Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents Brief Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund
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January 1, 1981

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents Brief Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 1981. d7100da0-c09a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9c249303-6816-46af-b015-d42ab9accf4e/patsy-v-florida-board-of-regents-brief-amicus-curiae-naacp-legal-defense-fund. Accessed October 08, 2025.
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No. 81-1874 I n the §>itjtrmr (Scurf of tfyr lmtr& #tntrs October T eem, 1981 Georgia P atsy, v. Petitioner. B oard op R egents of the State op F lorida, A B ody Cor porate, Fob and on B ehalf op F lorida I ntp«rnational U niversity. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., AS AMICUS CURIAE J ack Greenberg James M. Nabrit, III B ill Lann Lee* E ric Schnapper Suite 2030 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Attorneys for NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae * Counsel of Record I N D E X Pa?e I n t e r e s t o f Amicus ........................................ 1 Summary o f Argument ...................................... 3 Argument ............................................................... 4 I . THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 1 983 .................................. 7 I I . THE ORIGINS OF THE 'JUDICIAL REQUIREMENT OF ADMINIS TRATIVE EXHAUSTION ............. 15 I I I . THE PURPOSE OF EXHAUSTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE HIS TORY OF SECTION 1983 .............. 30 IV. THE DEBATES CONCERNING THE SHERMAN AMENDMENT ..................... 44 CONCLUSION 50 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES PgSg Cases Bacon v . Rutland Ra i l ro ad C o . , 232 U.S. 134 (1914) .......................... 20 Brown v. Board o f Educat ion, 347 U.S. 483 (1 954) .......................... 2 C i ty o f Columbus v. Leonard, 443 U.S. 905 ( 1 979) .................................... 39 Ex par te Young, 209 U.S. 113 ( 1 908) ........................................................ 10 F i r s t Nat i ona l C i t y Bank o f Gree l ey v. Board o f County Commissioners o f County o f Weld, 264 U.S 450 ( 1 924) ......................................................... 22 G i l c h r i s t v. Interborough Rapid Tra ns i t C o . , 279 U.S. 159 ( 1 929) ......... 21 Goldsmith v. United S t a te s Board o f Tax Appeal s , 270 U.S. 1 17 ( 1 926) ............................................... 21 H o l l i s v. Kutz, 255 U.S. 452 (1921) ......................................................... 21 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S 409 (1976) ......................................................... 7 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 ( 1 861 ) .......................................... .. 28 McKart v. United S t a t e s , 395 U.S 185 (1 969) ........................................................ 32 - i i - Page Monell v. New York C ity Department o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658 (1978) ................................. 2 , 9 , 1 2 , 1 6 , 18 ,22 ,28 ,3 0 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) ........................................................ 34 Myers v. Bethlehem Sh i pbu i ld ing Co rp . , 303 U.S. 41 (1938) ............ 22,30 N i c h o l l v. United S t a t e s , 7 Wall . (74 U.S. ) 1 22 ( 1 869) ...................... 23 Owens v. C i ty o f Independence, 445 U.S. 622 ( 1 980) ............................ 7,1 5,1 7, 18,23 Quern v. 'Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) ........................................................ 8 Po r ter v. In ve s to rs Synd i ca te , 286 U.S. 461 ( 1 932) ........................ 22 Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co. , 262 U.S. 43 ( 1 923) ................. 20 P re n t i s v. A t l a n t i c Coast Line C o . , 211 U.S. 210 ( 1 908) .......................... 1 8 Prigg v. Pennslyvan ia , 16 Pet . 539 (1 842) ........................................................ 28 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) - iii - 1 5 Page United S ta te s v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 1 61 ( 1 904) ................................... 1 9 S ta tut es C i v i l R ights Act o f 1871, S e c t i o n 1, U.S.C. § 1 983 ................................. passim 10 S t a t . 612 ...................................................... 24 11 S ta t . 195 ...................................................... 24 14 S t a t . 152 ............................................ 25 17 S t a t . 269 ...................................................... 26 Other A u t h o r i t i e s A l p e r t s , S u i t s Against Adminis t r a t i v e Agenc ies Under N . I .R .A . and A . A . , 12 N.Y.LU.L.Q. Rev. 393 (1 935) ............................................... 19 Berger , Exhaustion o f Admin i s t r a t ive Remedies, 48 Yale L.'J. 981 (1 938) ........................................................ 19 Comment, Exhaustion o f Adm in i s t ra t iv e Remedies, 39 Cor ne l l L.Q. 273 ( 1 939) ............................................... 1 9 Cong. Globe , 42nd Cong. 1st Sess . & App. (1871) ................................. 12 ,13 ,14 , 29 ,3 5 ,3 6 , 37 ,38 ,39 IV Page L i l i e n t h a l , The Federal Courts and Sta te Regula t i on o f P ub l i c U t i l i t i e s , 43 Haw. L. Rev. 379 (1 930) ............................................... 19 Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (1938) . . 19 v No. 81-1874 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES October Term, 1981 GEORGIA PATSY, P e t i t i o n e r v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, A BODY CORPORATE, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY. BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., AS AMICUS CURIAE I n t e r e s t o f Amicus The NAACP Legal Defense and Educat ion al Fund, I n c . , i s a n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n e s t a b l i s h e d under the laws o f the S ta te o f New York. I t was formed t o a s s i s t black 2 p e r s o n s t o s e c u r e t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s by the p r o s e c u t i o n o f l a w s u i t s . I t s c h a r t e r d e c l a r e s that i t s purposes inc lude rendering l e g a l s e r v i c e s g r a t u i t o u s l y to b lack persons s u f f e r i n g i n j u s t i c e by r e a son o f r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . For many years a t t o rn eys o f the Legal Defense Fund have r e p r e s e n t e d p a r t i e s in l i t i g a t i o n b e f o r e t h i s Cour t and the l o w e r c o u r t s i n v o l v i n g a v a r i e t y o f i s s u e s b r o u g h t pursuant t o 42 U.S.C. § 1 983. E. g . , Monell v . New York C i t y Departmet o f S o c i a l Ser v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658 (1978 ) ; Brown v. Board o f E d u c a t i o n , 347 U.S . 483 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . The Legal Defense Fund b e l i e v e s that i t s ex p e r i e n c e in such l i t i g a t i o n and the r e s e a r c h i t has p e r f o r m e d w i l l a s s i s t the Court in t h i s case . The p a r t i e s have con s e n t e d t o the f i l i n g o f t h i s b r i e f , and l e t t e r s o f consent have been f i l e d with the C l e r k . 3 Summary o f Argument We r e s p e c t f u l l y submit t h a t n e i t h e r the language nor the l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f s e c t i o n 1 o f the C i v i l R i g h t s Ac t o f 1 8 7 1 , p r e s e n t l y c o d i f i e d as 42 U . S . C . § 1983, impose any requirement o f exhaus t i o n o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s . The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y r e v e a l s that Congress intended no such r e s t r i c t i o n on the broad r i g h t t o br ing s e c t i o n 1983 a c t i o n s . Nor can any such r e s t r i c t i o n be i m p l i e d in l i g h t o f the f a c t t h a t any n o t i o n o f a j u d i c i a l l y imposed exhaust ion requirement d i d no t emerge u n t i l much l a t e r , in the twent i eth century . Indeed, any exhaust ion requirement would be i n c o n s i s t e n t with one o f the c r i t i c a l f i n d i n g s o f the f o r t y - s e c o n d C o n g r e s s t h a t s t a t e o f f i c i a l s were un wi l l ing t o en fo r c e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l gu ar an t ee s . 