to 1973 when he first re­
ceived an opportunity to take a road job with Ryder with 
full carryover seniority. Since Johnson received an oppor­
tunity to transfer to the road in September 1973, he should 
be awarded equitable back pay from August 18, 1967, until 
September 6, 1973. No adjustment in his seniority date 
is required on this record.

47. E r n e s t  M cM a n u s . Plaintiff McManus was first em­
ployed by Ryder in 1951 in the City Cartage department. 
Soon thereafter he went into military service and was re­
employed by the Company in 1953 upon his discharge. 
In 1953 McManus asked Jack Sperling, Ryder warehouse 
superintendent, for a road driving job. At that time, of 
course, Ryder had no black drivers. About two or three 
weeks later Sperling told McManus that it “wouldn’t work.”

In 1966 when McManus’ wife contracted cancer, Mc­
Manus approached Floyd Crozier, explained the situa­
tion involving his wife’s illness and his need for more 
money, and asked for a Road job. Crozier refused to give 
him a longline driving job and accused McManus of try­
ing to “start something.” McManus testified and the Court 
finds as a fact that, he would have taken a longline driving 
job with Ryder in 1966 if it had been offered to him.

In 1970 McManus orally requested from D. T. Bradfield 
a road driving job. Bradfield, at that time, refused to 
offer McManus an over-the-road job and replied that Ry­
der had “no facilities” for blacks. McManus did not apply 
for a Road job between 1966 and 1970 because he knew 
that all of the road drivers at Ryder were white and that 
blacks would be unable to get a longline driving job.

In 1971 McManus, like other Ryder employees in Char­
lotte, was given an opportunity to transfer to an over-

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52a

the-road job but did not do so because be would have had 
to forfeit his seniority. When he asked Bradfield in 1972 
for a Road job Bradfield replied that McManus had for­
feited his opportunity to transfer to a road job when he 
refused to do so in 1971. In 1973 when McManus was 
finally given an opportunity to transfer to an over-the- 
road job and carry with him his full seniority he did so 
and is presently a longline driver in good standing with 
the Company.

McManus gained significant experience driving trucks 
while working for Ryder and driving locally and in the 
yard. After 1966 when McManus approached Floyd Cro- 
zier and asked about a road driving job McManus was 
no longer allowed to drive locally for the Company. Mc­
Manus passed the Department of Transportation road 
test in 1973 and has been driving with the Company since 
that time.

The Court finds as a fact that McManus was qualified 
to drive over-the-road for Ryder in 1966 and at all times 
thereafter, and that he was denied a Road job in 1966 
and thereafter because of his race. He is entitled to equi­
table back pay from August 18, 1967 to September 6, 1973, 
the date he obtained the status of road driver with the 
Company with his full seniority for all purposes.

48 . W il l ia m  C o f f e y , J r . Intervenor Coffey was first 
employed by Ryder on September 4, 1956 as a checker. 
Because of his seniority standing with the Company, 
Coffey was often laid off from his City Cartage jobs. 
Coffey asked for a road driving job with the Company 
on several occasions when he was on layoff; however, all 
such requests were refused.

Sometime about 1966 or 1967 Coffey was given a road 
test by Tim Timmons, a safety supervisor for Ryder.

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53a

Coffey was informed that he had passed the road test 
but was never offered a longiine job. Coffey did not make 
a formal written application for a road driving job from 
1966 to 1969 because he knew that all of the road drivers 
employed by Ryder were white and that it would be futile 
for him to attempt to get such a job.

About April, 1969, shortly after he was again laid off 
from his City Cartage job, Coffey filed a written applica­
tion for a Road job with Ryder. When the Company would 
not offer him a job as a road driver, Coffey, who was then 
on layoff and who needed a job to take care of his family 
and other obligations, resigned his employment from Ry­
der and took a job with Hennis Freight Lines (“Hennis”). 
Coffey was required by Hennis to resign at Ryder before 
Hennis would hire him. The Court finds as a fact that 
Coffey wag denied a Road job with Ryder in 1966 or 1967 
and in 1969 because of his race and that he would have 
accepted a longiine driving job with the Company at those 
times. Coffey’s resignation in 1969 was, in effect, com­
pelled by the continuing discriminatory policies of Ryder, 
and the Court finds Coffey would not have resigned if he 
had been given a road driving job.

