Curry v. Dallas NAACP Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
May 1, 1979

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Curry v. Dallas NAACP Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae, 1979. b559bcc7-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9d9a02fe-5fcc-4ce7-a0a3-e8db45614fba/curry-v-dallas-naacp-motion-for-leave-to-file-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed April 27, 2025.
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IN THE Supreme Court of the United States OCTOBER TERM, 1978 No. 78-282 DONALD E. CURRY, ET AL., versus Petitioners, DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., and NOLAN ESTES, ET AL., No. 78-253 Respondents. NOLAN ESTES, ET AL., versus Petitioners, DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., No. 78-283 RALPH F. BRINEGAR, ET AL., versus DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., Respondents. Petitioners, Respondents. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of Amicus Curiae The Dallas Alliance and The Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance H. Ron White 1907 Elm St., Suite 2100 Dallas, Texas 75201 Lucas A. Powe, Jr. 2500 Red River Street Austin, Texas 78705 Attorneys for The Dallas Alliance and The Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance SCOFIELDS' QUALITY PRINTERS, P. O. BOX 53096, N. O., LA. 70153 - 504/822-1611 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1978 No. 78-282 DONALD E. CURRY, ET AL., Petitioners, versus DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., and NOLAN ESTES, ET AL., Respondents. No. 78-253 NOLAN ESTES, ET AL., versus Petitioners, DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., Respondents. No. 78-283 RALPH F. BRINEGAR, ET AL., Petitioners, versus DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., Respondents. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR THE DALLAS ALLIANCE AND THE EDUCATION TASK FORCE OF THE DALLAS ALLIANCE M OTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE The Dallas Alliance and the Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance hereby respectfully move for leave to file the attached Brief Amicus Curiae in this case pursuant to Rule 42 of this Court. The consent of at torneys for the petitioners and for the respondents, Tasby, et al, has been obtained and the letters have been deposited with the Clerk. The consent of the at torney for the respondent NAACP was requested but refused. The Dallas Alliance is a service organization de signed to encourage cooperation and combined effort of community groups in seeking resolution of urban problems affecting the Dallas community. The Alliance is comprised of a 40-member Board of Trustees drawn from local government, the business sector, and the community at large. The Board's racial composition reflects the ethnic makeup of the city's population. In addition, approximately 90 community organizations are affiliated with the Alliance, designated as com munity correspondent organizations. The Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance was formed in October, 1975. Consisting of seven Anglos, seven Mexican-Americans, six Blacks and one American Indian, the group's mission was the creation of a consensus school desegregation plan which would be constitutionally acceptable. The Task Force im mediately commenced an energetic and exhaustive in volvement in the drafting process. After more than four months and 1500 work hours, including num erous conferences with leading educators throughout the Nation, the Task Force was able to agree on a consensus plan. This plan was then sub mitted to the district court in the middle of the month of remedy hearings. The district judge subsequently adopted the plan of the Task Force (with modifications) as his final order in the case. In both the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the Task Force has participated as Amicus Curiae in support of the consensus plan. The Task Force's familiarity with this case, with DISD, and with the concepts the district judge ordered place it in a unique position to be of assistance in fleshing out the issues involved in this complex urban desegregation suit. Furthermore, the Task Force believes it likely that the other briefs may argue this case on grounds broader than necessary for an appropriate resolution of the controversy. Therefore, The Dallas Alliance and the Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance respectfully move for leave to file the attached Brief Amicus Curiae. Respectfully submitted, H. Ron White 1907 Elm St., Suite 2100 Dallas, Texas 75201 Lucas A. Powe, Jr. 2500 Red River Street Austin, Texas 78705 Attorneys for the Dallas Alliance and the Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae in Behalf of The Dallas Alliance and the Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance ----- i Table of Authorities ...................................... vi Interest of Amicus C u r ia e ................................................ 2 Introduction and Statement of the C a s e .....................2 A. The Narrow Issue ............................................. 2 B. Demographic History of Dallas ........... .. 4 1. Black Movement 1940-70 .........................5 2. Anglo Movement 1940-70 . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Mexican American Movement 1940-70 ........................................................ 8 4. The P re se n t.................................................. 8 C. The District Court's O r d e r ........................ 9 Summary of Argument ............................... 14 Argument ................................................ 15 I. The District Judge Appropriately Exercised the Broad Discretion Necessary to Implement a Desegrega tion P la n .............................................................. 15 II. Washington v. Davis and Its Progeny Have No Place in a Southern School Desegregation C a s e ............................................26 C onclusion........................................................................... 28 Proof of Service ....................... 29 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) Page Appendix A: Plate Maps Showing Racial Composition of Dallas, 1940-70 ............................ la Appendix B: Dallas Census Tract Statistics by Race, 1940-70 ........................................................ 6a Appendix C: Community Organizations Af filiated with The Dallas Alliance ........................ 16a TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED CASES Ashbacker Radio Co. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327 (1945) .................................................... 20 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 494 (1954) ............................................................................. 16 Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) .............. 3,16,20,27,28 Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) ........................ 22 Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) ........................................................ 15 Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1 9 6 8 ) ..............................3,4,16,25,27 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) . 16 Milliken v. Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) . . . 14,16, 22,23,24 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974) 14 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F. 2d 580 (CA 1 1974) ................................................................... 14 Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1 9 7 6 ) .................................................... 18 Singleton v. jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 1211 (CA 5 1970). .12-13 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) ..................4,13,16,17, 19,27,28 Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex. 1976) .............................................................. 10,11,13,22 Tasby v. Estes, 572 F. 2d 1010 (CA 5 1 9 7 8 ) ...........15 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) . . 2,26,27 OTHER AUTHORITIES Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976) ......................... 16 Bickel, Education in a Democracy: The Legal and Prac tical Problems of School Busing, 3 Human Rights 53 (1973) ....................................................................... 