Cooper v. Aaron Brief for Appellants
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1957

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Cooper v. Aaron Brief for Appellants, 1957. 23570bae-ab9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9c17b06a-ea68-4e29-a493-ed2803be440e/cooper-v-aaron-brief-for-appellants. Accessed July 07, 2025.
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Intteft Stairs OInurt of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit No. 15675 Civil JOHN AARON, A Minor, by THELMA AARON, His Mother and Next Friend, et al., against Appellants, WILLIAM G-. COOPER, et al., Appellees. Appeal from the U nited States District Court for the E astern District of A rkansas, W estern Division BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS W iley A. Branton, 119 East Barraque Street, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, U. S. T ate, 4207 Oakland Avenue, Dallas 15, Texas, R obert L. Carter, T hijrgood Marshall, 107 West 43rd Street, New York 36, N. Y., Attorneys for Appellants. S upreme P rinting Co., I nc., 114 W orth S treet, N. Y. 13, B E ek m an 3-2320 I N D E X PAGE Statement of the Case ............................................. 1 Points and Authorities ........................ ................... 5 Argument: There Are No Valid Reasons of an Equitable or Administrative Nature Warranting Appellees Being Granted an Extension of Time Beyond September, 1957, Either in Starting or Com pleting Desegregation at the Junior High and Elementary School Levels in the Little Rock School District Such as Proposed by Appel lees and Approved by the Judgment Below . .. 5 Conclusion................................ ................................. 16 Table of Cases Booker, et al. v. State of Tennessee Board of Educa tion, —- F. 2d — (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 1957)............... 15 Bowles v. Simon, 145 F. 2d 334 (7th Cir. 1944)....... 15 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; 349 U. S. 294 ....................................................................2,3,5,14,15 Bush v. Orleans School Board, 138 F. Supp. 336, 337 (E. D. La. 1956)...................................................... 2 Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F. 2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956) ............................................................... 5,15 Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 3 0 .................................. 2 Orleans School Board v. Bush, 351 U. S. 948 ........... 2 Pierce v. Board of Education of Cabell County (S. D. W. Va. 1956), unreported .................................... 14 Shedd v. Board of Education of Logan County (S. D. W. Va. 1956), Civil Action 873, unreported........... 14 ii PAGE Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631................ 6 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 ................................. 6 Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 144 F. Supp. 239 (E. D. Ya. 1956), aff’d — F. 2d — (4th Cir. Dec. 31, 1956) ........................................ 14-15 Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 112............. 15 Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp, 177 (W. D. Ky. 1955) 5,14 Other Authorities Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954).................. 11 Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools (1954)........... 9,10 Blose and Jaracz, Biennial Survey of Education in the United States 1948-1950, Table 43 (1952)....... 7 Bustard, The New Jersey Story, 21 Journal of Negro Education (1952) .................................................... 10 Chein, Deutsch, Hyman and Jahoda, Ed., Consistency and Inconsistency in Inter group Relations, 5 Jour nal of Social Issues (1949) .................................... 11 Clark, Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evidence, 9 Journal of Social Issues (1953) ....................... 9,10 Clark, Effects of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (1950) ........................... 10 Dean and Rosen, A Manual of Intergroup Relations (1955) ......................... 9,10,11 Delano, Grade School Segregation: The Latest Attach on Racial Discrimination, 61 Yale L. J. (1952) ...................................................................... 10 Deutsch and Collins, Interracial Housing (1951) . . . 11 Grambs, Education In A Transition Community, Commission on Educational Organizations, Na tional Conference of Christians and Jews ............ 9 Ill PAGE Kutner, Wilkens and Yarrow, Verbal Attitudes and Overt Behavior Involving Racial Prejudice, 47 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (1952) 11 LaPiere, Attitudes vs. Action, 13 Social Forces (1934) ..................................................................... 11 Lee, Attitudinal Multivalence in Culture and Per sonality, 60 American Journal of Sociology (1954- 55) ................................................ 11 Saenger and Gilbert, Customer Reactions to the Integration of Negro Sales Personnel, 4 Inter national Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research (1950) ............................................................ 11 Swanson and Griffin, Public Education in the South Today and Tomorrow, Table 33 (1955) .................. 7 Thompson, E d.: Next Steps in Racial Desegregation in Educa tion, 23 Journal of Negro Education (1954) .. 9,10 The Desegregation Decisions One Year After ward, 24 Journal of Negro Education (1955) 9,10 Educational Desegregation, 1956, 25 Journal of Negro Education (1956) ................................. 9,10 Tipton, Community in Crisis (1953)......................... 