Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents Brief Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1981
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents Brief Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense Fund, 1981. d7100da0-c09a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9c249303-6816-46af-b015-d42ab9accf4e/patsy-v-florida-board-of-regents-brief-amicus-curiae-naacp-legal-defense-fund. Accessed November 23, 2025.
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No. 81-1874
I n the
§>itjtrmr (Scurf of tfyr lmtr& #tntrs
October T eem, 1981
Georgia P atsy,
v.
Petitioner.
B oard op R egents of the State op F lorida, A B ody Cor
porate, Fob and on B ehalf op F lorida I ntp«rnational
U niversity.
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE NAACP LEGAL
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.,
AS AMICUS CURIAE
J ack Greenberg
James M. Nabrit, III
B ill Lann Lee*
E ric Schnapper
Suite 2030
10 Columbus Circle
New York, New York 10019
Attorneys for NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
* Counsel of Record
I N D E X
Pa?e
I n t e r e s t o f Amicus ........................................ 1
Summary o f Argument ...................................... 3
Argument ............................................................... 4
I . THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION
1 983 .................................. 7
I I . THE ORIGINS OF THE 'JUDICIAL
REQUIREMENT OF ADMINIS
TRATIVE EXHAUSTION ............. 15
I I I . THE PURPOSE OF EXHAUSTION
AND THE LEGISLATIVE HIS
TORY OF SECTION 1983 .............. 30
IV. THE DEBATES CONCERNING THE
SHERMAN AMENDMENT ..................... 44
CONCLUSION 50
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PgSg
Cases
Bacon v . Rutland Ra i l ro ad C o . ,
232 U.S. 134 (1914) .......................... 20
Brown v. Board o f Educat ion,
347 U.S. 483 (1 954) .......................... 2
C i ty o f Columbus v. Leonard, 443
U.S. 905 ( 1 979) .................................... 39
Ex par te Young, 209 U.S. 113
( 1 908) ........................................................ 10
F i r s t Nat i ona l C i t y Bank o f Gree l ey
v. Board o f County Commissioners
o f County o f Weld, 264 U.S 450
( 1 924) ......................................................... 22
G i l c h r i s t v. Interborough Rapid
Tra ns i t C o . , 279 U.S. 159
( 1 929) ......... 21
Goldsmith v. United S t a te s Board
o f Tax Appeal s , 270 U.S.
1 17 ( 1 926) ............................................... 21
H o l l i s v. Kutz, 255 U.S. 452
(1921) ......................................................... 21
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S 409
(1976) ......................................................... 7
Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How.
66 ( 1 861 ) .......................................... .. 28
McKart v. United S t a t e s , 395 U.S 185
(1 969) ........................................................ 32
- i i -
Page
Monell v. New York C ity Department
o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658
(1978) ................................. 2 , 9 , 1 2 , 1 6 ,
18 ,22 ,28 ,3 0
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961) ........................................................ 34
Myers v. Bethlehem Sh i pbu i ld ing
Co rp . , 303 U.S. 41 (1938) ............ 22,30
N i c h o l l v. United S t a t e s , 7 Wall .
(74 U.S. ) 1 22 ( 1 869) ...................... 23
Owens v. C i ty o f Independence, 445
U.S. 622 ( 1 980) ............................ 7,1 5,1 7,
18,23
Quern v. 'Jordan, 440 U.S. 332
(1979) ........................................................ 8
Po r ter v. In ve s to rs Synd i ca te ,
286 U.S. 461 ( 1 932) ........................ 22
Prendergast v. New York Telephone
Co. , 262 U.S. 43 ( 1 923) ................. 20
P re n t i s v. A t l a n t i c Coast Line C o . ,
211 U.S. 210 ( 1 908) .......................... 1 8
Prigg v. Pennslyvan ia , 16 Pet . 539
(1 842) ........................................................ 28
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367 (1951)
- iii -
1 5
Page
United S ta te s v. Sing Tuck, 194
U.S. 1 61 ( 1 904) ................................... 1 9
S ta tut es
C i v i l R ights Act o f 1871, S e c t i o n 1,
U.S.C. § 1 983 ................................. passim
10 S t a t . 612 ...................................................... 24
11 S ta t . 195 ...................................................... 24
14 S t a t . 152 ............................................ 25
17 S t a t . 269 ...................................................... 26
Other A u t h o r i t i e s
A l p e r t s , S u i t s Against Adminis
t r a t i v e Agenc ies Under N . I .R .A .
and A . A . , 12 N.Y.LU.L.Q. Rev.
393 (1 935) ............................................... 19
Berger , Exhaustion o f Admin i s t r a t ive
Remedies, 48 Yale L.'J. 981
(1 938) ........................................................ 19
Comment, Exhaustion o f Adm in i s t ra t iv e
Remedies, 39 Cor ne l l L.Q.
273 ( 1 939) ............................................... 1 9
Cong. Globe , 42nd Cong. 1st Sess . &
App. (1871) ................................. 12 ,13 ,14 ,
29 ,3 5 ,3 6 ,
37 ,38 ,39
IV
Page
L i l i e n t h a l , The Federal Courts and
Sta te Regula t i on o f P ub l i c
U t i l i t i e s , 43 Haw. L. Rev.
379 (1 930) ............................................... 19
Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251 (1938) . . 19
v
No. 81-1874
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1981
GEORGIA PATSY,
P e t i t i o n e r
v.
BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE STATE
OF FLORIDA, A BODY CORPORATE,
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY.
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE NAACP LEGAL
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.,
AS AMICUS CURIAE
I n t e r e s t o f Amicus
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educat ion
al Fund, I n c . , i s a n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n
e s t a b l i s h e d under the laws o f the S ta te o f
New York. I t was formed t o a s s i s t black
2
p e r s o n s t o s e c u r e t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r i g h t s by the p r o s e c u t i o n o f l a w s u i t s . I t s
c h a r t e r d e c l a r e s that i t s purposes inc lude
rendering l e g a l s e r v i c e s g r a t u i t o u s l y to
b lack persons s u f f e r i n g i n j u s t i c e by r e a
son o f r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . For many
years a t t o rn eys o f the Legal Defense Fund
have r e p r e s e n t e d p a r t i e s in l i t i g a t i o n
b e f o r e t h i s Cour t and the l o w e r c o u r t s
i n v o l v i n g a v a r i e t y o f i s s u e s b r o u g h t
pursuant t o 42 U.S.C. § 1 983. E. g . , Monell
v . New York C i t y Departmet o f S o c i a l Ser
v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658 (1978 ) ; Brown v. Board
o f E d u c a t i o n , 347 U.S . 483 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . The
Legal Defense Fund b e l i e v e s that i t s ex
p e r i e n c e in such l i t i g a t i o n and the r e
s e a r c h i t has p e r f o r m e d w i l l a s s i s t the
Court in t h i s case . The p a r t i e s have con
s e n t e d t o the f i l i n g o f t h i s b r i e f , and
l e t t e r s o f consent have been f i l e d with the
C l e r k .
3
Summary o f Argument
We r e s p e c t f u l l y submit t h a t n e i t h e r
the language nor the l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y
o f s e c t i o n 1 o f the C i v i l R i g h t s Ac t o f
1 8 7 1 , p r e s e n t l y c o d i f i e d as 42 U . S . C .
§ 1983, impose any requirement o f exhaus
t i o n o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s . The
l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y r e v e a l s that Congress
intended no such r e s t r i c t i o n on the broad
r i g h t t o br ing s e c t i o n 1983 a c t i o n s . Nor
can any such r e s t r i c t i o n be i m p l i e d in
l i g h t o f the f a c t t h a t any n o t i o n o f a
j u d i c i a l l y imposed exhaust ion requirement
d i d no t emerge u n t i l much l a t e r , in the
twent i eth century . Indeed, any exhaust ion
requirement would be i n c o n s i s t e n t with one
o f the c r i t i c a l f i n d i n g s o f the f o r t y -
s e c o n d C o n g r e s s t h a t s t a t e o f f i c i a l s
were un wi l l ing t o en fo r c e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
gu ar an t ee s .
4
T h is i s not t o say t h a t p o t e n t i a l
p l a i n t i f f s must o r w i l l i n e v i t a b l y sue
under s e c t i o n 1983. Rather , Congress has
prov ided an i n c e n t i v e f o r improvement o f
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and o the r remedies in the
s t a t e s by co n t in u in g t o make s e c t i o n 1983 a
r e a d y remedy w h i l e p e r m i t t i n g t h o s e ag
g r i e v e d t o u t i l i z e any s t a t e remedies which
they b e l i e v e t o be e f f i c a c i o u s .