18 K. Clark, A Possible Reality: A Design for the Attain ment of High Academic Achievement for Inner City Students (1972) ........................................................ 19-20 Hain, Sealing off the City: School Desegregation in Detroit, in H. Kalodner & j. Fishman eds., The Limits of Justice 233 (1978) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Continued) Page . . 21 Mays, Comment: Atlanta — Living with Brown Twenty Years Later, 3 Black L.J. 184 (1974)- . . . . . 23 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of the Law (1976) ...................... 16,25 Willie, The Sociology of Urban Education, 59-76, Lexington Books of D.C., Heath Company TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Continued) Page (1978) ............................................................................. 11 Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, 84 School Rev. 313 (1976) .............................. .. . 14,16,22 Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 Law and Contemp. Probs. (Spring 1978) (forthcoming) ....................... .. 20 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1978 No. 78-282 DONALD E. CURRY, ET AL„ Petitioners, versus DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL„ and NOLAN ESTES, ET AL., Respondents. No. 78-253 NOLAN ESTES, ET AL„ versus Petitioners, DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., Respondents. No. 78-283 RALPH F. BRINEGAR, ET AL., versus Petitioners, DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., Respondents. BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE DALLAS ALLIANCE AND THE EDUCATION TASK FORCE OF THE DALLAS ALLIANCE 2 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The Dallas Alliance is a service organization designed to encourage cooperation and combined effort of com munity groups in seeking resolution of urban problems affecting the Dallas community. The Alliance is com prised of a 40-member Board of Trustees drawn from local government, the business sector, and the com munity at large. The Board's racial composition reflects the ethnic makeup of the city's population. In addition, numerous community organizations are affiliated with the Alliance, designated as community correspondent organizations. (A list appears in Appendix C). As stated in greater detail in the Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae, the Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance is a tri-ethnic group that labored for 1500 hours in developing the consensus plan that was subsequently adopted by the district court in its final order. IN TRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. The Narrow Issue The most far-reaching issue presented in this litiga tion and briefed to the Court is an issue which neither the district court nor the Court of Appeals decided: whether the principles of Washington v, Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) should be interjected into school desegrega tion litigation in the urban South. Not only was this issue not faced below, it need not be faced here. Instead this case may be decided on the very traditional grounds of the discretion of a district judge. To say that the issue is traditional, however, is hardly to trivialize it. The vast urban setting of the eighth largest school system in the United States heightens its importance and provides a unique focus for exploring the parameters of informed discretion. Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) placed a special burden on district judges. Not only were they to be in the vanguard of Southern desegregation, but in so doing they were to demonstrate "a practical flexibili ty in shaping remedies and. . . a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." Id. at 300. The duty to reconcile has lost none of its importance over time even though the context for the application of the duty has changed markedly. Thus, thanks to Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) and its immediate progeny, by 1970 rural desegrega tion was complete. But the harder task, that of desegregating the urban systems was barely begin ning. The cries of nullification and interposition from Louisiana and Virginia had been stilled only to be replaced by the shouts from Boston and Louisville. The quaint names of the rural South vanished, to be replac ed by the more familiar nomenclature of urban A m erica: C h arlo tte , Mobile, Denver, Detroit, Pasadena, Dayton. But still, throughout all the changes, it remains the federal district judges who bear the primary burden of implementing the appropriate constitutional principles. To them falls the often thankless work; to “grapple with the flinty, intractable realities of day-to-day implementation" of school desegregation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971). A district judge, however, must do more than grap ple. He must decide. And in so doing he must imple ment a desegregation plan that "promises realistically to work." Green, 391 U.S. at 439. In a large, urban, tri ethnic community such as Dallas, where thousands of citizens are relocating their homes annually, the ap propriate choices are hardly self-evident. Yet they must be made. The starting point for any desegregation plan is determining where the children live. This litigation has been protracted and each time the case has come before the district court substantial demographic changes have occurred. If nothing else, Dallas has been an ur ban boom town. A brief look at its demographic history is essential for understanding the setting. B. Demographic History of Dallas In the thirty year period (1940-1970) Dallas changed radically. There were population changes in size, loca tion, economic characteristics, composition by race and eth n icity , as well as school age population characteristics. To a large extent Dallas is a new city, suburban in its development pattern with single, detached dwelling units being the dominant form of 5 housing until very recently. Population densities by tract are low in comparison with northeastern and even other southern cities. Since 1940 the physical size of the city and DISD have both quadrupled to well over 350 square miles of territory. The growth came largely in two major spurts, one in the early 1950's and the other in the early 1960's. To understand this growth in physical size and pop ulation some understanding of the physical and social geography is necessary. The core of the city is along the Trinity River. On the north side of the river the land is flat and in 1940 most (75%) of this area was planted in cotton in farm plats of approximately 80 to 100 acres. To the south is the Oak Cliff area which has rocky soil and a hilly type of terrain not suitable for industry or agriculture. 1. Black Movement— 1940-70 In 1940 75% of the small Black population lived in two areas of the city: immediately to the north of the Central Business District and to the far southeast of the Central Business District.1 Both of these areas are now completely surrounded by new areas. The re maining 25% of the Black population was more dispers ed and only 10 of the 58 tracts in the city at that time had fewer than 1% Black population.2 1 Plates of Dallas in 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970 showing racial percentages are in Appendix A. 2 Census tract statistics are in Appendix B. 6 The pattern of racial location in 1950 remained es sentially the same with the exception of major territorial annexation to the north and south with many more Anglo tracts. In 1957 a major annexation of a West Dallas district occurred. This area had two barrio areas, few Anglos and substantial Blacks. At the time of annexation this area, located in the west between Oak Cliff and North Dallas, had less than 11% of the housing above code, only 2 miles of paved streets, one 60 year-old school building, no parks, no sewers, no storm drains. During the huge growth of the 1950's the city's pop ulation and territory more than doubled. Black location concentration moved into the area identified as South Dallas (just north of the Trinity River). This was an older area being abandoned by Anglos moving to the far north of Dallas. A concentrated group of census tracts changed during the 1950's from Anglo to Black.3 While Black population was doubling, the rapidly ex panding Anglo population resulted in the DISD being 15-20% Black. The area known as East Oak Cliff had 65% of its pre sent housing built during this period. It was in 1960 a series of suburban type development subdivisions. Black residents were in two zones of this area of the city — in the older housing in far northeast Oak Cliff directly across the Trinity River from South Dallas on the only bridge and to the far south where Bishop College was placed after moving from Marshall, Texas. 