9 Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (1947) ............................................................ 11 Williams, Jr. and Ryan, Schools in Transition (1954) 9,10 Wilmer, Walkley and Cook, Human Relations in Interracial Housing (1955) .................................. 11 Inttefc States Olmtrt nf Appeals For the Eighth Circuit No. 15675 Civil J ohn A aron, A Minor, by T helma Aaeon, His Mother and Next Friend, et al., Appellants, against W illiam G. Cooper, el al., Appellees. Appeal F rom the U nited States District Court for the E astern District of Arkansas, W estern Division--------------------- o---------------------- BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS Statement of the Case Appellants here are children of public school age who are eligible to attend and are attending the public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas, and their parents and guardians. All are Negroes. Suit is brought on behalf of the named appellants and all other Negroes similarly situated and affected. Pursuant to law, local policy, custom, usage and regulation the schools in Little Rock are operated by appellees on a racially segregated basis. Appellants have made application to the school board of appellee School District to cease and desist the unlaw ful discrimination of assigning these appellants and other Negro children to schools on the basis of race and color 2 and to permit them and all other Negro children similarly affected to register, enroll, enter, attend classes and receive instruction in the public schools under the same terms and conditions as all other educable children of public school age and without any distinctions, restrictions or limita tions based on race or color. The minor appellants have been tendered to the Central High, Technical High, Forest Heights Junior High and Forest Park Elementary Schools— all operated exclusively for white children—which are the schools closest to appellants’ homes and to which they would normally be assigned but for their race and color. Appellees have refused or failed to act favorably upon appellants ’ requests, and this suit was thereupon instituted. In their complaint appellants invoke jurisdiction under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2281, but the court refused to convene a three-judge court and heard the cause sitting alone.1 Appellees in their answer placed no reliance on state laws requiring segregation in public schools but urged that they had made a prompt start towards full compliance with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, and presented a plan calling for desegregation at the senior high school level as soon as the West End High School was ready for occupancy (now set for September, 1957 (R. 70)), and after successful completion at this level (estimated at between 2-3 years (R. 88)), to be followed by desegrega tion at the junior high school level and after successful completion at this level (estimated at between 2-3 years 1 Appellants make no issue here of the court’s failure to convene a three-judge court and concede that the applicable precedents fully support the jurisdiction of the lower court. That a state policy requir ing segregation in public schools is unconstitutional is now established beyond question. Hence, injunctions to restrain enforcement of such a state policy can be issued by regularly constituted United States District Courts. See Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30; Bush v. Orleans School Board, 138 F. Supp. 336, 337 (E. D. La. 1956); Orleans School Board v. Bush, 351 U. S. 948. 3 (R. 88, 89)), to be followed by desegregation in the ele mentary grades. Appellees urged that this plan conformed to the requirements of the law, and that the complaint be dismissed (R. 19-29). A trial on the merits took place on August 15, 1956. The evidenciary facts there adduced are not in dispute: The Little Rock School System consists of elementary schools (grades 1-6), junior high schools (grades 7-9) and senior high schools (grades 10-12) or what is commonly called a 6-3-3 system (R. 13). The total student popula tion is 21,726, distributed as follows: 3,303 Negro and 9,285 white children in elementary schools; 1,252 Negro and 3,831 white children in junior high school; and 929 Negro and 3,126 white children in senior high schools (R. 41-44). There are three senior high schools, one of which is a technical high school which is offering a specialized course of study now available only to white children, and another senior high school is presently being erected (R. 42). On May 20, 1954, three days after the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, the school board of the appellee School District adopted a resolution in which full implementation of the Court’s decision was promised after an adequate plan and program of com pliance had been formulated (R. 69). The Superintendent of Schools was authorized to prepare a plan to carry out this stated policy. The Superintendent formulated such a plan, and on May 24, 1955, it was approved and adopted by the Board. The plan is set out in full in the court’s opinion (R. 37, et seq.). The plan sets forth various standards and guides which the Board considers essential to the successful desegregation of its school plant. It found that desegregation would place no serious additional financial burden on appellee School District; that integration could not be accomplished until needed school facilities had been completed. These facilities were specified as three senior high schools and six junior high schools. 