St. Mary's Honor Center v Hicks Brief Amici Curiae

    Nos. 91-56047, 91-56048

y  AN 1 6 1S92
IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DARREN THOMAS, et al.,

Plain tiifs-Appellees, 

vs.

COUNTY- OF LOS ANGELES, et a!., 

L>c fe n dan Is- Appellants.

On Appeal from a Preliminary Injunction Order in 
the United States District Court for the 

Central District of California

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

HUGH MANES 
CAROL WATSON 
MANES & WATSON 
3600 Wilsliire Bivd.. Suite 1710 
Los Angeles, CA 90010 
(213) 381-7793

ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM 
New York University Law School 
40 Washington Sq. West, Room 327 
New York, NY 10012 
( 212) 998-6198

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & 
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

PATRICK O. PAT1ERSON 
BILL LANN LEE 
KEVIN S. REED 
CONSTANCE L. RICE 
3i5 W. Ninth St., Suite 208 
lx>s Angeles, CA 90015 
(213) 624-2405

JULIUS L. CHAMBERS 
CLYDE E. MURPHY 
MARINA C. HSIEII 
ALAN JENKINS 
99 Hudson St., Suite 1600 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees 

(Additional Counsel on next page)

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
LIBRARY

99 HUDSON STREET 
NEW

 YORK, N. Y. 10013



Additional Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Counsel:

JOHN C. BURTON 
JAMES S. MULLER 
BURTON & NORRIS 
301 North Lake Street, 8th Floor 
Pasadena, CA 91101 
(818) 449-8300

GARY S. CASSELMAN 
11340 West Olympic Blvd., Suite 250 
Los Angeles, CA 90064 
(310) 478-8388

SCOTT CRAIG 
CRAIG & GOLDSTEIN 
10866 Wilshire Blvd., 15th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90024 
(310) 441-4111

RICHARD EIDEN 
2110 South Hill St., Suite O 
Oceanside, CA 92054 
(619) 967-9101

JAMES FOSTER 
4929 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 915 
Los Angeles, CA 90010 
(213) 936-2110

ART GOLDBERG 
SANDOR FUCHS 
GOLDBERG & FUCHS 
1467 Echo Park Ave.
Los Angeles, CA 90020 
(213) 250-5500

ROBERT MANN 
DONALD COOK 
MANN & COOK 
3600 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1710 
Los Angeles, CA 90010 
(213) 252-9444

TED YAMAMOTO 
1200 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 206 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
(213) 482-2248

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees



Nos. 91-56047, 91-56048

IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DARREN THOMAS, et al„ 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

vs.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., 

Defendants-Appellants.

On Appeal from a Preliminary Injunction Order in 
the United States District Court for the 

Central District of California

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

HUGH MANES 
CAROL WATSON 
MANES & WATSON 
3600 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 1710 
Los Angeles, CA 90010 
(213) 381-7793

ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM 
New York University Law School 
40 Washington Sq. West, Room 327 
New York, NY 10012.
(212) 998-6198 ,

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & 
EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.

PATRICK O. PATTERSON 
BILL LANN LEE 
KEVIN S. REED 
CONSTANCE L. RICE 
315 W. Ninth St., Suite 208 
Los Angeles, CA 90015 
(213) 624-2405

JULIUS L. CHAMBERS 
CLYDE E. MURPHY 
MARINA C. HSIEH 
ALAN JENKINS 
99 Hudson St., Suite 1600 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees



TABLE OF CONTENTS

ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ...........................................................................................  3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.............................................................................................. 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE....................................................................................................... 3

A. Nature of the C a se .........................................................................................................  3

B. Proceedings Below ......................................................................................................... 4

C. Attorneys' Fees ......................................................................................................................................  9

D. Statement of Facts .........................................................................................................  9

1. Introduction.........................................................................................................  9

2. The Pattern of Constitutional Violations by Lynwood Deputies ................ 10

a. Beatings ................................................................................................  13

b. Use of Firearms To Terrorize, Maim, and K ill...............................  18

c. Abusive Searches................................................................................  20

3. Racially Motivated Harassment........................................................................ 23

a. Racial Slurs, Intimidation and Ridicule . . ........................................  23

b. The Vikings .......................................................................................... 24

c. Policy of Targeting Gangs for "Special Attention"............................... 26

4. Retaliation.........................................................................................................  30

5. Cover C harges..................................................................................................  32

6. Discouragement of Complaints........................................................................ 33

7. Department-Wide Assignment Policies ..........................................................  35

8. Tacit Authorization of Unconstitutional Conduct........................................... 35

ARGUMENT ...............................................................................................................................  39

I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER GRANTING A PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION IS SUBJECT TO REVIEW ONLY FOR ABUSE OF

l



39

41

42

45

46

49

50

51

52

55

55

55

58

60

60

DISCRETION

NO LEGAL RULE INVOKED BY DEFENDANTS REMOTELY 
REQUIRES REVERSAL ON THIS RECORD.............................................

A. RIZZO  DOES NOT BAR THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
ISSUED BELOW..................................................................................

B. LYO N S  INTERPOSES NO OBSTACLE TO THE
INJUNCTION........................................................................................

C. THE INJUNCTION DOES NOT TRESPASS ON ANY
PRINCIPLE OF FEDERALISM.........................................................

D. ANDERSON V. CREIGHTON DOES NOT REVERSE THE
BALANCE OF EQUITIES THAT TIPS IN FAVOR OF 
ISSUANCE OF THE INJUNCTION..................................................

THE DISTRICT COURTS FINDINGS OF FACT ARE FULLY 
SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD..................................................................

THE DISTRICT COURTS APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE 
FACTS DID NOT RESULT IN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.................

A. THE COURT FOLLOWED THE CORRECT PROCEDURES IN
ISSUING THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION...............................

B. THE SCOPE OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS
PROPER................................................................................................

1. The Court Did Not Order Any Classwide Relief. ................

2. The Court’s Order Is Narrowly Tailored To Minimize
Federal Intrusion And Is Limited To The Scope Of The 
Probable Constitutional Violations Established By The 
Record........................................................................................

3. The Geographic Scope Of The Order Derives From
Defendants’ Representations To The Court Below................

C. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER COMPLIES WITH THE 
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 65(d), FED. R. CIV. P. .

1. The District Court's Oral And Written Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law Set Forth The Reasons For Issuance Of 
The Preliminary Injunction.......................................................

2. The District Court’s Order Is Sufficiently Specific In Its

ii



Terms, And It Describes In Reasonable Detail The Acts 
Sought To Be Restrained.......................................................

iii



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases . page

Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1971) ................................................................................ passim

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) ............................................... 7, 44, 45

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) ..............................................................................  43

Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp.. 862 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1988)............................................................  48

Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 984) ............................................................... 41

Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America,
476 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1973) ...........................................................................................  47

Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ..............................................................  46

Caribbean Marine Services Co. v. Baldrige,
844 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1988) ...........................................................................................  49

Chemlawn Services Corp. v. GNC Pumps, Inc.,
823 F.2d 515 (Fed. Cir. 1987).........................................................................................  48

City of Canton v. Harris, 103 L.Ed. 2d 412 (1989).....................................................................  41

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).................................................................passim

Clark v. County of Los Angeles, CV 91-3689 TJH (GHKx) ...................................................... 4

Combs v. Ryan s Coal Co., 785 F.2d 970 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986) ..................................................................................... 55

Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir.
1989), cert, denied sub nom. San Francisco Firefighters Local 798

v. City and County of San Francisco, 111 S.Ct. 248 (1990) ..........................................  54

Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1988)..................................................................................... 43

Flynt Distributing Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1984)............................................... 46

Fuller v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV 90-1601 (C.D. Cal.) .................................................  3

Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1938)................................................................................................  48

IV



Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984) ................................................... ...................  41

Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983) ..........................................................  42

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982) ............................................. 48

Harris v. City of Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1987)............................................................  41

Henry Hope X-Ray Products, Inc. v. Marron Carrel, Inc.,
674 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982) .........................................................................................  54

Hoffritz v. United States, 240 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1956)............................................................... 46

Hvbritech Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,
849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988).........................................................................................  48

ICC v. Rio Grande Growers Co-op, 564 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977)............................................. 53

International Longshoremen’s Association v. Philadelphia
Marine Trade Association, 389 U.S. 64 (1967) ............................................................... 57

Johnson v. Radford, 449 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1971) ............................................................... 51, 58

LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985).......................................................................  40

Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588 (1927)..........................................  55

Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National
Football League, 634 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1980) ...................................................... 43, 49

Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1984).......................................................................... 43

Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1983) . . .-..........................................  48

Matter of Thorpe, 655 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1981)..........................................................................48

McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1988)........................................... 43

Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 L.Ed.2d 31 (1990) ................................................................................  44

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) .................................................  41

Nelson v. IBEW Local 46, 899 F.2d 1557 (9th Cir. 1990)...................................................  40, 58

Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1985) ..............................................................................  40

NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941)..............................................................  58

v



NORML.v. Mullen. 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985);
affd  in part, mod. in part, 796 F.2d 276 (1991) .......................................................................... 43

Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984).............................................................................................................  52

Perfect Fit Industries v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800
(2d Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982)............................................................  56

Professional Assn, of College Educators v. El Paso Community 
College District, 730 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied,

~ 469 U.S. 881 (1984)...........................................................................................................  54

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) .........................................................................................  44

Regal Knitwear v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945) ..............................................................................  53

Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355
(9th Cir. 1988), cert, denied 490 U.S. 1035 (1989)...................................................  36, 46

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).....................................................................................passim

Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French
Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1953)............................................................... 35, 55

Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1988)............. : ........................................ 41

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974).......................................................................................  55

San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Kennedy,
412 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1969) ...........................................................................................  46

Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) ..................................................................................... 55

Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1987)............................................................  41

Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union. 446 U.S. 719 (1980) .................................... 44

Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 859 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1988)...............................................  44

United States v. Crookshanks, 441 F. Supp. 268 (D. Ore. 1977)...............................................  53

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948)............................................. 45

Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp.,
888 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1989) ...........................................................................................  36

vi



White v. Washington Public Power Supply System,
669 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1982) .........................................................................................  55

Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1983)....................................................................... passim

Statutes and Rules page

42 U.S.C. § 1988 ............................................................................................................................... 8

Cir. Rule 28-2.3 ................................................................................................................................. 8

Rule 23, Fed. R. Civ. P ............................................................................................................... 3, 4

Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P .................................................................................................... passim

Rule 65(d), Fed. R. Civ. P .................................................................................................... passim