3 Tracts 28, 29, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39.02, 40 and 41. 7 Within a three year period of the 1960's a tremen dous change, one with no Northern or Eastern city comparisons, took place in the recently developed sub divisions of East Oak Cliff — the area south of the river and east of Interstate 35E. While originally built for and marketed to Anglos, the average Anglo occupancy was but 2.3 years. Almost two dozen census tracts in the area shift from 90% Anglo to 90% Black.* Six of these tracts did not exist in 1940; four did not exist until 1970. In effect a new area of the city, with new schools, new streets, new shopping centers (the first two major centers in Dallas were built in this area) went from Anglo to Black overnight. 2. Anglo Movement— 1940-70 Anglo movements in this 30 year period show a different pattern to the fringes of the city — far northwest, northeast, east (Pleasant Grove) and far southwest. The growth was phenomenal and demon strates the recency and amount of post-war affluence in Dallas. While Blacks were coming from Louisiana and East Texas rural areas, for working class oppor tunities, Anglo Dallas in its affluence was coming from the upper midwest for corporate and financial oppor tunities. This wealth concentrated in the far north area and is, again, in housing not even there in 1950. F u r t h e r , t r e m e n d o u s suburban expansion, predominantly Anglo, took place around the city. 4 4 Tracts 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59.01, 59.02, 71.02, 86, 87.01, 87.02, 88, 89, 103, 104, 112, 113, 114.01, 114.02, 167.01, 169.01. 8 3. Mexican American Movement — 1940-70 While there is no census data on Mexican American location, an area north of the Central Business District by 1940 was called "Little Mexico" and the few Mexican Americans in Dallas were concentrated there. Most of the Mexican American population has come to Dallas during the current decade and is concentrated in an arc from West Dallas to East Dallas directly north of the Central Business District. 4. The Present In the period 1970-1975 racial data from the census are not available. Public school data, the Department of Urban Planning, and Real Estate Board reports do provide some insights. First, the city's and DISD's ex pansion in territory and overall population is com pleted. The suburban ring exists. Second, population densities have been increasing with many huge apart ment complexes. Over 50% of all housing starts during this period were multi-party structures. This propor tion is much higher today. Third, and most importantly, the Anglo school: district population in the past decade has shifted from 63% to approximately 35%. In elemen tary ages it is even lower. At first blush it is difficult to comprehend how the city's population remains majori ty Anglo while the Anglo percentage in DISD keeps dropping. The reason is the cost of housing in the Anglo areas of far North Dallas. In Northwest Dallas housing built from 1957-1961 sold originally for $28 to $31,000. The average age of the head of the household was 31 with 3 children, elementary age. Today these 9 same homes sell for $70 to $180,000 with average age of the head of the household being 52, 3 children, 1 high school age, and the other 2 already gone. The demographic picture of Dallas makes clear the enormity of the task facing a district judge. Unlike many cities where whites ring a black core and pie shaped wedges will accomplish considerable racial mix ing,5 Dallas has great physical separation of Blacks from most Anglos by, first, the Trinity River, second, the Central Business District, and finally by a Mexican American arc. From far South Dallas (e.g., South Oak Cliff or Zumwalt schools) to far North Dallas (W. T. White or Dealey schools) is approximately a 50 minute drive by car on Sunday. Yet the Black population is largely in South Dallas and the Anglos are in the far north.6 The problem is exacerbated by the low densi ties of Anglo children (except for the naturally integrated Pleasant Grove) and the band of Mexican American settlements between the Anglos and the Blacks. C. The District Court's Plan How, then, to desegregate? Between plaintiffs, defendants, interveners, amicus, and even students there were numerous theories and several carefully prepared plans. When the month of hearings ended in March 1976, judge Taylor had before him six major 5 E.g., Charlotte-Mecklenburg. 6 Housing costs, occupational demands, and convenience make it clear Anglos will continue to occupy the far north of the city. It is less clear how long they will remain in the southwest and southeast. 10 plans for achieving a unitary school system. As would be expected deep divisions existed among them on the amount of busing to be ordered.7 Beyond that, however, there were a surprising number of common points in most of the plans: The huge district should be divided into more manageable subdistricts,8 each of which should reflect the ethnic mix of the district as a whole; naturally integrated areas (not more than 75% Anglo or 75% Black and Mexican American combined) should be preserved;9 magnet schools, such as the nationally renowned Skyline in Pleasant Grove, should be created to accomplish desegregation in the high school grades;10 East Oak Cliff, because of geography and the location of naturally integrated areas, might re main unchanged.11 Additionally, there were middle points about which some of the parties appeared to care more than others. These included accountability mechanisms and the use of desegregation tools beyond transportation. 7 The highest was Plaintiffs' Plan A at 69,000; the lowest was D1SD at 14,000. 8 On this point there was less agreemen t since the polarity of the NAACP and DISD Plans led each to reject subdividing. Subdivid ing was present and heavily stressed in both plans of Plaintiffs and the Dallas Alliance Plan. 9 Judge Taylor noted “as all parties recognized, there would be no benefit educational or otherwise in disturbing this trend toward residential integration." 412 F. Supp. 1192, 1206. 10 Everyone supported the magnet concept. 11 Only the NAACP and Plaintiffs' Plan A disagreed. 11 The district court, in fashioning an order, incor porated not only the common desegregation tools that were tendered in each of the plans but adopted some new and innovative tools that appear necessary for an urban school district plan that is majority minority. The district court's final order of April 7 ,1976, divid ed the school district into six subdistricts. This con figuration was to preserve the naturally integrated areas; heighten parental involvement; achieve max imum desegregation within each subdistrict; facilitate administration and student assignment. As a means of facilitating student assignment for desegregation purposes as well as to insure maximum utilization of existing facilities, the judge standardized the grades throughout the district.12 This standardi zation provided for the establishment of K-3 Early Childhood Education Centers that were required to use the Diagnostic Prescriptive concept that had proven successful in California with respect to parental involvement.13 Special programming was included in the 4-6 Vanguard schools and the 7-8 Academies. The magnet concept was employed at the 9-12 high school level. 12 "In a good school desegregation plan: [there is] . . . (d) a uni form grade structure [that] facilitates interchange between and easy access to all units or schools within the system." Willie, The Sociology of Urban Education, 60, Lexington Books of D.C., Heath Company (1978). Contrast the proposals of Plaintiffs' Plan A and B which respectively have 14 and 9 different grade structures for elementary schools. 13 Thus, the order looked to using parents in the requirement to move as rapidly as possible to a 1-10 adult-student ratio in the Ear ly Childhood Education Centers. 412 F. Supp. at 1214. 