Cooper v. Aaron Brief for Appellants
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1957
Cite this item
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Cooper v. Aaron Brief for Appellants, 1957. 23570bae-ab9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9c17b06a-ea68-4e29-a493-ed2803be440e/cooper-v-aaron-brief-for-appellants. Accessed November 26, 2025.
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Intteft Stairs OInurt of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 15675
Civil
JOHN AARON, A Minor, by THELMA AARON, His
Mother and Next Friend, et al.,
against
Appellants,
WILLIAM G-. COOPER, et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the U nited States District Court for the
E astern District of A rkansas, W estern Division
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
W iley A. Branton,
119 East Barraque Street,
Pine Bluff, Arkansas,
U. S. T ate,
4207 Oakland Avenue,
Dallas 15, Texas,
R obert L. Carter,
T hijrgood Marshall,
107 West 43rd Street,
New York 36, N. Y.,
Attorneys for Appellants.
S upreme P rinting Co., I nc., 114 W orth S treet, N. Y. 13, B E ek m an 3-2320
I N D E X
PAGE
Statement of the Case ............................................. 1
Points and Authorities ........................ ................... 5
Argument:
There Are No Valid Reasons of an Equitable or
Administrative Nature Warranting Appellees
Being Granted an Extension of Time Beyond
September, 1957, Either in Starting or Com
pleting Desegregation at the Junior High and
Elementary School Levels in the Little Rock
School District Such as Proposed by Appel
lees and Approved by the Judgment Below . .. 5
Conclusion................................ ................................. 16
Table of Cases
Booker, et al. v. State of Tennessee Board of Educa
tion, —- F. 2d — (6th Cir. Jan. 14, 1957)............... 15
Bowles v. Simon, 145 F. 2d 334 (7th Cir. 1944)....... 15
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483; 349 U. S.
294 ....................................................................2,3,5,14,15
Bush v. Orleans School Board, 138 F. Supp. 336, 337
(E. D. La. 1956)...................................................... 2
Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F. 2d 853 (6th
Cir. 1956) ............................................................... 5,15
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 3 0 .................................. 2
Orleans School Board v. Bush, 351 U. S. 948 ........... 2
Pierce v. Board of Education of Cabell County (S. D.
W. Va. 1956), unreported .................................... 14
Shedd v. Board of Education of Logan County (S. D.
W. Va. 1956), Civil Action 873, unreported........... 14
ii
PAGE
Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U. S. 631................ 6
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 ................................. 6
Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 144
F. Supp. 239 (E. D. Ya. 1956), aff’d — F. 2d —
(4th Cir. Dec. 31, 1956) ........................................ 14-15
Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 112............. 15
Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp, 177 (W. D. Ky. 1955) 5,14
Other Authorities
Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954).................. 11
Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools (1954)........... 9,10
Blose and Jaracz, Biennial Survey of Education in
the United States 1948-1950, Table 43 (1952)....... 7
Bustard, The New Jersey Story, 21 Journal of Negro
Education (1952) .................................................... 10
Chein, Deutsch, Hyman and Jahoda, Ed., Consistency
and Inconsistency in Inter group Relations, 5 Jour
nal of Social Issues (1949) .................................... 11
Clark, Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evidence,
9 Journal of Social Issues (1953) ....................... 9,10
Clark, Effects of Prejudice and Discrimination on
Personality Development (1950) ........................... 10
Dean and Rosen, A Manual of Intergroup Relations
(1955) ......................... 9,10,11
Delano, Grade School Segregation: The Latest
Attach on Racial Discrimination, 61 Yale L. J.