ARGUMENT
Whether as a matter o f p o l i c y i t would
be wise t o r e q u i r e , as a p r e c o n d i t i o n o f
a c c e s s t o f e d e r a l c o u r t s , t h a t p e r s o n s
a l l e g i n g v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
r i g h t s , f i r s t exhaust any a v a i l a b l e s t a t e
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s , i s a c o m p l e x ,
s e n s i t i v e , and i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n . The
c our t o f appeal s below viewed t h i s case as
an ap pr o pr ia te v e h i c l e t o express i t s views
5
r e g a r d i n g f e d e r a l - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s , the
i d e a l a l l o c a t i o n o f j u d i c i a l r e s o u r c e s , and
the bes t manner in which the f e d e r a l c o u r t s
can e n c o u r a g e the s t a t e s t o s t r e n g t h e n
t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e d u r e s . We
b e l i e v e t h a t the F i f t h C i r c u i t m i s c o n
ce iv e d the nature o f the i ssue b e f o r e i t ,
and t h e r o l e o f t h e f e d e r a l c o u r t s i n
r e s o l v i n g i t .
The q u e s t i on presented by t h i s case i s
no t one o f j u d i c i a l p h i l o s o p h y , but o f
s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n . The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
o f the c ou r t s i s l i m i t e d to a s c e r t a i n i n g
the i n t e n t i o n o f the C o n g r e s s which met
some 110 y e a r s ago and f a s h i o n e d t h e
1871 C i v i l Rights Ac t . Those l e g i s l a t o r s
l i v e d in a t ime v e r y d i f f e r e n t f rom our
own. H a l f the c o u n t r y , s t i l l p r o s t r a t e
from an exhaust ing war, wavered between mob
r u le and t o t a l anarchy; the Klu Klux Klan,
6
t oday l i t t l e more than a d e p l o r a b l e r e l i c
o f pas t h a t r e d s , then fu nc t i o ned as v i r t u
a l l y a shadow government in many southern
s t a t e s . Far f rom b e i n g c o n c e r n e d about
o f f e n d i n g the s e n s i t i v i t i e s o f " s o v e r e i g n
s t a t e s , " the f o r t y - s e c o n d Congress pres ide d
over a m i l i t a r y o c cu p a t i o n o f those former
Confedera te S t a t e s , whose l ea der s i t o f t e n
l a b e l e d as t r a i t o r s . Whether the 1871
C i v i l Rights Act was w is e l y d r a f t e d when
adopted , o r ought to be amended in l i g h t o f
changing c o n d i t i o n s , are not q u es t i o n s t h i s
C our t need o r s h o u l d a d d r e s s . The s o l e
i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s Cour t i s whether the
f r a m e r s o f t h a t A c t i n t e n d e d t h a t i t s
r e m e d i e s o n l y be a v a i l a b l e t o t h o s e who
had f i r s t exhausted s t a t e a d m i n i s t ra t i v e
r e m ed ie s .
7
I . THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 1983
Because the qu e s t i on o f exhaust i on i s
one o f s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n , the language
o f the s t a t u t e i t s e l f i s o f c e n t r a l impor
tance . By i t s terms s e c t i o n 1983 c r e a t e s a
s p e c i e s o f t o r t l i a b i l i t y that admits o f no
p r e c o n d i t i o n s o r p r e r e q u i s i t e s . See Imbler
v . Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976 ) . I t s
language i s ab so lu t e and u n q u a l i f i e d ; no
mention i s made o f s t a t e or f e d e r a l admin
i s t r a t i v e r e m e d i e s , o f s t a t e j u d i c i a l
p r o c e e d i n g s , o r o f any o th er event which
must o c c u r b e t w e e n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
v i o l a t i o n and t h e commencement o f t h e
author i zed c i v i l a c t i o n . See Owen v . C i ty
o f Independence , 445 U.S. 622, 635 (1980 ) .
R a t h e r , t h e a c t i m p o s e s l i a b i l i t y on
" [ e ] v e r y p e r s o n " who under c o l o r o f law
s u b j e c t s " any p e r s o n " t o a " d e p r i v a t i o n o f
any r i g h t s , p r i v i l e g e s , o r i m m u n i t i e s
8
s e c u r e d by the C o n s t i t u t i o n and l a w s . "
Nothing on the fa ce o f the s t a t u t e sugges ts
that on ly persons who have exhausted s t a t e
r emed ies , r a t her than "any person" what
s o e v e r , can a v a i l themselves o f the p r o
t e c t i o n o f the s t a t u t e .
The e x i s t e n c e o f an e x h a u s t i o n r e
quirement i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with the type o f
d e f e n d a n t s s u b j e c t t o s u i t in a s e c t i o n
1 983 a c t i o n . Most o f the cases imposing
exhaust ion requirements invo lve d l i t i g a t i o n
aga ins t government agenc i es seeking reme
d i a l o rders aimed at those agenc i es them
s e l v e s . But s e c t i o n 1983 i s not so d i r e c t
ed. I t au th o r i z e s s u i t not j u s t or pr imar
i l y aga ins t government b o d i e s , but aga inst
any "person" who has v i o l a t e d f e d e r a l r i g h t s
under c o l o r o f s t a t e law. Sta tes can never1/
be named as de f end an ts , and l o c a l govern—
1/ Quern v . Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979 ) .
9
ments can on l y be sued under c e r t a i n nar -
2/
r o w l y d e f i n e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s . N a tu ra l
persons are the most common, and f r e q u e n t ly
the on ly de fendants in s e c t i o n 1983 c a s e s .
E x h a u s t i o n i s a r u l e about when a
pa r ty suing a s t a t e or f e d e r a l agency must
u t i l i z e remedies prov ided by that defendant
a g e n c y t o c o r r e c t i t s own e r r o r s . An
e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t c o u l d i n t e l l i g i
b l y , a l though mis taken ly in our v i ew , be
ap p l i e d in a p o l i c e b r u t a l i t y s u i t aga ins t
a c i t y . But i f such a s u i t , as Congress
c l e a r l y c o n t e m p l a t e d most s e c t i o n 1983
s u i t s would be, were against an i n d iv i d u a l
p o l i c e o f f i c e r , exhaust i on i s an anomalous
c o n c e p t . The ac tua l defendant pol iceman
s imply has no "a d m in i s t r a t iv e remedies" t o
2 / Monell v . New York C i ty Department o f
S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658, 690 -6 95
(1978 ) .
o f f e r . The C i t y i s not a named de f endant ,
and i f , as a l l e g e d , the conduct complained
o f i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h e c o n d u c t
i s "wi thout the a u t h o r i t y o f , and does not
a f f e c t t h e [ c i t y ] i n i t s s o v e r e i g n o r
governmental c a p a c i t y . " Ex parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908 ) . A c i t y o r s t a t e ,
o f c o u r s e , may choose t o c re a te an adminis
t r a t i v e remedy f o r i n j u r i e s caused by i t s
employees a c t in g in excess o f t h e i r author
i t y , j u s t as i t may prov ide a s s i s t a n c e f o r
v i c t i m s o f harms c o m m i t t e d by p r i v a t e
w r o n g d o e r s , s u c h as c o m p e n s a t i o n f o r
v i c t i m s o f c r imes . The p e r p e t r a t o r o f such
a p r i v a t e c r i m e c o u l d n o t c o n c e i v a b l y
immunize h i m s e l f f rom s u i t by demanding
t h a t h i s v i c t i m " e x h a u s t " s u c h t h i r d
p a r t y remed ies . The p o s i t i o n o f a wrong
doer who happens t o be a p u b l i c o f f i c i a l i s
not s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t . I t i s u n l i k e
l y in the extreme that Congress intended,
where a s u i t was br oug ht a g a i n s t bo t h a
c i t y and i t s o f f i c i a l s , t h a t the a c t i o n
c o u l d p r o c e e d a g a i n s t the o f f i c i a l but
would have t o be stayed pending exhaust ion
as to the c i t y i t s e l f . I t i s on ly margin
a l l y l e s s u n l i k e l y that Congress intended
t o impose an e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t in
t h e m i n o r i t y o f c a s e s in w h i c h o n l y a
government agency was named as a defendant .
The debates l eading t o the passage o f
s e c t i o n 1 o f the C i v i l Rights Act o f 1871,
the f o rerunner o f s e c t i o n 1983, support a
l i t e r a l r e a d i n g o f t h i s b road and u n r e
s t r i c t e d language. Representa t ive S h e l l a -
ba rger , the author and manager o f the b i l l
in the House , e x p l a i n e d how the c o u r t s
should i n t e r p r e t the Act :
T h i s Act i s r e m e d i a l , and in a i d o f
the p r e s e r v a t i o n o f human l i b e r t y and
human r i g h t s . A l l s t a t u t e s and
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s au thor i z ing
12
s u c h s t a t u t e s a r e l i b e r a l l y and
b e n e f i c e n t l y c ons t ru ed .