In 1972 D. T. Bradfield began attempts to hire Coffey 
as a road driver and Coffey finally came to work for the 
Company on May 11, 1973 as a road driver. At the time 
of the trial he was laid off from his road driving position 
with the Company but would not have been on layoff if 
he had maintained his initial hire date with the Company 
in 1956 as his road seniority date.

Coffey obtained driving experience while he served in 
the United States Army from 1946 to 1949 and while work­
ing for Ryder and Harris driving locally. He successfully 
passed the road test for Ryder in 1966 or 1967 and was

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54a

qualified to drive for Ryder at least since that time. Since 
he was qualified for hut was denied a Road job because 
of his race Coffey is entitled to he offered a longline job 
with Ryder with a seniority date of September 4, 1956. This 
is the seniority date Coffey would now have if he had been 
given a Road job in 1966 or 1969 since the 1973 collective 
bargaining agreements would have allowed him to recoup 
his hire date seniority. Coffey is also entitled to equitable 
hack pay from August 18, 1967, to the present including 
all times he has been on layoff from Ryder since returning 
as a road driver in 1973.

49. W il l ie  J a c k so x . Plaintiff Jackson began working 
at Harris as a stevedore in 1957. He became an employee 
of Ryder when Harris and Ryder merged. In 1969 Jack- 
son filed a written application for an over-the-road job with 
Ryder, at the same time that plaintiff Robert Johnson and 
class member Clyde Long applied for Road jobs. Jackson 
had not applied for a Road job prior to 1969 because he 
knew that the Company employed only white road drivers, 
because he knew that it would be futile for him to attempt 
to get a Road job, and because he knew he would have to 
forfeit his accrued seniority if he did get a Road job.

At approximately the same time that Jackson applied 
for a Road job with Ryder in 1969 he was laid off from 
his City Cartage job. After several years of being laid 
off and re-called on several occasions by Ryder, Jackson 
left his dock job with the Company and took an over-the- 
road driving job with the Dixie Trucking Company 
(“Dixie”) where he is still employed.

Jackson gained significant experience driving for Ryder 
and Harris locally and also driving for Dixie. While Jack- 
son had some accidents while working in the yard for

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55a

Ryder, these accidents were of the “fender-bender” variety. 
White drivers have been hired by Ryder with more serious 
accident records.

The Court finds as a fact that Jackson was denied a 
job with Ryder as an over-the-road driver from 1966 to 
1969 and that he was fully qualified to drive at all times 
pertinent to this case. Jackson is entitled to equitable back 
pay from August 18, 1967 until the present. He is also 
entitled to be offered a Road job with Ryder with a se­
niority date of September 15, 1957.

50. C ly d e  L ong. Class member Long applied for an 
over-the-road job with Ryder in 1969. He filled out an ap­
plication when he went to the Company’s offices with plain­
tiff Jackson. Long took the pertinent road test but was 
never told by the Company whether he had passed it, and 
was never called by the Company nor offered an oppor­
tunity to drive for Ryder. Long went back to Ryder sev­
eral times to check on his application but never received 
a job offer from the Company. On one occasion he was told 
by Donald Bradfield that he did not have enough ex­
perience to drive for Ryder.

Prior to 1969 Long had at least twenty years over-the- 
road driving experience. As of July, 1969, he had received 
no driving convictions and had had no accidents.

The Court finds as a fact that Long was qualified to 
be an over-the-road driver in 1969 and was denied a Road 
job at that time because of his race. Long is entitled to 
equitable back pay from November 1, 1971 (the first date 
road drivers were hired after September 1969) to the pres­
ent and to be hired as a road driver with a longline se­
niority date of September 13, 1969 (the day after the last 
road driver was hired in 1969).