(1952) ...................................................................... 10
Deutsch and Collins, Interracial Housing (1951) . . . 11
Grambs, Education In A Transition Community,
Commission on Educational Organizations, Na
tional Conference of Christians and Jews ............ 9
Ill
PAGE
Kutner, Wilkens and Yarrow, Verbal Attitudes and
Overt Behavior Involving Racial Prejudice, 47
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (1952) 11
LaPiere, Attitudes vs. Action, 13 Social Forces
(1934) ..................................................................... 11
Lee, Attitudinal Multivalence in Culture and Per
sonality, 60 American Journal of Sociology (1954-
55) ................................................ 11
Saenger and Gilbert, Customer Reactions to the
Integration of Negro Sales Personnel, 4 Inter
national Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research
(1950) ............................................................ 11
Swanson and Griffin, Public Education in the South
Today and Tomorrow, Table 33 (1955) .................. 7
Thompson, E d.:
Next Steps in Racial Desegregation in Educa
tion, 23 Journal of Negro Education (1954) .. 9,10
The Desegregation Decisions One Year After
ward, 24 Journal of Negro Education (1955) 9,10
Educational Desegregation, 1956, 25 Journal of
Negro Education (1956) ................................. 9,10
Tipton, Community in Crisis (1953)......................... 9
Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions
(1947) ............................................................ 11
Williams, Jr. and Ryan, Schools in Transition (1954) 9,10
Wilmer, Walkley and Cook, Human Relations in
Interracial Housing (1955) .................................. 11
Inttefc States Olmtrt nf Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
No. 15675
Civil
J ohn A aron, A Minor, by T helma Aaeon, His Mother
and Next Friend, et al.,
Appellants,
against
W illiam G. Cooper, el al.,
Appellees.
Appeal F rom the U nited States District Court for the
E astern District of Arkansas, W estern Division--------------------- o----------------------
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS
Statement of the Case
Appellants here are children of public school age who
are eligible to attend and are attending the public schools
in Little Rock, Arkansas, and their parents and guardians.
All are Negroes. Suit is brought on behalf of the named
appellants and all other Negroes similarly situated and
affected. Pursuant to law, local policy, custom, usage
and regulation the schools in Little Rock are operated by
appellees on a racially segregated basis.
Appellants have made application to the school board
of appellee School District to cease and desist the unlaw
ful discrimination of assigning these appellants and other
Negro children to schools on the basis of race and color
2
and to permit them and all other Negro children similarly
affected to register, enroll, enter, attend classes and receive
instruction in the public schools under the same terms and
conditions as all other educable children of public school
age and without any distinctions, restrictions or limita
tions based on race or color. The minor appellants have
been tendered to the Central High, Technical High, Forest
Heights Junior High and Forest Park Elementary Schools—
all operated exclusively for white children—which are the
schools closest to appellants’ homes and to which they
would normally be assigned but for their race and color.
Appellees have refused or failed to act favorably upon
appellants ’ requests, and this suit was thereupon instituted.
In their complaint appellants invoke jurisdiction under
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2281, but the court
refused to convene a three-judge court and heard the cause
sitting alone.1
Appellees in their answer placed no reliance on state
laws requiring segregation in public schools but urged that
they had made a prompt start towards full compliance
with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294, and presented
a plan calling for desegregation at the senior high school
level as soon as the West End High School was ready for
occupancy (now set for September, 1957 (R. 70)), and
after successful completion at this level (estimated at
between 2-3 years (R. 88)), to be followed by desegrega
tion at the junior high school level and after successful
completion at this level (estimated at between 2-3 years
1 Appellants make no issue here of the court’s failure to convene
a three-judge court and concede that the applicable precedents fully
support the jurisdiction of the lower court. That a state policy requir
ing segregation in public schools is unconstitutional is now established
beyond question. Hence, injunctions to restrain enforcement of such
a state policy can be issued by regularly constituted United States
District Courts. See Ex parte Poresky, 290 U. S. 30; Bush v.
Orleans School Board, 138 F. Supp. 336, 337 (E. D. La. 1956);
Orleans School Board v. Bush, 351 U. S. 948.
3
(R. 88, 89)), to be followed by desegregation in the ele
mentary grades. Appellees urged that this plan conformed
to the requirements of the law, and that the complaint be
dismissed (R. 19-29).
A trial on the merits took place on August 15, 1956.
The evidenciary facts there adduced are not in dispute:
The Little Rock School System consists of elementary
schools (grades 1-6), junior high schools (grades 7-9) and
senior high schools (grades 10-12) or what is commonly
called a 6-3-3 system (R. 13). The total student popula
tion is 21,726, distributed as follows: 3,303 Negro and
9,285 white children in elementary schools; 1,252 Negro
and 3,831 white children in junior high school; and 929
Negro and 3,126 white children in senior high schools
(R. 41-44). There are three senior high schools, one of
which is a technical high school which is offering a
specialized course of study now available only to white
children, and another senior high school is presently being
erected (R. 42).
