Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents Brief Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund

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January 1, 1981

Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents Brief Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund preview

Date is approximate. Patsy v. State of Florida Board of Regents Brief on behalf of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae

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  • Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents Brief Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 1981. d7100da0-c09a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9c249303-6816-46af-b015-d42ab9accf4e/patsy-v-florida-board-of-regents-brief-amicus-curiae-naacp-legal-defense-fund. Accessed October 08, 2025.

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    No. 81-1874

I n the

§>itjtrmr (Scurf of tfyr lmtr& #tntrs
October T eem, 1981

Georgia P atsy,

v.
Petitioner.

B oard op R egents of the State op F lorida, A B ody Cor­
porate, Fob and on B ehalf op F lorida I ntp«rnational 
U niversity.

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE NAACP LEGAL 
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., 

AS AMICUS CURIAE

J ack Greenberg 
James M. Nabrit, III 
B ill Lann Lee*
E ric Schnapper 

Suite 2030 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

Attorneys for NAACP Legal 
Defense and Educational 
Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae

* Counsel of Record



I N D E X

Pa?e

I n t e r e s t  o f  Amicus ........................................  1

Summary o f  Argument ...................................... 3

Argument ...............................................................  4

I .  THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION
1 983 ..................................    7

I I .  THE ORIGINS OF THE 'JUDICIAL 
REQUIREMENT OF ADMINIS­
TRATIVE EXHAUSTION .............   15

I I I .  THE PURPOSE OF EXHAUSTION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE HIS­
TORY OF SECTION 1983 ..............  30

IV. THE DEBATES CONCERNING THE
SHERMAN AMENDMENT .....................  44

CONCLUSION 50



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PgSg

Cases

Bacon v .  Rutland Ra i l ro ad  C o . ,
232 U.S.  134 (1914) ..........................  20

Brown v.  Board o f  Educat ion,
347 U.S.  483 (1 954) ..........................  2

C i ty  o f  Columbus v.  Leonard,  443
U.S. 905 ( 1 979) .................................... 39

Ex par te  Young, 209 U.S.  113
( 1 908) ........................................................ 10

F i r s t  Nat i ona l  C i t y  Bank o f  Gree l ey
v.  Board o f  County Commissioners
o f  County o f  Weld,  264 U.S 450
( 1 924) ......................................................... 22

G i l c h r i s t  v.  Interborough Rapid 
Tra ns i t  C o . ,  279 U.S. 159 
( 1 929) .........    21

Goldsmith v.  United S t a te s  Board 
o f  Tax Appeal s ,  270 U.S.
1 17 ( 1 926) ...............................................  21

H o l l i s  v.  Kutz,  255 U.S.  452
(1921) ......................................................... 21

Imbler v.  Pachtman, 424 U.S 409
(1976) ......................................................... 7

Kentucky v.  Dennison,  24 How.
66 ( 1 861 ) .......................................... .. 28

McKart v.  United S t a t e s ,  395 U.S 185
(1 969) ........................................................  32

-  i i  -



Page

Monell  v.  New York C ity  Department
o f  S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s ,  436 U.S.  658
(1978) .................................  2 , 9 , 1 2 , 1 6 ,

18 ,22 ,28 ,3 0

Monroe v.  Pape,  365 U.S. 167
(1961) ........................................................  34

Myers v.  Bethlehem Sh i pbu i ld ing
Co rp . ,  303 U.S. 41 (1938) ............  22,30

N i c h o l l  v.  United S t a t e s ,  7 Wall .
(74 U.S.  ) 1 22 ( 1 869) ......................  23

Owens v.  C i ty  o f  Independence,  445
U.S. 622 ( 1 980) ............................  7,1 5,1 7,

18,23

Quern v.  'Jordan,  440 U.S. 332
(1979) ........................................................  8

Po r ter  v.  In ve s to rs  Synd i ca te ,
286 U.S. 461 ( 1 932) ........................  22

Prendergast  v. New York Telephone
Co. , 262 U.S. 43 ( 1 923) ................. 20

P re n t i s  v. A t l a n t i c  Coast Line C o . ,
211 U.S.  210 ( 1 908) ..........................  1 8

Prigg  v.  Pennslyvan ia , 16 Pet .  539
(1 842) ........................................................  28

Tenney v.  Brandhove,  341 U.S.
367 (1951)

- iii -

1 5



Page

United S ta te s  v.  Sing Tuck, 194
U.S. 1 61 ( 1 904) ...................................  1 9

S ta tut es

C i v i l  R ights  Act  o f  1871, S e c t i o n  1,
U.S.C.  § 1 983 .................................  passim

10 S t a t .  612 ...................................................... 24

11 S ta t .  195 ...................................................... 24

14 S t a t . 152 ............................................  25

17 S t a t .  269 ...................................................... 26

Other A u t h o r i t i e s

A l p e r t s ,  S u i t s  Against  Adminis­
t r a t i v e  Agenc ies  Under N . I .R .A .  
and A . A . ,  12 N.Y.LU.L.Q.  Rev.
393 (1 935) ...............................................  19

Berger ,  Exhaustion o f  Admin i s t r a t ive  
Remedies,  48 Yale L.'J. 981 
(1 938) ........................................................  19

Comment, Exhaustion o f  Adm in i s t ra t iv e  
Remedies,  39 Cor ne l l  L.Q.
273 ( 1 939) ...............................................  1 9

Cong. Globe ,  42nd Cong. 1st Sess .  &
App. (1871) .................................  12 ,13 ,14 ,

29 ,3 5 ,3 6 ,
37 ,38 ,39

IV



Page

L i l i e n t h a l ,  The Federal  Courts  and 
Sta te  Regula t i on  o f  P ub l i c  
U t i l i t i e s ,  43 Haw.  L. Rev.
379 (1 930) ...............................................  19

Note,  51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (1938) . .  19

v



No. 81-1874
IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

October  Term, 1981

GEORGIA PATSY,

P e t i t i o n e r

v.

BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE 
OF FLORIDA, A BODY CORPORATE, 
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF FLORIDA 
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY.

BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE NAACP LEGAL 
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.,

AS AMICUS CURIAE

I n t e r e s t  o f  Amicus

The NAACP Legal  Defense and Educat ion­

al  Fund, I n c . ,  i s  a n o n - p r o f i t  c o r p o r a t i o n  

e s t a b l i s h e d  under the laws o f  the S ta te  o f  

New York.  I t  was formed t o  a s s i s t  black



2

p e r s o n s  t o  s e c u r e  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  

r i g h t s  by the p r o s e c u t i o n  o f  l a w s u i t s .  I t s  

c h a r t e r  d e c l a r e s  that  i t s  purposes  inc lude  

rendering  l e g a l  s e r v i c e s  g r a t u i t o u s l y  to  

b lack  persons  s u f f e r i n g  i n j u s t i c e  by r e a ­

son o f  r a c i a l  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n .  For  many 

years  a t t o rn eys  o f  the Legal  Defense Fund 

have r e p r e s e n t e d  p a r t i e s  in l i t i g a t i o n  

b e f o r e  t h i s  Cour t  and the  l o w e r  c o u r t s  

i n v o l v i n g  a v a r i e t y  o f  i s s u e s  b r o u g h t  

pursuant t o  42 U.S.C.  § 1 983. E. g . , Monell  

v .  New York C i t y  Departmet  o f  S o c i a l  Ser ­

v i c e s  , 436 U.S.  658 (1978 ) ;  Brown v.  Board 

o f  E d u c a t i o n , 347 U.S .  483 ( 1 9 5 4 ) .  The 

Legal  Defense Fund b e l i e v e s  that  i t s  ex ­

p e r i e n c e  in  such l i t i g a t i o n  and the  r e ­

s e a r c h  i t  has p e r f o r m e d  w i l l  a s s i s t  the  

Court in t h i s  case .  The p a r t i e s  have con­

s e n t e d  t o  the  f i l i n g  o f  t h i s  b r i e f ,  and 

l e t t e r s  o f  consent  have been f i l e d  with the

C l e r k .



3

Summary o f  Argument

We r e s p e c t f u l l y  submit  t h a t  n e i t h e r  

the language nor the l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  

o f  s e c t i o n  1 o f  the  C i v i l  R i g h t s  Ac t  o f  

1 8 7 1 ,  p r e s e n t l y  c o d i f i e d  as 42 U . S . C .  

§ 1983, impose any requirement o f  exhaus­

t i o n  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e m e d i e s .  The 

l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  r e v e a l s  that  Congress 

intended no such r e s t r i c t i o n  on the broad 

r i g h t  t o  br ing  s e c t i o n  1983 a c t i o n s .  Nor 

can any such r e s t r i c t i o n  be i m p l i e d  in 

l i g h t  o f  the  f a c t  t h a t  any n o t i o n  o f  a 

j u d i c i a l l y  imposed exhaust ion requirement 

d i d  no t  emerge u n t i l  much l a t e r ,  in the  

twent i eth  century .  Indeed,  any exhaust ion 

requirement  would be i n c o n s i s t e n t  with one 

o f  the  c r i t i c a l  f i n d i n g s  o f  the  f o r t y -  

s e c o n d  C o n g r e s s  t h a t  s t a t e  o f f i c i a l s  

were un wi l l ing  t o  en fo r c e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

gu ar an t ee s .



4

T h is  i s  not  t o  say  t h a t  p o t e n t i a l  

p l a i n t i f f s  must o r  w i l l  i n e v i t a b l y  sue 

under s e c t i o n  1983. Rather ,  Congress  has 

prov ided  an i n c e n t i v e  f o r  improvement o f  

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and o the r  remedies in the 

s t a t e s  by co n t in u in g  t o  make s e c t i o n  1983 a 

r e a d y  remedy w h i l e  p e r m i t t i n g  t h o s e  ag­

g r i e v e d  t o  u t i l i z e  any s t a t e  remedies which 

they b e l i e v e  t o  be e f f i c a c i o u s .

