Curry v. Dallas NAACP Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae
Public Court Documents
May 1, 1979
Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Curry v. Dallas NAACP Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae, 1979. b559bcc7-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9d9a02fe-5fcc-4ce7-a0a3-e8db45614fba/curry-v-dallas-naacp-motion-for-leave-to-file-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed November 01, 2025.
Copied!
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-282
DONALD E. CURRY, ET AL.,
versus
Petitioners,
DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., and
NOLAN ESTES, ET AL.,
No. 78-253
Respondents.
NOLAN ESTES, ET AL.,
versus
Petitioners,
DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,
No. 78-283
RALPH F. BRINEGAR, ET AL.,
versus
DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,
Respondents.
Petitioners,
Respondents.
Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and
Brief of Amicus Curiae
The Dallas Alliance and
The Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance
H. Ron White
1907 Elm St., Suite 2100
Dallas, Texas 75201
Lucas A. Powe, Jr.
2500 Red River Street
Austin, Texas 78705
Attorneys for The Dallas Alliance
and The Education Task Force
of the Dallas Alliance
SCOFIELDS' QUALITY PRINTERS, P. O. BOX 53096, N. O., LA. 70153 - 504/822-1611
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-282
DONALD E. CURRY, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
versus
DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., and
NOLAN ESTES, ET AL.,
Respondents.
No. 78-253
NOLAN ESTES, ET AL.,
versus
Petitioners,
DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,
Respondents.
No. 78-283
RALPH F. BRINEGAR, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
versus
DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,
Respondents.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR
THE DALLAS ALLIANCE AND THE
EDUCATION TASK FORCE OF THE DALLAS ALLIANCE
M OTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
The Dallas Alliance and the Education Task Force of
the Dallas Alliance hereby respectfully move for leave
to file the attached Brief Amicus Curiae in this case
pursuant to Rule 42 of this Court. The consent of at
torneys for the petitioners and for the respondents,
Tasby, et al, has been obtained and the letters have
been deposited with the Clerk. The consent of the at
torney for the respondent NAACP was requested but
refused.
The Dallas Alliance is a service organization de
signed to encourage cooperation and combined effort
of community groups in seeking resolution of urban
problems affecting the Dallas community. The Alliance
is comprised of a 40-member Board of Trustees drawn
from local government, the business sector, and the
community at large. The Board's racial composition
reflects the ethnic makeup of the city's population. In
addition, approximately 90 community organizations
are affiliated with the Alliance, designated as com
munity correspondent organizations.
The Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance was
formed in October, 1975. Consisting of seven Anglos,
seven Mexican-Americans, six Blacks and one
American Indian, the group's mission was the creation
of a consensus school desegregation plan which would
be constitutionally acceptable. The Task Force im
mediately commenced an energetic and exhaustive in
volvement in the drafting process. After more than
four months and 1500 work hours, including
num erous conferences with leading educators
throughout the Nation, the Task Force was able to
agree on a consensus plan. This plan was then sub
mitted to the district court in the middle of the month
of remedy hearings. The district judge subsequently
adopted the plan of the Task Force (with modifications)
as his final order in the case.
In both the district court and the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit the Task Force has participated as
Amicus Curiae in support of the consensus plan. The
Task Force's familiarity with this case, with DISD, and
with the concepts the district judge ordered place it in a
unique position to be of assistance in fleshing out the
issues involved in this complex urban desegregation
suit. Furthermore, the Task Force believes it likely that
the other briefs may argue this case on grounds
broader than necessary for an appropriate resolution of
the controversy.
Therefore, The Dallas Alliance and the Education
Task Force of the Dallas Alliance respectfully move for
leave to file the attached Brief Amicus Curiae.
Respectfully submitted,
H. Ron White
1907 Elm St., Suite 2100
Dallas, Texas 75201
Lucas A. Powe, Jr.
2500 Red River Street
Austin, Texas 78705
Attorneys for the Dallas
Alliance and the
Education Task Force
of the Dallas Alliance
Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae
in Behalf of The Dallas Alliance and the
Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance ----- i
Table of Authorities ...................................... vi
Interest of Amicus C u r ia e ................................................ 2
Introduction and Statement of the C a s e .....................2
A. The Narrow Issue ............................................. 2
B. Demographic History of Dallas ........... .. 4
1. Black Movement 1940-70 .........................5
2. Anglo Movement 1940-70 . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Mexican American Movement
1940-70 ........................................................ 8
4. The P re se n t.................................................. 8
C. The District Court's O r d e r ........................ 9
Summary of Argument ............................... 14
Argument ................................................ 15
I. The District Judge Appropriately
Exercised the Broad Discretion
Necessary to Implement a Desegrega
tion P la n .............................................................. 15
II. Washington v. Davis and Its Progeny
Have No Place in a Southern School
Desegregation C a s e ............................................26
C onclusion........................................................................... 28
Proof of Service ....................... 29
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
Appendix A: Plate Maps Showing Racial
Composition of Dallas, 1940-70 ............................ la
Appendix B: Dallas Census Tract Statistics
by Race, 1940-70 ........................................................ 6a
Appendix C: Community Organizations Af
filiated with The Dallas Alliance ........................ 16a
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Ashbacker Radio Co. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327
(1945) .................................................... 20
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 494
(1954) ............................................................................. 16
Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294
(1955) .............. 3,16,20,27,28
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of
Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) ........................ 22
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406 (1977) ........................................................ 15
Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391
U.S. 430 (1 9 6 8 ) ..............................3,4,16,25,27
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) . 16
Milliken v. Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) . . . 14,16,
22,23,24
Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D.
Mass. 1974) 14
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F. 2d 580 (CA 1
1974) ................................................................... 14
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424 (1 9 7 6 ) .................................................... 18
Singleton v. jackson Municipal Separate
School District, 419 F.2d 1211 (CA 5 1970). .12-13
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) ..................4,13,16,17,
19,27,28
Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex.
1976) .............................................................. 10,11,13,22
Tasby v. Estes, 572 F. 2d 1010 (CA 5 1 9 7 8 ) ...........15
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) . . 2,26,27
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,
85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976) ......................... 16
Bickel, Education in a Democracy: The Legal and Prac
tical Problems of School Busing, 3 Human Rights
53 (1973) ....................................................................... 18
K. Clark, A Possible Reality: A Design for the Attain
ment of High Academic Achievement for Inner City
Students (1972) ........................................................ 19-20
Hain, Sealing off the City: School Desegregation in
Detroit, in H. Kalodner & j. Fishman eds.,
The Limits of Justice 233 (1978)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Continued)
Page
. . 21
Mays, Comment: Atlanta — Living with Brown
Twenty Years Later, 3 Black L.J. 184 (1974)- . . . . . 23
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Fulfilling the
Letter and Spirit of the Law (1976) ...................... 16,25
Willie, The Sociology of Urban Education, 59-76,
Lexington Books of D.C., Heath Company
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Continued)
Page
(1978) ............................................................................. 11
Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, 84
School Rev. 313 (1976) .............................. .. . 14,16,22
Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned
Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the
Supreme Court, 42 Law and Contemp. Probs.
(Spring 1978) (forthcoming) ....................... .. 20
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1978
No. 78-282
DONALD E. CURRY, ET AL„
Petitioners,
versus
DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL„ and
NOLAN ESTES, ET AL.,
Respondents.
No. 78-253
NOLAN ESTES, ET AL„
versus
Petitioners,
DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,
Respondents.
No. 78-283
RALPH F. BRINEGAR, ET AL.,
versus
Petitioners,
DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,
Respondents.
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
THE DALLAS ALLIANCE AND THE
EDUCATION TASK FORCE OF THE DALLAS ALLIANCE
2
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The Dallas Alliance is a service organization designed
to encourage cooperation and combined effort of com
munity groups in seeking resolution of urban problems
affecting the Dallas community. The Alliance is com
prised of a 40-member Board of Trustees drawn from
local government, the business sector, and the com
munity at large. The Board's racial composition reflects
the ethnic makeup of the city's population. In addition,
numerous community organizations are affiliated with
the Alliance, designated as community correspondent
organizations. (A list appears in Appendix C).
