Cooper v. Aaron Brief for Appellants

Public Court Documents
January 1, 1957

Cooper v. Aaron Brief for Appellants preview

Case is commonly referred to as "Cooper v. Aaron" but is written on the brief as "Aaron v. Cooper"

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  • Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Cooper v. Aaron Brief for Appellants, 1957. 23570bae-ab9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9c17b06a-ea68-4e29-a493-ed2803be440e/cooper-v-aaron-brief-for-appellants. Accessed July 07, 2025.

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    Intteft Stairs OInurt of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit

No. 15675 
Civil

JOHN AARON, A Minor, by THELMA AARON, His 
Mother and Next Friend, et al.,

against
Appellants,

WILLIAM G-. COOPER, et al.,
Appellees.

Appeal from the U nited States District Court for the 
E astern District of A rkansas, W estern Division

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

W iley A. Branton,
119 East Barraque Street, 

Pine Bluff, Arkansas,
U. S. T ate,

4207 Oakland Avenue,
Dallas 15, Texas,

R obert L. Carter,
T hijrgood Marshall,

107 West 43rd Street,
New York 36, N. Y., 

Attorneys for Appellants.

S upreme P rinting  Co., I nc., 114 W orth S treet, N. Y. 13, B E ek m an  3-2320



I N D E X

PAGE

Statement of the Case .............................................  1
Points and Authorities ........................ ................... 5
Argument:

There Are No Valid Reasons of an Equitable or 
Administrative Nature Warranting Appellees 
Being Granted an Extension of Time Beyond 
September, 1957, Either in Starting or Com­
pleting Desegregation at the Junior High and 
Elementary School Levels in the Little Rock 
School District Such as Proposed by Appel­
lees and Approved by the Judgment Below . .. 5

Conclusion................................ .................................  16

Table of Cases

Booker, et al. v. State of Tennessee Board of Educa­
tion, —- F. 2d — (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 1957)............... 15

Bowles v. Simon, 145 F. 2d 334 (7th Cir. 1944).......  15
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; 349 U. S.

294 ....................................................................2,3,5,14,15
Bush v. Orleans School Board, 138 F. Supp. 336, 337 

(E. D. La. 1956)......................................................  2
Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F. 2d 853 (6th 

Cir. 1956) ...............................................................  5,15
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 3 0 ..................................  2
Orleans School Board v. Bush, 351 U. S. 948 ........... 2
Pierce v. Board of Education of Cabell County (S. D.

W. Va. 1956), unreported ....................................  14
Shedd v. Board of Education of Logan County (S. D.

W. Va. 1956), Civil Action 873, unreported...........  14



ii
PAGE

Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631................  6
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 .................................  6
Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 144 

F. Supp. 239 (E. D. Ya. 1956), aff’d — F. 2d —
(4th Cir. Dec. 31, 1956) ........................................ 14-15

Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 112............. 15
Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp, 177 (W. D. Ky. 1955) 5,14

Other Authorities

Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954)..................  11
Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools (1954)...........  9,10
Blose and Jaracz, Biennial Survey of Education in 

the United States 1948-1950, Table 43 (1952).......  7
Bustard, The New Jersey Story, 21 Journal of Negro 

Education (1952) ....................................................  10
Chein, Deutsch, Hyman and Jahoda, Ed., Consistency 

and Inconsistency in Inter group Relations, 5 Jour­
nal of Social Issues (1949) ....................................  11

Clark, Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evidence,
9 Journal of Social Issues (1953) .......................  9,10

Clark, Effects of Prejudice and Discrimination on 
Personality Development (1950) ........................... 10

Dean and Rosen, A Manual of Intergroup Relations
(1955) .........................    9,10,11

Delano, Grade School Segregation: The Latest 
Attach on Racial Discrimination, 61 Yale L. J.
(1952) ...................................................................... 10

Deutsch and Collins, Interracial Housing (1951) . . .  11
Grambs, Education In A Transition Community, 

Commission on Educational Organizations, Na­
tional Conference of Christians and Jews ............  9



Ill
PAGE

Kutner, Wilkens and Yarrow, Verbal Attitudes and 
Overt Behavior Involving Racial Prejudice, 47 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (1952) 11

LaPiere, Attitudes vs. Action, 13 Social Forces 
(1934) ..................................................................... 11