On May 20, 1954, three days after the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, the school
board of the appellee School District adopted a resolution
in which full implementation of the Court’s decision was
promised after an adequate plan and program of com
pliance had been formulated (R. 69). The Superintendent
of Schools was authorized to prepare a plan to carry
out this stated policy. The Superintendent formulated
such a plan, and on May 24, 1955, it was approved and
adopted by the Board. The plan is set out in full in the
court’s opinion (R. 37, et seq.).
The plan sets forth various standards and guides which
the Board considers essential to the successful desegregation
of its school plant. It found that desegregation would
place no serious additional financial burden on appellee
School District; that integration could not be accomplished
until needed school facilities had been completed. These
facilities were specified as three senior high schools and
six junior high schools.
4
Desegregation is to proceed in three stages. The first
step will involve the senior high schools; after successful
desegregation there, the second stage involving the junior
high schools will commence; after successful desegrega
tion there, the third and final phase will be instituted,
involving desegregation of the elementary schools. The
plan indicates that in the Board’s judgment it is best to
commence desegregation at the senior high school level,
because fewer students and teachers are affected and to
proceed in stages, in order to benefit from experience, and
to desegregate elementary schools last, because “ establish
ment of attendance areas at the elementary level is most
difficult due to the large number of both students and
buildings involved.’’ This plan was adopted in May, 1955,
and its first phase is now scheduled to commence beginning
September, 1957—desegregation at the senior high school
level.
Appellees sought to establish that they were acting
in good faith and that their proposed plan had to be fol
lowed in order to enable the school board to accomplish
desegregation without lowering educational standards.
Appellants sought to bring out in cross-examination of
the Superintendent that the problems set forth as justifica
tion for delay in starting and completing desegregation
were common to most public school systems and were not
indigenous to the institution of a non-discriminatory school
program; that desegregation could be accomplished at once
and that no good cause had been shown by appellees to
warrant the court giving its approval to the plan proposed.
The court, nonetheless, concluded that appellees’ pro
posed formula constituted good faith compliance with the
Supreme Court’s decision and ordered appellees to
proceed to desegregate the Little Rock School System
pursuant to the three step program as proposed. There
upon, the complaint was dismissed, and appellants brought
the cause here.
5
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
There are no valid reasons of an equitable or adminis
trative nature warranting appellees being granted an
extension of time beyond September, 1957, either in start
ing or completing desegregation at the junior high and
elementary school levels in the Little Rock School District
such as proposed by appellees and approved by the judg
ment below.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 349
U. S. 294;
Booker, et al. v. State of Tennessee Board of
Education, — F. 2d — (6th Cir. January 14,
1957);
Willis v. Walker, 138 F. Supp. 177 (W. D. Ky.
1955);
Clemons v. Board of Education, 228 F. 2d 853
(6th Cir. 1956).
ARGUMENT
There Are No Valid Reasons of An Equitable or
Administrative Nature Warranting Appellees Being
Granted An Extension of Time Beyond September,
1957, Either in Starting or Completing Desegregation at
the Junior High and Elementary School Levels in the
Little Rock School District Such As Proposed by Ap
pellees and Approved by the Judgment Below.
1. In the second Brown decision (349 II. S. 294), the
Court set forth principles which were to guide lower courts
in litigation involving implementation of the Court’s man
date outlawing segregation in public schools. Under the
Brown formula, the lower court is empowered to weigh and
balance appellants’ personal interest in immediate admis
sion to public schools on a non-discriminatory basis against
6
the public interest in having the transition from segregation
to non-segregation take place in a systematic and orderly
fashion. These private and public interests are to be
adjusted and reconciled so that equal educational oppor
tunities are afforded to all with the least practicable delay,
and the change-over in the school system is allowed to
take place in an orderly fashion.