4 Desegregation is to proceed in three stages. The first step will involve the senior high schools; after successful desegregation there, the second stage involving the junior high schools will commence; after successful desegrega tion there, the third and final phase will be instituted, involving desegregation of the elementary schools. The plan indicates that in the Board’s judgment it is best to commence desegregation at the senior high school level, because fewer students and teachers are affected and to proceed in stages, in order to benefit from experience, and to desegregate elementary schools last, because “ establish ment of attendance areas at the elementary level is most difficult due to the large number of both students and buildings involved.’’ This plan was adopted in May, 1955, and its first phase is now scheduled to commence beginning September, 1957—desegregation at the senior high school level. Appellees sought to establish that they were acting in good faith and that their proposed plan had to be fol lowed in order to enable the school board to accomplish desegregation without lowering educational standards. Appellants sought to bring out in cross-examination of the Superintendent that the problems set forth as justifica tion for delay in starting and completing desegregation were common to most public school systems and were not indigenous to the institution of a non-discriminatory school program; that desegregation could be accomplished at once and that no good cause had been shown by appellees to warrant the court giving its approval to the plan proposed. The court, nonetheless, concluded that appellees’ pro posed formula constituted good faith compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision and ordered appellees to proceed to desegregate the Little Rock School System pursuant to the three step program as proposed. There upon, the complaint was dismissed, and appellants brought the cause here. 5 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES There are no valid reasons of an equitable or adminis trative nature warranting appellees being granted an extension of time beyond September, 1957, either in start ing or completing desegregation at the junior high and elementary school levels in the Little Rock School District such as proposed by appellees and approved by the judg ment below. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 349 U. S. 294; Booker, et al. v. State of Tennessee Board of Education, — F. 2d — (6th Cir. January 14, 1957); Willis v. Walker, 138 F. Supp. 177 (W. D. Ky. 1955); Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F. 2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956). ARGUMENT There Are No Valid Reasons of An Equitable or Administrative Nature Warranting Appellees Being Granted An Extension of Time Beyond September, 1957, Either in Starting or Completing Desegregation at the Junior High and Elementary School Levels in the Little Rock School District Such As Proposed by Ap pellees and Approved by the Judgment Below. 1. In the second Brown decision (349 II. S. 294), the Court set forth principles which were to guide lower courts in litigation involving implementation of the Court’s man date outlawing segregation in public schools. Under the Brown formula, the lower court is empowered to weigh and balance appellants’ personal interest in immediate admis sion to public schools on a non-discriminatory basis against 6 the public interest in having the transition from segregation to non-segregation take place in a systematic and orderly fashion. These private and public interests are to be adjusted and reconciled so that equal educational oppor tunities are afforded to all with the least practicable delay, and the change-over in the school system is allowed to take place in an orderly fashion. At the threshold of the question here presented is whether the court’s approach to this question was in keep ing with this formula. We think it was not. Appellants’ right to a public education free of discrimination based upon race or color is present and immediate. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629. This right exists as an effective one only for a short period of time—here only as long as appellants are eligible to attend and are attending public school. In the very nature of things, since various obstacles have to be overcome before segregation can be eliminated, this right will be forever lost for some children and seriously impaired as to others. Some will have graduated before desegregation takes place, and others will be so far advanced that the one or two years of schooling left for them, even if under nondiscriminatory conditions, will not be sufficient for them to overcome the handicaps of many years of inferior education. Appellees propose a plan whereby desegregation in the Little Eock School System is to commence next term at the senior high iSchool level.2 2 Appellees insist that desegregation cannot commence until the new senior high school is finished (West End High School). Com pletion is now scheduled for July, 1957. Appellants have raised objection to delay until the new school is ready for occupancy. But West End High School will be ready for occupancy in September, 1957. Since this cause will not be reached for argument before the commencement of the last semester of the present school term, Sep tember, 1957, is the earliest practicable date this Court could insist upon a start being made. Thus appellants’ contentions that desegre gation in fact could have and should have commenced earlier are now largely academic. 