Others page

7 Moore’s Federal Practice H 65.12 (2d ed. 1991)....................................................................... 47

9 Moore’s Federal Practice 11 203.11, p. 3-48 (2d ed. 1991)........................................................47

C. Wright & A. Miller, 11 Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2949, pp. 469-473 ............. 46



ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in granting a preliminary 

injunction requiring the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department to follow its own stated policies 

and guidelines governing searches and use of force pending a trial on the merits, where:

a. The record established a persistent pattern of constitutional violations:

b. The court applied the correct legal standards;

c. The court's findings of fact are clearly supported by the record; and

d. The court carefully weighed the relevant factors and issued an injunction in the proper 

form.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Appellees accept the appellants' statements of jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case

This appeal arises from an action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 challenging a pattern 

of pervasive misconduct by sheriff s deputies assigned to the Lynwood station of the Los Angeles 

County Sheriffs Department ("LASD"). Defendants have appealed from the district court’s grant 

of a preliminary injunction requiring that, pending final determination of the action, LASD 

employees shall (1) follow the LASD's own stated policies and guidelines regarding the use of force 

and procedures for conducting searches, and (2) submit to the Court, in camera and under seal, 

copies of reports alleging the use of excessive force. ER 1888-89.1

'This brief uses the following abbreviations: "ER" refers to Appellants' Joint Excerpts of
Record; "Supp. ER" refers to Appellees' Supplemental Excerpts of Record; "CR" refers to docket 
entries in the Clerk's Record; "Cty. Br." refers to the opening brief tiled on behalf of Appellants 
County of Los Angeles. City of Lynwood. Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department. Sheriff 
Sherman Block. Undersheriff Robert Edmonds, Assistant Sheriffs Jerry Harper and Richard 
Foreman, and Captain Bert J. Cueva; "Dep. Br." refers to the opening brief filed on behalf of 21 
individual deputy Appellants; "LASD Manual" refers to the Los Angeles County Sheriffs 
Department Manual of Policy and Procedures.

1



B. Proceedings Below

On September 26. 1990. 75 victims of police misconduct (the "Thomas plaintiffs")2 filed this 

suit as a class action, alleging systematic lawlessness and wanton abuse of power by sheriffs 

deputies assigned to the LASD station in Lynwood, a city whose population of 62.000 is 24 percent 

African-American and 70 percent Latino.3 The complaint (ER 1-53) alleged 42 separate incidents - 

- all occurring within the span of 104 days between February 10 and May 25, 1990 — of what the 

district court characterized as "systematic and unjustified shootings, killings, beatings, terrorism, and 

destruction of property caused by Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs at the Lynwood sub-station."4 

ER 1957-58. The complaint named as defendants the County of Los Angeles, the LASD. the City 

of Lynwood. Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block, the Undersheriff and two Assistant 

Sheriffs, the Commander of the Lynwood station (Captain Bert J. Cueva), 21 individual LASD 

deputies, and 500 doe defendants.5 ER 4-5. Because the defendants had not taken sufficient 

action to correct abuses uncovered by prior individual damage suits,6 the Thomas plaintiffs sought 

to litigate their damage claims jointly and requested declaratory and injunctive relief on behalf of

2Six additional named plaintiffs appear solely as guardians ad litem on behalf of minor children. 
ER 1-3.

3United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Summary Population & 
Housing Characteristics (1990), California p. 67. According to the 1980 census, the population of 
Lynwood was approximately 55,000, of whom 34 percent were African-American and 43 percent 
were Latino. ER 15. The 1980 per capita taxable income for residents of Lynwood was $6,222, 
compared to a Los Angeles County per capita taxable income of $11,842. Id.

4One additional incident occurred on October 18. 1989. ER 98 (Demetrio Carrillo).

'The complaint also named as defendants the California Attorney General and the Los Angeles 
Countv District Attorney. The district court later dismissed all claims against both of these officials. 
CR 63, 137.

6Los Angeles County paid approximately $8.5 million in settlements and jury awards in 
individual excessive force lawsuits against LASD in 1986-1989, and the number of such lawsuits has 
steadily mounted in the last five years. Supp. ER 23. Sheriff Sherman Block has testified that his 
department does not keep records of lawsuits filed against deputies, nor does it keep records of 
judgments entered in such suits against deputies or against the department. ER 158-59.

2



a class pursuant to Rule 23. Fed. R. Civ. P.

The district judge who ultimately issued the preliminary injunction in Thomas, Hon. Terry 

J. Hatter. Jr., at first declined even to consider the Thomas plaintiffs’ claims. In July and August 

1990. the plaintiff in a separate action pending before Judge Hatter, Fuller v. County of Los Angeles, 

No. CV 90-1601 (C.D. Cal.), had moved for leave to file an amended complaint, to join additional 

parties, and to associate additional counsel in his case. Appellees' Request for Judicial Notice on 

Appeal, p. 4. In essence, these motions sought to amend the complaint in Fuller -  a § 1983 case 

alleging police misconduct by Lynwood deputies — to state all of the claims later pleaded in 

Thomas. The district court denied this motion, expressing concern about the effect that the 

proposed amendment might have on the rights of the individual deputy defendants in Fuller. 

Appellees’ Request for Judicial Notice on Appeal, pp. 13-14.

The Thomas complaint was filed together with a "notice of related case" advising the court 

of the Thomas plaintiffs’ position that their case and Fuller were related. See ER 1963 (CR 2). 

The Thomas case was initially assigned to Hon. A. Wallace Tashima. Thereafter, in accordance 

with the district court's local rules. Judge Tashima determined that the Thomas case was properly 

transferable and, with Judge Hatter's consent, ordered that it be transferred to Judge Hatter's 

calendar. See ER 1963 (CR 25).3

In November and December. 1990, defendants County of Los Angeles. City of Lynwood. 

LASD, Sherman Block, and Bert J. Cueva filed numerous motions, including motions to dismiss 

part or all of the complaint on various grounds: to stay all discovery and other proceedings in the 

action on various grounds; to stay all discovery relating to class certification and to dismiss the class * *

As the district court noted, a motion to certify the case as a class action had not been filed at 
the time the court issued its preliminary injunction. ER 1958. On October 28. 1991. plaintiffs filed 
such a motion, which is currently pending in the district court. Supp. ER 230 (CR 162).

sContrary to the assertion in the individual deputy defendants’ brief in this Court, plaintiffs did 
not file their notice of related case "(ujpon learning that the instant case had been assigned to 
Judge Tashima." Dep. Br., p. 10. The record shows that plaintiffs filed the complaint and notice 
of related case at the same time. See ER 1963 (CR 1, 2).

3



allegations of the complaint: and to sever plaintiffs' claims of entity and supervisorial liability from 

their claims against individual deputies. CR 28-30. 34-35. On January 2, 1991, the California 

Attorney General moved to dismiss all claims against him. CR 37. These motions were fully 

briefed, and the district court took them under submission in January 1991. See CR 36. 

Anticipating that the district court’s disposition of these motions would significantly affect the 

course of future proceedings, the parties stipulated to, and the Court ordered, a stay of further 

discovery pending a ruling on the motions. CR 36. 54-55.

On July 19, 1991, the district court granted the Attorney General's motion to dismiss the 

claims against him but denied the defendants’ other motions.9 Supp. ER 220 (CR 63). Meanwhile, 

plaintiffs' counsel had learned that the pattern of misconduct and abuse by Lynwood deputies was 

continuing. On July 9, 1991, 35 additional plaintiffs (the "Clark plaintiffs") filed a complaint 

alleging further unlawful acts by Lynwood deputies. Clark v. County of Los Angeles, CV 91-3689 

TJH (GHKx) (see Appellees’ Request for Judicial Notice on Appeal, p. 23). On July 15, 1991, the 

Thomas plaintiffs filed their motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking protection against specific 

forms of misconduct during the pendency of the lawsuit. Supp. ER 200.

In support of their preliminary injunction motion, plaintiffs filed over 200 pages of 

documentary evidence, including 58 declarations detailing the deputies' misconduct and 33 color 

photographs10 of injuries and property damage suffered by the victims. ER 54-260. Plaintiffs also 

relied on documents they had previously filed in opposition to defendants’ pending motions, 

including certified copies of the declarations of 11 deputies and news reports concerning the 

existence and activities of the "Vikings," a white-supremacist gang of deputies operating within the 

Lynwood substation. Supp. ER 48-199. Defendants responded with more than 1,200 pages of

9On August 21, 1991, the Los Angeles County District Attorney moved to dismiss the claims 
against him. CR 77, 78. The court granted this motion on September 24, 1991. CR 137.

10In their Excerpts of Record, defendants supplied the Court with indecipherable black and 
white copies of most of these photographs, and they omitted one altogether. Plaintiffs have 
provided the Court with accurate color photocopies to be substituted for the unintelligible copies 
filed by defendants.

4



declarations and other documents in an effort to refute plaintiffs’ claims. ER 352-780, CR 73-76. 

In reply, plaintiffs filed 25 additional declarations and other documents. ER 875-904, 1395-1577. 

Plaintiffs, but not defendants, requested an opportunity to present oral testimony on the motion. 

See ER 1967 (CR 79); see also Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction, p. 3 (CR 116).

On September 9, 1991, the district court heard the arguments of counsel, asked counsel for 

all parties to review LASD’s stated policies and guidelines, and directed counsel to report to the 

Court regarding the extent to which those policies and guidelines covered the misconduct alleged 

in plaintiffs’ motion. ER 1921-22. Counsel for the parties subsequently conferred and submitted 

a joint statement to the court which set forth each specific item of relief sought by plaintiffs in 

conjunction with the language of each LASD policy and guideline the parties agreed was relevant. 

ER 1741-58. The parties also filed separate statements supplementing their joint report. ER 1607- 

1740, 1759-1887. Plaintiffs’ separate submission included a modified proposed order which, in 

language taken from LASD’s stated policies and guidelines, specifically set forth the temporary 

relief requested with respect to search procedures, use of force, racial slurs, photographs of injured 

persons, and reports to the court. ER 1593.