As stated in greater detail in the Motion for Leave to
File Brief Amicus Curiae, the Education Task Force of the
Dallas Alliance is a tri-ethnic group that labored for
1500 hours in developing the consensus plan that was
subsequently adopted by the district court in its final
order.
IN TRODUCTION AND
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Narrow Issue
The most far-reaching issue presented in this litiga
tion and briefed to the Court is an issue which neither
the district court nor the Court of Appeals decided:
whether the principles of Washington v, Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976) should be interjected into school desegrega
tion litigation in the urban South. Not only was this
issue not faced below, it need not be faced here. Instead
this case may be decided on the very traditional
grounds of the discretion of a district judge. To say that
the issue is traditional, however, is hardly to trivialize
it. The vast urban setting of the eighth largest school
system in the United States heightens its importance
and provides a unique focus for exploring the
parameters of informed discretion.
Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) placed
a special burden on district judges. Not only were they
to be in the vanguard of Southern desegregation, but in
so doing they were to demonstrate "a practical flexibili
ty in shaping remedies and. . . a facility for adjusting
and reconciling public and private needs." Id. at 300.
The duty to reconcile has lost none of its importance
over time even though the context for the application
of the duty has changed markedly. Thus, thanks to
Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)
and its immediate progeny, by 1970 rural desegrega
tion was complete. But the harder task, that of
desegregating the urban systems was barely begin
ning. The cries of nullification and interposition from
Louisiana and Virginia had been stilled only to be
replaced by the shouts from Boston and Louisville. The
quaint names of the rural South vanished, to be replac
ed by the more familiar nomenclature of urban
A m erica: C h arlo tte , Mobile, Denver, Detroit,
Pasadena, Dayton. But still, throughout all the
changes, it remains the federal district judges who bear
the primary burden of implementing the appropriate
constitutional principles. To them falls the often
thankless work; to “grapple with the flinty, intractable
realities of day-to-day implementation" of school
desegregation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
A district judge, however, must do more than grap
ple. He must decide. And in so doing he must imple
ment a desegregation plan that "promises realistically
to work." Green, 391 U.S. at 439. In a large, urban, tri
ethnic community such as Dallas, where thousands of
citizens are relocating their homes annually, the ap
propriate choices are hardly self-evident. Yet they
must be made.
The starting point for any desegregation plan is
determining where the children live. This litigation has
been protracted and each time the case has come before
the district court substantial demographic changes
have occurred. If nothing else, Dallas has been an ur
ban boom town. A brief look at its demographic history
is essential for understanding the setting.
B. Demographic History of Dallas
In the thirty year period (1940-1970) Dallas changed
radically. There were population changes in size, loca
tion, economic characteristics, composition by race and
eth n icity , as well as school age population
characteristics. To a large extent Dallas is a new city,
suburban in its development pattern with single,
detached dwelling units being the dominant form of
5
housing until very recently. Population densities by
tract are low in comparison with northeastern and
even other southern cities.
Since 1940 the physical size of the city and DISD
have both quadrupled to well over 350 square miles of
territory. The growth came largely in two major
spurts, one in the early 1950's and the other in the early
1960's.
To understand this growth in physical size and pop
ulation some understanding of the physical and social
geography is necessary. The core of the city is along the
Trinity River. On the north side of the river the land is
flat and in 1940 most (75%) of this area was planted in
cotton in farm plats of approximately 80 to 100 acres.
To the south is the Oak Cliff area which has rocky soil
and a hilly type of terrain not suitable for industry or
agriculture.
1. Black Movement— 1940-70
In 1940 75% of the small Black population lived in
two areas of the city: immediately to the north of the
Central Business District and to the far southeast of
the Central Business District.1 Both of these areas are
now completely surrounded by new areas. The re
maining 25% of the Black population was more dispers
ed and only 10 of the 58 tracts in the city at that time
had fewer than 1% Black population.2
1 Plates of Dallas in 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970 showing racial
percentages are in Appendix A.
2 Census tract statistics are in Appendix B.
6
The pattern of racial location in 1950 remained es
sentially the same with the exception of major
territorial annexation to the north and south with
many more Anglo tracts.
In 1957 a major annexation of a West Dallas district
occurred. This area had two barrio areas, few Anglos
and substantial Blacks. At the time of annexation
this area, located in the west between Oak Cliff and
North Dallas, had less than 11% of the housing above
code, only 2 miles of paved streets, one 60 year-old
school building, no parks, no sewers, no storm drains.
During the huge growth of the 1950's the city's pop
ulation and territory more than doubled. Black location
concentration moved into the area identified as South
Dallas (just north of the Trinity River). This was an
older area being abandoned by Anglos moving to the
far north of Dallas. A concentrated group of census
tracts changed during the 1950's from Anglo to Black.3
While Black population was doubling, the rapidly ex
panding Anglo population resulted in the DISD being
15-20% Black.
The area known as East Oak Cliff had 65% of its pre
sent housing built during this period. It was in 1960 a
series of suburban type development subdivisions.
Black residents were in two zones of this area of the
city — in the older housing in far northeast Oak Cliff
directly across the Trinity River from South Dallas on
the only bridge and to the far south where Bishop
College was placed after moving from Marshall, Texas.
3 Tracts 28, 29, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39.02, 40 and 41.
7
Within a three year period of the 1960's a tremen
dous change, one with no Northern or Eastern city
comparisons, took place in the recently developed sub
divisions of East Oak Cliff — the area south of the river
and east of Interstate 35E. While originally built for and
marketed to Anglos, the average Anglo occupancy was
but 2.3 years. Almost two dozen census tracts in the
area shift from 90% Anglo to 90% Black.* Six of these
tracts did not exist in 1940; four did not exist until
1970. In effect a new area of the city, with new schools,
new streets, new shopping centers (the first two major
centers in Dallas were built in this area) went from
Anglo to Black overnight.
2. Anglo Movement— 1940-70
Anglo movements in this 30 year period show a
different pattern to the fringes of the city — far
northwest, northeast, east (Pleasant Grove) and far
southwest. The growth was phenomenal and demon
strates the recency and amount of post-war affluence
in Dallas. While Blacks were coming from Louisiana
and East Texas rural areas, for working class oppor
tunities, Anglo Dallas in its affluence was coming from
the upper midwest for corporate and financial oppor
tunities. This wealth concentrated in the far north area
and is, again, in housing not even there in 1950.
F u r t h e r , t r e m e n d o u s suburban expansion,
predominantly Anglo, took place around the city. 4
4 Tracts 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59.01, 59.02, 71.02, 86, 87.01, 87.02,
88, 89, 103, 104, 112, 113, 114.01, 114.02, 167.01, 169.01.
8
3. Mexican American Movement — 1940-70
While there is no census data on Mexican American
location, an area north of the Central Business District
by 1940 was called "Little Mexico" and the few Mexican
Americans in Dallas were concentrated there. Most of
the Mexican American population has come to Dallas
during the current decade and is concentrated in an arc
from West Dallas to East Dallas directly north of the
Central Business District.
4. The Present
In the period 1970-1975 racial data from the census
are not available. Public school data, the Department of
Urban Planning, and Real Estate Board reports do
provide some insights. First, the city's and DISD's ex
pansion in territory and overall population is com
pleted. The suburban ring exists. Second, population
densities have been increasing with many huge apart
ment complexes. Over 50% of all housing starts during
this period were multi-party structures. This propor
tion is much higher today. Third, and most importantly,
the Anglo school: district population in the past decade
has shifted from 63% to approximately 35%. In elemen
tary ages it is even lower. At first blush it is difficult to
comprehend how the city's population remains majori
ty Anglo while the Anglo percentage in DISD keeps
dropping. The reason is the cost of housing in the
Anglo areas of far North Dallas. In Northwest Dallas
housing built from 1957-1961 sold originally for $28 to
$31,000. The average age of the head of the household
was 31 with 3 children, elementary age. Today these
9
same homes sell for $70 to $180,000 with average age
of the head of the household being 52, 3 children, 1 high
school age, and the other 2 already gone.
