Tyson v. Cazes Brief for Appellees
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1965
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Tyson v. Cazes Brief for Appellees, 1965. 935a281b-c79a-ee11-be37-000d3a574715. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9be6c7a3-74be-44fb-b987-3e4ba4170488/tyson-v-cazes-brief-for-appellees. Accessed November 26, 2025.
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IN THE
UNITED STATES
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S
FIFTH CIRCUIT
No« 22i616
DR. BERTRAND O. TYSON,
Appellant,
versus
LT. CLARENCE J. CAZES, et al.,
Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, LT. CLARENCE J. CAZES
OFFICER LIONEL STEIN, OFFICER LESTER
HAYDEL, JR., OFFICER SAMUEL SAVAGE,
CHIEF OF POLICE DENNIS SONGY
EDWARD N. ENGOLIO
514 Railroad Avenue
Plaquemine, Louisiana
Attorney for the named
Appellees.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
S ta tem en t of A ppellee’s Contentions ...................... 1
A rgum ent -
I. Did the C elebrity Lounge H ave a R igh t to
Deny Service to C om plainant and If They
Did H ave Such a Right, W ere the Police
O fficers in V iolation of Any Civil R ights
S ta tu tes In M aking An A rrest in R e
sponse to the R equest of C elebrity Lounge’s
Call? ...................................................................... 4
II. If the C elebrity Lounge Does F a ll U nder
the Civil R ights A ct of 1964, H as Com
p la inan t Follow ed the P ro p e r P rocedu re? 17
H I. Does the F ed e ra l Court H ave Jurisd iction
of This C ause? ................................................... 22
Conclusion ............................................................................ 23
AUTHORITIES
B urton v. W ilm ington P ark in g A uthority, 1961, 365
U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 6 L.Ed. 2d 45 . . . . 5
E a to n V. G rubbs, 216 F. Supp. 465 E.D. N.C.
(1963) .............................................................................. 4
Shelley v. K raem er, 1948, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836,
92 L.Ed. 1161 .............................................................. 5
Swift V. F o u rth N ational B ank of Colum bus, G eor
gia, 205 F. Supp. 563 .................................................. 6
W illiam s v. H ow ard Johnson’s R esta u ra n t, 4th Cir.
(1959), 268 F.2d 845, 846 .......................................... 5
W illiam s v. Yellow Cab Com pany of P ittsburgh ,
200 F. 2nd 302 .............................................................. 6
IN TH E
U N ITED STATES COURT OF A PPE A L S
F IF T H CIRCUIT
NO. 22,616
DR. BERTRAN D O. TYSON,
A ppellant,
versus
LT. CLARENCE J. CAZES, e t al..
A ppellees.
On A ppeal from the U nited S ta tes D is tric t C ourt for the,
E a s te rn D istric t of Louisiana.
B R IE F FO R A P P E L L E E S , LT. CLARENCE J. CAZES
O FF IC E R LIO N EL STEIN , O F F IC E R LE ST ER
HAYDEL, JR ., O FF IC E R SAM UEL SAVAGE,
C H IE F OF PO LICE D EN N IS SONGY
STA TEM EN T O F A P P E L L E E ’S CONTENTIONS
D efendan ts’ (Gazes e t al) m otion to d ism iss and m o
tion for su m m ary ju d g m en t w ere based , substan tia lly ,
upon the following legal propositions:
Section 1983, T itle 42 U.S.C., c ited by appellan t in
his com plain t does not apply in cases of businesses
w hich a re not d irec tly or substan tia lly involved in in
te rs ta te com m erce or activ ity .
In his com plain t for dam ages, app e llan t cites the
Civil R ights A ct of 1964, T itle II, Sections 201(c) and
(d ). A ppellees contend in th e ir m otion to d ism iss, th a t
m oney d am ag es a re not allow able un d er the 1964 A ct;
th e C elebrity Lounge is no t a public fac ility w hich the
1964 A ct in tends to cover; appellan t h as no t followed
th e req u is ite p rocedu re in b ring ing h is action under
the 1964 A ct; police officers, ac ting in th e ir official
cap a c itie s should not be held personally liab le for offi
c ia l conduct in the p erfo rm an ce of official du ties es
p ec ia lly in the absence of an a llegation of n eg lig en ce ;
th a t the case fa ils to p resen t for d e te rm in a tio n a ques
tion aris ing un d er the C onstitution or law s of the
U nited S ta tes and, therefo re , fa ils to fa ll w ith in the
ju risd ic tion of the F e d e ra l Courts.
A ppellan t ch arg es a consp iracy ; th e re fo re , appellees
Cazes e t al, u rge the defenses of th e ir a lleged co-con
sp ira to rs , Offie S tew art and M rs. Lydia S tew art, as
th e ir own defenses, w hich defenses w e re :
The Civil R igh ts A ct of 1964 is inapp licab le to the
business conducted by the defendan t (S tew art).
D efendan t S tew art’s business w as solely th a t of in
tr a s ta te com m erce and beyond the lim its and au th o r
ity of C ongress to reg u la te as a segm en t of in te rs ta te
com m erce.