At the threshold of the question here presented is
whether the court’s approach to this question was in keep
ing with this formula. We think it was not. Appellants’
right to a public education free of discrimination based upon
race or color is present and immediate. Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, 332 U. S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629.
This right exists as an effective one only for a short period
of time—here only as long as appellants are eligible to
attend and are attending public school. In the very nature
of things, since various obstacles have to be overcome before
segregation can be eliminated, this right will be forever lost
for some children and seriously impaired as to others. Some
will have graduated before desegregation takes place, and
others will be so far advanced that the one or two years of
schooling left for them, even if under nondiscriminatory
conditions, will not be sufficient for them to overcome the
handicaps of many years of inferior education.
Appellees propose a plan whereby desegregation in the
Little Eock School System is to commence next term at the
senior high iSchool level.2
2 Appellees insist that desegregation cannot commence until the
new senior high school is finished (West End High School). Com
pletion is now scheduled for July, 1957. Appellants have raised
objection to delay until the new school is ready for occupancy. But
West End High School will be ready for occupancy in September,
1957. Since this cause will not be reached for argument before the
commencement of the last semester of the present school term, Sep
tember, 1957, is the earliest practicable date this Court could insist
upon a start being made. Thus appellants’ contentions that desegre
gation in fact could have and should have commenced earlier are now
largely academic.
7
After the successful completion of this phase of the pro
gram, desegregation will start at the junior high school level.
The start of the next phase is dependent upon the success
of the preceding steps, and hence under the Board’s formu
lation there are no definite terminal dates for the beginning
of one phase and the commencement of the next. The Super
intendent estimated that desegregation might start at the
junior high school level 2 or 3 years after it is instituted
at the senior high school level—1959-60,1960-61 (R. 88), and
it might start at the elementary grades 2 or 3 years after it
has been instituted at the junior high school level. Thus, it
is conceivable that desegregation will be completed by the
1963-64 school term. The evidence discloses, howmver, that
this is not definite, nor even a calculated guess, and it is
conceivable that the time estimated by Mr. Blossom may be
extended appreciably.
The court in approving this plan has lost sight of the
great private interest which these appellants have in being
afforded the right to equal education with the least practica
ble delay. That a Negro child attending segregated schools
in Arkansas receives educational advantages inferior to a
white child is clear from statistical data. In 1949-1950 the
State spent $123.60 for the education of every white child
and only $73.03 for every Negro child—a differential of
$50.53.® In 1951-1952, each child got less and the figures
were $102.05 and $67.75 respectively—a differential of
$34.30.4 That this short-changing of Negro children neces
sarily results in lowered educational standards in the schools
for Negroes is beyond dispute. Hence., for the Negro child,
insistence upon immediate vindication of his right to be
admitted to public schools without discrimination based
upon race or color is a matter of vital and pressing con-
3 Blose and Jaracz, Biennial Survey of Education in the United
States 1948-1950, Table 43 (1952).
4 Swanson and Griffin, Public Education in the South Today and
Tomorrow, Table 33 (1955).
8
cern. But the court below approved proposals which will
continue a pattern of inferior schooling for the majority
of Negro children presently enrolled in Little Rock public
schools for several years to come. By 1960-1961 wheii
desegration may commence at the junior high school level,
all Negroes now in junior high school will have graduated
to senior high school and will have opportunity for only
three years of unsegregated education. By 1963-64, when
desegregation may be commenced at the elementary school
level, all Negro children presently enrolled in elementary
schools will have graduated and will have been deprived,
of six years of unsegregated and equal education. This
is a long time to deny vindication of a right so basic and
fundamental as that here being asserted without some
over-powering justification. This is particularly true, in
view of appellees’ own admission that they have the
physical facilities to desegregate all of their schools now
(R. 81, 88).
This admission was made on several occasions during
the trial, but the Superintendent felt, however, that he
could not desegregate now and maintain educational stand
ards at the level he desired. Since Negro children are
presently receiving inferior education, what this sentiment
undoubtedly reflects is a fear that the mixing of Negro
children, handicapped by inferior educational offerings, into
schools with white children might lower the educational
standards maintained at the heretofore all-white schools.