The demographic picture of Dallas makes clear the
enormity of the task facing a district judge. Unlike
many cities where whites ring a black core and pie
shaped wedges will accomplish considerable racial mix
ing,5 Dallas has great physical separation of Blacks
from most Anglos by, first, the Trinity River, second,
the Central Business District, and finally by a Mexican
American arc. From far South Dallas (e.g., South Oak
Cliff or Zumwalt schools) to far North Dallas (W. T.
White or Dealey schools) is approximately a 50 minute
drive by car on Sunday. Yet the Black population is
largely in South Dallas and the Anglos are in the far
north.6 The problem is exacerbated by the low densi
ties of Anglo children (except for the naturally
integrated Pleasant Grove) and the band of Mexican
American settlements between the Anglos and the
Blacks.
C. The District Court's Plan
How, then, to desegregate? Between plaintiffs,
defendants, interveners, amicus, and even students
there were numerous theories and several carefully
prepared plans. When the month of hearings ended in
March 1976, judge Taylor had before him six major
5 E.g., Charlotte-Mecklenburg.
6 Housing costs, occupational demands, and convenience make
it clear Anglos will continue to occupy the far north of the city. It is
less clear how long they will remain in the southwest and
southeast.
10
plans for achieving a unitary school system. As would
be expected deep divisions existed among them on the
amount of busing to be ordered.7 Beyond that,
however, there were a surprising number of common
points in most of the plans: The huge district should be
divided into more manageable subdistricts,8 each of
which should reflect the ethnic mix of the district as a
whole; naturally integrated areas (not more than 75%
Anglo or 75% Black and Mexican American combined)
should be preserved;9 magnet schools, such as the
nationally renowned Skyline in Pleasant Grove, should
be created to accomplish desegregation in the high
school grades;10 East Oak Cliff, because of geography
and the location of naturally integrated areas, might re
main unchanged.11 Additionally, there were middle
points about which some of the parties appeared to care
more than others. These included accountability
mechanisms and the use of desegregation tools beyond
transportation.
7 The highest was Plaintiffs' Plan A at 69,000; the lowest was
D1SD at 14,000.
8 On this point there was less agreemen t since the polarity of the
NAACP and DISD Plans led each to reject subdividing. Subdivid
ing was present and heavily stressed in both plans of Plaintiffs and
the Dallas Alliance Plan.
9 Judge Taylor noted “as all parties recognized, there would be
no benefit educational or otherwise in disturbing this trend
toward residential integration." 412 F. Supp. 1192, 1206.
10 Everyone supported the magnet concept.
11 Only the NAACP and Plaintiffs' Plan A disagreed.
11
The district court, in fashioning an order, incor
porated not only the common desegregation tools that
were tendered in each of the plans but adopted some
new and innovative tools that appear necessary for an
urban school district plan that is majority minority.
The district court's final order of April 7 ,1976, divid
ed the school district into six subdistricts. This con
figuration was to preserve the naturally integrated
areas; heighten parental involvement; achieve max
imum desegregation within each subdistrict; facilitate
administration and student assignment.
As a means of facilitating student assignment for
desegregation purposes as well as to insure maximum
utilization of existing facilities, the judge standardized
the grades throughout the district.12 This standardi
zation provided for the establishment of K-3 Early
Childhood Education Centers that were required to
use the Diagnostic Prescriptive concept that had
proven successful in California with respect to parental
involvement.13 Special programming was included in
the 4-6 Vanguard schools and the 7-8 Academies. The
magnet concept was employed at the 9-12 high school
level.
12 "In a good school desegregation plan: [there is] . . . (d) a uni
form grade structure [that] facilitates interchange between and
easy access to all units or schools within the system." Willie, The
Sociology of Urban Education, 60, Lexington Books of D.C., Heath
Company (1978). Contrast the proposals of Plaintiffs' Plan A and
B which respectively have 14 and 9 different grade structures for
elementary schools.
13 Thus, the order looked to using parents in the requirement to
move as rapidly as possible to a 1-10 adult-student ratio in the Ear
ly Childhood Education Centers. 412 F. Supp. at 1214.
12
The court recognized its charge as being one of pro
viding an equal educational opportunity to all students
within the district by desegregating the district to the
maximum extent practicable. One of the desegregation
tools employed was student assignment. Once the
judge had carved out the naturally integrated areas and
divided the district into subdistricts that reflected the
approximate racial ratio of the entire school district, ex
cept for East Oak Cliff and Seagoville,14 there were few
options remaining. To facilitate the necessary parental
involvement, students that were in the K-3 grades
were assigned to schools within two miles of their
home if possible. Students in grades 4-8 were assigned
to centers in areas of centrality within their subdistrict
which generally reflected an ethnic balance (except for
East Oak Cliff). To provide maximum desegregation in
all new special programs such as the 4-6 Vanguard, the
7-8 Academies and the 9-12 magnets, the court re
quired that the enrollment in each of these special
schools reflect the racial makeup of the grade level.
The judge in this case, recognizing the instability and
ineffectiveness of the sole employment of a student
assignment tool, elected to go further in his remedial
order. He adopted a variety of desegregation techni
ques. Some, of course, are reasonably familiar. E.g.,
The Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District,
14 Seagoville, an area of blue collar Anglos, was made a separate
subdistrict because of its geographical isolation from the rest of
DISD. It lies in the far southeast, and although Seagoville is 81.5%
Anglo, it contains less than 2% of DISD's student population. The
nearest pocket of Blacks is 15 miles distant.
419 F, 2d 1211 (CA 5 1970) order on personnel.15
Others, however, have not heretofore been estab
lished as universal remedies. It was here, drawing on
the compromise efforts of the Education Task Force of
the Dallas Alliance, that the plan best reflected the
nature of the community. Because of the Mexican
American children, bilingual and multi-cultural educa
tion were needed as well as minority to majority trans
fers for Mexican Americans.16 Special programs for all,
including career education, curriculum transfers for
the physically handicapped, mentally retarded and
highly gifted were included. To ensure an ethnic mix at
the very top of the system a recruiting and employment
requirement to employ Blacks and Mexican Americans
in administrative posts according to their percent of the
population was ordered. In addition both an internal
and external accountability systems were ordered.
15 The other familiar techniques included: majority to minority
transfer; authorization to the district to modify attendance zones
to further promote desegregation; establishment of new facilities
in areas that will promote and enhance desegregation; the es
tablishment of a tri-ethnic committee to report to the court on a
continual basis; a discipline and due process policy; and retention
of jurisdiction.
The Fifth Circuit held that Judge Taylor erred in failing to re
quire D1SD to assume the burden of providing transportation to
those students electing to choose majority to minority transfer.
The inclusion of such a provision in an order is not a matter of dis
cretion, Swann v. Charlolte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1,
26-27 (1971), and the Fifth Circuit was hyper-technical in its read
ing of Part X of the order. The Dallas Alliance's Plan intended D1SD
to assume the burden; part X (3) of the order requires D1SD to
assume the burden; and in fact DISD is assuming the burden and
has done so from the time of the order.
16 "Mexican Americans who comprise less than five percent
of the school to which they are originally assigned, may transfer to
a school that offers the Bilingual Education Program." 412 F.
Supp. at 1218.
13
14
The totality of the tools selected anticipated Milliken
v. Bradley 11, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) and evidenced the far
sighted approach taken by the district court. Further
more, they suggest that it is questionable as to whether
any tri-ethnic school district can fully realize its
desegregative goal by student assignment alone.
