Draft Conclusion of Law 1

Working File
January 1, 1971

Draft Conclusion of Law 1 preview

17 pages

Date is approximate.

Cite this item

  • Case Files, Milliken Hardbacks. Draft Conclusion of Law 1, 1971. 73319fa4-52e9-ef11-a730-7c1e5247dfc0. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9dbdcd19-fd9b-449b-a2ab-cc36af098867/draft-conclusion-of-law-1. Accessed October 09, 2025.

    Copied!

    UNITE'" s.. 
EASTiL M ., 

SOU.?
•0 DIST'IC? COURT
-Ict or . . achi,

. L DIVISIU .

RONALD BRADLEY, et al., )

Plaintiffs )
vs. )

WILLIAM G. MILLIKEN, et al., )

Defendants )
DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, ) 
LOCAL #231, AMERICAN FEDERATION 
OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, }

Defendant- ) 
Intervenor

and *

DENISE MAGDOWSKI, et al.,
)

Defendants- 
Intervenor }

CIVIL ACTION NO; 
35257

CONCLUSIONS 0? LAW 

1. This Court has juriedic .-..on 

the subject matter of this action a.

28 U.S.C. S 1343(3). Or ad ley v. Mi 11 ike.

of the parties and 

one Civil Rights Act 

433 2d (6th Cir.
t

1970)
2. In evaluating the evidence and applying the legal

standards to the facts it is not necesssr- that the Court 

determine whether or not the defer.de.. .termination to 

per hue the policies a,,, practices set -orth i. nr,: reecr. 
on the oasis of some evil intent 

An act cay be ? »id to be ,ntentio'
irrelevant, 
-t was

taken witn res • >nab 1 & . c rseeable .r.o*. 1 tr. aits.
See; Keyes v. —— -- '• hool D . ,t.x ict §1, .. . 27S
(D. Coi. 1969) ; Sponger v. pasadcr- ! 1 V
Supp. vC•L. California 1970) v 1 ■ t. O •'
the. C f 3 h- 1 ?* * 311 "Op * $ \r ; , a.firmed
F 2 ___  v . C.r. 197.,

.c x i. i 1 and ocen



372 F.2d 836, af£\i eg, tec, 333 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1967), 
cert, denied, non. <^dao.Ptelch School 3o,rd v. ^ ito6

— — ' 333 U-S- 340 , t o , .  Macon County ~f
^lH££tion, 267 F.Supp. 453 (<vr n »7l -.D. >.la.) , afx. d suo norn. Wallace
v* States, 339 U.S. 215 (1967).

7 .  School districts era accountable tor the natural ' 
end probable consequences of their pupil and teacher assign­
ment policies, and where racially identifiable schools are 
the effect of such policies the school authorities bear the 
burden of showing that such policies are based upon educational- 
y co.„,.ellea, non-racial considerations. Keyes v. School 

Siatrict^o.^. 303 P. Su p p. at 292-293; oTyie v. s^ ~  
SiStrict_of the Citv of---------- ----- i £ ™ C '  -- - F* 2 d ____(Sth Cir. 1971).

a. In Brown v. Boa^d^^ducation, 347 U.S. <83, 74 3 Ct 
8 8 6. 90 L.Ed. 703 (1954,, the Supreme Court was dealing, simply, 
wrth racial segregation. The Court made no distinction as to 
Rortnerrt segregation or Southern segregation. The supreme 
Court held, Simply, that segregated education is inherently 
unequal that it deprived Negro children of the educational 
opportunity to fulfill all their dreams in this country. It 
further held that all children are deprived, in a constitution­
al sense, by segregation. Soangler v. Pasadena citv „«
Vacation, 311 F.Supp. 501 (1970).

9. A violation of the Fourteenth h-.endrer.t has occurred
when public school officials haw aio nCiVe i:nade a -or.os of educational
policy decisions which ware based wholly or ir. pari on con­
siderations of the race of students or teachers and which have 
contributed to increasing racial segregation in the public 
school system. Davis v. ^ g ^ D i s t rict of she ctevon

-------- ’•“  —  <6th C i c - 1 3 7 1 > ' P o ijS E lE S r  v .  L o u i s i a n a

£iS2SStol Assistance 275 F.Supp 833, 837 (S.D.LA
1987), affirmed, 389 U.S. 571, 33 s.ct. C93, 19 L.Ed.2d 730 "
(19G8;; tall v. St. Helena Parish School Board. 1 9 7 ?.supp.