Lee, Attitudinal Multivalence in Culture and Per­
sonality, 60 American Journal of Sociology (1954- 
55) ................................................    11

Saenger and Gilbert, Customer Reactions to the 
Integration of Negro Sales Personnel, 4 Inter­
national Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research 
(1950) ............................................................    11

Swanson and Griffin, Public Education in the South 
Today and Tomorrow, Table 33 (1955) ..................  7

Thompson, E d.:
Next Steps in Racial Desegregation in Educa­

tion, 23 Journal of Negro Education (1954) .. 9,10
The Desegregation Decisions One Year After­

ward, 24 Journal of Negro Education (1955) 9,10
Educational Desegregation, 1956, 25 Journal of 

Negro Education (1956) ................................. 9,10
Tipton, Community in Crisis (1953).........................  9
Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions

(1947) ............................................................    11
Williams, Jr. and Ryan, Schools in Transition (1954) 9,10
Wilmer, Walkley and Cook, Human Relations in 

Interracial Housing (1955) ..................................  11



Inttefc States Olmtrt nf Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit 

No. 15675 

Civil

J ohn A aron, A Minor, by T helma Aaeon, His Mother 
and Next Friend, et al.,

Appellants,
against

W illiam G. Cooper, el al.,
Appellees.

Appeal F rom the U nited States District Court for the 
E astern District of Arkansas, W estern Division--------------------- o----------------------

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Statement of the Case

Appellants here are children of public school age who 
are eligible to attend and are attending the public schools 
in Little Rock, Arkansas, and their parents and guardians. 
All are Negroes. Suit is brought on behalf of the named 
appellants and all other Negroes similarly situated and 
affected. Pursuant to law, local policy, custom, usage 
and regulation the schools in Little Rock are operated by 
appellees on a racially segregated basis.

Appellants have made application to the school board 
of appellee School District to cease and desist the unlaw­
ful discrimination of assigning these appellants and other 
Negro children to schools on the basis of race and color



2

and to permit them and all other Negro children similarly 
affected to register, enroll, enter, attend classes and receive 
instruction in the public schools under the same terms and 
conditions as all other educable children of public school 
age and without any distinctions, restrictions or limita­
tions based on race or color. The minor appellants have 
been tendered to the Central High, Technical High, Forest 
Heights Junior High and Forest Park Elementary Schools— 
all operated exclusively for white children—which are the 
schools closest to appellants’ homes and to which they 
would normally be assigned but for their race and color. 
Appellees have refused or failed to act favorably upon 
appellants ’ requests, and this suit was thereupon instituted. 
In their complaint appellants invoke jurisdiction under 
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2281, but the court 
refused to convene a three-judge court and heard the cause 
sitting alone.1

Appellees in their answer placed no reliance on state 
laws requiring segregation in public schools but urged that 
they had made a prompt start towards full compliance 
with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, and presented 
a plan calling for desegregation at the senior high school 
level as soon as the West End High School was ready for 
occupancy (now set for September, 1957 (R. 70)), and 
after successful completion at this level (estimated at 
between 2-3 years (R. 88)), to be followed by desegrega­
tion at the junior high school level and after successful 
completion at this level (estimated at between 2-3 years

1 Appellants make no issue here of the court’s failure to convene 
a three-judge court and concede that the applicable precedents fully 
support the jurisdiction of the lower court. That a state policy requir­
ing segregation in public schools is unconstitutional is now established 
beyond question. Hence, injunctions to restrain enforcement of such 
a state policy can be issued by regularly constituted United States 
District Courts. See Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30; Bush v. 
Orleans School Board, 138 F. Supp. 336, 337 (E. D. La. 1956); 
Orleans School Board v. Bush, 351 U. S. 948.



3

(R. 88, 89)), to be followed by desegregation in the ele­
mentary grades. Appellees urged that this plan conformed 
to the requirements of the law, and that the complaint be 
dismissed (R. 19-29).

A trial on the merits took place on August 15, 1956. 
The evidenciary facts there adduced are not in dispute: 
The Little Rock School System consists of elementary 
schools (grades 1-6), junior high schools (grades 7-9) and 
senior high schools (grades 10-12) or what is commonly 
called a 6-3-3 system (R. 13). The total student popula­
tion is 21,726, distributed as follows: 3,303 Negro and 
9,285 white children in elementary schools; 1,252 Negro 
and 3,831 white children in junior high school; and 929 
Negro and 3,126 white children in senior high schools 
(R. 41-44). There are three senior high schools, one of 
which is a technical high school which is offering a 
specialized course of study now available only to white 
children, and another senior high school is presently being 
erected (R. 42).