ARGUMENT

Whether as a matter  o f  p o l i c y  i t  would 

be wise t o  r e q u i r e ,  as a p r e c o n d i t i o n  o f  

a c c e s s  t o  f e d e r a l  c o u r t s ,  t h a t  p e r s o n s  

a l l e g i n g  v i o l a t i o n s  o f  t h e i r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  

r i g h t s ,  f i r s t  exhaust  any a v a i l a b l e  s t a t e  

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e m e d i e s ,  i s  a c o m p l e x ,  

s e n s i t i v e ,  and i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n .  The 

c our t  o f  appeal s  below viewed t h i s  case as 

an ap pr o pr ia te  v e h i c l e  t o  express  i t s  views



5

r e g a r d i n g  f e d e r a l - s t a t e  r e l a t i o n s ,  the  

i d e a l  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e s o u r c e s ,  and 

the bes t  manner in which the f e d e r a l  c o u r t s  

can e n c o u r a g e  the  s t a t e s  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  

t h e i r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e d u r e s .  We 

b e l i e v e  t h a t  the  F i f t h  C i r c u i t  m i s c o n ­

ce iv e d  the nature o f  the i ssue  b e f o r e  i t ,  

and t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  c o u r t s  i n  

r e s o l v i n g  i t .

The q u e s t i on  presented  by t h i s  case  i s  

no t  one o f  j u d i c i a l  p h i l o s o p h y ,  but  o f  

s t a t u t o r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  

o f  the c ou r t s  i s  l i m i t e d  to  a s c e r t a i n i n g  

the  i n t e n t i o n  o f  the  C o n g r e s s  which met 

some 110 y e a r s  ago  and f a s h i o n e d  t h e  

1871 C i v i l  Rights  Ac t .  Those l e g i s l a t o r s  

l i v e d  in  a t ime  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom our  

own. H a l f  the  c o u n t r y ,  s t i l l  p r o s t r a t e  

from an exhaust ing  war, wavered between mob 

r u le  and t o t a l  anarchy;  the Klu Klux Klan,



6

t oday  l i t t l e  more than a d e p l o r a b l e  r e l i c  

o f  pas t  h a t r e d s ,  then fu nc t i o ned  as v i r t u ­

a l l y  a shadow government in many southern 

s t a t e s .  Far f rom b e i n g  c o n c e r n e d  about  

o f f e n d i n g  the s e n s i t i v i t i e s  o f  " s o v e r e i g n  

s t a t e s , "  the f o r t y - s e c o n d  Congress pres ide d  

over  a m i l i t a r y  o c cu p a t i o n  o f  those  former 

Confedera te  S t a t e s ,  whose l ea der s  i t  o f t e n  

l a b e l e d  as t r a i t o r s .  Whether  the  1871 

C i v i l  Rights  Act was w is e l y  d r a f t e d  when 

adopted ,  o r  ought to  be amended in l i g h t  o f  

changing c o n d i t i o n s ,  are not q u es t i o n s  t h i s  

C our t  need o r  s h o u l d  a d d r e s s .  The s o l e  

i s s u e  b e f o r e  t h i s  Cour t  i s  whether  the  

f r a m e r s  o f  t h a t  A c t  i n t e n d e d  t h a t  i t s  

r e m e d i e s  o n l y  be a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h o s e  who 

had f i r s t  exhausted s t a t e  a d m i n i s t ra t i v e

r e m ed ie s .



7

I .  THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 1983

Because the qu e s t i on  o f  exhaust i on  i s  

one o f  s t a t u t o r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  the language 

o f  the s t a t u t e  i t s e l f  i s  o f  c e n t r a l  impor­

tance .  By i t s  terms s e c t i o n  1983 c r e a t e s  a 

s p e c i e s  o f  t o r t  l i a b i l i t y  that  admits o f  no 

p r e c o n d i t i o n s  o r  p r e r e q u i s i t e s .  See Imbler 

v .  Pachtman, 424 U.S.  409,  417 (1976 ) .  I t s  

language i s  ab so lu t e  and u n q u a l i f i e d ;  no 

mention i s  made o f  s t a t e  or  f e d e r a l  admin­

i s t r a t i v e  r e m e d i e s ,  o f  s t a t e  j u d i c i a l  

p r o c e e d i n g s ,  o r  o f  any o th er  event  which 

must  o c c u r  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  

v i o l a t i o n  and t h e  commencement  o f  t h e  

author i zed  c i v i l  a c t i o n .  See Owen v .  C i ty  

o f  Independence , 445 U.S.  622,  635 (1980 ) .

R a t h e r ,  t h e  a c t  i m p o s e s  l i a b i l i t y  on 

" [ e ] v e r y  p e r s o n " who under  c o l o r  o f  law 

s u b j e c t s  " any p e r s o n " t o  a " d e p r i v a t i o n  o f

any r i g h t s ,  p r i v i l e g e s ,  o r  i m m u n i t i e s



8

s e c u r e d  by the  C o n s t i t u t i o n  and l a w s . "  

Nothing on the fa ce  o f  the s t a t u t e  sugges ts  

that  on ly  persons  who have exhausted s t a t e  

r emed ies ,  r a t her  than "any person"  what­

s o e v e r ,  can a v a i l  themselves  o f  the p r o ­

t e c t i o n  o f  the s t a t u t e .

The e x i s t e n c e  o f  an e x h a u s t i o n  r e ­

quirement i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  with the type o f  

d e f e n d a n t s  s u b j e c t  t o  s u i t  in a s e c t i o n  

1 983 a c t i o n .  Most o f  the cases  imposing 

exhaust ion  requirements  invo lve d  l i t i g a t i o n  

aga ins t  government agenc i es  seeking  reme­

d i a l  o rders  aimed at those  agenc i es  them­

s e l v e s .  But s e c t i o n  1983 i s  not so d i r e c t ­

ed.  I t  au th o r i z e s  s u i t  not j u s t  or  pr imar­

i l y  aga ins t  government b o d i e s ,  but aga inst  

any "person"  who has v i o l a t e d  f e d e r a l  r i g h t s

under c o l o r  o f  s t a t e  law.  Sta tes  can never1/
be named as de f end an ts ,  and l o c a l  govern—

1/ Quern v .  Jordan,  440 U.S.  332 (1979 ) .



9

ments can on l y  be sued under c e r t a i n  nar -
2/

r o w l y  d e f i n e d  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  N a tu ra l  

persons  are the most common, and f r e q u e n t ly  

the on ly  de fendants  in s e c t i o n  1983 c a s e s .

E x h a u s t i o n  i s  a r u l e  about  when a 

pa r ty  suing a s t a t e  or  f e d e r a l  agency must 

u t i l i z e  remedies prov ided  by that  defendant  

a g e n c y  t o  c o r r e c t  i t s  own e r r o r s .  An 

e x h a u s t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t  c o u l d  i n t e l l i g i ­

b l y ,  a l though mis taken ly  in our v i ew ,  be 

ap p l i e d  in a p o l i c e  b r u t a l i t y  s u i t  aga ins t  

a c i t y .  But i f  such a s u i t ,  as Congress 

c l e a r l y  c o n t e m p l a t e d  most  s e c t i o n  1983 

s u i t s  would be,  were against  an i n d iv i d u a l  

p o l i c e  o f f i c e r ,  exhaust i on  i s  an anomalous 

c o n c e p t .  The ac tua l  defendant  pol iceman 

s imply  has no "a d m in i s t r a t iv e  remedies"  t o

2 /  Monell  v .  New York C i ty  Department o f  
S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s ,  436 U.S.  658,  690 -6 95  
(1978 ) .



o f f e r .  The C i t y  i s  not a named de f endant ,  

and i f ,  as a l l e g e d ,  the conduct  complained 

o f  i s  u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ,  t h e  c o n d u c t  

i s  "wi thout  the a u t h o r i t y  o f ,  and does not 

a f f e c t  t h e  [ c i t y ]  i n  i t s  s o v e r e i g n  o r  

governmental  c a p a c i t y . "  Ex parte  Young, 

209 U.S.  123, 159 (1908 ) .  A c i t y  o r  s t a t e ,  

o f  c o u r s e ,  may choose  t o  c re a te  an adminis ­

t r a t i v e  remedy f o r  i n j u r i e s  caused by i t s  

employees a c t in g  in excess  o f  t h e i r  author ­

i t y ,  j u s t  as i t  may prov ide  a s s i s t a n c e  f o r  

v i c t i m s  o f  harms c o m m i t t e d  by  p r i v a t e  

w r o n g d o e r s ,  s u c h  as c o m p e n s a t i o n  f o r  

v i c t i m s  o f  c r imes .  The p e r p e t r a t o r  o f  such 

a p r i v a t e  c r i m e  c o u l d  n o t  c o n c e i v a b l y  

immunize h i m s e l f  f rom s u i t  by demanding 

t h a t  h i s  v i c t i m  " e x h a u s t "  s u c h  t h i r d  

p a r t y  remed ies .  The p o s i t i o n  o f  a wrong­

doer  who happens t o  be a p u b l i c  o f f i c i a l  i s  

not  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t .  I t  i s  u n l i k e ­



l y  in the extreme that  Congress intended,  

where a s u i t  was br oug ht  a g a i n s t  bo t h  a 

c i t y  and i t s  o f f i c i a l s ,  t h a t  the  a c t i o n  

c o u l d  p r o c e e d  a g a i n s t  the  o f f i c i a l  but 

would have t o  be stayed pending exhaust ion 

as to  the c i t y  i t s e l f .  I t  i s  on ly  margin­

a l l y  l e s s  u n l i k e l y  that  Congress intended 

t o  impose  an e x h a u s t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t  in 

t h e  m i n o r i t y  o f  c a s e s  in  w h i c h  o n l y  a 

government agency was named as a defendant .

The debates  l eading  t o  the passage o f  

s e c t i o n  1 o f  the C i v i l  Rights  Act o f  1871, 

the f o rerunner  o f  s e c t i o n  1983, support  a 

l i t e r a l  r e a d i n g  o f  t h i s  b road  and u n r e ­

s t r i c t e d  language.  Representa t ive  S h e l l a -  

ba rger ,  the author and manager o f  the b i l l  

in  the  House ,  e x p l a i n e d  how the  c o u r t s  

should i n t e r p r e t  the Act :

T h i s  Act  i s  r e m e d i a l ,  and in a i d  o f  
the p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  human l i b e r t y  and 
human r i g h t s .  A l l  s t a t u t e s  and 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  au thor i z ing



12

s u c h  s t a t u t e s  a r e  l i b e r a l l y  and 
b e n e f i c e n t l y  c ons t ru ed .