-3-



rejected as a requirement to invoke protection of the 14th 
Amendment against alleged racial discrimination. U.S., ex 

v* 304 F 2d 53, G5 (5th Cir. 1962). Pro­
testations of gopd faith and lack of intention to discriminate 
are insufficient to justify racially discriminatory results.
Sims v. Ga. 3S9 U.S. 404 , 407-403 (1967). In Morris v. Alabama 
294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935) the Court said If . . . the mere 
general assertions by officials of their performance of duty were 
to oe accepted as an adequate justification . . . the constitution­
al provision - adopted with special reference to (black citizens’] 
protection would be but a vain and illusory requirement."

4. When the power to act is available, failure to 
take the necessary steos so as to negate or alleviate a 
situation which is harmful is as wrong as is the taking of 
afiirrnativa steps to advance the situation. Sins of omission
can be as serious as sins of commission. Davis v. School District
Sl.Pp.n&fig* ^c., 309 F. Supp. 734, 741-742, affirmed____F 2d
____ (6th Cir. 1971).

5. In cases where racial discrimination is an issue, 
“statistics often tell much, and Courts listen." Alabama v.

States, 304 F. 2d 533, 586 (5th Cir.), affirmed, 371 
U.S. 37 (1962). Accord, Turner v. Pouche„ 396 U.S. 346, 369 
(1970); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, No. 29013 (5th Cir. Jan. 2C,
1971) (rehearing on banc pending) ? Griggs v. Duke Power,
U.S.L.W. 4317 ( March 3, 1971).

6. This Court has jurisdiction to hear and to decide 
all issues, concerning alleged discrimination in the schools 
of the District, including policies involving the assignment 
of students, the allocation and hiring of faculty and admini­
strators, and the location and construction of schools. Swan: 
v* g^£lottG-MecklenbercT Board of Education. 39 U.S.L.W. 4 4 37 
(U.S. April 20, 1971); United States v. School District 151,
286 F,Supp. 786 (N.D. 111.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir.
196o); United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education,



649, 652 (E.D. La., 1961), affirmed, 363 U.S. 515, 32 S.Ct.
529, 7 L.Ed.2d 521 (1962); United States v. School District
LSI, 404 F .2d at 1134; Taylor v. Board of Education, 191 F.
Supp. 1S1 (S.D.NhY., 1961), affirmed 294 F.2d 36 (2nd Cir.•>
1961), cert, denied, 363 U.S. 940, 32 S.Ct. 3S2, & L.Ed.2d 
339 (1961); Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 213, 231,
84 S.Ct. 1226, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1364)* Spangler v. Pasadena 
City Board of Education, 311 F.Supp. 501 (1970).

10. The defendants, their predecessors and successors 
in office are responsible for the actions and chargeable with 
the knowledge of their agents and employees. Regardless of 
the policies adopted by any Board or Superintendent, the test 
is as a matter of law, what v/as actually dono or failed to be 
done in the operation of the public schools. Similarly the 
test is the "effect'1 of policies, practices, customs and usages. 
[Tr. p. 49-50, 68 (Stephens)] See generally, M. Law & Practice, 
Vol. 1'Agency § 1 and 111; MLP Vol. 10 s 131; Compare;
Poindexter v. La. Financial Assistance Comm., 236 F.Supp. 6S6 
E.D. La. aff*d per curiam sub non, La. Ed. Commission for Needy

v. Poindexter, 393 U.S. 17 (1968); same, 275 F.Supp.
833 (E.D.La., 1967), 389 U.S. 571 (1963).

11. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids States from drawing distinctions on account of 
race. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Watson v.