On May 20, 1954, three days after the decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, the school 
board of the appellee School District adopted a resolution 
in which full implementation of the Court’s decision was 
promised after an adequate plan and program of com­
pliance had been formulated (R. 69). The Superintendent 
of Schools was authorized to prepare a plan to carry 
out this stated policy. The Superintendent formulated 
such a plan, and on May 24, 1955, it was approved and 
adopted by the Board. The plan is set out in full in the 
court’s opinion (R. 37, et seq.).

The plan sets forth various standards and guides which 
the Board considers essential to the successful desegregation 
of its school plant. It found that desegregation would 
place no serious additional financial burden on appellee 
School District; that integration could not be accomplished 
until needed school facilities had been completed. These 
facilities were specified as three senior high schools and 
six junior high schools.



4

Desegregation is to proceed in three stages. The first 
step will involve the senior high schools; after successful 
desegregation there, the second stage involving the junior 
high schools will commence; after successful desegrega­
tion there, the third and final phase will be instituted, 
involving desegregation of the elementary schools. The 
plan indicates that in the Board’s judgment it is best to 
commence desegregation at the senior high school level, 
because fewer students and teachers are affected and to 
proceed in stages, in order to benefit from experience, and 
to desegregate elementary schools last, because “ establish­
ment of attendance areas at the elementary level is most 
difficult due to the large number of both students and 
buildings involved.’’ This plan was adopted in May, 1955, 
and its first phase is now scheduled to commence beginning 
September, 1957—desegregation at the senior high school 
level.

Appellees sought to establish that they were acting 
in good faith and that their proposed plan had to be fol­
lowed in order to enable the school board to accomplish 
desegregation without lowering educational standards.

Appellants sought to bring out in cross-examination of 
the Superintendent that the problems set forth as justifica­
tion for delay in starting and completing desegregation 
were common to most public school systems and were not 
indigenous to the institution of a non-discriminatory school 
program; that desegregation could be accomplished at once 
and that no good cause had been shown by appellees to 
warrant the court giving its approval to the plan proposed.

The court, nonetheless, concluded that appellees’ pro­
posed formula constituted good faith compliance with the 
Supreme Court’s decision and ordered appellees to 
proceed to desegregate the Little Rock School System 
pursuant to the three step program as proposed. There­
upon, the complaint was dismissed, and appellants brought 
the cause here.



5

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

There are no valid reasons of an equitable or adminis­
trative nature warranting appellees being granted an 
extension of time beyond September, 1957, either in start­
ing or completing desegregation at the junior high and 
elementary school levels in the Little Rock School District 
such as proposed by appellees and approved by the judg­
ment below.

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 349 
U. S. 294;

Booker, et al. v. State of Tennessee Board of 
Education, — F. 2d — (6th Cir. January 14, 
1957);

Willis v. Walker, 138 F. Supp. 177 (W. D. Ky.
1955);

Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F. 2d 853 
(6th Cir. 1956).

ARGUMENT

There Are No Valid Reasons of An Equitable or 
Administrative Nature Warranting Appellees Being 
Granted An Extension of Time Beyond September, 
1957, Either in Starting or Completing Desegregation at 
the Junior High and Elementary School Levels in the 
Little Rock School District Such As Proposed by Ap­
pellees and Approved by the Judgment Below.

1. In the second Brown decision (349 II. S. 294), the 
Court set forth principles which were to guide lower courts 
in litigation involving implementation of the Court’s man­
date outlawing segregation in public schools. Under the 
Brown formula, the lower court is empowered to weigh and 
balance appellants’ personal interest in immediate admis­
sion to public schools on a non-discriminatory basis against



6

the public interest in having the transition from segregation 
to non-segregation take place in a systematic and orderly 
fashion. These private and public interests are to be 
adjusted and reconciled so that equal educational oppor­
tunities are afforded to all with the least practicable delay, 
and the change-over in the school system is allowed to 
take place in an orderly fashion.