. . . . As has been again and again 
d e c i d e d  by  o u r  own Supreme  C o u r t  
o f  the United S t a t e s ,  and everywhere 
e l s e  where  t h e r e  i s  w i s e  j u d i c i a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  the l a r g e s t  l a t i t u d e  
c o n s i s t e n t  with the words employed i s  
u n i f o r m l y  g i v e n  in c o n s t r u i n g  such 
s t a t u t e s  and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  
as are meant t o  p r o t e c t  and defend and 
g iv e  remedies f o r  t h e i r  wrongs t o  a l l  
the p e o p l e .  3/

See a l s o  Monel l  v .  New York C i t y  Department 

o f  S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S.  658, 683-87 

(1978 ) .

The adopt i on  o f  an exhaust i on  r e q u i r e ­

ment,  f o r  whatever reasons ,  would n e c e s s a r ­

i l y  e s t a b l i s h  a b a r r i e r ,  sometimes tempo­

r a r y ,  on o c c a s i o n  perhaps permanent,  t o  r e ­

l i e f  in the f e d e r a l  c o u r t s .  At the l e a s t  

an aggr i eved  par ty  would f i nd  t h a t ,  u n t i l  

e x h a u s t i o n  was c o m p l e t e d ,  the  n a t i o n a l  

c o u r t s  were c l o s e d  t o  him;  i f  a l l  s t a t e

3/ Cong.  G l o b e ,  42nd C o n g . ,  1s t  S e s s .  
App. 68 (1871 ) .



- 13 -

r e m e d i e s  were not  s o u g h t ,  a c c e s s  t o  the

f e d e r a l  c ou r t s  might be prec luded  f o r e v e r .

Nothing could  have been fu r t he r  from the

contemplat i on  o f  the framers o f  the 1871

A c t .  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Lowe i n s i s t e d  t h a t

t h e  A c t  " t h r o w s  o p e n  t h e  d o o r s  o f  t h e

United S ta te s  c o u r t s  t o  those  whose r i g h t s

u n d e r  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n  a r e  d e n i e d  o r  
4 /

i m p a i r e d . "  Congressman Coburn u r g e d :

Obv ious ly  the cour t  o f  j u s t i c e  i s  the 
f i r s t  instrument t o  be used in aid o f  
t h e  f o u r t e e n t h  amendment ;  s a f e r ,  
m i l d er ,  sur er ,  more in accordance  with 
r e a s o n ,  w i th  our  s ys tem ,  and wi th  
p u b l i c  s e n t i m e n t .  Whenever ,  t h e n ,  
there  i s  a den ia l  o f  equal  p r o t e c t i o n  
by the  S t a t e ,  the  c o u r t s  o f  j u s t i c e  
o f  the nat i on  stand with open do or s ,  
. . . Here may come the weak and poor  
and dow ntrodden  with  a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  
they s h a l l  be heard.  5 /

Even those  who opposed o ther  as pe c t s  o f  the

4 /  Cong.  G l o b e ,  42nd C o n g . ,  1s t  S e s s .  
376.

5 /  Id.  459.



1 4

Act agreed that  the f e d e r a l  c o ur t s  should 

be a v a i l a b l e  whenever  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  

v i o l a t i o n  were  t h r e a t e n e d .  I f  a s t a t e  

p a s s e d  laws  c o n t r a v e n i n g  the  F o u r t e e n t h  

Amendment,  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  S l a t e r  empha­

s i z e d  ,

Such laws  would be s i m p l e  n u l l i t i e s  
. . .  and e v e r y  o f f i c e r  o f  the  s t a t e ,  
f rom a j u s t i c e  o f  the  p e a c e  t o  the 
supreme judge ,  from a c o n s ta b le  t o  the 
Ex ec ut ive ,  under t h e i r  oath to  support  
the C o n s t i t u t i o n  o f  the United S t a t e s ,  
would be bound t o  d i s r e ga rd  them. I f ,  
h o w e v e r ,  t h e i r  e n f o r c e m e n t  were  
attempted,  the c i t i z e n  i s  not without  
means o f  p r o t e c t i o n .  The F e d e r a l  
c o u r t s ,  a lways  open wi th  w r i t s  o f  
habeas c o r p u s , w r i t s  o f  r e s t r a i n t ,  and 
i n j u n c t i o n s ,  and o t h e r  r e m e d i a l  
a g e n c i e s ,  can at  a l l  t im es  r e n d e r  
e f f i c i e n t  and ample s e c u r i t y  aga inst  
a c t u a l  o r  t h r e a t e n e d  d i s r e g a r d  o f  
these  guarantees .  6 /

That the doors  o f  the f e d e r a l  c o ur t s  should 

now be c l o s e d  t o  p e t i t i o n e r ,  as the c o ur t s  

below urged,  would be square ly  c on t ra ry  to  

the o r i g i n a l  in te n t  o f  Congress .

6 /  Id .  App. 305 (emphasis added) .



1 5

I I .  THE ORIGINS OF THE 'JUDICIAL REQUIRE-
MENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION

The b r oa d  la n g u a g e  o f  s e c t i o n  1983,  

combined with the expansive  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  

i t  c l e a r l y  c o n t e m p l a t e d  by i t s  f r a m e r s ,  

would o r d i n a r i l y  be s u f f i c i e n t  t o  d e f e a t  

any c laim that  r e l i e f  aga inst  a p a r t i c u l a r  

p a r t y  c o u l d  be d e l a y e d  o r  d e n i e d .  T h i s  

Court has o n l y  re cogn ized  as l i m i t a t i o n s  

t o  s e c t i o n  1983 a c t i o n s  ru le s  " so  f i r m ly  

ro o ted  in the common lav? . . .  that  ’ Congress 

would have s p e c i f i c a l l y  so prov ided  had i t  

wished t o  a b o l i s h  the d o c t r i n e . ’ " Owens v . 

C i ty  o f  Independence , 445 U.S.  662 (1980 ) .

Thus in Tenney v.  Brandhove, 341 U.S.  367 

(1 95 1 ) ,  t h i s  Court concluded that  l e g i s l a ­

t i v e  i m m u n i t y  was in  1871 s u c h  a l o n g  

e s t a b l i s h e d  d o c t r i n e ,  not ing that  i t  had 

been at  the  c e n t e r  o f  the  P a r l i a m e n t a r y

s t r u g g l e s  o f  the s i x t e e n t h  and seventeenth



c e n t u r i e s ,  and was e x p r e s s l y  in co r p or a t ed  

in the Engl ish B i l l  o f  R ig h ts ,  the A r t i c l e s  

o f  C o n f e d e r a t i o n ,  the C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  and at 

l e a s t  e i g h t  18th century  s t a t e  c o n s t i t u ­

t i o n s  o r  b i l l s  o f  r i g h t s .  341 U.S.  372-75.

In M o n e l l  bo t h  the  m a j o r i t y  and the  

d i s s e n t e r s  agreed that  the s t a t e  o f  the law 

in 1871 regard ing  munic ipa l  immunity was o f  

c o n t r o l l i n g  i m p o r t a n c e  in  d e t e r m i n i n g  

whether c i t i e s  could  be sued under s e c t i o n  

1983. The m a jo r i t y  r e j e c t e d  any ab s o l u t e  

munic ipa l  immunity because  "by 1871, . . .  

muni c ipa l  c o r p o r a t i o n s  were r o u t i n e l y  sued 

in  the  f e d e r a l  c o u r t s  and t h i s  f a c t  was 

w e l l  known to  the Members o f  Co ngress , "  436 

U.S.  at 588.  ' J u s t i c e  Rehnquist  argued,  t o  

the c o n t r a r y ,  that  at that  time "no s t a t e  

c o ur t  had ever  he ld that  munic ipa l  c o r p o r a ­

t i o n s  were always l i a b l e  in t o r t  in p r e ­

c i s e l y  the same manner as o ther  p e r s o n s . "



17

436 U.S.  at 721. S i m i l a r l y ,  in Owens v . 

C i ty  o f  Independence , 445 U.S.  622 (1980 ) ,

a l l  members o f  the  Cour t  r e g a r d e d  t h i s  

h i s t o r i c a l  i s sue  as c r i t i c a l .  The m a jo r i t y  

c onc luded that  the broad language o f  the 

s t a t u t e  c o u l d  no t  be r e s t r i c t e d  by good  

f a i t h  i m m u n i t y  f o r  l o c a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  

b e c a u s e  in the  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  " t h e  

c o u r t s  had r e j e c t e d  the p r o p o s i t i o n  that  a 

m u n i c i p a l i t y  should be p r i v i l e g e d  where i t  

r e a s o n a b l y  b e l i e v e d  i t s  a c t i o n s  t o  be 

l a w f u l . "  445 U.S.  at 641. ' Ju s t i c e  Powel l  

and three  o ther  members o f  the Court d i s ­

s e n t e d  on the  ground t h a t  the  m a j o r i t y  

o p i n io n  "runs counter  t o  the common law in 

the 19th cent ury ,  which re co gn iz e d  substan­

t i a l  t o r t  immunity f o r  munic ipal  a c t i o n s . "  

445 U.S.  at  676.

I f  the  r i g h t  o f  p e t i t i o n e r  in t h i s  

case  t o  maintain an a c t i o n  in f e d e r a l  c our t



18

i s  t o  be d e l a y e d  o r  d e n i e d ,  d e s p i t e  the  

l i t e r a l  language o f  s e c t i o n  1983, i t  must 

be because the p r i n c i p l e  o f  a j u d i c i a l l y  

imposed a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  exhaust i on  r u l e  was 

so f i r m l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  in 1871 that  Congress 

was w e l l  aware o f  i t ,  knew that  the c o u r t s  

would apply  i t  un les s  o t herwise  d i r e c t e d ,  

and would  have  e x p r e s s l y  d i s a p p r o v e d  o f  

that  j u d i c i a l  p r a c t i c e  had i t  not wanted i t  

a p p l i e d .  For tun ate ly  here ,  un l ike  Monell  

and Owens, the i s s ue  i s  c l e a r  beyond p e r -  

adventure .  This  exhaust i on  d o c t r i n e  was 

t o t a l l y  unheard o f  in 1871.