Creativity is a necessary aspect.17
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. What occurred in the district court is precisely
what ought to occur. A district judge appraised himself
of all the available facts, considered and combined the
options, recognized the necessity of some compromise
among positions, selected the options best suited to
providing an equal and quality desegregated
educational opportunity to each child in the system,
and adopted a plan that promises to work both im
mediately and in the future. The promise of success is a
17 A very similar conclusion was reached by Plaintiffs' expert
witness, Dr. Charles V. Willie of Harvard. Dr. Willie was one of
the masters appointed by Judge Garrity in Morgan v. Hennigan, 379
F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509
F. 2d 580 (CA 1 1974) cert, denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), the Boston
case. He concludes an article about the largely rejected plan he
drafted by noting that it proposed "a new approach to school de
segregation which attempted to unite method and purpose. Some
of our proposals were rejected in favor of advancing racial quotas,
method without its purposes. . . How to prevent separation of
method from purpose in education is a problem in need of serious
study. An editorial in the New York Times summed up the issue
quite nicely: Integration must be made synonymous with better
education (May 20, 1975). Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?
84 School Rev. 313, 325 (1976).
15
key component. Success comes from quality and is
sustained by support. Judge Taylor knew of Boston and
Louisville. He knew that a court order without support
in the community is an exercise of will, not of dis
cretion. He charged the community to come forward
and make the plan work. The community responded ac
cordingly. To hold, as the Court of Appeals did, that
more had to be done, crossed the limits of appellate
review of district court discretion.18 Dayton Board of
Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 409 (1977).
2. Since this can and should be decided on the
narrow issue of the informed discretion of the district
judge, no other issues need be reached. But should the
issue tendered by the Curry Intervenors be faced, their
position should be rejected. Transmuting school suits
into battles that tax social science methodologies
beyond their limits holds promise for neither schools
nor courts — nor this Nation.
% ARGUMENT
I. The District Judge Appropriately Exer
cised The Broad Discretion Necessary To Im
plement A Successful Desegregation Plan.
18 In spite of Fifth Circuit's ruling, it acknowledged the com
prehensive approach by the district judge: "After developing a
voluminous record and holding hearings for over a month on the
feasibility and effectiveness of these proposals, the district judge
drew a comprehensive plan dealing, inter alia, with special
programs, transportation, discipline, facilities, personnel, and an
accountability system, as well as student assignments." 572 F, 2d
1010, 1013 (CA 5 1978).
The Civil Rights Commission in its 1976 report Ful
filling the Letter and Spirit of the Law spent considerable
detail to remind us of the received knowledge after two
decades of school desegregation: successful desegrega
tion happens not by chance but through planning and
total community commitment. Id. at 168-201. "Only in
learning together as equals, sharing knowledge and ex
periences, can children hope to develop the cultural
values which will prepare them to be fully contributing
members of society." Id. at 206. The report reflects well
the breadth of school desegregation in attempting to
provide the promise of Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 494 (1954): equal educational opportunities for
all.19
The path to the promise is not perfectly marked and
cryptic statements in Brown II, Swann and Green tell the
19 We do not read Brown 1 as purely a race case. First, it is not so
written; indeed it is written as an education case. Second, if it were
solely a race case, the remedy would have been significantly easier
to achieve and none of the language of Brown 11 and Swann would
have been necessary. Third, as a race case it places incredible
strains on credulity to assume that Southern schools, but for
segregation would have been integrated, while the Northern
schools would not. Milliken v. Bradley 1, 418 U.S. 717(1974). Finally,
while treating Brown as a race case has the advantage of simplicity
of remedy — bus to balance — it carries the corresponding difficul
ty of ignoring the mission of any school system: to provide a quali
ty education to each child. If the mission is recognized, the
availability of a richness of remedial actions in a school desegrega
tion context becomes apparent. Milliken v. Bradley 11, 433 U.S. 267
(1977). See generally, Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976).
See also Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, 84 School Rev. 313
(1976): "The fact that this desegregation decision was intended to
foster education seems to have been forgotten."
17
district judge upon default by a school board a broad
discretion is his. To exercise his discretion he must first
learn, then act, and finally evaluate (somewhat later)
the success of his product. Few other discretionary
decisions probe so deeply into the resources of a judge
or approach even a fraction of the difficulty. And, as we
have noted, the geography and population shifts in
Dallas made Judge Taylor's job unenviable in its com
plexity.
Although a native Dallasite, the judge had to study
the district to learn, inter alia, where the people lived,
where they would live in five years, what the ages of
their children were, where the schools were located, as
well as the conditions, complections and capacities of
the schools. Then a solid month of trial provided Judge
Taylor with a wealth of plans and information.
Naturally, none of the plans submitted was perfect. But
some were remarkably better than others. The judge
had already recognized, as he had stated in court, that
the DISD plan was "patently unconstitutional." The
responsibility for securing a constitutionally acceptable
plan was now squarely his. When school authorities
default "a district court has broad power to fashion a
remedy that will assure a unitary school system."
Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
Of the remaining plans, one other was especially
troublesome. The quota-like approach of the NAACP
with its demand to change student assignments as
neighborhoods change not only ran against Swann's
18
presaging of the holding in Pasadena City Board of Education
v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), but the NAACP in its
commitment to provide a racially balanced system for
Blacks was willing to leave the Mexican American
children in a secondary position (at least temporarily).20
Such a conclusion is also ''patently unconstitutional"
and it is unthinkable that a district judge would accept
it. Of necessity the focus on the plan to be ordered
narrowed to those plans which were constitutional and
which promised to work. The plan finally implemented
reflected the predominant thinking of the parties to the
litigation. Where commonalities of approach were pre
sent, they were implemented.21 The process was the
essence of informed discretion: the application of
reasoned judgment to the facts at hand.
It is true that the plan selected, essentially the plan
drafted and submitted by the Education Task Force of
the Dallas Alliance, is a compromise. It is easy to deride
compromise. Furthermore, sloganeering that con
stitutional rights cannot be compromised is as
irresistable as it is irrefutable. Unfortunately, it begs
the real question. The answer, of course, is that each
20 "The first magnitude of desegregation and the attaining of an
Unitary School System should be to achieve a racial balance of
black and white students in each school and then follow through
with the integration of other minorities into the system."
(Emphasis added).
21 The commonalities available demonstrate a substantial im
provement over the situation at the beginning of this decade
where the lack of alternatives from either counsel for the plain
tiffs and the school boards virtually mandated racial balance
remedies "because there is not much else that a court can do that
will have an impact." Bickel, Education in a Democracy: The Legal and
Practical Problems of School Busing, 3 Human Rights 53, 59-60 (1973).
19
child must be granted equal educational opportunities
and there is a duty on the school board (or, that failing,
the district judge) to establish a unitary school system.
But these in turn are only starting points. Despite a
decade of urban litigation involving cities as diverse as
Charlotte, Mobile, Denver, Detroit, Pasadena, and
Dayton, major questions — questions that no district
judge can avoid — are unanswered (and sometimes un
asked). Swann assumed that some one-race schools
were allowable. But how many? For what size school
district? What parameters ought a judge employ in
evaluating the one-race school question in a majority
minority district? Is there a maximum beyond which a
district may not go regardless of the strength of the
proffered justification? If neighborhood schools are
acceptable for the very young, what grades are encom
passed? At what point does the amount of time a stu
dent spends on a bus each day become unreasonable?
As a district judge fashions his remedy to include not
only student assignments, but also quality educational
programs and faculty hiring policies that assist
desegregation, what are the priorities among them?22
Is there any room for community involvement beyond
that which the adverse parties bring to the litigation?