4 T h is i s not t o say t h a t p o t e n t i a l p l a i n t i f f s must o r w i l l i n e v i t a b l y sue under s e c t i o n 1983. Rather , Congress has prov ided an i n c e n t i v e f o r improvement o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and o the r remedies in the s t a t e s by co n t in u in g t o make s e c t i o n 1983 a r e a d y remedy w h i l e p e r m i t t i n g t h o s e ag g r i e v e d t o u t i l i z e any s t a t e remedies which they b e l i e v e t o be e f f i c a c i o u s . ARGUMENT Whether as a matter o f p o l i c y i t would be wise t o r e q u i r e , as a p r e c o n d i t i o n o f a c c e s s t o f e d e r a l c o u r t s , t h a t p e r s o n s a l l e g i n g v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , f i r s t exhaust any a v a i l a b l e s t a t e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s , i s a c o m p l e x , s e n s i t i v e , and i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n . The c our t o f appeal s below viewed t h i s case as an ap pr o pr ia te v e h i c l e t o express i t s views 5 r e g a r d i n g f e d e r a l - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s , the i d e a l a l l o c a t i o n o f j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s , and the bes t manner in which the f e d e r a l c o u r t s can e n c o u r a g e the s t a t e s t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e d u r e s . We b e l i e v e t h a t the F i f t h C i r c u i t m i s c o n ce iv e d the nature o f the i ssue b e f o r e i t , and t h e r o l e o f t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n r e s o l v i n g i t . The q u e s t i on presented by t h i s case i s no t one o f j u d i c i a l p h i l o s o p h y , but o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n . The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the c ou r t s i s l i m i t e d to a s c e r t a i n i n g the i n t e n t i o n o f the C o n g r e s s which met some 110 y e a r s ago and f a s h i o n e d t h e 1871 C i v i l Rights Ac t . Those l e g i s l a t o r s l i v e d in a t ime v e r y d i f f e r e n t f rom our own. H a l f the c o u n t r y , s t i l l p r o s t r a t e from an exhaust ing war, wavered between mob r u le and t o t a l anarchy; the Klu Klux Klan, 6 t oday l i t t l e more than a d e p l o r a b l e r e l i c o f pas t h a t r e d s , then fu nc t i o ned as v i r t u a l l y a shadow government in many southern s t a t e s . Far f rom b e i n g c o n c e r n e d about o f f e n d i n g the s e n s i t i v i t i e s o f " s o v e r e i g n s t a t e s , " the f o r t y - s e c o n d Congress pres ide d over a m i l i t a r y o c cu p a t i o n o f those former Confedera te S t a t e s , whose l ea der s i t o f t e n l a b e l e d as t r a i t o r s . Whether the 1871 C i v i l Rights Act was w is e l y d r a f t e d when adopted , o r ought to be amended in l i g h t o f changing c o n d i t i o n s , are not q u es t i o n s t h i s C our t need o r s h o u l d a d d r e s s . The s o l e i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s Cour t i s whether the f r a m e r s o f t h a t A c t i n t e n d e d t h a t i t s r e m e d i e s o n l y be a v a i l a b l e t o t h o s e who had f i r s t exhausted s t a t e a d m i n i s t ra t i v e r e m ed ie s . 7 I . THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 1983 Because the qu e s t i on o f exhaust i on i s one o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n , the language o f the s t a t u t e i t s e l f i s o f c e n t r a l impor tance . By i t s terms s e c t i o n 1983 c r e a t e s a s p e c i e s o f t o r t l i a b i l i t y that admits o f no p r e c o n d i t i o n s o r p r e r e q u i s i t e s . See Imbler v . Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976 ) . I t s language i s ab so lu t e and u n q u a l i f i e d ; no mention i s made o f s t a t e or f e d e r a l admin i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s , o f s t a t e j u d i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s , o r o f any o th er event which must o c c u r b e t w e e n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n and t h e commencement o f t h e author i zed c i v i l a c t i o n . See Owen v . C i ty o f Independence , 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980 ) . R a t h e r , t h e a c t i m p o s e s l i a b i l i t y on " [ e ] v e r y p e r s o n " who under c o l o r o f law s u b j e c t s " any p e r s o n " t o a " d e p r i v a t i o n o f any r i g h t s , p r i v i l e g e s , o r i m m u n i t i e s 8 s e c u r e d by the C o n s t i t u t i o n and l a w s . " Nothing on the fa ce o f the s t a t u t e sugges ts that on ly persons who have exhausted s t a t e r emed ies , r a t her than "any person" what s o e v e r , can a v a i l themselves o f the p r o t e c t i o n o f the s t a t u t e . The e x i s t e n c e o f an e x h a u s t i o n r e quirement i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with the type o f d e f e n d a n t s s u b j e c t t o s u i t in a s e c t i o n 1 983 a c t i o n . Most o f the cases imposing exhaust ion requirements invo lve d l i t i g a t i o n aga ins t government agenc i es seeking reme d i a l o rders aimed at those agenc i es them s e l v e s . But s e c t i o n 1983 i s not so d i r e c t ed. I t au th o r i z e s s u i t not j u s t or pr imar i l y aga ins t government b o d i e s , but aga inst any "person" who has v i o l a t e d f e d e r a l r i g h t s under c o l o r o f s t a t e law. Sta tes can never1/ be named as de f end an ts , and l o c a l govern— 1/ Quern v . Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979 ) . 9 ments can on l y be sued under c e r t a i n nar - 2/ r o w l y d e f i n e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . N a tu ra l persons are the most common, and f r e q u e n t ly the on ly de fendants in s e c t i o n 1983 c a s e s . E x h a u s t i o n i s a r u l e about when a pa r ty suing a s t a t e or f e d e r a l agency must u t i l i z e remedies prov ided by that defendant a g e n c y t o c o r r e c t i t s own e r r o r s . An e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t c o u l d i n t e l l i g i b l y , a l though mis taken ly in our v i ew , be ap p l i e d in a p o l i c e b r u t a l i t y s u i t aga ins t a c i t y . But i f such a s u i t , as Congress c l e a r l y c o n t e m p l a t e d most s e c t i o n 1983 s u i t s would be, were against an i n d iv i d u a l p o l i c e o f f i c e r , exhaust i on i s an anomalous c o n c e p t . The ac tua l defendant pol iceman s imply has no "a d m in i s t r a t iv e remedies" t o 2 / Monell v . New York C i ty Department o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658, 690 -6 95 (1978 ) . o f f e r . The C i t y i s not a named de f endant , and i f , as a l l e g e d , the conduct complained o f i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h e c o n d u c t i s "wi thout the a u t h o r i t y o f , and does not a f f e c t t h e [ c i t y ] i n i t s s o v e r e i g n o r governmental c a p a c i t y . " Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908 ) . A c i t y o r s t a t e , o f c o u r s e , may choose t o c re a te an adminis t r a t i v e remedy f o r i n j u r i e s caused by i t s employees a c t in g in excess o f t h e i r author i t y , j u s t as i t may prov ide a s s i s t a n c e f o r v i c t i m s o f harms c o m m i t t e d by p r i v a t e w r o n g d o e r s , s u c h as c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r v i c t i m s o f c r imes . The p e r p e t r a t o r o f such a p r i v a t e c r i m e c o u l d n o t c o n c e i v a b l y immunize h i m s e l f f rom s u i t by demanding t h a t h i s v i c t i m " e x h a u s t " s u c h t h i r d p a r t y remed ies . The p o s i t i o n o f a wrong doer who happens t o be a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t . I t i s u n l i k e l y in the extreme