S ch o la rs  g e n e r a l l y  agree that  the idea

o f  a j u d i c i a l l y  imposed a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

e x h a u s t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t  has i t s  r o o t s  in

P r e n t i s  v .  A t l a n t i c  C oas t  L ine  C o . ,  211
1/

U.S. 210 ( 1 908) .  in that  case the r a i l -

7 /  Comment, Exhaustion o f  Adm in i s t r a t ive  
Remedies,  39 C or ne l l  L. Q. 273,  277 (1939)



1 9

road c h a l l e n g in g  c e r t a i n  proposed r a t e s  as 

c o n f i s c a t o r y  had f a i l e d  t o  appeal  them t o  

the  V i r g i n i a  Supreme Cour t  o f  A p p e a l s ,  

which reviewed such r a t e s  in a l e g i s l a t i v e  

c a p a c i t y .  Mr. ’J u s t i c e  Holmes,  emphasizing 

that  " [n]o  new ev idence  and no g reat  a d d i ­

t i o n a l  e x p e n s e "  would be i n v o l v e d ,  h e l d  

that  the r a i l r o a d  had sued t oo  soon,  and

2 /  cont inued

( " P r e n t i s  v .  A t l a n t i c  Coast Line Co. , i s  
t h e  r e a l  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  e x h a u s t i o n  
r u l e . " ) ?  L i l i e n t h a l ,  The F e d e r a l  C o u r t s  
and Sta te  Regula t i on  o f  P u b l i c  U t i l i t i e s ,  
43 Harv.  L. Rev.  379 ,  385 (1930 )  ( "The
d o c t r i n e  had i t s  beginning in P ren t i s  v . 
A t l a n t i c  Coast Line Co. , " ) ;  Note,  51 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1251, 1261 ( 1 9 3 8 ) ( " T h i s  p r i n c i p l e
was e s t a b l i s h e d  in the case o f  P ren t i s  v . 
A t l a n t i c  Coast Line Co. " ) .  A l p e r t ,  S u i t s  
Agains t  Admin i s t r a t ive  Agenc ies  under N . I .  
R. A . and A . A . A . ,  12 N.Y.U.L.Q.  Rev. 393,
395 (1935 ) .  P r o f e s s o r  Berger argues that
t h e  d o c t r i n e  o r i g i n a t e d  in  t h i s  C o u r t  
in a d e c i s i o n  four  years  b e f o re  P r e n t i s ,  
United S ta tes  v.  Sing Tuck, 194 U.S.  161 
(1904 ) .  R. Berger ,  Exhaustion o f  Adminis­
t r a t i v e  Remedies,  48 Yale L. J.  981 , 9 81 —
82 (1938 ) .



20

d i r e c t e d  i t  t o  pu rsu e  t h a t  a p p e a l .  211 

U.S.  at 230.  But the Court d id  not  pretend 

i t  was apply ing  any h i t h e r t o  heard o f  r u l e .  

The m a j o r i t y  o p i n io n  re p e a t e d l y  disavowed 

any attempt to  f ormula te  a "g enera l  r u l e "  

o r  "g enera l  p r i n c i p l e s , "  211 U.S.  at 229;  

i t  c i t e d  no a u t h o r i t y  f o r  i t s  d e c i s i o n ,  and 

in d i c a t e d  that  the defendant  had not  ra i se d  

the  argument  on which the  d e c i s i o n  was 

based.  I d .

The p o s s i b i l i t y  that  exhaust ion was a 

requirement  o f  gen era l  a p p l i c a t i o n  emerged 

on ly  s l o w l y .  The e a r l y  attempts  t o  invoke 

P r e n t i s  as a de f ense  sought t o  r e qu i r e  ex­

h a u s t i o n  o f  j u d i c i a l  r e m e d i e s ,  and were
8/

s o u n d l y  r e j e c t e d .  in  1921 the  Supreme 

C o u r t  u n a n i m o u s l y  r e v e r s e d  a c o u r t  o f

8 /  Prendergast  v.  New York Telephone Co. , 
262 U.S.  43,  48 (1923 ) ;  Bacon v.  Rutland
R a i l r o a d  C o . ,  232 U.S 134,  137 ( 1 9 1 4 ) .



21

appeals  d e c i s i o n  that  a consumer aggr i eved

by f e d e r a l  agency a c t i o n  in c r ea s in g  u t i l i t y

r a t e s  had t o  f i l e  a formal  c omplaint  and
9 /

se ek  a m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h a t  d e c i s i o n .

In Goldsmith v .  United Sta tes  Board o f  Tax

A p p e a l s , 270 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1926 ) ,  the

Cour t  h e l d  t h a t  the  p l a i n t i f f  c o u l d  no t

complain o f  a c t i o n  taken by the Board u n t i l

he had sought a hearing b e f o r e  i t  on the

d i s p u t e  in  q u e s t i o n ,  b u t  t h i s  was an

argument the  d e f e n d a n t  i t s e l f  had never  
1 0/

made.  Not u n t i l  1929 do t h i s  C o u r t ' s

d e c i s i o n s  r e f e r  t o  a " d o c t r i n e "  approved in
JM/

P r e n t i s .  The term " e x h a u s t "  appe ar s

9 /  H o l l i s  v.  Kutz,  255 U.S. 452,  453-54
T 1 9 2 1 ) .

10/  B r i e f  on Behal f  o f  Defendant in Error ,  
No.  320 , O c t o b e r  Term 1 925 , pp .  3,  23.

11/  G i l c h r i s t  v .  Interborough Rapid Tran- 
s i t  C o . , 279 U.S 159, 208 (1929) .



22

on ly  i n t e r m i t t e n t l y  in those  e a r l y  ye a rs .  

Only  in Myers v .  Beth lehem S h i p b u i l d i n g  

Corp . , 303 U.S.  41, 50-51 ( 1 938) ,  some 57

y e a r s  a f t e r  t h e  e n a c t m e n t  o f  s e c t i o n  

1 983 , i s  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a j u d i c i a l l y  

imposed exhaust ion  requirement  s u f f i c i e n t l y  

c l e a r  t h a t  any i n f e r e n c e  about  C o n g r e s ­

s i o n a l  i n te n t  c ould  even arguably  be drawn 

from Congre ss i on a l  s i l e n c e .

The absence o f  any j u d i c i a l  exhaust i on  

requirement  u n t i l  l ong a f t e r  the enactment 

o f  s e c t i o n  1983 i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  important 

because the 42nd Congress was w e l l  aware o f  

t h e  volume o f  l i t i g a t i o n  in th e  f e d e r a l  

c o u r t s  aga in s t  l o c a l  governments.  Monell  

v .  New York C i ty  Department o f  S o c i a l  S e r -

12/

12/  Po r ter  v.  I n v e s t o r s  S y n d i c a t e , 286 U.S 
461 ,  468 ( 1 9 3 2 ) ;  F i r s t  N a t i o n a l  Bank o f  
Gree ley  v.  Board o f  County Commissioners o f  
County o f  Weld, 264 U.S 450,  453 (1924 ) .



23

v i c e s , 436 U.S.  658,  673,  n.28 (1978 ) ;  Owen 

v .  C i t y  o f  I n d e p e n d e n c e , 445 U.S .  622,  

64 2 -4 3  ( 1 9 8 0 ) .  Only where f e d e r a l  law 

e x p r e s s l y  r e qu i red  exhaust ion as a p r ec o n ­

d i t i o n  o f  s u i t  d id  the c ou r t s  impose such a 

requi rement .  N i c h o l l  v .  United S t a t e s ,  7

Wal l .  (74 U.S. )  122, 130-31 (1869 ) .

W h e n e v e r  d u r i n g  t h e  19 th  c e n t u r y  

C o n g r e s s  w i shed  t o  impose  an e x h a u s t i o n  

r e q u i r e m e n t ,  i t  d i d  s o  e x p r e s s l y  and 

u n e q u i v o c a l l y .  In 1857 Congress author i zed  

importers  who paid  d u t i e s  under p r o t e s t  t o  

sue  f o r  a r e f u n d  p r o v i d e d  t h e y  f i r s t
I V

appealed t o  the C o l l e c t o r  o f  Customs. j n

13/  "On the ent ry  o f  any goods ,  wares
and merchandise imported on and a f t e r  
the f i r s t  day o f  'July a f o r e s a i d ,  the 
d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  c o l l e c t o r  o f  t h e  
customs at the por t  o f  impor ta t ion  and 
e n t r y ,  as t o  t h e i r  l i a b i l i t y  t o  duty 
o r  e x e m p t i o n  t h e r e f o r m  s h a l l  be 
f i n a l  and c o n c l u s i v e  a g a i n s t  t h e  
owner,  importer ,  c ons ign ee ,  or  agent 
o f  any such goods ,  wares,  and merchan-



24

1866 Congress  gave aggr i eved  taxpayers  the

r i g h t  t o  sue the Commissioner o f  I n t e rn a l

Revenue f o r  taxes  e r ro n e o u s ly  o r  i l l e g a l l y

a s s e s s e d ,  but on ly  i f  an "appeal  s h a l l  have
1 1 /

been d u l y  made t o  the  c o m m i s s i o n e r . "

13/  cont inued

d i s e ;  u n l e s s  the  owner ,  i m p o r t e r ,  
c o ns ignee  or agent s h a l l ,  w i th in  ten 
days a f t e r  such e n t r y ,  g i v e  n o t i c e  to  
t h e  c o l l e c t o r ,  i n  w r i t i n g  o f  h i s  
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i th  such d e c i s i o n ,  
s e t t i n g  f o r t h  t h e r e in  d i s t i n c t l y  and 
s p e c i f i c a l l y  h i s  grounds o f  o b j e c t i o n  
h e r e t o ,  and s h a l l ,  w i th in  t h i r t y  days 
a f t e r  t h e  d a t e  o f  s u c h  d e c i s i o n ,  
appeal  there from t o  the s e c r e t a r y  o f  
the t r e a s u r y ,  whose d e c i s i o n  on such 
appeal  s h a l l  be f i n a l  and c o n c l u s i v e ;  
and the sa id  goods ,  wares and merchan­
d i s e  s h a l l  be l i a b l e  t o  d u t y  o r  
exempted t h e r e f r o m  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  any 
a c t  o f  C o n g r e s s  t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y  
no twi t hs t an d in g ;  un less  s u i t  s h a l l  be 
brought  w i t h i n  t h i r t y  days a f t e r  such 
d e c i s i o n  f o r  any d u t i e s  t h a t  may 
have been pa id ,  o r  may t h e r e a f t e r  be 
pa id ,  on said  goods ,  or  w i t h i n  t h i r t y  
days a f t e r  the d u t i e s  s h a l l  have been 
paid  in cases  where such goods s h a l l  
be in bond. "  11 S t a t .  195.