The F o u rteen th A m endm ent does no t p ro tec t th e in
d iv idual invasion of ind iv iduals’ righ ts.
The prohibitions of T itle II. 1964 A ct. can be en
forced only by civil su its for an in junction and n e ith er
c rim in a l penalties nor th e recovery of m oney d a m
ages could possibly be had under the law.
The E q u a l P ro tec tio n C lause of the F ou rteen th
A m endm ent does not re la te to p riv a te conduct of p r i
v a te individuals in th e ir p riv a te p laces of business.
P la in tiff-A ppellan t alleges in A rt. I l l of his com plain t
th a t “ all of the defendan ts did conspire to deny p la in
tiff his constitu tional rig h ts to full and equal enjoy
m en t of a public accom m odation” . The six p a ra g ra p h s
of Art. I l l of the com plain t charg e a consp iracy ; th e re
fore, all defenses availab le to the ow ners of the Celeb
rity Lounge w ill be u rged h ere in the defense of the
police officers of the City of P laquem ine because if the
C elebrity Lounge w ere “ w ithin its r ig h ts” then it fol
lows the ow ners thereo f h ad a rig h t to call the police
officers who w ere under a corresponding duty to an
sw er the C elebrity Lounge’s call and to p ro tec t its
righ ts.
Thus we a rr iv e a t the basic issues of the case:
I. Did the C elebrity Lounge have a rig h t to deny
serv ice to com pla inan t and if they did have such a
righ t, w ere the police officers in violation of any Civil
R igh ts S ta tu tes in m ak ing an a r re s t in response to the
req u es t of C elebrity L ounge’s call?
II. If the C elebrity Lounge does fall under the Civil
R ights A ct of 1964, has com pla inan t followed the p rop
e r p rocedure?
III. Does the F e d e ra l C ourt h ave ju risd ic tion of
th is cause?
ARGUMENT
DID TH E C EL EB R ITY LOUNGE HAVE A
RIG H T TO D EN Y SERV ICE TO COM PLAIN
ANT AND IF TH EY DID HAVE SUCH A
RIGHT, W ER E THE PO LICE O FF IC E R S IN
VIOLATION OF ANY CIVIL RIG HTS STAT
U TES IN MAKING AN A R R EST IN R E
SPONSE TO TH E R EQ U EST OF C ELEB R ITY
LO U N G E’S CALL?
An exam ination of the affidav it filed h e re in by the
ow ner of C elebrity Lounge, P ag es 15-17 of the P rin te d
R ecord , shows th a t the C eleb rity ’s business does not
p rovide live e n te rta in m en t to its p a tro n s nor does it
se rv e m ea ls to its pa trons, th a t all item s offered for
sa le have been pu rchased in the S ta te of L ouisiana and
a re provided for consum ption on the p rem ises, th a t the
p rin c ip a l custom ers of th is business live and a re dom i
ciled in or n ea r the Town of P laquem ine and, su b stan
tia lly , all of its custom ers a re re s id en ts of the S ta te of
L ouisiana and, fu rth e r, th a t th is es tab lishm en t does
not provide lodging to tra n s ie n t guests, nor is it lo
ca ted in a building w hich so provides. F ro m the ev i
dence subm itted in th is case, it has been conclusively
estab lished th a t Offie S tew art, ow ner of C elebrity
Lounge, w as engaged in a business w hich m oved in
in tra s ta te com m erce w hich, th e re fo re , could not be
m ad e a p a r t of the Civil R igh ts A ct of 1964. The Su
p rem e Court of the U nited S ta tes has consisten tly held
th a t the F ou rteen th A m endm ent does not p ro tec t the
ind iv idual invasion of the ind iv idual’s righ ts. We cite
E aton V. G ruhhs, 216 F. Supp. 465 E.D. N.C. (1963) for
the proposition th a t ind iv idual invasion of ind iv idual
rig h ts is not the su b jec t m a tte r of the F o u rteen th
A m endm ent. Also cited in su p p o rt of th is proposition
a re BurtO'n v. W ilm ington P arking A u thority , 1961, 365
U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 6 L .Ed. 2d 45; Shelley v.
K ra em er, 1948, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161;
W illiam s v. H oward Johnson’s R estauran t, 4th Cir.
(1959), 268 F. 2d 845, 846.
P la in tiff’s com plain t a lleges th a t the police officers
ch arg ed h im w ith d istu rb ing the peace and being
drunk and d isorderly , both ch arg es hav ing been d is
m issed by the M unicipal Court. C om plainan t fa ils to
show any charges by the police officers under any ord i
nance or s ta tu te deem ing it unlaw ful to serve N egroes
in a saloon or lounge. No action is a lleged under such
a s ta tu te , nor w as th ere , in fac t, any such action tak en
by the police officers. C om plainan t a ttem p ts to show
now, a f te r the tr ia l of th is m otion to d ism iss and sum
m a ry judgm ent, th a t such an o rd inance ex isted on the
reco rd s of the City of P laquem ipe. The D istric t Court,
in d ism issing th is contention, s ta ted :
“ W hether or not th e re w as, in th is case, a
local o rd inance in effect w hich w as in conflict
w ith Section 202 is of no m om ent. The fac ts, as
c lea rly s ta ted by the p la in tiff in his com plain t,
show conclusively th a t he w as denied serv ice
in the C elebrity Lounge not because of the
com pulsion of any s ta te or local law or ord i
nance , bu t because the ow ners the reo f did not
choose to serve N egroes in th e ir estab lish
m ent. And since the C elebrity Lounge w as not
an e s tab lish m en t covered by Section 201 of the
A ct, the ow ners of C elebrity Lounge h ad a per-
fee t r ig h t, under the law , to a c t as they did.