that Congress intended, where a s u i t was br oug ht a g a i n s t bo t h a c i t y and i t s o f f i c i a l s , t h a t the a c t i o n c o u l d p r o c e e d a g a i n s t the o f f i c i a l but would have t o be stayed pending exhaust ion as to the c i t y i t s e l f . I t i s on ly margin a l l y l e s s u n l i k e l y that Congress intended t o impose an e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t in t h e m i n o r i t y o f c a s e s in w h i c h o n l y a government agency was named as a defendant . The debates l eading t o the passage o f s e c t i o n 1 o f the C i v i l Rights Act o f 1871, the f o rerunner o f s e c t i o n 1983, support a l i t e r a l r e a d i n g o f t h i s b road and u n r e s t r i c t e d language. Representa t ive S h e l l a - ba rger , the author and manager o f the b i l l in the House , e x p l a i n e d how the c o u r t s should i n t e r p r e t the Act : T h i s Act i s r e m e d i a l , and in a i d o f the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f human l i b e r t y and human r i g h t s . A l l s t a t u t e s and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s au thor i z ing 12 s u c h s t a t u t e s a r e l i b e r a l l y and b e n e f i c e n t l y c ons t ru ed . . . . . As has been again and again d e c i d e d by o u r own Supreme C o u r t o f the United S t a t e s , and everywhere e l s e where t h e r e i s w i s e j u d i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the l a r g e s t l a t i t u d e c o n s i s t e n t with the words employed i s u n i f o r m l y g i v e n in c o n s t r u i n g such s t a t u t e s and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s as are meant t o p r o t e c t and defend and g iv e remedies f o r t h e i r wrongs t o a l l the p e o p l e . 3/ See a l s o Monel l v . New York C i t y Department o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658, 683-87 (1978 ) . The adopt i on o f an exhaust i on r e q u i r e ment, f o r whatever reasons , would n e c e s s a r i l y e s t a b l i s h a b a r r i e r , sometimes tempo r a r y , on o c c a s i o n perhaps permanent, t o r e l i e f in the f e d e r a l c o u r t s . At the l e a s t an aggr i eved par ty would f i nd t h a t , u n t i l e x h a u s t i o n was c o m p l e t e d , the n a t i o n a l c o u r t s were c l o s e d t o him; i f a l l s t a t e 3/ Cong. G l o b e , 42nd C o n g . , 1s t S e s s . App. 68 (1871 ) . - 13 - r e m e d i e s were not s o u g h t , a c c e s s t o the f e d e r a l c ou r t s might be prec luded f o r e v e r . Nothing could have been fu r t he r from the contemplat i on o f the framers o f the 1871 A c t . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Lowe i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e A c t " t h r o w s o p e n t h e d o o r s o f t h e United S ta te s c o u r t s t o those whose r i g h t s u n d e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a r e d e n i e d o r 4 / i m p a i r e d . " Congressman Coburn u r g e d : Obv ious ly the cour t o f j u s t i c e i s the f i r s t instrument t o be used in aid o f t h e f o u r t e e n t h amendment ; s a f e r , m i l d er , sur er , more in accordance with r e a s o n , w i th our s ys tem , and wi th p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t . Whenever , t h e n , there i s a den ia l o f equal p r o t e c t i o n by the S t a t e , the c o u r t s o f j u s t i c e o f the nat i on stand with open do or s , . . . Here may come the weak and poor and dow ntrodden with a s s u r a n c e t h a t they s h a l l be heard. 5 / Even those who opposed o ther as pe c t s o f the 4 / Cong. G l o b e , 42nd C o n g . , 1s t S e s s . 376. 5 / Id. 459. 1 4 Act agreed that the f e d e r a l c o ur t s should be a v a i l a b l e whenever a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n were t h r e a t e n e d . I f a s t a t e p a s s e d laws c o n t r a v e n i n g the F o u r t e e n t h Amendment, R e p r e s e n t a t i v e S l a t e r empha s i z e d , Such laws would be s i m p l e n u l l i t i e s . . . and e v e r y o f f i c e r o f the s t a t e , f rom a j u s t i c e o f the p e a c e t o the supreme judge , from a c o n s ta b le t o the Ex ec ut ive , under t h e i r oath to support the C o n s t i t u t i o n o f the United S t a t e s , would be bound t o d i s r e ga rd them. I f , h o w e v e r , t h e i r e n f o r c e m e n t were attempted, the c i t i z e n i s not without means o f p r o t e c t i o n . The F e d e r a l c o u r t s , a lways open wi th w r i t s o f habeas c o r p u s , w r i t s o f r e s t r a i n t , and i n j u n c t i o n s , and o t h e r r e m e d i a l a g e n c i e s , can at a l l t im es r e n d e r e f f i c i e n t and ample s e c u r i t y aga inst a c t u a l o r t h r e a t e n e d d i s r e g a r d o f these guarantees . 6 / That the doors o f the f e d e r a l c o ur t s should now be c l o s e d t o p e t i t i o n e r , as the c o ur t s below urged, would be square ly c on t ra ry to the o r i g i n a l in te n t o f Congress . 6 / Id . App. 305 (emphasis added) . 1 5 I I . THE ORIGINS OF THE 'JUDICIAL REQUIRE- MENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION The b r oa d la n g u a g e o f s e c t i o n 1983, combined with the expansive c o n s t r u c t i o n o f i t c l e a r l y c o n t e m p l a t e d by i t s f r a m e r s , would o r d i n a r i l y be s u f f i c i e n t t o d e f e a t any c laim that r e l i e f aga inst a p a r t i c u l a r p a r t y c o u l d be d e l a y e d o r d e n i e d . T h i s Court has o n l y re cogn ized as l i m i t a t i o n s t o s e c t i o n 1983 a c t i o n s ru le s " so f i r m ly ro o ted in the common lav? . . . that ’ Congress would have s p e c i f i c a l l y so prov ided had i t wished t o a b o l i s h the d o c t r i n e . ’ " Owens v . C i ty o f Independence , 445 U.S. 662 (1980 ) . Thus in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1 95 1 ) , t h i s Court concluded that l e g i s l a t i v e i m m u n i t y was in 1871 s u c h a l o n g e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e , not ing that i t had been at the c e n t e r o f the P a r l i a m e n t a r y s t r u g g l e s o f the s i x t e e n t h and seventeenth c e n t u r i e s , and was e x p r e s s l y in co r p or a t ed in the Engl ish B i l l o f R ig h ts , the A r t i c l e s o f C o n f e d e r a t i o n , the C o n s t i t u t i o n , and at l e a s t e i g h t 18th century s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n s o r b i l l s o f r i g h t s . 341 U.S. 372-75. In M o n e l l bo t h the m a j o r i t y and the d i s s e n t e r s agreed that the s t a t e o f the law in 1871 regard ing munic ipa l immunity was o f c o n t r o l l i n g i m p o r t a n c e in d e t e r m i n i n g whether c i t i e s could be sued under s e c t i o n 1983. The m a jo r i t y r e j e c t e d any ab s o l u t e munic ipa l immunity because "by 1871, . . . muni c ipa l c o r p o r a t i o n s were r o u t i n e l y sued in the f e d e r a l c o u r t s and t h i s f a c t was w e l l known to the Members o f Co ngress , " 436 U.S. at 588. ' J u s t i c e Rehnquist argued, t o the c o n t r a r y , that at that time "no s t a t e c o ur t had ever he ld that munic ipa l c o r p o r a t i o n s were always l i a b l e in t o r t in p r e c i s e l y the same manner as o ther p e r s o n s . " 17 436 U.S. at 721. S i m i l a r l y , in Owens v . C i ty o f Independence , 445 U.S. 622 (1980 ) , a l l members o f the Cour t r e g a r d e d t h i s h i s t o r i c a l i s sue as c r i t i c a l . The m a jo r i t y c onc luded that the broad language o f the s t a t u t e c o u l d no t be r e s t r i c t e d by good f a i t h i m m u n i t y f o r l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s b e c a u s e in the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y " t h e c o u r t s had r e j e c t e d the p r o p o s i t i o n that a m u n i c i p a l i t y should be p r i v i l e g e d where i t r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e d i t s a c t i o n s t o be l a w f u l . " 445 U.S. at 641. ' Ju s t i c e Powel l and three o ther members o f the Court d i s s e n t e d on the ground t h