Curry v. Dallas NAACP Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae

Public Court Documents
May 1, 1979

Curry v. Dallas NAACP Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae preview

Date is approximate. Curry v. Dallas NAACP Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae for the Dallas Alliance and the Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance

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  • Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Curry v. Dallas NAACP Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae, 1979. b559bcc7-ae9a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9d9a02fe-5fcc-4ce7-a0a3-e8db45614fba/curry-v-dallas-naacp-motion-for-leave-to-file-brief-amicus-curiae. Accessed April 27, 2025.

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    IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-282

DONALD E. CURRY, ET AL., 

versus
Petitioners,

DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., and 
NOLAN ESTES, ET AL.,

No. 78-253

Respondents.

NOLAN ESTES, ET AL., 

versus
Petitioners,

DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,

No. 78-283

RALPH F. BRINEGAR, ET AL., 

versus

DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,

Respondents.

Petitioners,

Respondents.

Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and 
Brief of Amicus Curiae 
The Dallas Alliance and

The Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance

H. Ron White 
1907 Elm St., Suite 2100 
Dallas, Texas 75201 
Lucas A. Powe, Jr.
2500 Red River Street 
Austin, Texas 78705
Attorneys for The Dallas Alliance 

and The Education Task Force 
of the Dallas Alliance

SCOFIELDS' QUALITY PRINTERS, P. O. BOX 53096, N. O., LA. 70153 - 504/822-1611



IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-282

DONALD E. CURRY, ET AL.,
Petitioners,

versus

DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL., and 
NOLAN ESTES, ET AL.,

Respondents.

No. 78-253

NOLAN ESTES, ET AL., 

versus
Petitioners,

DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,
Respondents.

No. 78-283

RALPH F. BRINEGAR, ET AL.,
Petitioners,

versus

DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,
Respondents.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE FOR 

THE DALLAS ALLIANCE AND THE 
EDUCATION TASK FORCE OF THE DALLAS ALLIANCE



M OTION FOR LEAVE 
TO FILE BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE

The Dallas Alliance and the Education Task Force of 
the Dallas Alliance hereby respectfully move for leave 
to file the attached Brief Amicus Curiae in this case 
pursuant to Rule 42 of this Court. The consent of at­
torneys for the petitioners and for the respondents, 
Tasby, et al, has been obtained and the letters have 
been deposited with the Clerk. The consent of the at­
torney for the respondent NAACP was requested but 
refused.

The Dallas Alliance is a service organization de­
signed to encourage cooperation and combined effort 
of community groups in seeking resolution of urban 
problems affecting the Dallas community. The Alliance 
is comprised of a 40-member Board of Trustees drawn 
from local government, the business sector, and the 
community at large. The Board's racial composition 
reflects the ethnic makeup of the city's population. In 
addition, approximately 90 community organizations 
are affiliated with the Alliance, designated as com­
munity correspondent organizations.

The Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance was 
formed in October, 1975. Consisting of seven Anglos, 
seven Mexican-Americans, six Blacks and one 
American Indian, the group's mission was the creation 
of a consensus school desegregation plan which would 
be constitutionally acceptable. The Task Force im­



mediately commenced an energetic and exhaustive in­
volvement in the drafting process. After more than 
four months and 1500 work hours, including 
num erous conferences with leading educators 
throughout the Nation, the Task Force was able to 
agree on a consensus plan. This plan was then sub­
mitted to the district court in the middle of the month 
of remedy hearings. The district judge subsequently 
adopted the plan of the Task Force (with modifications) 
as his final order in the case.

In both the district court and the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit the Task Force has participated as 
Amicus Curiae in support of the consensus plan. The 
Task Force's familiarity with this case, with DISD, and 
with the concepts the district judge ordered place it in a 
unique position to be of assistance in fleshing out the 
issues involved in this complex urban desegregation 
suit. Furthermore, the Task Force believes it likely that 
the other briefs may argue this case on grounds 
broader than necessary for an appropriate resolution of 
the controversy.

Therefore, The Dallas Alliance and the Education 
Task Force of the Dallas Alliance respectfully move for 
leave to file the attached Brief Amicus Curiae.

Respectfully submitted,

H. Ron White
1907 Elm St., Suite 2100
Dallas, Texas 75201



Lucas A. Powe, Jr.
2500 Red River Street 
Austin, Texas 78705

Attorneys for the Dallas 
Alliance and the 
Education Task Force 
of the Dallas Alliance



Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae 
in Behalf of The Dallas Alliance and the 
Education Task Force of the Dallas Alliance ----- i

Table of Authorities ......................................   vi

Interest of Amicus C u r ia e ................................................ 2

Introduction and Statement of the C a s e .....................2

A. The Narrow Issue .............................................  2

B. Demographic History of Dallas ........... .. 4

1. Black Movement 1940-70 .........................5

2. Anglo Movement 1940-70 . . . . . . . . . . .  7

3. Mexican American Movement
1940-70 ........................................................  8

4. The P re se n t.................................................. 8

C. The District Court's O r d e r ........................  9

Summary of Argument ...............................   14

Argument ................................................   15

I. The District Judge Appropriately
Exercised the Broad Discretion 
Necessary to Implement a Desegrega­
tion P la n ..............................................................  15

II. Washington v. Davis and Its Progeny
Have No Place in a Southern School 
Desegregation C a s e ............................................26

C onclusion........................................................................... 28

Proof of Service .......................       29

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page



TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

Page
Appendix A: Plate Maps Showing Racial

Composition of Dallas, 1940-70 ............................  la

Appendix B: Dallas Census Tract Statistics 
by Race, 1940-70 ........................................................  6a

Appendix C: Community Organizations Af­
filiated with The Dallas Alliance ........................ 16a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

Ashbacker Radio Co. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327
(1945) ....................................................    20

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 494
(1954) .............................................................................  16

Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294
(1955) ..............   3,16,20,27,28

Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of 
Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971) ........................  22

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406 (1977)  ........................................................  15

Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391
U.S. 430 (1 9 6 8 ) ..............................3,4,16,25,27

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)   . 16

Milliken v. Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) . . .  14,16,
22,23,24

Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D.
Mass. 1974) 14



Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F. 2d 580 (CA 1
1974) ...................................................................    14

Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424 (1 9 7 6 ) .................................................... 18

Singleton v. jackson Municipal Separate 
School District, 419 F.2d 1211 (CA 5 1970). .12-13

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) ..................4,13,16,17,

19,27,28

Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex.
1976) .............................................................. 10,11,13,22

Tasby v. Estes, 572 F. 2d 1010 (CA 5 1 9 7 8 ) ...........15

Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) . .  2,26,27 

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and 
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation,
85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976) .........................    16

Bickel, Education in a Democracy: The Legal and Prac­
tical Problems of School Busing, 3 Human Rights 
53 (1973) .......................................................................  18

K. Clark, A Possible Reality: A Design for the Attain­
ment of High Academic Achievement for Inner City 
Students (1972) ........................................................  19-20

Hain, Sealing off the City: School Desegregation in 
Detroit, in H. Kalodner & j. Fishman eds.,
The Limits of Justice 233 (1978)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Continued)

Page

. . 21



Mays, Comment: Atlanta — Living with Brown
Twenty Years Later, 3 Black L.J. 184 (1974)- . . . . .  23

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Fulfilling the 
Letter and Spirit of the Law (1976) ......................  16,25

Willie, The Sociology of Urban Education, 59-76, 
Lexington Books of D.C., Heath Company

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED (Continued)

Page

(1978) .............................................................................  11

Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, 84
School Rev. 313 (1976) .............................. .. . 14,16,22

Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned 
Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the 
Supreme Court, 42 Law and Contemp. Probs.
(Spring 1978) (forthcoming) ....................... ..  20



IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

No. 78-282

DONALD E. CURRY, ET AL„
Petitioners,

versus

DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL„ and 
NOLAN ESTES, ET AL.,

Respondents.

No. 78-253

NOLAN ESTES, ET AL„ 

versus
Petitioners,

DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,
Respondents.