7 After the successful completion of this phase of the pro gram, desegregation will start at the junior high school level. The start of the next phase is dependent upon the success of the preceding steps, and hence under the Board’s formu lation there are no definite terminal dates for the beginning of one phase and the commencement of the next. The Super intendent estimated that desegregation might start at the junior high school level 2 or 3 years after it is instituted at the senior high school level—1959-60,1960-61 (R. 88), and it might start at the elementary grades 2 or 3 years after it has been instituted at the junior high school level. Thus, it is conceivable that desegregation will be completed by the 1963-64 school term. The evidence discloses, howmver, that this is not definite, nor even a calculated guess, and it is conceivable that the time estimated by Mr. Blossom may be extended appreciably. The court in approving this plan has lost sight of the great private interest which these appellants have in being afforded the right to equal education with the least practica ble delay. That a Negro child attending segregated schools in Arkansas receives educational advantages inferior to a white child is clear from statistical data. In 1949-1950 the State spent $123.60 for the education of every white child and only $73.03 for every Negro child—a differential of $50.53.® In 1951-1952, each child got less and the figures were $102.05 and $67.75 respectively—a differential of $34.30.4 That this short-changing of Negro children neces sarily results in lowered educational standards in the schools for Negroes is beyond dispute. Hence., for the Negro child, insistence upon immediate vindication of his right to be admitted to public schools without discrimination based upon race or color is a matter of vital and pressing con- 3 Blose and Jaracz, Biennial Survey of Education in the United States 1948-1950, Table 43 (1952). 4 Swanson and Griffin, Public Education in the South Today and Tomorrow, Table 33 (1955). 8 cern. But the court below approved proposals which will continue a pattern of inferior schooling for the majority of Negro children presently enrolled in Little Rock public schools for several years to come. By 1960-1961 wheii desegration may commence at the junior high school level, all Negroes now in junior high school will have graduated to senior high school and will have opportunity for only three years of unsegregated education. By 1963-64, when desegregation may be commenced at the elementary school level, all Negro children presently enrolled in elementary schools will have graduated and will have been deprived, of six years of unsegregated and equal education. This is a long time to deny vindication of a right so basic and fundamental as that here being asserted without some over-powering justification. This is particularly true, in view of appellees’ own admission that they have the physical facilities to desegregate all of their schools now (R. 81, 88). This admission was made on several occasions during the trial, but the Superintendent felt, however, that he could not desegregate now and maintain educational stand ards at the level he desired. Since Negro children are presently receiving inferior education, what this sentiment undoubtedly reflects is a fear that the mixing of Negro children, handicapped by inferior educational offerings, into schools with white children might lower the educational standards maintained at the heretofore all-white schools. If this is the basic problem, then that is all the more reason why desegregation at the elementary level should take place without undue delay, before the inferior educational offerings available have had too great an impact on the child’s educational development. Thus, we submit, if the basic reason for the proposed formula is the fear of lower ing educational standards, then all the plan proposes to do is to make .solution of this problem more difficult for all the Negro children presently enrolled in school. This fear 9 constitutes no reason for continuing to relegate Negro children to inferior education but places upon the school board the necessity of giving special attention to these children, when segregation is removed, so as to help them overcome the disabilities of inferior education as soon as possible. Further, there is nothing other than the unsupported opinion of the Board as set forth in the plan itself and the Superintendent’s testimony to validate the plan as a sound one. There is no objective evidence that it is easier to achieve successful desegregation by a step by step process involv ing successive desegregation of small segments of an insti tution until the whole job is accomplished. Examination of the actual instances of desegregation reveals that seg- mentalized desegregation, including the progressive de segregation of different grades of each school unit, does not allay anxieties and doubts, or assure a greater com munity acceptance of desegregation.5 Contrarily, such methods appear to mobilize the resistance of those white persons immediately affected, since they feel themselves arbitrarily selected as an “ experimental” group. The remaining individuals in the community then observe con flict instead of a process of peaceful adjustment. Hence, 5 Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools 79-80 (1954) ; Clark, “Desegregation: A n Appraisal of the Evidence” 9 Journal of Social Issues 1-68, especially 45-46 (1953) ; Dean and Rosen, A Manual of Intergroup Relations 57-108, especially 70 (1955) ; Grambs, Educa tion In A Transition Community, Commission on Educational Or ganizations, National Conference of Christians and jews 37, 39-40; Thompson, Ed. “Next Steps In Racial Desegregation in Education” 23 Journal of Negro Education (1954); Thompson, Ed. “The De segregation Decision: One Year Afterward” 24 Journal of Negro Education (1955); Thompson, Ed. “Educational Desegregation, 1956” 25 Journal of Negro Education (1956); Tipton, Community In Crisis, especially 71 (1953) ; Williams, Jr. and Ryan, Schools In Transition 241-244 (1954). 