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56a

51. J o h n n y  A lex a n d er . Class member Alexander testi­
fied that he applied at Ryder in May or Jnne, 1971 , and 
never heard anything from the Company pursuant to his 
application. He also testified that he attended the Griffin 
Truck Driving School in Hickory, North Carolina and 
graduated from that school.

Ryder was unable to find a written application filed by 
Alexander in 1971; however, an application for a driving 
job filed October 4, 1973, was uncovered. Since the evi­
dence indicates that Alexander lacked truck driving ex­
perience in 1971 and that the Company has hired only six 
drivers since October 4, 1973, the Court concludes that 
Alexander was denied a Road job for reasons other than 
his race. All his claims for relief are denied.

52. V in c e n t  J o sep h  G ra y . Class member Gray applied 
for a Road job with Ryder in 1973. At that time, Gray 
was living in Englewood, New Jersey, but was prepared 
to come to Charlotte and did move to Charlotte shortly 
after he applied with the Company. Despite the facts that 
Gray had at least three years of driving experience in New 
Jersey and had passed a course with Ryder Truck Driving 
School (a school which is not affiliated with the defendant 
Company), Gray was never contacted by Ryder. When he 
came to Charlotte in 1973, Gray, who had had significant 
previous driving experience, passed the road test for John­
son Motor Lines, Inc., a large, long-distance trucking com­
pany, and worked for that firm until he was laid off. White 
applicants with less experience then Gray (e.g., J .  K. Lee, 
T. A. Meggs, T. C. Mullis, B. S. High, G. A. Beaver, R. E. 
Crosby) and who had a history of driving in states other 
than North Carolina (e.g., J .  E. Danner, R. E. Crosby, 
B. F. Clontz, J .  H. Green) were hired by the Company be­
tween 1966 and 1973.

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57a

The Court finds as a fact that Gray was qualified to be 
a road driver in 1973 and was denied a job in 1973 because 
of his race. He is entitled to equitable back pay from 
September 13, 1973 to the present and to be hired as an 
over-the-road driver with Ryder with a longline seniority 
date of September 13, 1973.2

53. S a m m ie  S im m s . Class member Simms applied with 
Ryder for an over-the-road driving job in 1971. He took 
and passed the road test administered to applicants for 
longline driving jobs. At that time, Simms had experience 
which included driving for two years in the United States 
Army, driving for Wilson Transfer, for whom he drove 
as far as Georgia and Mississippi, and driving for Nolan 
Concrete Company.

Simms was placed on the Board as a casual road driver 
for Ryder but was never called to drive for the Company 
and never drove for the Company. On August 16, 1971, 
he received a letter from the Company telling him that 
his employment had been terminated but that he would be 
offered a job again when the Company began hiring road 
drivers. Immediately prior to Simms’ termination, the 
Company had received “static” from certain white road 
drivers because Simms, Leroy Sloan (a black) and a man 
named Street (a white) had been hired as casual road 
drivers.

Simms has never been recalled by the Company or of­
fered an over-the-road job since 1971 and has never 
driven one run for the Company. Ryder offered no ex­
planation at trial as to why Simms, an admittedly qualified 
driver, was never given a driving opportunity after Au­

2 The date September 9, 1973, is chosen for Gray’s seniority date 
and as the date from which back pay is measured because all 
drivers hired by Ryder after September 13, 1973 applied after 
May, 1973.

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58a

gust, 1971. While Simms would have preferred taking a 
permanent road driving job with Ryder in August , 1971, 
he was willing to drive on a part-time basis. Indeed, he 
went by the Company’s terminal on several occasions in 
August, 1971 seeking work but was never given any. A 
number of white drivers were hired in 1971.

The Court finds as a fact that Simms was qualified to be 
an over-the-road driver in 1971 and was not hired by the 
Company because of his race. He is entitled to equitable 
back pay from November 2, 1971 (the date the first perma­
nent road driver was hired by Ryder after August, 1971) 
to the present and to be hired as a longline driver with a 
road seniority date of August 4, 1971 (his original date of 
hire with the Company).