No. 78-283

RALPH F. BRINEGAR, ET AL.,

versus
Petitioners,

DALLAS N.A.A.C.P., ET AL.,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
THE DALLAS ALLIANCE AND THE 

EDUCATION TASK FORCE OF THE DALLAS ALLIANCE



2

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Dallas Alliance is a service organization designed 
to encourage cooperation and combined effort of com­
munity groups in seeking resolution of urban problems 
affecting the Dallas community. The Alliance is com­
prised of a 40-member Board of Trustees drawn from 
local government, the business sector, and the com­
munity at large. The Board's racial composition reflects 
the ethnic makeup of the city's population. In addition, 
numerous community organizations are affiliated with 
the Alliance, designated as community correspondent 
organizations. (A list appears in Appendix C).

As stated in greater detail in the Motion for Leave to 
File Brief Amicus Curiae, the Education Task Force of the 
Dallas Alliance is a tri-ethnic group that labored for 
1500 hours in developing the consensus plan that was 
subsequently adopted by the district court in its final 
order.

IN TRODUCTION AND 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Narrow Issue

The most far-reaching issue presented in this litiga­
tion and briefed to the Court is an issue which neither 
the district court nor the Court of Appeals decided: 
whether the principles of Washington v, Davis, 426 U.S. 
229 (1976) should be interjected into school desegrega­



tion litigation in the urban South. Not only was this 
issue not faced below, it need not be faced here. Instead 
this case may be decided on the very traditional 
grounds of the discretion of a district judge. To say that 
the issue is traditional, however, is hardly to trivialize 
it. The vast urban setting of the eighth largest school 
system in the United States heightens its importance 
and provides a unique focus for exploring the 
parameters of informed discretion.

Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) placed 
a special burden on district judges. Not only were they 
to be in the vanguard of Southern desegregation, but in 
so doing they were to demonstrate "a practical flexibili­
ty in shaping remedies and. . . a facility for adjusting 
and reconciling public and private needs." Id. at 300. 
The duty to reconcile has lost none of its importance 
over time even though the context for the application 
of the duty has changed markedly. Thus, thanks to 
Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) 
and its immediate progeny, by 1970 rural desegrega­
tion was complete. But the harder task, that of 
desegregating the urban systems was barely begin­
ning. The cries of nullification and interposition from 
Louisiana and Virginia had been stilled only to be 
replaced by the shouts from Boston and Louisville. The 
quaint names of the rural South vanished, to be replac­
ed by the more familiar nomenclature of urban 
A m erica: C h arlo tte , Mobile, Denver, Detroit,
Pasadena, Dayton. But still, throughout all the 
changes, it remains the federal district judges who bear



the primary burden of implementing the appropriate 
constitutional principles. To them falls the often 
thankless work; to “grapple with the flinty, intractable 
realities of day-to-day implementation" of school 
desegregation. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).

A district judge, however, must do more than grap­
ple. He must decide. And in so doing he must imple­
ment a desegregation plan that "promises realistically 
to work." Green, 391 U.S. at 439. In a large, urban, tri­
ethnic community such as Dallas, where thousands of 
citizens are relocating their homes annually, the ap­
propriate choices are hardly self-evident. Yet they 
must be made.

The starting point for any desegregation plan is 
determining where the children live. This litigation has 
been protracted and each time the case has come before 
the district court substantial demographic changes 
have occurred. If nothing else, Dallas has been an ur­
ban boom town. A brief look at its demographic history 
is essential for understanding the setting.

B. Demographic History of Dallas

In the thirty year period (1940-1970) Dallas changed 
radically. There were population changes in size, loca­
tion, economic characteristics, composition by race and 
eth n icity , as well as school age population 
characteristics. To a large extent Dallas is a new city, 
suburban in its development pattern with single, 
detached dwelling units being the dominant form of



5
housing until very recently. Population densities by 
tract are low in comparison with northeastern and 
even other southern cities.

Since 1940 the physical size of the city and DISD 
have both quadrupled to well over 350 square miles of 
territory. The growth came largely in two major 
spurts, one in the early 1950's and the other in the early 
1960's.

To understand this growth in physical size and pop­
ulation some understanding of the physical and social 
geography is necessary. The core of the city is along the 
Trinity River. On the north side of the river the land is 
flat and in 1940 most (75%) of this area was planted in 
cotton in farm plats of approximately 80 to 100 acres. 
To the south is the Oak Cliff area which has rocky soil 
and a hilly type of terrain not suitable for industry or 
agriculture.

1. Black Movement— 1940-70

In 1940 75% of the small Black population lived in 
two areas of the city: immediately to the north of the 
Central Business District and to the far southeast of 
the Central Business District.1 Both of these areas are 
now completely surrounded by new areas. The re­
maining 25% of the Black population was more dispers­
ed and only 10 of the 58 tracts in the city at that time 
had fewer than 1% Black population.2

1 Plates of Dallas in 1940, 1950, 1960, and 1970 showing racial 
percentages are in Appendix A.
2 Census tract statistics are in Appendix B.



6

The pattern of racial location in 1950 remained es­
sentially the same with the exception of major 
territorial annexation to the north and south with 
many more Anglo tracts.

In 1957 a major annexation of a West Dallas district 
occurred. This area had two barrio areas, few Anglos 
and substantial Blacks. At the time of annexation 
this area, located in the west between Oak Cliff and 
North Dallas, had less than 11% of the housing above 
code, only 2 miles of paved streets, one 60 year-old 
school building, no parks, no sewers, no storm drains.

During the huge growth of the 1950's the city's pop­
ulation and territory more than doubled. Black location 
concentration moved into the area identified as South 
Dallas (just north of the Trinity River). This was an 
older area being abandoned by Anglos moving to the 
far north of Dallas. A concentrated group of census 
tracts changed during the 1950's from Anglo to Black.3 
While Black population was doubling, the rapidly ex­
panding Anglo population resulted in the DISD being 
15-20% Black.

The area known as East Oak Cliff had 65% of its pre­
sent housing built during this period. It was in 1960 a 
series of suburban type development subdivisions. 
Black residents were in two zones of this area of the 
city — in the older housing in far northeast Oak Cliff 
directly across the Trinity River from South Dallas on 
the only bridge and to the far south where Bishop 
College was placed after moving from Marshall, Texas.

3 Tracts 28, 29, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39.02, 40 and 41.



7

Within a three year period of the 1960's a tremen­
dous change, one with no Northern or Eastern city 
comparisons, took place in the recently developed sub­
divisions of East Oak Cliff — the area south of the river 
and east of Interstate 35E. While originally built for and 
marketed to Anglos, the average Anglo occupancy was 
but 2.3 years. Almost two dozen census tracts in the 
area shift from 90% Anglo to 90% Black.* Six of these 
tracts did not exist in 1940; four did not exist until 
1970. In effect a new area of the city, with new schools, 
new streets, new shopping centers (the first two major 
centers in Dallas were built in this area) went from 
Anglo to Black overnight.

2. Anglo Movement— 1940-70

Anglo movements in this 30 year period show a 
different pattern to the fringes of the city — far 
northwest, northeast, east (Pleasant Grove) and far 
southwest. The growth was phenomenal and demon­
strates the recency and amount of post-war affluence 
in Dallas. While Blacks were coming from Louisiana 
and East Texas rural areas, for working class oppor­
tunities, Anglo Dallas in its affluence was coming from 
the upper midwest for corporate and financial oppor­
tunities. This wealth concentrated in the far north area 
and is, again, in housing not even there in 1950. 
F u r t h e r ,  t r e m e n d o u s  suburban expansion, 
predominantly Anglo, took place around the city. 4

4 Tracts 49, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59.01, 59.02, 71.02, 86, 87.01, 87.02, 
88, 89, 103, 104, 112, 113, 114.01, 114.02, 167.01, 169.01.



8
3. Mexican American Movement — 1940-70

While there is no census data on Mexican American 
location, an area north of the Central Business District 
by 1940 was called "Little Mexico" and the few Mexican 
Americans in Dallas were concentrated there. Most of 
the Mexican American population has come to Dallas 
during the current decade and is concentrated in an arc 
from West Dallas to East Dallas directly north of the 
Central Business District.

