Tyson v. Cazes Brief for Appellees
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1965

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Tyson v. Cazes Brief for Appellees, 1965. 935a281b-c79a-ee11-be37-000d3a574715. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9be6c7a3-74be-44fb-b987-3e4ba4170488/tyson-v-cazes-brief-for-appellees. Accessed July 06, 2025.
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IN THE UNITED STATES C O U R T O F A P P E A L S FIFTH CIRCUIT No« 22i616 DR. BERTRAND O. TYSON, Appellant, versus LT. CLARENCE J. CAZES, et al., Appellees. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. BRIEF FOR APPELLEES, LT. CLARENCE J. CAZES OFFICER LIONEL STEIN, OFFICER LESTER HAYDEL, JR., OFFICER SAMUEL SAVAGE, CHIEF OF POLICE DENNIS SONGY EDWARD N. ENGOLIO 514 Railroad Avenue Plaquemine, Louisiana Attorney for the named Appellees. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page S ta tem en t of A ppellee’s Contentions ...................... 1 A rgum ent - I. Did the C elebrity Lounge H ave a R igh t to Deny Service to C om plainant and If They Did H ave Such a Right, W ere the Police O fficers in V iolation of Any Civil R ights S ta tu tes In M aking An A rrest in R e sponse to the R equest of C elebrity Lounge’s Call? ...................................................................... 4 II. If the C elebrity Lounge Does F a ll U nder the Civil R ights A ct of 1964, H as Com p la inan t Follow ed the P ro p e r P rocedu re? 17 H I. Does the F ed e ra l Court H ave Jurisd iction of This C ause? ................................................... 22 Conclusion ............................................................................ 23 AUTHORITIES B urton v. W ilm ington P ark in g A uthority, 1961, 365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 6 L.Ed. 2d 45 . . . . 5 E a to n V. G rubbs, 216 F. Supp. 465 E.D. N.C. (1963) .............................................................................. 4 Shelley v. K raem er, 1948, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 .............................................................. 5 Swift V. F o u rth N ational B ank of Colum bus, G eor gia, 205 F. Supp. 563 .................................................. 6 W illiam s v. H ow ard Johnson’s R esta u ra n t, 4th Cir. (1959), 268 F.2d 845, 846 .......................................... 5 W illiam s v. Yellow Cab Com pany of P ittsburgh , 200 F. 2nd 302 .............................................................. 6 IN TH E U N ITED STATES COURT OF A PPE A L S F IF T H CIRCUIT NO. 22,616 DR. BERTRAN D O. TYSON, A ppellant, versus LT. CLARENCE J. CAZES, e t al.. A ppellees. On A ppeal from the U nited S ta tes D is tric t C ourt for the, E a s te rn D istric t of Louisiana. B R IE F FO R A P P E L L E E S , LT. CLARENCE J. CAZES O FF IC E R LIO N EL STEIN , O F F IC E R LE ST ER HAYDEL, JR ., O FF IC E R SAM UEL SAVAGE, C H IE F OF PO LICE D EN N IS SONGY STA TEM EN T O F A P P E L L E E ’S CONTENTIONS D efendan ts’ (Gazes e t al) m otion to d ism iss and m o tion for su m m ary ju d g m en t w ere based , substan tia lly , upon the following legal propositions: Section 1983, T itle 42 U.S.C., c ited by appellan t in his com plain t does not apply in cases of businesses w hich a re not d irec tly or substan tia lly involved in in te rs ta te com m erce or activ ity . In his com plain t for dam ages, app e llan t cites the Civil R ights A ct of 1964, T itle II, Sections 201(c) and (d ). A ppellees contend in th e ir m otion to d ism iss, th a t m oney d am ag es a re not allow able un d er the 1964 A ct; th e C elebrity Lounge is no t a public fac ility w hich the 1964 A ct in tends to cover; appellan t h as no t followed th e req u is ite p rocedu re in b ring ing h is action under the 1964 A ct; police officers, ac ting in th e ir official cap a c itie s should not be held personally liab le for offi c ia l conduct in the p erfo rm an ce of official du ties es p ec ia lly in the absence of an a llegation of n eg lig en ce ; th a t the case fa ils to p resen t for d e te rm in a tio n a ques tion aris ing un d er the C onstitution or law s of the U nited S ta tes and, therefo re , fa ils to fa ll w ith in the ju risd ic tion of the F e d e ra l Courts. A ppellan t ch arg es a consp iracy ; th e re fo re , appellees Cazes e t al, u rge the defenses of th e ir a lleged co-con sp ira to rs , Offie S tew art and M rs. Lydia S tew art, as th e ir own defenses, w hich defenses w e re : The Civil R igh ts A ct of 1964 is inapp licab le to the business conducted by the defendan t (S tew art). D efendan t S tew art’s business w as solely th a t of in tr a s ta te com m erce and beyond the lim its and au th o r ity of C ongress to reg u la te as a segm en t of in te rs ta te com m erce. The F o u rteen th A m endm ent does no t p ro tec t th e in d iv idual