54. J a m es S m it h , J r . Class member Smith applied for 
an over-the-road job with Ryder in July, 1972. He was 
never contacted by the Company and never went back to 
the terminal to check on the status of his application.

Although the Court retains some question as to the rea­
son why Ryder did not follow up on Smith’s application 
(his driving record was not checked until 1974), the Court 
concludes, in view of Smith’s driving record which shows 
numerous convictions and license suspensions, that Smith’s 
record would have prevented him from getting a Road job 
in 1972. All of Smith’s claims for relief are denied.

55. T o m m ie  F r e e m a n . Class member Freeman began 
working for Harris in 1957  in a job under the City Cartage 
contract. He became a Ryder employee when Ryder and 
Harris merged.

In 1967 Freeman asked Ryder official Earl Hunsinger 
about a job driving over-the-road for Ryder. Hunsinger

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59a

informed Mm that it was against Company policy to trans­
fer from a City Cartage job to a Road job. In 1969 Free­
man again sought an over-the-road job and talked to Don 
Bradfield about driving but was not offered a job. He 
talked to Bradfield again in 1970 and received a similar 
response.

In 1971, Freeman did not avail himself of the opportu­
nity to transfer and become an over-the-road driver be­
cause it meant losing his Company seniority. In 1973 
Freeman was offered a Road job with full seniority pur­
suant to the 1973 contracts, but did not transfer because 
his wife became sick during the week when transfers were 
taking place. He signed a slip (dated September 7, 1973) 
stating that he desired to be given his City Cartage job 
hack and that he did not desire to transfer to the road 
“for the time being.”

Freeman had significant driving experience since 1957 
driving for Harris and Ryder in Charlotte and in local 
runs out of Charlotte.

The Court finds as a fact that Freeman was qualified to 
be a road driver with Ryder in 1967 and in 1969 and that 
he was denied a job at those times because of his race. 
Freeman is entitled to equitable back pay from August 18, 
1967, until September 6, 1973, when he turned down an 
opportunity to move to a road driving job with his full 
seniority. No adjustment in his seniority date is required 
on this record.

56. I sa ia h  M a sse y . Class member Massey applied for a 
Road job with Ryder in 1972. He was employed by the 
Company as a longline driver in April 1973. Prior to the 
date he was employed, he passed the Department of 
Transportation test and all other tests required by the 
Company.

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60a

After becoming a road driver with Ryder, Massey made 
several trips to the Company. His performance on those 
trips was satisfactory.

While Massey was on one trip for the Company, D. T. 
Bradfield, the Ryder employee in charge of hiring road 
drivers, received a copy of Massey’s driving record from 
the North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles. The 
driving check indicated that Massey’s driving license had 
previously been suspended. When Massey returned from 
his road trip, he was terminated by the Company even 
though he stated to Bradfield that the suspension as listed 
on the Department of Motor Vehicles check was erroneous.

Prior to being suspended by the Company, Massey had 
a conversation with Lonnie Elder, a black switcher for 
the Company, wherein Massey complained that black driv­
ers were given the older trucks to drive while white 
drivers were given the newer trucks. The evidence indi­
cates that Elder had frequent conversations with D. T. 
Bradfield concerning Company business.

The treatment accorded Massey is significantly different 
from that given by the Company to Don Jenkins, a white 
driver. Jenkins, by mistake, worked more than thirty days 
days for the Company and was “forced on” the longline 
seniority roster because the Company failed to terminate 
him before his thirty-day probationary period ended. Jen­
kins was allowed to remain as a driver for Ryder despite 
the fact that he had falsified his application and that he 
had received numerous traffic citations. Massey, in contrast, 
was immediately terminated by the Company.

Ryder has provided no satisfactory explanation as to 
why Massey was treated differently by the Company than 
Don Jenkins. The Court concludes that Massey was termi­
nated from his job on account of his race. He is entitled

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61a

to be reinstated with a longline driving seniority date of 
April 15, 1973, and with equitable back pay from May 11, 
1973 (the date Massey was terminated) until the present.