a t the m a j o r i t y o p i n io n "runs counter t o the common law in the 19th cent ury , which re co gn iz e d substan t i a l t o r t immunity f o r munic ipal a c t i o n s . " 445 U.S. at 676. I f the r i g h t o f p e t i t i o n e r in t h i s case t o maintain an a c t i o n in f e d e r a l c our t 18 i s t o be d e l a y e d o r d e n i e d , d e s p i t e the l i t e r a l language o f s e c t i o n 1983, i t must be because the p r i n c i p l e o f a j u d i c i a l l y imposed a d m i n i s t r a t i v e exhaust i on r u l e was so f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d in 1871 that Congress was w e l l aware o f i t , knew that the c o u r t s would apply i t un les s o t herwise d i r e c t e d , and would have e x p r e s s l y d i s a p p r o v e d o f that j u d i c i a l p r a c t i c e had i t not wanted i t a p p l i e d . For tun ate ly here , un l ike Monell and Owens, the i s s ue i s c l e a r beyond p e r - adventure . This exhaust i on d o c t r i n e was t o t a l l y unheard o f in 1871. S ch o la rs g e n e r a l l y agree that the idea o f a j u d i c i a l l y imposed a d m i n i s t r a t i v e e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t has i t s r o o t s in P r e n t i s v . A t l a n t i c C oas t L ine C o . , 211 1/ U.S. 210 ( 1 908) . in that case the r a i l - 7 / Comment, Exhaustion o f Adm in i s t r a t ive Remedies, 39 C or ne l l L. Q. 273, 277 (1939) 1 9 road c h a l l e n g in g c e r t a i n proposed r a t e s as c o n f i s c a t o r y had f a i l e d t o appeal them t o the V i r g i n i a Supreme Cour t o f A p p e a l s , which reviewed such r a t e s in a l e g i s l a t i v e c a p a c i t y . Mr. ’J u s t i c e Holmes, emphasizing that " [n]o new ev idence and no g reat a d d i t i o n a l e x p e n s e " would be i n v o l v e d , h e l d that the r a i l r o a d had sued t oo soon, and 2 / cont inued ( " P r e n t i s v . A t l a n t i c Coast Line Co. , i s t h e r e a l b e g i n n i n g o f t h e e x h a u s t i o n r u l e . " ) ? L i l i e n t h a l , The F e d e r a l C o u r t s and Sta te Regula t i on o f P u b l i c U t i l i t i e s , 43 Harv. L. Rev. 379 , 385 (1930 ) ( "The d o c t r i n e had i t s beginning in P ren t i s v . A t l a n t i c Coast Line Co. , " ) ; Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251, 1261 ( 1 9 3 8 ) ( " T h i s p r i n c i p l e was e s t a b l i s h e d in the case o f P ren t i s v . A t l a n t i c Coast Line Co. " ) . A l p e r t , S u i t s Agains t Admin i s t r a t ive Agenc ies under N . I . R. A . and A . A . A . , 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 393, 395 (1935 ) . P r o f e s s o r Berger argues that t h e d o c t r i n e o r i g i n a t e d in t h i s C o u r t in a d e c i s i o n four years b e f o re P r e n t i s , United S ta tes v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904 ) . R. Berger , Exhaustion o f Adminis t r a t i v e Remedies, 48 Yale L. J. 981 , 9 81 — 82 (1938 ) . 20 d i r e c t e d i t t o pu rsu e t h a t a p p e a l . 211 U.S. at 230. But the Court d id not pretend i t was apply ing any h i t h e r t o heard o f r u l e . The m a j o r i t y o p i n io n re p e a t e d l y disavowed any attempt to f ormula te a "g enera l r u l e " o r "g enera l p r i n c i p l e s , " 211 U.S. at 229; i t c i t e d no a u t h o r i t y f o r i t s d e c i s i o n , and in d i c a t e d that the defendant had not ra i se d the argument on which the d e c i s i o n was based. I d . The p o s s i b i l i t y that exhaust ion was a requirement o f gen era l a p p l i c a t i o n emerged on ly s l o w l y . The e a r l y attempts t o invoke P r e n t i s as a de f ense sought t o r e qu i r e ex h a u s t i o n o f j u d i c i a l r e m e d i e s , and were 8/ s o u n d l y r e j e c t e d . in 1921 the Supreme C o u r t u n a n i m o u s l y r e v e r s e d a c o u r t o f 8 / Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co. , 262 U.S. 43, 48 (1923 ) ; Bacon v. Rutland R a i l r o a d C o . , 232 U.S 134, 137 ( 1 9 1 4 ) . 21 appeals d e c i s i o n that a consumer aggr i eved by f e d e r a l agency a c t i o n in c r ea s in g u t i l i t y r a t e s had t o f i l e a formal c omplaint and 9 / se ek a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h a t d e c i s i o n . In Goldsmith v . United Sta tes Board o f Tax A p p e a l s , 270 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1926 ) , the Cour t h e l d t h a t the p l a i n t i f f c o u l d no t complain o f a c t i o n taken by the Board u n t i l he had sought a hearing b e f o r e i t on the d i s p u t e in q u e s t i o n , b u t t h i s was an argument the d e f e n d a n t i t s e l f had never 1 0/ made. Not u n t i l 1929 do t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n s r e f e r t o a " d o c t r i n e " approved in JM/ P r e n t i s . The term " e x h a u s t " appe ar s 9 / H o l l i s v. Kutz, 255 U.S. 452, 453-54 T 1 9 2 1 ) . 10/ B r i e f on Behal f o f Defendant in Error , No. 320 , O c t o b e r Term 1 925 , pp . 3, 23. 11/ G i l c h r i s t v . Interborough Rapid Tran- s i t C o . , 279 U.S 159, 208 (1929) . 22 on ly i n t e r m i t t e n t l y in those e a r l y ye a rs . Only in Myers v . Beth lehem S h i p b u i l d i n g Corp . , 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 ( 1 938) , some 57 y e a r s a f t e r t h e e n a c t m e n t o f s e c t i o n 1 983 , i s the e x i s t e n c e o f a j u d i c i a l l y imposed exhaust ion requirement s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r t h a t any i n f e r e n c e about C o n g r e s s i o n a l i n te n t c ould even arguably be drawn from Congre ss i on a l s i l e n c e . The absence o f any j u d i c i a l exhaust i on requirement u n t i l l ong a f t e r the enactment o f s e c t i o n 1983 i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important because the 42nd Congress was w e l l aware o f t h e volume o f l i t i g a t i o n in th e f e d e r a l c o u r t s aga in s t l o c a l governments. Monell v . New York C i ty Department o f S o c i a l S e r - 12/ 12/ Po r ter v. I n v e s t o r s S y n d i c a t e , 286 U.S 461 , 468 ( 1 9 3 2 ) ; F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank o f Gree ley v. Board o f County Commissioners o f County o f Weld, 264 U.S 450, 453 (1924 ) . 23 v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658, 673, n.28 (1978 ) ; Owen v . C i t y o f I n d e p e n d e n c e , 445 U.S . 622, 64 2 -4 3 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . Only where f e d e r a l law e x p r e s s l y r e qu i red exhaust ion as a p r ec o n d i t i o n o f s u i t d id the c ou r t s impose such a requi rement . N i c h o l l v . United S t a t e s , 7 Wal l . (74 U.S. ) 122, 130-31 (1869 ) . W h e n e v e r d u r i n g t h e 19 th c e n t u r y C o n g r e s s w i shed t o impose an e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t , i t d i d s o e x p r e s s l y and u n e q u i v o c a l l y . In 1857 Congress author i zed importers who paid d u t i e s under p r o t e s t t o sue f o r a r e f u n d p r o v i d e d t h e y f i r s t I V appealed t o the C o l l e c t o r o f Customs. j n 13/ "On the ent ry o f any goods , wares and merchandise imported on and a f t e r the f i r s t day o f 'July a f o r e s a i d , the d e c i s i o n o f t h e c o l l e c t o r o f t h e customs at the por t o f impor ta t ion and e n t r y , as t o t h e i r l i a b i l i t y t o duty o r e x e m p t i o n t h e r e f o r m s h a l l be f i n a l and c o n c l u s i v e a g a i n s t t h e owner, importer , c ons ign ee , or agent o f any such goods , wares, and merchan- 24 1866 Congress gave aggr i eved taxpayers the r i g h t t o sue the Commissioner o f I n t e rn a l Revenue f o r taxes e r ro n e o u s ly o r i l l e g a l l y a s s e s s e d , but on ly i f an "appeal s h a l l have 1 1 / been d u l y made t o the c o m m i s s i o n e r . " 13/ cont inued d i s e ; u n l e s s the owner , i m p o r t e r , c o ns ignee or agent s h a l l , w i th in ten days a f t e r such e n t r y , g i v e n o t i c e to t h e c o l l e c t o r , i n w r i t i n g o f h i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i th such d e c i s i o n , s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e r e in d i s t i n c t l y and s p e c i f i c a l l y h i s grounds o f o b j e c t i o n h e r e t o , and s h a l l , w i th in t h i r t y days a f t e r t h e d a t e o f s u c h d e c i s i o n , appeal there from t o the s e c r e t a r y o f the t r e a s u r y , whose d e c i s i o n on such appeal s h a l l be f i n a l and c o n c l u s i v e ; and the sa id goods , wares and merchan d i s e s h a l l be l i a b l e t o d u t y o r exempted t h e r e f r o m a c c o r d i n g l y , any a c t o f C o n g r e s s t o t h e c o n t r a r y no twi t hs t an d in g ; un less s u i t s h a l l be brought w i t h i n t h i r t y days a f t e r such d e c i s i o n f o r any d u t i e s t h a t may have been pa id , o r may t h e r e a f t e r be pa id , on said goods , or w i t h i n t h i r t y days a f t e r the d u t i e s s h a l l have been paid in cases where such goods s h a l l be in bond. " 11 S t a t . 