. . . . As has been again and again
d e c i d e d by o u r own Supreme C o u r t
o f the United S t a t e s , and everywhere
e l s e where t h e r e i s w i s e j u d i c i a l
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the l a r g e s t l a t i t u d e
c o n s i s t e n t with the words employed i s
u n i f o r m l y g i v e n in c o n s t r u i n g such
s t a t u t e s and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s
as are meant t o p r o t e c t and defend and
g iv e remedies f o r t h e i r wrongs t o a l l
the p e o p l e . 3/
See a l s o Monel l v . New York C i t y Department
o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658, 683-87
(1978 ) .
The adopt i on o f an exhaust i on r e q u i r e
ment, f o r whatever reasons , would n e c e s s a r
i l y e s t a b l i s h a b a r r i e r , sometimes tempo
r a r y , on o c c a s i o n perhaps permanent, t o r e
l i e f in the f e d e r a l c o u r t s . At the l e a s t
an aggr i eved par ty would f i nd t h a t , u n t i l
e x h a u s t i o n was c o m p l e t e d , the n a t i o n a l
c o u r t s were c l o s e d t o him; i f a l l s t a t e
3/ Cong. G l o b e , 42nd C o n g . , 1s t S e s s .
App. 68 (1871 ) .
- 13 -
r e m e d i e s were not s o u g h t , a c c e s s t o the
f e d e r a l c ou r t s might be prec luded f o r e v e r .
Nothing could have been fu r t he r from the
contemplat i on o f the framers o f the 1871
A c t . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Lowe i n s i s t e d t h a t
t h e A c t " t h r o w s o p e n t h e d o o r s o f t h e
United S ta te s c o u r t s t o those whose r i g h t s
u n d e r t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a r e d e n i e d o r
4 /
i m p a i r e d . " Congressman Coburn u r g e d :
Obv ious ly the cour t o f j u s t i c e i s the
f i r s t instrument t o be used in aid o f
t h e f o u r t e e n t h amendment ; s a f e r ,
m i l d er , sur er , more in accordance with
r e a s o n , w i th our s ys tem , and wi th
p u b l i c s e n t i m e n t . Whenever , t h e n ,
there i s a den ia l o f equal p r o t e c t i o n
by the S t a t e , the c o u r t s o f j u s t i c e
o f the nat i on stand with open do or s ,
. . . Here may come the weak and poor
and dow ntrodden with a s s u r a n c e t h a t
they s h a l l be heard. 5 /
Even those who opposed o ther as pe c t s o f the
4 / Cong. G l o b e , 42nd C o n g . , 1s t S e s s .
376.
5 / Id. 459.
1 4
Act agreed that the f e d e r a l c o ur t s should
be a v a i l a b l e whenever a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
v i o l a t i o n were t h r e a t e n e d . I f a s t a t e
p a s s e d laws c o n t r a v e n i n g the F o u r t e e n t h
Amendment, R e p r e s e n t a t i v e S l a t e r empha
s i z e d ,
Such laws would be s i m p l e n u l l i t i e s
. . . and e v e r y o f f i c e r o f the s t a t e ,
f rom a j u s t i c e o f the p e a c e t o the
supreme judge , from a c o n s ta b le t o the
Ex ec ut ive , under t h e i r oath to support
the C o n s t i t u t i o n o f the United S t a t e s ,
would be bound t o d i s r e ga rd them. I f ,
h o w e v e r , t h e i r e n f o r c e m e n t were
attempted, the c i t i z e n i s not without
means o f p r o t e c t i o n . The F e d e r a l
c o u r t s , a lways open wi th w r i t s o f
habeas c o r p u s , w r i t s o f r e s t r a i n t , and
i n j u n c t i o n s , and o t h e r r e m e d i a l
a g e n c i e s , can at a l l t im es r e n d e r
e f f i c i e n t and ample s e c u r i t y aga inst
a c t u a l o r t h r e a t e n e d d i s r e g a r d o f
these guarantees . 6 /
That the doors o f the f e d e r a l c o ur t s should
now be c l o s e d t o p e t i t i o n e r , as the c o ur t s
below urged, would be square ly c on t ra ry to
the o r i g i n a l in te n t o f Congress .
6 / Id . App. 305 (emphasis added) .
1 5
I I . THE ORIGINS OF THE 'JUDICIAL REQUIRE-
MENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION
The b r oa d la n g u a g e o f s e c t i o n 1983,
combined with the expansive c o n s t r u c t i o n o f
i t c l e a r l y c o n t e m p l a t e d by i t s f r a m e r s ,
would o r d i n a r i l y be s u f f i c i e n t t o d e f e a t
any c laim that r e l i e f aga inst a p a r t i c u l a r
p a r t y c o u l d be d e l a y e d o r d e n i e d . T h i s
Court has o n l y re cogn ized as l i m i t a t i o n s
t o s e c t i o n 1983 a c t i o n s ru le s " so f i r m ly
ro o ted in the common lav? . . . that ’ Congress
would have s p e c i f i c a l l y so prov ided had i t
wished t o a b o l i s h the d o c t r i n e . ’ " Owens v .
C i ty o f Independence , 445 U.S. 662 (1980 ) .
Thus in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1 95 1 ) , t h i s Court concluded that l e g i s l a
t i v e i m m u n i t y was in 1871 s u c h a l o n g
e s t a b l i s h e d d o c t r i n e , not ing that i t had
been at the c e n t e r o f the P a r l i a m e n t a r y
s t r u g g l e s o f the s i x t e e n t h and seventeenth
c e n t u r i e s , and was e x p r e s s l y in co r p or a t ed
in the Engl ish B i l l o f R ig h ts , the A r t i c l e s
o f C o n f e d e r a t i o n , the C o n s t i t u t i o n , and at
l e a s t e i g h t 18th century s t a t e c o n s t i t u
t i o n s o r b i l l s o f r i g h t s . 341 U.S. 372-75.
In M o n e l l bo t h the m a j o r i t y and the
d i s s e n t e r s agreed that the s t a t e o f the law
in 1871 regard ing munic ipa l immunity was o f
c o n t r o l l i n g i m p o r t a n c e in d e t e r m i n i n g
whether c i t i e s could be sued under s e c t i o n
1983. The m a jo r i t y r e j e c t e d any ab s o l u t e
munic ipa l immunity because "by 1871, . . .
muni c ipa l c o r p o r a t i o n s were r o u t i n e l y sued
in the f e d e r a l c o u r t s and t h i s f a c t was
w e l l known to the Members o f Co ngress , " 436
U.S. at 588. ' J u s t i c e Rehnquist argued, t o
the c o n t r a r y , that at that time "no s t a t e
c o ur t had ever he ld that munic ipa l c o r p o r a
t i o n s were always l i a b l e in t o r t in p r e
c i s e l y the same manner as o ther p e r s o n s . "
17
436 U.S. at 721. S i m i l a r l y , in Owens v .
C i ty o f Independence , 445 U.S. 622 (1980 ) ,
a l l members o f the Cour t r e g a r d e d t h i s
h i s t o r i c a l i s sue as c r i t i c a l . The m a jo r i t y
c onc luded that the broad language o f the
s t a t u t e c o u l d no t be r e s t r i c t e d by good
f a i t h i m m u n i t y f o r l o c a l g o v e r n m e n t s
b e c a u s e in the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y " t h e
c o u r t s had r e j e c t e d the p r o p o s i t i o n that a
m u n i c i p a l i t y should be p r i v i l e g e d where i t
r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e d i t s a c t i o n s t o be
l a w f u l . " 445 U.S. at 641. ' Ju s t i c e Powel l
and three o ther members o f the Court d i s
s e n t e d on the ground t h a t the m a j o r i t y
o p i n io n "runs counter t o the common law in
the 19th cent ury , which re co gn iz e d substan
t i a l t o r t immunity f o r munic ipal a c t i o n s . "
445 U.S. at 676.
I f the r i g h t o f p e t i t i o n e r in t h i s
case t o maintain an a c t i o n in f e d e r a l c our t
18
i s t o be d e l a y e d o r d e n i e d , d e s p i t e the
l i t e r a l language o f s e c t i o n 1983, i t must
be because the p r i n c i p l e o f a j u d i c i a l l y
imposed a d m i n i s t r a t i v e exhaust i on r u l e was
so f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d in 1871 that Congress
was w e l l aware o f i t , knew that the c o u r t s
would apply i t un les s o t herwise d i r e c t e d ,
and would have e x p r e s s l y d i s a p p r o v e d o f
that j u d i c i a l p r a c t i c e had i t not wanted i t
a p p l i e d . For tun ate ly here , un l ike Monell
and Owens, the i s s ue i s c l e a r beyond p e r -
adventure . This exhaust i on d o c t r i n e was
t o t a l l y unheard o f in 1871.