57. W il l ie  T h o m pso n . Class member Thompson testified 
that he went to Eyder in 1968 and asked about a Road job 
but was told that the Company was not hiring any drivers 
at that time. Ryder hired no longline drivers in 1968. 
Thompson never followed up his initial inquiry and never 
filed a written application until 1973.

In 1973 Thompson did file a written application with the 
Company. The Court finds as a fact that Thompson was 
qualified to be a road driver in 1973; however, his applica­
tion was not filed until November 8, 1973. Ryder has hired 
no drivers since November 29, 1973, and has hired no 
drivers who applied as late as November, 1973.

Under all the circumstances of this case the Court con­
cludes that Thompson was not denied a job because of his 
race. All of his claims for relief are denied.

58. S tbouo J o h n so n . Class member Stroud Johnson 
worked for Ryder on a casual basis as a dockworker under 
the City Cartage contract in 1973. He claimed at trial that 
white casual workers with less time than he with the Com­
pany were hired as permanent dockworkers. He has never 
been offered a job as a permanent dockworker. The statis­
tical data in this case does not create an inference that 
Ryder has had a policy of refusing to hire blacks as dock- 
workers. Under all the circumstances of this case, the 
Court concludes that Stroud Johnson was not denied a job 
because of his race. All of Stroud Johnson’s claims for 
relief are denied.

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62a

59. R ichard  W il l ia m s . Class member Williams applied 
for a Road job with Ryder in 1972  and was hired several 
weeks thereafter. From the beginning of his employment 
with Ryder, the Company had difficulty in reaching Wil­
liams when they needed him to come and drive. He was 
suspended or discharged three times by the Company be­
cause of his unavailability for work and because the Com­
pany could not contact him. Each time he was reinstated 
after discussions with Local 71 and with Williams. Finally, 
on May 14, 1973, he was discharged by the Company again 
for his unavailability for work. A white driver was simi­
larly discharged (0. L. Marshall).

Based on all the evidence, the Court concludes that Wil­
liams was not terminated because of his race but was 
terminated because of his failure to follow the rules of 
the Company. All of Williams’ claims for relief are denied.

60. J a m es C o w en . Class member Cowen applied for a 
job with Ryder on July 12, 1972. At that time, he filed a 
written application, but he never heard from, the Company.

D. T. Bradfield testified that C'owen was not offered a 
job because of a previous back injury. Cowen, however, 
stated on his application that he had completely recovered 
from any injury to his back. The evidence indicates that 
at least two white drivers (0. E. Wimberly and R. J .  Gwalt- 
ney) who had previous medical problems were sent to the 
Company doctor for a physical to determine if their prob­
lems still existed at the time of their application with 
Ryder. Cowen was not sent to the doctor despite the fact 
his application clearly indicated he was suffering no dis­
ability.

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63a

As of July, 1972, Cowen had over-the-road driving ex­
perience with G-uignard Freight Lines and with Lloyds 
Motor Express.

The Court concludes that Cowen was qualified to be a 
road driver for Ryder and was denied a job in July, 1972, 
because of his race. He is entitled to be hired by the Com­
pany with a longline seniority date of November 1, 1972, 
and with equitable back pay from November 1, 1972, until 
the present.3

61. L eeoy  S lo a x . Plaintiff Sloan applied for a Road job 
with Ryder in July 1971. He was hired several days later 
as a casual road driver and allowed to make several trips 
for the Company. On August 16, 1971, he was terminated 
by the Company.

Subsequently, the Company learned that Sloan had falsi­
fied his application. In the pertinent portion of the appli­
cation form he had stated that he had never had any 
accidents or driving tickets. A check of his motor vericle 
record indicated that Sloan had had numerous traffic tickets 
and had had his license suspended on several occasions.

Sloan was never re-called by the Company as a road 
driver; however, he did begin working for Ryder in 1972 
as a garageman under the Shop contract. While working 
in the Shop, Sloan and other black garagemen were given 
the dirtier, more difficult jobs to do by the maintenance 
supervisory personnel, while white garagemen, including 
Ray Connors, were often given less demanding tasks. Sloan 
suffered from this discriminatory assignment of work.