H ence, p la in tiff s ta te s no c la im ag a in st the
ow ners of the C elebrity Lounge, Offie and
L ydia S tew art, upon w hich re lie f can be g ra n t
ed in so far as an action under the Civil R ights
A ct of 1964 is concerned .”
In W illiam s v. Y ellow Cab C om pany of P ittsburgh ,
200 F. 2nd 302, the C ourt sa id :
“ I t h as long been se ttled th a t the F o u rteen th
A m endm ent is d irec ted only to S ta te action and
th a t the invasion by ind iv iduals is no t w ithin
its purview . I t n ecessarily follows th a t the ju r
isd ic tion conferred upon the F e d e ra l D is tric t
C ourts by Section 1343, T itle 28, is s im ila rly
lim ited and th a t re d re ss for the invasion by an
ind iv idual of the civil rig h ts of ano ther m u st
be sought in the S ta te C ourts un less, of course,
th e re is d iversity .”
U.S. V. Crookshank, 92 U.S. 542.
U.S. V. H arris , 106 U.S. 629.
Civil R igh ts C ases
109 U.S. 311, 17.
Shelley v. K raem e r, 334 U.S. 1, 13.
In S w ift V. F ourth National B a n k of Colum bus, Geor
gia, 205 F . Supp. 563 the F ifth C ircu it C ourt of A ppeal
sa id :
“ The F ou rteen th A m endm ent canno t be the
b asis fo r an action com plaining of the ac ts of
p riv a te ind iv iduals or business e s tab lish
m en ts .”
O riginally , app e llan t a ttem p ted to base his c la im u n
der Section 201(c) and 201(d) of the Civil R ights A ct
of 1964 and he fu rth e r contends th a t under Section 202
the fac t th a t seg regation in ce rta in types of estab lish
m en ts , even though not specifically covered by Section
201, is req u ired by s ta te or local law pu rp o rts to c lass i
fy an a c t of seg regation p rac ticed in such an e s tab
lishm en t as falling w ith in the in tendm en t of the Civil
R ights Act.
The portion of Section 201 of the Civil R ights A ct of
1964, T itle 42, U.S.C., Section 2000a, w hich seem ed to
be a t issue h ere , provides as follows:
“ (a) All persons shall be en titled to the full
and equal en joym ent of the goods, serv ices,
facilities, p riv ileges, ad v an tag es , and accom
m odations of any p lace of public accom m oda
tion, as defined in this section, w ithout d isc rim
ination or seg regation on the ground of race ,
color, religion, or national origin.
“ (b) E ach of the following estab lishm en ts
w hich serves the public is a p lace of public a c
com m odation w ith in the m eaning of th is sub
ch ap te r if its operations a ffec t com m erce, or if
d iscrim ination or seg regation by it is suppo rt
ed by S ta te action:
“ (1) any inn, hotel, m otel, or o ther estab lish
m en t w hich provides lodging to tran s ien t
guests, o ther th an an estab lish m en t located
w ith in a building w hich contains not m ore than
five room s for re n t or h ire and w hich is ac tual-
8
ly occupied by the p ro p rie to r of such estab lish
m en t as his res id en ce;
“ (2) any re s ta u ra n t, ca fe te ria , lunchroom ,
lunch counter, soda fountain , or o ther facility
p rinc ipa lly engaged in selling food for coji-
sum ption on the p rem ises, including, b u t not
lim ited to, any such fac ility located on the
p rem ises of any re ta in e s tab lish m en t; or any
gasoline sta tion ;
“ (3) any m otion p ic tu re house, th e a te r , con
c e r t hall, spo rts a ren a , s tad ium or o ther p lace
of exhibition or en te rta in m en t; and
“ (4) any es tab lish m en t (A) (i) w hich is
physically located w ith in the p rem ises of any
estab lish m en t o therw ise covered by th is sub
section, or (ii) w ith in the p rem ises of w hich is
physically located any such covered estab lish
m ent, and (b) w hich holds itse lf out as se rv
ing p a tro n s of such covered estab lishm ent.