If this is the basic problem, then that is all the more reason
why desegregation at the elementary level should take
place without undue delay, before the inferior educational
offerings available have had too great an impact on the
child’s educational development. Thus, we submit, if the
basic reason for the proposed formula is the fear of lower
ing educational standards, then all the plan proposes to do
is to make .solution of this problem more difficult for all
the Negro children presently enrolled in school. This fear
9
constitutes no reason for continuing to relegate Negro
children to inferior education but places upon the school
board the necessity of giving special attention to these
children, when segregation is removed, so as to help them
overcome the disabilities of inferior education as soon as
possible.
Further, there is nothing other than the unsupported
opinion of the Board as set forth in the plan itself and the
Superintendent’s testimony to validate the plan as a sound
one.
There is no objective evidence that it is easier to achieve
successful desegregation by a step by step process involv
ing successive desegregation of small segments of an insti
tution until the whole job is accomplished. Examination
of the actual instances of desegregation reveals that seg-
mentalized desegregation, including the progressive de
segregation of different grades of each school unit, does
not allay anxieties and doubts, or assure a greater com
munity acceptance of desegregation.5 Contrarily, such
methods appear to mobilize the resistance of those white
persons immediately affected, since they feel themselves
arbitrarily selected as an “ experimental” group. The
remaining individuals in the community then observe con
flict instead of a process of peaceful adjustment. Hence,
5 Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools 79-80 (1954) ; Clark,
“Desegregation: A n Appraisal of the Evidence” 9 Journal of Social
Issues 1-68, especially 45-46 (1953) ; Dean and Rosen, A Manual of
Intergroup Relations 57-108, especially 70 (1955) ; Grambs, Educa
tion In A Transition Community, Commission on Educational Or
ganizations, National Conference of Christians and jews 37, 39-40;
Thompson, Ed. “Next Steps In Racial Desegregation in Education”
23 Journal of Negro Education (1954); Thompson, Ed. “The De
segregation Decision: One Year Afterward” 24 Journal of Negro
Education (1955); Thompson, Ed. “Educational Desegregation,
1956” 25 Journal of Negro Education (1956); Tipton, Community
In Crisis, especially 71 (1953) ; Williams, Jr. and Ryan, Schools In
Transition 241-244 (1954).
10
their own anxieties are increased and resistance stiffens.
This reaction may then become self-perpetuating, resulting
in ineffective and incomplete desegregation.6
In addition to these problems, a major objection to
such a plan is that it can result in some children in the same
family attending non-segregated classes while their brothers
and sisters attend segregated classes. This would stimulate
and intensify problems of intra-family relationships and
aggravate the known psychological reactions to racial
segregation and discrimination.7
Analysis of instances where an extended time period for
desegregation has been utilized indicates that this plan may
be interpreted by the general community, white and Negro,
as indicative of anxiety and hesitancy about ending segre
gation or an intention of evading non-segregation. The
evidence indicates that rather than obtaining community
acceptance of non-segregation, this method may reinforce
initial resistance and opposition to desegregation.8
Adoption of this method is often predicated upon
the erroneous assumption that changes in attitude must
6 See footnote 5, supra.
7 Clark, Effects of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality
Development (1950). See also footnote 5, supra.
8 Ashmore, The Negro and the Schools 40-84, op. cit. supra,
note 5; Bustard, “The New Jersey Story” 21 Journal of Negro
Education 275-285 (1952); Clark, “Desegregation-. A n Appraisal
of the Evidence” 9 Journal of Social Issues 1-68, op. cit. supra,
note 5; Dean and Rosen, A Manual of Intergroup Relations 57-108
(1955); Delano, “Grade School Segregation: The Latest Attack
on Racial Discrimination” 61 Yale L. J. 738-744 (1952) ; Thomp
son, Ed. “Next Steps in Racial Desegregation in Education 23
Journal of Negro Education 201-338 (1954); Thompson, Ed. “The
Desegregation Decision: One Year Afterward” 24 Journal of Negro
Education 165-381 (1955); Thompson, Ed. “Educational Desegre
gation, 1956” 25 Journal of Negro Education (1956); Williams,
Jr. and Ryan, Schools in Transition, op cit. supra, note 5.
