Campaign Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum of for Law In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion Summary Judgement
Public Court Documents
November 19, 1996

11 pages
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Case Files, Campaign to Save our Public Hospitals v. Giuliani Hardbacks. Campaign Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum of for Law In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion Summary Judgement, 1996. 1201a073-6835-f011-8c4e-7c1e5267c7b6. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9bf84e3e-15a9-42f8-9d99-f6a977306423/campaign-plaintiffs-supplemental-memorandum-of-for-law-in-support-of-plaintiffs-motion-summary-judgement. Accessed June 06, 2025.
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rt £ » . % 3 . ¥ h SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF QUEENS oo i pe er 0 ot we ame ee THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al. Plaintiffs, INDEX NO. 004897-96 - against - RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al, Defendants. wi 30, ti ct ne en mn en ne X CAMPAIGN TO SAVE OUR PUBLIC HOSPITALS - QUEENS COALITION, an unincorporated association, et al., Plaintiffs, INDEX NO. 10763/96 - against - RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. i. so pm ee te ee a ep X CAMPAIGN PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT KENNETH KIMERLING PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC. 99 Hudson St., 14th Floor New York, N.Y. 10013 (212) 219-3360 ELAINE R. JONES Director-Counsel NORMAN CHACHKIN MARIANNE L. ENGELMAN LADO RACHEL D. GODSIL NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 99 Hudson St., 1leth Floor New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900 BARBARA OLSHANSKY CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 666 Broadway, 7th Floor New York, N.Y. 10012 (212) 664-6464 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF QUEENS em mw em i et 5 mi. on A. we X THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al. Plaintiffs, INDEX NO. 004897-96 - against - RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al, Defendants. 2 sm i ree aS em eo, eer Sl X CAMPAIGN TO SAVE OUR PUBLIC HOSPITALS - QUEENS COALITION, an unincorporated association, et al., Plaintiffs, INDEX NO. 10763/96 - against - RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. ws 2 mm 0 oS nt Sv fn. Sm) em ms i mn i rm X CAMPAIGN PLAINTIFFS’ SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Digpogitions of New" York: (City’s real property are unquestionably among the most important issues facing local government. Land and resources are scarce and the implications for the affected neighborhood may be grave. Similarly, the provision of health care to New York City residents and particularly to the poor is one of New York City government’s most central responsibilities; the City is obligated by the State constitution to provide care to the poor.’ 1 The New York State Constitution mandates that the State and its political subdivisions provide aid, care, and support for the needy and protect the health of the inhabitants of the State When the City determined that a public benefit corporation would more effectively provide care to the indigent than the municipal hospital system, the City worked closely with the State Legislature and the Governor for the enactment of the Health and Hospitals Act which created the Health and Hospitals Corporation ("HHC") .2 - Although a primary goal of the City and the Act was to free HHC from constraints upon its ability to deliver health services, the enactment also effectuated the concurrent goal of ensuring the City's econcinuing control over its real property.’ Accordingly, the HHC Act restricted HHC from disposing of any health facility or real property of the City without consent from the Board of Estimate. "U.L. § 7385(6). It is undisputed that when the HHC Act was passed, the Board of Estimate had authority, under the City Charter, to consider both the business terms and the land use effects of any disposition of the City’s real property. Contrary to defendants’ claim, nothing in the language of the HHC Act or its legislative history suggests that there was any intention to limit the Board of Estimate’s plenary authority when it considered the disposition of the City’s real property by HHC. Rather, the HHC Act, while facilitating the and the City of New York. New York State Constitution Article XV1l, Section 3 & 4. 2 See Letter from Mayor Lindsay to Governor Rockefeller, dated May 8, 1969, contained in Governor’s Bill Jacket 1969, Chapter 1016 at 10. ? 1d. 8c 13 ("The corporation could not transfer or dispose Of . any’ health facility or real property acquired from or constructed for the City without public hearing and consent of the Board of Estimate"). Clty’'s interest in‘ providing high quality health care tro the indigent, preserved City control of its real property through Board of Estimate review of both the business terms and the land use implications of any dlspoutelen of that property. Under the revised City Charter, the Board of Estimate’s authority is now divided. The Mayor has been granted authority to approve the business terms of any disposition of City property and, through the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure ("ULURP"),* the City Council has been granted the authority -- formerly held by the Board of Estimate -- to be the final decisionmaker in the review of the land use implications of a disposition of City property.’ Therefore, in light of this restructuring of City government since enactment of the HHC enabling legislation, the only interpretation Of the HHC Act that is consistent with its language and its purposes as reflected in the legislative history is this: the authority to consent to the business terms of any City real property by HHC lies with the Mayor, while the authority to review and approve or disapprove the land use effects and implications of any such transfer lies with the City Council through ULURP. NewYork City Charter § 197-c. For a thorough discussion of the applicability of ULURP to the disposition of New York City’s real property by HHC, see Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 18-21 [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Opening Memorandum] and Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at pp. 3-9 [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Reply Memorandum] . °* See Final Report of the New York City Charter Revision Commission (March 1990) at 19 [hereinafter New York City Charter Commission Final Report]. Defendanig’ reliance upon § 1152(e) of the City Charter to argue to the contrary is unavailing. Section 1152 (e) provides that upon the dissolution of the Board of Estimate, the powers it exercised as set forth by any state or local law should devolve upon. the body, agency or Officer of the City charged with comparable and related powers and responsibilities under the Charter. The Board of Estimate had the power to review both the land use and the business terms of a disposition of property by HHC; both powers must devolve to the appropriate entities. Because the Charter devolves the power over land use to the Council through ULURP, and the authority to consent to the business terms to the Mayor, § 1152 requires a like interpretation of the HHC Act. ARGUMENT A. The HHC Act Provided for a Land Use Review of any Disposition by HHC of City Property The HHC Act clearly intended for there to be authority to conduct a land use review of any disposition of the target hospitals by HHC. Defendants’ unsupported and conclusory argument that the HHC Act withheld the authority to conduct a land use review is completely unsupported by the HHC Act. See U.L. § 7385(6) The text of the HHC Act requires consent by the Board of Estimate to any HHC decision to dispose of City-owned property. U.L. § 7385(6) As defendants note in their opening memorandum, under the City Charter in effect when the HHC Act was enacted, the Board of Estimate had authority to review both the land use and the business terms of dispositions of City-owned property. Defendants’ 4 Opening Memorandum at 18; City Charter Commission Final Report at 19; see generally Tribeca Community Associations Inc. v. New York State Urban Development Corporation, Index No. 20355 (April 1, 1993 Sup.” Ct. "N.Y. . County) (attached to Plaintiffs’ Opening memorandum) . The former Charter § 384 provided: Disposal of property of the city. a. No property of the city may be sold, leased, exchanged or otherwise disposed of except with the approval of the board of estimate The HHC Act § 7385(6) provides: [NJo health facility or other real property acquired or constructed by the corporation shall be sold, leased, or otherwise transferred by the corporation . . . without the consent of the board of estimate of the city; It is obvious that the HHC Act was modeled upon the former Charter: both required Board of Estimate approval or consent prior to a disposition of the City’s real property. The Act itself thus does not limit the Board of Estimate’s power to consider the business terms of any disposition of City property. Instead, the Act required the consent of the Board of Estimate prior to any disposition of City property by HHC without any limitation upon the issues considered by the Board of Estimate in deciding whether to grant its consent. The Act granted the Board of Estimate the authority to consider the full panapoly of issues it would consider in any other disposition of city property: namely, the business terms and the land use impacts. Nor does the legislative history provide any support for the defendants’ argument. There are several explicit references in materials contained in the Governor’s Bill Jacket to HHC'’s power to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of real property of the City. Each such reference is accompanied by an explanation of the limitation upon HHC’s power: the Board of Estimate must consent. Relevant quotes from the Governor’s Bill Jacket are listed below: * "The corporation could not transfer or dispose of any health facility or real property acquired from or constructed for the City without public hearing and consent of the Board of Estimate." Letter of Mayor Lindsay to Governor Rockefeller dated May 8, 1969, Governor’s Bill Jacket at 14 (urging passage) . "Real or personal property could be disposed of by sale, lease, or sublease but could not be transferred from the corporation without a public hearing and the approval of the Board of Estimate." Legislative Memorandum, Community Service Society of New York, Committee on Health, April 14, 1969, Governor’s Bill Jacket at 29 (urging opposition). "The powers of the Corporation are set forth, including that of receiving direct payment for health services rendered; to borrow money and issue bonds but if for construction of a health facility, only on prior approval of the Mayor; to dispose of real property after public hearing and with consent of the Board of Estimate." Letter of State of New York Department of Health to Counsel to the Governor dated May 20, 1969, Governor’s Bill Jacket at 66 (recommending enactment) . "Mr. Lindsay also said