195. 14/ "No s u i t s h a l l be maintained in any c our t f o r the re co ve r y o f any tax 25 The f o r t y - s e c o n d C o n g r e s s , which framed s e c t i o n 1983, a l s o gave merchant seamen a cause o f a c t i o n f o r a pe n a l t y o f up t o one hundred d o l l a r s aga ins t any ships master who f a i l e d t o pro v id e adequate water and p r o v i s i o n s , but the pe na l t y cou ld not be sought u n t i l the seamen had complained t o a navy o f f i c e r or an American consu lar o f f i - 14/ c ont inued a l l e g e d t o have been e r r o n e o u s l y o r i l l e g a l l y assessed or c o l l e c t e d , u n t i l a p p e a l s h a l l have been d u l y made t o the commissioner o f i n te r n a l revenue, a c co rd ing t o the p r o v i s i o n s o f law in t h a t r e g a r d , and t h e r e g u l a t i o n s o f the s e c r e t a r y o f the t rea sur y e s t a b l i s h e d in p u rs u an c e t h e r e o f , and a d e c i s i o n o f said commissioner s h a l l be had thereon , un less such s u i t s h a l l be b r o u g h t w i t h i n s i x months f rom the t i m e o f s a i d d e c i s i o n , o r w i t h i n s i x months f rom the t ime t h i s a c t takes e f f e c t : P r o v id e d , That i f said d e c i s i o n s h a l l be d e l a y e d more than s i x m ont hs f r o m t h e d a t e o f su c h appeal , then said s u i t may be brought at any time wi th in twelve months from the date o f such a p p e a l . " 14 S t a t . 152. 26 c i a l . 17 S t a t . 269, No such exhaust ion requi rement , on the o ther hand was imposed as a p r e c o n d i t i o n o f s u i t s in the Court o f 1 5/C l a i m s . T h i s l e g i s l a t i o n makes c l e a r that the Congress which enacted the 1871 C i v i l R i g h t s A c t knew how t o w r i t e an exhaust ion requirement i n t o a s ta tu te and did so whenever i t wanted t o r e qu i r e the u t i l i z a t i o n o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d ie s p r i o r t o s u i t . I t s r e f u s a l t o p l a c e such a requirement in to s e c t i o n 1 983 can on ly be understood as a d e l i b e r a t e d e c i s i o n not t o i m p o s e any s u c h r e q u i r e m e n t on t h o s e s e e k i n g r e l i e f a g a i n s t s t a t e o f f i c i a l s v i o l a t i n g f e d e r a l r i g h t s . Had C o n g r e s s i n t e n d e d t o impose any e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t , i t i s f a r more l i k e l y that i t would have been concerned 15/ 10 S t a t . 612. 27 with exhaust ion o f s ta te j u d i c i a l remedies than s t a t e ad m i n i s t ra t i ve remedies . The v i o l a t i o n s o f f e d e r a l r i g h t s about which C o n g r e s s was c o n c e r n e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y v i o l e n c e d i r e c t e d a t b l a c k s , f e d e r a l o f f i c i a l s and un ion s y m p a t h i z e r s , were , then as now, r e dressed by j u d i c i a l a c t i o n . In the n ineteenth century ad m i n i s t ra t i ve remedies were so un tr i ed and even uncommon that i t i s f a r more probab le that Congress would have e x p e c t e d any r e d r e s s t o come from the c o u r t s . The s ta te c ou r t s were at l e a s t marg ina l l y more l i k e l y t o be indepen dent o f l o c a l p o l i t i c s and pa ss i ons than would e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s dependent on popu l a r support f o r c o nt in u at i o n in o f f i c e . A l though s t a t e j u d g e s might be o b l i g a t e d by the Supremacy C la us e t o e n f o r c e the C o n s t i t u t i o n , the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e which re igned in 1871 was that the f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d n o t i m p o s e on s t a t e 28 e x e c u t i v e o f f i c i a l s any o b l i g a t i o n s t o implement f e d e r a l law. Monel l v. New York C i t y Department o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658, 676-79 (1978) ( d i s c u s s i n g Prigg v. P en n s ly van ia , 16 Pet . 539 (1 84 2 ) , and Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 ( 1 8 6 1 ) ) . The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f s e c t i o n 1983, however, makes c l e a r that j u d i c i a l e x h a u s t i o n was no t t o be r e q u i r e d . The opponents o f the 1871 Act we l l understood that i t c onta ined no requirement o f j u d i c i a l e x h a u s t i o n , and o b j e c t e d t o i t on p r e c i s e l y t h a t g r o u n d . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Storm complained that s e c t i o n 1 does not even g iv e the Sta te c o u r t s a chan ce t o t r y q u e s t i o n s , o r t o show wh eth er t h e y w i l l t r y the q u e s t i o n s that might come b e f o r e them under the f i r s t s e c t i o n o f t h e f o u r t e e n t h amendment, f a i r l y o r n o t . I t t a k e s the whole qu e s t i o n away from them in the beg inn ing . Now these q u e s t i o n s could a l l be t r i e d , I take i t , in the S ta te c o u r t s , and by a w r i t o f e r r o r . . . c o u l d be 29 brought b e f o re the Supreme Court f o r r e v i e w . . . . But the f i r s t s e c t i o n does no t a l l o w t h a t r i g h t . I t t a k e s the w h o l e q u e s t i o n away a t o n c e and f o r e v e r . . . 16/ S e n a t o r Thurman o p p o s e d t h a t s e c t i o n because o f the c e n t r a l i z i n g tendency o f t r a n s f e r r i n g a l l mere p r i v a t e s u i t s , as w e l l as p u n i s h m e n t o f o f f e n s e s , f rom the S t a t e i n t o the F e d e r a l c o u r t s . I do no t say t h a t t h i s s e c t i o n g i v e s t o the F e d e r a l c ou r t s e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n . I do not suppose that i t i s so unders toood . I t l e a v e s i t , I p r e s u m e , i n t h e o p t i o n t o the p e r s o n who imag ines h i m s e l f t o be i n j u r e d t o sue in the S t a t e c o u r t o r in the F e d e r a l c o u r t , an o p t i o n t h a t he who has been l e a s t in ju r ed , but who has some m a l i c e t o g r a t i f y , w i l l be the most l i k e l y t o a v a i l h i m s e l f o f . 1 7 / The i n c l u s i o n o f t h i s o b j e c t i o n in Thur- man ' s "parade o f h o r r i b l e s " i s p r e c i s e l y the s o r t o f e v i d e n c e as t o the meaning o f the a c t which Mr. J u s t i c e R e hn qu is t 1 6/ Cong. G l o b e , 42nd C o n g . , 1s t S e s s . App. 86. 17/ Id. App. 216. 30 t h o u g h t c r i t i c a l in M o n e l l v . New York C i t y Department o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658, 722 (1978 ) . I I I . THE PURPOSE OF EXHAUSTION AND THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1983 A l t h o u g h the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s o f f e r e d f o r the exhaust ion r u le are numerous, many are o b v i o u s l y i n a p p l i c a b l e here . The most common a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t i s where a p l a i n t i f f s ee k s r e v i e w by t h e c o u r t s o f a c t i o n by a f e d e r a l ag enc y c h ar ge d by s t a t u t e w i th i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e s t a t u t e on w h i c h t h e p l a i n t i f f r e l i e s . See Myers v. Bethlehem S h i p b u i l d i n g C o r p . , 303 U.S . 