10 their own anxieties are increased and resistance stiffens. This reaction may then become self-perpetuating, resulting in ineffective and incomplete desegregation.6 In addition to these problems, a major objection to such a plan is that it can result in some children in the same family attending non-segregated classes while their brothers and sisters attend segregated classes. This would stimulate and intensify problems of intra-family relationships and aggravate the known psychological reactions to racial segregation and discrimination.7 Analysis of instances where an extended time period for desegregation has been utilized indicates that this plan may be interpreted by the general community, white and Negro, as indicative of anxiety and hesitancy about ending segre gation or an intention of evading non-segregation. The evidence indicates that rather than obtaining community acceptance of non-segregation, this method may reinforce initial resistance and opposition to desegregation.8 Adoption of this method is often predicated upon the erroneous assumption that changes in attitude must 6 See footnote 5, supra. 7 Clark, Effects of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (1950). See also footnote 5, supra. 8 Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools 40-84, op. cit. supra, note 5; Bustard, “The New Jersey Story” 21 Journal of Negro Education 275-285 (1952); Clark, “Desegregation-. A n Appraisal of the Evidence” 9 Journal of Social Issues 1-68, op. cit. supra, note 5; Dean and Rosen, A Manual of Intergroup Relations 57-108 (1955); Delano, “Grade School Segregation: The Latest Attack on Racial Discrimination” 61 Yale L. J. 738-744 (1952) ; Thomp son, Ed. “Next Steps in Racial Desegregation in Education 23 Journal of Negro Education 201-338 (1954); Thompson, Ed. “The Desegregation Decision: One Year Afterward” 24 Journal of Negro Education 165-381 (1955); Thompson, Ed. “Educational Desegre gation, 1956” 25 Journal of Negro Education (1956); Williams, Jr. and Ryan, Schools in Transition, op cit. supra, note 5. 11 precede desegregation. Public opinion and acceptance are important factors in obtaining effective desegrega tion, but in many instances they follow rather than precede the enforcement of non-segregation. Examina tion of actual changes from public school segrega tion to non-segregation clearly indicates that resistance to desegregation is greater in anticipation of the change to non-segregation than when desegregation actually occurs.9 It appears, therefore, that the segmentalized approaches to desegregation tend to result in ineffective desegrega tion.10 Granted the difficulties of the problem, courts are not to exercise their equity power merely to give time for the sake of time, but are to exercise it to afford time for sys tematic and effective change where such may be necessary in the public interest. In larger cities than Little Bock desegregation was accomplished over a much shorter time span and without apparent adverse effects. This was true of Louisville, Kentucky; Kansas City, Missouri; St. Louis, 9 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954); Chein, Deutsch, Hyman and Jahoda, Ed., “Consistency and Inconsistency In Inter- group Relations” 5 Journal of Social Issues 1-63 (1949); Deutsch and Collins, Interracial Housing (1951) ; Kutner, Wilkens and Yarrow, “Verbal Attitudes and Overt Behavior Involving Racial Prejudice” 47 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 649-652 (1952); LaPiere, “Attitudes vs. Action” 13 Social Forces 230-237 (1934); Lee, “Attitudinal Multivalence in Culture and Personality” 60 American Journal of Sociology 294-299 (1954-55) ; Saenger and Gilbert, “Customer Reactions to. the Integration of Negro Sales Per sonnel” 4 International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research 57-75 (1950); Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions (1947); Wilmer, Walkley and Cook, Pluman Relations in Inter racial Housing (1955); Dean and Rosen, A Manual of Intergroup Relations 57-108, op. cit. supra, note 5, and see other citations in note 5. 10 See note 8, supra. 12 Missouri; Washington, D. C.; Baltimore,, Maryland. Cer tainly, with a smaller school population, fewer teachers, buildings and attendance areas, Little Rock should be able to plan and implement an effective program of transition on a much more accelerated time schedule than could be possible in larger urban centers heretofore referred to. Hence, it is submitted, that in a balancing of the equities no good cause has been shown which would justify or warrant the court below in postponing beyond September, 1957, vindication of the present rights of these appellants to admission to schools without restrictions based upon race. 2. Presumably appellees, in proposing to commence desegregation at the senior high school level in September, 1957, are making a “ prompt and reasonable start towards full compliance” with the May 17, 1954, ruling of the United States Supreme Court. But the fact that a start has been made does not render automatic a grant of additional time to complete the process. Such an exten sion should be given only where necessary to implement the May 17, 1954, ruling in an effective manner. “ The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems relating to adminis tration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attend ance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a non-racial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problem. ’ ’ 13 There is nothing in the evidence in this case to show that any administrative problems exist of the nature set forth in the Brown decision to warrant delay in implementa tion of appellants’ unquestioned constitutional rights. Appellees raise questions concerning the physical