12 The court recognized its charge as being one of pro viding an equal educational opportunity to all students within the district by desegregating the district to the maximum extent practicable. One of the desegregation tools employed was student assignment. Once the judge had carved out the naturally integrated areas and divided the district into subdistricts that reflected the approximate racial ratio of the entire school district, ex cept for East Oak Cliff and Seagoville,14 there were few options remaining. To facilitate the necessary parental involvement, students that were in the K-3 grades were assigned to schools within two miles of their home if possible. Students in grades 4-8 were assigned to centers in areas of centrality within their subdistrict which generally reflected an ethnic balance (except for East Oak Cliff). To provide maximum desegregation in all new special programs such as the 4-6 Vanguard, the 7-8 Academies and the 9-12 magnets, the court re quired that the enrollment in each of these special schools reflect the racial makeup of the grade level. The judge in this case, recognizing the instability and ineffectiveness of the sole employment of a student assignment tool, elected to go further in his remedial order. He adopted a variety of desegregation techni ques. Some, of course, are reasonably familiar. E.g., The Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 14 Seagoville, an area of blue collar Anglos, was made a separate subdistrict because of its geographical isolation from the rest of DISD. It lies in the far southeast, and although Seagoville is 81.5% Anglo, it contains less than 2% of DISD's student population. The nearest pocket of Blacks is 15 miles distant. 419 F, 2d 1211 (CA 5 1970) order on personnel.15 Others, however, have not heretofore been estab lished as universal remedies. It was here, drawing on the compromise efforts of the Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance, that the plan best reflected the nature of the community. Because of the Mexican American children, bilingual and multi-cultural educa tion were needed as well as minority to majority trans fers for Mexican Americans.16 Special programs for all, including career education, curriculum transfers for the physically handicapped, mentally retarded and highly gifted were included. To ensure an ethnic mix at the very top of the system a recruiting and employment requirement to employ Blacks and Mexican Americans in administrative posts according to their percent of the population was ordered. In addition both an internal and external accountability systems were ordered. 15 The other familiar techniques included: majority to minority transfer; authorization to the district to modify attendance zones to further promote desegregation; establishment of new facilities in areas that will promote and enhance desegregation; the es tablishment of a tri-ethnic committee to report to the court on a continual basis; a discipline and due process policy; and retention of jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit held that Judge Taylor erred in failing to re quire D1SD to assume the burden of providing transportation to those students electing to choose majority to minority transfer. The inclusion of such a provision in an order is not a matter of dis cretion, Swann v. Charlolte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1971), and the Fifth Circuit was hyper-technical in its read ing of Part X of the order. The Dallas Alliance's Plan intended D1SD to assume the burden; part X (3) of the order requires D1SD to assume the burden; and in fact DISD is assuming the burden and has done so from the time of the order. 16 "Mexican Americans who comprise less than five percent of the school to which they are originally assigned, may transfer to a school that offers the Bilingual Education Program." 412 F. Supp. at 1218. 13 14 The totality of the tools selected anticipated Milliken v. Bradley 11, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) and evidenced the far sighted approach taken by the district court. Further more, they suggest that it is questionable as to whether any tri-ethnic school district can fully realize its desegregative goal by student assignment alone. Creativity is a necessary aspect.17 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 1. What occurred in the district court is precisely what ought to occur. A district judge appraised himself of all the available facts, considered and combined the options, recognized the necessity of some compromise among positions, selected the options best suited to providing an equal and quality desegregated educational opportunity to each child in the system, and adopted a plan that promises to work both im mediately and in the future. The promise of success is a 17 A very similar conclusion was reached by Plaintiffs' expert witness, Dr. Charles V. Willie of Harvard. Dr. Willie was one of the masters appointed by Judge Garrity in Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F. 2d 580 (CA 1 1974) cert, denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), the Boston case. He concludes an article about the largely rejected plan he drafted by noting that it proposed "a new approach to school de segregation which attempted to unite method and purpose. Some of our proposals were rejected in favor of advancing racial quotas, method without its purposes. . . How to prevent separation of method from purpose in education is a problem in need of serious study. An editorial in the New York Times summed up the issue quite nicely: Integration must be made synonymous with better education (May 20, 1975). Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education? 84 School Rev. 313, 325 (1976). 15 key component. Success comes from quality and is sustained by support. Judge Taylor knew of Boston and Louisville. He knew that a court order without support in the community is an exercise of will, not of dis cretion. He charged the community to come forward and make the plan work. The community responded ac cordingly. To hold, as the Court of Appeals did, that more had to be done, crossed the limits of appellate review of district court discretion.18 Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 409 (1977). 2. Since this can and should be decided on the narrow issue of the informed discretion of the district judge, no other issues need be reached. But should the issue tendered by the Curry Intervenors be faced, their position should be rejected. Transmuting school suits into battles that tax social science methodologies beyond their limits holds promise for neither schools nor courts — nor this Nation. % ARGUMENT I. The District Judge Appropriately Exer cised The Broad Discretion Necessary To Im plement A Successful Desegregation Plan. 18 In spite of Fifth Circuit's ruling, it acknowledged the com prehensive approach by the district judge: "After developing a voluminous record and holding hearings for over a month on the feasibility and effectiveness of these proposals, the district judge drew a comprehensive plan dealing, inter alia, with special programs, transportation, discipline, facilities, personnel, and an accountability system, as well as student assignments." 572 F, 2d 1010, 1013 (CA 5 1978). The Civil Rights Commission in its 1976 report Ful filling the Letter and Spirit of the Law spent considerable detail to remind us of the received knowledge after two decades of school desegregation: successful desegrega tion happens not by chance but through planning and total community commitment. Id. at 168-201. "Only in learning together as equals, sharing knowledge and ex periences, can children hope to develop the cultural values which will prepare them to be fully contributing members of society." Id. at 206. The report reflects well the breadth of school desegregation in attempting to provide the promise of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 494 (1954): equal educational opportunities for all.19 The path to the promise is not perfectly marked and cryptic statements in Brown II, Swann and Green tell the 19 We do not read Brown 1 as purely a race case. First, it is not so written; indeed it is written as an education case. Second, if it were solely a race case, the remedy would have been significantly easier to achieve and none of the language of Brown 11 and Swann would have been necessary. Third, as a race case it places incredible strains on credulity to assume that Southern schools, but for segregation would have been integrated, while the Northern schools would not. Milliken v. Bradley 1, 418 U.S. 717(1974). Finally, while treating Brown as a race case has the advantage of simplicity of remedy — bus to balance — it carries the corresponding difficul ty of ignoring the mission of any school system: to provide a quali ty education to each child. If the mission is recognized, the availability of a richness of remedial actions in a school desegrega tion context becomes apparent. Milliken v. Bradley 11, 433 U.S. 267 (1977). See generally, Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976). See also Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, 84 School Rev. 313 (1976): "The fact that this desegregation decision was intended to foster education seems to have been forgotten." 