14/  "No s u i t  s h a l l  be maintained in
any c our t  f o r  the re co ve r y  o f  any tax



25

The f o r t y - s e c o n d  C o n g r e s s ,  which framed 

s e c t i o n  1983, a l s o  gave merchant seamen a 

cause o f  a c t i o n  f o r  a pe n a l t y  o f  up t o  one 

hundred d o l l a r s  aga ins t  any ships  master 

who f a i l e d  t o  pro v id e  adequate water and 

p r o v i s i o n s ,  but the pe na l t y  cou ld  not  be 

sought u n t i l  the seamen had complained t o  a 

navy o f f i c e r  or  an American consu lar  o f f i -

14/  c ont inued

a l l e g e d  t o  have been e r r o n e o u s l y  o r  
i l l e g a l l y  assessed  or  c o l l e c t e d ,  u n t i l  
a p p e a l  s h a l l  have been d u l y  made t o  
the commissioner o f  i n te r n a l  revenue,  
a c co rd ing  t o  the p r o v i s i o n s  o f  law in 
t h a t  r e g a r d ,  and t h e  r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  
the s e c r e t a r y  o f  the t rea sur y  e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  in  p u rs u an c e  t h e r e o f ,  and a 
d e c i s i o n  o f  said commissioner  s h a l l  be 
had thereon ,  un less  such s u i t  s h a l l  be 
b r o u g h t  w i t h i n  s i x  months f rom the  
t i m e  o f  s a i d  d e c i s i o n ,  o r  w i t h i n  
s i x  months f rom the  t ime t h i s  a c t  
takes  e f f e c t :  P r o v id e d , That i f  said
d e c i s i o n  s h a l l  be d e l a y e d  more than 
s i x  m ont hs  f r o m  t h e  d a t e  o f  su c h  
appeal ,  then said s u i t  may be brought  
at any time wi th in  twelve months from 
the date  o f  such a p p e a l . "  14 S t a t .  152.



26

c i a l . 17 S t a t .  269,  No such exhaust ion

requi rement ,  on the o ther  hand was imposed 

as a p r e c o n d i t i o n  o f  s u i t s  in the Court  o f
1 5/C l a i m s .  T h i s  l e g i s l a t i o n  makes c l e a r

that  the Congress  which enacted the 1871 

C i v i l  R i g h t s  A c t  knew how t o  w r i t e  an 

exhaust ion requirement  i n t o  a s ta tu te  and 

did  so whenever i t  wanted t o  r e qu i r e  the 

u t i l i z a t i o n  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  r e m e d ie s  

p r i o r  t o  s u i t .  I t s  r e f u s a l  t o  p l a c e  such a 

requirement  in to  s e c t i o n  1 983 can on ly  be 

understood  as a d e l i b e r a t e  d e c i s i o n  not  t o  

i m p o s e  any s u c h  r e q u i r e m e n t  on t h o s e  

s e e k i n g  r e l i e f  a g a i n s t  s t a t e  o f f i c i a l s  

v i o l a t i n g  f e d e r a l  r i g h t s .

Had C o n g r e s s  i n t e n d e d  t o  impose  any 

e x h a u s t i o n  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  i t  i s  f a r  more 

l i k e l y  that  i t  would have been concerned

15/  10 S t a t .  612.



27

with exhaust ion o f  s ta te  j u d i c i a l  remedies 

than s t a t e  ad m i n i s t ra t i ve  remedies .  The 

v i o l a t i o n s  o f  f e d e r a l  r i g h t s  about which 

C o n g r e s s  was c o n c e r n e d ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  

v i o l e n c e  d i r e c t e d  a t  b l a c k s ,  f e d e r a l  

o f f i c i a l s  and un ion  s y m p a t h i z e r s ,  were ,  

then as now, r e dressed  by j u d i c i a l  a c t i o n .  

In the n ineteenth  century ad m i n i s t ra t i ve  

remedies  were so un tr i ed  and even uncommon 

that  i t  i s  f a r  more probab le  that  Congress 

would  have e x p e c t e d  any r e d r e s s  t o  come 

from the c o u r t s .  The s ta te  c ou r t s  were at 

l e a s t  marg ina l l y  more l i k e l y  t o  be indepen­

dent o f  l o c a l  p o l i t i c s  and pa ss i ons  than 

would e l e c t e d  o f f i c i a l s  dependent on popu­

l a r  support  f o r  c o nt in u at i o n  in o f f i c e .  A l ­

though s t a t e  j u d g e s  might  be o b l i g a t e d  

by the  Supremacy C la us e  t o  e n f o r c e  the  

C o n s t i t u t i o n ,  the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  d o c t r i n e  

which re igned in 1871 was that  the f e d e r a l  

g o v e r n m e n t  c o u l d  n o t  i m p o s e  on s t a t e



28

e x e c u t i v e  o f f i c i a l s  any o b l i g a t i o n s  t o  

implement f e d e r a l  law. Monel l  v.  New York 

C i t y  Department  o f  S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s , 436 

U.S.  658,  676-79 (1978) ( d i s c u s s i n g  Prigg 

v.  P en n s ly van ia , 16 Pet .  539 (1 84 2 ) ,  and 

Kentucky v.  Dennison, 24 How. 66 ( 1 8 6 1 ) ) .

The l e g i s l a t i v e  h i s t o r y  o f  s e c t i o n  

1983, however,  makes c l e a r  that  j u d i c i a l  

e x h a u s t i o n  was no t  t o  be r e q u i r e d .  The 

opponents  o f  the 1871 Act  we l l  understood 

that  i t  c onta ined  no requirement  o f  j u d i ­

c i a l  e x h a u s t i o n ,  and o b j e c t e d  t o  i t  on 

p r e c i s e l y  t h a t  g r o u n d .  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  

Storm complained that  s e c t i o n  1

does  not even g iv e  the Sta te  c o u r t s  a 
chan ce  t o  t r y  q u e s t i o n s ,  o r  t o  show 
wh eth er  t h e y  w i l l  t r y  the  q u e s t i o n s  
that  might come b e f o r e  them under the 
f i r s t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  f o u r t e e n t h  
amendment,  f a i r l y  o r  n o t .  I t  t a k e s  
the whole qu e s t i o n  away from them in 
the beg inn ing .

Now these  q u e s t i o n s  could  a l l  be 
t r i e d ,  I take i t ,  in the S ta te  c o u r t s ,  
and by a w r i t  o f  e r r o r  . . .  c o u l d  be



29

brought  b e f o re  the Supreme Court f o r  
r e v i e w . . . .  But the f i r s t  s e c t i o n  does 
no t  a l l o w  t h a t  r i g h t .  I t  t a k e s  the  
w h o l e  q u e s t i o n  away a t  o n c e  and 
f o r e v e r  . . .  16/

S e n a t o r  Thurman o p p o s e d  t h a t  s e c t i o n

because o f  the c e n t r a l i z i n g  tendency 
o f  t r a n s f e r r i n g  a l l  mere  p r i v a t e  
s u i t s ,  as  w e l l  as p u n i s h m e n t  o f  
o f f e n s e s ,  f rom the  S t a t e  i n t o  the  
F e d e r a l  c o u r t s .  I do no t  say  t h a t  
t h i s  s e c t i o n  g i v e s  t o  the  F e d e r a l  
c ou r t s  e x c l u s i v e  j u r i s d i c t i o n .  I do 
not  suppose that  i t  i s  so unders toood .  
I t  l e a v e s  i t ,  I p r e s u m e ,  i n  t h e  
o p t i o n  t o  the  p e r s o n  who imag ines  
h i m s e l f  t o  be i n j u r e d  t o  sue  in  
the  S t a t e  c o u r t  o r  in the  F e d e r a l  
c o u r t ,  an o p t i o n  t h a t  he who has  
been l e a s t  in ju r ed ,  but who has some 
m a l i c e  t o  g r a t i f y ,  w i l l  be the  most  
l i k e l y  t o  a v a i l  h i m s e l f  o f .  1 7 /

The i n c l u s i o n o f t h i s  o b j e c t i o n in Thur-

man ' s "parade o f h o r r i b l e s "  i s p r e c i s e l y

the s o r t  o f e v i d e n c e  as t o  the  meaning

o f the  a c t  which Mr. J u s t i c e R e hn qu is t

1 6/  Cong.  G l o b e ,  42nd C o n g . ,  1s t  S e s s .
App. 86.

17/  Id.  App. 216.



30

t h o u g h t  c r i t i c a l  in  M o n e l l  v .  New York 

C i t y  Department  o f  S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s , 436 

U.S.  658,  722 (1978 ) .

I I I .  THE PURPOSE OF EXHAUSTION AND THE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1983

A l t h o u g h  the  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  o f f e r e d  

f o r  the exhaust ion r u le  are numerous, many 

are o b v i o u s l y  i n a p p l i c a b l e  here .  The most 

common a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x h a u s t i o n  

r e q u i r e m e n t  i s  where a p l a i n t i f f  s ee k s  

r e v i e w  by  t h e  c o u r t s  o f  a c t i o n  by a 

f e d e r a l  ag enc y  c h ar ge d  by s t a t u t e  w i th  

i m p l e m e n t i n g  t h e  s t a t u t e  on w h i c h  t h e  

p l a i n t i f f  r e l i e s .  See Myers v.  Bethlehem 

S h i p b u i l d i n g  C o r p . ,  303 U.S .  41 ( 1 9 3 8 ) .  

The c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  e x p e r t i s e  and s t a t u ­

t o r y  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  r e l e v a n t  t o  such a case 

c l e a r l y  have no p l a c e  here .  The 1871 C i v i l  

R i g h t s  A c t  d i d  n o t  e s t a b l i s h  any s t a t e  

a g e n c i e s  t o  e n f o r c e  t h e  C o n s t i t u t i o n ;

n e i t h e r  did i t  d i r e c t  or  au thor i ze  s ta te



31

o f f i c i a l s  t o  pr ov i de  any a d m i n i s t ra t i v e  or  

j u d i c i a l  r e m e d i e s  f o r  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  

v i o l a t i o n s .  N o t h i n g  in  t h e  l a n g u a g e  

o f  the s t a t u t e  contemplates  that  the s t a t e s  

are t o  p l a y  any r o l e  in r e d r e ss i n g  v i o l a ­

t i o n s  o f  the C o n s t i t u t i o n .