S ch o la rs g e n e r a l l y agree that the idea
o f a j u d i c i a l l y imposed a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t has i t s r o o t s in
P r e n t i s v . A t l a n t i c C oas t L ine C o . , 211
1/
U.S. 210 ( 1 908) . in that case the r a i l -
7 / Comment, Exhaustion o f Adm in i s t r a t ive
Remedies, 39 C or ne l l L. Q. 273, 277 (1939)
1 9
road c h a l l e n g in g c e r t a i n proposed r a t e s as
c o n f i s c a t o r y had f a i l e d t o appeal them t o
the V i r g i n i a Supreme Cour t o f A p p e a l s ,
which reviewed such r a t e s in a l e g i s l a t i v e
c a p a c i t y . Mr. ’J u s t i c e Holmes, emphasizing
that " [n]o new ev idence and no g reat a d d i
t i o n a l e x p e n s e " would be i n v o l v e d , h e l d
that the r a i l r o a d had sued t oo soon, and
2 / cont inued
( " P r e n t i s v . A t l a n t i c Coast Line Co. , i s
t h e r e a l b e g i n n i n g o f t h e e x h a u s t i o n
r u l e . " ) ? L i l i e n t h a l , The F e d e r a l C o u r t s
and Sta te Regula t i on o f P u b l i c U t i l i t i e s ,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 379 , 385 (1930 ) ( "The
d o c t r i n e had i t s beginning in P ren t i s v .
A t l a n t i c Coast Line Co. , " ) ; Note, 51 Harv.
L. Rev. 1251, 1261 ( 1 9 3 8 ) ( " T h i s p r i n c i p l e
was e s t a b l i s h e d in the case o f P ren t i s v .
A t l a n t i c Coast Line Co. " ) . A l p e r t , S u i t s
Agains t Admin i s t r a t ive Agenc ies under N . I .
R. A . and A . A . A . , 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 393,
395 (1935 ) . P r o f e s s o r Berger argues that
t h e d o c t r i n e o r i g i n a t e d in t h i s C o u r t
in a d e c i s i o n four years b e f o re P r e n t i s ,
United S ta tes v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161
(1904 ) . R. Berger , Exhaustion o f Adminis
t r a t i v e Remedies, 48 Yale L. J. 981 , 9 81 —
82 (1938 ) .
20
d i r e c t e d i t t o pu rsu e t h a t a p p e a l . 211
U.S. at 230. But the Court d id not pretend
i t was apply ing any h i t h e r t o heard o f r u l e .
The m a j o r i t y o p i n io n re p e a t e d l y disavowed
any attempt to f ormula te a "g enera l r u l e "
o r "g enera l p r i n c i p l e s , " 211 U.S. at 229;
i t c i t e d no a u t h o r i t y f o r i t s d e c i s i o n , and
in d i c a t e d that the defendant had not ra i se d
the argument on which the d e c i s i o n was
based. I d .
The p o s s i b i l i t y that exhaust ion was a
requirement o f gen era l a p p l i c a t i o n emerged
on ly s l o w l y . The e a r l y attempts t o invoke
P r e n t i s as a de f ense sought t o r e qu i r e ex
h a u s t i o n o f j u d i c i a l r e m e d i e s , and were
8/
s o u n d l y r e j e c t e d . in 1921 the Supreme
C o u r t u n a n i m o u s l y r e v e r s e d a c o u r t o f
8 / Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co. ,
262 U.S. 43, 48 (1923 ) ; Bacon v. Rutland
R a i l r o a d C o . , 232 U.S 134, 137 ( 1 9 1 4 ) .
21
appeals d e c i s i o n that a consumer aggr i eved
by f e d e r a l agency a c t i o n in c r ea s in g u t i l i t y
r a t e s had t o f i l e a formal c omplaint and
9 /
se ek a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h a t d e c i s i o n .
In Goldsmith v . United Sta tes Board o f Tax
A p p e a l s , 270 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1926 ) , the
Cour t h e l d t h a t the p l a i n t i f f c o u l d no t
complain o f a c t i o n taken by the Board u n t i l
he had sought a hearing b e f o r e i t on the
d i s p u t e in q u e s t i o n , b u t t h i s was an
argument the d e f e n d a n t i t s e l f had never
1 0/
made. Not u n t i l 1929 do t h i s C o u r t ' s
d e c i s i o n s r e f e r t o a " d o c t r i n e " approved in
JM/
P r e n t i s . The term " e x h a u s t " appe ar s
9 / H o l l i s v. Kutz, 255 U.S. 452, 453-54
T 1 9 2 1 ) .
10/ B r i e f on Behal f o f Defendant in Error ,
No. 320 , O c t o b e r Term 1 925 , pp . 3, 23.
11/ G i l c h r i s t v . Interborough Rapid Tran-
s i t C o . , 279 U.S 159, 208 (1929) .
22
on ly i n t e r m i t t e n t l y in those e a r l y ye a rs .
Only in Myers v . Beth lehem S h i p b u i l d i n g
Corp . , 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 ( 1 938) , some 57
y e a r s a f t e r t h e e n a c t m e n t o f s e c t i o n
1 983 , i s the e x i s t e n c e o f a j u d i c i a l l y
imposed exhaust ion requirement s u f f i c i e n t l y
c l e a r t h a t any i n f e r e n c e about C o n g r e s
s i o n a l i n te n t c ould even arguably be drawn
from Congre ss i on a l s i l e n c e .
The absence o f any j u d i c i a l exhaust i on
requirement u n t i l l ong a f t e r the enactment
o f s e c t i o n 1983 i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important
because the 42nd Congress was w e l l aware o f
t h e volume o f l i t i g a t i o n in th e f e d e r a l
c o u r t s aga in s t l o c a l governments. Monell
v . New York C i ty Department o f S o c i a l S e r -
12/
12/ Po r ter v. I n v e s t o r s S y n d i c a t e , 286 U.S
461 , 468 ( 1 9 3 2 ) ; F i r s t N a t i o n a l Bank o f
Gree ley v. Board o f County Commissioners o f
County o f Weld, 264 U.S 450, 453 (1924 ) .
23
v i c e s , 436 U.S. 658, 673, n.28 (1978 ) ; Owen
v . C i t y o f I n d e p e n d e n c e , 445 U.S . 622,
64 2 -4 3 ( 1 9 8 0 ) . Only where f e d e r a l law
e x p r e s s l y r e qu i red exhaust ion as a p r ec o n
d i t i o n o f s u i t d id the c ou r t s impose such a
requi rement . N i c h o l l v . United S t a t e s , 7
Wal l . (74 U.S. ) 122, 130-31 (1869 ) .
W h e n e v e r d u r i n g t h e 19 th c e n t u r y
C o n g r e s s w i shed t o impose an e x h a u s t i o n
r e q u i r e m e n t , i t d i d s o e x p r e s s l y and
u n e q u i v o c a l l y . In 1857 Congress author i zed
importers who paid d u t i e s under p r o t e s t t o
sue f o r a r e f u n d p r o v i d e d t h e y f i r s t
I V
appealed t o the C o l l e c t o r o f Customs. j n
13/ "On the ent ry o f any goods , wares
and merchandise imported on and a f t e r
the f i r s t day o f 'July a f o r e s a i d , the
d e c i s i o n o f t h e c o l l e c t o r o f t h e
customs at the por t o f impor ta t ion and
e n t r y , as t o t h e i r l i a b i l i t y t o duty
o r e x e m p t i o n t h e r e f o r m s h a l l be
f i n a l and c o n c l u s i v e a g a i n s t t h e
owner, importer , c ons ign ee , or agent
o f any such goods , wares, and merchan-
24
1866 Congress gave aggr i eved taxpayers the
r i g h t t o sue the Commissioner o f I n t e rn a l
Revenue f o r taxes e r ro n e o u s ly o r i l l e g a l l y
a s s e s s e d , but on ly i f an "appeal s h a l l have
1 1 /
been d u l y made t o the c o m m i s s i o n e r . "
13/ cont inued
d i s e ; u n l e s s the owner , i m p o r t e r ,
c o ns ignee or agent s h a l l , w i th in ten
days a f t e r such e n t r y , g i v e n o t i c e to
t h e c o l l e c t o r , i n w r i t i n g o f h i s
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i th such d e c i s i o n ,
s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e r e in d i s t i n c t l y and
s p e c i f i c a l l y h i s grounds o f o b j e c t i o n
h e r e t o , and s h a l l , w i th in t h i r t y days
a f t e r t h e d a t e o f s u c h d e c i s i o n ,
appeal there from t o the s e c r e t a r y o f
the t r e a s u r y , whose d e c i s i o n on such
appeal s h a l l be f i n a l and c o n c l u s i v e ;
and the sa id goods , wares and merchan
d i s e s h a l l be l i a b l e t o d u t y o r
exempted t h e r e f r o m a c c o r d i n g l y , any
a c t o f C o n g r e s s t o t h e c o n t r a r y
no twi t hs t an d in g ; un less s u i t s h a l l be
brought w i t h i n t h i r t y days a f t e r such
d e c i s i o n f o r any d u t i e s t h a t may
have been pa id , o r may t h e r e a f t e r be
pa id , on said goods , or w i t h i n t h i r t y
days a f t e r the d u t i e s s h a l l have been
paid in cases where such goods s h a l l
be in bond. " 11 S t a t . 195.