41 ( 1 9 3 8 ) . The c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f e x p e r t i s e and s t a t u t o r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e l e v a n t t o such a case c l e a r l y have no p l a c e here . The 1871 C i v i l R i g h t s A c t d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h any s t a t e a g e n c i e s t o e n f o r c e t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ; n e i t h e r did i t d i r e c t or au thor i ze s ta te 31 o f f i c i a l s t o pr ov i de any a d m i n i s t ra t i v e or j u d i c i a l r e m e d i e s f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s . N o t h i n g in t h e l a n g u a g e o f the s t a t u t e contemplates that the s t a t e s are t o p l a y any r o l e in r e d r e ss i n g v i o l a t i o n s o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n . I f e x h a u s t i o n i s t o be r e q u i r e d i t must be f o r reasons o ther than implementing o r r e s p e c t i n g a c o n g r e s s i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e scheme. E x h a u s t i o n in a case such as t h i s could p l a u s i b l y be urged t o se rve one o f two purposes . F i r s t , i f an aggr i eved p a r t y were t o o b t a i n in the s ta te ad m i n i s t ra t i v e proceeding the r e l i e f that would o t herwise be sought in f e d e r a l c o u r t , the work o f those cour t s would be reduced. S e c o n d , i f t h e v i c t i m ' s i n j u r i e s a r e re dressed by the s ta te i t s e l f , some p o t e n t i a l f o r f e d e r a l - s t a t e c o n f l i c t might be avo ided . We do not suggest that e i t h e r o f these j u s t i f i c a t i o n s are pe r s u a s i v e , but 32 o n l y t h a t i t must be on a b a s i s such as t h i s t h a t e x h a u s t i o n i s g r o u n d e d . See McKart v . U n i t ed S t a t e s , 395 U.S . 185, 193-95 (1969 ) . A l l the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s that might be advanced in t h i s o r any o t h e r c a s e f o r r e q u i r i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e exhaust ion r e s t on one a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l assumption — that the agency whose pr oc edures must be pursued w i l l make a s e r i o u s and good f a i t h e f f o r t t o c o n s id e r the p l a i n t i f f ' s c la ims and t o implement the same r u l e s that the p l a i n t i f f s e e k s t o e n f o r c e in c o u r t . Abse nt t h a t assumption, there i s no reason whatever t o b e l i e v e that any o f the purposes o f exhaus t i o n w i l l be se rved . I f the agency i s not a c t in g in good f a i t h , no p o s s i b l e r e l i e f can come o f the agency p r o c e e d i n g s , and the f e d e r a l c o u r t s in u l t i m a t e l y g r a n t i n g r e l i e f w i l l h a v e t o d i s a p p r o v e o f t h e agency proce ed in g as w e l l as the i n i t i a l 33 v i o l a t i o n . More s e r i o u s l y , an a g e n c y pr oc eed in g in bad f a i t h could manipulate an exhaust ion requirement to s e v e r e l y aggra vate the v i o l a t i o n that has a l ready o c c u r red . Rather than "b u i ld i n g a r e c o r d , " the pr oc ee d in g could be used as an o pp or tu n i t y t o conduct p r e - t r i a l d i s c o v e r y and then r e shape the a g e nc y ' s de f ense . The r e s o l u t i o n o f the underly ing c laim could be de layed in the hope o f e x h a u s t i n g the p l a i n t i f f ' s r e s o u r c e s o r h i s or her p a t i e n c e . We do no t c o nt en d t h a t t h i s c r u c i a l assumption o f agency good f a i t h and minimal c o m p e te n c e i s m is t ak en as t o a l l s t a t e a g e n c i e s , o r u n j u s t i f i e d on the f a c t s o f t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case . Rather, we urge that t h i s ass um pt io n i s t o t a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t with the f i n d i n g s and c on c lu s i o n s which led Congress t o adopt the 1871 C i v i l Rights Ac t . The f o r t y - s e c o n d Congress , we contend, be l i e v e d that s ta te o f f i c i a l s were c e r t a i n l y - 34 u n a b l e , and in most c a s e s u n w i l l i n g , t o comply with or e n f o r c e the United S ta tes C o n s t i t u t i o n . In l i g h t o f that f i n d i n g , which l i e s at the heart o f the 1871 A c t , we submi t t h a t C o n g r e s s c an n o t c o n c e i v a b l y have intended t o r e q u i r e aggr i eved p a r t i e s , p r i o r t o o b t a i n i n g a c c e s s t o f e d e r a l c o u r t s , t o s e e k r e d r e s s f r o m t h e v e r y s t a t e o f f i c i a l s whom C o n g r e s s c o n c l u d e d would deny i t . One c r i t i c a l purpose o f the 1871 Act was " t o p r o v id e a f e d e r a l remedy where the s t a t e remedy, though adequate in t he o r y , was not a v a i l a b l e in p r a c t i c e . " Monroe v . Pape, 365 U.S 1 67, 1 74 (1 961) . Congressman Stoughton as se r te d The w h o l e S o u t h , Mr. S p e a k e r , i s r a p i d l y d r i f t i n g i n t o a s t a t e o f anarchy and b l oodshed , which renders the w o r s t Government on the f a c e o f t h e e a r t h r e s p e c t a b l e by way o f comparison. There i s no s e c u r i t y f o r l i f e , person or p r o p e r t y . The S ta te a u t h o r i t i e s and l o c a l c o u r t s are un 35 a b l e o r u n w i l l i n g t o c h e c k t h e e v i l o r p u n i s h the c r i m i n a l s . 18/ Re pr e se nt a t iv e Perry exc la imed : Where t h e s e gangs o f a s s a s s i n s show t h e m s e l v e s , t h e r e s t o f t h e peop le l ook on, i f not with sympathy, a t l e a s t w i t h f o r e b e a r a n c e . The b o a s t e d c o u r a g e o f the South i s not courage in t h e i r p r es en c e . S h e r i f f s , having eyes to see , see not ; judg es , ha v in g e a r s t o h e a r , hear n o t ; w i t n e s s e s c o n c e a l the t r u t h o r f a l s i f y i t ; grand j u r i e s act as i f they might be a c c o m p l i c e s . In the p r e s e n c e o f t h e s e gangs a l l the a p p a r a t u s and machinery o f c i v i l government, a l l the p r o c e s s e s o f j u s t i c e , skulk away as i f government and j u s t i c e were cr imes and f e a r e d d e t e c t i o n . Among the most dangerous things an in jured par ty can do i s t o appeal f o r j u s t i c e . Of the u n c o u n t e d s c o r e s and h u n d r e d s o f a t r o c i o u s m u t i l a t i o n s and murders i t i s c r e d i b l y s t a t e d t h a t no t one has been punished. 19/ Senator Pool argued that the s t a t e " c o u r t s have been t r i e d , and the e xe c u t iv e arm has 18/ Cong. G l o b e , 42nd C o n g . , 1 s t S e s s . 321 . 19/ Id. App. 78. - 36 b e e n t r i e d , and b o t h h a ve f a i l e d . " R ep r es e nt a t iv e Snyder noted that m u l t i p l i e d hundreds o f l o y a l p e o p l e , b o t h m a le and f e m a l e , h a ve b e e n whipped, s courged , l a c e r a t e d , e x i l e d , r o b b e d , and m u r d e r e d , b y t h e s e demonish Klans. . . . Anarchy and v i o l e n c e are supreme and the a d h e r e n t s o f the Government are u t t e r l y unpro t e c t e d . They appeal in vain t o S ta te a u t h o r i t y , and a r e now b e f o r e us as hu mb le s u p p l i a n t s f o r f e d e r a l p r o t e c t i o n . 21/ Senator Morton argued But i t i s sa id these crimes should be p u n i s h e d by the S t a t e s ; t h a t the y are a l ready o f f e n s e s aga inst the laws o f the S t a t e s , and the matter should be l e f t with the S t a t e s . The answer t o t h a t i s , t h a t the S t a t e s do not punish them; the S ta tes do not p r o t e c t the r i g h t s o f the p e o p l e ; th e S t a t e c o u r t s are power less t o r e dr e ss these wrongs. The gr ea t f a c t remains that l a r g e c l a s s e s o f p e o p l e , numbering n e a r l y one h a l f in some S t a t e s , are wi thout l e g a l remedy in the c o u r t s o f t h e S t a t e s . S h o u l d t h i s f a c t be over l ook ed f o r the sake o f a theory? Sha l l i t be said with any reason that 20/ 20 / Id. App. 1 70 1 1 / I d . App. 1 99 37 i t i s p r oper t o l eave the punishment o f these crimes t o the S t a te s when i t i s a n o t o r i o u s f a c t that the S t a te s do not punish them. 22/ Senator Osborn exp l a ine d : I f the S ta te c ou r t s had proven them s e l v e s c o m p e t e n t t o s u p p r e s s t h e l o c a l d i s o r d e r s , o r t o m a i n t a i n law and o r d e r , we s h o u ld no t have been c a l l e d upon t o l e g i s l a t e upon t h i s s u b j e c t at a l l . But the y have not done s o . We are d r i v e n by e x i s t i n g f a c t s t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e s e v e r a l S t a t e s in the South what the y have b e e n u n a b l e f u l l y t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e m s e l v e s , i . e . , the f u l l and com p l e t e ad m in i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e in the c o u r t s . 