invasion of ind iv iduals’ righ ts. The prohibitions of T itle II. 1964 A ct. can be en forced only by civil su its for an in junction and n e ith er c rim in a l penalties nor th e recovery of m oney d a m ages could possibly be had under the law. The E q u a l P ro tec tio n C lause of the F ou rteen th A m endm ent does not re la te to p riv a te conduct of p r i v a te individuals in th e ir p riv a te p laces of business. P la in tiff-A ppellan t alleges in A rt. I l l of his com plain t th a t “ all of the defendan ts did conspire to deny p la in tiff his constitu tional rig h ts to full and equal enjoy m en t of a public accom m odation” . The six p a ra g ra p h s of Art. I l l of the com plain t charg e a consp iracy ; th e re fore, all defenses availab le to the ow ners of the Celeb rity Lounge w ill be u rged h ere in the defense of the police officers of the City of P laquem ine because if the C elebrity Lounge w ere “ w ithin its r ig h ts” then it fol lows the ow ners thereo f h ad a rig h t to call the police officers who w ere under a corresponding duty to an sw er the C elebrity Lounge’s call and to p ro tec t its righ ts. Thus we a rr iv e a t the basic issues of the case: I. Did the C elebrity Lounge have a rig h t to deny serv ice to com pla inan t and if they did have such a righ t, w ere the police officers in violation of any Civil R igh ts S ta tu tes in m ak ing an a r re s t in response to the req u es t of C elebrity L ounge’s call? II. If the C elebrity Lounge does fall under the Civil R ights A ct of 1964, has com pla inan t followed the p rop e r p rocedure? III. Does the F e d e ra l C ourt h ave ju risd ic tion of th is cause? ARGUMENT DID TH E C EL EB R ITY LOUNGE HAVE A RIG H T TO D EN Y SERV ICE TO COM PLAIN ANT AND IF TH EY DID HAVE SUCH A RIGHT, W ER E THE PO LICE O FF IC E R S IN VIOLATION OF ANY CIVIL RIG HTS STAT U TES IN MAKING AN A R R EST IN R E SPONSE TO TH E R EQ U EST OF C ELEB R ITY LO U N G E’S CALL? An exam ination of the affidav it filed h e re in by the ow ner of C elebrity Lounge, P ag es 15-17 of the P rin te d R ecord , shows th a t the C eleb rity ’s business does not p rovide live e n te rta in m en t to its p a tro n s nor does it se rv e m ea ls to its pa trons, th a t all item s offered for sa le have been pu rchased in the S ta te of L ouisiana and a re provided for consum ption on the p rem ises, th a t the p rin c ip a l custom ers of th is business live and a re dom i ciled in or n ea r the Town of P laquem ine and, su b stan tia lly , all of its custom ers a re re s id en ts of the S ta te of L ouisiana and, fu rth e r, th a t th is es tab lishm en t does not provide lodging to tra n s ie n t guests, nor is it lo ca ted in a building w hich so provides. F ro m the ev i dence subm itted in th is case, it has been conclusively estab lished th a t Offie S tew art, ow ner of C elebrity Lounge, w as engaged in a business w hich m oved in in tra s ta te com m erce w hich, th e re fo re , could not be m ad e a p a r t of the Civil R igh ts A ct of 1964. The Su p rem e Court of the U nited S ta tes has consisten tly held th a t the F ou rteen th A m endm ent does not p ro tec t the ind iv idual invasion of the ind iv idual’s righ ts. We cite E aton V. G ruhhs, 216 F. Supp. 465 E.D. N.C. (1963) for the proposition th a t ind iv idual invasion of ind iv idual rig h ts is not the su b jec t m a tte r of the F o u rteen th A m endm ent. Also cited in su p p o rt of th is proposition a re BurtO'n v. W ilm ington P arking A u thority , 1961, 365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 6 L .Ed. 2d 45; Shelley v. K ra em er, 1948, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161; W illiam s v. H oward Johnson’s R estauran t, 4th Cir. (1959), 268 F. 2d 845, 846. P la in tiff’s com plain t a lleges th a t the police officers ch arg ed h im w ith d istu rb ing the peace and being drunk and d isorderly , both ch arg es hav ing been d is m issed by the M unicipal Court. C om plainan t fa ils to show any charges by the police officers under any ord i nance or s ta tu te deem ing it unlaw ful to serve N egroes in a saloon or lounge. No action is a lleged under such a s ta tu te , nor w as th ere , in fac t, any such action tak en by the police officers. C om plainan t a ttem p ts to show now, a f te r the tr ia l of th is m otion to d ism iss and sum m a ry judgm ent, th a t such an o rd inance ex isted on the reco rd s of the City of P laquem ipe. The D istric t Court, in d ism issing th is contention, s ta ted : “ W hether or not th e re w as, in th is case, a local o rd inance in effect w hich w as in conflict w ith Section 202 is of no m om ent. The fac ts, as c lea rly s ta ted by the p la in tiff in his com plain t, show conclusively th a t he w as denied serv ice in the C elebrity Lounge not because of the com pulsion of any s ta te or local law or