22 Consider Dr. Kenneth Clark's analysis:
Given the fact that public schools, so far, reflect the racial
populations of the cities, the goal of attaining high quality
education through the democratic process of realistic and
administratively feasible forms of desegregation appears
to be, at least temporarily, abandoned and is being re
placed by the need to concentrate on raising the quality of
education without regard to the present racial composi
tion of a city's public schools. This educational imperative must
be met, for the present generation of students in the public
20
Parties, obviously, have pat answers to these and
other questions. That is the nature of litigation. For
judges, however, the best that is possible is an educated
guess as to what the ultimate answers to these
questions will be, assuming that in fact answers will be
forthcoming. What a district judge faces, then, is an ex
plicit directive — establish a unitary school system —
large parameters of which are vague.23 It is hardly sur
prising that the lack of explicit rules, the vagueness of
doctrine despite numerous decisions involving urban
systems, becomes translated into the terminology of
informed discretion. For the district judge that delicate
balance of private and public needs pin-pointed by
Brown 11 must mean compromise. Not compromise in a
pejorative sense, but compromise in its best sense. For
compromise fits well with no theories and often defies
logic; its sole virtue is that in the real world it works.24
schools of our cities is not expendable. If we continue to
frustrate these students educationally, they will be, in
fact, the ingredients of the “social dynamite" which
threatens the stability of our cities, our economy, and the
democratic form of government. It is conceivable, also,
that a present emphasis on raising the quality of educa
tion for these children will eventually facilitate rather
than block the continued struggle for a non-racial
organization of the public schools in the United States.
K. Clark, A Possible Reality: A Design for the Attainment of High Academic
Achievement for Inner City Students 51 (1972) (Emphasis added).
23 See generally, Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned
Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 Law and
Contemp. Probs.______(Spring 1978) (forthcoming).
24 “Legal theory is one thing. But the practicalities are
different." Ashbacker Radio Co. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327, 332(1945).
21
While the plan adopted is largely the consensus plan
of the Dallas Alliance and thus to that extent reflects
compromise among private citizens, Amicus believes
that it is unreasonable to expect district judges to be
limited to the entire plan of one of the participants.25 A
judge must pick and choose among features of the
various plans before the court, trying to get the best
mix of concepts and programs. It is his duty — not that
of any of the parties (except the school board) — to
fashion a plan that promises to work. In the exercise of
this duty a district judge will encourage, as he will in all
litigation, compromises among the parties. Indeed the
very vagueness of the law and flux of urban America
invite compromise. It is not a dirty word; it is a legal and
practical necessity. And it is what judge Taylor did. He
took common parts from all of the plans. He reached
for consensus. He gave more to one side in some places,
less in others. Desegregation plans are not made in
heaven. They are drafted by individuals with sharply
competing (and sometimes divided) interests. Putting
together a compromise whole is not an abuse of discre
tion.
Choosing the amount of busing to achieve a
desegregated system has always been the most difficult
task for the lower courts. Their familiarities with the
25 See also, Main, Sealing off the City: School Desegregation in Detroit, in
H. Kalodner & J. Fishman eds., The Limits of Justice 223, 274
(1978): "The NAACP and the board of education submitted dras
tically different plans. Both parties seemed to take extreme posi
tions on the assumption the court would strike a compromise
between them."
"practicalities of the situation," Davis v. Board of School
Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971),
whether it be knowledge of traffic patterns, natural
boundaries, or the demographics of the district, place
them in the best position to exercise informed choice. It
probably would not have been an abuse of discretion to
have ordered the busing necessary to implement Plain
tiffs' Plan A, but the concept of discretion mandates the
choice not to adopt it also.26 It is true that there were no
extensive time-distance studies entered into the record
— and those offered were conducted on Sundays. But
any knowledge of Dallas leads one quickly to the
realization that once the naturally integrated areas
were preserved there would indeed be lengthy bus
rides necessary to eliminate many of the one-race
schools, judge Taylor chose not to do this. The goal of
desegregation is not merely to rearrange the student
assignments in a system.27 It is rather to adopt a plan
that will realistically overcome the effects of past dis
crimination. It is to integrate minds as well as build
ings. Thus Judge Taylor wisely anticipated Milliken v.
26 Plaintiffs' Plan A would have transported 69,000 students
and its projected cost of implementation was $22,000,000. 412 F.
Supp. at 1200.
27 Although many people believe to the contrary. E.g., the letter
from John W. Roberts of the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union
stating Judge Garrity's task is “to evaluate plans as they are placed
before him not on the basis of the educational quality of the plan,
but rather on the basis of whether or not they meet the standards
for school desegregation developed by the Federal Courts."
Quoted in Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, 84 School Rev,
313 (1976).
23
Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) and opted to enrich the
educational experiences of the students in a desegrega
tion context.28 This was not only present in the Early
Childhood Education concept adopted for K-3 and the
magnet approach to grades 9-12,29 but beyond this the
district judge crafted an order looking to the other
facets necessary to make a desegregation plan work.
DISD was placed under an obligation to recruit
quickly additional Black and Mexican American
teachers, principals, and other certificated personnel.
Yet simply having teachers, principals and ad
ministrators ready to occupy buildings is not enough.
Clearly the district judge recognized the disparate im-
28 Each of the Black members of the Education Task Force of the
Dallas Alliance agrees with the statement of Dr. Benjamin Mays:
"Black people must not resign themselves to the pessimistic view
that a non-integrated school cannot provide Black children with
an excellent educational setting. Instead, Black people, while
working to implement Brown, should recognize that integration
alone does not provide a quality education and that much of the
substance of quality education can be provided to Black children in
the interim." Mays, Comment: Atlanta—Living with Brown Twenty Years
Later, 3 Black L.J. 184, 191-92 (1974).
29 We admit magnet schools have not always worked —
although with an example like Skyline it is hardly surprising the
participants at the district court thought magnets an attractive
idea. The use of magnets is not simply freedom of choice by
another name. While it is true a student must choose to attend a
magnet, that choice may — and should — be heavily influenced by
the school districts. Magnet schools, after all, are intended to be
significantly superior to other high schools and this can be assist
ed by a district's phasing out competing courses at non-magnet
schools. Should the magnet concept be found ineffective the
retention of jurisdiction by the district judge allows for correction.
E.g., high school attendance zones might be modified to achieve
additional racial mixing.
plications of exposing innocent minority children to
possible instructional and administrative biases that
sometime fail to vanish in spite of a court order. For the
experience to be effective, they must understand and
be capable of functioning in their multi-cultural set
ting. Thus the district judge required in-depth training
of these personnel to implement the plan and improve
attitudes and awareness to facilitate the effectiveness
of the personnel in a desegregated setting.
Finally, the judge sought methodologies of account
ability. He accomplished this in two separate fashions.
First, the very top administrators in the system were to
reflect the racial composition of the city. This would
mandate increased hiring of Blacks and Mexican
Americans in the hopes that the commitment at the top
to make desegregation work now would be reflected in
commitment below. Second, the order provides not
only for an internal audit by DISD to be filed with the
Court, but, more significantly, an external audit of the
progress the system is making in adopting the plan of
the district court.
If there were nothing more than the district judge's
understanding of the district and his reasoned actions
in light of the available options and his anticipation of
the authority Milliken II would give, the plan adopted
could be sustained as an appropriate exercise of dis
cretion so long as it held the promise to work. But a
realization of what it means to adopt a desegregation
plan for a complex urban community places an even
heavier than normal burden on a district judge to assess
25
workability not only now, as Green demands, but five
years or more from now. It is inconceivable that urban
systems could be put through all the effort of creating
desegregation plans satisfactory to a federal judiciary
only to learn that if all the schools go one-race shortly
thereafter from extraneous causes, or from the very
existence of the plan that promises to work only now,
there is no further Fourteenth Amendment obligation.
No plan has value that cannot continue to work. And
for a plan to continue to work there must be communi
ty support as the Civil Rights Commission has
recognized. Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of the Law (1976).
Judge Taylor knew this and he achieved that support.
One can search for various measures of the strength of
community support but the passage by the voters of
the $80,000,000 bond issue to assist implementation of
the court order is strong evidence that Judge Taylor's
prescient charge to the community to come forward
and be involved worked — and promises to continue to
work. The Dallas community, business, church, civic
organizations, as well as private citizens, has demon
strated support for the plan by providing resources a
court is unable to order. Within six months of the court
order 144 schools had been adopted by either business
or civic organizations as focal points for the community
effort in channeling volunteers, equipment, private
monies to the schools, as well as providing part-time
and full-time job opportunities for students.