At the threshold of the question here presented is 
whether the court’s approach to this question was in keep­
ing with this formula. We think it was not. Appellants’ 
right to a public education free of discrimination based upon 
race or color is present and immediate. Sipuel v. Board of 
Regents, 332 U. S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. 
This right exists as an effective one only for a short period 
of time—here only as long as appellants are eligible to 
attend and are attending public school. In the very nature 
of things, since various obstacles have to be overcome before 
segregation can be eliminated, this right will be forever lost 
for some children and seriously impaired as to others. Some 
will have graduated before desegregation takes place, and 
others will be so far advanced that the one or two years of 
schooling left for them, even if under nondiscriminatory 
conditions, will not be sufficient for them to overcome the 
handicaps of many years of inferior education.

Appellees propose a plan whereby desegregation in the 
Little Eock School System is to commence next term at the 
senior high iSchool level.2

2 Appellees insist that desegregation cannot commence until the 
new senior high school is finished (West End High School). Com­
pletion is now scheduled for July, 1957. Appellants have raised 
objection to delay until the new school is ready for occupancy. But 
West End High School will be ready for occupancy in September, 
1957. Since this cause will not be reached for argument before the 
commencement of the last semester of the present school term, Sep­
tember, 1957, is the earliest practicable date this Court could insist 
upon a start being made. Thus appellants’ contentions that desegre­
gation in fact could have and should have commenced earlier are now 
largely academic.



7

After the successful completion of this phase of the pro­
gram, desegregation will start at the junior high school level. 
The start of the next phase is dependent upon the success 
of the preceding steps, and hence under the Board’s formu­
lation there are no definite terminal dates for the beginning 
of one phase and the commencement of the next. The Super­
intendent estimated that desegregation might start at the 
junior high school level 2 or 3 years after it is instituted 
at the senior high school level—1959-60,1960-61 (R. 88), and 
it might start at the elementary grades 2 or 3 years after it 
has been instituted at the junior high school level. Thus, it 
is conceivable that desegregation will be completed by the 
1963-64 school term. The evidence discloses, howmver, that 
this is not definite, nor even a calculated guess, and it is 
conceivable that the time estimated by Mr. Blossom may be 
extended appreciably.

The court in approving this plan has lost sight of the 
great private interest which these appellants have in being 
afforded the right to equal education with the least practica­
ble delay. That a Negro child attending segregated schools 
in Arkansas receives educational advantages inferior to a 
white child is clear from statistical data. In 1949-1950 the 
State spent $123.60 for the education of every white child 
and only $73.03 for every Negro child—a differential of 
$50.53.® In 1951-1952, each child got less and the figures 
were $102.05 and $67.75 respectively—a differential of 
$34.30.4 That this short-changing of Negro children neces­
sarily results in lowered educational standards in the schools 
for Negroes is beyond dispute. Hence., for the Negro child, 
insistence upon immediate vindication of his right to be 
admitted to public schools without discrimination based 
upon race or color is a matter of vital and pressing con-

3 Blose and Jaracz, Biennial Survey of Education in the United 
States 1948-1950, Table 43 (1952).

4 Swanson and Griffin, Public Education in the South Today and 
Tomorrow, Table 33 (1955).



8

cern. But the court below approved proposals which will 
continue a pattern of inferior schooling for the majority 
of Negro children presently enrolled in Little Rock public 
schools for several years to come. By 1960-1961 wheii 
desegration may commence at the junior high school level, 
all Negroes now in junior high school will have graduated 
to senior high school and will have opportunity for only 
three years of unsegregated education. By 1963-64, when 
desegregation may be commenced at the elementary school 
level, all Negro children presently enrolled in elementary 
schools will have graduated and will have been deprived, 
of six years of unsegregated and equal education. This 
is a long time to deny vindication of a right so basic and 
fundamental as that here being asserted without some 
over-powering justification. This is particularly true, in 
view of appellees’ own admission that they have the 
physical facilities to desegregate all of their schools now 
(R. 81, 88).