23/ Congresman Rainey remarked: The qu e s t i o n i s sometimes asked, Why do n o t t h e c o u r t s o f l aw a f f o r d r e d r e s s ? Why the n e c e s s i t y o f app ea l ing t o Congress? We answer that the c ou r t s are in many in s ta n c e s under the c o n t r o l o f those who are whol ly i n i m i c a l t o the i m p a r t i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f law and e q u i t y . What b e n e f i t could r e s u l t f rom an a p pe a l t o t r i b u n a l s 22/ I d . App. 252. 23 / Id. at 653. 38 whose o f f i c e r s a re s e c r e t l y in sym pathy with the very e v i l aga in s t which we are s t r i v i n g . 24/ Senator Pra t t urged: [0] f the hundreds o f ou t ra ges commit t ed upon l o y a l p e o p l e th r o u g h the agency o f t h i s Klu Klux Klan o r g a n i z a t i o n , [but] not one has been punished. This d e f e c t in the a d m in i s t ra t i o n o f the laws d o e s not e x t e n d t o o t h e r c a s e s . V i g o r o u s l y enough are the laws en fo r c e d aga inst Union p e o p le . They only f a i l in e f f i c i e n c y when a man o f known Union sent iments , white or b l a c k , i n v o k e s t h e i r a i d . Then ' J u s t i c e c l o s e s the d o o r o f her t e m p l e s . 25/ Congressman Lowe argued Whi l e murder i s s t a l k i n g ab road in d i s g u i s e , whi le whippings and l y n ch - ings and banishment have been v i s i t e d upon u n o f f e n d i n g Amer ican c i t i z e n s , the l o c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s have been f o u n d i n a d e q u a t e o r u n w i l l i n g t o apply the proper c o r r e c t i v e . Combina t i o n s , d a r k e r than the n i g h t t h a t h ides them, c o n s p i r a c i e s wicked as the w o r s t o f f e l o n s c o u l d d e v i s e , have gone unwhipped o f j u s t i c e . Immunity i s g iven t o c r ime , and the r e c o r d s o f 1 1 / Id. at 394 25 / Id. at 505 39 the p u b l i c t r i b u n a l s are searched in v a i n f o r any e v i d e n c e o f e f f e c t i v e r e d r e s s . 2 6 / Mr. Beat ty a s s e r t e d : [M]en w e r e m u r d e r e d , h o u s e s w e r e burned, women were ou t raged , men were s courged , and o f f i c e r s o f the law shot down; and the S ta te made no s u c c e s s f u l e f f o r t t o br ing the g u i l t y t o puni sh ment or a f f o r d p r o t e c t i o n or r e dr ess t o t h e o u t r a g e d and i n n o c e n t . 2 7 / R e c o g n i z i n g t h a t the f o r t y - s e c o n d Congress b e l i e v e d that remedies nominal ly a v a i l a b l e on the fa ce o f s t a t e laws were not a v a i l a b l e in p r a c t i c e , ' Ju s t i c e Rehn- q u i s t urged in C i ty o f Columbus v. Leonard 443 U.S. 905 (1979) (Rehnquist , J . , d i s s e n t ing from d e n ia l o f c e r t i o r a r i ) that exhaus t i o n might non ethe less be requ i red where a s t a t e could demonstrate in f a c t " th at there i s an a v a i l a b l e and adequate remedy." The 26 / Id. at 374 27 / Id. at 428 40 p r a c t i c e suggested by ' J u s t i c e Rehnquist i s f a r d i f f e r e n t from any requirement h i t h e r t o imposed by the f e d e r a l c o u r t s , and would d e f e a t r a t h e r than advance the p u r p o s e s behind exhaust i on . To put i t s e l f o u t s i d e the c a t e g o r y o f cases about which Congress was concerned , a s t a t e would have t o prove more than that some a d m i n i s t r a t i v e procedure e x i s t e d in which the r e l i e f sought in f e d e r a l c our t was t e c h n i c a l l y a v a i l a b l e . A s t a t e would have t o demonstrate by c l e a r and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t s u c h r e l i e f was i n f a c t p rov ided by that p r o c e s s t o persons such as the p l a i n t i f f . The r e s o l u t i o n o f such c la ims would n e c e s s a r i l y d e f e a t the v e r y p u r p o s e s o f e x h a u s t i o n . Far f rom r e d u c i n g t h e w o r k l o a d o f t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s , t h i s n o v e l ap pr o ac h would f o r c e f e d e r a l j u d g e s t o p r e s i d e o v e r o f t e n 41 l engthy t r i a l s r egard ing the e n t i r e c a s e l oad and h i s t o r y o f the agency, weighing the f r equency and type o f r e l i e f awarded, a s c e r t a i n i n g wh ether r e l i e f was e q u a l l y a v a i l a b l e in a l l r e l e va n t types o f c a s e s , and search ing f o r m e r i t o r i o u s c la ims that might have been w r on g f u l l y den ied . Often such hear ings would be more time consuming and complex than the ac tua l t r i a l on the m e r i t s . In a d d i t i o n , r a t her than d e f e r r i n g t o s ta te a u t h o r i t i e s on the assumption that t h e y would a c t c o m p e t e n t l y and in good f a i t h , the f e d e r a l c o ur t s would be requ i red t o s i t in judgment on the ac tua l a b i l i t i e s and c h a r a c t e r o f t h e s t a t e o f f i c i a l s i n v o lv e d , a p r o c e s s v i r t u a l l y c e r t a i n t o aggravate f e d e r a l - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s . This e n t i r e p r o c e s s , m o r e o v e r , w o u ld be an attempt by the s t a t e t o prove t ha t , however j u s t i f i e d the Congress might have been in 42 e n a c t i n g the 1871 C i v i l R i g h t s A c t , i t s u n d e r l y i n g f i n d i n g s w e r e e r r o n e o u s as app l i ed t o the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency. The f e d e r a l c o u r t s do n o t o r d i n a r i l y s i t t o r e c o n s i d e r the wisdom o r a c c u r a c y o f c o n g r e s s i o n a l f i n d i n g s . We r e c o g n i z e that c i rcumstances in the S o u t h h a v e c h a n g e d g r e a t l y s i n c e t h e ena c tm ent o f the 1871 C i v i l R i g h t s A c t . Some a d m i n i s t r a t i v e remedies now in e x i s t e n c e a r e f a i r o r e f f i c i e n t o r b o t h ; o t h e r s , r e g r e t t a b l y , a re n e i t h e r . But Congress gave the f e d e r a l c o u r t s no mandate t o c o n d u c t t r i a l s on t h e e f f i c a c y and b i a s e s o f each o f the thousands o f s ta te ag enc i es that abound t oday , and no author i t y t o p i c k and c h o s e when s e c t i o n 1983 would a f f o r d i t s p r o t e c t i o n s . R a t h e r , C o n g r e s s p r o v i d e d f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y o f improvement in the c o n d i t i o n s which i t found in 1871 by p er m i t t in g 43 a g g r i e v e d p a r t i e s t o u t i l i z e any s t a t e r e m e d i e s , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , j u d i c i a l o r l e g i s l a t i v e , which the y b e l i e v e d t o be e f f i c a c i o u s . Such i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n s , by p e o p l e who w i l l o f t e n u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e a l i t i e s o f the agen c i e s f a r b e t t e r than a f e d e r a l judge , impose none o f the burdens on f e d e r a l c o u r t s o r d i f f i c u l i t e s f o r f e d e r a l - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s inherent in J u s t i c e R e h n g u i s t ' s p r o p o s a l . T h i s s t a t u t o r y system p r o v id e s s ta te agenc i es anxious f o r an op p or tu n i t y t o r e s o l v e d i sp u t e s i n t e r n a l l y w i th a p o w e r f u l i n c e n t i v e t o make genuine ad m i n i s t ra t