3 The date November 1, 1972, is chosen for Cowen’s seniority 
date and date for back pay purposes as a representative date by 
which time his application could have been checked by Ryder thus 
making him eligible for employment. Ryder did hire several 
drivers in November, 1972.

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64a

Nonetheless Sloan is not entitled to any individual relief 
because the Court concludes that his driving record was 
such that the Company legitimately refused to rehire him 
in 1971 and that, therefore, he was not denied a road driv­
ing job because of his race. All of Sloan’s claims for in­
dividual relief are denied.

62. B o o ker  T. A lex a n d er  and J .  P. Ca m p b e l l . Plaintiff 
Alexander and class member Campbell are currently 
garagemen in Ryder’s Shop. Their testimony concerned 
racial discrimination within the Shop and is not directly 
related to the testimony of other plaintiffs and class mem­
bers regarding discrimination in over-the-road driving jobs.

Campbell and Alexander demonstrated that around 1967 
or 1968 the Company unilaterally changed the job duties 
of mechanics (who were all and still are all white) to allow 
them to grease tractor trailers and change the oil in tractor 
trailers. These tasks had normally and consistently been 
performed by garagemen, and the job descriptions con­
tained in the pertinent collective bargaining agreement in­
dicates that garagemen have been designated to do those 
duties.

In addition, Campbell and Alexander, like plaintiff Sloan, 
showed that through discriminatory assignment of work 
in the Shop black garagemen were consistently required 
to clean the grease pit and do other dirty jobs while white 
garagemen were given easier tasks.

Because of the restrictive seniority provisions of the 
Shop contract in effect prior to 1973, neither Alexander 
nor Campbell were allowed to move from a garageman’s 
job to a mechanic helper’s job or other Shop job without 
forfeiting their accrued seniority. Alexander testified that 
he was discouraged from becoming a trailer mechanic be­

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65a

cause of the requirement that he forfeit all his seniority 
if he moved from a garageman job to a trailer mechanic 
job. Campbell was told that if he attempted to become a 
mechanic helper and did not qualify for the position he 
would be terminated with the Company.

The testimony of Campbell and Alexander as well as 
that of a white employee by the name of Frank Ellis 
demonstrated that racial discrimination was practiced by 
Ryder’s supervisory personnel in the Shop, especially by 
Robert Attaway. Attaway assigned work in the Shop on 
a racially discriminatory basis and regularly had white 
favorites. In addition, Attaway, on at least one occasion, 
used the word “nigger” in a conversation with Ellis.

Actions in the Shop seemed to favor white mechanics 
over the garagemen. For example, on one occasion the 
doors of the Shop leading to the garagemen’s work area 
broke down and were not repaired while doors leading to 
the mechanics’ work area were repaired.

The Court concludes that neither Campbell or Alexander 
is entitled to monetary relief or to changes in their seni­
ority ; however, their claims of racial discrimination within 
the Shop are supported by the evidence and require ap­
propriate injunctive relief.

63. R u e b e n  W in sl o w . Class member Winslow first ap­
plied at Ryder in September 1969. He was told by someone 
who identified himself as Ryder Terminal Manager that his 
application would be put on file. In 1971, Winslow filed a 
second application and spoke to D. T. Bradfield. Again in 
1973, Winslow filed an application with Ryder. Despite his 
attempts to obtain a job and the fact that Ryder was 
periodically hiring drivers, Winslow never heard from the 
Company.

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66a

As of 1969, Winslow had driving experience with Check­
erboard Feed and other employers; he was qualified to 
drive for Ryder. The Court finds as a fact that Winslow 
was denied a job because of his race in 1969 and 1971. He 
is entitled to equitable back pay from September 30, 1969, 
to the present and to be hired as a longline driver with a 
longline seniority date of September 30, 1969.