14/ "No s u i t s h a l l be maintained in
any c our t f o r the re co ve r y o f any tax
25
The f o r t y - s e c o n d C o n g r e s s , which framed
s e c t i o n 1983, a l s o gave merchant seamen a
cause o f a c t i o n f o r a pe n a l t y o f up t o one
hundred d o l l a r s aga ins t any ships master
who f a i l e d t o pro v id e adequate water and
p r o v i s i o n s , but the pe na l t y cou ld not be
sought u n t i l the seamen had complained t o a
navy o f f i c e r or an American consu lar o f f i -
14/ c ont inued
a l l e g e d t o have been e r r o n e o u s l y o r
i l l e g a l l y assessed or c o l l e c t e d , u n t i l
a p p e a l s h a l l have been d u l y made t o
the commissioner o f i n te r n a l revenue,
a c co rd ing t o the p r o v i s i o n s o f law in
t h a t r e g a r d , and t h e r e g u l a t i o n s o f
the s e c r e t a r y o f the t rea sur y e s t a b
l i s h e d in p u rs u an c e t h e r e o f , and a
d e c i s i o n o f said commissioner s h a l l be
had thereon , un less such s u i t s h a l l be
b r o u g h t w i t h i n s i x months f rom the
t i m e o f s a i d d e c i s i o n , o r w i t h i n
s i x months f rom the t ime t h i s a c t
takes e f f e c t : P r o v id e d , That i f said
d e c i s i o n s h a l l be d e l a y e d more than
s i x m ont hs f r o m t h e d a t e o f su c h
appeal , then said s u i t may be brought
at any time wi th in twelve months from
the date o f such a p p e a l . " 14 S t a t . 152.
26
c i a l . 17 S t a t . 269, No such exhaust ion
requi rement , on the o ther hand was imposed
as a p r e c o n d i t i o n o f s u i t s in the Court o f
1 5/C l a i m s . T h i s l e g i s l a t i o n makes c l e a r
that the Congress which enacted the 1871
C i v i l R i g h t s A c t knew how t o w r i t e an
exhaust ion requirement i n t o a s ta tu te and
did so whenever i t wanted t o r e qu i r e the
u t i l i z a t i o n o f a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e m e d ie s
p r i o r t o s u i t . I t s r e f u s a l t o p l a c e such a
requirement in to s e c t i o n 1 983 can on ly be
understood as a d e l i b e r a t e d e c i s i o n not t o
i m p o s e any s u c h r e q u i r e m e n t on t h o s e
s e e k i n g r e l i e f a g a i n s t s t a t e o f f i c i a l s
v i o l a t i n g f e d e r a l r i g h t s .
Had C o n g r e s s i n t e n d e d t o impose any
e x h a u s t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t , i t i s f a r more
l i k e l y that i t would have been concerned
15/ 10 S t a t . 612.
27
with exhaust ion o f s ta te j u d i c i a l remedies
than s t a t e ad m i n i s t ra t i ve remedies . The
v i o l a t i o n s o f f e d e r a l r i g h t s about which
C o n g r e s s was c o n c e r n e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y
v i o l e n c e d i r e c t e d a t b l a c k s , f e d e r a l
o f f i c i a l s and un ion s y m p a t h i z e r s , were ,
then as now, r e dressed by j u d i c i a l a c t i o n .
In the n ineteenth century ad m i n i s t ra t i ve
remedies were so un tr i ed and even uncommon
that i t i s f a r more probab le that Congress
would have e x p e c t e d any r e d r e s s t o come
from the c o u r t s . The s ta te c ou r t s were at
l e a s t marg ina l l y more l i k e l y t o be indepen
dent o f l o c a l p o l i t i c s and pa ss i ons than
would e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s dependent on popu
l a r support f o r c o nt in u at i o n in o f f i c e . A l
though s t a t e j u d g e s might be o b l i g a t e d
by the Supremacy C la us e t o e n f o r c e the
C o n s t i t u t i o n , the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d o c t r i n e
which re igned in 1871 was that the f e d e r a l
g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d n o t i m p o s e on s t a t e
28
e x e c u t i v e o f f i c i a l s any o b l i g a t i o n s t o
implement f e d e r a l law. Monel l v. New York
C i t y Department o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436
U.S. 658, 676-79 (1978) ( d i s c u s s i n g Prigg
v. P en n s ly van ia , 16 Pet . 539 (1 84 2 ) , and
Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 ( 1 8 6 1 ) ) .
The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f s e c t i o n
1983, however, makes c l e a r that j u d i c i a l
e x h a u s t i o n was no t t o be r e q u i r e d . The
opponents o f the 1871 Act we l l understood
that i t c onta ined no requirement o f j u d i
c i a l e x h a u s t i o n , and o b j e c t e d t o i t on
p r e c i s e l y t h a t g r o u n d . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e
Storm complained that s e c t i o n 1
does not even g iv e the Sta te c o u r t s a
chan ce t o t r y q u e s t i o n s , o r t o show
wh eth er t h e y w i l l t r y the q u e s t i o n s
that might come b e f o r e them under the
f i r s t s e c t i o n o f t h e f o u r t e e n t h
amendment, f a i r l y o r n o t . I t t a k e s
the whole qu e s t i o n away from them in
the beg inn ing .
Now these q u e s t i o n s could a l l be
t r i e d , I take i t , in the S ta te c o u r t s ,
and by a w r i t o f e r r o r . . . c o u l d be
29
brought b e f o re the Supreme Court f o r
r e v i e w . . . . But the f i r s t s e c t i o n does
no t a l l o w t h a t r i g h t . I t t a k e s the
w h o l e q u e s t i o n away a t o n c e and
f o r e v e r . . . 16/
S e n a t o r Thurman o p p o s e d t h a t s e c t i o n
because o f the c e n t r a l i z i n g tendency
o f t r a n s f e r r i n g a l l mere p r i v a t e
s u i t s , as w e l l as p u n i s h m e n t o f
o f f e n s e s , f rom the S t a t e i n t o the
F e d e r a l c o u r t s . I do no t say t h a t
t h i s s e c t i o n g i v e s t o the F e d e r a l
c ou r t s e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n . I do
not suppose that i t i s so unders toood .
I t l e a v e s i t , I p r e s u m e , i n t h e
o p t i o n t o the p e r s o n who imag ines
h i m s e l f t o be i n j u r e d t o sue in
the S t a t e c o u r t o r in the F e d e r a l
c o u r t , an o p t i o n t h a t he who has
been l e a s t in ju r ed , but who has some
m a l i c e t o g r a t i f y , w i l l be the most
l i k e l y t o a v a i l h i m s e l f o f . 1 7 /
The i n c l u s i o n o f t h i s o b j e c t i o n in Thur-
man ' s "parade o f h o r r i b l e s " i s p r e c i s e l y
the s o r t o f e v i d e n c e as t o the meaning
o f the a c t which Mr. J u s t i c e R e hn qu is t
1 6/ Cong. G l o b e , 42nd C o n g . , 1s t S e s s .
App. 86.
17/ Id. App. 216.
30
t h o u g h t c r i t i c a l in M o n e l l v . New York
C i t y Department o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436
U.S. 658, 722 (1978 ) .
I I I . THE PURPOSE OF EXHAUSTION AND THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 1983
A l t h o u g h the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s o f f e r e d
f o r the exhaust ion r u le are numerous, many
are o b v i o u s l y i n a p p l i c a b l e here . The most
common a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e e x h a u s t i o n
r e q u i r e m e n t i s where a p l a i n t i f f s ee k s
r e v i e w by t h e c o u r t s o f a c t i o n by a
f e d e r a l ag enc y c h ar ge d by s t a t u t e w i th
i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e s t a t u t e on w h i c h t h e
p l a i n t i f f r e l i e s . See Myers v. Bethlehem
S h i p b u i l d i n g C o r p . , 303 U.S . 41 ( 1 9 3 8 ) .
The c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f e x p e r t i s e and s t a t u
t o r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y r e l e v a n t t o such a case
c l e a r l y have no p l a c e here . The 1871 C i v i l
R i g h t s A c t d i d n o t e s t a b l i s h any s t a t e
a g e n c i e s t o e n f o r c e t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ;
n e i t h e r did i t d i r e c t or au thor i ze s ta te
31
o f f i c i a l s t o pr ov i de any a d m i n i s t ra t i v e or
j u d i c i a l r e m e d i e s f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
v i o l a t i o n s . N o t h i n g in t h e l a n g u a g e
o f the s t a t u t e contemplates that the s t a t e s
are t o p l a y any r o l e in r e d r e ss i n g v i o l a
t i o n s o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n .