373 U.S. 526 (1963). The Constitution forbids 
indirect, as well as direct, discrimination on a racial basis, 

v* i±£2R' Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 123, (1940)). The 
Constitution equally "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple 
minded modes of discrimination." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 263, 275; 
Sraith v. Texas, supra, at 132 (1940).

12. In determining whether a constitutional violation

-4-



has occurred, proof that a patcrn of racially segregated 
schools has existed for a considerable period of tine amounts 
to a showing of racial classification by the State and its 
agencies, local school authorities, which must be justified 
by clear and convincing evidence. Alabama v. United States,
304 F.2d 533, 586 (5th Cir.)„ aff'd 371 U.S. 37 (1302); United 
States v. Board of Educ. of Bessemer, 390 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 
1968); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Dd., 417 F.2d SOI, 309 
(■juh Cir.) , cert. denied, 396 U.S. 304 (1969); Turner v. Fouche, 
396 U.S. 346, 360 (1370); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, F.2d
____ (5th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Homes, Inc, v. Town of
•Lackawanna, __ F.2d___(2nd Cir.), Cert. Denied, u.S.
___ (1971); Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 374
F.2d 183, 192 (4th Cir. 1966); P.olfe v. County Bd. of Educ. of 
Ml?cpln County, 391 F.2d 77, SO (<7th Cir. 1968); United States 
v * School District 151, 301 F.Supp. 201.

' 12. The Board's practice, which transcended individual
instances, of shaping school attendance zones on a north-south 
rather than east-vest orientation, with the result that zone
boundaries conformed to racial residential dividing lines and 
segregation was entrenched, violating the Fourteenth Amendment.
ggP-Vgr v. School Dd. of Norfolk, ___ F.2d___(4th Cir. I960) ;
Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Pint.. 409 F.2d
682 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, ___U.S. ___ (1969); Northcross
v- g°nrd of Educ. of Memphis, 333 F.2d 661, 663-64 (6th Cir. 
1964); Clark v. Board of Educ. of Little ftnek, 426 F.2d 
(3th Cir. 1970).

13. Pupil racial segregation in the Detroit public 
school 3ydten and residential racial segregation resulting 
primarily from public and private racial discrimination are 
interdependent phenomena. The affirmative obligation of the 
defendant Detroit Board has boon and i3 to adopt and implement



• •

pupil assignment policies and practices that, to the maximum 
extent possible, compensate for and avoid incorporating into 
the school system the effects of residential racial discrimination. 
The Board's purposeful and deliberate building upon housing 
segregation violates the Fourteenth Amendment. See Davis v.
School District of the City of Pontiac, supra; Drover v. Norfolk 
School Board, 397 F.2d 37, 41 (4th Cir. 1968); Henry V. Clarksdale 
Municipal Separate School District, 409 F. 2d 682, 687, 6 89 (5th 
Cir. 1969); Spangler and United States v . Pasadena City Board 
of Education, above, 311 F.Supp. at 512; Sloan v. Tenth School Dist. 
of Wilson County, 433 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1970).

14. The defendant Detroit Board's policy of selective 
optional attendance zones, to the extent that it facilitated the 
separation of pupils on the basis of race, was without educational 
justification and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F.Supp. 401, 499-501 (D.D.C., 1967), 
affirmed, Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Taylor
v. New Rochelle Board of■Education, 234 F.2d 36, 38 (2d Cir. 1961), 
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); Spangler and United States 
v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 311 F.Supp. at 507-508,
512; Kelley v. Altheimer, Arkansas Public School District No.
22, 297 F.Supp. 753, 758 (E.D.Ark., 1969); Montgomery v.
Oakley Training School, 426 F.2d 269, 271 (5th Cir. 1970).