4. The Present

In the period 1970-1975 racial data from the census 
are not available. Public school data, the Department of 
Urban Planning, and Real Estate Board reports do 
provide some insights. First, the city's and DISD's ex­
pansion in territory and overall population is com­
pleted. The suburban ring exists. Second, population 
densities have been increasing with many huge apart­
ment complexes. Over 50% of all housing starts during 
this period were multi-party structures. This propor­
tion is much higher today. Third, and most importantly, 
the Anglo school: district population in the past decade 
has shifted from 63% to approximately 35%. In elemen­
tary ages it is even lower. At first blush it is difficult to 
comprehend how the city's population remains majori­
ty Anglo while the Anglo percentage in DISD keeps 
dropping. The reason is the cost of housing in the 
Anglo areas of far North Dallas. In Northwest Dallas 
housing built from 1957-1961 sold originally for $28 to 
$31,000. The average age of the head of the household 
was 31 with 3 children, elementary age. Today these



9

same homes sell for $70 to $180,000 with average age 
of the head of the household being 52, 3 children, 1 high 
school age, and the other 2 already gone.

The demographic picture of Dallas makes clear the 
enormity of the task facing a district judge. Unlike 
many cities where whites ring a black core and pie 
shaped wedges will accomplish considerable racial mix­
ing,5 Dallas has great physical separation of Blacks 
from most Anglos by, first, the Trinity River, second, 
the Central Business District, and finally by a Mexican 
American arc. From far South Dallas (e.g., South Oak 
Cliff or Zumwalt schools) to far North Dallas (W. T. 
White or Dealey schools) is approximately a 50 minute 
drive by car on Sunday. Yet the Black population is 
largely in South Dallas and the Anglos are in the far 
north.6 The problem is exacerbated by the low densi­
ties of Anglo children (except for the naturally 
integrated Pleasant Grove) and the band of Mexican 
American settlements between the Anglos and the 
Blacks.

C. The District Court's Plan

How, then, to desegregate? Between plaintiffs, 
defendants, interveners, amicus, and even students 
there were numerous theories and several carefully 
prepared plans. When the month of hearings ended in 
March 1976, judge Taylor had before him six major

5 E.g., Charlotte-Mecklenburg.

6 Housing costs, occupational demands, and convenience make 
it clear Anglos will continue to occupy the far north of the city. It is 
less clear how long they will remain in the southwest and 
southeast.



10
plans for achieving a unitary school system. As would 
be expected deep divisions existed among them on the 
amount of busing to be ordered.7 Beyond that, 
however, there were a surprising number of common 
points in most of the plans: The huge district should be 
divided into more manageable subdistricts,8 each of 
which should reflect the ethnic mix of the district as a 
whole; naturally integrated areas (not more than 75% 
Anglo or 75% Black and Mexican American combined) 
should be preserved;9 magnet schools, such as the 
nationally renowned Skyline in Pleasant Grove, should 
be created to accomplish desegregation in the high 
school grades;10 East Oak Cliff, because of geography 
and the location of naturally integrated areas, might re­
main unchanged.11 Additionally, there were middle 
points about which some of the parties appeared to care 
more than others. These included accountability 
mechanisms and the use of desegregation tools beyond 
transportation.

7 The highest was Plaintiffs' Plan A at 69,000; the lowest was 
D1SD at 14,000.
8 On this point there was less agreemen t since the polarity of the 
NAACP and DISD Plans led each to reject subdividing. Subdivid­
ing was present and heavily stressed in both plans of Plaintiffs and 
the Dallas Alliance Plan.
9 Judge Taylor noted “as all parties recognized, there would be 
no benefit educational or otherwise in disturbing this trend 
toward residential integration." 412 F. Supp. 1192, 1206.
10 Everyone supported the magnet concept.
11 Only the NAACP and Plaintiffs' Plan A disagreed.



11

The district court, in fashioning an order, incor­
porated not only the common desegregation tools that 
were tendered in each of the plans but adopted some 
new and innovative tools that appear necessary for an 
urban school district plan that is majority minority.

The district court's final order of April 7 ,1976, divid­
ed the school district into six subdistricts. This con­
figuration was to preserve the naturally integrated 
areas; heighten parental involvement; achieve max­
imum desegregation within each subdistrict; facilitate 
administration and student assignment.

As a means of facilitating student assignment for 
desegregation purposes as well as to insure maximum 
utilization of existing facilities, the judge standardized 
the grades throughout the district.12 This standardi­
zation provided for the establishment of K-3 Early 
Childhood Education Centers that were required to 
use the Diagnostic Prescriptive concept that had 
proven successful in California with respect to parental 
involvement.13 Special programming was included in 
the 4-6 Vanguard schools and the 7-8 Academies. The 
magnet concept was employed at the 9-12 high school 
level.
12 "In a good school desegregation plan: [there is] . . . (d) a uni­
form grade structure [that] facilitates interchange between and 
easy access to all units or schools within the system." Willie, The 
Sociology of Urban Education, 60, Lexington Books of D.C., Heath 
Company (1978). Contrast the proposals of Plaintiffs' Plan A and 
B which respectively have 14 and 9 different grade structures for 
elementary schools.
13 Thus, the order looked to using parents in the requirement to 
move as rapidly as possible to a 1-10 adult-student ratio in the Ear­
ly Childhood Education Centers. 412 F. Supp. at 1214.



12

The court recognized its charge as being one of pro­
viding an equal educational opportunity to all students 
within the district by desegregating the district to the 
maximum extent practicable. One of the desegregation 
tools employed was student assignment. Once the 
judge had carved out the naturally integrated areas and 
divided the district into subdistricts that reflected the 
approximate racial ratio of the entire school district, ex­
cept for East Oak Cliff and Seagoville,14 there were few 
options remaining. To facilitate the necessary parental 
involvement, students that were in the K-3 grades 
were assigned to schools within two miles of their 
home if possible. Students in grades 4-8 were assigned 
to centers in areas of centrality within their subdistrict 
which generally reflected an ethnic balance (except for 
East Oak Cliff). To provide maximum desegregation in 
all new special programs such as the 4-6 Vanguard, the 
7-8 Academies and the 9-12 magnets, the court re­
quired that the enrollment in each of these special 
schools reflect the racial makeup of the grade level.

The judge in this case, recognizing the instability and 
ineffectiveness of the sole employment of a student 
assignment tool, elected to go further in his remedial 
order. He adopted a variety of desegregation techni­
ques. Some, of course, are reasonably familiar. E.g., 
The Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District,

14 Seagoville, an area of blue collar Anglos, was made a separate 
subdistrict because of its geographical isolation from the rest of 
DISD. It lies in the far southeast, and although Seagoville is 81.5% 
Anglo, it contains less than 2% of DISD's student population. The 
nearest pocket of Blacks is 15 miles distant.



419 F, 2d 1211 (CA 5 1970) order on personnel.15 
Others, however, have not heretofore been estab­
lished as universal remedies. It was here, drawing on 
the compromise efforts of the Education Task Force of 
the Dallas Alliance, that the plan best reflected the 
nature of the community. Because of the Mexican 
American children, bilingual and multi-cultural educa­
tion were needed as well as minority to majority trans­
fers for Mexican Americans.16 Special programs for all, 
including career education, curriculum transfers for 
the physically handicapped, mentally retarded and 
highly gifted were included. To ensure an ethnic mix at 
the very top of the system a recruiting and employment 
requirement to employ Blacks and Mexican Americans 
in administrative posts according to their percent of the 
population was ordered. In addition both an internal 
and external accountability systems were ordered.

15 The other familiar techniques included: majority to minority 
transfer; authorization to the district to modify attendance zones 
to further promote desegregation; establishment of new facilities 
in areas that will promote and enhance desegregation; the es­
tablishment of a tri-ethnic committee to report to the court on a 
continual basis; a discipline and due process policy; and retention 
of jurisdiction.

The Fifth Circuit held that Judge Taylor erred in failing to re­
quire D1SD to assume the burden of providing transportation to 
those students electing to choose majority to minority transfer. 
The inclusion of such a provision in an order is not a matter of dis­
cretion, Swann v. Charlolte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 
26-27 (1971), and the Fifth Circuit was hyper-technical in its read­
ing of Part X of the order. The Dallas Alliance's Plan intended D1SD 
to assume the burden; part X (3) of the order requires D1SD to 
assume the burden; and in fact DISD is assuming the burden and 
has done so from the time of the order.

16 "Mexican Americans who comprise less than five percent 
of the school to which they are originally assigned, may transfer to 
a school that offers the Bilingual Education Program." 412 F. 
Supp. at 1218.