I f  e x h a u s t i o n  i s  t o  be r e q u i r e d  i t  

must be f o r  reasons  o ther  than implementing 

o r  r e s p e c t i n g  a c o n g r e s s i o n a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  scheme.  E x h a u s t i o n  in a 

case  such as t h i s  could  p l a u s i b l y  be urged 

t o  se rve  one o f  two purposes .  F i r s t ,  i f  an 

aggr i eved  p a r t y  were t o  o b t a i n  in the s ta te  

ad m i n i s t ra t i v e  proceeding  the r e l i e f  that  

would o t herwise  be sought in f e d e r a l  c o u r t ,  

the work o f  those  cour t s  would be reduced.  

S e c o n d ,  i f  t h e  v i c t i m ' s  i n j u r i e s  a r e  

re dressed  by the s ta te  i t s e l f ,  some p o t e n ­

t i a l  f o r  f e d e r a l - s t a t e  c o n f l i c t  might be 

avo ided .  We do not  suggest  that  e i t h e r  o f  

these  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  are pe r s u a s i v e ,  but



32

o n l y  t h a t  i t  must be on a b a s i s  such as 

t h i s  t h a t  e x h a u s t i o n  i s  g r o u n d e d .  See 

McKart v .  U n i t ed  S t a t e s , 395 U.S .  185,  

193-95 (1969 ) .

A l l  the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  that  might be 

advanced  in  t h i s  o r  any o t h e r  c a s e  f o r  

r e q u i r i n g  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  exhaust ion  r e s t  on 

one a b s o l u t e l y  e s s e n t i a l  assumption —  that  

the agency whose pr oc edures  must be pursued 

w i l l  make a s e r i o u s  and good f a i t h  e f f o r t  

t o  c o n s id e r  the p l a i n t i f f ' s  c la ims  and t o  

implement the same r u l e s  that  the p l a i n t i f f  

s e e k s  t o  e n f o r c e  in c o u r t .  Abse nt  t h a t  

assumption,  there  i s  no reason whatever t o  

b e l i e v e  that  any o f  the purposes  o f  exhaus­

t i o n  w i l l  be se rved .  I f  the agency i s  not  

a c t in g  in good f a i t h ,  no p o s s i b l e  r e l i e f  

can come o f  the agency p r o c e e d i n g s ,  and the 

f e d e r a l  c o u r t s  in  u l t i m a t e l y  g r a n t i n g  

r e l i e f  w i l l  h a v e  t o  d i s a p p r o v e  o f  t h e  

agency proce ed in g  as w e l l  as the i n i t i a l



33

v i o l a t i o n .  More s e r i o u s l y ,  an a g e n c y  

pr oc eed in g  in bad f a i t h  could manipulate an 

exhaust ion requirement to  s e v e r e l y  aggra­

vate  the v i o l a t i o n  that  has a l ready  o c c u r ­

red .  Rather than "b u i ld i n g  a r e c o r d , "  the 

pr oc ee d in g  could  be used as an o pp or tu n i t y  

t o  conduct  p r e - t r i a l  d i s c o v e r y  and then r e ­

shape the a g e nc y ' s  de f ense .  The r e s o l u t i o n  

o f  the underly ing  c laim could  be de layed in 

the  hope o f  e x h a u s t i n g  the  p l a i n t i f f ' s  

r e s o u r c e s  o r  h i s  or  her p a t i e n c e .

We do no t  c o nt en d  t h a t  t h i s  c r u c i a l  

assumption o f  agency good f a i t h  and minimal 

c o m p e te n c e  i s  m is t ak en  as t o  a l l  s t a t e  

a g e n c i e s ,  o r  u n j u s t i f i e d  on the f a c t s  o f  

t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  case .  Rather,  we urge that  

t h i s  ass um pt io n  i s  t o t a l l y  i n c o n s i s t e n t  

with the f i n d i n g s  and c on c lu s i o n s  which led  

Congress t o  adopt the 1871 C i v i l  Rights  Ac t .  

The f o r t y - s e c o n d  Congress ,  we contend,  be ­

l i e v e d  that  s ta te  o f f i c i a l s  were c e r t a i n l y



- 34

u n a b l e ,  and in  most  c a s e s  u n w i l l i n g ,  t o  

comply with or  e n f o r c e  the United S ta tes  

C o n s t i t u t i o n .  In l i g h t  o f  that  f i n d i n g ,  

which l i e s  at the heart  o f  the 1871 A c t ,  we 

submi t  t h a t  C o n g r e s s  c an n o t  c o n c e i v a b l y  

have intended t o  r e q u i r e  aggr i eved  p a r t i e s ,  

p r i o r  t o  o b t a i n i n g  a c c e s s  t o  f e d e r a l  

c o u r t s ,  t o  s e e k  r e d r e s s  f r o m  t h e  v e r y  

s t a t e  o f f i c i a l s  whom C o n g r e s s  c o n c l u d e d  

would deny i t .

One c r i t i c a l  purpose o f  the 1871 Act 

was " t o  p r o v id e  a f e d e r a l  remedy where the 

s t a t e  remedy, though adequate in t he o r y ,  

was not  a v a i l a b l e  in p r a c t i c e . "  Monroe v . 

Pape, 365 U.S 1 67, 1 74 (1 961) .  Congressman 

Stoughton as se r te d

The w h o l e  S o u t h ,  Mr.  S p e a k e r ,  i s  
r a p i d l y  d r i f t i n g  i n t o  a s t a t e  o f  
anarchy and b l oodshed ,  which renders  
the  w o r s t  Government  on the  f a c e  o f  
t h e  e a r t h  r e s p e c t a b l e  by way o f  
comparison.  There i s  no s e c u r i t y  f o r  
l i f e ,  person or  p r o p e r t y .  The S ta te  
a u t h o r i t i e s  and l o c a l  c o u r t s  are un­



35

a b l e  o r  u n w i l l i n g  t o  c h e c k  t h e  
e v i l  o r  p u n i s h  the  c r i m i n a l s .  18/

Re pr e se nt a t iv e  Perry exc la imed :

Where t h e s e  gangs  o f  a s s a s s i n s  
show t h e m s e l v e s ,  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
peop le  l ook  on,  i f  not  with sympathy, 
a t  l e a s t  w i t h  f o r e b e  a r a n c e  . The
b o a s t e d  c o u r a g e  o f  the  South i s  not  
courage in t h e i r  p r es en c e .  S h e r i f f s ,  
having eyes  to  see ,  see not ;  judg es ,  
ha v in g  e a r s  t o  h e a r ,  hear  n o t ;  w i t ­
n e s s e s  c o n c e a l  the  t r u t h  o r  f a l s i f y  
i t ;  grand j u r i e s  act  as i f  they might 
be a c c o m p l i c e s .  In the  p r e s e n c e  o f  
t h e s e  gangs  a l l  the  a p p a r a t u s  and 
machinery o f  c i v i l  government,  a l l  the 
p r o c e s s e s  o f  j u s t i c e ,  skulk away as i f  
government and j u s t i c e  were cr imes and 
f e a r e d  d e t e c t i o n .  Among the  most  
dangerous things  an in jured  par ty  can 
do i s  t o  appeal  f o r  j u s t i c e .  Of the 
u n c o u n t e d  s c o r e s  and h u n d r e d s  o f  
a t r o c i o u s  m u t i l a t i o n s  and murders i t  
i s  c r e d i b l y  s t a t e d  t h a t  no t  one has 
been punished.  19/

Senator  Pool  argued that  the s t a t e  " c o u r t s

have been t r i e d ,  and the e xe c u t iv e  arm has

18/  Cong.  G l o b e ,  42nd C o n g . ,  1 s t  S e s s .  
321 .

19/  Id.  App. 78.



- 36

b e e n  t r i e d ,  and b o t h  h a ve  f a i l e d . "

R ep r es e nt a t iv e  Snyder noted that

m u l t i p l i e d  hundreds o f  l o y a l  p e o p l e ,  
b o t h  m a le  and f e m a l e ,  h a ve  b e e n  
whipped,  s courged ,  l a c e r a t e d ,  e x i l e d ,  
r o b b e d ,  and m u r d e r e d ,  b y  t h e s e  
demonish Klans.  . . .  Anarchy and v i o ­
l e n c e  are  supreme and the  a d h e r e n t s  
o f  the Government are u t t e r l y  unpro­
t e c t e d .  They appeal  in vain t o  S ta te  
a u t h o r i t y ,  and a r e  now b e f o r e  us 
as  hu mb le  s u p p l i a n t s  f o r  f e d e r a l  
p r o t e c t i o n .  21/

Senator  Morton argued

But i t  i s  sa id  these  crimes should be 
p u n i s h e d  by the  S t a t e s ;  t h a t  the y  
are a l ready  o f f e n s e s  aga inst  the laws 
o f  the S t a t e s ,  and the matter  should 
be l e f t  with the S t a t e s .  The answer 
t o  t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  the  S t a t e s  do not  
punish them; the S ta tes  do not p r o t e c t  
the  r i g h t s  o f  the  p e o p l e ;  th e  S t a t e  
c o u r t s  are power less  t o  r e dr e ss  these  
wrongs.  The gr ea t  f a c t  remains that  
l a r g e  c l a s s e s  o f  p e o p l e ,  numbering 
n e a r l y  one h a l f  in  some S t a t e s ,  are  
wi thout  l e g a l  remedy in the c o u r t s  o f  
t h e  S t a t e s .  S h o u l d  t h i s  f a c t  be 
over l ook ed  f o r  the sake o f  a theory?  
Sha l l  i t  be said  with any reason that

20/

20 / Id. App. 1 70

1 1 / I d . App. 1 99



37

i t  i s  p r oper  t o  l eave  the punishment 
o f  these  crimes t o  the S t a te s  when i t  
i s  a n o t o r i o u s  f a c t  that  the S t a te s  do 
not punish them. 22/

Senator  Osborn exp l a ine d :

I f  the S ta te  c ou r t s  had proven them­
s e l v e s  c o m p e t e n t  t o  s u p p r e s s  t h e  
l o c a l  d i s o r d e r s ,  o r  t o  m a i n t a i n  law 
and o r d e r ,  we s h o u ld  no t  have been 
c a l l e d  upon t o  l e g i s l a t e  upon t h i s  
s u b j e c t  at  a l l .  But the y  have not  
done s o .  We are  d r i v e n  by e x i s t i n g  
f a c t s  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  t h e  s e v e r a l  
S t a t e s  in the  South what the y  have 
b e e n  u n a b l e  f u l l y  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r  
t h e m s e l v e s ,  i . e . ,  the  f u l l  and com­
p l e t e  ad m in i s t r a t i o n  o f  j u s t i c e  in the 
c o u r t s .  23/

Congresman Rainey remarked:

The qu e s t i o n  i s  sometimes asked,  Why 
do  n o t  t h e  c o u r t s  o f  l aw a f f o r d  
r e d r e s s ?  Why the n e c e s s i t y  o f  app ea l ­
ing t o  Congress?  We answer that  the 
c ou r t s  are in many in s ta n c e s  under the 
c o n t r o l  o f  those  who are whol ly  i n i m i ­
c a l  t o  the  i m p a r t i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
o f  law and e q u i t y .  What b e n e f i t  could  
r e s u l t  f rom an a p pe a l  t o  t r i b u n a l s

22/  I d . App. 252. 