“ (c) The operations of an es tab lishm en t af
fec t com m erce w ith in the m ean ing of th is sub
ch ap te r if (1) it is one of the estab lishm en ts
described in p a ra g ra p h (1) of subsection (b)
of th is section ; (2) in the case of an e s tab lish
m en t described in p a ra g ra p h (2) of subsection
(b) of this section, it se rves or offers to serve
in te rs ta te tra v e le rs or a su b stan tia l portion
of the food w hich it serves, or gasoline or o th
e r p roducts w hich it sells, has m oved in com
m e rc e ; (3) in the case of an e s tab lish m en t de
scribed in p a ra g ra p h (3) of subsection (b) of
th is section, it custom arily p resen ts film s, p e r
fo rm ances, a th le tic team s, exhibitions, or oth
e r sources of en te rta in m en t w hich m ove in
com m erce; and (4) in the case of an estab lish
m en t described in p a ra g ra p h (4) of subsection
(b) of th is section, it is physically located w ith
in the p rem ises of, or th e re is physically lo ca t
ed w ithin its p rem ises, an e s tab lish m en t the
operations of w hich affect com m erce w ithin
the m eaning of th is subsection. F o r purposes
of th is section, ‘co m m erce ’ m eans trav e l,
trad e , tra ffic , com m erce, tran sp o rta tio n , or
com m unication am ong the sev e ra l S ta tes , or
betw een the D istric t of Colum bia and any
S tate , or betw een any foreign country or any
te rr i to ry or possession and any S ta te or the
D istric t of Colum bia, or betw een points in the
sam e S ta te but th rough any o ther S ta te or the
D istric t of Colum bia or a fo reign country.
“ (d) D iscrim ination or seg regation by an es
tab lish m en t is supported by S ta te action w ith
in the m ean ing of th is su b ch ap te r if such d is
crim ination or seg regation (1) is c a rr ied on
under color of any law , s ta tu te , o rd inance, or
regu la tion ; or (2) is c a rr ied on under color of
any custom or usage req u ired or enforced by
officials of the S ta te or po litical subdivision
thereo f; o r (3) is req u ired by action of the
S ta te or po litical subdivision thereo f.’’
Section 202, w hich is 42 U.S.C., Section 2000a-l, is
h e reby quoted for th e benefit of th is b rief:
10
“ All persons sha ll be en titled to be free , a t
any es tab lish m en t or p lace, from d isc rim in a
tion or seg regation of any kind on the ground
of race , color, religion, or na tional origin, if
such d isc rim in a tio n or seg reg a tio n is or p u r
p o rts to be req u ired by any law , s ta tu te , o rd i
nance , regu la tion , ru le , or o rd er of a s ta te or
an y agency or po litical subdivision thereo f.”
I t is c lea r from a read ing of the above sections of
th e Civil R igh ts A ct th a t the C elebrity Lounge does not
fa ll under Section 201 and it is c lea r from the a lleg a
tions of ap p e llan t’s petition th a t no charg e w as filed
ag a in st h im because of any law , s ta tu te or ord inance,
regulation, ru le or order of the Town of P laquem ine
requ irin g segregation . By the v ery language of the
com plain t itself, Tyson w as charged w ith d istu rb ing
the peace and being drunk and d isorderly , and none
of said s ta tu te s req u ire s segregation . The police of
fice rs w ere called by the ow ner of C elebrity Lounge,
or his agent, who asked Tyson to leave in the p resence
of the police officers and he refused to do so. The only
a lte rn a tiv e for the ow ner or the ow ner’s agen t of th e
C elebrity Lounge w as to physically oust Tyson or to
se rv e him . The ow ner did not choose to serve h im nor
did he choose to take the law in his own hands and
physically oust him . He asked for and rece ived the
help of the police officers to m a in ta in the peace and
o rd e r of h is estab lishm ent. The ow ner h ad a righ t to
choose th is course because th e re is no law w hich forces
h im to ser% e a pa tro n he does not choose to serve. The
police officers w ere un d er a co rresponding duty to
m a m ta in the peace and o rd er of the tow n and its
ru s ire s s estab lishm en ts, especially w hen requested to
do so as in th is case. H ad the police o fficers re fused
11
to a r re s t Tyson, it could have led to ac ts of violence
on the p a r ts of citizens of the town and a consequent
continuation of a d is tu rbance of the peace, w hich m ay
have resu lted in bloodshed or som e other serious
physical violence.
I t m ay be tru e th a t S tew art or his agen t d isc rim i
na ted ag a in st Tyson by refusing to serve him but in so
d iscrim inating , the ow ner of the C elebrity Lounge
m ade his own choice to d iscrim inate . He w as not
forced to do so' by the police officers; had he chosen
to serve Tyson, he w as free to do so. I t is the sam e
as the ow ner of a hom e who chooses to ad m it one guest
ra th e r than another, and if the unw elcom e guest should
in sis t on en tering the hom e and rem ain ing th e re a f te r
being asked to leave, then certa in ly the ow ner has no
a lte rn a tiv e than to oust him physically or call on the
police to m a in ta in the peace and dignity of his hom e.
W hen the Congress chose not to include a bar, saloon
or lounge, such as the C elebrity Lounge, in Section 201
of the Act, it had a specific reason for th is om ission.
This ce leb ra ted ac t w as con troversial, perhaps one of
the m ost a rgu m en ta tiv e passed in our generation and
ce rta in ly the m a tte r w as well considered by Congress.
F o r th e Courts to now include it under Section 201 would
p lace a leg islative function upon the Courts, w hich the
Constitution of the U nited S ta tes specifically prohibits.