13



14

The totality of the tools selected anticipated Milliken 
v. Bradley 11, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) and evidenced the far­
sighted approach taken by the district court. Further­
more, they suggest that it is questionable as to whether 
any tri-ethnic school district can fully realize its 
desegregative goal by student assignment alone. 
Creativity is a necessary aspect.17

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1. What occurred in the district court is precisely 
what ought to occur. A district judge appraised himself 
of all the available facts, considered and combined the 
options, recognized the necessity of some compromise 
among positions, selected the options best suited to 
providing an equal and quality desegregated 
educational opportunity to each child in the system, 
and adopted a plan that promises to work both im­
mediately and in the future. The promise of success is a

17 A very similar conclusion was reached by Plaintiffs' expert 
witness, Dr. Charles V. Willie of Harvard. Dr. Willie was one of 
the masters appointed by Judge Garrity in Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 
F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 
F. 2d 580 (CA 1 1974) cert, denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), the Boston 
case. He concludes an article about the largely rejected plan he 
drafted by noting that it proposed "a new approach to school de­
segregation which attempted to unite method and purpose. Some 
of our proposals were rejected in favor of advancing racial quotas, 
method without its purposes. . . How to prevent separation of 
method from purpose in education is a problem in need of serious 
study. An editorial in the New York Times summed up the issue 
quite nicely: Integration must be made synonymous with better 
education (May 20, 1975). Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education? 
84 School Rev. 313, 325 (1976).



15

key component. Success comes from quality and is 
sustained by support. Judge Taylor knew of Boston and 
Louisville. He knew that a court order without support 
in the community is an exercise of will, not of dis­
cretion. He charged the community to come forward 
and make the plan work. The community responded ac­
cordingly. To hold, as the Court of Appeals did, that 
more had to be done, crossed the limits of appellate 
review of district court discretion.18 Dayton Board of 
Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 409 (1977).

2. Since this can and should be decided on the 
narrow issue of the informed discretion of the district 
judge, no other issues need be reached. But should the 
issue tendered by the Curry Intervenors be faced, their 
position should be rejected. Transmuting school suits 
into battles that tax social science methodologies 
beyond their limits holds promise for neither schools 
nor courts — nor this Nation.

%  ARGUMENT

I. The District Judge Appropriately Exer­
cised The Broad Discretion Necessary To Im­
plement A Successful Desegregation Plan.

18 In spite of Fifth Circuit's ruling, it acknowledged the com­
prehensive approach by the district judge: "After developing a 
voluminous record and holding hearings for over a month on the 
feasibility and effectiveness of these proposals, the district judge 
drew a comprehensive plan dealing, inter alia, with special 
programs, transportation, discipline, facilities, personnel, and an 
accountability system, as well as student assignments." 572 F, 2d 
1010, 1013 (CA 5 1978).



The Civil Rights Commission in its 1976 report Ful­
filling the Letter and Spirit of the Law spent considerable 
detail to remind us of the received knowledge after two 
decades of school desegregation: successful desegrega­
tion happens not by chance but through planning and 
total community commitment. Id. at 168-201. "Only in 
learning together as equals, sharing knowledge and ex­
periences, can children hope to develop the cultural 
values which will prepare them to be fully contributing 
members of society." Id. at 206. The report reflects well 
the breadth of school desegregation in attempting to 
provide the promise of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 494 (1954): equal educational opportunities for 
all.19

The path to the promise is not perfectly marked and 
cryptic statements in Brown II, Swann and Green tell the

19 We do not read Brown 1 as purely a race case. First, it is not so 
written; indeed it is written as an education case. Second, if it were 
solely a race case, the remedy would have been significantly easier 
to achieve and none of the language of Brown 11 and Swann would 
have been necessary. Third, as a race case it places incredible 
strains on credulity to assume that Southern schools, but for 
segregation would have been integrated, while the Northern 
schools would not. Milliken v. Bradley 1, 418 U.S. 717(1974). Finally, 
while treating Brown as a race case has the advantage of simplicity 
of remedy — bus to balance — it carries the corresponding difficul­
ty of ignoring the mission of any school system: to provide a quali­
ty education to each child. If the mission is recognized, the 
availability of a richness of remedial actions in a school desegrega­
tion context becomes apparent. Milliken v. Bradley 11, 433 U.S. 267 
(1977). See generally, Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and 
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976). 
See also Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, 84 School Rev. 313 
(1976): "The fact that this desegregation decision was intended to 
foster education seems to have been forgotten."



17

district judge upon default by a school board a broad 
discretion is his. To exercise his discretion he must first 
learn, then act, and finally evaluate (somewhat later) 
the success of his product. Few other discretionary 
decisions probe so deeply into the resources of a judge 
or approach even a fraction of the difficulty. And, as we 
have noted, the geography and population shifts in 
Dallas made Judge Taylor's job unenviable in its com­
plexity.

Although a native Dallasite, the judge had to study 
the district to learn, inter alia, where the people lived, 
where they would live in five years, what the ages of 
their children were, where the schools were located, as 
well as the conditions, complections and capacities of 
the schools. Then a solid month of trial provided Judge 
Taylor with a wealth of plans and information. 
Naturally, none of the plans submitted was perfect. But 
some were remarkably better than others. The judge 
had already recognized, as he had stated in court, that 
the DISD plan was "patently unconstitutional." The 
responsibility for securing a constitutionally acceptable 
plan was now squarely his. When school authorities 
default "a district court has broad power to fashion a 
remedy that will assure a unitary school system." 
Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.

Of the remaining plans, one other was especially 
troublesome. The quota-like approach of the NAACP 
with its demand to change student assignments as 
neighborhoods change not only ran against Swann's



18

presaging of the holding in Pasadena City Board of Education 
v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), but the NAACP in its 
commitment to provide a racially balanced system for 
Blacks was willing to leave the Mexican American 
children in a secondary position (at least temporarily).20 
Such a conclusion is also ''patently unconstitutional" 
and it is unthinkable that a district judge would accept 
it. Of necessity the focus on the plan to be ordered 
narrowed to those plans which were constitutional and 
which promised to work. The plan finally implemented 
reflected the predominant thinking of the parties to the 
litigation. Where commonalities of approach were pre­
sent, they were implemented.21 The process was the 
essence of informed discretion: the application of 
reasoned judgment to the facts at hand.

It is true that the plan selected, essentially the plan 
drafted and submitted by the Education Task Force of 
the Dallas Alliance, is a compromise. It is easy to deride 
compromise. Furthermore, sloganeering that con­
stitutional rights cannot be compromised is as 
irresistable as it is irrefutable. Unfortunately, it begs 
the real question. The answer, of course, is that each

20 "The first magnitude of desegregation and the attaining of an 
Unitary School System should be to achieve a racial balance of 
black and white students in each school and then follow through 
with the integration of other minorities into the system." 
(Emphasis added).

21 The commonalities available demonstrate a substantial im­
provement over the situation at the beginning of this decade 
where the lack of alternatives from either counsel for the plain­
tiffs and the school boards virtually mandated racial balance 
remedies "because there is not much else that a court can do that 
will have an impact." Bickel, Education in a Democracy: The Legal and 
Practical Problems of School Busing, 3 Human Rights 53, 59-60 (1973).



19

child must be granted equal educational opportunities 
and there is a duty on the school board (or, that failing, 
the district judge) to establish a unitary school system. 
But these in turn are only starting points. Despite a 
decade of urban litigation involving cities as diverse as 
Charlotte, Mobile, Denver, Detroit, Pasadena, and 
Dayton, major questions — questions that no district 
judge can avoid — are unanswered (and sometimes un­
asked). Swann assumed that some one-race schools 
were allowable. But how many? For what size school 
district? What parameters ought a judge employ in 
evaluating the one-race school question in a majority 
minority district? Is there a maximum beyond which a 
district may not go regardless of the strength of the 
proffered justification? If neighborhood schools are 
acceptable for the very young, what grades are encom­
passed? At what point does the amount of time a stu­
dent spends on a bus each day become unreasonable? 
As a district judge fashions his remedy to include not 
only student assignments, but also quality educational 
programs and faculty hiring policies that assist 
desegregation, what are the priorities among them?22 
Is there any room for community involvement beyond 
that which the adverse parties bring to the litigation?

