Campaign Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum of for Law In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion Summary Judgement
Public Court Documents
November 19, 1996
11 pages
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Case Files, Campaign to Save our Public Hospitals v. Giuliani Hardbacks. Campaign Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum of for Law In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion Summary Judgement, 1996. 1201a073-6835-f011-8c4e-7c1e5267c7b6. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9bf84e3e-15a9-42f8-9d99-f6a977306423/campaign-plaintiffs-supplemental-memorandum-of-for-law-in-support-of-plaintiffs-motion-summary-judgement. Accessed December 05, 2025.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF QUEENS
oo i pe er 0 ot we ame ee
THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.
Plaintiffs, INDEX NO. 004897-96
- against -
RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, THE MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al,
Defendants.
wi 30, ti ct ne en mn en ne X
CAMPAIGN TO SAVE OUR PUBLIC HOSPITALS -
QUEENS COALITION, an unincorporated
association, et al.,
Plaintiffs, INDEX NO. 10763/96
- against -
RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, THE MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
i. so pm ee te ee a ep X
CAMPAIGN PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
KENNETH KIMERLING
PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCATION FUND, INC.
99 Hudson St., 14th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10013
(212) 219-3360
ELAINE R. JONES
Director-Counsel
NORMAN CHACHKIN
MARIANNE L. ENGELMAN LADO
RACHEL D. GODSIL
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL
FUND, INC.
99 Hudson St., 1leth Floor
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
BARBARA OLSHANSKY
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
666 Broadway, 7th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10012
(212) 664-6464
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF QUEENS
em mw em i et 5 mi. on A. we X
THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.
Plaintiffs, INDEX NO. 004897-96
- against -
RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, THE MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al,
Defendants.
2 sm i ree aS em eo, eer Sl X
CAMPAIGN TO SAVE OUR PUBLIC HOSPITALS -
QUEENS COALITION, an unincorporated
association, et al.,
Plaintiffs, INDEX NO. 10763/96
- against -
RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, THE MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
ws 2 mm 0 oS nt Sv fn. Sm) em ms i mn i rm X
CAMPAIGN PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Digpogitions of New" York: (City’s real property are
unquestionably among the most important issues facing local
government. Land and resources are scarce and the implications for
the affected neighborhood may be grave. Similarly, the provision
of health care to New York City residents and particularly to the
poor is one of New York City government’s most central
responsibilities; the City is obligated by the State constitution
to provide care to the poor.’
1
The New York State Constitution mandates that the State
and its political subdivisions provide aid, care, and support for
the needy and protect the health of the inhabitants of the State
When the City determined that a public benefit corporation
would more effectively provide care to the indigent than the
municipal hospital system, the City worked closely with the State
Legislature and the Governor for the enactment of the Health and
Hospitals Act which created the Health and Hospitals Corporation
("HHC") .2 - Although a primary goal of the City and the Act was to
free HHC from constraints upon its ability to deliver health
services, the enactment also effectuated the concurrent goal of
ensuring the City's econcinuing control over its real property.’
Accordingly, the HHC Act restricted HHC from disposing of any
health facility or real property of the City without consent from
the Board of Estimate. "U.L. § 7385(6).
It is undisputed that when the HHC Act was passed, the Board
of Estimate had authority, under the City Charter, to consider both
the business terms and the land use effects of any disposition of
the City’s real property. Contrary to defendants’ claim, nothing
in the language of the HHC Act or its legislative history suggests
that there was any intention to limit the Board of Estimate’s
plenary authority when it considered the disposition of the City’s
real property by HHC. Rather, the HHC Act, while facilitating the
and the City of New York. New York State Constitution Article
XV1l, Section 3 & 4.
2 See Letter from Mayor Lindsay to Governor Rockefeller,
dated May 8, 1969, contained in Governor’s Bill Jacket 1969,
Chapter 1016 at 10.
? 1d. 8c 13 ("The corporation could not transfer or dispose
Of . any’ health facility or real property acquired from or
constructed for the City without public hearing and consent of the
Board of Estimate").
Clty’'s interest in‘ providing high quality health care tro the
indigent, preserved City control of its real property through Board
of Estimate review of both the business terms and the land use
implications of any dlspoutelen of that property.
Under the revised City Charter, the Board of Estimate’s
authority is now divided. The Mayor has been granted authority to
approve the business terms of any disposition of City property and,
through the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure ("ULURP"),* the City
Council has been granted the authority -- formerly held by the
Board of Estimate -- to be the final decisionmaker in the review of
the land use implications of a disposition of City property.’