17 district judge upon default by a school board a broad discretion is his. To exercise his discretion he must first learn, then act, and finally evaluate (somewhat later) the success of his product. Few other discretionary decisions probe so deeply into the resources of a judge or approach even a fraction of the difficulty. And, as we have noted, the geography and population shifts in Dallas made Judge Taylor's job unenviable in its com plexity. Although a native Dallasite, the judge had to study the district to learn, inter alia, where the people lived, where they would live in five years, what the ages of their children were, where the schools were located, as well as the conditions, complections and capacities of the schools. Then a solid month of trial provided Judge Taylor with a wealth of plans and information. Naturally, none of the plans submitted was perfect. But some were remarkably better than others. The judge had already recognized, as he had stated in court, that the DISD plan was "patently unconstitutional." The responsibility for securing a constitutionally acceptable plan was now squarely his. When school authorities default "a district court has broad power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system." Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. Of the remaining plans, one other was especially troublesome. The quota-like approach of the NAACP with its demand to change student assignments as neighborhoods change not only ran against Swann's 18 presaging of the holding in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), but the NAACP in its commitment to provide a racially balanced system for Blacks was willing to leave the Mexican American children in a secondary position (at least temporarily).20 Such a conclusion is also ''patently unconstitutional" and it is unthinkable that a district judge would accept it. Of necessity the focus on the plan to be ordered narrowed to those plans which were constitutional and which promised to work. The plan finally implemented reflected the predominant thinking of the parties to the litigation. Where commonalities of approach were pre sent, they were implemented.21 The process was the essence of informed discretion: the application of reasoned judgment to the facts at hand. It is true that the plan selected, essentially the plan drafted and submitted by the Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance, is a compromise. It is easy to deride compromise. Furthermore, sloganeering that con stitutional rights cannot be compromised is as irresistable as it is irrefutable. Unfortunately, it begs the real question. The answer, of course, is that each 20 "The first magnitude of desegregation and the attaining of an Unitary School System should be to achieve a racial balance of black and white students in each school and then follow through with the integration of other minorities into the system." (Emphasis added). 21 The commonalities available demonstrate a substantial im provement over the situation at the beginning of this decade where the lack of alternatives from either counsel for the plain tiffs and the school boards virtually mandated racial balance remedies "because there is not much else that a court can do that will have an impact." Bickel, Education in a Democracy: The Legal and Practical Problems of School Busing, 3 Human Rights 53, 59-60 (1973). 19 child must be granted equal educational opportunities and there is a duty on the school board (or, that failing, the district judge) to establish a unitary school system. But these in turn are only starting points. Despite a decade of urban litigation involving cities as diverse as Charlotte, Mobile, Denver, Detroit, Pasadena, and Dayton, major questions — questions that no district judge can avoid — are unanswered (and sometimes un asked). Swann assumed that some one-race schools were allowable. But how many? For what size school district? What parameters ought a judge employ in evaluating the one-race school question in a majority minority district? Is there a maximum beyond which a district may not go regardless of the strength of the proffered justification? If neighborhood schools are acceptable for the very young, what grades are encom passed? At what point does the amount of time a stu dent spends on a bus each day become unreasonable? As a district judge fashions his remedy to include not only student assignments, but also quality educational programs and faculty hiring policies that assist desegregation, what are the priorities among them?22 Is there any room for community involvement beyond that which the adverse parties bring to the litigation? 22 Consider Dr. Kenneth Clark's analysis: Given the fact that public schools, so far, reflect the racial populations of the cities, the goal of attaining high quality education through the democratic process of realistic and administratively feasible forms of desegregation appears to be, at least temporarily, abandoned and is being re placed by the need to concentrate on raising the quality of education without regard to the present racial composi tion of a city's public schools. This educational imperative must be met, for the present generation of students in the public 20 Parties, obviously, have pat answers to these and other questions. That is the nature of litigation. For judges, however, the best that is possible is an educated guess as to what the ultimate answers to these questions will be, assuming that in fact answers will be forthcoming. What a district judge faces, then, is an ex plicit directive — establish a unitary school system — large parameters of which are vague.23 It is hardly sur prising that the lack of explicit rules, the vagueness of doctrine despite numerous decisions involving urban systems, becomes translated into the terminology of informed discretion. For the district judge that delicate balance of private and public needs pin-pointed by Brown 11 must mean compromise. Not compromise in a pejorative sense, but compromise in its best sense. For compromise fits well with no theories and often defies logic; its sole virtue is that in the real world it works.24 schools of our cities is not expendable. If we continue to frustrate these students educationally, they will be, in fact, the ingredients of the “social dynamite" which threatens the stability of our cities, our economy, and the democratic form of government. It is conceivable, also, that a present emphasis on raising the quality of educa tion for these children will eventually facilitate rather than block the continued struggle for a non-racial organization of the public schools in the United States. K. Clark, A Possible Reality: A Design for the Attainment of High Academic Achievement for Inner City Students 51 (1972) (Emphasis added). 23 See generally, Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 Law and Contemp. Probs.______(Spring 1978) (forthcoming). 24 “Legal theory is one thing. But the practicalities are different." Ashbacker Radio Co. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327, 332(1945). 