This is not a m a tte r of jud icial in te rp re ta tio n but th is
is a m a tte r of legislation. By excluding a b a r from
Section 201 it is ap p aren t th a t Congress w as a tte m p t
ing to p ro tec t som e of the righ ts of som e individuals
to o pera te th e ir businesses in such a m an n er as to
serve p a tro n s of th e ir own choosing.
12
Section 202 p ro tec ts the individual who w ishes to
p ra c tic e in teg ra tion by prohibiting the s ta te from en
forc ing d isc rim in a tio n or seg regation of its volition.
The ow ners of the C elebrity Lounge chose not to p ra c
tice in teg ration ; since the 1964 A ct does not enforce in
te g ra tio n upon such people, then they had a free
choice to refuse to serve Dr. Tyson.
Since it m ust be inevitab ly concluded th a t the Cele
b rity Lounge had such a rig h t to deny serv ice to com
p la inan t, then it follows logically th a t they also had a
rig h t to call the police to enforce th e ir rig h ts and again
i t m u st follow logically th a t the police w ere under a
corresponding duty to p reven t violence, bloodshed, and
to p rev en t a c iv ilian from tak ing the law in his own
hands. The action taken by the police officers in th is
case should be com m ended ra th e r th an condem ned.
They w ere able to rem ove the com plainan t from the
p rem ises w ithout violence and in a peacefu l and digni
fied m anner. Not once did they re so rt to any s ta tu te
w hich enforces segregation . I t is doubtful if these
police officers knew th a t such a s ta tu te existed , if one
does exist, because the ch arg es m ade ag ain st Tyson
w ere as follows:
D isturbing the peace.
Sim ple D runk and
D isorderly conduct.
If S tew art had chosen to in teg ra te the C elebrity
Lounge and if, in so doing, w hite people had given h im
trouble, it would have been the duty of the police of
fice rs to rem ove said tro u b lem ak e rs because tm der
Section 202 of the Civil R ights Act, a p ro p rie to r m ay
in teg ra te his es tab lishm en t even though it is not one
13
covered by Section 201 of the Act. Thus, the law of
fice rs of P laquem ine should not only have p erm itted
in teg ra tio n bu t they should have assis ted S tew art in
h is righ ts to in teg ra te his estab lishm ent, had S tew art
chosen to do so. S tew art did not choose to exercise his
rig h ts under Section 202. Tyson had no righ t, p riv ilege
or im m unity under Section 202 unless S tew art chose
to give h im such a right.
Since it has been concluded th a t the actions of
S tew art or his agen ts w ere individual actions, then
Sections 42 U.S.C., Section 1983 and 1985 do not apply
because to recover under th a t s ta tu te th e re m u st be
a conspiracy under color of s ta te action and not one
involving individual action. 42 U.S.C., Section 1983
provides as follows:
“ E v ery person who, under color of any s ta t
ute, ordinance, regulation, custom , or usage, of
any s ta te or te rrito ry , sub jects, or causes to
be subjected , any citizen of the U nited S tates
or o ther person w ith in the ju risd iction thereof
to the depriva tion of any righ ts, p riv ileges, or
im m unities, secu red by the C onstitution and
law s, shall be liable to the p a rty in ju red in
an action a t law, su it in equity, or o ther p roper
proceedings for red re ss .”
Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1985 provides in p ertinen t
p a r t, as follows:
“ (3) If two or m ore persons in any s ta te or
te rr i to ry conspire to go in disguise on the
highw ay or in the p rem ises of ano ther, for the
purpose of depriving, e ith er d irec tly or indi-
14
rectly , any person or c lass of persons of the
equal pro tection of the law s, or of equal p riv
ileges and im m unities un d er the law s; or for
the purpose of p reven ting or h indering the
constitu ted au thorities of any s ta te or te r r i
to ry from giving or securing to all persons
w ith in such s ta te or te rr i to ry the equal pro
tection of the law s; * * * in any case of con
sp iracy se t fo rth in this section, if one or m ore
persons engaged th e re in do, or cause to be
done, any ac t in fu rth eran ce of the ob ject of
such conspiracy, w hereby ano ther is in ju red
in his person or p roperty , or deprived of h av
ing and exerc ising any righ t or priv ilege of a
citizen of the U nited S tates, the p a r ty so in
ju red or deprived m ay have an action for the
reco v ery of d am ages, occasioned by such in
ju ry or deprivation, ag a in st any one or m ore
of the consp ira to rs.”
U nder Section 1983 th e re w as no depriva tion of any
rig h t, priv ilege or im m unity secu red by the C onstitu
tion and law s of the U nited S ta tes , the S ta te of Louisi
a n a or the City of P laquem ine. The action on the p a r ts
of the ow ners of C elebrity Lounge w as individual a c
tion p u rsu an t to th e ir constitu tionally g u a ran teed
r ig h t to the equal pro tection of the law and the p eace
ful use of th e ir p roperty . T here can be no conspiracy
under Section 1985 w hich would lead tow ard depriv
ing Dr. Tyson of the equal pro tection of the law s, or of
equal p riv ileges and im m unities under the law s, w hen
th e re is no law which g ran ts h im the rig h t and p riv
ilege to dem and a d rink a t a b a r of th is classification.