This admission was made on several occasions during 
the trial, but the Superintendent felt, however, that he 
could not desegregate now and maintain educational stand­
ards at the level he desired. Since Negro children are 
presently receiving inferior education, what this sentiment 
undoubtedly reflects is a fear that the mixing of Negro 
children, handicapped by inferior educational offerings, into 
schools with white children might lower the educational 
standards maintained at the heretofore all-white schools. 
If this is the basic problem, then that is all the more reason 
why desegregation at the elementary level should take 
place without undue delay, before the inferior educational 
offerings available have had too great an impact on the 
child’s educational development. Thus, we submit, if the 
basic reason for the proposed formula is the fear of lower­
ing educational standards, then all the plan proposes to do 
is to make .solution of this problem more difficult for all 
the Negro children presently enrolled in school. This fear



9

constitutes no reason for continuing to relegate Negro 
children to inferior education but places upon the school 
board the necessity of giving special attention to these 
children, when segregation is removed, so as to help them 
overcome the disabilities of inferior education as soon as 
possible.

Further, there is nothing other than the unsupported 
opinion of the Board as set forth in the plan itself and the 
Superintendent’s testimony to validate the plan as a sound 
one.

There is no objective evidence that it is easier to achieve 
successful desegregation by a step by step process involv­
ing successive desegregation of small segments of an insti­
tution until the whole job is accomplished. Examination 
of the actual instances of desegregation reveals that seg- 
mentalized desegregation, including the progressive de­
segregation of different grades of each school unit, does 
not allay anxieties and doubts, or assure a greater com­
munity acceptance of desegregation.5 Contrarily, such 
methods appear to mobilize the resistance of those white 
persons immediately affected, since they feel themselves 
arbitrarily selected as an “ experimental” group. The 
remaining individuals in the community then observe con­
flict instead of a process of peaceful adjustment. Hence,

5 Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools 79-80 (1954) ; Clark, 
“Desegregation: A n Appraisal of the Evidence” 9 Journal of Social 
Issues 1-68, especially 45-46 (1953) ; Dean and Rosen, A Manual of 
Intergroup Relations 57-108, especially 70 (1955) ; Grambs, Educa­
tion In A  Transition Community, Commission on Educational Or­
ganizations, National Conference of Christians and jews 37, 39-40; 
Thompson, Ed. “Next Steps In Racial Desegregation in Education” 
23 Journal of Negro Education (1954); Thompson, Ed. “The De­
segregation Decision: One Year Afterward” 24 Journal of Negro 
Education (1955); Thompson, Ed. “Educational Desegregation, 
1956” 25 Journal of Negro Education (1956); Tipton, Community 
In Crisis, especially 71 (1953) ; Williams, Jr. and Ryan, Schools In 
Transition 241-244 (1954).



10

their own anxieties are increased and resistance stiffens. 
This reaction may then become self-perpetuating, resulting 
in ineffective and incomplete desegregation.6

In addition to these problems, a major objection to 
such a plan is that it can result in some children in the same 
family attending non-segregated classes while their brothers 
and sisters attend segregated classes. This would stimulate 
and intensify problems of intra-family relationships and 
aggravate the known psychological reactions to racial 
segregation and discrimination.7

Analysis of instances where an extended time period for 
desegregation has been utilized indicates that this plan may 
be interpreted by the general community, white and Negro, 
as indicative of anxiety and hesitancy about ending segre­
gation or an intention of evading non-segregation. The 
evidence indicates that rather than obtaining community 
acceptance of non-segregation, this method may reinforce 
initial resistance and opposition to desegregation.8

Adoption of this method is often predicated upon 
the erroneous assumption that changes in attitude must

6 See footnote 5, supra.

7 Clark, Effects of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality 
Development (1950). See also footnote 5, supra.

8 Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools 40-84, op. cit. supra, 
note 5; Bustard, “The New Jersey Story” 21 Journal of Negro 
Education 275-285 (1952); Clark, “Desegregation-. A n Appraisal 
of the Evidence” 9 Journal of Social Issues 1-68, op. cit. supra, 
note 5; Dean and Rosen, A Manual of Intergroup Relations 57-108 
(1955); Delano, “Grade School Segregation: The Latest Attack 
on Racial Discrimination” 61 Yale L. J. 738-744 (1952) ; Thomp­
son, Ed. “Next Steps in Racial Desegregation in Education 23 
Journal of Negro Education 201-338 (1954); Thompson, Ed. “The 
Desegregation Decision: One Year Afterward” 24 Journal of Negro 
Education 165-381 (1955); Thompson, Ed. “Educational Desegre­
gation, 1956” 25 Journal of Negro Education (1956); Williams, 
Jr. and Ryan, Schools in Transition, op cit. supra, note 5.