On September 23, 1991, after hearing further argument and after reading and considering 

the thousands of pages of declarations, memoranda, reports, and other documents submitted by the 

parties, the district judge stated that he did not "relish getting involved in a situation where the 

court is asked to indeed supervise ongoing law enforcement activities," but that he could not 

"overlook the evidence that’s been presented so far." ER 1949. Faced with credible evidence of 

a pattern of widespread constitutional violations by LASD deputies in Lynwood, the district court 

made oral findings that serious issues had been raised and that the balance of hardships clearly fell 

on the side of the plaintiffs, and stated that it was therefore his intention to grant provisional relief 

in the form of "a very simple order." Id. By requiring the defendants to follow their own policies 

and guidelines regarding the use of force and the conduct of searches until such time as the factual

5



record could be more fully developed at trial, the order would provide the plaintiffs with a measure 

of temporary protection from further violations of their constitutional rights while minimizing the 

degree of federal intrusion into the operation of a local law enforcement agency and also 

safeguarding the rights of individual deputies. See ER 1948-55.

After the hearing, the district court signed an order requiring that, pending final 

determination of the action, all employees of LASD, whether sworn or civilian, shall: (1) "Follow 

the Department’s own stated policies and guidelines regarding the use of force and procedures for 

conducting searches"; and (2) "Submit to the Court, in camera and under seal, copies of reports 

alleging the use of excessive force that are in the possession of the Department on the first of every 

month."11 ER 1889.

The district court stayed its order until 5:00 p.m. the following day, September 24, 1991, in 

order to permit defendants to seek emergency appellate relief. ER 1889. Defendants then sought 

and obtained orders of this Court granting a stay pending appeal and expediting the appeal. Orders 

of Sept. 24 and Oct. 1, 1991.

On October 8, 1991, the district court filed written findings of fact and conclusions of law 

which supplemented its previous oral findings. ER 1957-61. The Court concluded that plaintiffs 

had established their probable success on the merits and the likelihood of irreparable injury, and 

that issuance of the preliminary injunction "will serve the public interest in that it will prevent, or 

at least minimize the physical, emotional, and psychological harm being suffered by plaintiffs and 

the Lynwood community at the hands of Lynwood area deputies." ER 1960. Defendants 

subsequently requested and obtained an extension of time in order to address the district court's 

written findings and conclusions in their briefs in this Court. Order of Oct. 16. 1991.

uAt the district judge’s direction, plaintiffs’ counsel submitted a proposed order after the 
hearing. The judge struck out language in the proposed order that would have limited its 
application to "the jurisdiction of the Lynwood station of this Department," and he also struck out 
language requiring that copies of departmental reports alleging the use of excessive force be served 
on plaintiffs’ counsel, subject to an appropriate protective order. ER 1889.

6 •



C. Attorneys’ Fees

To the extent they are prevailing parties, plaintiffs intend to seek attorneys’ fees for this 

appeal pursuant to 42 LLS.C. § 1988. See Cir. Rule 28-2.3.

D. Statement of Facts 

1. Introduction

The district court’s findings of fact frame the issues for consideration on this appeal unless 

they are "clearly erroneous" under Rule 52(a). Fed. R. Civ. P.12 In the present case, the district 

court made its findings in the context of ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction. Such 

findings — made on the basis of a necessarily incomplete factual record, under properly relaxed 

evidentiary standards, and in support of temporary relief to deal with an emergency situation -- are 

subject only to the most limited appellate review.13 Here, each of the district court’s findings of 

fact is supported by ample evidence in the record.

2. The Pattern of Constitutional Violations by Lynwood Deputies 

The district court found that, "[a]s a result of the terrorist-type tactics of deputies working 

in Lynwood, and policy makers' tolerance of such tactics, plaintiffs are being irreparably injured -- 

both physically and mentally — and their civil rights are being violated." ER 1959. Plaintiffs’ 

complaint set forth at least 130 abusive acts committed by Lynwood deputies — almost exclusively 

against African-Americans and Latinos — within the first few months of 1990. These acts included 

at least 69 warrantless, harassing arrests and detentions; 31 incidents of excessive force and 

unwarranted physical abuse against handcuffed and otherwise defenseless detainees (beating, 

kicking, pushing, striking with flashlights, choking, slamming doors on legs, slapping, shooting to

12Rule 52(a) requires a court of appeals to respect a district court's factual findings even though 
the appellate court might have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible 
views of the evidence, the district court's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. 
Anderson v. City o f Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).

13In such a case, the appellate court is "foreclosed from fully reviewing the important questions 
presented. Review of an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction is much more limited 
than review of an order granting or denying a permanent injunction." Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 
724 (9th Cir. 1983).

7



maim); seven ransackings of homes and businesses; 16 incidents of outright torture (interrogation 

with stun guns, beating victims into unconsciousness, holding a gun in a victim’s mouth and pulling 

the trigger on an empty chamber, pushing a victim's head through a squad car window); quick-stop 

driving to bang a victim’s head against the squad car screen; and uninhibited expressions of racial 

animus by deputies, including use of epithets such as "niggers" and "wetbacks." ER 16-38.

The declarations submitted in support of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction 

provided sworn statements supporting the allegations of the complaint. These declarations — which 

the district court found "more credible than [the evidence] presented by the defendants" (ER 1959) 

-  also demonstrated that the pattern of gross misconduct by Lynwood deputies did not end with 

the filing of plaintiffs’ complaint in September 1990, but continued to subject plaintiffs to 

irreparable injury and continued to deprive plaintiffs of their civil' rights.14 ER 1959. In addition 

to documenting 14 of the specific incidents described in the complaint, plaintiffs' declarations 

attested to 28 further and strikingly similar incidents. The original complaint names 21 individual 

deputies as defendants,15 and the declarations filed by the parties identity an additional 45 deputies 

by name as being involved in such incidents.16 This total of 66 specifically identified deputies -

14In the Excerpts of Record they filed in this Court, defendants inserted the portion of their 
memorandum of points and authorities below in which they argued their version of the facts set 
forth in plaintiffs' declarations. ER 781-812. However, defendants did not include in their Excerpts 
of Record any portions of the memoranda filed by plaintiffs in the court below. In accordance with 
Circuit Rules 30-1.3 ("excerpts of record shall not include briefs or other memoranda of law filed 
in the district court" unless they have independent relevance) and 30-2 (sanctions for "inclusion of 
unnecessary material in excerpts of record"), plaintiffs have not included any such memoranda in 
their Supplemental Excerpts of Record. Plaintiffs, however, wish to refer the Court to the detailed 
statements of the facts set forth in their memoranda below. See CR 62, pp. 3-46; CR 116, pp. 13- 
44.

15The complaint names as defendants deputies Rosas. Mato. Delgadillo. Garcia. Courgin. Mann. 
Nordskog, Raimo. Gillies. Kiff. Brown-Vover. Boge, Mossotti. Smith. Campbell. Thompson. Pippen. 
Leslie. Sheehy, and Archamba'ult.

16The declarations (ER 54-260, 352-780, 1395-1577) identity the following additional deputies 
(victims of the misconduct are indicated in parentheses): Cormier (Darren Thomas), Pinesett
(Darren Thomas), Ripley (Darren Thomas, Tracy Batts). Wilkerson (Tracy Batts), Wallace (William 
Leonard), Sgt. Yarborough (Jose Ortega), Pacina (the Maya family), Goran (the Rodriguez family, 
the Villegas family), Orosco (the Calderon family), Benson (Richard Hernandez), Running (Richard 
Hernandez), Brownell (Richard Hernandez, Alan Brahier, Thomas Monreal), Brannigan (the

8



which does not take into account the numerous deputies whom plaintiffs have named as doe 

defendants but have not yet been able to identify — constitutes more than 50 percent of all deputies 

assigned to the Lynwood station.17

Defendants in their briefs seek to create the impression that most if not all of the plaintiffs 

and declarants subjected to abuse by Lynwood deputies are dangerous criminals.18 This assertion, 

even if true, would hardly justify condoning a massive pattern of police misconduct, abusive 

searches, excessive force, and physical brutality. In fact, defendants' assertion is not true. The 

record shows that the great majority of the plaintiffs and declarants who were beaten and otherwise 

abused by deputies have not been convicted of any criminal activity in connection with those 

incidents, and that most were not even arrested during their encounters with the deputies. The 

figures are as follows:19 60 plaintiffs and declarants were not'arrested;20 4 were arrested but not

Melendrez family), Schneider (Ron Dalton. Marcello Gonzales), Reeves (Ron Dalton, Marcello 
Gonzales), Sgt. Coleman (Ron Dalton, Marcello Gonzales), Lt. Jackson (Ron Dalton, Marcello 
Gonzales), Owen (Elzie Coleman), Costleigh (Jeremiah Randle, Cesar Guerrero), Goss (Jeremiah 
Randle), Alvarado (Jeremiah Randle), Steinwand (Leopoldo Ortega), Enos (Alan Brahier), O’Hara 
(Gregory Mason), Sennett (Gregory Mason), Frazier (the Villegas family), Jonsen (the Villegas 
family), Roche’ (the Brown family), McCarthy (the Charles family), Anderson (Thomas Monreal), 
Corina (Thomas Monreal), Caldwell (Thomas Monreal), Santana (Enrique Bugarin), Wilber (Larry 
Clarke, Stanley Jones, Kelvin Davis), Archer (Kelvin Davis), Rossman (Cesar Guerrero), Dunn 
(Jose Luis Hernandez), Saucedo (Richard Cruz), Luna (Lloyd Polk funeral, Ernesto Avila, Jesse 
Melendrez), Chapman (Carlos Maya), Santee (Steven Thomas), Payne (Henry Castro), Sgt. Holmes 
(Lloyd Polk funeral), Sgt. Golden (Demetrio Carrillo), Lt. Rudelaff (Demetrio Carrillo).

17The record indicates that there are 125 deputies at the Lynwood station, and that 85 of those 
deputies are assigned to patrol duties. Supp. ER 50. See also ER 1484 (approximately 85 deputies 
assigned to the Lynwood station). Without citing any reference in the record, the County 
defendants have claimed in their brief on appeal that the Lynwood station has "approximately 140 
sworn officers" and/or "140 patrol officers." Cty. Br.. p. 36 n.24. Using defendants' unsubstantiated 
figure, the 66 deputies whom plaintiffs have identified by name constitute 47 percent of all deputies 
assigned to Lynwood.

lsThe County defendants assert, for example, that "[tjhose arrested were prosecuted, usually 
successfully. Of the named plaintiffs who were arrested, virtually all have been convicted or are 
currently being prosecuted. ..." Cty. Br., p. 31 n.16. See also, e.g., id. at 11. 27 n.14, 42; Dep. Br.. 
p. 41.