ord i nance , bu t because the ow ners the reo f did not choose to serve N egroes in th e ir estab lish m ent. And since the C elebrity Lounge w as not an e s tab lish m en t covered by Section 201 of the A ct, the ow ners of C elebrity Lounge h ad a per- fee t r ig h t, under the law , to a c t as they did. H ence, p la in tiff s ta te s no c la im ag a in st the ow ners of the C elebrity Lounge, Offie and L ydia S tew art, upon w hich re lie f can be g ra n t ed in so far as an action under the Civil R ights A ct of 1964 is concerned .” In W illiam s v. Y ellow Cab C om pany of P ittsburgh , 200 F. 2nd 302, the C ourt sa id : “ I t h as long been se ttled th a t the F o u rteen th A m endm ent is d irec ted only to S ta te action and th a t the invasion by ind iv iduals is no t w ithin its purview . I t n ecessarily follows th a t the ju r isd ic tion conferred upon the F e d e ra l D is tric t C ourts by Section 1343, T itle 28, is s im ila rly lim ited and th a t re d re ss for the invasion by an ind iv idual of the civil rig h ts of ano ther m u st be sought in the S ta te C ourts un less, of course, th e re is d iversity .” U.S. V. Crookshank, 92 U.S. 542. U.S. V. H arris , 106 U.S. 629. Civil R igh ts C ases 109 U.S. 311, 17. Shelley v. K raem e r, 334 U.S. 1, 13. In S w ift V. F ourth National B a n k of Colum bus, Geor gia, 205 F . Supp. 563 the F ifth C ircu it C ourt of A ppeal sa id : “ The F ou rteen th A m endm ent canno t be the b asis fo r an action com plaining of the ac ts of p riv a te ind iv iduals or business e s tab lish m en ts .” O riginally , app e llan t a ttem p ted to base his c la im u n der Section 201(c) and 201(d) of the Civil R ights A ct of 1964 and he fu rth e r contends th a t under Section 202 the fac t th a t seg regation in ce rta in types of estab lish m en ts , even though not specifically covered by Section 201, is req u ired by s ta te or local law pu rp o rts to c lass i fy an a c t of seg regation p rac ticed in such an e s tab lishm en t as falling w ith in the in tendm en t of the Civil R ights Act. The portion of Section 201 of the Civil R ights A ct of 1964, T itle 42, U.S.C., Section 2000a, w hich seem ed to be a t issue h ere , provides as follows: “ (a) All persons shall be en titled to the full and equal en joym ent of the goods, serv ices, facilities, p riv ileges, ad v an tag es , and accom m odations of any p lace of public accom m oda tion, as defined in this section, w ithout d isc rim ination or seg regation on the ground of race , color, religion, or national origin. “ (b) E ach of the following estab lishm en ts w hich serves the public is a p lace of public a c com m odation w ith in the m eaning of th is sub ch ap te r if its operations a ffec t com m erce, or if d iscrim ination or seg regation by it is suppo rt ed by S ta te action: “ (1) any inn, hotel, m otel, or o ther estab lish m en t w hich provides lodging to tran s ien t guests, o ther th an an estab lish m en t located w ith in a building w hich contains not m ore than five room s for re n t or h ire and w hich is ac tual- 8 ly occupied by the p ro p rie to r of such estab lish m en t as his res id en ce; “ (2) any re s ta u ra n t, ca fe te ria , lunchroom , lunch counter, soda fountain , or o ther facility p rinc ipa lly engaged in selling food for coji- sum ption on the p rem ises, including, b u t not lim ited to, any such fac ility located on the p rem ises of any re ta in e s tab lish m en t; or any gasoline sta tion ; “ (3) any m otion p ic tu re house, th e a te r , con c e r t hall, spo rts a ren a , s tad ium or o ther p lace of exhibition or en te rta in m en t; and “ (4) any es tab lish m en t (A) (i) w hich is physically located w ith in the p rem ises of any estab lish m en t o therw ise covered by th is sub section, or (ii) w ith in the p rem ises of w hich is physically located any such covered estab lish m ent, and (b) w hich holds itse lf out as se rv ing p a tro n s of such covered estab lishm ent. “ (c) The operations of an es tab lishm en t af fec t com m erce w ith in the m ean ing of th is sub ch ap te r if (1) it is one of the estab lishm en ts described in p a ra g ra p h (1) of subsection (b) of th is section ; (2) in the case of an e s tab lish m en t described in p a ra g ra p h (2) of subsection (b) of this section, it se rves or offers to serve in te rs ta te tra v e le rs or a su b stan tia l portion of the food w hich it serves, or gasoline or o th e r p roducts w hich it sells, has m oved in com m e rc e ; (3) in the case of an e s tab lish m en t de scribed in p a ra g ra p h (3) of subsection (b) of th is section, it custom arily p resen ts film s, p e r fo rm ances, a th le tic team s, exhibitions, or oth e r sources of en te rta in m en t w hich m ove in com m erce; and (4) in the case of an estab lish m en t described in p a ra g ra p h (4) of subsection (b) of