11

precede desegregation. Public opinion and acceptance 
are important factors in obtaining effective desegrega­
tion, but in many instances they follow rather than 
precede the enforcement of non-segregation. Examina­
tion of actual changes from public school segrega­
tion to non-segregation clearly indicates that resistance 
to desegregation is greater in anticipation of the change 
to non-segregation than when desegregation actually 
occurs.9

It appears, therefore, that the segmentalized approaches 
to desegregation tend to result in ineffective desegrega­
tion.10

Granted the difficulties of the problem, courts are not 
to exercise their equity power merely to give time for the 
sake of time, but are to exercise it to afford time for sys­
tematic and effective change where such may be necessary 
in the public interest. In larger cities than Little Bock 
desegregation was accomplished over a much shorter time 
span and without apparent adverse effects. This was true 
of Louisville, Kentucky; Kansas City, Missouri; St. Louis,

9 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954); Chein, Deutsch, 
Hyman and Jahoda, Ed., “Consistency and Inconsistency In Inter- 
group Relations” 5 Journal of Social Issues 1-63 (1949); Deutsch 
and Collins, Interracial Housing (1951) ; Kutner, Wilkens and 
Yarrow, “Verbal Attitudes and Overt Behavior Involving Racial 
Prejudice” 47 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 649-652 
(1952); LaPiere, “Attitudes vs. Action” 13 Social Forces 230-237 
(1934); Lee, “Attitudinal Multivalence in Culture and Personality” 
60 American Journal of Sociology 294-299 (1954-55) ; Saenger and 
Gilbert, “Customer Reactions to. the Integration of Negro Sales Per­
sonnel” 4 International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research 
57-75 (1950); Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions 
(1947); Wilmer, Walkley and Cook, Pluman Relations in Inter­
racial Housing (1955); Dean and Rosen, A Manual of Intergroup 
Relations 57-108, op. cit. supra, note 5, and see other citations in 
note 5.

10 See note 8, supra.



12

Missouri; Washington, D. C.; Baltimore,, Maryland. Cer­
tainly, with a smaller school population, fewer teachers, 
buildings and attendance areas, Little Rock should be able 
to plan and implement an effective program of transition 
on a much more accelerated time schedule than could be 
possible in larger urban centers heretofore referred to.

Hence, it is submitted, that in a balancing of the equities 
no good cause has been shown which would justify or 
warrant the court below in postponing beyond September, 
1957, vindication of the present rights of these appellants 
to admission to schools without restrictions based upon 
race.

2. Presumably appellees, in proposing to commence 
desegregation at the senior high school level in September, 
1957, are making a “ prompt and reasonable start towards 
full compliance” with the May 17, 1954, ruling of the 
United States Supreme Court. But the fact that a start 
has been made does not render automatic a grant of 
additional time to complete the process. Such an exten­
sion should be given only where necessary to implement 
the May 17, 1954, ruling in an effective manner.

“ The burden rests upon the defendants to 
establish that such time is necessary in the public 
interest and is consistent with good faith compliance 
at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the 
courts may consider problems relating to adminis­
tration, arising from the physical condition of the 
school plant, the school transportation system, 
personnel, revision of school districts and attend­
ance areas into compact units to achieve a system 
of determining admission to the public schools on 
a non-racial basis, and revision of local laws and 
regulations which may be necessary in solving the 
foregoing problem. ’ ’



13

There is nothing in the evidence in this case to show 
that any administrative problems exist of the nature set 
forth in the Brown decision to warrant delay in implementa­
tion of appellants’ unquestioned constitutional rights.

Appellees raise questions concerning the physical 
deficiencies of the school plant but according to their own 
plan the physical deficiencies which delayed desegregation 
have now been remedied. There are six junior high schools, 
and there will be three senior high schools ready for 
occupancy in September, 1957, when the West End High 
School is completed. In addition there is Technical High 
School.

In May, 1955, this was the indispensable condition to 
accomplishing desegregation. In August, 1956, however, 
added reasons were voiced for deferring accomplishing 
desegregation until 1963 or beyond. What these problems 
are is not clear from Mr. Blossom’s testimony.