19The record does not reveal the status or disposition of any charges against 12 persons: Larry 
Clarke, Richard Cruz, Kelvin Davis, Raul Gonzalez, Bernardo Guzman, Stanley Jones, Fernando 
Martinez, Gregory Mason, Jesse Melendrez, Raphael Ochoa, Salvador Preciado, and Teresa 
Rodriguez.

9



charged with any crime;20 21 12 were charged but later had the charges dismissed by the District 

Attorney or by a court;22 2 were tried and acquitted;23 9 still have pending cases;24 and only 7 

pleaded guilty or were convicted of a criminal offense, of whom only 2 were convicted of crimes 

involving violence.25

20Adolpho Alejade (ER 30), Brian Alejade (ER 30), James Brown (ER 21), Jose Bugarin (ER 
85), Antonio Caballero (ER 30), Carolina Calderon (ER 90), Christiana Calderon (ER 90), Jorge 
Calderon (ER 90), Linda Calderon (ER 90), Mary Charles (ER 107), Marianne English (ER 36), 
Jeffrey Holliman (ER 142), Candi Leonard (ER 92), Sandi Leonard (ER 92), Yidefonza Lorenzana 
(ER 33), Antonio Guzman (ER 134), Jose Luis Hernandez (ER 136), Alfredo Maya (ER 168), 
George Maya (ER 168), Gilbert Maya (ER 168), Irene Maya (ER 168), Lupe Maya (ER 168), 
Marguerita Maya (ER 168), Raul Maya (ER 168), Raul Maya, Jr. (ER 168), Ruben Maya (ER 
168), Lilia Melendrez (ER 170), Natalie Mendez (ER 175), Georgia Mendibles (ER 181), Estella 
Montoya (ER 31), Rebecca Montoya (ER 31), Alice Orejel (ER 192), Maria Orejel (ER 192), Delia 
Osita (ER 130), Frances Palacila (ER 90), Rudy Perez (ER 170), Jeremiah Randle (ER 199), 
Estella Rojas (ER 33), Aurelo Salazar (ER 208), Marta Sanchez (ER 33), Charles Scott (ER 226), 
Anthony Sorto (ER 90), Elsa Tovar (ER 237), Herman Tovar (ER 237), Jaime Tovar (ER 237), 
Jesus Tovar (ER 237), Marcelo Tovar (ER 237), Francisco Tovar, Sr. (ER 237), Francisco Tovar, 
Jr. (ER 237), Yesenia Tovar (ER 237), Crystal Trevino (ER 31), Monique Trevino (ER 31), Brenda 
Villegas (ER 246), Demesio Villegas (ER 246), Jose Villegas (ER 246), Maria Villegas (ER 246), 
Ramona Fuamatu Villegas (ER 246), Herman Walker (ER 254), Alvin Washington ER 256), and 
Danny Williams (ER 1570).

21 Aaron Breitigam (ER 28), Calvin Charles (ER 104), Cesar Guerrero (ER 131), and Thomas 
Monreal (ER 183).

"Ernesto Avila (ER 1483, CR 27), Enrique Bugarin (ER 84), Henry Castro (ER 102-03), Kevin 
Marshall (ER 702), Carlos Maya (ER 1536), Lloyd Polk (ER 151, 1506-15), William Scott (ER 
702), Darren Thomas (ER 778), and Steven Thomas (ER 622).

:3Demetrio Carrillo (ER 101) and Elzie Coleman (Appellees' Request for Judicial Notice on 
Appeal, p. 16).

24Tracy Batts (ER 609-10), Ron Dalton (ER 121-23. 1540-41), Marcelo Gonzales (ER 1541), 
Eric Jones (ER 1541), Jose Ortega (ER 683-87), Alfonso Sanchez (Appellees' Request for Judicial 
Notice on Appeal, pp. 17-20). Alfredo Sanehez (id.), Jose Sanchez (id.), and Sergio Sanchez (id.). 
The Compton Municipal Court recently granted a motion to hold an evidentiary hearing into 
alleged juror misconduct at the trial of the Sanchez brothers. Id.

25Jesus Avila (receiving stolen property) (ER 512-18); Alan Brahier (assault) (ER 597); Ruben 
Calderon (taking vehicle for temporary use) (CR 48); Sergio Galindo (receiving stolen property) 
(ER 519-22); Richard Hernandez (evading a police officer) (ER 614-18); Leopoldo Ortega (charged 
with attempted murder; docket provided by defendants illegible regarding nature of conviction) (ER 
543-45); and Michael Sterling (drinking in public) (ER 702).

10



a. Beatings

The record before the district court established a pervasive practice of unjustified beatings 

by Lynwood deputies. The beatings, frequently accompanied by racial slurs and taunts (see 

Statement of Facts, Section 3, infra), often included blows to the head and other vital parts of the 

body with impact weapons.26 Plaintiffs’ declarations document 22 such incidents.

The case of plaintiffs Darren Thomas, Kevin Marshall, William Scott, and Michael Sterling 

illustrates the pattern of unjustified beatings by Lynwood deputies. At about 11:30 p.m. on April 

25, 1990, Darren Thomas was standing in a private yard in Lynwood, socializing with some African- 

American and Latino relatives and friends after a funeral. As they talked and drank beer, two 

LASD patrol cars drove up; one deputy flashed a light on the men in the yard and ordered them 

to come out into the street, while two other deputies entered the yard and began pushing and 

shoving, ordering the men to "get out of the goddamn yard." Once they were out on the street, they 

were ordered to put their hands on the hot hood of one of the patrol cars.27 ER 228-29.

The men asked, "What’s the problem? What did we do wrong?," but the deputies ignored 

their questions. Then a deputy repeatedly hit Mr. Thomas's cousin, Kevin Marshall, in the back 

of the head while telling him to be quiet. Another deputy handcuffed Thomas tightly and ordered 

him to go to the patrol car, repeatedly shoving and jerking him around while he attempted to 

comply. The deputy also threw Thomas to the ground, causing his glasses to fall off and the frames 

to crack. ER 229.

26The declarations include accounts of beatings on the head with clubs, flashlights, saps, and 
other objects (Sergio Sanchez, ER 220; Alfonso Sanchez, Supp. ER 217; Jose Sanchez, ER 216; 
Richard Hernandez, ER 140; Ron Dalton. ER 121; Alan Brahier, ER 73; Larry Clarke. ER 115; 
Stanley Jones, ER 147; Steven Thomas. ER 235); slamming heads into curbs, a brick wall, a trailer, 
and a car (Sergio Sanchez, ER 220; Alfredo Sanchez. ER 212; Calvin Charles, ER 104; Alan 
Brahier, ER»73; Jose Luis Hernandez. ER 136); and kicking in the face and eyes (Leopoldo Ortega, 
ER 196; Gregory Mason, ER 165). See also Complaint H 35. ER 25 (Lloyd Polk's head beaten with 
billy clubs); If 38, ER 26 (Fernando Martinez's head shoved through patrol car window); 11 54. ER 
31-32 (Ruben Calderon choked with flashlight).

27The record shows that it is a common practice for Lynwood deputies to force persons to place 
their unprotected faces and hands against the hot hoods of patrol cars. See ER 99 (Demetrio 
Carrillo); ER 229 (Darren Thomas); ER 137 (Jose Luis Hernandez); ER 120 (Richard Cruz).

11



Mr. Thomas, his unde, William Scott, and two cousins, Kevin Marshall and Michael Sterling, 

were all arrested and driven to the Lynwood station. Despite repeated requests, they were not told 

why they had been arrested. A deputy drove the patrol car recklessly on the way to the station, 

making wild turns and slamming on the brakes so that the three handcuffed men in the back seat 

would bang their heads against the metal screen separating the front seat from the back.28 ER 

229.

When they arrived at the Lynwood station, the men were taken to the back room of an 

"OSS" ("Operation Safe Streets," or "gang") trailer, where the deputies told them they had "fucked 

up" and that the deputies would "kick [y]our ass" if they didn't shut up and quit asking so many 

questions. As a deputy began to book him, Thomas asked what he was being charged with, and why 

his rights had not been read to him. The deputy became angry, put the handcuffs back on Thomas, 

and said, "Lve had enough of this shit." ER 229-30.

After another deputy entered, hitting his hand with his flashlight in a menacing manner, the 

first deputy put Thomas in a carotid chokehold and choked him unconscious. The next thing 

Thomas remembers is being hit with a jolt of electricity from a taser gun. He was on his knees, 

handcuffed, and repeatedly hit and kicked while he was subjected to racial slurs. One of the 

deputies said, "Yeah nigger, you ain't got no rights. We are going to make sure you don’t ask any 

more questions." Thomas looked down and saw his blood and broken teeth on the floor of the 

trailer. ER 230.

Thomas was again put in a chokehold and choked into unconsciousness, and he was again 

shot with the taser gun. He then found himself flat on the floor, face down. As a deputy picked 

him up by the neck, he heard someone say, "That's enough." He also heard Scott and Sterling 

yelling, "What are you doing to him?" In response, a deputy grabbed Scott, pointed a shotgun in 

Sterling's face, and told them to be quiet or they would be next. Scott and Sterling were then taken

28This is known as a "screen test" in the jargon of the deputies. See also ER 27 (Complaint 1111 
39-40, Fernando Martinez).

12



out of the room, and Thomas was taken to the hospital after being threatened again with the taser 

gun. His lip required stitches, his two front teeth were knocked out, and he was in severe pain. 

ER 230-31.

Thomas was falsely charged with attempted assault on an officer (dismissed before trial), 

drinking in public (dismissed during trial because there is no Lynwood ordinance prohibiting 

drinking on private property), and resisting, delaying, and obstructing an officer (dismissed after the 

jury was unable to reach a verdict). ER 231. As the district court found, several other plaintiffs 

were also charged with crimes pursuant to an unwritten policy of charging persons injured by 

deputies. ER 1958. See Statement of Facts, Section 5, infra.

Examples of the many other unjustified beatings by Lynwood deputies that are documented 

by the record are the following:

•  Deputies arrested Lloyd Polk, kicked him and repeatedly beat him with billy clubs, 

breaking both his arms and inflicting other serious injuries. See ER 151, 154-57; ER 25. A 

Municipal Court judge later dismissed charges that Polk had assaulted a police officer, finding that 

there was "abundant evidence that the officer was using excessive force" and that "the conduct on 

the part of these officers was outrageous." ER 1510, 1513. Almost ten months after the beating, 

Jason Mann (one of the deputies who beat Polk) signed a declaration stating that he had never 

been under investigation for the use of excessive force. Supp. ER 142.