64. J .  D. G r ie r . Class member Grier applied for an  
over-the-road job with Ryder in July, 1969. Subsequently, 
he talked with D. T. Bradfield on several occasions but was 
never offered a job as an over-the-road driver for the 
Company.4

As of July, 1969, Grier had significant experience work­
ing as an over-the-road driver for Thomas and Howard 
Company and New Dixie Truck Lines, among others. The 
Court finds as a fact that Grier was qualified to be an 
over-the-road driver for Ryder in 1969 and that he was 
not hired because of his race. Grier is entitled to equitable 
back pay from August 12, 1969 to the present and to be 
hired as an over-the-road driver with Ryder with a longline 
seniority date of August 12, 1969.

65. B o bby  T a ylor . Class member Taylor applied for a 
road job with Ryder on October 23, 1973. He never heard

4 The Company’s chief witness, D. T. Bradfield, testified that 
Grier was offered a road job in December, 1969, as a longline truck 
driver. However, upon cross-examination it became clear that 
Grier had not been offered a job by the Company but, at best, had 
been told that he might be offered a job sometime later when his 
references were finally checked out. The Court finds that no job 
offer was made. Moreover, in 1969 Ryder was utilizing a signifi­
cant number of double runs. The Court finds as a fact that the 
hiring of Grier was inextricably linked in the possible hiring of 
another black applicant by the name of Moss who also was never 
hired by the Company.

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67a

from the Company, and has never worked for Ryder. The 
last driver hired by Ryder in 1973 was hired on November 
29, 1973, and applied on August 29, 1973. No road drivers 
have been hired since November 29, 1973.

Although Taylor was qualified to be an over-the-road 
driver for Ryder in 1973, the Court concludes that he was 
not discriminated against on account of his race. All of 
Taylor’s claims for relief are denied.

66. W il e y  C a r p e n t e r . Class member Carpenter applied 
in June, 1972, for a local driving position for Ryder but 
was never hired. The evidence shows no recent discrimina­
tion by Ryder in the hiring of local drivers. The Court 
concludes that Carpenter has failed to demonstrate that 
he was not hired because of his race. All of his claims for 
relief are denied.

67. The above numbered paragraphs constitute the 
Court’s findings of fact made pursuant to Rule 52, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Where said findings also con­
stitute conclusions of law they should be so treated.

Conclusions of Law

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
enters the following Conclusions of Law:

1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under the 
provisions of Section 706(f) of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 28 U.S.C. 
§1343(4).

2. Defendant Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. is an employer 
within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(b).

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68a

3. Defendants International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and 
Local 71 thereof are labor organizations within the mean­
ing of 42 UjS.C. §2000e-(d).

4. Plaintiffs herein have complied with the procedural 
requirements of Section 706(a), 706(d) and 706(e) of Title 
\HI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This action is also 
properly brought pursuant to 42 TJ.S.C. §1981 and 28 
TJ.S.C. § 1343.

5. The policy, pattern and practice of the defendant 
Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. of excluding black persons, in­
cluding certain named plaintiffs as well as members of the 
class which the plaintiffs represent, from certain jobs with 
the defendant Company including, but not limited to, long- 
line truck driver positions, journeyman mechanic and 
trailer mechanic positions, and supervisory jobs constitutes 
an unlawful employment practice in violation of Title V II 
and 42 TJ.S.C. § 1981. Hairston  v. McLean Trucking Co. 
[6 EPD Tf 8841 and 7 EPD  ft 9144] 62 F.R.D. 642 (M.D.N.C. 
1974), remanded fo r  additional relie f [10 EPD [[10,353] 
520 F.2d 226, 11 F E P  Cases 91 (4th Cir. 1975); Rodrigues 
v. E ast Texas Motor F reight , supra.

6. The refusal of the defendant Company and the de­
fendant unions to take affirmative action to remedy the 
present and continuing effects of past and continuing dis­
crimination constitutes a violation by the Company and 
the unions of Title V II and 42 TJ.S.C. § 1981.