21 While the plan adopted is largely the consensus plan of the Dallas Alliance and thus to that extent reflects compromise among private citizens, Amicus believes that it is unreasonable to expect district judges to be limited to the entire plan of one of the participants.25 A judge must pick and choose among features of the various plans before the court, trying to get the best mix of concepts and programs. It is his duty — not that of any of the parties (except the school board) — to fashion a plan that promises to work. In the exercise of this duty a district judge will encourage, as he will in all litigation, compromises among the parties. Indeed the very vagueness of the law and flux of urban America invite compromise. It is not a dirty word; it is a legal and practical necessity. And it is what judge Taylor did. He took common parts from all of the plans. He reached for consensus. He gave more to one side in some places, less in others. Desegregation plans are not made in heaven. They are drafted by individuals with sharply competing (and sometimes divided) interests. Putting together a compromise whole is not an abuse of discre tion. Choosing the amount of busing to achieve a desegregated system has always been the most difficult task for the lower courts. Their familiarities with the 25 See also, Main, Sealing off the City: School Desegregation in Detroit, in H. Kalodner & J. Fishman eds., The Limits of Justice 223, 274 (1978): "The NAACP and the board of education submitted dras tically different plans. Both parties seemed to take extreme posi tions on the assumption the court would strike a compromise between them." "practicalities of the situation," Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971), whether it be knowledge of traffic patterns, natural boundaries, or the demographics of the district, place them in the best position to exercise informed choice. It probably would not have been an abuse of discretion to have ordered the busing necessary to implement Plain tiffs' Plan A, but the concept of discretion mandates the choice not to adopt it also.26 It is true that there were no extensive time-distance studies entered into the record — and those offered were conducted on Sundays. But any knowledge of Dallas leads one quickly to the realization that once the naturally integrated areas were preserved there would indeed be lengthy bus rides necessary to eliminate many of the one-race schools, judge Taylor chose not to do this. The goal of desegregation is not merely to rearrange the student assignments in a system.27 It is rather to adopt a plan that will realistically overcome the effects of past dis crimination. It is to integrate minds as well as build ings. Thus Judge Taylor wisely anticipated Milliken v. 26 Plaintiffs' Plan A would have transported 69,000 students and its projected cost of implementation was $22,000,000. 412 F. Supp. at 1200. 27 Although many people believe to the contrary. E.g., the letter from John W. Roberts of the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union stating Judge Garrity's task is “to evaluate plans as they are placed before him not on the basis of the educational quality of the plan, but rather on the basis of whether or not they meet the standards for school desegregation developed by the Federal Courts." Quoted in Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, 84 School Rev, 313 (1976). 23 Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) and opted to enrich the educational experiences of the students in a desegrega tion context.28 This was not only present in the Early Childhood Education concept adopted for K-3 and the magnet approach to grades 9-12,29 but beyond this the district judge crafted an order looking to the other facets necessary to make a desegregation plan work. DISD was placed under an obligation to recruit quickly additional Black and Mexican American teachers, principals, and other certificated personnel. Yet simply having teachers, principals and ad ministrators ready to occupy buildings is not enough. Clearly the district judge recognized the disparate im- 28 Each of the Black members of the Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance agrees with the statement of Dr. Benjamin Mays: "Black people must not resign themselves to the pessimistic view that a non-integrated school cannot provide Black children with an excellent educational setting. Instead, Black people, while working to implement Brown, should recognize that integration alone does not provide a quality education and that much of the substance of quality education can be provided to Black children in the interim." Mays, Comment: Atlanta—Living with Brown Twenty Years Later, 3 Black L.J. 184, 191-92 (1974). 29 We admit magnet schools have not always worked — although with an example like Skyline it is hardly surprising the participants at the district court thought magnets an attractive idea. The use of magnets is not simply freedom of choice by another name. While it is true a student must choose to attend a magnet, that choice may — and should — be heavily influenced by the school districts. Magnet schools, after all, are intended to be significantly superior to other high schools and this can be assist ed by a district's phasing out competing courses at non-magnet schools. Should the magnet concept be found ineffective the retention of jurisdiction by the district judge allows for correction. E.g., high school attendance zones might be modified to achieve additional racial mixing. plications of exposing innocent minority children to possible instructional and administrative biases that sometime fail to vanish in spite of a court order. For the experience to be effective, they must understand and be capable of functioning in their multi-cultural set ting. Thus the district judge required in-depth training of these personnel to implement the plan and improve attitudes and awareness to facilitate the effectiveness of the personnel in a desegregated setting. Finally, the judge sought methodologies of account ability. He accomplished this in two separate fashions. First, the very top administrators in the system were to reflect the racial composition of the city. This would mandate increased hiring of Blacks and Mexican Americans in the hopes that the commitment at the top to make desegregation work now would be reflected in commitment below. Second, the order provides not only for an internal audit by DISD to be filed with the Court, but, more significantly, an external audit of the progress the system is making in adopting the plan of the district court. If there were nothing more than the district judge's understanding of the district and his reasoned actions in light of the available options and his anticipation of the authority Milliken II would give, the plan adopted could be sustained as an appropriate exercise of dis cretion so long as it held the promise to work. But a realization of what it means to adopt a desegregation plan for a complex urban community places an even heavier than normal burden on a district judge to assess 25 workability not only now, as Green demands, but five years or more from now. It is inconceivable that urban systems could be put through all the effort of creating desegregation plans satisfactory to a federal judiciary only to learn that if all the schools go one-race shortly thereafter from extraneous causes, or from the very existence of the plan that promises to work only now, there is no further Fourteenth Amendment obligation. No plan has value that cannot continue to work. And for a plan to continue to work there must be communi ty support as the Civil Rights Commission has recognized. Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of the Law (1976). Judge Taylor knew this and he achieved that support. One can search for various measures of the strength of community support but the passage by the voters of the $80,000,000 bond issue to assist implementation of the court order is strong evidence that Judge Taylor's prescient charge to the community to come forward and be involved worked — and promises to continue to work. The Dallas community, business, church, civic organizations, as well as private citizens, has demon strated support for the plan by providing resources a court is unable to order. Within six months of the court order 144 schools had been adopted by either business or civic organizations as focal points for the community effort in channeling volunteers, equipment, private monies to the schools, as well as providing part-time and full-time job opportunities for students. The successful efforts to include the community and gain a broad base of support for the plan at present and maintain it in the future say much for the district judge. He did not, unfortunately satisfy everyone. Maybe such a goal is impossible. Legal responsibilities cannot, of course, be shifted, The responsibility for a unitary school system rests with appropriate elected officials and, in default of their duties, with a federal judge. But the judge cannot blind himself to what all others can see and no one argues that school desegregation cases where the community is in an uproar are a model for either the political or judicial process. Schools must be integrated. Minds must be reached. Quality and caring must be assured. It must not only begin, it must also continue. Maybe better plans could have been devised but the plan adopted by Judge Taylor carried the promise to work.30 The informed discretion of the dis trict judge can require no more. II. Washington V. Davis And Its Progeny Have No Place In Southern School Desegregation Cases. Not only is the Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) issue not necessary to a decision by this Court (and not considered by the Court below), such a holding is not in the best interests of Dallas or the Unit ed States. School suits should not extend for the rest of this century whether the goal is to integrate or to avoid integration. Decisional principles should en- 30 Naturally the district judge retained jurisdiction over the DISD litigation. Should the plans and concepts he approved be shown not to work in practice, he is free to modify or abandon them as experiences dictate. 