th is section, it is physically located w ith in the p rem ises of, or th e re is physically lo ca t ed w ithin its p rem ises, an e s tab lish m en t the operations of w hich affect com m erce w ithin the m eaning of th is subsection. F o r purposes of th is section, ‘co m m erce ’ m eans trav e l, trad e , tra ffic , com m erce, tran sp o rta tio n , or com m unication am ong the sev e ra l S ta tes , or betw een the D istric t of Colum bia and any S tate , or betw een any foreign country or any te rr i to ry or possession and any S ta te or the D istric t of Colum bia, or betw een points in the sam e S ta te but th rough any o ther S ta te or the D istric t of Colum bia or a fo reign country. “ (d) D iscrim ination or seg regation by an es tab lish m en t is supported by S ta te action w ith in the m ean ing of th is su b ch ap te r if such d is crim ination or seg regation (1) is c a rr ied on under color of any law , s ta tu te , o rd inance, or regu la tion ; or (2) is c a rr ied on under color of any custom or usage req u ired or enforced by officials of the S ta te or po litical subdivision thereo f; o r (3) is req u ired by action of the S ta te or po litical subdivision thereo f.’’ Section 202, w hich is 42 U.S.C., Section 2000a-l, is h e reby quoted for th e benefit of th is b rief: 10 “ All persons sha ll be en titled to be free , a t any es tab lish m en t or p lace, from d isc rim in a tion or seg regation of any kind on the ground of race , color, religion, or na tional origin, if such d isc rim in a tio n or seg reg a tio n is or p u r p o rts to be req u ired by any law , s ta tu te , o rd i nance , regu la tion , ru le , or o rd er of a s ta te or an y agency or po litical subdivision thereo f.” I t is c lea r from a read ing of the above sections of th e Civil R igh ts A ct th a t the C elebrity Lounge does not fa ll under Section 201 and it is c lea r from the a lleg a tions of ap p e llan t’s petition th a t no charg e w as filed ag a in st h im because of any law , s ta tu te or ord inance, regulation, ru le or order of the Town of P laquem ine requ irin g segregation . By the v ery language of the com plain t itself, Tyson w as charged w ith d istu rb ing the peace and being drunk and d isorderly , and none of said s ta tu te s req u ire s segregation . The police of fice rs w ere called by the ow ner of C elebrity Lounge, or his agent, who asked Tyson to leave in the p resence of the police officers and he refused to do so. The only a lte rn a tiv e for the ow ner or the ow ner’s agen t of th e C elebrity Lounge w as to physically oust Tyson or to se rv e him . The ow ner did not choose to serve h im nor did he choose to take the law in his own hands and physically oust him . He asked for and rece ived the help of the police officers to m a in ta in the peace and o rd e r of h is estab lishm ent. The ow ner h ad a righ t to choose th is course because th e re is no law w hich forces h im to ser% e a pa tro n he does not choose to serve. The police officers w ere un d er a co rresponding duty to m a m ta in the peace and o rd er of the tow n and its ru s ire s s estab lishm en ts, especially w hen requested to do so as in th is case. H ad the police o fficers re fused 11 to a r re s t Tyson, it could have led to ac ts of violence on the p a r ts of citizens of the town and a consequent continuation of a d is tu rbance of the peace, w hich m ay have resu lted in bloodshed or som e other serious physical violence. I t m ay be tru e th a t S tew art or his agen t d isc rim i na ted ag a in st Tyson by refusing to serve him but in so d iscrim inating , the ow ner of the C elebrity Lounge m ade his own choice to d iscrim inate . He w as not forced to do so' by the police officers; had he chosen to serve Tyson, he w as free to do so. I t is the sam e as the ow ner of a hom e who chooses to ad m it one guest ra th e r than another, and if the unw elcom e guest should in sis t on en tering the hom e and rem ain ing th e re a f te r being asked to leave, then certa in ly the ow ner has no a lte rn a tiv e than to oust him physically or call on the police to m a in ta in the peace and dignity of his hom e. W hen the Congress chose not to include a bar, saloon or lounge, such as the C elebrity Lounge, in Section 201 of the Act, it had a specific reason for th is om ission. This ce leb ra ted ac t w as con troversial, perhaps one of the m ost a rgu m en ta tiv e passed in our generation and ce rta in ly the m a tte r w as well considered by Congress. F o r th e Courts to now include it under Section 201 would p lace a leg islative function upon the Courts, w hich the Constitution of the U nited S ta tes specifically prohibits. This is not a m a tte r of jud icial in te rp re ta tio n but th is is a m a tte r of legislation. By excluding a b a r from Section 201 it is ap p aren t th a t Congress w as a tte m p t ing to p ro tec t som e of the righ ts of som e individuals to o pera te th e ir businesses in such a m an n er as to serve p a tro n s of th e ir own choosing. 