•  After Demetrio Carrillo criticized deputies for driving over a sidewalk and almost 

hitting him with their patrol car in a school driveway, the deputies handcuffed Carrillo and severely 

beat .him in a secluded area behind the Lynwood Civic Center while calling him "mother-fucker" 

and "God-damn Mexican." ER 98-100.

•  Deputies struck Jose Louie Ortega across the back and ribs with a flashlight, 

denied him medical attention, and arrested him for resisting or obstructing an officer. ER 194-95.

•  Deputies handcuffed Richard Hernandez, dragged him through gravel and broken 

glass, and beat him with batons and flashlights while calling him "son of a bitch" and "asshole." ER

13



140-41.

•  Deputies beat Ron Dalton with fists and batons. A month later, they picked him 

up again, kicked him repeatedly and beat him with fists, batons, and flashlights. They then hogtied 

him and kicked and beat him some more. ER 121-23.

•  Deputies kicked Calvin Charles in the testicles, spread his arms and fingers back, 

dragged him across asphalt by the handcuffs, shoved his head into the side of the "gang" trailer at 

the Lynwood station, and punched him in the face and stomach. ER 104-106.

•  Deputies dragged Alan Brahier out of his car, threw him to the pavement, hit him 

on the head and body with flashlights, punched him in the eye. dragged him face down on the 

pavement, slammed his head into a brick wall, and hogtied him and beat him with flashlights. ER 

73-75.

•  Deputies handcuffed Leopoldo Ortega and then beat, kicked, and struck him with 

a flashlight or baton. A deputy also tried to break his fingers. Deputies then took him to the OSS 

trailer at the Lynwood station, where he was subjected to further kicking and beating about the 

face, arms, and legs. Later, at the County Jail, a large number of deputies beat him severely after 

they learned that he had been charged with the attempted murder of Lynwood deputies. After this 

beating, he was strapped to a bed in the hospital ward for two days. ER 196-98.

•  Deputies punched Thomas Monreal in the eye. beat him in the back of a patrol 

car, and slapped him at the OSS trailer at the Lynwood station. ER 184-86. Several deputies also 

repeatedly beat and kicked Cesar Guerrero, who was handcuffed, at the OSS trailer. ER 131-32. 

186.

•  Deputies slammed Jose Luis Hernandez's face onto the hot hood of a patrol car. 

grabbed him by the neck and threw him down, bent back his arm and thumb, threw him into the 

patrol car, slammed the door shut on his leg, and threatened to shoot him. ER 136-38.

Deputies handcuffed Larry Clarke and Stanley Jones, and then proceeded to kick 

them in the groin, lift them off the ground by their handcuffs, and beat them repeatedly with saps.

14



ER 115-16. The deputies also held guns to their heads and pulled their triggers on empty 

chambers. ER 115. 147. During the beatings. Clarke told a deputy three times that Jones was an 

epileptic. ER 116.

•  A deputy handcuffed Richard Cruz and then hit him on the hip with a club, 

saying, "I can hit you in places where there won't be any bruises." ER 119. The deputy later used 

his car to force Cruz off the bicycle he was riding, and then made Cruz put his hands on the hood 

of the car and punched him in the eye. ER 120.

•  Deputies kicked Aurelo Salazar with their boots, repeatedly beat him with their 

fists, and squashed his hand with a boot as if putting out a cigarette, breaking his thumb. One of 

the deputies, who had falsely arrested Salazar before, said, "Remember me from court?" The 

deputies then laughed at him and left him lying on the sidewalk as they drove away. ER 208.

•  Deputies handcuffed and hog-tied Gregory Mason at the Lynwood station and 

kicked him in the eye, face, and arm while calling him "asshole" and "stupid-ass nigger." ER 166.

•  After they observed him driving his new BMW, deputies handcuffed and 

repeatedly kicked Jeremiah Randle — a black Los Angeles school teacher — in the knee while 

calling him "nigger" and heaping other verbal abuse on him. ER 201. They also severely twisted 

his fingers and wrists. Id.

b. Use of Firearms To Terrorize, Maim, and Kill 

The record shows that Lynwood deputies have repeatedly used their firearms to terrorize 

members of the public. They routinely enter homes and other premises with their weapons drawn 

and give armed orders to men. women, and young children without regard to whether their captives 

pose any threat to deputies or others. See, e.g., ER 108 (deputy cocked gun and pointed it. without 

provocation, at Mary Charles' 13-year-oJd son); ER 85 (when Enrique Bugarin asked if he had a 

search warrant, deputy grabbed his gun and said, "This is my search warrant"); ER 80 (when told 

that he was violating James Brown's constitutional rights by illegally searching his home, deputy 

responded by telling Brown to shut up and putting his gun closer to Brown's face); ER 142-43

15



(while Jeffrey Holliman lay on the ground in response to deputies’ commands, deputy shoved the 

muzzle of his shotgun into Holliman's neck and threatened to kill him).

Lynwood deputies also frequently use their firearms to terrorize people during beatings. 

See, e.g., ER 230-31 (when William Scott and Michael Sterling protested the beating of Darren 

Thomas, deputy grabbed Scott by the neck, pointed a shotgun in Sterling’s face, and told them to 

be quiet or they would be next); ER 122 (during beatings, one deputy put a gun to Marcello 

Gonzales' head, and another deputy put a gun in Ron Dalton's mouth and threatened to blow his 

head off if he moved or tried to run); ER 115, 147 (during beatings, a deputy put a gun in Larry 

Clarke’s right ear and pulled the trigger on an empty chamber, and another deputy twice placed the 

barrel of his gun behind Stanley Jones’ head and pulled the trigger on an empty chamber).

The record further demonstrates that Lynwood deputies misuse their firearms to kill or 

maim unarmed persons. See ER 149-50 (8 to 12 deputies surrounded, shot, and killed William 

Leonard without justification); ER 63 (after deputies shot and wounded Tracy Batts in the leg, 

deputy directed a Compton police officer to unleash his attack dog on Batts); ER 117 (deputy fired 

at Elzie Coleman 23 times without justification, hitting him in the leg, thumb, torso, arm, and 

testicles); ER 125-26 (after yelling to his partner to "[mjove so I can shoot his black ass," deputy 

shot Kelvin Davis in the buttocks, causing him to lose one kidney and part of his intestines; as 

Davis lay wounded on the ground, the other deputy kicked him in his side and face, saying, "You 

shouldn’t have been running anyway, nigger").29

c. Abusive Searches

The record contains evidence of two searches of a business and ten searches of homes in 

which Lynwood deputies stormed in during the early morning hours without giving notice of their 

identity or time for the occupants to answer the door; they destroyed property; they threw property

Z9See also Supp. ER 31-45 (October 1990 newspaper study reporting that deputies shot at least 
56 people under "seriously questioned circumstances" between 1985 and 1990); ER 1573, 903 
(deputies shot and killed an unarmed African-American man in August 1991 and placed an object 
near or under his body); ER 901-02 (deputies shot and killed an unarmed Latino man in August 
1991).

16



on the floor or from room to room; they terrorized the occupants by brandishing weapons; they 

forced whole families to stand or kneel, nearly naked, in the cold night air for long periods of time; 

they confiscated property not identified in search warrants; they shoved or needlessly moved the 

frail and ill; and they left people terrified and suffering psychologically and physically from the 

experience.

The January 24, 1991, raid on the Villegas family's home is illustrative. At 5:30 a.m., Jose 

and Maria Villegas and their adult children and young grandchildren were awakened by someone 

breaking down the door to their Lynwood home. ER 243, 248, 250. Members of the Latino family 

initially thought the intruders, who did not identify themselves, were gang members (ER 250) or 

robbers. ER 252. It later became apparent, however, that they were Lynwood deputies. At 

gunpoint, the deputies ordered the adults to go outside in their underwear or nightgowns, where 

they were forced to stay in the cold night air for a long period of time while deputies searched the 

house and photographed the two Villegas brothers holding name cards. ER 243-44, 246, 250.

Cynthia Villegas pleaded with the deputies to be careful with her 68-year-old father, Jose, 

because he had diabetes and a heart condition and could not see much without his glasses. ER 243, 

253. His wife, Maria, also told them that her husband was sick. ER 250. Nevertheless, the 

deputies repeatedly pushed Mr. Villegas and, after hearing his wife’s and daughter's pleas, said they 

did not care and again pushed him, almost knocking him to the ground. ER 243, 253. Additionally, 

for a long period of time during the raid, deputies refused to let 58-year-old Maria Villegas go to 

the bathroom. When they finally let her go, she was humiliated as three male deputies watched her 

use the toilet. ER 251.

After Brenda Villegas was ordered outside at gunpoint, she told the deputies that her three 

young children (ages 6, 5, and 2) were asleep in the house and that they would be frightened. After 

a while, she was allowed to go as far as the living room to call for them; but when they appeared, 

deputies pointed guns at them, refused their mother's request to get clothes for herself and her 

children, and ordered all of them to go outside. Her 6-year-old daughter. Perla, became feverish

17



as they stood out in the cold, and she vomited and was sick the next day. Perla and her 5-year-old 

sister, Christina, in particular, have experienced emotional distress since the raid. ER 244.

Despite repeated requests, Ramona Fuamatu Villegas also was not allowed to go back inside 

to get her 5-year-old daughter, Elizabeth. After a deputy eventually went into Elizabeth’s room, 

the child came out crying and freezing because she was without shoes or a jacket. Since the raid, 

Elizabeth has been afraid that deputies will return and that everyone in the family will be arrested, 

and she has had nightmares about someone shooting her. ER 252-53.

Although the deputies caused physical damage to the Villegas home and psychological harm 

to the members of the family, their search revealed no guns or illegal items, and no one was 

arrested. ER 244-45, 246-47, 248, 253.

The record contains evidence of many other abusive searches conducted by Lynwood 

deputies, including the following:

•  On February 15, 1990, deputies raided the J & A Towing and Repair shop, an 

African-American-owned business, terrorizing customers and employees and needlessly destroying 

property. ER 142-45, 226-27, 256-57. In September 1990, deputies returned to the shop, searched 

it without a warrant, and threatened retaliation if the owners did not drop this lawsuit. ER 145-46.

•  In the predawn hours of March 1, 1990, deputies raided several Latino families’ 

homes at gunpoint. They failed to give reasonable notice and an opportunity to open the door; 

they needlessly destroyed property; they mistreated small children and elderly persons; and they 

forced people to stay outdoors for long periods in night clothes or underwear. ER 88-90, 96-97, 

168-69, 181-82, 192-93, 237-42.