27 courage reasonable compromise, not further litigation. This applies to whether one-race schools cause challenges as to the existence of a unitary system or are justified as the normal outcome of urban housing patterns having nothing at all to do with actions of school boards. Suddenly to reverse school desegregation cases into endless — and fruitless — squabbling over whether school segregation caused housing segregation or vice versa does more than tax the limits of judicial com petence and social science methodologies. Fundamen tally, it encourages the false hope that school systems may be released from the obligations to eradicate past dejure segregation. The fruits of a quarter-century of footdragging by school districts ought not be a return to separate and unequal. Yet the Washington v. Davis rationale promises little else. That is why it has been so enthusiastically embraced by those who resisted Brown IIr Green, and Swann. Providing for equal and quality educational opportunities for each child in a school dis trict — the goal of the Dallas Alliance Plan — can be made vastly more difficult when judicial as well as political pressures offer the hope that compromise is unnecessary — that the future belongs to those who questioned Brown. The South has made great progress in the last 15 years. Indeed today Boston is clearly a Northern phenomena, one that unfortunately may plague this great Nation for years. The North perceives no obligations in this area and the North resists. District 28 courts daily remind the South of its obligations. The spur has worked to set Southern school cases against a backdrop of high commitment to educational quality even during a period of fiscal retrenchment elsewhere. This is hardly a position mandating a call, no matter how uncertain, for retreat. Leaving these cases in the community, in the school boards, in the local district courts, where a judge may be guided by the equitable principles of Brown II and Swann and the desire to bring to each child the promise of the best education, is the appropriate solution. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above the Court should reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals remand ing this case to the district court for continued imple mentation of the ordered plan. DATED M a y ____ , 1979. Respectfully submitted, H. RON WHITE 1907 Elm Street, Suite 2100 Dallas, Texas 75201 LUCAS A. POWE, JR. 2500 Red River Street Austin, Texas 78705 Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 29 PROOF OF SERVICE I, H. Ron White, an attorney for the Amicus Curiae herein, hereby certify that on the ------ day of May, 1 9 7 9 ,1 served three copies of the foregoing Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of Amicus Curiae to the Supreme Court upon the following Counsel for the Petitioners, Counsel for the Respondents and the Respondent Pro Se: Mr. Edward B. Cioutman, III 8204 Elmbrook Drive, Suite 200 P. O. Box 47972 Dallas, Texas 75247 Ms. Vilma S. Martinez Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund 28 Geary Street San Francisco, California 94108 Mr. Nathaniel R. Jones 1790 Broadway, 10th Floor New York, New York 10019 Mr. Lee Holt, City Attorney New City Hall Dallas, Texas 75201 Mr. John Bryant 8035 East R. L. Thornton Dallas, Texas 75228 Mr. James G. Vetter, Jr. 555 Griffin Square Building Suite 920 Dallas, Texas 75202 Mr. James T. Maxwell (pro se) 4440 Sigma Road, Suite 112 Dallas, Texas 75240 Mr. Thomas E. Ashton, III Dallas Legal Services Foundation, Inc. 912 Commerce Street, Room 202 Dallas, Texas 75202 Mr. E. Brice Cunningham 2606 Forest Avenue, Suite 202 Dallas, Texas 75215 Mr. James A. Donohoe 1700 Republic National Bank Building Dallas, Texas 75201 Mr. Martin Frost 777 South R. L. Thornton Freeway, Suite 120 Dallas, Texas 75203 Mr. Warren Whitham 210 Adolphus Tower Dallas, Texas 75202 Mr. Mark Martin 1200 One Main Place Dallas, Texas 75250 Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr. Mr. Robert L. Blumenthal 3000 One Main Place Dallas, Texas 75250 30 by mailing same to such Counsel and Respondent pro se at their respective addresses and depositing the same in a United States mail box in an envelope properly ad dressed to such addresses with first class postage prepaid. I further certify that all parties required to be served have been served. H. RON WHITE Attorney for Amicus Curiae Dallas Alliance and Education Task Force of Dallas Alliance # l a 1940 . 0 srAftf«a»*«* Of « .* « « « * * » AMIS ya®AW SflWllOfBIM! PUB. NO.T4SK PLATE B- l COMMUNITY ANALYSIS PROGRAM - CITY OF DALLAS BLACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT 2a 1-M »•«* 80-74.® f,m. MHUPlATS B-2 a»9««« *®®a»s*» • «i»» ®» vm im BLACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT - 1950 3a " w w r H A C K P O P U i A T I O N % V v % | 2 5 - 4 9 . 9 J " * - 9 9 5 0 - 7 4 . 9 £ ^ | | g ^ Q - - . 2 4 . 9 8 0 2 » ♦ C O M M U N I T Y ANA17SIS f C O C B A M - C I T Y O f DALLAS pLACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT - 1960 7 U i . N O . T A 3 X P L A T E B- 3 U G SW © Pf SCI M l B IA C « P Q S U U 7 > 0 « a . o - 1 - 9.9 1 1 0 - 24 9 v X v 2 5 -4 9 .9 S0' 74 9 - C O M M U N IT Y A N A L Y S IS I S O C S A M * C IT Y O f D A L L A S LACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT * 1970 PUS'. N O .T 4 S X P L A T E B -4 5a CENSUS TRACTS IN THE DALLAS, TEX. SMSA IN S E T A - DALLAS AND VICIN ITY OKM DAUAt TtK n tvta&XD Mf r»a»ocn»i to r 3 APPENDIX B P O P U L A T IO N B Y RA CE B Y C E N S U S T R A C T : 1940, 1950, 196 0 A N D 1970 C E N SU S 19 4 0 1950 1960 1970 T R A C T W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE BLA CK W H ITE BLA CK 001 2,587 296 4 ,445 153 3 ,549 43 3 ,772 8 002.01 3,685 60 7,093 57 3 ,462 3 3 ,120 0 002 .02 4,271 12 3 ,877 0 003 3,758 60 4 ,327 14 3 ,935 7 3,566 12 004.01 8 ,198 22 7 ,495 77 2 ,789 2 2 ,8 1 7 0 004 .02 9 ,695 35 4 ,2 4 9 6 5 ,469 121 004 .03 7,342 760 6 ,192 129 005 4 ,255 83 3 ,831 27 3,315 53 4 ,497 58 006.01 9,089 535 3,382 3 4 ,674 7 5 ,653 11 006 .02 8,344 205 7,201 124 7 ,790 49 007.01 5 ,716 694 4,911 1,363 3 ,704 5 3 ,2 9 7 8 007 .02 2 ,142 422 2 ,586 96 008 3,847 89 4,772 69 4 ,605 6 4 ,634 19 009 3,329 87 3 ,275 42 2 ,833 12 3 ,074 4 010 5,785 99 5 ,284 44 4 ,479 19 4,681 14 011.01 7,955 173 8 ,166 77 4,234 21 4 ,050 5 0 11 .02 2 ,488 12 2 ,388 1 012 5,875 118 5 ,6 6 7 59 5,126 3 4 ,6 9 7 10 013.01 7,645 383 8,515 214 3 ,423 11 1,881 1 013 .02 4 ,6 8 7 47 4 ,928 19 014 2 ,259 385 2 ,357 264 3 ,1 7 7 83 3 ,716 26 015.01 11 ,104 596 11 ,164 356 6 ,323 62 6 ,4 0 7 5 015 .02 4 ,665 78 3 ,702 42 CENSUS TRACT WHITE 016 2 ,774 017 .01 2,281 017 .02 018 3 ,859 019 5 ,377 020 5,145 021 2 ,727 022 .01 6 ,200 022 .02 023 3 ,727 024 4 ,239 025 2,045 026 2,595 027.01 4 ,419 027 .02 028 4,701 029 2,154 030 4 ,095 031.01 2 ,106 031.02 032.01 3 ,626 032 .02 1950 W H ITE B L A C K 2,0 7 0 7,352 1,171 7,802 3,933 50 4 ,3 9 7 73 5 ,335 175 1,235 86 6 ,195 1,648 3 ,364 1,168 3 ,774 96 2 ,159 2 ,714 2 ,929 2 4 ,6 4 7 4 ,7 7 0 4 ,2 4 9 112 1,793 167 3 ,264 2 ,602 2,011 357 2 ,868 391 # 1940 BLACK 6 ,0 3 9 9 ,741 166 206 228 187 2 ,098 1,319 87 2,501 2 2 ,925 147 266 3 ,6 5 5 410 395 1960 1970 W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B LA CK 1,114 7 ,086 425 5 ,559 548 5 ,8 2 3 42 269 322 2 ,758 2 ,720 10 2 ,578 17 2 ,305 21 1 ,390 28 5 ,0 9 3 84 6 ,0 0 5 44 545 37 153 29 1,702 620 1 ,233 418 2 ,415 340 1,856 342 2 ,106 1,373 591 1 ,939 2 ,722 86 2 ,0 6 9 341 1,790 3 ,688 460 4 ,2 4 9 2 ,156 1 1 ,665 119 32 7,245 13 7,247 105 4 ,869 23 4 ,890 965 2 ,928 75 2,445 214 1,685 89 3 ,6 8 7 1 ,688 1,185 468 151 979 411 1 ,4 5 7 981 56 40 53 1 1,269 192 342 15 133 73 1940 1950CENSUS TRACT WHITE 033 4 ,963 034 5,151 035 2,404 036 3 ,262 037 2,121 038 3,912 039.01 0 39 .02 2 ,933 040 4 ,137 041 2 ,043 042 4,354 043 1,268 044 4,856 045 2 ,950 046 2,868 047 4 ,670 048 4 ,779 049 3 ,330 050 5 ,258 051 4 ,066 