22 Consider Dr. Kenneth Clark's analysis:
Given the fact that public schools, so far, reflect the racial 
populations of the cities, the goal of attaining high quality 
education through the democratic process of realistic and 
administratively feasible forms of desegregation appears 
to be, at least temporarily, abandoned and is being re­
placed by the need to concentrate on raising the quality of 
education without regard to the present racial composi­
tion of a city's public schools. This educational imperative must 
be met, for the present generation of students in the public



20

Parties, obviously, have pat answers to these and 
other questions. That is the nature of litigation. For 
judges, however, the best that is possible is an educated 
guess as to what the ultimate answers to these 
questions will be, assuming that in fact answers will be 
forthcoming. What a district judge faces, then, is an ex­
plicit directive — establish a unitary school system — 
large parameters of which are vague.23 It is hardly sur­
prising that the lack of explicit rules, the vagueness of 
doctrine despite numerous decisions involving urban 
systems, becomes translated into the terminology of 
informed discretion. For the district judge that delicate 
balance of private and public needs pin-pointed by 
Brown 11 must mean compromise. Not compromise in a 
pejorative sense, but compromise in its best sense. For 
compromise fits well with no theories and often defies 
logic; its sole virtue is that in the real world it works.24

schools of our cities is not expendable. If we continue to 
frustrate these students educationally, they will be, in 
fact, the ingredients of the “social dynamite" which 
threatens the stability of our cities, our economy, and the 
democratic form of government. It is conceivable, also, 
that a present emphasis on raising the quality of educa­
tion for these children will eventually facilitate rather 
than block the continued struggle for a non-racial 
organization of the public schools in the United States.

K. Clark, A Possible Reality: A Design for the Attainment of High Academic 
Achievement for Inner City Students 51 (1972) (Emphasis added).
23 See generally, Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned
Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 Law and 
Contemp. Probs.______(Spring 1978) (forthcoming).
24 “Legal theory is one thing. But the practicalities are 
different." Ashbacker Radio Co. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327, 332(1945).



21

While the plan adopted is largely the consensus plan 
of the Dallas Alliance and thus to that extent reflects 
compromise among private citizens, Amicus believes 
that it is unreasonable to expect district judges to be 
limited to the entire plan of one of the participants.25 A 
judge must pick and choose among features of the 
various plans before the court, trying to get the best 
mix of concepts and programs. It is his duty — not that 
of any of the parties (except the school board) — to 
fashion a plan that promises to work. In the exercise of 
this duty a district judge will encourage, as he will in all 
litigation, compromises among the parties. Indeed the 
very vagueness of the law and flux of urban America 
invite compromise. It is not a dirty word; it is a legal and 
practical necessity. And it is what judge Taylor did. He 
took common parts from all of the plans. He reached 
for consensus. He gave more to one side in some places, 
less in others. Desegregation plans are not made in 
heaven. They are drafted by individuals with sharply 
competing (and sometimes divided) interests. Putting 
together a compromise whole is not an abuse of discre­
tion.

Choosing the amount of busing to achieve a 
desegregated system has always been the most difficult 
task for the lower courts. Their familiarities with the

25 See also, Main, Sealing off the City: School Desegregation in Detroit, in 
H. Kalodner & J. Fishman eds., The Limits of Justice 223, 274 
(1978): "The NAACP and the board of education submitted dras­
tically different plans. Both parties seemed to take extreme posi­
tions on the assumption the court would strike a compromise 
between them."



"practicalities of the situation," Davis v. Board of School 
Commissioners of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971), 
whether it be knowledge of traffic patterns, natural 
boundaries, or the demographics of the district, place 
them in the best position to exercise informed choice. It 
probably would not have been an abuse of discretion to 
have ordered the busing necessary to implement Plain­
tiffs' Plan A, but the concept of discretion mandates the 
choice not to adopt it also.26 It is true that there were no 
extensive time-distance studies entered into the record 
— and those offered were conducted on Sundays. But 
any knowledge of Dallas leads one quickly to the 
realization that once the naturally integrated areas 
were preserved there would indeed be lengthy bus 
rides necessary to eliminate many of the one-race 
schools, judge Taylor chose not to do this. The goal of 
desegregation is not merely to rearrange the student 
assignments in a system.27 It is rather to adopt a plan 
that will realistically overcome the effects of past dis­
crimination. It is to integrate minds as well as build­
ings. Thus Judge Taylor wisely anticipated Milliken v.

26 Plaintiffs' Plan A would have transported 69,000 students 
and its projected cost of implementation was $22,000,000. 412 F. 
Supp. at 1200.
27 Although many people believe to the contrary. E.g., the letter 
from John W. Roberts of the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union 
stating Judge Garrity's task is “to evaluate plans as they are placed 
before him not on the basis of the educational quality of the plan, 
but rather on the basis of whether or not they meet the standards 
for school desegregation developed by the Federal Courts." 
Quoted in Willie, Racial Balance or Quality Education?, 84 School Rev, 
313 (1976).



23

Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) and opted to enrich the 
educational experiences of the students in a desegrega­
tion context.28 This was not only present in the Early 
Childhood Education concept adopted for K-3 and the 
magnet approach to grades 9-12,29 but beyond this the 
district judge crafted an order looking to the other 
facets necessary to make a desegregation plan work.

DISD was placed under an obligation to recruit 
quickly additional Black and Mexican American 
teachers, principals, and other certificated personnel. 
Yet simply having teachers, principals and ad­
ministrators ready to occupy buildings is not enough. 
Clearly the district judge recognized the disparate im-

28 Each of the Black members of the Education Task Force of the 
Dallas Alliance agrees with the statement of Dr. Benjamin Mays: 
"Black people must not resign themselves to the pessimistic view 
that a non-integrated school cannot provide Black children with 
an excellent educational setting. Instead, Black people, while 
working to implement Brown, should recognize that integration 
alone does not provide a quality education and that much of the 
substance of quality education can be provided to Black children in 
the interim." Mays, Comment: Atlanta—Living with Brown Twenty Years 
Later, 3 Black L.J. 184, 191-92 (1974).
29 We admit magnet schools have not always worked — 
although with an example like Skyline it is hardly surprising the 
participants at the district court thought magnets an attractive 
idea. The use of magnets is not simply freedom of choice by 
another name. While it is true a student must choose to attend a 
magnet, that choice may — and should — be heavily influenced by 
the school districts. Magnet schools, after all, are intended to be 
significantly superior to other high schools and this can be assist­
ed by a district's phasing out competing courses at non-magnet 
schools. Should the magnet concept be found ineffective the 
retention of jurisdiction by the district judge allows for correction. 
E.g., high school attendance zones might be modified to achieve 
additional racial mixing.



plications of exposing innocent minority children to 
possible instructional and administrative biases that 
sometime fail to vanish in spite of a court order. For the 
experience to be effective, they must understand and 
be capable of functioning in their multi-cultural set­
ting. Thus the district judge required in-depth training 
of these personnel to implement the plan and improve 
attitudes and awareness to facilitate the effectiveness 
of the personnel in a desegregated setting.

Finally, the judge sought methodologies of account­
ability. He accomplished this in two separate fashions. 
First, the very top administrators in the system were to 
reflect the racial composition of the city. This would 
mandate increased hiring of Blacks and Mexican 
Americans in the hopes that the commitment at the top 
to make desegregation work now would be reflected in 
commitment below. Second, the order provides not 
only for an internal audit by DISD to be filed with the 
Court, but, more significantly, an external audit of the 
progress the system is making in adopting the plan of 
the district court.

If there were nothing more than the district judge's 
understanding of the district and his reasoned actions 
in light of the available options and his anticipation of 
the authority Milliken II would give, the plan adopted 
could be sustained as an appropriate exercise of dis­
cretion so long as it held the promise to work. But a 
realization of what it means to adopt a desegregation 
plan for a complex urban community places an even 
heavier than normal burden on a district judge to assess



25

workability not only now, as Green demands, but five 
years or more from now. It is inconceivable that urban 
systems could be put through all the effort of creating 
desegregation plans satisfactory to a federal judiciary 
only to learn that if all the schools go one-race shortly 
thereafter from extraneous causes, or from the very 
existence of the plan that promises to work only now, 
there is no further Fourteenth Amendment obligation. 
No plan has value that cannot continue to work. And 
for a plan to continue to work there must be communi­
ty support as the Civil Rights Commission has 
recognized. Fulfilling the Letter and Spirit of the Law (1976). 
Judge Taylor knew this and he achieved that support. 
One can search for various measures of the strength of 
community support but the passage by the voters of 
the $80,000,000 bond issue to assist implementation of 
the court order is strong evidence that Judge Taylor's 
prescient charge to the community to come forward 
and be involved worked — and promises to continue to 
work. The Dallas community, business, church, civic 
organizations, as well as private citizens, has demon­
strated support for the plan by providing resources a 
court is unable to order. Within six months of the court 
order 144 schools had been adopted by either business 
or civic organizations as focal points for the community 
effort in channeling volunteers, equipment, private 
monies to the schools, as well as providing part-time 
and full-time job opportunities for students.