12 Section 202 p ro tec ts the individual who w ishes to p ra c tic e in teg ra tion by prohibiting the s ta te from en forc ing d isc rim in a tio n or seg regation of its volition. The ow ners of the C elebrity Lounge chose not to p ra c tice in teg ration ; since the 1964 A ct does not enforce in te g ra tio n upon such people, then they had a free choice to refuse to serve Dr. Tyson. Since it m ust be inevitab ly concluded th a t the Cele b rity Lounge had such a rig h t to deny serv ice to com p la inan t, then it follows logically th a t they also had a rig h t to call the police to enforce th e ir rig h ts and again i t m u st follow logically th a t the police w ere under a corresponding duty to p reven t violence, bloodshed, and to p rev en t a c iv ilian from tak ing the law in his own hands. The action taken by the police officers in th is case should be com m ended ra th e r th an condem ned. They w ere able to rem ove the com plainan t from the p rem ises w ithout violence and in a peacefu l and digni fied m anner. Not once did they re so rt to any s ta tu te w hich enforces segregation . I t is doubtful if these police officers knew th a t such a s ta tu te existed , if one does exist, because the ch arg es m ade ag ain st Tyson w ere as follows: D isturbing the peace. Sim ple D runk and D isorderly conduct. If S tew art had chosen to in teg ra te the C elebrity Lounge and if, in so doing, w hite people had given h im trouble, it would have been the duty of the police of fice rs to rem ove said tro u b lem ak e rs because tm der Section 202 of the Civil R ights Act, a p ro p rie to r m ay in teg ra te his es tab lishm en t even though it is not one 13 covered by Section 201 of the Act. Thus, the law of fice rs of P laquem ine should not only have p erm itted in teg ra tio n bu t they should have assis ted S tew art in h is righ ts to in teg ra te his estab lishm ent, had S tew art chosen to do so. S tew art did not choose to exercise his rig h ts under Section 202. Tyson had no righ t, p riv ilege or im m unity under Section 202 unless S tew art chose to give h im such a right. Since it has been concluded th a t the actions of S tew art or his agen ts w ere individual actions, then Sections 42 U.S.C., Section 1983 and 1985 do not apply because to recover under th a t s ta tu te th e re m u st be a conspiracy under color of s ta te action and not one involving individual action. 42 U.S.C., Section 1983 provides as follows: “ E v ery person who, under color of any s ta t ute, ordinance, regulation, custom , or usage, of any s ta te or te rrito ry , sub jects, or causes to be subjected , any citizen of the U nited S tates or o ther person w ith in the ju risd iction thereof to the depriva tion of any righ ts, p riv ileges, or im m unities, secu red by the C onstitution and law s, shall be liable to the p a rty in ju red in an action a t law, su it in equity, or o ther p roper proceedings for red re ss .” Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1985 provides in p ertinen t p a r t, as follows: “ (3) If two or m ore persons in any s ta te or te rr i to ry conspire to go in disguise on the highw ay or in the p rem ises of ano ther, for the purpose of depriving, e ith er d irec tly or indi- 14 rectly , any person or c lass of persons of the equal pro tection of the law s, or of equal p riv ileges and im m unities un d er the law s; or for the purpose of p reven ting or h indering the constitu ted au thorities of any s ta te or te r r i to ry from giving or securing to all persons w ith in such s ta te or te rr i to ry the equal pro tection of the law s; * * * in any case of con sp iracy se t fo rth in this section, if one or m ore persons engaged th e re in do, or cause to be done, any ac t in fu rth eran ce of the ob ject of such conspiracy, w hereby ano ther is in ju red in his person or p roperty , or deprived of h av ing and exerc ising any righ t or priv ilege of a citizen of the U nited S tates, the p a r ty so in ju red or deprived m ay have an action for the reco v ery of d am ages, occasioned by such in ju ry or deprivation, ag a in st any one or m ore of the consp ira to rs.” U nder Section 1983 th e re w as no depriva tion of any rig h t, priv ilege or im m unity secu red by the C onstitu tion and law s of the U nited S ta tes , the S ta te of Louisi a n a or the City of P laquem ine. The action on the p a r ts of the ow ners of C elebrity Lounge w as individual a c tion p u rsu an t to th e ir constitu tionally g u a ran teed r ig h t to the equal pro tection of the law and the p eace ful use of th e ir p roperty . T here can be no conspiracy under Section 1985 w hich would lead tow ard depriv ing Dr. Tyson of the equal