•  In another early morning raid, deputies broke down the gate in front of Thomas 

Monreal’s house. They forced him to stand outside in his underwear while they searched the house, 

causing damage and disarray. One of the deputies punched him in the eye while he was 

handcuffed. ER 184-85.

•  Deputies conducted two warrantless searches of the Bugarin home, during which

18



they intimidated the people there and unnecessarily destroyed property. ER 82-87.

•  In an early morning raid of the Mendez family’s home, deputies failed to give 

reasonable notice and an opportunity to open the door, needlessly destroyed property, and 

mistreated small children and a pregnant woman. ER 170-77.

•  Deputies raided an African-American family's home at gunpoint, pulling down the 

support pole on the front porch and crashing through the front door without announcing who they 

were. When James Brown stated to one of the deputies that they were violating his constitutional 

rights, the deputy told Brown to "shut up" and put his gun closer to Brown's face. ER 80.

•  Deputies raided another African-American family's home three times in nine 

months. They held family members at gunpoint (including Maiy Charles’ 15-month-old 

granddaughter), ransacked the children’s rooms, and needlessly destroyed property. ER 107-110.

3. Racially Motivated Harassment

a. Racial Slurs, Intimidation and Ridicule

The district court found that "[t]he actions of many deputies working in the Lynwood sub­

station are motivated by racial hostility ...." ER 1958. This finding is amply supported by the 

record, which shows that racial slurs — "nigger," "goddam Mexican," "stupid-ass fucking nigger," 

"mother-fucking Mexican," and the like — frequently accompany beatings and other abuse 

administered by Lynwood deputies. The record contains the following examples, among others, of 

such racial slurs:

•  When Jeremiah Randle, a 28-year-old black school teacher, asked why he had 

been stopped, a deputy replied, "Look, nigger, I don't have to tell you shit." Deputies then told 

him, "Your black ass is going to jail," and "Yeah, nigger is going to jail, and going to jail tonight." 

While the deputies then kicked him repeatedly as he screamed out in pain, the deputies called him 

"nigger," "pussy," "bitch," and "cry-baby." After the beating was over, another deputy told him. 

"We're not racist; we think everyone should own a nigger." ER 200-201.

•  When Larry Clarke asked why a deputy had pulled Clarke up off the ground by

19



the handcuffs and had then put his gun in Clarke’s ear and pulled the trigger on an empty chamber, 

the deputy told him, "Shut the fuck up,” and then called him a "stupid black guy" while beating him 

on the head and back with a sap. Clarke lost consciousness twice during the beating. ER 115-16.

•  While beating Demetrio Carrillo, deputies called him a "mother-fucker" and a 

"God-damn Mexican." ER 100.

•  Deputies called Gregory Mason a "stupid-ass nigger" while beating and kicking him 

at the Lynwood station. Mason was then taken to St. Francis Hospital, where he asked that medical 

treatment be delayed until someone had called his wife and asked her to come to the hospital. 

When a deputy learned that Mason’s wife was on the way. Mason was handcuffed and taken back 

to the station, where a lieutenant called him a "stupid-ass fucking nigger," accused him of "trying 

to be smart," and told him that they were going to "lose [him] in the system." ER 166-67.

•  Deputies said, "nigger, you ain't got no rights" and subjected Darren Thomas to 

other racial slurs while beating and kicking him at the Lynwood station. ER 230.

•  Deputies called Alfredo Sanchez a "mother-fucking Mexican" and yelled other 

offensive remarks about "Mexicans" while beating and kicking the Sanchez brothers into 

unconsciousness. ER 213, Supp. ER 217.

•  Deputies called Calvin Charles a "nigger" and kicked him in the testicles, and then 

told him, "We are going to take you home to your Mammy." ER 105.

•  Aiming at Kelvin Davis, a deputy yelled to his partner, "Move so I can shoot his 

black ass," and then shot Davis in the buttocks. As Davis lay wounded on the ground, the other 

deputy said, "You shouldn't have been running anyway, nigger," and then kicked him in his side and 

in his face. Davis lost one kidney and part of his intestines from the gunshot wound, and he had 

to wear a colostomy bag for five months. ER 125-26.

The district court also found that "many of the deputies and sergeants in Lynwood were out 

to intimidate and ridicule Blacks and Hispanics." ER 1959. In addition to the evidence outlined 

above, this finding is supported by evidence that Lynwood deputies regularly forced black residents

20



to posture themselves as gorillas to pass the "A.P.E. Test"; posted on the Lynwood substation 

employee bulletin board and maintained for an extended period of time a map of Lynwood shaped 

as Africa; and distributed to black residents advertisements for "Nigger Pills" and "Coon-ard Line 

Boat Tickets to Africa." ER 1400-1402.

b. The Vikings

The district court found that "[m]any of the incidents which brought about this motion 

involved a group of Lynwood area deputies who are members of a neo-nazi. white supremacist gang 

— the Vikings -  which exists with the knowledge of departmental policy makers." ER 1958. 

Plaintiffs filed with the Court certified copies of the declarations of 11 LASD deputies concerning 

the existence of a white-supremacist gang of Lynwood deputies known as the "Vikings." Supp. ER 

59-199. These declarations show that, for more than a year, Sheriffs Department personnel within 

the Lynwood station were aware of allegations of racially motivated, anti-black, white-supremacist, 

hate crime activities by Lynwood deputies affiliated with the Vikings (Supp. ER 164-99 

[Declarations of Danielle Cormier, Dan Figueroa, Lance Fralick, Doug Gillies, Kevin Kiff, Jerold 

Reeves, and Jay Ritter, H 3]); that knowledge of these allegations was widespread throughout the 

Sheriffs Department (id.., 11 6); and that on numerous occasions starting as early as April 1990, the 

commander of the Lynwood station stated that deputies affiliated with the Vikings were linked to 

criminal activities and were associated with "raping and pillaging" minority members of the 

community (id., U 4; Supp. ER 153 [Declaration of Clifford Yates, U 6]).

Also before the Court was a lengthy investigative report on the Vikings, which found that 

"[a] sizeable group of deputies in the Lynwood Sheriffs Station has taken on characteristics of a 

street gang, and their harassing activities within the department have led their commander [Captain 

Cueva] to label them a ’malignancy’ that must be dealt with quickly." Supp. ER 48. However, the 

record indicates that the only action ever taken with regard to the Vikings did not occur until 

several months after this lawsuit was filed, and it consisted merely of transferring four deputies from

21



Lynwood to other locations.30 Supp. ER 59-199.

c. Policy of Targeting Gangs for "Special Attention"

The Court’s findings with regard to racially motivated harassment and intimidation are 

further buttressed by evidence that an official policy of targeting certain gangs in the Lynwood area 

for "special attention" (ER 129) has resulted in racially motivated harassment. In accordance with 

provisions of the LASD Manual (CR 130),31 the Commander of the Lynwood station has told his 

deputies to target members of some 30 gangs and to arrest them for any kind of conduct that could 

be construed as a violation of any statute or municipal ordinance. ER 129. Operation Safe Streets 

("OSS") deputies are assigned to the Lynwood station to specialize in targeting suspected gang 

members and in suppressing gangs. ER 762.

The record contains substantial evidence demonstrating the racial harassment associated 

with this gang-targeting policy:

•  When Herman Walker, a 23-year-old African-American, tried to calm a group of 

younger men who were upset because someone they knew had been shot, Lynwood deputies picked 

him up and held him in the back of a patrol car for approximately three hours. Instead of thanking 

him for his assistance, Lynwood deputies asked him what gang he belonged to, and told him that

30Although plaintiffs have not yet had an opportunity to conduct thorough discovery, the record 
at present shows that at least deputies Jason Mann, Michael Schneider, and Brian Steinwand are 
members of the Vikings. Deputies Mann and Schneider were transferred from the Lynwood station 
in December 1990 because the station's commander, Captain Cueva, suspected them of being 
Vikings. Supp. ER 56-199. Deputy Steinwand’s mark of membership is in the form of a Viking 
tatoo on his outer left ankle, with his moniker "Steiny" above it and the initials "LVS" below it. ER 
1410. Deputy Mann inflicted savage beatings on Lloyd Polk (ER 151) and Alan Brahier (ER 73- 
75), and he reportedly shot and killed Arturo Jimenez, who was unarmed. See ER 902. Deputy 
Schneider was involved in the incident in which Ron Dalton was beaten. See ER 706. Deputy 
Steinwand was involved in the Leopoldo Ortega incident (ER 546) and in the framing of Tracy 
Batts (ER 1410).

31LASD Manual § 2-06\050.10 describes the "Safe Streets Bureau," which is comprised of two 
Details: the "Gang Enforcement Team" and the "Operation Safe Streets Detail (OSS)." CR 130. 
The responsibilities of the OSS Detail include "[targeting particularly violent or active street gangs 
within assigned OSS team areas," "[participating in street gang suppression efforts within assigned 
OSS team areas," and "[investigating all cases, otherwise routinely assigned to Station Detectives 
that involve ’target’ street gang members." Id.

22



they knew he must be a gang member because he was black. ER 254-55.

•  To investigate a robbery of four bicycles during which a victim was wounded by 

shots from a handgun, deputies used a form search warrant to search eight different homes of 

suspected Latino gang members for a wide variety of items, including all "evidence of gang 

membership to include items of personal property with gang graffiti on them, doodles, writings, 

plaques, phone books that tend to show membership in the ‘Young Crowd’ gang, also any clothing 

to include, but not limited to, jackets, hats, sweatshirts, and common everyday objects [on] which 

gang graffiti has been placed." ER 420-22. The "Statement of Probable Cause" in support of the 

warrant application includes several pages of form allegations setting forth sweeping statements 

about the behavior of supposed gang members in general (ER 424-30), with only limited reference 

to the specific facts of the incident purportedly under investigation. See ER 426. Deputies used 

a similar form search warrant in another investigation to search seven different homes of suspected 

Latino gang members. ER 638-46.

•  In the court below, deputies assigned to the Gang Enforcement Team at the 

Lynwood station claimed that they initially approached Darren Thomas because he and others were 

drinking in front of his house and were therefore "prime targets for gang drive-by shootings." ER 

688-89, 693, 695. According to each of the deputies’ declarations, "it was dark enough so we could 

not even tell what nationality or the specific characteristics of any of the individuals who were 

standing around [sic]." ER 688, 693, 695. The deputies acknowledged that, "simply to get them off 

the street and avoid their being our next victims, a decision was made to cite them for drinking in 

public. This involves taking the individuals to the station where they are cited and released within 

a few hours." ER 689, 694, 696. Deputies proceeded to subject Thomas to racial slurs and to 

administer a severe beating in which they knocked out his two front teeth. ER 228-34.