Therefore, in light of this restructuring of City government since
enactment of the HHC enabling legislation, the only interpretation
Of the HHC Act that is consistent with its language and its
purposes as reflected in the legislative history is this: the
authority to consent to the business terms of any City real
property by HHC lies with the Mayor, while the authority to review
and approve or disapprove the land use effects and implications of
any such transfer lies with the City Council through ULURP.
NewYork City Charter § 197-c. For a thorough discussion
of the applicability of ULURP to the disposition of New York City’s
real property by HHC, see Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 18-21
[hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Opening Memorandum] and Plaintiffs’ Reply
Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at pp. 3-9 [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum] .
°* See Final Report of the New York City Charter Revision
Commission (March 1990) at 19 [hereinafter New York City Charter
Commission Final Report].
Defendanig’ reliance upon § 1152(e) of the City Charter to
argue to the contrary is unavailing. Section 1152 (e) provides that
upon the dissolution of the Board of Estimate, the powers it
exercised as set forth by any state or local law should devolve
upon. the body, agency or Officer of the City charged with
comparable and related powers and responsibilities under the
Charter. The Board of Estimate had the power to review both the
land use and the business terms of a disposition of property by
HHC; both powers must devolve to the appropriate entities. Because
the Charter devolves the power over land use to the Council through
ULURP, and the authority to consent to the business terms to the
Mayor, § 1152 requires a like interpretation of the HHC Act.
ARGUMENT
A. The HHC Act Provided for a Land Use Review of any
Disposition by HHC of City Property
The HHC Act clearly intended for there to be authority to
conduct a land use review of any disposition of the target
hospitals by HHC. Defendants’ unsupported and conclusory argument
that the HHC Act withheld the authority to conduct a land use
review is completely unsupported by the HHC Act. See U.L. §
7385(6)
The text of the HHC Act requires consent by the Board of
Estimate to any HHC decision to dispose of City-owned property.
U.L. § 7385(6) As defendants note in their opening memorandum,
under the City Charter in effect when the HHC Act was enacted, the
Board of Estimate had authority to review both the land use and the
business terms of dispositions of City-owned property. Defendants’
4
Opening Memorandum at 18; City Charter Commission Final Report at
19; see generally Tribeca Community Associations Inc. v. New York
State Urban Development Corporation, Index No. 20355 (April 1,
1993 Sup.” Ct. "N.Y. . County) (attached to Plaintiffs’ Opening
memorandum) . The former Charter § 384 provided:
Disposal of property of the city. a. No property of the city
may be sold, leased, exchanged or otherwise disposed of except
with the approval of the board of estimate
The HHC Act § 7385(6) provides:
[NJo health facility or other real property acquired or
constructed by the corporation shall be sold, leased, or
otherwise transferred by the corporation . . . without the
consent of the board of estimate of the city;
It is obvious that the HHC Act was modeled upon the former Charter:
both required Board of Estimate approval or consent prior to a
disposition of the City’s real property.
The Act itself thus does not limit the Board of Estimate’s
power to consider the business terms of any disposition of City
property. Instead, the Act required the consent of the Board of
Estimate prior to any disposition of City property by HHC without
any limitation upon the issues considered by the Board of Estimate
in deciding whether to grant its consent. The Act granted the
Board of Estimate the authority to consider the full panapoly of
issues it would consider in any other disposition of city property:
namely, the business terms and the land use impacts.
Nor does the legislative history provide any support for the
defendants’ argument. There are several explicit references in
materials contained in the Governor’s Bill Jacket to HHC'’s power to
sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of real property of the City.
Each such reference is accompanied by an explanation of the limitation
upon HHC’s power: the Board of Estimate must consent. Relevant
quotes from the Governor’s Bill Jacket are listed below:
* "The corporation could not transfer or dispose of any
health facility or real property acquired from or
constructed for the City without public hearing and
consent of the Board of Estimate." Letter of Mayor
Lindsay to Governor Rockefeller dated May 8, 1969,
Governor’s Bill Jacket at 14 (urging passage) .
"Real or personal property could be disposed of by sale,
lease, or sublease but could not be transferred from the
corporation without a public hearing and the approval of
the Board of Estimate." Legislative Memorandum,
Community Service Society of New York, Committee on
Health, April 14, 1969, Governor’s Bill Jacket at 29
(urging opposition).
"The powers of the Corporation are set forth, including
that of receiving direct payment for health services
rendered; to borrow money and issue bonds but if for
construction of a health facility, only on prior approval
of the Mayor; to dispose of real property after public
hearing and with consent of the Board of Estimate."
Letter of State of New York Department of Health to
Counsel to the Governor dated May 20, 1969, Governor’s
Bill Jacket at 66 (recommending enactment) .
"Mr. Lindsay also said that the corporation would not be
authorized to sell or lease any hospital or health
facility without the permission of the Board of Estimate,
the same procedure now followed by the Health Services
Administration." New Health Unit Urged by Mayor: Public Corporation
Would Manage City Hospitals, New York Times, December 13, 1968,
Governor's Bill Jacket at 178.