The successful efforts to include the community and
gain a broad base of support for the plan at present and
maintain it in the future say much for the district judge.
He did not, unfortunately satisfy everyone. Maybe
such a goal is impossible. Legal responsibilities cannot,
of course, be shifted, The responsibility for a unitary
school system rests with appropriate elected officials
and, in default of their duties, with a federal judge. But
the judge cannot blind himself to what all others can
see and no one argues that school desegregation cases
where the community is in an uproar are a model for
either the political or judicial process. Schools must be
integrated. Minds must be reached. Quality and caring
must be assured. It must not only begin, it must also
continue. Maybe better plans could have been devised
but the plan adopted by Judge Taylor carried the
promise to work.30 The informed discretion of the dis
trict judge can require no more.
II. Washington V. Davis And Its Progeny
Have No Place In Southern School
Desegregation Cases.
Not only is the Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976) issue not necessary to a decision by this Court
(and not considered by the Court below), such a
holding is not in the best interests of Dallas or the Unit
ed States. School suits should not extend for the rest
of this century whether the goal is to integrate or to
avoid integration. Decisional principles should en-
30 Naturally the district judge retained jurisdiction over the
DISD litigation. Should the plans and concepts he approved be
shown not to work in practice, he is free to modify or abandon
them as experiences dictate.
27
courage reasonable compromise, not further litigation.
This applies to whether one-race schools cause
challenges as to the existence of a unitary system or are
justified as the normal outcome of urban housing
patterns having nothing at all to do with actions of
school boards.
Suddenly to reverse school desegregation cases into
endless — and fruitless — squabbling over whether
school segregation caused housing segregation or vice
versa does more than tax the limits of judicial com
petence and social science methodologies. Fundamen
tally, it encourages the false hope that school systems
may be released from the obligations to eradicate past
dejure segregation. The fruits of a quarter-century of
footdragging by school districts ought not be a return
to separate and unequal. Yet the Washington v. Davis
rationale promises little else. That is why it has been so
enthusiastically embraced by those who resisted Brown
IIr Green, and Swann. Providing for equal and quality
educational opportunities for each child in a school dis
trict — the goal of the Dallas Alliance Plan — can be
made vastly more difficult when judicial as well as
political pressures offer the hope that compromise is
unnecessary — that the future belongs to those who
questioned Brown.
The South has made great progress in the last 15
years. Indeed today Boston is clearly a Northern
phenomena, one that unfortunately may plague this
great Nation for years. The North perceives no
obligations in this area and the North resists. District
28
courts daily remind the South of its obligations. The
spur has worked to set Southern school cases against a
backdrop of high commitment to educational quality
even during a period of fiscal retrenchment elsewhere.
This is hardly a position mandating a call, no matter
how uncertain, for retreat. Leaving these cases in the
community, in the school boards, in the local district
courts, where a judge may be guided by the equitable
principles of Brown II and Swann and the desire to bring
to each child the promise of the best education, is the
appropriate solution.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above the Court should
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals remand
ing this case to the district court for continued imple
mentation of the ordered plan.
DATED M a y ____ , 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
H. RON WHITE
1907 Elm Street, Suite 2100
Dallas, Texas 75201
LUCAS A. POWE, JR.
2500 Red River Street
Austin, Texas 78705
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
29
PROOF OF SERVICE
I, H. Ron White, an attorney for the Amicus Curiae
herein, hereby certify that on the ------ day of May,
1 9 7 9 ,1 served three copies of the foregoing Motion for
Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of Amicus
Curiae to the Supreme Court upon the following
Counsel for the Petitioners, Counsel for the
Respondents and the Respondent Pro Se:
Mr. Edward B. Cioutman, III
8204 Elmbrook Drive, Suite 200
P. O. Box 47972
Dallas, Texas 75247
Ms. Vilma S. Martinez
Mexican-American Legal Defense
and Educational Fund
28 Geary Street
San Francisco, California 94108
Mr. Nathaniel R. Jones
1790 Broadway, 10th Floor
New York, New York 10019
Mr. Lee Holt, City Attorney
New City Hall
Dallas, Texas 75201
Mr. John Bryant
8035 East R. L. Thornton
Dallas, Texas 75228
Mr. James G. Vetter, Jr.
555 Griffin Square Building
Suite 920
Dallas, Texas 75202
Mr. James T. Maxwell (pro se)
4440 Sigma Road, Suite 112
Dallas, Texas 75240
Mr. Thomas E. Ashton, III
Dallas Legal Services
Foundation, Inc.
912 Commerce Street, Room 202
Dallas, Texas 75202
Mr. E. Brice Cunningham
2606 Forest Avenue, Suite 202
Dallas, Texas 75215
Mr. James A. Donohoe
1700 Republic National Bank
Building
Dallas, Texas 75201
Mr. Martin Frost
777 South R. L. Thornton
Freeway, Suite 120
Dallas, Texas 75203
Mr. Warren Whitham
210 Adolphus Tower
Dallas, Texas 75202
Mr. Mark Martin
1200 One Main Place
Dallas, Texas 75250
Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr.
Mr. Robert L. Blumenthal
3000 One Main Place
Dallas, Texas 75250
30
by mailing same to such Counsel and Respondent pro
se at their respective addresses and depositing the same
in a United States mail box in an envelope properly ad
dressed to such addresses with first class postage
prepaid.
I further certify that all parties required to be served
have been served.