Thus, the provisions of Section 1985 a re in no w ay
app licab le to the cause of action w hich com plainan t
15
has a ttem p ted to a sse rt and, the re fo re , th e re can be
no consp iracy charged under sa id section.
C om plainant has attem pted , a t the la s t m inute, to
in jec t a new com plain t in th is cause by v irtue of a
le tte r dated N ovem ber 25, 1964 subm itted to Judge
W est, a t w hich tim e he a ttem p ted to in troduce new
evidence and sponsor new pleadings in the form of an
ordinance prohibiting the sa le of alcoholic beverages
of m ore th an 3.2% by volum e for consum ption on the
sam e p rem ises to persons of the w hite and C aucasian
race and persons of the Negro or b lack race . This
m a tte r cannot be considered by the Court a t this tim e
and even if it w ere perm issib le p rocedurally , Dr. Ty
son, according to allegations contained in his com
plaint, w as not charged w ith a violation of any such
ord inance and th e re is no evidence in the reco rd nor
is th e re any allegation to the effect th a t any person
a ttem p ted to sell spirituous, vinous or m a lt liquor of
alcoholic content of m ore than 3.2% by volum e to p e r
sons of the w hite and C aucasian race and persons of
the N egro or b lack ra c e in this case, nor is th e re any
evidence or a llegation th a t an a r re s t w as m ade under
any such ordinance.
The allegations of Dr. T yson’s com plain t do not show
w h at type of liquor w as o rdered , if any spirituous
liquor w as ordered . He could v ery well have o rdered
a soft drink and S tew art could v ery well, under the
law , have re fu sed to serve h im a soft drink. T hat is
no t the issue in th is case. Tyson need not have o rdered
any drink a t all and S tew art still would have had the
rig h t to oust him . Dr. Tyson w as asked to leave Mr.
S tew art’s p rem ises repea ted ly ; his p resence th e re
am ounted to a d is tu rbance of the peace of said p rem -
16
ises in th a t it w as con tem pla ted a physical eviction
would have been n ecessa ry in the even t the police had
not been called upon to in tervene.
R ealizing his cause w as futile on the law and fac ts
as orig inally p resen ted , it seem s th a t now, in his brief,
p la in tiff-appellan t is a ttem p tin g to p resen t a new se t
of facts, new evidence and a new legal a rgum en t. To
th is, we strenuously object.
Conceding, how ever, th a t appellan t has a righ t to
c re a te a new cause of action a t this tim e, and re se rv
ing all righ ts in the prem ises, is p la in tiff still p erm itted
to sue for dam ag es under the Civil R igh ts S ta tu te?
W hat is p la in tiff’s p rocedure if the police officers did
m ak e an a r re s t under a seg regation o rd inance?
Section 204(a) of the Civil R ights A ct specifically
spells out ap p e llan t’s course of action if it is tru e the
police officers a ttem p ted to enforce a seg regation ordi
nance. A civil action for p reven tive relief is allow ed
and not an action for dam ages.
In e ither case, ap p e llan t’s p resen t action should be
d ism issed. N either the fac ts nor the law b e a r out his
orig inal action for dam ages; nor is appellan t pro-
cedu ra lly co rrec t in suing for dam ag es if the police
officers a ttem p ted to enforce a seg regation ord inance
w hich appellan t now contends is the m a in issue.
On page 10 of his brief app e llan t in quoting Vice-
P res id en t H um phrey, who w as then Senato r H um ph
rey , contends “ if any governm ent is going to use race ,
color, relig ion or national origin as a basis for dep riv
ing the ow ners of an estab lishm en t of freedom to
17
choose th e ir custom ers, the choice th a t will be en
forced is desegregation , not seg reg a tio n ” . H ere the
S tew arts exerc ised th e ir choice, and th e ir choice w as
not to serve Tyson. None of the defendan ts h ere w ere
a ttem p tin g to exercise a seg regation o rd inance bu t
in accord w ith the very w ords of the V ice-P residen t of
the U nited S tates, they w ere exerc ising the ir ‘freedom
to choose th e ir cu s to m ers’.
A gain on p. 11 of his brief, appellan t in quoting Mr.
M acG regor s ta te s th a t Section 202 is lim ited to those
situations in w hich a S ta te is enforcing an unconstitu
tional law requ iring segregation . No such situation
exists here.
II.
IF TH E CELEBRITY LOUNGE DOES FALL
UNDER TH E CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,
HAS COMPLAINANT FOLLOWED THE
P R O PE R PR O C ED U R E?
If it w ere the in tention of the p la in tiff to have
b rough t th is action under the Civil R ights A ct of 1964,
p la in tiff’s com plaint does not follow the p rocedure re
qu ired under the 1964 Act. The p rocedure is outlined
in Section 204(a) of the Civil R ights Act, w hich is
hereby quoted as follows:
“ (a) W henever any person has engaged or
th e re a re reasonab le grounds to believe th a t
any person is about to engage in any ac t or
p rac tice prohibited by section 203, a civil ac
tion for preven tive relief, including an app lica
tion for a p e rm a n en t or te m p o ra ry injunction.