052 5 ,2 6 0 053 5 ,446 054 5 ,1 2 0 WHITE BLACK 4 ,585 451 5 ,183 442 2 ,397 186 2 ,722 286 648 6 ,8 4 0 3,734 695 2,091 5 ,553 4 ,142 68 1,861 3 ,078 5 ,3 7 7 133 1,575 40 5 ,639 87 7 ,676 12 2 ,835 36 4 ,1 9 7 41 4 ,3 3 6 36 4,311 922 4 ,834 85 4 ,515 8 4,981 22 6 ,701 3 6 ,3 6 9 1 BLACK 680 656 227 111 5,321 73 3 ,668 67 3 ,302 122 45 115 13 67 84 79 37 100 18 44 2 24 1960 1970 W H ITE B LA CK W H ITE BLA CK 2,768 519 821 977 543 5 ,559 81 6 ,852 150 2 ,372 31 3,234 73 3 ,041 8 1,825 62 6 ,8 8 0 31 5 ,8 1 7 49 5 ,559 11 4 ,8 5 8 121 4 ,548 49 4 ,525 10 4 ,642 5 3 ,742 205 4 ,418 122 3 ,662 418 4,265 135 3 ,438 4 ,8 1 7 24 4 ,4 8 9 22 2,962 1 ,877 2 ,4 3 7 1 ,280 5 ,6 9 0 25 6 ,3 8 6 9 6 ,719 5 7 ,172 3 2 ,654 14 2 ,7 5 3 10 3 ,074 8 2 ,973 4 3 ,369 196 3 ,4 3 3 193 4 ,640 1 ,500 5 1 8 7 ,006 3 ,984 52 2 ,871 56 4 ,025 4 3 ,584 0 4 ,293 10 3 ,771 2 5 ,946 0 5 ,344 1 5 ,9 6 2 5 4 ,2 8 7 2 ,620 # C E N SU S 194 0 1950 T R A C T W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE 055 3 ,070 3 4 ,070 056 4,586 2 5 ,580 057 4 ,306 1 6 ,101 058 6 1 ,495 57 059.01 4 ,3 0 0 0 59 .02 060.01 1 ,396 060 .02 061 149 062 2 ,5 6 7 063.01 4 ,628 063 .02 064 4 ,3 9 8 065 4 ,519 066 89 067 2 ,651 068 3,582 069 5 ,817 070 2 ,738 071 .01 7 ,285 071 .02 072 3 ,649 073.01 6 ,755 1960 1970 WHITE B LA C K WHITE B LA C K 4,284 34 562 3 ,443 4 ,970 1 3 ,497 1 ,539 6 ,3 6 6 0 1 ,813 5 ,524 7 ,008 1 930 7,304 3 ,3 7 8 3 601 3 ,717 4 ,643 0 3 ,925 648 2 ,506 0 1,185 0 4 ,751 7 4 ,298 4 4 ,532 25 5 ,2 1 0 0 4 ,5 2 7 0 2 ,463 1 2,211 1 5 ,762 0 5 ,892 2 6 ,253 0 6 ,2 5 7 0 2 ,509 0 3 ,123 3 2 ,343 1 4 ,384 59 590 2 1,913 4 2,613 29 2 ,1 7 8 138 4 ,432 2,371 1 ,763 5,861 3,703 3 4 ,635 6 2 ,859 16 2 ,452 2 BLACK 0 0 3 3 ,539 1 1 0 1 1 7 0 0 4 0 4 0 60 13 110 CENSUS 1940 1950 T R A C T 073 .02 W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B LA C K 074 716 56 075.01 075 .02 990 132 076.01 076 .02 076 .03 076 .04 2,534 72 077 2 ,679 60 078.01 078 .02 078 .03 1 ,518 23 079.01 079 .02 1 ,738 6 080 2 ,940 69 081 4 ,298 23 082 2 ,270 8 083 1 ,286 2 084 6,241 0 085 2,541 1 086 2 ,3 1 8 3 087.01 087 .02 5 ,9 7 9 18 1960 1970 W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE BLA CK 4,001 46 4 ,0 0 9 18 1,660 49 1,676 12 1,224 89 720 14 461 6 1 ,728 20 2,285 3 1 ,286 45 803 9 4 ,084 13 838 3 3 ,670 4 5 ,743 39 5 ,733 33 4 ,2 3 0 3 ,019 893 1 3 ,448 3,171 6 ,970 81 2 ,1 8 9 3 7,712 16 5 ,629 1 5,851 5 5 ,456 23 5 ,885 5 5 ,9 2 6 18 6 ,9 1 7 8 3 ,3 4 3 1 5 ,0 2 9 0 2 ,037 6 1 ,623 2 6 ,8 6 3 6 6 ,2 2 5 4 3 ,5 3 8 1 3 ,274 0 4 ,318 3 925 3 ,155 1,916 5 362 4 ,606 9,491 1 1 ,099 12,334 10a C E N SU S 1940 1950 1960 1970 T R A C T W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B LA C K 088 4,691 1 9 ,138 15 407 11 ,829 089 2 ,7 6 9 1,004 1,590 18 676 7,272 090.01 2 ,2 4 8 36 999 1 1 ,177 7 090 .02 2 ,540 0 4,221 1 091 .01 4 4 7 34 6 ,322 0 5 ,378 0 091 .02 8 ,274 0 8 ,782 1 092 .01 4 ,172 12 4,601 1 5 ,4 0 6 2 092 .02 4 ,535 0 4 ,7 1 0 0 093.01 5 ,112 33 3,891 2 3 ,648 2 093 .02 4 ,2 4 7 0 7 ,310 57 094 525 2 7 ,966 2 6 ,969 6 095 2 ,412 9 2 ,485 0 096.01 6 ,954 64 12 ,011 90 096 .02 8 ,6 5 7 3 096 .03 4 ,7 4 6 0 096 .04 2 ,059 137 097 5 ,766 2 8 ,6 6 9 7 098 4 ,7 8 8 3 9 ,1 5 7 8 099 4 ,621 0 3 ,185 2 100 1 ,170 3 ,289 861 2 ,764 101 4 ,200 7,702 3 ,5 6 7 7 ,569 102 315 7 ,417 329 6,171 103 5,062 2 299 4 ,448 11a C E N SU S 194 0 T R A C T W H ITE B LA C K 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111.01 111.02 112 113 114.01 114.02 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122.01 122 .02 123 1950 W H ITE B L A C K 196 0 1970 W H ITE UU B LA C K W H ITE B LA CK 2,1 6 7 351 902 1,568 1 ,527 3 ,329 1,119 2 ,720 5 ,695 172 5 ,4 9 7 282 3,664 0 6 ,3 9 0 24 4 ,8 9 2 1 14,901 12 386 8 1 ,312 6 3 ,907 0 10 ,138 1 7 ,047 13 1,914 7 11 ,584 19 2 ,688 2 846 2 ,696 1,376 1 174 4 ,643 402 0 133 4 ,369 134 1,605 168 6 ,3 0 2 42 6 ,7 2 9 5 ,113 0 7 ,484 19 4 ,192 3 5 ,841 4 2 ,174 0 2 ,686 0 1 ,110 0 2,454 0 1 ,281 0 2 ,526 0 275 0 2 2 7 15 3 ,490 4 12 ,168 2 4 ,066 175 4 ,916 2 6 ,9 9 4 9 12a C E N SU S 194 0 19 5 0 T R A C T W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K 124 125 126 127 128 129 130.01 130.02 131 132 133 134.01 134 .02 135 136.01 136 .02 136 .03 137 .03 138.01 140.01 140.02 141.0 I 141.02 1960 1970 W H ITE B LA CK W H ITE B LA CK 6,381 11 6 ,820 4 9,515 1 8 ,8 3 0 0 2 ,228 0 4 ,0 1 0 0 8,811 0 8 ,325 2 6 ,534 3 9 ,183 7 5,371 1 5 ,293 0 7 ,657 100 13 ,746 70 9 ,6 8 0 15 2 ,646 6 7,725 9 1,614 255 2 ,1 2 8 80 2,341 9 2 ,049 2 1 ,767 5 1,146 8 1,504 0 967 8 2 ,885 8 1 ,770 312 1,112 247 7 ,600 2 11 ,191 20 0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 37 0 13a 1950C E N S U S 1940 TRACT WHITE BLACK WHITE 148 158 159 163 164 165.01 165 .02 165.03 165.04 166.01 167.01 167.02 169.01 169 .02 171 176.01 178.01 178.02 179 180 181.03 184 BLACK 1960 1970 WHITE BLACK WHITE B LA CK 0 0 0 0 0 0 37 0 42 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 0 0 562 0 1 ,627 21 0 0 86 1 0 0 1 ,477 10 1 ,638 0 2 ,068 24 146 3 ,085 341 395 547 90 155 2,851 113 6 164 0 135 0 156 0 0 0 0 0 209 0 205 0 166 0 101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14a CENSUS T R A C T 185.01 185 .02 190.01 190 .02 190 .03 192.01 194 0 1950 1960 1970 W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B LA C K 68 48 19 0 66 2 112 14 0 8 0 0 453 2 169 0 4 ,6 9 7 5 Source: 1940, 195 0, 1960and 1970 Census o f Population, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 15a APPENDIX C THE DALLAS ALLIANCE CORRESPONDENT ORGANIZATIONS American G.I. Forum American Indian Center of Dallas, Inc, American Institute of Architects, Dallas Chapter American Jewish Committee, Dallas Chapter Amigos Bishop College BTJai B'Rith Womens' Council Boy's Club of Dallas, Inc. Brown Berets Camp Fire Council of Metropolitan Dallas Catholic Charities Catholic Diocese of Dallas Church Women United Community Council of Greater Dallas Community Relations Council, Jewish Federation of Greater Dallas Council of Catholic Women, Dallas Deanery Cumberland Presbyterian Church Dallas Alumnae Chapter, Delta Sigma Theta Dallas Association for Retarded Citizens Dallas Association of Young Lawyers Dallas Bar Association Dallas Black Chamber of Commerce Dallas Chamber of Commerce Dallas Citizens Council Dallas City Council of PTAs 17a Dallas Civic Ballet Dallas Council on Alcoholism Dallas County Adult Probation Department Dallas County AFL-CIO Dallas County Community Action Committee Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation Center Dallas County Nutrition Program Dallas Federation of Women's Clubs Dallas Homeowners League Dallas Housing Authority Dallas Housing Forum Dallas Inter-Tribal Center Dallas Junior Chamber of Commerce Dallas Mexican Chamber of Commerce Dallas Opportunities Industrialization Center Dallas Police Department Dallas Minority Business Center Dallas Public Library Dallas Symphony Association, Inc. Dallas Urban League East Dallas Community Design Center Family Guidance Center Goals for Dallas Goodwill Industries of Dallas, Inc. Greater Dallas Community of Churches Greater Dallas Community Relations Commission Greater Dallas Crime Commission Greater Dallas Housing Opportunity Center, Inc. Greater Dallas Planning Council Historic Preservation League of Dallas, Inc. Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance Jobs for Progress, Inc, (Operation SER) Junior League of Dallas, Inc. League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) League of Women Voters of Dallas Links, Inc., of Dallas Los Barrios Unidas Clinic Mental Health Association of Dallas County Mount Olive Volunteer Effort (MOVE) National Alliance of Businessmen National Association of Social Workers, Inc. National Conference of Christians & Jews National Council of Jewish Women, Greater Dallas Section National Organization for Women (NOW) NAACP — John F. Kennedy Branch NAACP — Oak Cliff/Cedar Crest Branch NAACP — South Dallas Branch Neighborhood Conservation Alliance Neighborhood Housing Services of Dallas, Inc. North Park/Love Field Civic League Rabbinical Association of Dallas Salesmanship Club of Dallas Salvation Army Senior Citizens of Greater Dallas, Inc. Southern Methodist University Tejas Girl Scout Council, Inc. Theater Three United Methodist Church, Office of the Bishop 18a 19a Urban Studies Program, SMU Venture Advisors, Inc. Visiting Nurses Association Voluntary Action Center of Dallas County Wesley Rankin Community Center Womens' Council of Dallas County, Inc. Women for Change Center YMCA of Dallas Metropolitan Area YWCA of Metropolitan Dallas