H. RON WHITE
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Dallas Alliance and
Education Task Force of
Dallas Alliance
#
l a
1940 .
0 srAftf«a»*«* Of « .* « « « * * »
AMIS ya®AW SflWllOfBIM!
PUB. NO.T4SK
PLATE B- l
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS PROGRAM - CITY OF DALLAS
BLACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT
2a
1-M
»•«*
80-74.®
f,m. MHUPlATS B-2
a»9««« *®®a»s*» • «i»» ®» vm im
BLACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT - 1950
3a
" w w r H A C K P O P U i A T I O N
%
V v % | 2 5 - 4 9 . 9
J " * - 9 9 5 0 - 7 4 . 9
£ ^ | | g ^ Q - - . 2 4 . 9 8 0 2 » ♦
C O M M U N I T Y ANA17SIS f C O C B A M - C I T Y O f DALLAS
pLACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT - 1960
7 U i . N O . T A 3 X
P L A T E B- 3
U G SW ©
Pf SCI M l B IA C « P Q S U U 7 > 0 «
a . o -
1 - 9.9
1 1 0 - 24 9
v X v 2 5 -4 9 .9
S0' 74 9
- C O M M U N IT Y A N A L Y S IS I S O C S A M * C IT Y O f D A L L A S
LACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT * 1970
PUS'. N O .T 4 S X
P L A T E B -4
5a
CENSUS TRACTS IN THE DALLAS, TEX. SMSA
IN S E T A - DALLAS AND VICIN ITY
OKM
DAUAt TtK
n tvta&XD Mf r»a»ocn»i
to r 3
APPENDIX B
P O P U L A T IO N B Y RA CE B Y C E N S U S T R A C T : 1940, 1950, 196 0 A N D 1970
C E N SU S 19 4 0 1950 1960 1970
T R A C T W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE BLA CK W H ITE BLA CK
001 2,587 296 4 ,445 153 3 ,549 43 3 ,772 8
002.01 3,685 60 7,093 57 3 ,462 3 3 ,120 0
002 .02 4,271 12 3 ,877 0
003 3,758 60 4 ,327 14 3 ,935 7 3,566 12
004.01 8 ,198 22 7 ,495 77 2 ,789 2 2 ,8 1 7 0
004 .02 9 ,695 35 4 ,2 4 9 6 5 ,469 121
004 .03 7,342 760 6 ,192 129
005 4 ,255 83 3 ,831 27 3,315 53 4 ,497 58
006.01 9,089 535 3,382 3 4 ,674 7 5 ,653 11
006 .02 8,344 205 7,201 124 7 ,790 49
007.01 5 ,716 694 4,911 1,363 3 ,704 5 3 ,2 9 7 8
007 .02 2 ,142 422 2 ,586 96
008 3,847 89 4,772 69 4 ,605 6 4 ,634 19
009 3,329 87 3 ,275 42 2 ,833 12 3 ,074 4
010 5,785 99 5 ,284 44 4 ,479 19 4,681 14
011.01 7,955 173 8 ,166 77 4,234 21 4 ,050 5
0 11 .02 2 ,488 12 2 ,388 1
012 5,875 118 5 ,6 6 7 59 5,126 3 4 ,6 9 7 10
013.01 7,645 383 8,515 214 3 ,423 11 1,881 1
013 .02 4 ,6 8 7 47 4 ,928 19
014 2 ,259 385 2 ,357 264 3 ,1 7 7 83 3 ,716 26
015.01 11 ,104 596 11 ,164 356 6 ,323 62 6 ,4 0 7 5
015 .02 4 ,665 78 3 ,702 42
CENSUS
TRACT WHITE
016 2 ,774
017 .01 2,281
017 .02
018 3 ,859
019 5 ,377
020 5,145
021 2 ,727
022 .01 6 ,200
022 .02
023 3 ,727
024 4 ,239
025 2,045
026 2,595
027.01 4 ,419
027 .02
028 4,701
029 2,154
030 4 ,095
031.01 2 ,106
031.02
032.01 3 ,626
032 .02
1950
W H ITE B L A C K
2,0 7 0 7,352
1,171 7,802
3,933 50
4 ,3 9 7 73
5 ,335 175
1,235 86
6 ,195 1,648
3 ,364 1,168
3 ,774 96
2 ,159 2 ,714
2 ,929 2
4 ,6 4 7 4 ,7 7 0
4 ,2 4 9 112
1,793 167
3 ,264 2 ,602
2,011 357
2 ,868 391
#
1940
BLACK
6 ,0 3 9
9 ,741
166
206
228
187
2 ,098
1,319
87
2,501
2
2 ,925
147
266
3 ,6 5 5
410
395
1960 1970
W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B LA CK
1,114 7 ,086 425 5 ,559
548 5 ,8 2 3 42 269
322 2 ,758
2 ,720 10 2 ,578 17
2 ,305 21 1 ,390 28
5 ,0 9 3 84 6 ,0 0 5 44
545 37 153 29
1,702 620 1 ,233 418
2 ,415 340 1,856 342
2 ,106 1,373 591 1 ,939
2 ,722 86 2 ,0 6 9 341
1,790 3 ,688 460 4 ,2 4 9
2 ,156 1 1 ,665 119
32 7,245 13 7,247
105 4 ,869 23 4 ,890
965 2 ,928 75 2,445
214 1,685 89 3 ,6 8 7
1 ,688 1,185 468 151
979 411 1 ,4 5 7 981
56 40 53 1
1,269 192 342 15
133 73
1940 1950CENSUS
TRACT WHITE
033 4 ,963
034 5,151
035 2,404
036 3 ,262
037 2,121
038 3,912
039.01
0 39 .02 2 ,933
040 4 ,137
041 2 ,043
042 4,354
043 1,268
044 4,856
045 2 ,950
046 2,868
047 4 ,670
048 4 ,779
049 3 ,330
050 5 ,258
051 4 ,066
052 5 ,2 6 0
053 5 ,446
054 5 ,1 2 0
WHITE BLACK
4 ,585 451
5 ,183 442
2 ,397 186
2 ,722 286
648 6 ,8 4 0
3,734 695
2,091 5 ,553
4 ,142 68
1,861 3 ,078
5 ,3 7 7 133
1,575 40
5 ,639 87
7 ,676 12
2 ,835 36
4 ,1 9 7 41
4 ,3 3 6 36
4,311 922
4 ,834 85
4 ,515 8
4,981 22
6 ,701 3
6 ,3 6 9 1
BLACK
680
656
227
111
5,321
73
3 ,668
67
3 ,302
122
45
115
13
67
84
79
37
100
18
44
2
24
1960 1970
W H ITE B LA CK W H ITE BLA CK
2,768 519 821 977
543 5 ,559 81 6 ,852
150 2 ,372 31 3,234
73 3 ,041 8 1,825
62 6 ,8 8 0 31 5 ,8 1 7
49 5 ,559 11 4 ,8 5 8
121 4 ,548 49 4 ,525
10 4 ,642 5 3 ,742
205 4 ,418 122 3 ,662
418 4,265 135 3 ,438
4 ,8 1 7 24 4 ,4 8 9 22
2,962 1 ,877 2 ,4 3 7 1 ,280
5 ,6 9 0 25 6 ,3 8 6 9
6 ,719 5 7 ,172 3
2 ,654 14 2 ,7 5 3 10
3 ,074 8 2 ,973 4
3 ,369 196 3 ,4 3 3 193
4 ,640 1 ,500 5 1 8 7 ,006
3 ,984 52 2 ,871 56
4 ,025 4 3 ,584 0
4 ,293 10 3 ,771 2
5 ,946 0 5 ,344 1
5 ,9 6 2 5 4 ,2 8 7 2 ,620
#
C E N SU S 194 0 1950
T R A C T W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE
055 3 ,070 3 4 ,070
056 4,586 2 5 ,580
057 4 ,306 1 6 ,101
058 6 1 ,495 57
059.01 4 ,3 0 0
0 59 .02
060.01 1 ,396
060 .02
061 149
062 2 ,5 6 7
063.01 4 ,628
063 .02
064 4 ,3 9 8
065 4 ,519
066 89
067 2 ,651
068 3,582
069 5 ,817
070 2 ,738
071 .01 7 ,285
071 .02
072 3 ,649
073.01 6 ,755
1960 1970
WHITE B LA C K WHITE B LA C K
4,284 34 562 3 ,443
4 ,970 1 3 ,497 1 ,539
6 ,3 6 6 0 1 ,813 5 ,524
7 ,008 1 930 7,304
3 ,3 7 8 3 601 3 ,717
4 ,643 0 3 ,925 648
2 ,506 0
1,185 0 4 ,751 7
4 ,298 4 4 ,532 25
5 ,2 1 0 0 4 ,5 2 7 0
2 ,463 1 2,211 1
5 ,762 0 5 ,892 2
6 ,253 0 6 ,2 5 7 0
2 ,509 0 3 ,123 3
2 ,343 1 4 ,384 59
590 2 1,913 4
2,613 29 2 ,1 7 8 138
4 ,432 2,371 1 ,763 5,861
3,703 3 4 ,635 6
2 ,859 16 2 ,452 2
BLACK
0
0
3
3 ,539
1
1
0
1
1
7
0
0
4
0
4
0
60
13
110
CENSUS 1940 1950
T R A C T
073 .02
W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B LA C K
074 716 56
075.01
075 .02
990 132
076.01
076 .02
076 .03
076 .04
2,534 72
077 2 ,679 60
078.01
078 .02
078 .03
1 ,518 23
079.01
079 .02
1 ,738 6
080 2 ,940 69
081 4 ,298 23
082 2 ,270 8
083 1 ,286 2
084 6,241 0
085 2,541 1
086 2 ,3 1 8 3
087.01
087 .02
5 ,9 7 9 18
1960 1970
W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE BLA CK
4,001 46 4 ,0 0 9 18
1,660 49 1,676 12
1,224 89 720 14
461 6
1 ,728 20 2,285 3
1 ,286 45 803 9
4 ,084 13 838 3
3 ,670 4
5 ,743 39 5 ,733 33
4 ,2 3 0 3 ,019 893 1
3 ,448 3,171
6 ,970 81
2 ,1 8 9 3 7,712 16
5 ,629 1 5,851 5