18
res tra in in g o rder, or o ther order, m ay be in
stitu ted by the person aggrieved and, upon
tim ely application , the court m ay, in its dis
cretion, perm it the A ttorney G eneral to in te r
vene in such civil action if he certifies th a t
the case is of g enera l public im portance . Upon
app lication by the com plainan t and in such
c ircu m stan ces as the court m a y deem just, the
court m ay appoint an a tto rn ey for such com
p la in an t and m ay authorize the com m ence
m en t of the civil action w ithout the paym ent
of fees, costs, or secu rity .”
The Civil R igh ts A ct does not allow m oney dam ages.
In Section II, p. 13 of his b rief, appellan t seeks an in
junction ag a in st the ow ners of the C elebrity Lounge
and the police officers under Sections 203(a) and (c),
if the a llegations of the com plain t a re proved. L e t us
exam ine the p e rtin en t a rtic le s of ap p e llan t’s com plain t
to d e term ine , in the ligh t of F e d e ra l and S ta te law , and
the C onstitution, if any cause ex ists h e r e :
TH E COMPLAINT (pp. 4-
8 R ecord)
R E A S O N WHY TH E
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND
SECS. 1983 AND 1985 A RE
NOT A PPL IC A B L E:
II. 7.
P la in tiff w as told by an
em ployee of the C elebrity
Lounge th a t they do not
se rv e colored people.
Choice not to serve w as
m ade by th e ow ner or his
agen t. M iss G ilchrist.
19
II. 8.
M rs. L ydia S tew art, the
m an ag e r, requested p la in
tiff to leave.
No S ta te ac tion because
the b a r ow ners requested
the police to come. No
consp iracy w here the a r
re s t is based on individual
action.
II. 9.
M rs. S tew art again told
p la in tiff to leave.
D efendan ts a r re s te d and
ja iled p la in tiff and c h a rg
ed h im w ith being drunk,
d iso rderly and d isturb ing
the peace.
F reed o m of choice by
owner. No conspiracy.
No S ta te action. Ind iv id
u a l ow ner requested ac
tion here. No seg regation
s ta tu te v io lated here.
II. 10.
A h earing w as held and
p la in tiff w as re leased .
Due process m ust have
been p r e s e n t because
p la in tiff w as re leased .
II. 11.
D efendants m aliciously
deta ined plaintiff.
If th is is tru e , the case
fa lls into the v ery tee th of
A rt. 2315, L ouisiana Civil
Code. No d iversity here.
Case m u s t be dism issed.
II. 12.
M alicious prosecution.
T o rt action under Art.
2315, L ouisiana Civil Code.
20
II. 13.
P la in tiff
sober.
alleges he w as On a sim ple drunk charge ,
p la in tiff w as tr ied and
acqu itted . M any an a c
cused, under a s im ila r
charge , would have re l
ished th is acqu itta l.
III. 14.
C onspiracy. W here? T here a re no fac ts
in the com plain t, alleging
any m eeting of the m inds
betw een the S tew arts and
the police officers.
III. 15.
P ub lic accom m odations,
un d er color of law and of
the custom s and usages of
the S ta te of Louisiana.
The S tew arts chose not to
se rv e Tyson. This b a r is
no t covered by 201, and
202 does no t apply w here
the p ro p rie to r w ishes to
keep a. seg reg a ted b a r.
III. 16.
D enial of due process. P la in tiff w as tr ied and ac
qu itted w ith in tw enty-four
hours.
21
III. 17.
C onspiracy to deprive
p la in tiff of a rig h t g u a ra n
teed to him .
W herein does the law
g u aran tee any m a n the
rig h t to dem and serv ice a t
a b a r w here the ow ner
does not w ish to serve
him .
III. 18.
P la in tiff w as detained,
em b arra ssed , caused dis
com fort, m ade a public
spec tac le and caused im
p a irm e n t of his re p u ta
tion.
T h e s e a re allegations
w hich sound in to r t and
should be tr ied under Art.
2315, L ouisiana Civil Code.
III. 19.
$100,000 dam ages.
No dam ag es allow ed un
der Civil R igh ts Act. S tew
a r ts w ere acting individ
ually and, therefo re , do
not fa ll under 42 U.S.C.,
Section 1983 and Sec. 1985.
If th e re w as no conspir
acy on the p a r t of the
S tew arts, then th e ir a l
leged co-conspira tors can
not be guilty of a conspir
acy.
22
III.
DOES THE FED ERA L COURT HAVE JU R IS
DICTION O F TH IS CAUSE?
We have estab lished th a t th is case does not com e
under the Civil R ights Act nor does it com e under 42,
U.S.C. 1983 and 1985. The nex t d e term ina tion would be
d iversity of citizenship and the requisite^ ju risd ic
tional am ount. T here is no d iversity here and no serious
c la im for m oney dam ages w hich can su b stan tia te an
a llegation of $10,000.00 and, fu rth e rm o re , if th is action
is based on m alicious prosecu tion as alleged in the
com plaint in A rticle 2, P a ra g ra p h 11, then it should
have been brough t under A rticle 2315 of the Civil Code
of the S ta te of Louisiana.