Appellees are concerned about the public’s reaction to 
desegregation and have sought to obtain public acceptance 
of the Board’s plan by having it read and explained to 
some 125-150 groups (R. 69). Appellees have problems 
of finance, procurement and training of an adequate staff, 
development of a sound curriculum, development of attend­
ance areas to enable each child to attend school in the 
area in which he resides, of seeking to make certain that 
each classroom contains teachable groups of youngsters. 
Their objective is to provide the best possible education 
and to seek to satisfy the education needs of each child 
insofar as possible. (See testimony of the Superintendent 
of Schools, R. 69, et seq.) While all of these problems 
are common to any school system, it is appellees’ conten­
tion that the mere elimination of racial separation in a 
school system makes them more acute and pressing (R. 88). 
It is asserted that whenever desegregation takes place, it 
will create problems; postponement, however, gives time 
for understanding (R. 88). Appellees’ basic thesis is that



14

racial differences affect school achievement, and, therefore, 
desegregation presents problems of curricula planning (R. 
89). In this regard it is their contention that desegrega­
tion per se creates administrative problems of great 
magnitude.

There is no denying the fact that desegregation of the 
Little Rock Schools will cause problems, but there is no 
evidence that problems of an administrative nature will be 
created such as to warrant extended delay in completing 
the process as is now approved by the judgment below. Any 
change creates some difficulties, and in this instance there 
is a great emotional attachment to the present discrimina­
tory practices. But compliance with the law cannot be put 
off because some members of the public do not want to 
change their habits or customs. See Brown v. Board of 
Education, supra. Indeed, the objective evidence indicates 
that unwarranted delays, not based on administrative needs 
in effecting desegregation, may result in confusion, con­
flict and race tensions and thereby render public acceptance 
more of a problem than it would have been.11

Similar plans have been rejected by courts as not in 
accord with the requirements of the law. In Pierce v. 
Board of Education of Cabell County (S. D. "YV. Va. 1956), 
unreported, the court rejected a proposed plan in which 
desegregation would be completed in a period of 12 years 
and ordered immediate desegregation. Similarly, in Shedd 
v. Board of Education of Logan County (S. D. W. Va.
1956), Civil Action 873, unreported, the Board of Educa­
tion proposed to complete desegregation of the first six 
grades in September 1956 and to defer desegregation of 
grades 7-12 until the completion of two new buildings. 
The court rejected this proposal and ordered desegrega­
tion completed in all grades by September 1956. In Willis 
v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W. D. Ky. 1955) and in 
Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 144 F.

11 See note 5, supra.



15

Supp. 239 (E. D. Va. 1956), aff’d — F. 2d — (4th Cir. 
Dec. 31, 1956), plans seeking extended time spans tq 
accomplish desegregation were rejected as violative of 
plaintiffs’ rights to equal educational opportunities.

Under appellees ’ plan, all of these appellants not now in 
senior high school will be denied their present and personal 
rights to equal educational opportunities for periods of 
3-6 years and perhaps even more. To deny appellants’ 
rights for this length of time, we submit, constitutes 
non-compliance with the declaration of the Supreme Court 
in the Brown case. See Clemons v. Board of Education, 
228 F. 2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956); Booker v. State of Tennessee 
Board of Education, — F. 2d — (6th Cir. decided Jan. 14,
1957).

There can be no justification for a delay which would 
relegate these appellants and the majority of the other 
Negroes in the Little Rock schools to inferior education 
for an extended period of time, while the school board 
wrestles with these problems with which it is now faced 
and will have to face for many years after unsegregated 
education has become an accepted fact of American life.

There is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts. In 
failing or refusing to apply the law to these facts, or in 
misapplying the law, the court below has failed in its 
obligation to follow and apply the yardstick laid down by 
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, supra. 
This, we submit, is reversible error. Union Tool Co. v. 
Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 112; Bowles v. Simon, 145 F. 2d 
334 (7th Cir. 1944); Booker v. State of Tennessee Board 
of Education, supra-, Clemons v. Board of Education, supra.



16

Conclusion

For the reasons hereinabove indicated, it is respectfully 
submitted that the judgment of the court below should be 
reversed.

W iley A. Braxton,
119 East Barraque Street, 

Pine Bluff, Arkansas,

U. S. T ate,
4207 Oakland Avenue,

Dallas 15, Texas,

R obert L. Carter,
T huegood Marshall,

107 West 43rd Street,
New York 36, N. Y.,

Attorneys for Appellants.

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