11
precede desegregation. Public opinion and acceptance
are important factors in obtaining effective desegrega
tion, but in many instances they follow rather than
precede the enforcement of non-segregation. Examina
tion of actual changes from public school segrega
tion to non-segregation clearly indicates that resistance
to desegregation is greater in anticipation of the change
to non-segregation than when desegregation actually
occurs.9
It appears, therefore, that the segmentalized approaches
to desegregation tend to result in ineffective desegrega
tion.10
Granted the difficulties of the problem, courts are not
to exercise their equity power merely to give time for the
sake of time, but are to exercise it to afford time for sys
tematic and effective change where such may be necessary
in the public interest. In larger cities than Little Bock
desegregation was accomplished over a much shorter time
span and without apparent adverse effects. This was true
of Louisville, Kentucky; Kansas City, Missouri; St. Louis,
9 Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (1954); Chein, Deutsch,
Hyman and Jahoda, Ed., “Consistency and Inconsistency In Inter-
group Relations” 5 Journal of Social Issues 1-63 (1949); Deutsch
and Collins, Interracial Housing (1951) ; Kutner, Wilkens and
Yarrow, “Verbal Attitudes and Overt Behavior Involving Racial
Prejudice” 47 Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 649-652
(1952); LaPiere, “Attitudes vs. Action” 13 Social Forces 230-237
(1934); Lee, “Attitudinal Multivalence in Culture and Personality”
60 American Journal of Sociology 294-299 (1954-55) ; Saenger and
Gilbert, “Customer Reactions to. the Integration of Negro Sales Per
sonnel” 4 International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research
57-75 (1950); Williams, The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions
(1947); Wilmer, Walkley and Cook, Pluman Relations in Inter
racial Housing (1955); Dean and Rosen, A Manual of Intergroup
Relations 57-108, op. cit. supra, note 5, and see other citations in
note 5.
10 See note 8, supra.
12
Missouri; Washington, D. C.; Baltimore,, Maryland. Cer
tainly, with a smaller school population, fewer teachers,
buildings and attendance areas, Little Rock should be able
to plan and implement an effective program of transition
on a much more accelerated time schedule than could be
possible in larger urban centers heretofore referred to.
Hence, it is submitted, that in a balancing of the equities
no good cause has been shown which would justify or
warrant the court below in postponing beyond September,
1957, vindication of the present rights of these appellants
to admission to schools without restrictions based upon
race.
2. Presumably appellees, in proposing to commence
desegregation at the senior high school level in September,
1957, are making a “ prompt and reasonable start towards
full compliance” with the May 17, 1954, ruling of the
United States Supreme Court. But the fact that a start
has been made does not render automatic a grant of
additional time to complete the process. Such an exten
sion should be given only where necessary to implement
the May 17, 1954, ruling in an effective manner.
“ The burden rests upon the defendants to
establish that such time is necessary in the public
interest and is consistent with good faith compliance
at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the
courts may consider problems relating to adminis
tration, arising from the physical condition of the
school plant, the school transportation system,
personnel, revision of school districts and attend
ance areas into compact units to achieve a system
of determining admission to the public schools on
a non-racial basis, and revision of local laws and
regulations which may be necessary in solving the
foregoing problem. ’ ’
13
There is nothing in the evidence in this case to show
that any administrative problems exist of the nature set
forth in the Brown decision to warrant delay in implementa
tion of appellants’ unquestioned constitutional rights.
Appellees raise questions concerning the physical
deficiencies of the school plant but according to their own
plan the physical deficiencies which delayed desegregation
have now been remedied. There are six junior high schools,
and there will be three senior high schools ready for
occupancy in September, 1957, when the West End High
School is completed. In addition there is Technical High
School.
In May, 1955, this was the indispensable condition to
accomplishing desegregation. In August, 1956, however,
added reasons were voiced for deferring accomplishing
desegregation until 1963 or beyond. What these problems
are is not clear from Mr. Blossom’s testimony.