I f e x h a u s t i o n i s t o be r e q u i r e d i t
must be f o r reasons o ther than implementing
o r r e s p e c t i n g a c o n g r e s s i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e scheme. E x h a u s t i o n in a
case such as t h i s could p l a u s i b l y be urged
t o se rve one o f two purposes . F i r s t , i f an
aggr i eved p a r t y were t o o b t a i n in the s ta te
ad m i n i s t ra t i v e proceeding the r e l i e f that
would o t herwise be sought in f e d e r a l c o u r t ,
the work o f those cour t s would be reduced.
S e c o n d , i f t h e v i c t i m ' s i n j u r i e s a r e
re dressed by the s ta te i t s e l f , some p o t e n
t i a l f o r f e d e r a l - s t a t e c o n f l i c t might be
avo ided . We do not suggest that e i t h e r o f
these j u s t i f i c a t i o n s are pe r s u a s i v e , but
32
o n l y t h a t i t must be on a b a s i s such as
t h i s t h a t e x h a u s t i o n i s g r o u n d e d . See
McKart v . U n i t ed S t a t e s , 395 U.S . 185,
193-95 (1969 ) .
A l l the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s that might be
advanced in t h i s o r any o t h e r c a s e f o r
r e q u i r i n g a d m i n i s t r a t i v e exhaust ion r e s t on
one a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l assumption — that
the agency whose pr oc edures must be pursued
w i l l make a s e r i o u s and good f a i t h e f f o r t
t o c o n s id e r the p l a i n t i f f ' s c la ims and t o
implement the same r u l e s that the p l a i n t i f f
s e e k s t o e n f o r c e in c o u r t . Abse nt t h a t
assumption, there i s no reason whatever t o
b e l i e v e that any o f the purposes o f exhaus
t i o n w i l l be se rved . I f the agency i s not
a c t in g in good f a i t h , no p o s s i b l e r e l i e f
can come o f the agency p r o c e e d i n g s , and the
f e d e r a l c o u r t s in u l t i m a t e l y g r a n t i n g
r e l i e f w i l l h a v e t o d i s a p p r o v e o f t h e
agency proce ed in g as w e l l as the i n i t i a l
33
v i o l a t i o n . More s e r i o u s l y , an a g e n c y
pr oc eed in g in bad f a i t h could manipulate an
exhaust ion requirement to s e v e r e l y aggra
vate the v i o l a t i o n that has a l ready o c c u r
red . Rather than "b u i ld i n g a r e c o r d , " the
pr oc ee d in g could be used as an o pp or tu n i t y
t o conduct p r e - t r i a l d i s c o v e r y and then r e
shape the a g e nc y ' s de f ense . The r e s o l u t i o n
o f the underly ing c laim could be de layed in
the hope o f e x h a u s t i n g the p l a i n t i f f ' s
r e s o u r c e s o r h i s or her p a t i e n c e .
We do no t c o nt en d t h a t t h i s c r u c i a l
assumption o f agency good f a i t h and minimal
c o m p e te n c e i s m is t ak en as t o a l l s t a t e
a g e n c i e s , o r u n j u s t i f i e d on the f a c t s o f
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case . Rather, we urge that
t h i s ass um pt io n i s t o t a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t
with the f i n d i n g s and c on c lu s i o n s which led
Congress t o adopt the 1871 C i v i l Rights Ac t .
The f o r t y - s e c o n d Congress , we contend, be
l i e v e d that s ta te o f f i c i a l s were c e r t a i n l y
- 34
u n a b l e , and in most c a s e s u n w i l l i n g , t o
comply with or e n f o r c e the United S ta tes
C o n s t i t u t i o n . In l i g h t o f that f i n d i n g ,
which l i e s at the heart o f the 1871 A c t , we
submi t t h a t C o n g r e s s c an n o t c o n c e i v a b l y
have intended t o r e q u i r e aggr i eved p a r t i e s ,
p r i o r t o o b t a i n i n g a c c e s s t o f e d e r a l
c o u r t s , t o s e e k r e d r e s s f r o m t h e v e r y
s t a t e o f f i c i a l s whom C o n g r e s s c o n c l u d e d
would deny i t .
One c r i t i c a l purpose o f the 1871 Act
was " t o p r o v id e a f e d e r a l remedy where the
s t a t e remedy, though adequate in t he o r y ,
was not a v a i l a b l e in p r a c t i c e . " Monroe v .
Pape, 365 U.S 1 67, 1 74 (1 961) . Congressman
Stoughton as se r te d
The w h o l e S o u t h , Mr. S p e a k e r , i s
r a p i d l y d r i f t i n g i n t o a s t a t e o f
anarchy and b l oodshed , which renders
the w o r s t Government on the f a c e o f
t h e e a r t h r e s p e c t a b l e by way o f
comparison. There i s no s e c u r i t y f o r
l i f e , person or p r o p e r t y . The S ta te
a u t h o r i t i e s and l o c a l c o u r t s are un
35
a b l e o r u n w i l l i n g t o c h e c k t h e
e v i l o r p u n i s h the c r i m i n a l s . 18/
Re pr e se nt a t iv e Perry exc la imed :
Where t h e s e gangs o f a s s a s s i n s
show t h e m s e l v e s , t h e r e s t o f t h e
peop le l ook on, i f not with sympathy,
a t l e a s t w i t h f o r e b e a r a n c e . The
b o a s t e d c o u r a g e o f the South i s not
courage in t h e i r p r es en c e . S h e r i f f s ,
having eyes to see , see not ; judg es ,
ha v in g e a r s t o h e a r , hear n o t ; w i t
n e s s e s c o n c e a l the t r u t h o r f a l s i f y
i t ; grand j u r i e s act as i f they might
be a c c o m p l i c e s . In the p r e s e n c e o f
t h e s e gangs a l l the a p p a r a t u s and
machinery o f c i v i l government, a l l the
p r o c e s s e s o f j u s t i c e , skulk away as i f
government and j u s t i c e were cr imes and
f e a r e d d e t e c t i o n . Among the most
dangerous things an in jured par ty can
do i s t o appeal f o r j u s t i c e . Of the
u n c o u n t e d s c o r e s and h u n d r e d s o f
a t r o c i o u s m u t i l a t i o n s and murders i t
i s c r e d i b l y s t a t e d t h a t no t one has
been punished. 19/
Senator Pool argued that the s t a t e " c o u r t s
have been t r i e d , and the e xe c u t iv e arm has
18/ Cong. G l o b e , 42nd C o n g . , 1 s t S e s s .
321 .
19/ Id. App. 78.
- 36
b e e n t r i e d , and b o t h h a ve f a i l e d . "
R ep r es e nt a t iv e Snyder noted that
m u l t i p l i e d hundreds o f l o y a l p e o p l e ,
b o t h m a le and f e m a l e , h a ve b e e n
whipped, s courged , l a c e r a t e d , e x i l e d ,
r o b b e d , and m u r d e r e d , b y t h e s e
demonish Klans. . . . Anarchy and v i o
l e n c e are supreme and the a d h e r e n t s
o f the Government are u t t e r l y unpro
t e c t e d . They appeal in vain t o S ta te
a u t h o r i t y , and a r e now b e f o r e us
as hu mb le s u p p l i a n t s f o r f e d e r a l
p r o t e c t i o n . 21/
Senator Morton argued
But i t i s sa id these crimes should be
p u n i s h e d by the S t a t e s ; t h a t the y
are a l ready o f f e n s e s aga inst the laws
o f the S t a t e s , and the matter should
be l e f t with the S t a t e s . The answer
t o t h a t i s , t h a t the S t a t e s do not
punish them; the S ta tes do not p r o t e c t
the r i g h t s o f the p e o p l e ; th e S t a t e
c o u r t s are power less t o r e dr e ss these
wrongs. The gr ea t f a c t remains that
l a r g e c l a s s e s o f p e o p l e , numbering
n e a r l y one h a l f in some S t a t e s , are
wi thout l e g a l remedy in the c o u r t s o f
t h e S t a t e s . S h o u l d t h i s f a c t be
over l ook ed f o r the sake o f a theory?