23 /  Id.  at 653.



38

whose o f f i c e r s  a re  s e c r e t l y  in sym­
pathy with the very  e v i l  aga in s t  which 
we are s t r i v i n g .  24/

Senator  Pra t t  urged:

[0] f  the hundreds o f  ou t ra ges  commit­
t ed  upon l o y a l  p e o p l e  th r o u g h  the  
agency o f  t h i s  Klu Klux Klan o r g a n i z a ­
t i o n ,  [but]  not  one has been punished.  
This  d e f e c t  in the a d m in i s t ra t i o n  o f  
the  laws  d o e s  not  e x t e n d  t o  o t h e r  
c a s e s .  V i g o r o u s l y  enough are the laws 
en fo r c e d  aga inst  Union p e o p le .  They 
only  f a i l  in e f f i c i e n c y  when a man o f  
known Union sent iments ,  white or  b l a c k ,  
i n v o k e s  t h e i r  a i d .  Then ' J u s t i c e  
c l o s e s  the  d o o r  o f  her  t e m p l e s .  25/

Congressman Lowe argued

Whi l e  murder  i s  s t a l k i n g  ab road  in  
d i s g u i s e ,  whi le  whippings and l y n ch -  
ings  and banishment have been v i s i t e d  
upon u n o f f e n d i n g  Amer ican c i t i z e n s ,  
the  l o c a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s  have been 
f o u n d  i n a d e q u a t e  o r  u n w i l l i n g  t o  
apply the proper  c o r r e c t i v e .  Combina­
t i o n s ,  d a r k e r  than the  n i g h t  t h a t  
h ides  them, c o n s p i r a c i e s  wicked as the 
w o r s t  o f  f e l o n s  c o u l d  d e v i s e ,  have 
gone unwhipped o f  j u s t i c e .  Immunity 
i s  g iven  t o  c r ime ,  and the r e c o r d s  o f

1 1 / Id. at 394

25 / Id. at 505



39

the p u b l i c  t r i b u n a l s  are searched in 
v a i n  f o r  any e v i d e n c e  o f  e f f e c t i v e  
r e d r e s s . 2 6 /

Mr. Beat ty  a s s e r t e d :

[M]en  w e r e  m u r d e r e d ,  h o u s e s  w e r e  
burned,  women were ou t raged ,  men were 
s courged ,  and o f f i c e r s  o f  the law shot  
down; and the S ta te  made no s u c c e s s f u l  
e f f o r t  t o  br ing  the g u i l t y  t o  puni sh­
ment or  a f f o r d  p r o t e c t i o n  or  r e dr ess  
t o  t h e  o u t r a g e d  and i n n o c e n t . 2 7 /

R e c o g n i z i n g  t h a t  the  f o r t y - s e c o n d  

Congress b e l i e v e d  that  remedies nominal ly  

a v a i l a b l e  on the fa ce  o f  s t a t e  laws were 

not  a v a i l a b l e  in p r a c t i c e ,  ' Ju s t i c e  Rehn- 

q u i s t  urged in C i ty  o f  Columbus v.  Leonard 

443 U.S.  905 (1979) (Rehnquist ,  J . , d i s s e n t ­

ing from d e n ia l  o f  c e r t i o r a r i )  that  exhaus­

t i o n  might non ethe less  be requ i red  where a 

s t a t e  could  demonstrate in f a c t  " th at  there  

i s  an a v a i l a b l e  and adequate remedy."  The

26 / Id. at 374

27 / Id. at 428



40

p r a c t i c e  suggested  by ' J u s t i c e  Rehnquist  i s  

f a r  d i f f e r e n t  from any requirement  h i t h e r t o  

imposed by the f e d e r a l  c o u r t s ,  and would 

d e f e a t  r a t h e r  than advance  the  p u r p o s e s  

behind exhaust i on .

To put i t s e l f  o u t s i d e  the c a t e g o r y  o f  

cases  about which Congress was concerned ,  a 

s t a t e  would have t o  prove more than that  

some a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  procedure  e x i s t e d  in 

which the r e l i e f  sought in f e d e r a l  c our t  

was t e c h n i c a l l y  a v a i l a b l e .  A s t a t e  would 

have t o  demonstrate  by c l e a r  and c o n v i n c ­

i n g  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  s u c h  r e l i e f  was i  n 

f a c t  p rov ided  by that  p r o c e s s  t o  persons  

such as the p l a i n t i f f .  The r e s o l u t i o n  o f  

such c la ims  would n e c e s s a r i l y  d e f e a t  the 

v e r y  p u r p o s e s  o f  e x h a u s t i o n .  Far f rom 

r e d u c i n g  t h e  w o r k l o a d  o f  t h e  f e d e r a l  

c o u r t s ,  t h i s  n o v e l  ap pr o ac h  would  f o r c e  

f e d e r a l  j u d g e s  t o  p r e s i d e  o v e r  o f t e n



41

l engthy  t r i a l s  r egard ing  the e n t i r e  c a s e ­

l oad and h i s t o r y  o f  the agency,  weighing 

the f r equency  and type o f  r e l i e f  awarded, 

a s c e r t a i n i n g  wh ether  r e l i e f  was e q u a l l y  

a v a i l a b l e  in a l l  r e l e va n t  types  o f  c a s e s ,  

and search ing f o r  m e r i t o r i o u s  c la ims  that  

might have been w r on g f u l l y  den ied .  Often 

such hear ings  would be more time consuming 

and complex than the ac tua l  t r i a l  on the 

m e r i t s .  In a d d i t i o n ,  r a t her  than d e f e r r i n g  

t o  s ta te  a u t h o r i t i e s  on the assumption that  

t h e y  would a c t  c o m p e t e n t l y  and in good 

f a i t h ,  the f e d e r a l  c o ur t s  would be requ i red  

t o  s i t  in judgment on the ac tua l  a b i l i t i e s  

and c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  s t a t e  o f f i c i a l s  

i n v o lv e d ,  a p r o c e s s  v i r t u a l l y  c e r t a i n  t o  

aggravate  f e d e r a l - s t a t e  r e l a t i o n s .  This 

e n t i r e  p r o c e s s ,  m o r e o v e r ,  w o u ld  be an 

attempt by the s t a t e  t o  prove  t ha t ,  however 

j u s t i f i e d  the Congress might have been in



42

e n a c t i n g  the  1871 C i v i l  R i g h t s  A c t ,  i t s  

u n d e r l y i n g  f i n d i n g s  w e r e  e r r o n e o u s  as  

app l i ed  t o  the  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  agency.  The 

f e d e r a l  c o u r t s  do  n o t  o r d i n a r i l y  s i t  

t o  r e c o n s i d e r  the  wisdom o r  a c c u r a c y  o f  

c o n g r e s s i o n a l  f i n d i n g s .

We r e c o g n i z e  that  c i rcumstances  in the 

S o u t h  h a v e  c h a n g e d  g r e a t l y  s i n c e  t h e  

ena c tm ent  o f  the  1871 C i v i l  R i g h t s  A c t .  

Some a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  remedies  now in e x i s ­

t e n c e  a r e  f a i r  o r  e f f i c i e n t  o r  b o t h ;  

o t h e r s ,  r e g r e t t a b l y ,  a re  n e i t h e r .  But 

Congress gave the f e d e r a l  c o u r t s  no mandate 

t o  c o n d u c t  t r i a l s  on t h e  e f f i c a c y  and 

b i a s e s  o f  each o f  the thousands o f  s ta te  

ag enc i es  that  abound t oday ,  and no author ­

i t y  t o  p i c k  and c h o s e  when s e c t i o n  1983 

would a f f o r d  i t s  p r o t e c t i o n s .

R a t h e r ,  C o n g r e s s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  the  

p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  improvement in the c o n d i ­

t i o n s  which i t  found in 1871 by p er m i t t in g



43

a g g r i e v e d  p a r t i e s  t o  u t i l i z e  any s t a t e  

r e m e d i e s ,  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e ,  j u d i c i a l  o r  

l e g i s l a t i v e ,  which the y  b e l i e v e d  t o  be 

e f f i c a c i o u s .  Such i n d i v i d u a l  d e c i s i o n s ,  by 

p e o p l e  who w i l l  o f t e n  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  

r e a l i t i e s  o f  the agen c i e s  f a r  b e t t e r  than a 

f e d e r a l  judge ,  impose none o f  the burdens 

on f e d e r a l  c o u r t s  o r  d i f f i c u l i t e s  f o r  

f e d e r a l - s t a t e  r e l a t i o n s  inherent  in J u s t i c e  

R e h n g u i s t ' s  p r o p o s a l .  T h i s  s t a t u t o r y  

system p r o v id e s  s ta te  agenc i es  anxious f o r  

an op p or tu n i t y  t o  r e s o l v e  d i sp u t e s  i n t e r ­

n a l l y  w i th  a p o w e r f u l  i n c e n t i v e  t o  make 

genuine ad m i n i s t ra t i ve  r e l i e f  a v a i l a b l e  in 

p r a c t i c e  in o r d e r  t o  pe r s u a d e  a g g r i e v e d  

p a r t i e s  t o  seek r e dr ess  there  rather  than 

in f e d e r a l  c o u r t .  Regardless  o f  whether 

t h i s  Court might today choose  a d i f f e r e n t  

a p p r o a c h ,  t h i s  i s  the  scheme e n a c t e d  by 

C o n g r e s s  when i t  a d o pt ed  th e  1871 C i v i l



Rights  A c t ,  and i t  i s  the scheme which the 

f e d e r a l  c o u r t s  must adhere  t o  u n t i l  and 

un less  Congress  d i r e c t s  o t h er w is e .