Appellees are concerned about the public’s reaction to
desegregation and have sought to obtain public acceptance
of the Board’s plan by having it read and explained to
some 125-150 groups (R. 69). Appellees have problems
of finance, procurement and training of an adequate staff,
development of a sound curriculum, development of attend
ance areas to enable each child to attend school in the
area in which he resides, of seeking to make certain that
each classroom contains teachable groups of youngsters.
Their objective is to provide the best possible education
and to seek to satisfy the education needs of each child
insofar as possible. (See testimony of the Superintendent
of Schools, R. 69, et seq.) While all of these problems
are common to any school system, it is appellees’ conten
tion that the mere elimination of racial separation in a
school system makes them more acute and pressing (R. 88).
It is asserted that whenever desegregation takes place, it
will create problems; postponement, however, gives time
for understanding (R. 88). Appellees’ basic thesis is that
14
racial differences affect school achievement, and, therefore,
desegregation presents problems of curricula planning (R.
89). In this regard it is their contention that desegrega
tion per se creates administrative problems of great
magnitude.
There is no denying the fact that desegregation of the
Little Rock Schools will cause problems, but there is no
evidence that problems of an administrative nature will be
created such as to warrant extended delay in completing
the process as is now approved by the judgment below. Any
change creates some difficulties, and in this instance there
is a great emotional attachment to the present discrimina
tory practices. But compliance with the law cannot be put
off because some members of the public do not want to
change their habits or customs. See Brown v. Board of
Education, supra. Indeed, the objective evidence indicates
that unwarranted delays, not based on administrative needs
in effecting desegregation, may result in confusion, con
flict and race tensions and thereby render public acceptance
more of a problem than it would have been.11
Similar plans have been rejected by courts as not in
accord with the requirements of the law. In Pierce v.
Board of Education of Cabell County (S. D. "YV. Va. 1956),
unreported, the court rejected a proposed plan in which
desegregation would be completed in a period of 12 years
and ordered immediate desegregation. Similarly, in Shedd
v. Board of Education of Logan County (S. D. W. Va.
1956), Civil Action 873, unreported, the Board of Educa
tion proposed to complete desegregation of the first six
grades in September 1956 and to defer desegregation of
grades 7-12 until the completion of two new buildings.
The court rejected this proposal and ordered desegrega
tion completed in all grades by September 1956. In Willis
v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W. D. Ky. 1955) and in
Thompson v. School Board of Arlington County, 144 F.
11 See note 5, supra.
15
Supp. 239 (E. D. Va. 1956), aff’d — F. 2d — (4th Cir.
Dec. 31, 1956), plans seeking extended time spans tq
accomplish desegregation were rejected as violative of
plaintiffs’ rights to equal educational opportunities.
Under appellees ’ plan, all of these appellants not now in
senior high school will be denied their present and personal
rights to equal educational opportunities for periods of
3-6 years and perhaps even more. To deny appellants’
rights for this length of time, we submit, constitutes
non-compliance with the declaration of the Supreme Court
in the Brown case. See Clemons v. Board of Education,
228 F. 2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956); Booker v. State of Tennessee
Board of Education, — F. 2d — (6th Cir. decided Jan. 14,
1957).
There can be no justification for a delay which would
relegate these appellants and the majority of the other
Negroes in the Little Rock schools to inferior education
for an extended period of time, while the school board
wrestles with these problems with which it is now faced
and will have to face for many years after unsegregated
education has become an accepted fact of American life.
There is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts. In
failing or refusing to apply the law to these facts, or in
misapplying the law, the court below has failed in its
obligation to follow and apply the yardstick laid down by
the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, supra.
This, we submit, is reversible error. Union Tool Co. v.
Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 112; Bowles v. Simon, 145 F. 2d
334 (7th Cir. 1944); Booker v. State of Tennessee Board
of Education, supra-, Clemons v. Board of Education, supra.
16
Conclusion
For the reasons hereinabove indicated, it is respectfully
submitted that the judgment of the court below should be
reversed.
W iley A. Braxton,
119 East Barraque Street,
Pine Bluff, Arkansas,
U. S. T ate,
4207 Oakland Avenue,
Dallas 15, Texas,
R obert L. Carter,
T huegood Marshall,
107 West 43rd Street,
New York 36, N. Y.,
Attorneys for Appellants.