The successful efforts to include the community and 
gain a broad base of support for the plan at present and 
maintain it in the future say much for the district judge.



He did not, unfortunately satisfy everyone. Maybe 
such a goal is impossible. Legal responsibilities cannot, 
of course, be shifted, The responsibility for a unitary 
school system rests with appropriate elected officials 
and, in default of their duties, with a federal judge. But 
the judge cannot blind himself to what all others can 
see and no one argues that school desegregation cases 
where the community is in an uproar are a model for 
either the political or judicial process. Schools must be 
integrated. Minds must be reached. Quality and caring 
must be assured. It must not only begin, it must also 
continue. Maybe better plans could have been devised 
but the plan adopted by Judge Taylor carried the 
promise to work.30 The informed discretion of the dis­
trict judge can require no more.

II. Washington V. Davis And Its Progeny 
Have No Place In Southern  School 
Desegregation Cases.

Not only is the Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 
(1976) issue not necessary to a decision by this Court 
(and not considered by the Court below), such a 
holding is not in the best interests of Dallas or the Unit­
ed States. School suits should not extend for the rest 
of this century whether the goal is to integrate or to 
avoid integration. Decisional principles should en-

30 Naturally the district judge retained jurisdiction over the 
DISD litigation. Should the plans and concepts he approved be 
shown not to work in practice, he is free to modify or abandon 
them as experiences dictate.



27

courage reasonable compromise, not further litigation. 
This applies to whether one-race schools cause 
challenges as to the existence of a unitary system or are 
justified as the normal outcome of urban housing 
patterns having nothing at all to do with actions of 
school boards.

Suddenly to reverse school desegregation cases into 
endless — and fruitless — squabbling over whether 
school segregation caused housing segregation or vice 
versa does more than tax the limits of judicial com­
petence and social science methodologies. Fundamen­
tally, it encourages the false hope that school systems 
may be released from the obligations to eradicate past 
dejure segregation. The fruits of a quarter-century of 
footdragging by school districts ought not be a return 
to separate and unequal. Yet the Washington v. Davis 
rationale promises little else. That is why it has been so 
enthusiastically embraced by those who resisted Brown 
IIr Green, and Swann. Providing for equal and quality 
educational opportunities for each child in a school dis­
trict — the goal of the Dallas Alliance Plan — can be 
made vastly more difficult when judicial as well as 
political pressures offer the hope that compromise is 
unnecessary — that the future belongs to those who 
questioned Brown.

The South has made great progress in the last 15 
years. Indeed today Boston is clearly a Northern 
phenomena, one that unfortunately may plague this 
great Nation for years. The North perceives no 
obligations in this area and the North resists. District



28
courts daily remind the South of its obligations. The 
spur has worked to set Southern school cases against a 
backdrop of high commitment to educational quality 
even during a period of fiscal retrenchment elsewhere. 
This is hardly a position mandating a call, no matter 
how uncertain, for retreat. Leaving these cases in the 
community, in the school boards, in the local district 
courts, where a judge may be guided by the equitable 
principles of Brown II and Swann and the desire to bring 
to each child the promise of the best education, is the 
appropriate solution.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above the Court should 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals remand­
ing this case to the district court for continued imple­
mentation of the ordered plan.

DATED M a y ____ , 1979.

Respectfully submitted,

H. RON WHITE
1907 Elm Street, Suite 2100
Dallas, Texas 75201

LUCAS A. POWE, JR.
2500 Red River Street 
Austin, Texas 78705

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae



29

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, H. Ron White, an attorney for the Amicus Curiae
herein, hereby certify that on the ------ day of May,
1 9 7 9 ,1 served three copies of the foregoing Motion for 
Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of Amicus 
Curiae to the Supreme Court upon the following 
Counsel for the Petitioners, Counsel for the 
Respondents and the Respondent Pro Se:

Mr. Edward B. Cioutman, III 
8204 Elmbrook Drive, Suite 200 
P. O. Box 47972 
Dallas, Texas 75247 
Ms. Vilma S. Martinez 
Mexican-American Legal Defense 

and Educational Fund 
28 Geary Street 
San Francisco, California 94108 
Mr. Nathaniel R. Jones 
1790 Broadway, 10th Floor 
New York, New York 10019 
Mr. Lee Holt, City Attorney 
New City Hall 
Dallas, Texas 75201 
Mr. John Bryant 
8035 East R. L. Thornton 
Dallas, Texas 75228 
Mr. James G. Vetter, Jr.
555 Griffin Square Building 
Suite 920
Dallas, Texas 75202 
Mr. James T. Maxwell (pro se) 
4440 Sigma Road, Suite 112 
Dallas, Texas 75240

Mr. Thomas E. Ashton, III 
Dallas Legal Services 

Foundation, Inc.
912 Commerce Street, Room 202 
Dallas, Texas 75202 
Mr. E. Brice Cunningham 
2606 Forest Avenue, Suite 202 
Dallas, Texas 75215 
Mr. James A. Donohoe 
1700 Republic National Bank 

Building
Dallas, Texas 75201 
Mr. Martin Frost 
777 South R. L. Thornton 

Freeway, Suite 120 
Dallas, Texas 75203 
Mr. Warren Whitham 
210 Adolphus Tower 
Dallas, Texas 75202 
Mr. Mark Martin 
1200 One Main Place 
Dallas, Texas 75250 
Mr. Robert H. Mow, Jr.
Mr. Robert L. Blumenthal 
3000 One Main Place 
Dallas, Texas 75250



30

by mailing same to such Counsel and Respondent pro 
se at their respective addresses and depositing the same 
in a United States mail box in an envelope properly ad­
dressed to such addresses with first class postage 
prepaid.

I further certify that all parties required to be served 
have been served.

H. RON WHITE 
Attorney for Amicus Curiae 
Dallas Alliance and

Education Task Force of 
Dallas Alliance

#



l a

1940 .

0 srAftf«a»*«* Of « .* « « « * * »  
AMIS ya®AW SflWllOfBIM!

PUB. NO.T4SK
PLATE B- l

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS PROGRAM -  CITY OF DALLAS

BLACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT



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" w w r  H A C K P O P U i  A T I O N
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C O M M U N I T Y  ANA17SIS f C O C B A M  -  C I T Y  O f  DALLAS

pLACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT - 1960

7 U i . N O .  T A 3 X
P L A T E  B- 3



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Pf SCI M l B IA C «  P Q S U U 7 > 0 «

a . o -
1 -  9.9

1 1 0 - 24 9

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S0' 74 9

- C O M M U N IT Y  A N A L Y S IS  I S O C S A M  *  C IT Y  O f  D A L L A S

LACK POPULATION BY CENSUS TRACT * 1970
PUS'. N O .T 4 S X
P L A T E  B -4



5a
CENSUS TRACTS IN THE DALLAS, TEX. SMSA

IN S E T  A - DALLAS AND VICIN ITY

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APPENDIX B
P O P U L A T IO N  B Y  RA CE B Y  C E N S U S  T R A C T :  1940,  1950,  196 0  A N D  1970

C E N SU S 19 4 0 1950 1960 1970

T R A C T W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE BLA CK W H ITE BLA CK
001 2,587 296 4 ,445 153 3 ,549 43 3 ,772 8

002.01 3,685 60 7,093 57 3 ,462 3 3 ,120 0

002 .02 4,271 12 3 ,877 0

003 3,758 60 4 ,327 14 3 ,935 7 3,566 12

004.01 8 ,198 22 7 ,495 77 2 ,789 2 2 ,8 1 7 0
004 .02 9 ,695 35 4 ,2 4 9 6 5 ,469 121