15. By requiring that students from majority black 
residential areas be transported to majority white schools to 
relieve overcrowding, while not transporting children from 
majority white residential areas to majority black schools 
(which have space available) to relieve overcrowding, defendants 
have placed an unfair burden and stigma on black children and, 
thus, have violated the Fourteenth Amendment. See; Brice v.
Landis, 314 F.Supp. 974 (N.D. Calif. 1969); Lee v. Macon County

C-



Board of Educ., No. 30154 (5th Cir. June 29, 1971); Cordon v.
Jefferson Davis Parish School Board, No. 30075 (5th Cir. June 
20, 1971); Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Educ., 311 F.Supp.
501, 524 (C.D. Calif. 1970).>
, 16. The Detroit Board's manipulation and gerrymandering
of attendance tone boundary lines to foster segregation by 
expanding the zones of identifiably black schools to contain 
increasing black populations or by removing areas of one racial 
composition from a zone for a school identifiable- as serving 
students of a different race. Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New 
Rochelle, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), Cert, denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); 
United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968); 
Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F.Supp. 501, 507-10,
522 (C.D. Calif. 1970); Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 309
F.Supp. 734, 744 (E.D. Mich. 1970); aff'd ____F.2d ___ (6th
Cir. 1970); Northcroos V . Board of Ed. of the City of Memphis,
333 F .'2d 661, 663-664 (6th Cir. 1964).

17. The practice of the Board, contrary to its avowed 
policy, of transporting black students from overcrowded black 
scnools to other identifiably black schools while passing closer 
identifiably white schools which could have accepted these 
children and thus achieved greater desegregation-has been held 
to be deliberate segregation by school authorities. Spangler 
v * Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F.Supp. 501, 507-03, 512 
(C.D. Calif. 1970); Kelley v. Alfcheimer, 297 F.Supp. 753, 758 
(E.D. Ark. 1969); Montgomery v. Oakley Training School, 426 
F.2d 269, 671 (5th Cir. 1970). The assignment of black students 
who were bussed into white schools as an intact group to classes 
rather than mixing them with the other members of the student 
body has been held unconstitutional as early as HcLaurin v.
Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, ___ U.S. ___ (1950); cf. McNeoso v.
Board of Educ., __F.Supp __ (N.D. 111.____), aff’d F.2d



(7th Cir. ___), rcv'd ___ U.S.__ (1963). In-school
segregation is equally violative of constitutional rights as 
segregation by school building. Johnson v. Jackson Parish
School Bd., __ F.2d __ (5th Cir. 1970); Jackson v. Marvell
School Pint. Ho. 22, __F.2d __ (8th Cir. 1970).

18. The manner in which the District formulated and
modified attendance zones for elementary schools had the natural 
inevitable and predictable effect of perpetuating and exacerbating 
existing racial segregation of students. Such conduct con­
stitutes de jure discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. United States v. School District 151, 285 F.Supp. 786, 
795-736, 798 (N.D. 111.), a f f d , 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968); 
Brewer v. City of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37, 40-42 (4th Cir. 1963); 
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 831 
367-863 (5th Cir. 1965), affd en banc, 330 F.2d 375 (1966), 
cert, denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Taylor v. Board of Education, 
294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); Spangler 
v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 311 F.Supp. 501, 522 (C.D. 
Cal. 1970); Davis v. School District, 309 F.Supp. 734, 744 (E.D. 
Mich. 1970), a f f d ___F.2d____(6th Cir. 1371).

19. A school board may not, consistently with the 
Fourteenth Amendment, maintain segregated elementary schools 
or permit educational choices to be influenced by a policy of 
racial segregation in order to accomodate community sentiment 
or the wishes of a majority of voters. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 
U.S. 1, 12-13, 15-16 (1958); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General 
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736-737 (1964); Hall v. St. Helena 
Parish School Board, 197 F.Supp. 649 , 659 (E.D. La.), affd 
368 U.S. 515 (1961); Roltnan v. Mulkev, 307 U.S. 369 (1967);
Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 331 U.S. 450 (1958); United 
States v. School District 151, 285 F.Supp. 786, 798 (11.B. 111.) 
affd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1963); Spangler v. Pasadena City 
Board of Education, 311 F. Supp. 501, 523 (C.D. Cal. 1970).

-8-



20. Assignment of teachers on a racial basis so that
teachers are assigned to schools attended bv children of their 
race tends to establish racially identifiable schools. Such 
assignment deprives students of their right to be free of racial 
discrimination in the operation of public elementary schools 
and is de jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment- Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. IDS (1965); Bradley v. School 
Board, 382 U.S. 103 (1965); Green v. County School Board, 391 
U.S. 430 (1968); United States v. School District 151, 286 F. 
Supp. 786, 797 (N.D. 111.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1123 (7th Cir.
1968), Cert, denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3486 (1971); Spangler v.