pro tection of the law s, or of equal p riv ileges and im m unities under the law s, w hen th e re is no law which g ran ts h im the rig h t and p riv ilege to dem and a d rink a t a b a r of th is classification. Thus, the provisions of Section 1985 a re in no w ay app licab le to the cause of action w hich com plainan t 15 has a ttem p ted to a sse rt and, the re fo re , th e re can be no consp iracy charged under sa id section. C om plainant has attem pted , a t the la s t m inute, to in jec t a new com plain t in th is cause by v irtue of a le tte r dated N ovem ber 25, 1964 subm itted to Judge W est, a t w hich tim e he a ttem p ted to in troduce new evidence and sponsor new pleadings in the form of an ordinance prohibiting the sa le of alcoholic beverages of m ore th an 3.2% by volum e for consum ption on the sam e p rem ises to persons of the w hite and C aucasian race and persons of the Negro or b lack race . This m a tte r cannot be considered by the Court a t this tim e and even if it w ere perm issib le p rocedurally , Dr. Ty son, according to allegations contained in his com plaint, w as not charged w ith a violation of any such ord inance and th e re is no evidence in the reco rd nor is th e re any allegation to the effect th a t any person a ttem p ted to sell spirituous, vinous or m a lt liquor of alcoholic content of m ore than 3.2% by volum e to p e r sons of the w hite and C aucasian race and persons of the N egro or b lack ra c e in this case, nor is th e re any evidence or a llegation th a t an a r re s t w as m ade under any such ordinance. The allegations of Dr. T yson’s com plain t do not show w h at type of liquor w as o rdered , if any spirituous liquor w as ordered . He could v ery well have o rdered a soft drink and S tew art could v ery well, under the law , have re fu sed to serve h im a soft drink. T hat is no t the issue in th is case. Tyson need not have o rdered any drink a t all and S tew art still would have had the rig h t to oust him . Dr. Tyson w as asked to leave Mr. S tew art’s p rem ises repea ted ly ; his p resence th e re am ounted to a d is tu rbance of the peace of said p rem - 16 ises in th a t it w as con tem pla ted a physical eviction would have been n ecessa ry in the even t the police had not been called upon to in tervene. R ealizing his cause w as futile on the law and fac ts as orig inally p resen ted , it seem s th a t now, in his brief, p la in tiff-appellan t is a ttem p tin g to p resen t a new se t of facts, new evidence and a new legal a rgum en t. To th is, we strenuously object. Conceding, how ever, th a t appellan t has a righ t to c re a te a new cause of action a t this tim e, and re se rv ing all righ ts in the prem ises, is p la in tiff still p erm itted to sue for dam ag es under the Civil R igh ts S ta tu te? W hat is p la in tiff’s p rocedure if the police officers did m ak e an a r re s t under a seg regation o rd inance? Section 204(a) of the Civil R ights A ct specifically spells out ap p e llan t’s course of action if it is tru e the police officers a ttem p ted to enforce a seg regation ordi nance. A civil action for p reven tive relief is allow ed and not an action for dam ages. In e ither case, ap p e llan t’s p resen t action should be d ism issed. N either the fac ts nor the law b e a r out his orig inal action for dam ages; nor is appellan t pro- cedu ra lly co rrec t in suing for dam ag es if the police officers a ttem p ted to enforce a seg regation ord inance w hich appellan t now contends is the m a in issue. On page 10 of his brief app e llan t in quoting Vice- P res id en t H um phrey, who w as then Senato r H um ph rey , contends “ if any governm ent is going to use race , color, relig ion or national origin as a basis for dep riv ing the ow ners of an estab lishm en t of freedom to 17 choose th e ir custom ers, the choice th a t will be en forced is desegregation , not seg reg a tio n ” . H ere the S tew arts exerc ised th e ir choice, and th e ir choice w as not to serve Tyson. None of the defendan ts h ere w ere a ttem p tin g to exercise a seg regation o rd inance bu t in accord w ith the very w ords of the V ice-P residen t of the U nited S tates, they w ere exerc ising the ir ‘freedom to choose th e ir cu s to m ers’. A gain on p. 11 of his brief, appellan t in quoting Mr. M acG regor s ta te s th a t Section 202 is lim ited to those situations in w hich a S ta te is enforcing an unconstitu tional law requ iring segregation . No such situation exists here. II. IF TH E CELEBRITY LOUNGE DOES FALL UNDER TH E CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, HAS COMPLAINANT FOLLOWED THE P R O PE R PR O C ED U R E? If it w ere the in tention of the p la in tiff to have b rough t th is action under the Civil R ights A ct of 1964, p la in tiff’s com plaint does not follow the p rocedure re qu ired under the 1964 Act. The p rocedure is outlined in Section 204(a) of the Civil R ights Act, w hich is hereby quoted as follows: “ (a) W henever any person has engaged or th e re a re reasonab le grounds to believe th a t any person is about to engage in any ac t or p rac tice prohibited by section 203, a civil ac tion for preven tive relief, including an app lica tion for a p e rm a n en t or te m p o ra ry injunction. 