i ve r e l i e f a v a i l a b l e in p r a c t i c e in o r d e r t o pe r s u a d e a g g r i e v e d p a r t i e s t o seek r e dr ess there rather than in f e d e r a l c o u r t . Regardless o f whether t h i s Court might today choose a d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h , t h i s i s the scheme e n a c t e d by C o n g r e s s when i t a d o pt ed th e 1871 C i v i l Rights A c t , and i t i s the scheme which the f e d e r a l c o u r t s must adhere t o u n t i l and un less Congress d i r e c t s o t h er w is e . IV. THE DEBATES CONCERNING THE SHERMAN AMENDMENT_________________________________ _ In t h i s c a s e , as in Monroe, Monel l and Owen, c o n s i d e r a b l e l i g h t i s thrown on the i n t e n t o f C o n g r e s s by t h e c o n t r o v e r s y s u r r o u n d i n g t h e Sherman Amendment. The f i r s t c on fe r e n c e r e p or t on the 1871 C i v i l Rights Act c onta ined a p r o v i s i o n dr a f t e d by Senator Sherman which imposed on a c i t y o r county s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y f o r any i n j u r i e s caused by a r i o t w i th in i t s bor de r s . This p r o p o s a l was r e j e c t e d by the House on a v a r i e t y o f g r o u n d s . M one l l v . New York C i t y Department o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S at 6 6 9 - 6 8 3 . C o n g r e s s then a d op t e d l a n guage, now c o d i f i e d as 42 U.S.C. § 1 986, imposing l i a b i l i t y on any person who had - 44 - 45 knowledge o f a c o n s p i r a c y t o v i o l a t e the v i c t i m ' s c i v i l r i g h t s and f a i l e d t o use h i s 28 / o r her power t o prevent i t . 28/ In r e j e c t i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the d o c t r i n e o f r espondeat s u p e r i o r t o impose on c i t i e s o r c o u n t i e s s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s commit ted by t h e i r o f f i c i a l s , Monel l r e l i e d h e a v i l y on the h i s t o r y o f the Sherman Amendment. 436 U.S. at 693-94. Monell reasoned that the d e b a t e s on t h a t amendment p r o v i d e d a c r i t i c a l i n s i g h t i n t o Congress ' views as to the c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which l i a b i l i t y should be imposed on a defendant . One a s p e c t o f the Sherman amendment debates r e l i e d on by Monell was o p p o s i t i o n t o the amendment on the ground t h a t i t imposed l i a b i l i t y on a l o c a l government even i f i t "d id not know o f an impending o r e n s u i n g r i o t o r d i d n o t h a ve t h e wherewithal t o do anything about i t . " 436 U.S at 692, n . 57 . Senator Stevenson argued t h e amendment " u n d e r t a k e s t o c r e a t e a c o r p o r a t e l i a b i l i t y f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y which no prudence or f o r e s i g h t could have p r e s e n t e d . " Cong. Globe , 42nd Cong. , 1st Sess . 762. Repre se nta t ive Kerr o b j e c t e d , There i s . . . a t o t a l and a b s o l u t e a b s e n c e o f n o t i c e , c o n s t r u c t i v e o r impl i ed , w i thin any decent l i m i t s o f l aw o r r e a s o n . . . . Under t h i s 46 The language adopted in p l a c e o f the Sherman amendment, and now c o n t a i n e d in s e c t i o n 1 9 8 6 , r e p r e s e n t s t h e v i e w o f Congress as t o the amount o f knowledge and degree o f a c t i o n or i n a c t i o n ap propr ia te f o r the im po s i t i o n o f the l i a b i l i t y by the f e d r a l c o u r t s . The s u b s t i t u t e amendment p r o v i d e d : [A]ny person or persons having knowl edge o f the wrongs c o n s p i r e d t o be d o n e and m e n t i o n e d i n t h e s e c o n d s e c t i o n o f t h i s a c t are ab out t o be committed, and having power t o prevent o r aid in preve nt in g the same, sh a l l n e g l e c t or r e f u s e t o do so , and such wrongful act s h a l l be committed; such person or per sons s h a l l be l i a b l e to t h e p e r s o n i n j u r e d , o r h i s l e g a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Id . at 804. 28/ c ont inued s e c t i o n i t i s no t r e q u i r e d , b e f o r e l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h , t h a t i t s h a l l be known that there was any i n t e n t i o n t o commit these c r imes, so as t o f a s t e n l i a b i l i t y j u s t l y upon the muni c i pa l i t y . _Id. at 788. See a l s o i d . at 791 (Rep. W i l l a r d . ) 47 The f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e c a l l e d f o r was knowledge p r i o r t o the a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n that the ac t subsequent ly complained o f was t o o c c u r ; the a c t i o n requ i red was f a i l u r e t o p r e v e n t t h a t harm. T h i s c o m b i n a t i o n o f f o r e k n o w l e d g e and l a c k o f p r e v e n t i o n r e p r e s e n t s a c a r e f u l l y framed balance o f the competing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s urged in the c o n g r e s s i o n a l de b at es . These p r e r e q u i s i t e s t o l i a b i l i t y were not o n l y the minimum c o n s e r v a t i v e s would ac cept as a p r e c o n d i t i o n t o s u i t , but the most the suppor ters o f R ec on s t r u c t i o n would concede . The i m p o s i t i o n o f an e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t would a l t e r t h i s b a l a n c e in s u b s t a n t i a l manner c l e a r l y not contemplated by Congress . F i r s t , in a d d i t i o n t o knowing t h a t a v i o l a t i o n was about t o o c c u r , a c i t y would have t o be n o t i f i e d a f t e r the v i o l a t i o n that the v i c t im wanted r e d r e s s . S e c o n d , o v e r and above hav ing f a i l e d t o 48 prevent the v i o l a t i o n , the c i t y would have t o f a i l as w e l l t o p r o v i d e a s u b s e q u e n t remedy. During the debates on the Sherman amendment Senator Thurman a c t u a l l y advo ca ted j u s t such an exhaust ion requi rmeent , urg ing that p l a i n t i f f s be re qu i r ed t o g iv e c i t i e s a w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f c la im wi th in 7 days o f the com m is s i o n o f the o f f e n s e , c i t i n g a s t a t u t e w i t h such a p r o v i s i o n enacted under George IV. Id . at 770. This p r o p o s a l f ound no s u p p o r t in C o n g r e s s , h o w e v e r , and was n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e language u l t i m a t e l y adopted. I f C o n g r e s s d i d no t c o n t e m p l a t e any exhaust i on requirement under s e c t i o n 1986, a f o r t i o r i , i t c a n n o t have i n t e n d e d one under s e c t i o n 1983. Unlike a s e c t i o n 1986 d e f e n d a n t , who i s l i a b l e m e r e l y f o r f a i l i n g t o prevent harm to the v i c t i m , a s e c t i o n 1983 defendant must a c t u a l l y commit 49 o r ca us e the v i o l a t i o n i t s e l f . M o n e l l , 436 U . S . a t 6 9 2 . Thus a s e c t i o n 1983 defendant by d e f i n i t i o n knows more and does more than a s e c t i o n 1 986 de fendant . And, s i n c e the 1983 d e f e n d a n t i s the a c t i v e e v i l d o e r , n o t m e r e l y a n e g l e c t f u l b y s t a n d e r , i t i s f a r l e s s l i k e l y t h a t an a p p e a l f o r r e d r e s s would s u c c e e d t o the f o r m e r t h a n t o t h e l a t t e r . I f a c i t y f a i l e d t o p r e v e n t a known c o n s p i r a c y o f p o l i c e o f f i c e r s from v i o l a t i n g a v i c t i m ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , exhaust i on would not be a p r e c o n d i t i o n o f a s e c t i o n 1 986 s u i t a g a i n s t the c i t y ; C on gr es s ca nn ot have intended t o impose such a requirement on a s e c t i o n 1983 s u i t a g a i n s t the p o l i c e m e n themse lves . 50 CONCLUSION For the above reasons the judgment o f the c our t o f appeal s should be re ve rs e d . R e s p e c t f u l l y submitted, 'JACK GREENBERG 'JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I BILL LANN LEE*/ ERIC SCHNAPPER Sui te 2030 10 Columbus C i r c l e New York, New York 10019 At torneys f o r NAACP Legal Defense and Educa t i o n a l Fund, I n c . , as Amicus Curiae * / Counsel o f Record MeiieN psess inc~-n. V. c. " 21?