deficiencies of the school plant but according to their own plan the physical deficiencies which delayed desegregation have now been remedied. There are six junior high schools, and there will be three senior high schools ready for occupancy in September, 1957, when the West End High School is completed. In addition there is Technical High School. In May, 1955, this was the indispensable condition to accomplishing desegregation. In August, 1956, however, added reasons were voiced for deferring accomplishing desegregation until 1963 or beyond. What these problems are is not clear from Mr. Blossom’s testimony. Appellees are concerned about the public’s reaction to desegregation and have sought to obtain public acceptance of the Board’s plan by having it read and explained to some 125-150 groups (R. 69). Appellees have problems of finance, procurement and training of an adequate staff, development of a sound curriculum, development of attend ance areas to enable each child to attend school in the area in which he resides, of seeking to make certain that each classroom contains teachable groups of youngsters. Their objective is to provide the best possible education and to seek to satisfy the education needs of each child insofar as possible. (See testimony of the Superintendent of Schools, R. 69, et seq.) While all of these problems are common to any school system, it is appellees’ conten tion that the mere elimination of racial separation in a school system makes them more acute and pressing (R. 88). It is asserted that whenever desegregation takes place, it will create problems; postponement, however, gives time for understanding (R. 88). Appellees’ basic thesis is that 14 racial differences affect school achievement, and, therefore, desegregation presents problems of curricula planning (R. 89). In this regard it is their contention that desegrega tion per se creates administrative problems of great magnitude. There is no denying the fact that desegregation of the Little Rock Schools will cause problems, but there is no evidence that problems of an administrative nature will be created such as to warrant extended delay in completing the process as is now approved by the judgment below. Any change creates some difficulties, and in this instance there is a great emotional attachment to the present discrimina tory practices. But compliance with the law cannot be put off because some members of the public do not want to change their habits or customs. See Brown v. Board of Education, supra. Indeed, the objective evidence indicates that unwarranted delays, not based on administrative needs in effecting desegregation, may result in confusion, con flict and race tensions and thereby render public acceptance more of a problem than it would have been.11 Similar plans have been rejected by courts as not in accord with the requirements of the law. In Pierce v. Board of Education of Cabell County (S. D. "YV. Va. 1956), unreported, the court rejected a proposed plan in which desegregation would be completed in a period of 12 years and ordered immediate desegregation. Similarly, in Shedd v. Board of Education of Logan County (S. D. W. Va. 1956), Civil Action 873, unreported, the Board of Educa tion proposed to complete desegregation of the first six grades in September 1956 and to defer desegregation of grades 7-12 until the completion of two new buildings. The court rejected this proposal and ordered desegrega tion completed in all grades by September 1956. In Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W. D. Ky. 1955) and in Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 144 F. 11 See note 5, supra. 15 Supp. 239 (E. D. Va. 1956), aff’d — F. 2d — (4th Cir. Dec. 31, 1956), plans seeking extended time spans tq accomplish desegregation were rejected as violative of plaintiffs’ rights to equal educational opportunities. Under appellees ’ plan, all of these appellants not now in senior high school will be denied their present and personal rights to equal educational opportunities for periods of 3-6 years and perhaps even more. To deny appellants’ rights for this length of time, we submit, constitutes non-compliance with the declaration of the Supreme Court in the Brown case. See Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F. 2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956); Booker v. State of Tennessee Board of Education, — F. 2d — (6th Cir. decided Jan. 14, 1957). There can be no justification for a delay which would relegate these appellants and the majority of the other Negroes in the Little Rock schools to inferior education for an extended period of time, while the school board wrestles with these problems with which it is now faced and will have to face for many years after unsegregated education has become an accepted fact of American life. There is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts. In failing or refusing to apply the law to these facts, or in misapplying the law, the court below has failed in its obligation to follow and apply the yardstick laid down by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, supra. This, we submit, is reversible error. Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 112; Bowles v. Simon, 145 F. 2d 334 (7th Cir. 1944); Booker v. State of Tennessee Board of Education, supra-, Clemons v. Board of Education, supra. 16 Conclusion For the reasons hereinabove indicated, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the court below should be reversed. W iley A. Braxton, 119 East Barraque Street, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, U. S. T ate, 4207 Oakland Avenue, Dallas 15, Texas, R obert L. Carter, T huegood Marshall, 107 West 43rd Street, New York 36, N. Y., Attorneys for Appellants.