5 ,456 23 5 ,885 5
5 ,9 2 6 18 6 ,9 1 7 8
3 ,3 4 3 1 5 ,0 2 9 0
2 ,037 6 1 ,623 2
6 ,8 6 3 6 6 ,2 2 5 4
3 ,5 3 8 1 3 ,274 0
4 ,318 3 925 3 ,155
1,916 5 362 4 ,606
9,491 1 1 ,099 12,334
10a
C E N SU S 1940 1950 1960 1970
T R A C T W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B LA C K
088 4,691 1 9 ,138 15 407 11 ,829
089 2 ,7 6 9 1,004 1,590 18 676 7,272
090.01 2 ,2 4 8 36 999 1 1 ,177 7
090 .02 2 ,540 0 4,221 1
091 .01 4 4 7 34 6 ,322 0 5 ,378 0
091 .02 8 ,274 0 8 ,782 1
092 .01 4 ,172 12 4,601 1 5 ,4 0 6 2
092 .02 4 ,535 0 4 ,7 1 0 0
093.01 5 ,112 33 3,891 2 3 ,648 2
093 .02 4 ,2 4 7 0 7 ,310 57
094 525 2 7 ,966 2 6 ,969 6
095 2 ,412 9 2 ,485 0
096.01 6 ,954 64 12 ,011 90
096 .02 8 ,6 5 7 3
096 .03 4 ,7 4 6 0
096 .04 2 ,059 137
097 5 ,766 2 8 ,6 6 9 7
098 4 ,7 8 8 3 9 ,1 5 7 8
099 4 ,621 0 3 ,185 2
100 1 ,170 3 ,289 861 2 ,764
101 4 ,200 7,702 3 ,5 6 7 7 ,569
102 315 7 ,417 329 6,171
103 5,062 2 299 4 ,448
11a
C E N SU S 194 0
T R A C T W H ITE B LA C K
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111.01
111.02
112
113
114.01
114.02
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122.01
122 .02
123
1950
W H ITE B L A C K
196 0 1970
W H ITE
UU
B LA C K W H ITE B LA CK
2,1 6 7 351 902 1,568
1 ,527 3 ,329 1,119 2 ,720
5 ,695 172 5 ,4 9 7 282
3,664 0 6 ,3 9 0 24
4 ,8 9 2 1 14,901 12
386 8 1 ,312 6
3 ,907 0 10 ,138 1
7 ,047 13 1,914 7
11 ,584 19
2 ,688 2 846 2 ,696
1,376 1 174 4 ,643
402 0 133 4 ,369
134 1,605
168 6 ,3 0 2 42 6 ,7 2 9
5 ,113 0 7 ,484 19
4 ,192 3 5 ,841 4
2 ,174 0 2 ,686 0
1 ,110 0 2,454 0
1 ,281 0 2 ,526 0
275 0 2 2 7 15
3 ,490 4 12 ,168 2
4 ,066 175
4 ,916 2 6 ,9 9 4 9
12a
C E N SU S 194 0 19 5 0
T R A C T W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K
124
125
126
127
128
129
130.01
130.02
131
132
133
134.01
134 .02
135
136.01
136 .02
136 .03
137 .03
138.01
140.01
140.02
141.0 I
141.02
1960 1970
W H ITE B LA CK W H ITE B LA CK
6,381 11 6 ,820 4
9,515 1 8 ,8 3 0 0
2 ,228 0 4 ,0 1 0 0
8,811 0 8 ,325 2
6 ,534 3 9 ,183 7
5,371 1 5 ,293 0
7 ,657 100 13 ,746 70
9 ,6 8 0 15
2 ,646 6 7,725 9
1,614 255 2 ,1 2 8 80
2,341 9 2 ,049 2
1 ,767 5 1,146 8
1,504 0
967 8 2 ,885 8
1 ,770 312 1,112 247
7 ,600 2
11 ,191 20
0 0
0 0
66 0 0 0
47 0
0 0
37 0
13a
1950C E N S U S 1940
TRACT WHITE BLACK WHITE
148
158
159
163
164
165.01
165 .02
165.03
165.04
166.01
167.01
167.02
169.01
169 .02
171
176.01
178.01
178.02
179
180
181.03
184
BLACK
1960 1970
WHITE BLACK WHITE B LA CK
0 0
0 0 0 0
37 0 42 0
0 0 23 0
0 0 0 0
562 0 1 ,627 21
0 0
86 1
0 0
1 ,477 10 1 ,638 0
2 ,068 24 146 3 ,085
341 395
547 90 155 2,851
113 6
164 0
135 0 156 0
0 0
0 0
209 0 205 0
166 0 101 0
0 0
0 0 0 0
14a
CENSUS
T R A C T
185.01
185 .02
190.01
190 .02
190 .03
192.01
194 0 1950 1960 1970
W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B LA C K
68 48 19 0
66 2
112 14 0 8
0 0
453 2
169 0 4 ,6 9 7 5
Source: 1940, 195 0, 1960and 1970 Census o f Population, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.
15a
APPENDIX C
THE DALLAS ALLIANCE
CORRESPONDENT ORGANIZATIONS
American G.I. Forum
American Indian Center of Dallas, Inc,
American Institute of Architects, Dallas Chapter
American Jewish Committee, Dallas Chapter
Amigos
Bishop College
BTJai B'Rith Womens' Council
Boy's Club of Dallas, Inc.
Brown Berets
Camp Fire Council of Metropolitan Dallas
Catholic Charities
Catholic Diocese of Dallas
Church Women United
Community Council of Greater Dallas
Community Relations Council, Jewish Federation of
Greater Dallas
Council of Catholic Women, Dallas Deanery
Cumberland Presbyterian Church
Dallas Alumnae Chapter, Delta Sigma Theta
Dallas Association for Retarded Citizens
Dallas Association of Young Lawyers
Dallas Bar Association
Dallas Black Chamber of Commerce
Dallas Chamber of Commerce
Dallas Citizens Council
Dallas City Council of PTAs
17a
Dallas Civic Ballet
Dallas Council on Alcoholism
Dallas County Adult Probation Department
Dallas County AFL-CIO
Dallas County Community Action Committee
Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation
Center
Dallas County Nutrition Program
Dallas Federation of Women's Clubs
Dallas Homeowners League
Dallas Housing Authority
Dallas Housing Forum
Dallas Inter-Tribal Center
Dallas Junior Chamber of Commerce
Dallas Mexican Chamber of Commerce
Dallas Opportunities Industrialization Center
Dallas Police Department
Dallas Minority Business Center
Dallas Public Library
Dallas Symphony Association, Inc.
Dallas Urban League
East Dallas Community Design Center
Family Guidance Center
Goals for Dallas
Goodwill Industries of Dallas, Inc.
Greater Dallas Community of Churches
Greater Dallas Community Relations Commission
Greater Dallas Crime Commission
Greater Dallas Housing Opportunity Center, Inc.
Greater Dallas Planning Council
Historic Preservation League of Dallas, Inc.
Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance
Jobs for Progress, Inc, (Operation SER)
Junior League of Dallas, Inc.
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)
League of Women Voters of Dallas
Links, Inc., of Dallas
Los Barrios Unidas Clinic
Mental Health Association of Dallas County
Mount Olive Volunteer Effort (MOVE)
National Alliance of Businessmen
National Association of Social Workers, Inc.
National Conference of Christians & Jews
National Council of Jewish Women, Greater Dallas
Section
National Organization for Women (NOW)
NAACP — John F. Kennedy Branch
NAACP — Oak Cliff/Cedar Crest Branch
NAACP — South Dallas Branch
Neighborhood Conservation Alliance
Neighborhood Housing Services of Dallas, Inc.
North Park/Love Field Civic League
Rabbinical Association of Dallas
Salesmanship Club of Dallas
Salvation Army
Senior Citizens of Greater Dallas, Inc.
Southern Methodist University
Tejas Girl Scout Council, Inc.
Theater Three
United Methodist Church, Office of the Bishop
18a
19a
Urban Studies Program, SMU
Venture Advisors, Inc.
Visiting Nurses Association
Voluntary Action Center of Dallas County
Wesley Rankin Community Center
Womens' Council of Dallas County, Inc.
Women for Change Center
YMCA of Dallas Metropolitan Area
YWCA of Metropolitan Dallas