City Board of Education, 311 F.Supp. 501, 523 (C.D.
Cal. 1970); Davis v. School Pistrlct, 309 F.Supp. 401, 501-503 
(D. D.C. 1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968).

21. lhe defendant Detroit Board*s racially discriminatory 
P^^etices with respect to the assignment of faculty and staff 
personnel, an aspect of school administration over which the 
defendants have direct and continuing control, creates an 
inference, which the defendants must dispel by credible evidence, 
that other school board policies and practices which resulted in 
the racial separation of pupils were racially discriminatory. 
United States v. School District 151, 301 F.Supp. 201, 223-230 
(N.D. Hi. 1969), affirmed as modified, 432 F.2d 1147, 1151
(7th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, ___U.S. _____, 39 L.W. 3486 (1971);
Turner v. Fouche, 336 U.S. 346, 360 (1970).

22. The responsibility for faculty and administration 
desegregation is defendants', not the teachers and administra­
tors . The constitutional prohibition against segregation in 
public schools may not be made contingent upon the preferences
of teachers or the administrative staff. If necessary to further 
desegregation, faculty and administrators must be assigned

-9-



United States vinvoluntarily to S C h O O l s . School District 151,
28C F.Supp. 736 (N.D. 111.), aff»d, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 
1963); United States v. Board of Education, 396 F.2d 44 (5th 
Cir. 1968); David v. Board of School Commissioners, 393 F.2d 690

"V * » r » .  I -- „ ini

(5th Cir. 1968); Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 
311 F.Supp. 501, 523 (C.D. Cal. 1970).

23. Defendants are under a constitutional obligation 
to take affirmative remedial action to desegregate the faculties
and administrativo staffs of the public elementary schools forth­
with. United States v. Montgomery Board of Education, 395 U.S. 
225 (1969); United States v. School District 151, 286 F .Supp.
786, 797 (N.D. 111.), a f f d , 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968);
Clark v. Board of Education, 369 F.2d 661, 66S (8th Cir. 1966)?

States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 
836, 893, affd en banc, 330 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. 
denied, sub non. Caddo Parish School Board v. United States,
389 U.'S. 840 (1967); Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Educa- 
tion, 311 F.Supp. 501, 523 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Davis v. -School 
District, 309 F.Supp. 734, 744 (E.D. Mich. 1970).

24. When an unconstitutional pattern of teacher 
assignment has been found the standard for relief is assign­
ment of staff "so that the ratio of Negro to white teachers in 
each school, and the ratio of other staff in each, are sub­
stantially the same as each such ratio is to the teachers and 
otnt.r staff respectively, in tne entire school system. Swann, 
supra.; Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist.,
419 F.2d 1211 (1970).

25. The location of schools "influences the pattern 
of residential development of the city and metropolitan area
and have important impact on composition of inner city neighbor­
hood. 11 The classic pattern is often the building of schools 
specifically intended for Negro or white students. The building 
of new schools in areas of white suburban expansion farthest from

-10-



Negro population centers, in areas of Negro containment, in order 
to maintain the separation of the races with a minimum departure 
from the formal principles of “neighborhood zoning" promotes 
segregated residential patterns which, when combined with 
”neighborhood zoning", further lock the school system into the 
mold of separation of the races. Swann v. Charlotto-Mecklenburg 
Board of Education, 39 U.S.L.W. 4437, 4444, cited in Davis v.
School District of the City of Pontiac, Inc., #20477 ___ F.2d
____ Slip op. p.10 (concurring opinion of Judge Cecil) (6th
Cir. 1971); Accord, Kelly v. Metropolitan Co-gnty Board of 
Nashville, Tenn., 436 F.2d 856, (6th Cir. 1970); Brewer v.
School Board of City of Norfolk, 397 F.2d 37, 42 (4th Cir. 1968); 
Sloan v. Tenth School District of Wilson County, 433 F.2d 587,
589 (6th Cir. 1970); Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Educ.,
311 F. Supp. 501,522 (M.D. Calif. 1370).