18 res tra in in g o rder, or o ther order, m ay be in stitu ted by the person aggrieved and, upon tim ely application , the court m ay, in its dis cretion, perm it the A ttorney G eneral to in te r vene in such civil action if he certifies th a t the case is of g enera l public im portance . Upon app lication by the com plainan t and in such c ircu m stan ces as the court m a y deem just, the court m ay appoint an a tto rn ey for such com p la in an t and m ay authorize the com m ence m en t of the civil action w ithout the paym ent of fees, costs, or secu rity .” The Civil R igh ts A ct does not allow m oney dam ages. In Section II, p. 13 of his b rief, appellan t seeks an in junction ag a in st the ow ners of the C elebrity Lounge and the police officers under Sections 203(a) and (c), if the a llegations of the com plain t a re proved. L e t us exam ine the p e rtin en t a rtic le s of ap p e llan t’s com plain t to d e term ine , in the ligh t of F e d e ra l and S ta te law , and the C onstitution, if any cause ex ists h e r e : TH E COMPLAINT (pp. 4- 8 R ecord) R E A S O N WHY TH E CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND SECS. 1983 AND 1985 A RE NOT A PPL IC A B L E: II. 7. P la in tiff w as told by an em ployee of the C elebrity Lounge th a t they do not se rv e colored people. Choice not to serve w as m ade by th e ow ner or his agen t. M iss G ilchrist. 19 II. 8. M rs. L ydia S tew art, the m an ag e r, requested p la in tiff to leave. No S ta te ac tion because the b a r ow ners requested the police to come. No consp iracy w here the a r re s t is based on individual action. II. 9. M rs. S tew art again told p la in tiff to leave. D efendan ts a r re s te d and ja iled p la in tiff and c h a rg ed h im w ith being drunk, d iso rderly and d isturb ing the peace. F reed o m of choice by owner. No conspiracy. No S ta te action. Ind iv id u a l ow ner requested ac tion here. No seg regation s ta tu te v io lated here. II. 10. A h earing w as held and p la in tiff w as re leased . Due process m ust have been p r e s e n t because p la in tiff w as re leased . II. 11. D efendants m aliciously deta ined plaintiff. If th is is tru e , the case fa lls into the v ery tee th of A rt. 2315, L ouisiana Civil Code. No d iversity here. Case m u s t be dism issed. II. 12. M alicious prosecution. T o rt action under Art. 2315, L ouisiana Civil Code. 20 II. 13. P la in tiff sober. alleges he w as On a sim ple drunk charge , p la in tiff w as tr ied and acqu itted . M any an a c cused, under a s im ila r charge , would have re l ished th is acqu itta l. III. 14. C onspiracy. W here? T here a re no fac ts in the com plain t, alleging any m eeting of the m inds betw een the S tew arts and the police officers. III. 15. P ub lic accom m odations, un d er color of law and of the custom s and usages of the S ta te of Louisiana. The S tew arts chose not to se rv e Tyson. This b a r is no t covered by 201, and 202 does no t apply w here the p ro p rie to r w ishes to keep a. seg reg a ted b a r. III. 16. D enial of due process. P la in tiff w as tr ied and ac qu itted w ith in tw enty-four hours. 21 III. 17. C onspiracy to deprive p la in tiff of a rig h t g u a ra n teed to him . W herein does the law g u aran tee any m a n the rig h t to dem and serv ice a t a b a r w here the ow ner does not w ish to serve him . III. 18. P la in tiff w as detained, em b arra ssed , caused dis com fort, m ade a public spec tac le and caused im p a irm e n t of his re p u ta tion. T h e s e a re allegations w hich sound in to r t and should be tr ied under Art. 2315, L ouisiana Civil Code. III. 19. $100,000 dam ages. No dam ag es allow ed un der Civil R igh ts Act. S tew a r ts w ere acting individ ually and, therefo re , do not fa ll under 42 U.S.C., Section 1983 and Sec. 1985. If th e re w as no conspir acy on the p a r t of the S tew arts, then th e ir a l leged co-conspira tors can not be guilty of a conspir acy. 22 III. DOES THE FED ERA L COURT HAVE JU R IS DICTION O F TH IS CAUSE? We have estab lished th a t th is case does not com e under the Civil R ights Act nor does it com e under 42, U.S.C. 1983 and 1985. The nex t d e term ina tion would be d iversity of citizenship and the requisite^ ju risd ic tional am ount. T here is no d iversity here and no serious c la im for m oney dam ages w hich can su b stan tia te an a llegation of $10,000.00 and, fu rth e rm o re , if th is action is based on m alicious prosecu tion as alleged in the com