004 .03 7,342 760 6 ,192 129

005 4 ,255 83 3 ,831 27 3,315 53 4 ,497 58

006.01 9,089 535 3,382 3 4 ,674 7 5 ,653 11
006 .02 8,344 205 7,201 124 7 ,790 49
007.01 5 ,716 694 4,911 1,363 3 ,704 5 3 ,2 9 7 8
007 .02 2 ,142 422 2 ,586 96
008 3,847 89 4,772 69 4 ,605 6 4 ,634 19
009 3,329 87 3 ,275 42 2 ,833 12 3 ,074 4
010 5,785 99 5 ,284 44 4 ,479 19 4,681 14
011.01 7,955 173 8 ,166 77 4,234 21 4 ,050 5
0 11 .02 2 ,488 12 2 ,388 1
012 5,875 118 5 ,6 6 7 59 5,126 3 4 ,6 9 7 10
013.01 7,645 383 8,515 214 3 ,423 11 1,881 1
013 .02 4 ,6 8 7 47 4 ,928 19
014 2 ,259 385 2 ,357 264 3 ,1 7 7 83 3 ,716 26
015.01 11 ,104 596 11 ,164 356 6 ,323 62 6 ,4 0 7 5
015 .02 4 ,665 78 3 ,702 42



CENSUS
TRACT WHITE
016 2 ,774
017 .01 2,281
017 .02
018 3 ,859
019 5 ,377
020 5,145
021 2 ,727
022 .01 6 ,200
022 .02
023 3 ,727
024 4 ,239
025 2,045
026 2,595
027.01 4 ,419
027 .02
028 4,701
029 2,154
030 4 ,095
031.01 2 ,106
031.02
032.01 3 ,626
032 .02

1950
W H ITE B L A C K

2,0 7 0 7,352
1,171 7,802

3,933 50
4 ,3 9 7 73
5 ,335 175
1,235 86
6 ,195 1,648

3 ,364 1,168
3 ,774 96
2 ,159 2 ,714
2 ,929 2
4 ,6 4 7 4 ,7 7 0

4 ,2 4 9 112
1,793 167
3 ,264 2 ,602
2,011 357

2 ,868 391

#

1940
BLACK

6 ,0 3 9
9 ,741

166
206
228
187

2 ,098

1,319
87

2,501
2

2 ,925

147

266
3 ,6 5 5

410

395

1960  1970
W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B LA CK

1,114 7 ,086 425 5 ,559
548 5 ,8 2 3 42 269

322 2 ,758
2 ,720 10 2 ,578 17
2 ,305 21 1 ,390 28
5 ,0 9 3 84 6 ,0 0 5 44

545 37 153 29
1,702 620 1 ,233 418
2 ,415 340 1,856 342
2 ,106 1,373 591 1 ,939
2 ,722 86 2 ,0 6 9 341
1,790 3 ,688 460 4 ,2 4 9
2 ,156 1 1 ,665 119

32 7,245 13 7,247
105 4 ,869 23 4 ,890
965 2 ,928 75 2,445
214 1,685 89 3 ,6 8 7

1 ,688 1,185 468 151
979 411 1 ,4 5 7 981

56 40 53 1
1,269 192 342 15

133 73



1940 1950CENSUS
TRACT WHITE
033 4 ,963
034 5,151
035 2,404
036 3 ,262
037 2,121
038 3,912
039.01
0 39 .02 2 ,933
040 4 ,137
041 2 ,043
042 4,354
043 1,268
044 4,856
045 2 ,950
046 2,868
047 4 ,670
048 4 ,779
049 3 ,330
050 5 ,258
051 4 ,066
052 5 ,2 6 0
053 5 ,446
054 5 ,1 2 0

WHITE BLACK
4 ,585 451
5 ,183 442
2 ,397 186
2 ,722 286

648 6 ,8 4 0
3,734 695

2,091 5 ,553
4 ,142 68
1,861 3 ,078
5 ,3 7 7 133
1,575 40
5 ,639 87
7 ,676 12
2 ,835 36
4 ,1 9 7 41
4 ,3 3 6 36
4,311 922
4 ,834 85
4 ,515 8
4,981 22
6 ,701 3
6 ,3 6 9 1

BLACK
680
656
227
111

5,321

73

3 ,668
67

3 ,302
122

45
115

13
67
84
79
37

100
18
44

2
24

1960 1970

W H ITE B LA CK W H ITE BLA CK
2,768 519 821 977

543 5 ,559 81 6 ,852
150 2 ,372 31 3,234

73 3 ,041 8 1,825
62 6 ,8 8 0 31 5 ,8 1 7
49 5 ,559 11 4 ,8 5 8

121 4 ,548 49 4 ,525
10 4 ,642 5 3 ,742

205 4 ,418 122 3 ,662
418 4,265 135 3 ,438

4 ,8 1 7 24 4 ,4 8 9 22
2,962 1 ,877 2 ,4 3 7 1 ,280
5 ,6 9 0 25 6 ,3 8 6 9
6 ,719 5 7 ,172 3
2 ,654 14 2 ,7 5 3 10
3 ,074 8 2 ,973 4
3 ,369 196 3 ,4 3 3 193
4 ,640 1 ,500 5 1 8 7 ,006
3 ,984 52 2 ,871 56
4 ,025 4 3 ,584 0
4 ,293 10 3 ,771 2
5 ,946 0 5 ,344 1
5 ,9 6 2 5 4 ,2 8 7 2 ,620



#
C E N SU S  194 0  1950
T R A C T W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE
055 3 ,070 3 4 ,070

056 4,586 2 5 ,580

057 4 ,306 1 6 ,101

058 6 1 ,495 57

059.01 4 ,3 0 0
0 59 .02
060.01 1 ,396

060 .02
061 149

062 2 ,5 6 7

063.01 4 ,628
063 .02
064 4 ,3 9 8

065 4 ,519

066 89
067 2 ,651
068 3,582
069 5 ,817
070 2 ,738
071 .01 7 ,285
071 .02
072 3 ,649
073.01 6 ,755

1960 1970

WHITE B LA C K WHITE B LA C K
4,284 34 562 3 ,443

4 ,970 1 3 ,497 1 ,539

6 ,3 6 6 0 1 ,813 5 ,524

7 ,008 1 930 7,304
3 ,3 7 8 3 601 3 ,717

4 ,643 0 3 ,925 648
2 ,506 0

1,185 0 4 ,751 7
4 ,298 4 4 ,532 25
5 ,2 1 0 0 4 ,5 2 7 0
2 ,463 1 2,211 1
5 ,762 0 5 ,892 2
6 ,253 0 6 ,2 5 7 0

2 ,509 0 3 ,123 3
2 ,343 1 4 ,384 59

590 2 1,913 4

2,613 29 2 ,1 7 8 138
4 ,432 2,371 1 ,763 5,861
3,703 3 4 ,635 6
2 ,859 16 2 ,452 2

BLACK
0
0
3

3 ,539
1

1

0
1
1

7
0
0
4
0
4
0

60

13
110



CENSUS 1940 1950
T R A C T
073 .02

W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B LA C K

074 716 56
075.01
075 .02

990 132

076.01
076 .02
076 .03
076 .04

2,534 72

077 2 ,679 60
078.01
078 .02
078 .03

1 ,518 23

079.01
079 .02

1 ,738 6

080 2 ,940 69
081 4 ,298 23
082 2 ,270 8
083 1 ,286 2
084 6,241 0
085 2,541 1
086 2 ,3 1 8 3
087.01

087 .02
5 ,9 7 9 18

1960 1970
W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE BLA CK

4,001 46 4 ,0 0 9 18
1,660 49 1,676 12
1,224 89 720 14

461 6
1 ,728 20 2,285 3
1 ,286 45 803 9
4 ,084 13 838 3

3 ,670 4
5 ,743 39 5 ,733 33
4 ,2 3 0 3 ,019 893 1

3 ,448 3,171
6 ,970 81

2 ,1 8 9 3 7,712 16
5 ,629 1 5,851 5
5 ,456 23 5 ,885 5
5 ,9 2 6 18 6 ,9 1 7 8
3 ,3 4 3 1 5 ,0 2 9 0
2 ,037 6 1 ,623 2
6 ,8 6 3 6 6 ,2 2 5 4
3 ,5 3 8 1 3 ,274 0
4 ,318 3 925 3 ,155
1,916 5 362 4 ,606
9,491 1 1 ,099 12,334