•  The "OSS" or "gang" trailer at the Lynwood station is a common site for beatings. 

Darren Thomas (ER 229-30), Calvin Charles (ER 105), Leopoldo Ortega (ER 196-97), Thomas 

Monreal (ER 186), and Cesar Guerrero (ER 131) were all beaten there.

23



Additionally, the record shows that deputies have subjected individuals suspected of gang 

connections to recurring instances of abuse, including the following:
«

•  Lloyd Polk, claimed by deputies to be a member of a gang (ER 752), alleged three 

separate incidents of deputy misconduct on February 11, April 15, and April 22, 1990, including a 

severe beating in which both his arms were broken. ER 25-26, 151, 154-57. Deputies later 

subjected him to further harassment after a court dismissed criminal charges that he had assaulted 

a police officer. ER 151. Lloyd Polk was subsequently murdered. ER 754-55. When Polk’s friends 

-  identified by deputies as "gang members" (ER 753) — held a car wash to raise money for his 

funeral, Lynwood deputies arrived in at least 11 cars, blocked off the street, and "ran makes" and 

wrote tickets on all the low-rider cars parked at or near the car wash site. ER 60-62. Pursuant to 

a "policy and practice of the O.S.S. unit to monitor all funerals involving gang members ..." (ER 

753). deputies appeared at Polk’s funeral, videotaping and intimidating the mourners. ER 152-53.

•  Acting pursuant to a warrant alleging the presence of gang members (ER 420-30), 

in March 1990 deputies staged an early-morning raid on the home of Teresa Rodriguez, terrorizing 

and abusing family members and destroying property. ER 181-82, 192-93. In October 1990, after 

Rodriguez and others had filed this lawsuit, deputies arrested her and said, "You’re one of the 

bitches that wants to get rich with the Lynwood lawsuit." ER 206. Since that incident, deputies 

have often shined their spotlights'into the windows of her home at night. Id.

•  Believing Calvin Charles to be a gang member (ER 660), deputies staged abusive 

raids on his mother’s home three times in nine months. ER 107-110. Deputies have beaten Calvin 

Charles on more than one occasion. ER 104.

•  Deputies raided the J & A Towing and Repair shop -  claimed by defendants to 

be owned by gang members (ER 782) -- in February 1990, terrorizing and abusing employees and 

customers. ER 142-45. Deputies searched the shop again in September 1990 and threatened its 

owners with further retaliation for participating in this litigation. ER 145-46. After the assistant 

manager called the Lynwood station and complained to the watch commander, deputies returned

24



yet again and one deputy yelled, "Do you want a fucking war?!" ER 146.

•  Deputies beat Ron Dalton, identified by defendants as a member of a gang (ER 

802), on at least two occasions, in April 1990 and again in May 1990. ER 121-23.

•  In August or September 1990, deputies raided the home of Thomas Monreal, 

claimed by defendants to be a gang member (ER 803), forcing him to stand outside in his 

underwear while they searched his house. They caused damage and disarray, and a deputy punched 

Monreal in the eye while he was handcuffed. No charges were ever filed against him. ER 184-85. 

In October 1990, deputies arrested Monreal and Cesar Guerrero for attempted murder. They beat 

Monreal in the back of a patrol car, and then took him to the OSS trailer at the Lynwood station, 

where he observed other deputies beating and kicking Guerrero, who was handcuffed. A deputy, 

noticing that Monreal was watching Guerrero being beaten, slapped Monreal and shut the door. 

The next morning, both Monreal and Guerrero were released without any charges being filed 

against them. ER 131-32, 185-87.

•  Apparently believing that Richard Cruz was a gang member (ER 119, 467), a 

deputy arrested, verbally abused, and clubbed him. ER 119. The deputy then took Cruz to the 

Lynwood station, where he was booked and released with a citation. Id. Later that day, the same 

deputy spotted Cruz riding a bicycle he had borrowed from a friend. The deputy forced him off 

the bicycle, called him an "asshole," punched him in the eye, and then let him go. ER 120. When 

Cruz returned to his mother’s house, he found the same deputy parked outside, shining his spotlight 

in the windows of the house. Id.

•  Deputies, claiming that gang members were drinking beer in front of Enrique and

Jose Bugarin’s apartment complex (ER 716), conducted two warrantless, abusive searches of their 

apartment in the space of one week. ER 82-87. ’

4. Retaliation

The district court found that, "[sjince the date this case was filed, there have been many 

confrontations between deputy sheriffs and plaintiffs, in an apparent attempt by the deputies to

25



convince plaintiffs to dismiss this action." ER 1958. For instance, when they searched Jeffrey

Holliman’s auto repair shop, deputies asked him, "Who do you think you are to file a lawsuit
%

against the sheriffs?" ER 145. The deputies threatened to return to plant drugs and cause other 

problems, and told Holliman that it would be in his "best interest" to drop the suit. ER 145-146. 

The next day, after Holliman had filed a complaint about this conduct with the Lynwood watch 

commander, the deputies returned and one of them said, "Do you want a fucking war?!" ER 146.

Other evidence of retaliatory conduct by deputies includes the following: ER 206 (deputy 

called Teresa Rodriguez "one of the bitches that wants to get rich with the Lynwood lawsuit"; often 

since that incident, deputies have harassed her by shining spotlights into the windows of her home); 

ER 134 (deputy told Antonio Guzman to "tell your two white-boy lawyers [referring to plaintiffs’ 

lead counsel George V. Denny III and plaintiffs’ investigator David Lynn] that they can kiss my 

behind," and said that plaintiffs’ lawyers were interested only in getting money from the 

government); ER 198 (deputies beat Leopoldo Ortega after questioning him about this lawsuit); 

ER 60-62 (deputies often harassed plaintiff Lloyd Polk because he was a named plaintiff in this 

lawsuit; deputy referred to plaintiffs’ lead counsel and investigator in disparaging terms; deputies 

harassed persons conducting car wash to raise money for funeral expenses for plaintiff Polk); ER 

152-53 (deputies harassed mourners at the funeral of plaintiff Polk).

Retaliation against the plaintiffs for filing this lawsuit is part of a larger pattern of 

retaliation and intimidation directed at persons who assert their rights or otherwise question 

deputies’ authority. As the district court found, many Lynwood deputies "regularly disregard the 

civil rights of individuals they are sworn to protect. ..." ER 1958. For example, when deputies 

arrested Darren Thomas and three friends and family members and took them to the OSS trailer 

at the Lynwood station, Thomas and the others asked what they had done wrong and why they had 

been arrested. Deputies told them that they had "fucked up" and that the deputies would "kick 

[their] ass" if they didn't shut up and quit asking so many questions. ER 229-30. When Thomas 

asked a deputy what he was being charged with and why he had not been advised of his rights, the

26



deputy became angry, put handcuffs back on Thomas, and said, "I’ve had enough of this shit." 

During the severe beating that ensued, one of the deputies said, "Yeah, nigger, you ain’t got no 

rights. We are going to make sure you don’t ask any more questions." ER 230.

Other examples of such retaliation and intimidation include the following:

•  When Jeremiah Randle asked deputies what their "p.c." was for stopping him, a 

deputy replied, "I don’t have to tell you shit." Randle then stated that he had not broken any laws 

and asked if it was department policy to stop and detain people without telling them why. The 

deputy responded, "Shut the fuck up! I don't have to tell you anything." ER 200. Deputies then 

proceeded to kick him repeatedly while calling him "nigger" and spouting other verbal abuse. ER 

200-201.

•  When James Brown complained that deputies were violating his constitutional 

rights by illegally searching his home, a deputy responded by saying, "Shut up," and put his gun 

closer to Brown’s face. ER 80.

•  When Enrique Bugarin told a deputy he could not come into the Bugarin home 

without a search warrant, the deputy grabbed his gun and said, "This is my search warrant." ER 

85.

•  When Kelvin Davis lay wounded on the ground and asked why he had been shot, 

a deputy replied, "You shouldn’t have been running anyway, nigger." The deputy then-kicked him. 

ER 126.

•  As deputies stormed Jorge Calderon’s home, he asked, "What did I do?" In reply, 

a deputy screamed at him, "Shut up asshole," and ordered him to sit down. ER 88. When 

Calderon threatened to sue, a deputy told him, "Shut up or I’m going to kick your fucking ass." ER 

89.

•  When a deputy said to Henry Castro, "What are you doing here, stupid 

motherfucker?," Castro responded, "You don’t have the right to talk to people like that." The 

deputy then told him that he was "going to jail right now." ER 102.

27



•  Asked by a deputy why he was driving through "Cedar," Jose Luis Hernandez 

responded, "Excuse me, can’t we pass through Cedar?" The deputy became angry and yelled, 

"Don’t you fucking get smart with me!" He then pulled Hernandez out of the back of the patrol 

car and threw him against a pole, saying, "If you ever do that again I’ll shoot you." ER 138.

•  When Lynwood deputies raided their home, Jesse Melendrez told his sister out 

loud to call David Lynn, plaintiffs’ investigator. A deputy then grabbed Melendrez by the collar 

and took him to a patrol car, saying, "I don't have to take this crap." ER 171.

5. Cover Charges

The district court found that "[sjeveral plaintiffs were charged with crimes after they were 

allegedly brutalized by deputies. These individuals were charged pursuant to an unwritten Sheriffs 

Department policy of charging a person injured in the course of a routine stop. Because of the 

unreasonable force used in effectuating their arrests, many of these victims had their criminal 

charges dropped at arraignment."32 ER 1958.

As an LASD deputy testified at a recent criminal trial, he learned in his training that, if 

deputies hurt someone, they should arrest and charge the person with a crime in order to protect 

themselves from accusations of police brutality. ER 65-71. The record shows that this policy was 

followed in many of the cases before the Court, in which criminal charges were made and 

subsequently dropped or dismissed. See ER 98-101 (Demerrio Carrillo beaten and charged with 

obstructing an officer; acquitted); ER 102-103 (Henry Castro beaten and charged with drinking in 

public, being intoxicated, and disturbing the peace; charges dropped); ER 117 and Appellees’ 

Request for Judicial Notice on Appeal, p. 16 (Elzie Lee Coleman shot at 23 times and charged with 

being an ex-felon with a gun and brandishing a weapon; acquitted); ER 151, 1483, 1506-1515 

(Municipal Court dismissed charges against Lloyd Polk, finding that deputies used "excessive force" 

and that "the conduct on the part of these officers was outrageous"); ER 165-67 (Gregory Mason

32The record shows that at least 16 plaintiffs or declarants either were arrested but not charged 
or had charges dismissed by the District Attorney or a court. See nn. 21-22, supra.