that the corporation would not be authorized to sell or lease any hospital or health facility without the permission of the Board of Estimate, the same procedure now followed by the Health Services Administration." New Health Unit Urged by Mayor: Public Corporation Would Manage City Hospitals, New York Times, December 13, 1968, Governor's Bill Jacket at 178. The legislative history therefore illustrates that the Act intended to provide HHC power to dispose of real property of the City only with the consent of the Board of Estimate -- exercising its full powers of review. Indeed, it is notable that the procedure set forth in the HHC Act for disposing of the City’s real property by HHC was the same procedure followed by the Health Services Administration, the City agency that operated the municipal hospital system. Undoubtedly, when the Board of Estimate considered whether to approve of a disposition by the Health Services Administration of real property, the Board of Estimate had the authority to consider land use effects as it did in all other dispositions of City property. Defendants wunpersuasively seek to rely upon the 1985 disposition of the R&S building at Bellevue hospital to support their argument that the Board of Estimate lacked authority under the HHC Act to consider the land use effects of a disposition of City property. This argument fails for several reasons. First, the Board of Estimate did consider the land use impacts of that disposition, see Supplementary Affidavit of Gail Benjamin, September 20, 1996; Appearance Notice for September 13, 1985 Board of Estimate Hearing annexed to Affirmation of Rachel D. Godsil, November 19, 1996. Second, the only point defendants can make is that the Board of Estimate did not subject the sublease itself to ULURP. ULURP was complied with, however, in the companion resolution followed by the Board of Estimate in approving the zoning change necessary for the purchase. Therefore, the disposition itself was subject to ULURP. See Board of Estimate Resolucion No. 13, Exhibit B of Affirmation of David Karnovsky, September 30, 1996. Finally, even if the Board of Estimate had chosen not to exercise its recognized land use powers in considering that sublease -- a conclusion plaintiffs dispute -- such a decision would not support defendants’ argument that the Board of Estimate lacked those powers. Defendants’ argument flies directly in the face of the HHC Act which clearly intended for there to be consideration of the land use impacts of any disposition of City property by HHC. B. The Board of Estimate’s Authority Over Land Use Review Devolves to the City Council With the dissolution of the Board of Estimate, the City Charter now divides the authority to consent to dispositions of City-owned land between the Mayor and, through ULURP, the City Council. New York City Charter § 384 (a) & (b) (5); City Charter Commission Final Report at 19. Section 1152 (e) provides that upon dissolution of the Board of Estimate, the powers it exercised "set forth in any state or local law that are not otherwise devolved by the terms of such law" are to "devolve upon the body, agency or officer of the city charged with comparable and related powers and responsibilities under" the Charter. New York City Charter § 1152 (e) (emphasis added). The HHC Act requires the consent of the Board of Estimate prior to any disposition of the City’s real property... HHC Act 7582(6). Section 1152 (e) thus provides that, for purposes of the HHC Act, the Board of Estimate’s authority is divided as it is by the City Charter. Therefore, for purposes of the HHC Act, the Board of Estimate’s land use authority devolves to the City Council through ULURP. New York City Charter §8§ 197-c & 384 (a) & (b) (5); New York City Charter Commission Final Report at 19. Ignoring the clear language of § 7385(6) of the HHC Act, defendants make the conclusory assertion -- refuted above -- that the Board of Estimate had only the power to approve the business terms of transactions. under § :7385(6) and “that .§ 1152(e) accordingly requires devolution of the Board of Estimate’s consent powers under § 7385(6) only to the Mayor and only with respect to business terms. Defendants’ Reply Memorandum at 12. Because defendants lack any support in the HHC Act for the proposition that the Board of Estimate’s consent powers are so limited, their argument under § 1152(e) is plainly wrong. The HHC Act intended for a land use review of dispositions by HHC of City-owned property. The target hospitals are City-owned property. The City Charter provides that such a review should take place under the auspices of the ULURP process with final decisionmaking authority residing in the City Council. Plaintiffs are thus entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied, and plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment be granted, together with such other and further relief as the Court shall deem just and proper. Dated: New York, New York November 19, 1996 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, KENNETH KIMERLING PUERTO RICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND, INC. 99 Hudson St..,: 14th Floor New York, New York 10013 9 (212) 219-3360 ELAINE R. JONES Director-Counsel NORMAN CHACHKIN MARIANNE L. ENGELMAN LADO RACHEL D. GODSIL NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 99 Hudson 8t., 16th Floor New York, New York 10013 (212) 219-1900 BARBARA OLSHANSKY CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 666 Broadway, 7th Floor New York, New York 10012 (212) 664-6464 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS 10