Sha l l i t be said with any reason that
20/
20 / Id. App. 1 70
1 1 / I d . App. 1 99
37
i t i s p r oper t o l eave the punishment
o f these crimes t o the S t a te s when i t
i s a n o t o r i o u s f a c t that the S t a te s do
not punish them. 22/
Senator Osborn exp l a ine d :
I f the S ta te c ou r t s had proven them
s e l v e s c o m p e t e n t t o s u p p r e s s t h e
l o c a l d i s o r d e r s , o r t o m a i n t a i n law
and o r d e r , we s h o u ld no t have been
c a l l e d upon t o l e g i s l a t e upon t h i s
s u b j e c t at a l l . But the y have not
done s o . We are d r i v e n by e x i s t i n g
f a c t s t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e s e v e r a l
S t a t e s in the South what the y have
b e e n u n a b l e f u l l y t o p r o v i d e f o r
t h e m s e l v e s , i . e . , the f u l l and com
p l e t e ad m in i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e in the
c o u r t s . 23/
Congresman Rainey remarked:
The qu e s t i o n i s sometimes asked, Why
do n o t t h e c o u r t s o f l aw a f f o r d
r e d r e s s ? Why the n e c e s s i t y o f app ea l
ing t o Congress? We answer that the
c ou r t s are in many in s ta n c e s under the
c o n t r o l o f those who are whol ly i n i m i
c a l t o the i m p a r t i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
o f law and e q u i t y . What b e n e f i t could
r e s u l t f rom an a p pe a l t o t r i b u n a l s
22/ I d . App. 252.
23 / Id. at 653.
38
whose o f f i c e r s a re s e c r e t l y in sym
pathy with the very e v i l aga in s t which
we are s t r i v i n g . 24/
Senator Pra t t urged:
[0] f the hundreds o f ou t ra ges commit
t ed upon l o y a l p e o p l e th r o u g h the
agency o f t h i s Klu Klux Klan o r g a n i z a
t i o n , [but] not one has been punished.
This d e f e c t in the a d m in i s t ra t i o n o f
the laws d o e s not e x t e n d t o o t h e r
c a s e s . V i g o r o u s l y enough are the laws
en fo r c e d aga inst Union p e o p le . They
only f a i l in e f f i c i e n c y when a man o f
known Union sent iments , white or b l a c k ,
i n v o k e s t h e i r a i d . Then ' J u s t i c e
c l o s e s the d o o r o f her t e m p l e s . 25/
Congressman Lowe argued
Whi l e murder i s s t a l k i n g ab road in
d i s g u i s e , whi le whippings and l y n ch -
ings and banishment have been v i s i t e d
upon u n o f f e n d i n g Amer ican c i t i z e n s ,
the l o c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s have been
f o u n d i n a d e q u a t e o r u n w i l l i n g t o
apply the proper c o r r e c t i v e . Combina
t i o n s , d a r k e r than the n i g h t t h a t
h ides them, c o n s p i r a c i e s wicked as the
w o r s t o f f e l o n s c o u l d d e v i s e , have
gone unwhipped o f j u s t i c e . Immunity
i s g iven t o c r ime , and the r e c o r d s o f
1 1 / Id. at 394
25 / Id. at 505
39
the p u b l i c t r i b u n a l s are searched in
v a i n f o r any e v i d e n c e o f e f f e c t i v e
r e d r e s s . 2 6 /
Mr. Beat ty a s s e r t e d :
[M]en w e r e m u r d e r e d , h o u s e s w e r e
burned, women were ou t raged , men were
s courged , and o f f i c e r s o f the law shot
down; and the S ta te made no s u c c e s s f u l
e f f o r t t o br ing the g u i l t y t o puni sh
ment or a f f o r d p r o t e c t i o n or r e dr ess
t o t h e o u t r a g e d and i n n o c e n t . 2 7 /
R e c o g n i z i n g t h a t the f o r t y - s e c o n d
Congress b e l i e v e d that remedies nominal ly
a v a i l a b l e on the fa ce o f s t a t e laws were
not a v a i l a b l e in p r a c t i c e , ' Ju s t i c e Rehn-
q u i s t urged in C i ty o f Columbus v. Leonard
443 U.S. 905 (1979) (Rehnquist , J . , d i s s e n t
ing from d e n ia l o f c e r t i o r a r i ) that exhaus
t i o n might non ethe less be requ i red where a
s t a t e could demonstrate in f a c t " th at there
i s an a v a i l a b l e and adequate remedy." The
26 / Id. at 374
27 / Id. at 428
40
p r a c t i c e suggested by ' J u s t i c e Rehnquist i s
f a r d i f f e r e n t from any requirement h i t h e r t o
imposed by the f e d e r a l c o u r t s , and would
d e f e a t r a t h e r than advance the p u r p o s e s
behind exhaust i on .
To put i t s e l f o u t s i d e the c a t e g o r y o f
cases about which Congress was concerned , a
s t a t e would have t o prove more than that
some a d m i n i s t r a t i v e procedure e x i s t e d in
which the r e l i e f sought in f e d e r a l c our t
was t e c h n i c a l l y a v a i l a b l e . A s t a t e would
have t o demonstrate by c l e a r and c o n v i n c
i n g e v i d e n c e t h a t s u c h r e l i e f was i n
f a c t p rov ided by that p r o c e s s t o persons
such as the p l a i n t i f f . The r e s o l u t i o n o f
such c la ims would n e c e s s a r i l y d e f e a t the
v e r y p u r p o s e s o f e x h a u s t i o n . Far f rom
r e d u c i n g t h e w o r k l o a d o f t h e f e d e r a l
c o u r t s , t h i s n o v e l ap pr o ac h would f o r c e
f e d e r a l j u d g e s t o p r e s i d e o v e r o f t e n
41
l engthy t r i a l s r egard ing the e n t i r e c a s e
l oad and h i s t o r y o f the agency, weighing
the f r equency and type o f r e l i e f awarded,
a s c e r t a i n i n g wh ether r e l i e f was e q u a l l y
a v a i l a b l e in a l l r e l e va n t types o f c a s e s ,
and search ing f o r m e r i t o r i o u s c la ims that
might have been w r on g f u l l y den ied . Often
such hear ings would be more time consuming
and complex than the ac tua l t r i a l on the
m e r i t s . In a d d i t i o n , r a t her than d e f e r r i n g
t o s ta te a u t h o r i t i e s on the assumption that
t h e y would a c t c o m p e t e n t l y and in good
f a i t h , the f e d e r a l c o ur t s would be requ i red
t o s i t in judgment on the ac tua l a b i l i t i e s
and c h a r a c t e r o f t h e s t a t e o f f i c i a l s
i n v o lv e d , a p r o c e s s v i r t u a l l y c e r t a i n t o
aggravate f e d e r a l - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s . This
e n t i r e p r o c e s s , m o r e o v e r , w o u ld be an
attempt by the s t a t e t o prove t ha t , however
j u s t i f i e d the Congress might have been in
42
e n a c t i n g the 1871 C i v i l R i g h t s A c t , i t s
u n d e r l y i n g f i n d i n g s w e r e e r r o n e o u s as
app l i ed t o the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e agency. The
f e d e r a l c o u r t s do n o t o r d i n a r i l y s i t
t o r e c o n s i d e r the wisdom o r a c c u r a c y o f
c o n g r e s s i o n a l f i n d i n g s .
We r e c o g n i z e that c i rcumstances in the
S o u t h h a v e c h a n g e d g r e a t l y s i n c e t h e
ena c tm ent o f the 1871 C i v i l R i g h t s A c t .
Some a d m i n i s t r a t i v e remedies now in e x i s
t e n c e a r e f a i r o r e f f i c i e n t o r b o t h ;
o t h e r s , r e g r e t t a b l y , a re n e i t h e r . But
Congress gave the f e d e r a l c o u r t s no mandate
t o c o n d u c t t r i a l s on t h e e f f i c a c y and
b i a s e s o f each o f the thousands o f s ta te
ag enc i es that abound t oday , and no author
i t y t o p i c k and c h o s e when s e c t i o n 1983
would a f f o r d i t s p r o t e c t i o n s .
R a t h e r , C o n g r e s s p r o v i d e d f o r the
p o s s i b i l i t y o f improvement in the c o n d i
t i o n s which i t found in 1871 by p er m i t t in g
43
a g g r i e v e d p a r t i e s t o u t i l i z e any s t a t e
r e m e d i e s , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , j u d i c i a l o r
l e g i s l a t i v e , which the y b e l i e v e d t o be
e f f i c a c i o u s . Such i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n s , by
p e o p l e who w i l l o f t e n u n d e r s t a n d t h e
r e a l i t i e s o f the agen c i e s f a r b e t t e r than a
f e d e r a l judge , impose none o f the burdens
on f e d e r a l c o u r t s o r d i f f i c u l i t e s f o r
f e d e r a l - s t a t e r e l a t i o n s inherent in J u s t i c e
R e h n g u i s t ' s p r o p o s a l . T h i s s t a t u t o r y
system p r o v id e s s ta te agenc i es anxious f o r
an op p or tu n i t y t o r e s o l v e d i sp u t e s i n t e r
n a l l y w i th a p o w e r f u l i n c e n t i v e t o make
genuine ad m i n i s t ra t i ve r e l i e f a v a i l a b l e in
p r a c t i c e in o r d e r t o pe r s u a d e a g g r i e v e d
p a r t i e s t o seek r e dr ess there rather than
in f e d e r a l c o u r t . Regardless o f whether
t h i s Court might today choose a d i f f e r e n t
a p p r o a c h , t h i s i s the scheme e n a c t e d by
C o n g r e s s when i t a d o pt ed th e 1871 C i v i l
Rights A c t , and i t i s the scheme which the
f e d e r a l c o u r t s must adhere t o u n t i l and
un less Congress d i r e c t s o t h er w is e .