26. By building new elementary schools and additions
to old schools in a manner that creates maintained and exacerbated 
existing segregation of elementary school pupils, the District 
caused do jure segregation in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg, 39 U.S.L.W. 4437,
4443 (U.S. April 30, 1971); United States v . Montgomery County 
Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225, 231 (1369); Lee v. Macon 
County Board of Education, 267 F.Supp 458, 472, 4S0 (M.D. Ala.), 
affect, 309 U.S. 215 (1967); United States v. Board of Public 
Instruction, 395 F.2d 56, 69 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v.
School District 151, 276 F.Supp. 786, 800 (M.D. 111.), aff'd,
404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968); Brewer v. City of Norfolk,
397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968); Spangler v. Pasadena City Board 
of Education, 311 F.Supp. 501, 517-519 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Davis 
v. School District, 309 F.Supp. 734, 741 (E.D. Mich. 1970); 
aff’d, _  F.2d ___ (6th Cir. 1971).

27. The Board' 3 school construction policies and 
practices have added to and reinforced the pattern of segregation re­
ferred to. Although there were vacant seats throughout the city

-11-



to which students could have been assigned at lesser cost
and with the achievement of integration, the Board continued
to expend substantial sums for construction of new schools
designed to service particular areas of racial concentration,
and "such schools opened as and have continued to bo racially
identifiable in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 91 S. Ct. 1284, __(1971);
United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125, 1132-33 (7th
Cir. 1968); Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp.
734, 741-42 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff»d____F.2d.___ (6th Cir.
1971); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 311 F.Supp. 501,
517-13 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified
School Dist., Civ. Ho. C-70-1331 (N.D. Cal., April 28, 1371);
cf. Sloan v. Tenth School Dist. of Wilson County, ___F2d.___,
(6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Board of Educ. of Polk Countv,

..   —    - — --------------------- —---------------------- -—       .     ..... . . r

___F.2d___ (5th Cir. 1968); Kelley v. Aitheim.er, __ F.2a__
(8th Cir. 1967); Bradley v. School Bd., __ F.Supp ___ (E.D.
Va. 1971); Clark v. Board of Educ. off Little Rock, 401 U.S. 971 
(1971).

28. The legal effects of racially discriminatory con­
finement to a school district are not different from the effects 
of such containment within a district. Lee v. Macon County
Board of Education, ____F.2d____ (5th Cir. Ho. 30, 154, decided
June 29, 1971.

29. The obligation of school districts found to be 
illegally segregated on the basis of race is to prepare, adopt, 
and implement such plans —  giving affirmative consideration to 
racial factors —  as will eradicate the effects of prior dis­
crimination and "achieve the greatest possible degree of actual 
desegregation". Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of 
Education, above, 91 S.Ct. at 1281; McDaniel v. Barresi,
U.S. ____, 91 S. Ct. 12S7, 1289 (1971).

30. The related doctrines that race and Socio-Economic

-12-



Status correlate highly and that better quality education is 
more readily provided in schools attended predominatly by 
higher SES pupils may be educationally supportable, but they 
may not be employed as a limitation upon a school district's
obligation to eliminate —  by pupil desegregation —  the effects 
of its prior discriminatory practices, particularly where the 
Grfect of such a limitation would be to “protect" ciuality 
education at the schools attended predominantly by white students 
while denying the equal protection of the laws by perpetuating 
lesser education at scnools attended predominantly by black, 
lower SES children. Swarm v. Charlotte-Hocklenhera Beard of 
Education, 91 S.Ct. at 1200, note 8; Brunson v. Board of Trustees 
•i*2v F.2d 020, 324 et. seq. (4th Cir. 1970); brewer v. School 
Board of City of Norfolk, __ F.2d ___ (4th Cir. 1970).

31. The public and private racially discriminatory 
policies that have effected the extreme containment of black 
families within the Detroit school district deny equal education— 
al opportunity to the children of such families, and the State, 
which is empowered to alter school district lines, is obligated 
to do so absent a showing of a compelling non-racial, educational 
justification for maintaining such lines. Brown v. Board of 
Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300-301 (1955).