10a



C E N SU S 1940 1950 1960 1970

T R A C T W H ITE B LA C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B LA C K

088 4,691 1 9 ,138 15 407 11 ,829

089 2 ,7 6 9 1,004 1,590 18 676 7,272

090.01 2 ,2 4 8 36 999 1 1 ,177 7

090 .02 2 ,540 0 4,221 1
091 .01 4 4 7 34 6 ,322 0 5 ,378 0
091 .02 8 ,274 0 8 ,782 1
092 .01 4 ,172 12 4,601 1 5 ,4 0 6 2
092 .02 4 ,535 0 4 ,7 1 0 0
093.01 5 ,112 33 3,891 2 3 ,648 2
093 .02 4 ,2 4 7 0 7 ,310 57
094 525 2 7 ,966 2 6 ,969 6
095 2 ,412 9 2 ,485 0
096.01 6 ,954 64 12 ,011 90
096 .02 8 ,6 5 7 3
096 .03 4 ,7 4 6 0
096 .04 2 ,059 137
097 5 ,766 2 8 ,6 6 9 7
098 4 ,7 8 8 3 9 ,1 5 7 8
099 4 ,621 0 3 ,185 2
100 1 ,170 3 ,289 861 2 ,764
101 4 ,200 7,702 3 ,5 6 7 7 ,569
102 315 7 ,417 329 6,171
103 5,062 2 299 4 ,448

11a



C E N SU S  194 0
T R A C T  W H ITE B LA C K

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111.01
111.02 

112 
113
114.01
114.02
115
116
117
118
119
120 
121
122.01
122 .02  
123

1950
W H ITE B L A C K

196 0  1970

W H ITE

UU

B LA C K W H ITE B LA CK

2,1 6 7 351 902 1,568

1 ,527 3 ,329 1,119 2 ,720

5 ,695 172 5 ,4 9 7 282

3,664 0 6 ,3 9 0 24

4 ,8 9 2 1 14,901 12

386 8 1 ,312 6

3 ,907 0 10 ,138 1

7 ,047 13 1,914 7

11 ,584 19

2 ,688 2 846 2 ,696

1,376 1 174 4 ,643

402 0 133 4 ,369

134 1,605

168 6 ,3 0 2 42 6 ,7 2 9

5 ,113 0 7 ,484 19

4 ,192 3 5 ,841 4

2 ,174 0 2 ,686 0

1 ,110 0 2,454 0

1 ,281 0 2 ,526 0

275 0 2 2 7 15

3 ,490 4 12 ,168 2
4 ,066 175

4 ,916 2 6 ,9 9 4 9

12a



C E N SU S 194 0 19 5 0

T R A C T W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K

124

125
126
127
128 
129
130.01
130.02

131
132
133
134.01
134 .02  
135
136.01
136 .02
136 .03
137 .03
138.01
140.01
140.02
141.0 I
141.02

1960 1970

W H ITE B LA CK W H ITE B LA CK

6,381 11 6 ,820 4

9,515 1 8 ,8 3 0 0

2 ,228 0 4 ,0 1 0 0

8,811 0 8 ,325 2

6 ,534 3 9 ,183 7

5,371 1 5 ,293 0

7 ,657 100 13 ,746 70

9 ,6 8 0 15

2 ,646 6 7,725 9

1,614 255 2 ,1 2 8 80

2,341 9 2 ,049 2

1 ,767 5 1,146 8

1,504 0

967 8 2 ,885 8

1 ,770 312 1,112 247

7 ,600 2

11 ,191 20

0 0

0 0

66 0 0 0

47 0
0 0

37 0

13a



1950C E N S U S  1940
TRACT WHITE BLACK WHITE
148
158
159
163
164
165.01
165 .02
165.03
165.04
166.01
167.01
167.02
169.01
169 .02  
171
176.01
178.01
178.02
179
180
181.03 
184

BLACK
1960 1970

WHITE BLACK WHITE B LA CK

0 0
0 0 0 0

37 0 42 0
0 0 23 0
0 0 0 0

562 0 1 ,627 21
0 0

86 1
0 0

1 ,477 10 1 ,638 0
2 ,068 24 146 3 ,085

341 395
547 90 155 2,851

113 6
164 0

135 0 156 0
0 0
0 0

209 0 205 0
166 0 101 0

0 0
0 0 0 0

14a



CENSUS
T R A C T

185.01
185 .02

190.01
190 .02
190 .03

192.01

194 0 1950 1960 1970

W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B L A C K W H ITE B LA C K

68 48 19 0

66 2

112 14 0 8

0 0

453 2

169 0 4 ,6 9 7 5

Source: 1940, 195 0, 1960and 1970 Census o f Population, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

15a



APPENDIX C

THE DALLAS ALLIANCE

CORRESPONDENT ORGANIZATIONS

American G.I. Forum
American Indian Center of Dallas, Inc,
American Institute of Architects, Dallas Chapter 
American Jewish Committee, Dallas Chapter 
Amigos 
Bishop College
BTJai B'Rith Womens' Council 
Boy's Club of Dallas, Inc.
Brown Berets
Camp Fire Council of Metropolitan Dallas 
Catholic Charities 
Catholic Diocese of Dallas 
Church Women United 
Community Council of Greater Dallas 
Community Relations Council, Jewish Federation of 

Greater Dallas
Council of Catholic Women, Dallas Deanery
Cumberland Presbyterian Church
Dallas Alumnae Chapter, Delta Sigma Theta
Dallas Association for Retarded Citizens
Dallas Association of Young Lawyers
Dallas Bar Association
Dallas Black Chamber of Commerce
Dallas Chamber of Commerce
Dallas Citizens Council
Dallas City Council of PTAs



17a
Dallas Civic Ballet 
Dallas Council on Alcoholism 
Dallas County Adult Probation Department 
Dallas County AFL-CIO 
Dallas County Community Action Committee 
Dallas County Mental Health & Mental Retardation 

Center
Dallas County Nutrition Program
Dallas Federation of Women's Clubs
Dallas Homeowners League
Dallas Housing Authority
Dallas Housing Forum
Dallas Inter-Tribal Center
Dallas Junior Chamber of Commerce
Dallas Mexican Chamber of Commerce
Dallas Opportunities Industrialization Center
Dallas Police Department
Dallas Minority Business Center
Dallas Public Library
Dallas Symphony Association, Inc.
Dallas Urban League
East Dallas Community Design Center
Family Guidance Center
Goals for Dallas
Goodwill Industries of Dallas, Inc.
Greater Dallas Community of Churches
Greater Dallas Community Relations Commission
Greater Dallas Crime Commission
Greater Dallas Housing Opportunity Center, Inc.
Greater Dallas Planning Council
Historic Preservation League of Dallas, Inc.



Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance 
Jobs for Progress, Inc, (Operation SER)
Junior League of Dallas, Inc.
League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)
League of Women Voters of Dallas
Links, Inc., of Dallas
Los Barrios Unidas Clinic
Mental Health Association of Dallas County
Mount Olive Volunteer Effort (MOVE)
National Alliance of Businessmen 
National Association of Social Workers, Inc.
National Conference of Christians & Jews 
National Council of Jewish Women, Greater Dallas 

Section
National Organization for Women (NOW)
NAACP — John F. Kennedy Branch 
NAACP — Oak Cliff/Cedar Crest Branch 
NAACP — South Dallas Branch 
Neighborhood Conservation Alliance 
Neighborhood Housing Services of Dallas, Inc.
North Park/Love Field Civic League 
Rabbinical Association of Dallas 
Salesmanship Club of Dallas 
Salvation Army
Senior Citizens of Greater Dallas, Inc.
Southern Methodist University 
Tejas Girl Scout Council, Inc.
Theater Three
United Methodist Church, Office of the Bishop

18a



19a

Urban Studies Program, SMU 
Venture Advisors, Inc.
Visiting Nurses Association 
Voluntary Action Center of Dallas County 
Wesley Rankin Community Center 
Womens' Council of Dallas County, Inc. 
Women for Change Center 
YMCA of Dallas Metropolitan Area 
YWCA of Metropolitan Dallas

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