plaint in A rticle 2, P a ra g ra p h 11, then it should have been brough t under A rticle 2315 of the Civil Code of the S ta te of Louisiana. Y g lesia s vs. G ulf S trea m P a rk R acing A sso ciation, 201 F. 2d 817, which is a F ifth C ircuit C ourt of A ppeals case, w herein it w as alleged th a t the Gulf S tream P a rk R acing A ssociation, acting under color of law of the S ta te of F lo ri da, did sub jec t the p la in tiff or cause h e r to be sub jected to a deprivation of righ ts secu red by the Constitution of the U nited S ta tes by cau s ing h e r to be falsely im prisoned for an u n re a sonable period of tim e w ithout bond, and w ith out an opportunity to confer w ith Counsel and caused her to be pu t to tr ia l on a c rim in a l charge th ereby depriv ing h e r of her lib e rty w ithout due p rocess of law and of the rig h t to have a fa ir tr ia l conducted in accordance w ith due p rocess of law. The Court held th a t this w as essen tia lly a charge of fa lse im prison m en t and p erhaps m alicious prosecu tion and 23 therefo re the com plain t fa ils to s ta te its c laim for re lie f in the scope of 8 USCA Sec. 43. (This is now 42 USCA 1983). CONCLUSION A ppellan t’s conclusion asks for a rev e rsa l and re m an d to afford an opportunity to prove the allegations of his com plaint. L et us suppose I w ere to adm it the a llegations of his com plaint, and for the purposes of a m otion for su m m a ry ju d g m en t w hich w as filed h e re in don’t we ad m it the com pla in t’s well p leaded a llega tions, then does it m ak e any d ifference as to the legal outcom e of th is m a tte r? Will Dr. Tyson, John Doe, E d w ard Brow n, or A bram W hite have a rig h t to in sist on drinking a t a b a r w here the ow ner says. No? I th ink not. Will all police action be called S ta te A ction even w hen the individual p ro p rie to r has req u ested th a t action? P ro cedu ra lly , can appellan t am end his p leadings w ith a le tte r to the F e d e ra l D istric t, Judge and an a rg u m e n t in his app e lla te b rie f effecting such an am endm ent? E ven if this am en d m en t w ere perm issib le , did th e defendan ts m ove in under color of s ta te law or city ordinance req u irin g seg regation or w as this the in dividual action of the lounge’s p ro p rie to rs? Does any m a n in A m erica have a rig h t anym ore to ply any tra d e or p rac tice any profession in the m a n n er he deem s to the b es t in te res t of h is p a trons and clients and in acco rdance w ith his own concept as to his busi- 24 ness and professional lim ita tions and capab ilities, or m u s t every doctor tr e a t every pa tien t, m u st ev ery law y er tak e every case, m u s t every b u sinessm an serve ev ery custom er th e reb y reducing his ability to serve those he h as chosen to serve and to p rac tice m edicine and law in the best p rofessional m an n er w ithout c lu t te ring his office or his p rac tice w ith too m any cases, p a tien ts or custom ers? Thus, in sum m ariz ing th is con clusion, the answ er to the problem s here in a re as fol lows: 1. Civil R ights A ct of 1964 does not apply to the C elebrity Lounge. 2. If it does apply, appellan t has not followed the p rocedure outlined in the A ct of 1964. 3. The police officers in th is case did not ac t under any seg regation o rd inance bu t w ere called upon by the individual action of the S tew arts. 4. A ppellant, if he has any case a t all ag a in st th e police officers, fa lls under A rticle 2315 of the L ouisiana Civil Code. 5. M oney d am ag es a re not allow able under the Civil R igh ts A ct of 1964. 6. In o rder to recover under Sections 1983 and 1985 of T itle 42, U.S.C., p lain tiff m u st prove th a t the S tew arts w ere acting under color of som e s ta tu te , ord inance, reg u la tion, custom or usage of the s ta te . The ac- 25 tions of Mr. and M rs. S tew art w ere in d ividual actions. 7. T here is no rig h t g ran ted to the p lain tiff to rem ain , unw anted, on the p rem ises of the C elebrity Lounge, e ith e r by the Civil R ights A ct of 1964 or by Title 42, U.S.C., Section 1983 or Section 1985. 8. T here is no fed era l ju risd ic tion h ere be cause th e re is no fed era l offense, nor does th is action p rom ulgate a v io lation of the fed era lly g u a ran teed civil right. R espectfu lly subm itted . (Signed) EDWARD N. ENGOLIO EDW ARD N. ENGOLIO 514 R ailroad Avenue P laquem ine, Louisiana A ttorney for A ppellees, Lt. C larence J. Cazes, O fficer Lionel Stein, O fficer L es te r H aydel, J r., O fficer Sam uel Savage, Chief of Police, Dennis Songy 26 CERTIFICATE I certify th a t a copy of the foregoing b rie f has been served upon opposing counsel of reco rd by placing the sam e p roperly add ressed in the United S ta tes M ail w ith adequa te postage affixed thereto . V Scofields’ Q uality P rin ters, Inc. — N ew O rleans, La.