32. The Court concludes that Sec. 2a of Act 48 and 
the action of the Governor's Commission pursuant to that Act in 
establishing the present regions, has the effect of making de­
segregation more difficult; and to the extent that any of its 
provisions make any plan of desegregation more difficult it may 
not as a matter of law be considered. Bradley v. Milliken,
433 F .2d 397, (6th Cir. 1970),

33. Under the Constitution of the United States and 
the Constitution and the laws of Michigan, the responsibility
for providing public educational opportunity to all children 
on constitutional terms is ultimately that of the State. Turner



v * Warren County Board of Education, 313 F.Supp. 330 (E.D.N.C., 
1970); Godwin v. Johnston County Board of Education/ 301 F.Supp. 
1339 (E.D.N.C. 1969); United States v. Texas Education Agency,
431 OF.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1S70); Article 8, 55 1 and 2, Michigan 
Constitution; Dasaiewicz v. Board of Education of City of 
Detroit,. 3 N.W* 2d 71 (Mich. 1942); Jones v. Grand Ledge Public 
Schools, 84 N.W. 2d 327 (Mich. 1957); M a y  'Arp, Primary School 
District v. State Board of Education, 102 N.W. 2d 720 (Mich. 1960)

34. The Michigan Constitution of 1963 gives the State 
broad authority and responsibility for public education. It 
provides; "The legislature shall maintain and support a system 
of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by 
law." Art. VIII, Sec. 2 School districts "are agencies of the 
State, deriving their powers from the State, not independent 
entities with inherent rights, privileges or immunities." School 
Diet. Mo. 7, et. al. v. The Board of Education of the IntermediateS **■’ ' " “ -----  " ' 1 ....... —1..."
School District of the County of Kent et. al., No. 4585 (Kent 
eir. et., Oct. 16, 1967) (slip op. at 4-S); Attorney General 
ex rel Kies v. hawrey, 131 Mich. 639; School District of the 
City of Lansing v. State Board of Education, 367 Mich. 591;
Xmlay Township Primary School District No. J v. Board of Education, 
359 Mich. 478; Jones v. Grand Ledge Schools, 349 Mich. 1.

35. "That a state's form of government may delegate the 
power of daily administration over public schools to officials 
w±th less than state-wide jurisdiction does not dispel the 
obligacxon of those who have broader control to use the authority 
they have consistently with the Constitution . . .  In such 
instances the constitutional obligation toward the individual 
school children is a shared one.” Bradley v. School Board
9l ..the City of Richmond, Virginia, 51 F.R.D. 139, 143 (1970).

C6. In addition to the State Board and State Super­
intendent the next level of public education is the Intermediate 
school district. They are in most instances contiguous with

-14-



county boundaries but in other instances they extend beyond 
those political boundaries. {19 Tr. 2045 Porter] M.S.A. 15.3291 
ct. soq. Tho superintendent and board in all respects are the 
legal successors to the powers, duties and responsibilities of 
the county superintendent and county board of education. Tho 
first duty of the superintendent is to "TPJut' into practice 

educational policies of the state and of the board, . . .  
Pc_j.oi.il such duties as the superintendent of public instruction 
or the board prescribes . . .,** and generally supervise 
distribution and accounting of state aid to local districts.
M *S*A * IS.3301(1). The Intermediate board provides for certain 
types of education on a county wide or multi-district basis.
(±9 Tr. p. 2044). They also supervise, recommend and approve 
consolidations and annexations of local districts. (Vol. p. ) 
P.a . lolA. State law provides for combinations and annexations 
of those Intermediate districts subject to the approval of the 
State Board of Education. M.S.A. 15.3302(1); 15.3303(1).