Y g lesia s vs. G ulf S trea m P a rk R acing A sso
ciation, 201 F. 2d 817, which is a F ifth C ircuit
C ourt of A ppeals case, w herein it w as alleged
th a t the Gulf S tream P a rk R acing A ssociation,
acting under color of law of the S ta te of F lo ri
da, did sub jec t the p la in tiff or cause h e r to be
sub jected to a deprivation of righ ts secu red by
the Constitution of the U nited S ta tes by cau s
ing h e r to be falsely im prisoned for an u n re a
sonable period of tim e w ithout bond, and w ith
out an opportunity to confer w ith Counsel and
caused her to be pu t to tr ia l on a c rim in a l
charge th ereby depriv ing h e r of her lib e rty
w ithout due p rocess of law and of the rig h t to
have a fa ir tr ia l conducted in accordance w ith
due p rocess of law. The Court held th a t this
w as essen tia lly a charge of fa lse im prison
m en t and p erhaps m alicious prosecu tion and
23
therefo re the com plain t fa ils to s ta te its c laim
for re lie f in the scope of 8 USCA Sec. 43. (This
is now 42 USCA 1983).
CONCLUSION
A ppellan t’s conclusion asks for a rev e rsa l and re
m an d to afford an opportunity to prove the allegations
of his com plaint. L et us suppose I w ere to adm it the
a llegations of his com plaint, and for the purposes of a
m otion for su m m a ry ju d g m en t w hich w as filed h e re
in don’t we ad m it the com pla in t’s well p leaded a llega
tions, then does it m ak e any d ifference as to the legal
outcom e of th is m a tte r?
Will Dr. Tyson, John Doe, E d w ard Brow n, or A bram
W hite have a rig h t to in sist on drinking a t a b a r w here
the ow ner says. No? I th ink not. Will all police action
be called S ta te A ction even w hen the individual p ro
p rie to r has req u ested th a t action?
P ro cedu ra lly , can appellan t am end his p leadings
w ith a le tte r to the F e d e ra l D istric t, Judge and an
a rg u m e n t in his app e lla te b rie f effecting such an
am endm ent?
E ven if this am en d m en t w ere perm issib le , did th e
defendan ts m ove in under color of s ta te law or city
ordinance req u irin g seg regation or w as this the in
dividual action of the lounge’s p ro p rie to rs?
Does any m a n in A m erica have a rig h t anym ore to
ply any tra d e or p rac tice any profession in the m a n n er
he deem s to the b es t in te res t of h is p a trons and clients
and in acco rdance w ith his own concept as to his busi-
24
ness and professional lim ita tions and capab ilities, or
m u s t every doctor tr e a t every pa tien t, m u st ev ery
law y er tak e every case, m u s t every b u sinessm an serve
ev ery custom er th e reb y reducing his ability to serve
those he h as chosen to serve and to p rac tice m edicine
and law in the best p rofessional m an n er w ithout c lu t
te ring his office or his p rac tice w ith too m any cases,
p a tien ts or custom ers? Thus, in sum m ariz ing th is con
clusion, the answ er to the problem s here in a re as fol
lows:
1. Civil R ights A ct of 1964 does not apply to
the C elebrity Lounge.
2. If it does apply, appellan t has not followed
the p rocedure outlined in the A ct of 1964.
3. The police officers in th is case did not ac t
under any seg regation o rd inance bu t w ere
called upon by the individual action of the
S tew arts.
4. A ppellant, if he has any case a t all ag a in st
th e police officers, fa lls under A rticle 2315
of the L ouisiana Civil Code.
5. M oney d am ag es a re not allow able under
the Civil R igh ts A ct of 1964.
6. In o rder to recover under Sections 1983
and 1985 of T itle 42, U.S.C., p lain tiff m u st
prove th a t the S tew arts w ere acting under
color of som e s ta tu te , ord inance, reg u la
tion, custom or usage of the s ta te . The ac-
25
tions of Mr. and M rs. S tew art w ere in
d ividual actions.
7. T here is no rig h t g ran ted to the p lain tiff
to rem ain , unw anted, on the p rem ises of
the C elebrity Lounge, e ith e r by the Civil
R ights A ct of 1964 or by Title 42, U.S.C.,
Section 1983 or Section 1985.
8. T here is no fed era l ju risd ic tion h ere be
cause th e re is no fed era l offense, nor does
th is action p rom ulgate a v io lation of the
fed era lly g u a ran teed civil right.
R espectfu lly subm itted .
(Signed) EDWARD N. ENGOLIO
EDW ARD N. ENGOLIO
514 R ailroad Avenue
P laquem ine, Louisiana
A ttorney for A ppellees,
Lt. C larence J. Cazes, O fficer
Lionel Stein, O fficer L es te r
H aydel, J r., O fficer Sam uel
Savage, Chief of Police, Dennis
Songy
26
CERTIFICATE
I certify th a t a copy of the foregoing b rie f has been
served upon opposing counsel of reco rd by placing the
sam e p roperly add ressed in the United S ta tes M ail
w ith adequa te postage affixed thereto .
V
Scofields’ Q uality P rin ters, Inc. — N ew O rleans, La.