IV. THE DEBATES CONCERNING THE SHERMAN
AMENDMENT_________________________________ _

In t h i s  c a s e ,  as in Monroe, Monel l  and 

Owen, c o n s i d e r a b l e  l i g h t  i s  thrown on the 

i n t e n t  o f  C o n g r e s s  by t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y  

s u r r o u n d i n g  t h e  Sherman Amendment.  The 

f i r s t  c on fe r e n c e  r e p or t  on the 1871 C i v i l  

Rights  Act c onta ined  a p r o v i s i o n  dr a f t e d  

by Senator  Sherman which imposed on a c i t y  

o r  county s t r i c t  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  any i n j u r i e s  

caused by a r i o t  w i th in  i t s  bor de r s .  This 

p r o p o s a l  was r e j e c t e d  by the  House on a 

v a r i e t y  o f  g r o u n d s .  M one l l  v .  New York 

C i t y  Department o f  S o c i a l  S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S 

at  6 6 9 - 6 8 3 .  C o n g r e s s  then  a d op t e d  l a n ­

guage,  now c o d i f i e d  as 42 U.S.C.  § 1 986,

imposing l i a b i l i t y  on any person who had

- 44 -



45

knowledge o f  a c o n s p i r a c y  t o  v i o l a t e  the

v i c t i m ' s  c i v i l  r i g h t s  and f a i l e d  t o  use h i s
28 /

o r  her  power t o  prevent  i t .

28/  In r e j e c t i n g  the a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  the 
d o c t r i n e  o f  r espondeat  s u p e r i o r  t o  impose 
on c i t i e s  o r  c o u n t i e s  s t r i c t  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  v i o l a t i o n s  commit ted  by 
t h e i r  o f f i c i a l s ,  Monel l  r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  on 
the h i s t o r y  o f  the Sherman Amendment. 436 
U.S.  at 693-94.  Monell  reasoned that  the 
d e b a t e s  on t h a t  amendment  p r o v i d e d  a 
c r i t i c a l  i n s i g h t  i n t o  Congress '  views as to  
the  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  under  which l i a b i l i t y  
should be imposed on a defendant .

One a s p e c t  o f  the  Sherman amendment 
debates  r e l i e d  on by Monell  was o p p o s i t i o n  
t o  the  amendment on the  ground t h a t  i t  
imposed l i a b i l i t y  on a l o c a l  government  
even i f  i t  "d id  not  know o f  an impending 
o r  e n s u i n g  r i o t  o r  d i d  n o t  h a ve  t h e  
wherewithal  t o  do anything about i t . "  436 
U.S at 692,  n . 57 .  Senator  Stevenson argued 
t h e  amendment  " u n d e r t a k e s  t o  c r e a t e  a 
c o r p o r a t e  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  p e r s o n a l  i n j u r y  
which no prudence or  f o r e s i g h t  could  have 
p r e s e n t e d . "  Cong. Globe ,  42nd Cong. ,  1st  
Sess .  762. Repre se nta t ive  Kerr o b j e c t e d ,

There i s  . . .  a t o t a l  and a b s o l u t e  
a b s e n c e  o f  n o t i c e ,  c o n s t r u c t i v e  o r  
impl i ed ,  w i thin  any decent  l i m i t s  o f  
l aw  o r  r e a s o n .  . . .  Under  t h i s



46

The language adopted in p l a c e  o f  the 

Sherman amendment,  and now c o n t a i n e d  in 

s e c t i o n  1 9 8 6 ,  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  v i e w  o f  

Congress as t o  the amount o f  knowledge and 

degree  o f  a c t i o n  or  i n a c t i o n  ap propr ia te  

f o r  the im po s i t i o n  o f  the l i a b i l i t y  by the 

f e d r a l  c o u r t s .  The s u b s t i t u t e  amendment 

p r o v i d e d :

[A]ny person or  persons  having knowl­
edge  o f  the  wrongs  c o n s p i r e d  t o  be 
d o n e  and m e n t i o n e d  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  
s e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  a c t  are  ab out  t o  be 
committed,  and having power t o  prevent  
o r  aid in preve nt in g  the same, sh a l l  
n e g l e c t  or  r e f u s e  t o  do so ,  and such 
wrongful  act  s h a l l  be committed;  such 
person or  per sons  s h a l l  be l i a b l e  to  
t h e  p e r s o n  i n j u r e d ,  o r  h i s  l e g a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  Id .  at 804.

28/  c ont inued

s e c t i o n  i t  i s  no t  r e q u i r e d ,  b e f o r e  
l i a b i l i t y  a t t a c h ,  t h a t  i t  s h a l l  be 
known that  there  was any i n t e n t i o n  t o  
commit these  c r imes,  so as t o  f a s t e n  
l i a b i l i t y  j u s t l y  upon the muni c i pa l ­
i t y .  _Id. at  788.

See a l s o  i d . at 791 (Rep. W i l l a r d . )



47

The f o r m  o f  k n o w l e d g e  c a l l e d  f o r  was 

knowledge p r i o r  t o  the a l l e g e d  v i o l a t i o n  

that  the ac t  subsequent ly  complained o f  was 

t o  o c c u r ;  the a c t i o n  requ i red  was f a i l u r e  

t o  p r e v e n t  t h a t  harm. T h i s  c o m b i n a t i o n  

o f  f o r e k n o w l e d g e  and l a c k  o f  p r e v e n t i o n  

r e p r e s e n t s  a c a r e f u l l y  framed balance  o f  

the competing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  urged in the 

c o n g r e s s i o n a l  de b at es .  These p r e r e q u i s i t e s  

t o  l i a b i l i t y  were not  o n l y  the  minimum 

c o n s e r v a t i v e s  would ac cept  as a p r e c o n d i ­

t i o n  t o  s u i t ,  but the most the suppor ters  

o f  R ec on s t r u c t i o n  would concede .

The i m p o s i t i o n  o f  an e x h a u s t i o n  

r e q u i r e m e n t  would a l t e r  t h i s  b a l a n c e  in 

s u b s t a n t i a l  manner c l e a r l y  not contemplated 

by Congress .  F i r s t ,  in a d d i t i o n  t o  knowing 

t h a t  a v i o l a t i o n  was about  t o  o c c u r ,  a 

c i t y  would have t o  be n o t i f i e d  a f t e r  the 

v i o l a t i o n  that  the v i c t im  wanted r e d r e s s .

S e c o n d ,  o v e r  and above  hav ing  f a i l e d  t o



48

prevent  the v i o l a t i o n ,  the c i t y  would have 

t o  f a i l  as w e l l  t o  p r o v i d e  a s u b s e q u e n t  

remedy. During the debates  on the Sherman 

amendment Senator  Thurman a c t u a l l y  advo­

ca ted  j u s t  such an exhaust ion requi rmeent ,  

urg ing  that  p l a i n t i f f s  be re qu i r ed  t o  g iv e  

c i t i e s  a w r i t t e n  n o t i c e  o f  c la im wi th in  7 

days  o f  the  com m is s i o n  o f  the  o f f e n s e ,  

c i t i n g  a s t a t u t e  w i t h  such a p r o v i s i o n  

enacted under George IV. Id .  at 770. This  

p r o p o s a l  f ound  no s u p p o r t  in  C o n g r e s s ,  

h o w e v e r ,  and was n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  

language u l t i m a t e l y  adopted.

I f  C o n g r e s s  d i d  no t  c o n t e m p l a t e  any 

exhaust i on  requirement  under s e c t i o n  1986, 

a f o r t i o r i , i t  c a n n o t  have i n t e n d e d  one 

under s e c t i o n  1983. Unlike a s e c t i o n  1986 

d e f e n d a n t ,  who i s  l i a b l e  m e r e l y  f o r  

f a i l i n g  t o  prevent  harm to  the v i c t i m ,  a 

s e c t i o n  1983 defendant  must a c t u a l l y  commit



49

o r  ca us e  the  v i o l a t i o n  i t s e l f .  M o n e l l , 

436 U . S .  a t  6 9 2 .  Thus a s e c t i o n  1983 

defendant  by d e f i n i t i o n  knows more and does  

more than a s e c t i o n  1 986 de fendant .  And, 

s i n c e  the  1983 d e f e n d a n t  i s  the  a c t i v e  

e v i l d o e r ,  n o t  m e r e l y  a n e g l e c t f u l  b y ­

s t a n d e r ,  i t  i s  f a r  l e s s  l i k e l y  t h a t  an 

a p p e a l  f o r  r e d r e s s  would s u c c e e d  t o  the  

f o r m e r  t h a n  t o  t h e  l a t t e r .  I f  a c i t y  

f a i l e d  t o  p r e v e n t  a known c o n s p i r a c y  o f  

p o l i c e  o f f i c e r s  from v i o l a t i n g  a v i c t i m ' s  

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  r i g h t s ,  exhaust i on  would not 

be a p r e c o n d i t i o n  o f  a s e c t i o n  1 986 s u i t  

a g a i n s t  the  c i t y ;  C on gr es s  ca nn ot  have 

intended t o  impose such a requirement  on a 

s e c t i o n  1983 s u i t  a g a i n s t  the  p o l i c e m e n

themse lves .



50

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons  the judgment o f  

the c our t  o f  appeal s  should be re ve rs e d .

R e s p e c t f u l l y  submitted,

'JACK GREENBERG 
'JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I  
BILL LANN LEE*/
ERIC SCHNAPPER 

Sui te  2030 
10 Columbus C i r c l e  
New York,  New York 10019

At torneys  f o r  NAACP Legal  
Defense and Educa­
t i o n a l  Fund, I n c . ,  
as Amicus Curiae

* /  Counsel  o f  Record



MeiieN psess inc~-n. V. c. " 21?

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