r/. Leadership and general supervision over all public 
education is vested in the State Board of Education. Art. VIII Sec 
3, Mich. Constitution 1363. The duties of the State Board and 
Superintendent include but arc not limited to, specifying the 
number of hours necessary to constitute a school day; approval 
until 1962 of school sites; approval of school construction 
plans (P.Exs. 10 & 174,); accreditation of schools, approval of 
IocUjs based on State aid funds; review of suspensions and 
explusions of individual students for misconduct [Op. Attv.
Gen. July 7, 1970, Mo. 4705}; authority over transportation 
routes and disbursement of transportation funds, teacher 
certification and the like 15:1023 (10) (Porter, Tr. Vol 19 
p. 2057-03). State law provides review procedures from actions 
o± local-or intermediate districts (See M.S.A. 15.3442), with 
authority in the State Board to ratify, reject, amend or modify 
hue actions of-these inferior state agencies. See M.S.A.



15.3467; 15.1919 (91); 15.1313 (62b)j 15.2299 (1); 15.1961? 
15.3402; Bridgohamoton School District No. 2 Fractional of 
Caraonville Mich. v. Supt. of Public Instruction, 323 Mich. 615.
In general, the state superintendent ic given the duty "To do 
all'things necessary to promote the welfare of the public schools 
and public educational instructions and provide proper 
educational facilities for the youth of the state." M.S.A. 
lo.3252. See also 15.2299 (57), providing in certain instances 
for reorganisation of school districts.

Jo. State officials including all of the defendants, are
charged under the Michigan constitution with the duty of providing
pupils an education without discrimination with respect to race.
Art. VIII Sec. 2 Mich. Const. 1963. Article I Sec. 2 of the
constitution provides:

No person shall be denied the equal pro­
tection of the laws; nor shall any person 
be denied the enjoyment of his civil or 
political rights or be discriminated against 
in the exercise thereof because of religion, 
race, color or national origin. The legis­
lature shall implement this section by 
appropriate legislation. Compare: Jenkins 
v. Morristion School District, #A-117~ C j 7 
Supreme Court July 25, 0 7 1 “Tslip o p . p .
12, 14 and 16)

3S. The State Department of Education has recently 
established an Equal Educational Opportunities section having 
responsibility to identify racially imbalanced school districts 
and develop desegregation plans. [19 Tr. p, 2045 (Porter)]
Section 15.3355 provides that no school or department shall be 
kept for any person or persons on account of race or color.

40. The state further provides special funds to local 
oldtracts ior compensatory education which are administered on 
a per senool oasis under direct 'review of the state board. All 
otner state.aid is subject to fiscal reyeiw and accounting by 
the state. M.S.A. 15.1919 (53), (61), (62), (64a). See also 
l-> .1919 (68b) providing for special supplements to merged



districts "for tho purpose of bringing about uniformity of 
educational opportunity for all pupils of the district." The 
general consolidation law M.S.A. 1J:3401 authorises annexation 
for even noncontiguous school districts upon approval of the 
superintendent of public instruction and electors, as provided 
by law. Op. Atty. Gen., Feb. 5, 1964, No. 4193. Consolidation 
with respect to so called "first class" districts, i.e. Detroit, 
is generally treated as an annexation with the first class 
district being the surviving entity. The law provides procedures
covering all necessary considerations. M.S.A. 15.3184, 15.3186.

41. The pattern of actions and ommission on the part 
of noth State and District defendants constitute collectively 
a pattern of conauct vroiative of the 14th Amendment. "Tho 
fact that such came slowly and surreptitiously rather than by 
legislative pronouncement makes the situation no less evil."

i i

Copyright notice

© NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

This collection and the tools to navigate it (the “Collection”) are available to the public for general educational and research purposes, as well as to preserve and contextualize the history of the content and materials it contains (the “Materials”). Like other archival collections, such as those found in libraries, LDF owns the physical source Materials that have been digitized for the Collection; however, LDF does not own the underlying copyright or other rights in all items and there are limits on how you can use the Materials. By accessing and using the Material, you acknowledge your agreement to the Terms. If you do not agree, please do not use the Materials.


Additional info

To the extent that LDF includes information about the Materials’ origins or ownership or provides summaries or transcripts of original source Materials, LDF does not warrant or guarantee the accuracy of such information, transcripts or summaries, and shall not be responsible for any inaccuracies.