7. The pertinent collective bargaining agreements in 
effect at the time the Complaint was filed in this action

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69a

and more specifically tlie restrictive seniority provisions of 
said agreements limiting seniority carryover from one bar­
gaining agreement to another perpetuated into the present 
the effects of past discrimination and were in violation of 
Title V II and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Hairston  v. McLean Truck­
ing Co., supra; Barnett v. W. T. Grant Co., [9 EPD 
U 10,199] 518 F.2d 593, 10 F E P  Cases 1057 (4th Cir. 1975); 
Sabala  v. W estern Gillette, Inc., [10 EPD 10,360] 516 
F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975); Rodrigues v. E ast Texas Motor 
Freight, supra.

8. The pattern and practice engaged in by the defendant 
Company in fostering racially discriminatory work assign­
ments in the Maintenance department and in allowing the 
harassment of blacks is a violation of Title V II and 42 
IJ.S.C. § 1981. Commonwealth o f Pa. v. Local Union No. 
542, International Union o f Op. Engineers, [5 EPD  8004] 
347 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

9. Plaintiffs Robert L. Johnson, Jr ., Ernest McManus, 
William O. Coffey, Jr ., and Willie Jackson and class mem­
bers Clyde Long, Vincent Gray, Sammie Simms, Tommie 
Freeman, Isaiah Massey, James Cowen, Rneben Winslow, 
and J .  D. Grier have each suffered harm as a result of the 
discriminatory practices of the defendants. These indi­
vidual discriminatees have suffered monetary loss and, in 
some cases, loss of valuable seniority as a result of the 
discriminatory practices of the defendants. Each indi­
vidual the Court has found to be a victim of discrimination 
is entitled to those equitable remedies necessary to restore 
to him all benefits he would have had but for the racial 
discrimination practiced by the defendants. Each individ­

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70a

ual is entitled to monetary damages in the nature of equit­
able back pay and job placement and seniority adjustment 
as required by the facts of each individual case. Albem arle 
P aper Co. v. Moody, [9 EPD  10,230] — U.S. —, 43 
U.S.L.W. 4880 (1975); Hairston  v. McLean Trucking Co., 
supra; Pettw ay  v. American Cast Iron  P ipe Co., [7 EPD 
1J9291] 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974). Said individuals are 
also entitled to equitable monetary relief for any future 
loss of earnings resulting from the discriminatory conduct 
of the defendants. United States v. United States Steel 
Corp., [6 EPD H 9042] 371 F. Supp. 1045, 1060, 1063 (N.D. 
Ala. 1973); Bush  v. Lone Star Steel Co., [7 EPD If 9179] 
373 F. Supp. 526, 538 (E.D. Tex. 1974). In its discretion 
the Court concludes the defendant Company should bear 
the burden of making necessary back pay payments. Plain­
tiff Booker T. Alexander and class member J .  P. Campbell 
have also suffered from the discriminatory actions of the 
defendants; however, they are entitled to no individual 
monetary relief.

10. The plaintiffs, having prevailed in this matter, are 
entitled to their costs including reasonable counsel fees, 
court costs and expenses. L ea  v. Cone Mills Corp., [3 EPD 
IT 8102] 438 F,2d 86 (4th Cir., 1971); Robinson  v. Lorillard  
Corp., supra at 804. The Court, in its discretion, taxes all 
costs, fees, and expenses against the defendant Company.

11. This Court is required, under applicable law, to enter 
injunctive relief which completely and effectively remedies 
the pervasive discrimination evident on this record. See 
generally, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra; Hairston  v.

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71a

McLean Trucking Co., supra.5 A judgment will be entered 
hereafter to meet this duty.

O pinion  o f  D istrict C ourt—-N ovem ber 18, 1975

6 The record indicates that the defendant Company has entered 
into a Partial Consent Decree in the case of United States v. Truck­
ing Em ployers, Inc., Civil Action No. 74-453 (D.D.C. 1974) (the 
“T E I” case) since the initiation of this action. That decree imposes 
on the Company certain affirmative duties throughout their oper­
ations. This Court will not require any relief which conflicts with 
that ordered in T E I ;  however, a judgment will be entered the 
purpose of which will be to erase all discriminatory practices and, 
to the extent possible under the applicable statutes, to remedy 
completely the effects of those practices.



MEILEN PRESS INC —  N. Y. C. 219