IV. THE DEBATES CONCERNING THE SHERMAN
AMENDMENT_________________________________ _
In t h i s c a s e , as in Monroe, Monel l and
Owen, c o n s i d e r a b l e l i g h t i s thrown on the
i n t e n t o f C o n g r e s s by t h e c o n t r o v e r s y
s u r r o u n d i n g t h e Sherman Amendment. The
f i r s t c on fe r e n c e r e p or t on the 1871 C i v i l
Rights Act c onta ined a p r o v i s i o n dr a f t e d
by Senator Sherman which imposed on a c i t y
o r county s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y f o r any i n j u r i e s
caused by a r i o t w i th in i t s bor de r s . This
p r o p o s a l was r e j e c t e d by the House on a
v a r i e t y o f g r o u n d s . M one l l v . New York
C i t y Department o f S o c i a l S e r v i c e s , 436 U.S
at 6 6 9 - 6 8 3 . C o n g r e s s then a d op t e d l a n
guage, now c o d i f i e d as 42 U.S.C. § 1 986,
imposing l i a b i l i t y on any person who had
- 44 -
45
knowledge o f a c o n s p i r a c y t o v i o l a t e the
v i c t i m ' s c i v i l r i g h t s and f a i l e d t o use h i s
28 /
o r her power t o prevent i t .
28/ In r e j e c t i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n o f the
d o c t r i n e o f r espondeat s u p e r i o r t o impose
on c i t i e s o r c o u n t i e s s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y f o r
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s commit ted by
t h e i r o f f i c i a l s , Monel l r e l i e d h e a v i l y on
the h i s t o r y o f the Sherman Amendment. 436
U.S. at 693-94. Monell reasoned that the
d e b a t e s on t h a t amendment p r o v i d e d a
c r i t i c a l i n s i g h t i n t o Congress ' views as to
the c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which l i a b i l i t y
should be imposed on a defendant .
One a s p e c t o f the Sherman amendment
debates r e l i e d on by Monell was o p p o s i t i o n
t o the amendment on the ground t h a t i t
imposed l i a b i l i t y on a l o c a l government
even i f i t "d id not know o f an impending
o r e n s u i n g r i o t o r d i d n o t h a ve t h e
wherewithal t o do anything about i t . " 436
U.S at 692, n . 57 . Senator Stevenson argued
t h e amendment " u n d e r t a k e s t o c r e a t e a
c o r p o r a t e l i a b i l i t y f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r y
which no prudence or f o r e s i g h t could have
p r e s e n t e d . " Cong. Globe , 42nd Cong. , 1st
Sess . 762. Repre se nta t ive Kerr o b j e c t e d ,
There i s . . . a t o t a l and a b s o l u t e
a b s e n c e o f n o t i c e , c o n s t r u c t i v e o r
impl i ed , w i thin any decent l i m i t s o f
l aw o r r e a s o n . . . . Under t h i s
46
The language adopted in p l a c e o f the
Sherman amendment, and now c o n t a i n e d in
s e c t i o n 1 9 8 6 , r e p r e s e n t s t h e v i e w o f
Congress as t o the amount o f knowledge and
degree o f a c t i o n or i n a c t i o n ap propr ia te
f o r the im po s i t i o n o f the l i a b i l i t y by the
f e d r a l c o u r t s . The s u b s t i t u t e amendment
p r o v i d e d :
[A]ny person or persons having knowl
edge o f the wrongs c o n s p i r e d t o be
d o n e and m e n t i o n e d i n t h e s e c o n d
s e c t i o n o f t h i s a c t are ab out t o be
committed, and having power t o prevent
o r aid in preve nt in g the same, sh a l l
n e g l e c t or r e f u s e t o do so , and such
wrongful act s h a l l be committed; such
person or per sons s h a l l be l i a b l e to
t h e p e r s o n i n j u r e d , o r h i s l e g a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Id . at 804.
28/ c ont inued
s e c t i o n i t i s no t r e q u i r e d , b e f o r e
l i a b i l i t y a t t a c h , t h a t i t s h a l l be
known that there was any i n t e n t i o n t o
commit these c r imes, so as t o f a s t e n
l i a b i l i t y j u s t l y upon the muni c i pa l
i t y . _Id. at 788.
See a l s o i d . at 791 (Rep. W i l l a r d . )
47
The f o r m o f k n o w l e d g e c a l l e d f o r was
knowledge p r i o r t o the a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n
that the ac t subsequent ly complained o f was
t o o c c u r ; the a c t i o n requ i red was f a i l u r e
t o p r e v e n t t h a t harm. T h i s c o m b i n a t i o n
o f f o r e k n o w l e d g e and l a c k o f p r e v e n t i o n
r e p r e s e n t s a c a r e f u l l y framed balance o f
the competing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s urged in the
c o n g r e s s i o n a l de b at es . These p r e r e q u i s i t e s
t o l i a b i l i t y were not o n l y the minimum
c o n s e r v a t i v e s would ac cept as a p r e c o n d i
t i o n t o s u i t , but the most the suppor ters
o f R ec on s t r u c t i o n would concede .
The i m p o s i t i o n o f an e x h a u s t i o n
r e q u i r e m e n t would a l t e r t h i s b a l a n c e in
s u b s t a n t i a l manner c l e a r l y not contemplated
by Congress . F i r s t , in a d d i t i o n t o knowing
t h a t a v i o l a t i o n was about t o o c c u r , a
c i t y would have t o be n o t i f i e d a f t e r the
v i o l a t i o n that the v i c t im wanted r e d r e s s .
S e c o n d , o v e r and above hav ing f a i l e d t o
48
prevent the v i o l a t i o n , the c i t y would have
t o f a i l as w e l l t o p r o v i d e a s u b s e q u e n t
remedy. During the debates on the Sherman
amendment Senator Thurman a c t u a l l y advo
ca ted j u s t such an exhaust ion requi rmeent ,
urg ing that p l a i n t i f f s be re qu i r ed t o g iv e
c i t i e s a w r i t t e n n o t i c e o f c la im wi th in 7
days o f the com m is s i o n o f the o f f e n s e ,
c i t i n g a s t a t u t e w i t h such a p r o v i s i o n
enacted under George IV. Id . at 770. This
p r o p o s a l f ound no s u p p o r t in C o n g r e s s ,
h o w e v e r , and was n o t i n c l u d e d i n t h e
language u l t i m a t e l y adopted.
I f C o n g r e s s d i d no t c o n t e m p l a t e any
exhaust i on requirement under s e c t i o n 1986,
a f o r t i o r i , i t c a n n o t have i n t e n d e d one
under s e c t i o n 1983. Unlike a s e c t i o n 1986
d e f e n d a n t , who i s l i a b l e m e r e l y f o r
f a i l i n g t o prevent harm to the v i c t i m , a
s e c t i o n 1983 defendant must a c t u a l l y commit
49
o r ca us e the v i o l a t i o n i t s e l f . M o n e l l ,
436 U . S . a t 6 9 2 . Thus a s e c t i o n 1983
defendant by d e f i n i t i o n knows more and does
more than a s e c t i o n 1 986 de fendant . And,
s i n c e the 1983 d e f e n d a n t i s the a c t i v e
e v i l d o e r , n o t m e r e l y a n e g l e c t f u l b y
s t a n d e r , i t i s f a r l e s s l i k e l y t h a t an
a p p e a l f o r r e d r e s s would s u c c e e d t o the
f o r m e r t h a n t o t h e l a t t e r . I f a c i t y
f a i l e d t o p r e v e n t a known c o n s p i r a c y o f
p o l i c e o f f i c e r s from v i o l a t i n g a v i c t i m ' s
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s , exhaust i on would not
be a p r e c o n d i t i o n o f a s e c t i o n 1 986 s u i t
a g a i n s t the c i t y ; C on gr es s ca nn ot have
intended t o impose such a requirement on a
s e c t i o n 1983 s u i t a g a i n s t the p o l i c e m e n
themse lves .
50
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons the judgment o f
the c our t o f appeal s should be re ve rs e d .
R e s p e c t f u l l y submitted,
'JACK GREENBERG
'JAMES M. NABRIT, I I I
BILL LANN LEE*/
ERIC SCHNAPPER
Sui te 2030
10 Columbus C i r c l e
New York, New York 10019
At torneys f o r NAACP Legal
Defense and Educa
t i o n a l Fund, I n c . ,
as Amicus Curiae
* / Counsel o f Record
MeiieN psess inc~-n. V. c. " 21?