The legislative history therefore illustrates that the Act intended
to provide HHC power to dispose of real property of the City only
with the consent of the Board of Estimate -- exercising its full
powers of review.
Indeed, it is notable that the procedure set forth in the HHC
Act for disposing of the City’s real property by HHC was the same
procedure followed by the Health Services Administration, the City
agency that operated the municipal hospital system. Undoubtedly,
when the Board of Estimate considered whether to approve of a
disposition by the Health Services Administration of real property,
the Board of Estimate had the authority to consider land use
effects as it did in all other dispositions of City property.
Defendants wunpersuasively seek to rely upon the 1985
disposition of the R&S building at Bellevue hospital to support
their argument that the Board of Estimate lacked authority under the
HHC Act to consider the land use effects of a disposition of City
property. This argument fails for several reasons. First, the
Board of Estimate did consider the land use impacts of that
disposition, see Supplementary Affidavit of Gail Benjamin,
September 20, 1996; Appearance Notice for September 13, 1985 Board
of Estimate Hearing annexed to Affirmation of Rachel D. Godsil,
November 19, 1996. Second, the only point defendants can make is
that the Board of Estimate did not subject the sublease itself to
ULURP. ULURP was complied with, however, in the companion
resolution followed by the Board of Estimate in approving the
zoning change necessary for the purchase. Therefore, the
disposition itself was subject to ULURP. See Board of Estimate
Resolucion No. 13, Exhibit B of Affirmation of David Karnovsky,
September 30, 1996. Finally, even if the Board of Estimate had
chosen not to exercise its recognized land use powers in
considering that sublease -- a conclusion plaintiffs dispute --
such a decision would not support defendants’ argument that the
Board of Estimate lacked those powers. Defendants’ argument flies
directly in the face of the HHC Act which clearly intended for
there to be consideration of the land use impacts of any
disposition of City property by HHC.
B. The Board of Estimate’s Authority Over Land Use Review
Devolves to the City Council
With the dissolution of the Board of Estimate, the City
Charter now divides the authority to consent to dispositions of
City-owned land between the Mayor and, through ULURP, the City
Council. New York City Charter § 384 (a) & (b) (5); City Charter
Commission Final Report at 19. Section 1152 (e) provides that upon
dissolution of the Board of Estimate, the powers it exercised "set
forth in any state or local law that are not otherwise devolved by
the terms of such law" are to "devolve upon the body, agency or
officer of the city charged with comparable and related powers and
responsibilities under" the Charter. New York City Charter §
1152 (e) (emphasis added). The HHC Act requires the consent of the
Board of Estimate prior to any disposition of the City’s real
property... HHC Act 7582(6).
Section 1152 (e) thus provides that, for purposes of the HHC
Act, the Board of Estimate’s authority is divided as it is by the
City Charter. Therefore, for purposes of the HHC Act, the Board of
Estimate’s land use authority devolves to the City Council through
ULURP. New York City Charter §8§ 197-c & 384 (a) & (b) (5); New York
City Charter Commission Final Report at 19.
Ignoring the clear language of § 7385(6) of the HHC Act,
defendants make the conclusory assertion -- refuted above -- that
the Board of Estimate had only the power to approve the business
terms of transactions. under § :7385(6) and “that .§ 1152(e)
accordingly requires devolution of the Board of Estimate’s consent
powers under § 7385(6) only to the Mayor and only with respect to
business terms. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum at 12. Because
defendants lack any support in the HHC Act for the proposition that
the Board of Estimate’s consent powers are so limited, their
argument under § 1152(e) is plainly wrong.
The HHC Act intended for a land use review of dispositions by
HHC of City-owned property. The target hospitals are City-owned
property. The City Charter provides that such a review should take
place under the auspices of the ULURP process with final
decisionmaking authority residing in the City Council. Plaintiffs
are thus entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that
defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied, and plaintiffs’
cross-motion for summary judgment be granted, together with such
other and further relief as the Court shall deem just and proper.
Dated: New York, New York
November 19, 1996
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
KENNETH KIMERLING
PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE &
EDUCATION FUND, INC.
99 Hudson St..,: 14th Floor
New York, New York 10013
9
(212) 219-3360
ELAINE R. JONES
Director-Counsel
NORMAN CHACHKIN
MARIANNE L. ENGELMAN LADO
RACHEL D. GODSIL
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL
FUND, INC.
99 Hudson 8t., 16th Floor
New York, New York 10013
(212) 219-1900
BARBARA OLSHANSKY
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
666 Broadway, 7th Floor
New York, New York 10012
(212) 664-6464
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
10