28



beaten at Lynwood station; subsequently charged with drunk driving and assault on a police officer 

after attorneys filed complaint about the beating); ER 194-95 (Jose Louie Ortega beaten; 

subsequently arrested for obstructing an officer after friend called station to request medical 

attention); ER 228-31 (Darren Thomas beaten and charged with resisting, delaying, and obstructing 

an officer; charges dismissed after jury unable to reach verdict).

6. Discouragement of Complaints

The district court found that "[witnesses who attempted to file misconduct reports regarding 

some of the brutality incidents were discouraged from doing so by deputies and their superiors." 

ER 1958. The record shows that a number of plaintiffs and declarants were subjected to conduct 

designed to discourage them from filing complaints. A deputy told Jeffrey Holliman, for example, 

that Holliman’s wife had been calling the Lynwood watch commander and "telling him a bunch of 

bullshit" .(Le., complaining about the raids on Holliman’s auto repair shop); the deputy warned 

Holliman to "watch out." ER 145. After Holliman himself filed a complaint with the Lynwood 

watch commander, another deputy confronted him again. ER 146.

This inference of supervisory involvement in the discouragement of complaints is further 

supported by evidence that Lynwood sergeants told would-be complainants on the telephone that 

they probably deserved to be beaten and that the sergeants themselves would also "kick ass" if the 

complainants came to the station. ER 1401. The sergeants would then stop the tape recorder on 

which those calls were recorded and rotate the tape backwards in order to insure that recordings 

of those calls would not be preserved. Id.

Other evidence supporting the district court's finding on discouragement of complaints 

includes the following:

•  On a Wednesday afternoon in December of 1990, Maria Hernandez took her son, 

Jose, to the Lynwood station to file a complaint about a beating he had received at the hands of 

deputies. After waiting a considerable length of time, they were first told that the deputy in charge 

had left for the day and that they should come back at 6:00 a.m. the next morning to file a

29



complaint. They were later told that no one would be available to take their complaint until 5:00 

a.m. the following Saturday morning. Only when Ms. Hernandez threatened to hire an attorney 

was she given a complaint form. ER 138-139.

•  When Herman Walker went to the Lynwood station and tried to register a 

complaint of racial harassment, a deputy actively discouraged him and belittled him for attempting 

to complain. ER 255.

•  Gregory Mason was beaten, then jailed and released the following day without any 

charges having been filed against him. After his attorneys filed a complaint about the beating, 

Mason was charged with drunk driving and assault on a police officer. ER 167.

•  When Steven Thomas went to the Lynwood station to file a complaint, the deputy 

behind the counter said, "Since the Rodney King incident, everyone wants to get into the act." ER 

236. A sergeant initially refused to let Thomas file a complaint, but eventually gave him a 

complaint form. Id.

•  Captain Cueva, the Commander of the Lynwood station, expressly stated that he 

was not inclined to investigate any complaint of deputy misconduct filed by an alleged gang member 

unless the complainant was willing to take a polygraph examination. ER 130.

7. Department-Wide Assignment Policies

The district court found that "[m]ost of the deputies who work in the Lynwood area are

permanently assigned to the Lynwood sub-station; however, a significant number of officers, such

as reserve officers and members of department-wide bureaus, are not permanently assigned to the

Lynwood sub-station, but occasionally work in the Lynwood area." ER 1958. This finding is

supported by defendants’ admission below that an "artificial and meaningless limitation to deputies

assigned to the Lynwood station does not accord with the operational practices or training of the
*

Sheriffs Department (in which personnel are freely assigned and transferred) ...." Defendants' 

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction, CR 76, p. 26. Counsel for the county defendants advised the district court at the

30



hearing on September 23. 1991. that an injunction limited to the Lynwood station would "interject 

confusion into law enforcement operations of a local law enforcement agency" (ER 1934), and 

counsel for the individual deputy defendants told the .Court that, "[fjrom a practical point of view, 

... it would be impossible for the court to issue such an injunction ...." ER 1936-37.

8. Tacit Authorization of Unconstitutional Conduct 

The district court found "a direct link between departmental policy makers, who tacitly 

authorize deputies' unconstitutional behavior, and the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs." ER 1959. 

The record contains substantial evidence of the open and notorious nature of deputies’ 

unconstitutional conduct, including several widely disseminated media reports of excessive force and 

improper use of deadly force against minorities, as well as reports of white-supremacist activities 

by the Vikings that have long been known to policymaking officials. ER 899-903; Supp. ER 4-199. 

Despite these reports and the evidence of massive and repeated brutality presented in this case,33 

the Commander of the Lynwood station admitted that, between June 1989 and April 1990, he did 

not discipline a single deputy for unnecessary or unreasonable use of force. ER 129.34 

Policymakers either have tacitly authorized the deputies' failure to make the use-of-force reports 

required by LASD’s formal policies,35 or they have received those reports and, with full knowledge

33The record shows, for example, that in March 1987 Deputy Paul Archambault fired all the 
bullets in his gun, reloaded, and then continued to fire at Pascual Solis as he lay on the ground, 
killing him and then planting a weapon. Los Angeles County settled the resulting lawsuit for 
$520,000. Supp. ER 29-30. In May 1990, Deputy Archambault fired all the bullets in his gun, 
reloaded, and then continued to fire at plaintiff Elzie Coleman as he lay on the ground, severely 
wounding him and then planting a weapon. Id; ER 117. Coleman was subsequently acquitted of 
all charges relating to the incident. Appellees' Request for Judicial Notice on Appeal, p. 16. Three 
years after killing Solis and five months after shooting Coleman, Deputy Archambault was still on 
patrol duty at the Lynwood station, where he helps train rookie officers. Supp. ER 30.

34Not until December 1990, three months after this lawsuit was filed, were any deputies 
transferred out of the Lynwood station because of their activities in the Vikings. Supp. ER 56-199. 
The transferred deputies state that they were never investigated for the use of excessive force. 
Supp. ER 128, 142, 147, 156.

35LASD Manual § 3-01/030.25 requires deputies to make reports to supervisors in all cases 
involving the use of physical force (ER 1785-86); § 5-09/430.20 requires an immediate departmental 
investigation at the scene of an officer-involved shooting (CR 130); and § 5-07/075.00 requires 
deputies to photograph premises before and after a search. CR 130.

31



of their contents, have tacitly authorized and ratified the deputies’ violent and unconstitutional 

behavior.36

The photographs filed with plaintiffs' declarations also demonstrate that defendants have, 

at the very least, tacitly authorized abusive conduct and physical brutality by deputies. In view of 

the reporting requirements imposed by LASD policies, supervisory and policymaking officials 

cannot reasonably claim that they were unaware of the extent of the physical injuries and 

destruction of property documented in those photographs. See, e.g., ER 76-79, 1499-1502 (injuries 

to Alan Brahier); ER 118 (damage to Charles home); ER 154-57 (injuries to Lloyd Polk); ER 178 

(damage to Melendrez home); ER 232-34 (injuries to Darren Thomas); ER 1485-90 (injuries to 

Ron Dalton); ER 1491 (injuries to Cesar Guerrero); ER 1492-94 (injuries to Jose Hernandez); ER 

1495-98 (injuries to Richard Hernandez); ER 1503-05 (injuries to Leopoldo Ortega).

Furthermore, Captain Cueva, the Commander of the Lynwood station, has stated that he 

is not inclined to investigate complaints of deputy misconduct made by asserted gang members 

unless the complainants first submit to a polygraph examination. ER 130. This policy further 

assures deputies that, whenever they can claim that their victims are gang members, they are not 

likely to be punished for the use of excessive force or other unconstitutional behavior. This practice 

of tolerating and tacitly authorizing misconduct is reinforced by training in which deputies are 

taught to arrest and make criminal charges against persons they injure (ER 65, 68), and by a code 

of silence under which a deputy will not "snitch another officer off." ER 65, 71.

The district court’s finding of tacit authorization of deputy misconduct is also supported by 

the testimony of Sheriff Sherman Block. Los Angeles County paid approximately $8.5 million in

36There is also evidence of direct involvement by Lynwood station supervisors themselves in such 
misconduct. See, e.g., ER 166-67 (lieutenant called Gregory Mason a "stupid-ass fucking nigger," 
accused him of "trying to be smart," and told him they were going to "lose [him] in the system"); 
ER 201-202 (sergeant, informed of use of excessive force against Jeremiah Randle, said that he 
could arrest Randle for resisting arrest and take him to the doctor, or that Randle could take 
himself to the doctor); ER 1400-01 (sergeants told callers complaining of excessive force that they 
probably deserved to be beaten, and then rewound tape to obliterate evidence of conversations); 
ER 732 (supervising sergeant was present at scene of Jose Luis Hernandez incident); ER 757 
(sergeant directed deputies to attend Lloyd Polk's funeral).

32



settlements and jury awards in cases arising out of deputy misconduct in 1986-1989, and the number 

of excessive force lawsuits filed against LASD has steadily mounted in the last five years. Supp. ER 

31-45. Sheriff Block, however, has testified that his department does not keep records of lawsuits 

filed against deputies, nor does it keep records of judgments entered in such suits against deputies 

or against the department. ER 158-59. The Sheriff explained that, "without question," he had more 

faith in the department’s internal investigative procedures than he did in independent judicial 

determinations in civil lawsuits. ER 159. Sheriff Block’s satisfaction with his department’s internal 

procedures is understandable; even on the extraordinary record of unconstitutional behavior and 

abuse presented in this case, there is no evidence that even one of the deputies identified by 

plaintiffs has been disciplined in any way.

33



ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER GRANTING A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS
SUBJECT TO REVIEW ONLY FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

Presented with credible evidence of a pattern of widespread constitutional violations by 

Lynwood deputies, the district court issued a preliminary injunction designed to provide the 

plaintiffs with a measure of temporary protection while minimizing the degree of federal intrusion 

into local law enforcement operations and also safeguarding the rights of individual deputies. See 

ER 1948-55. Like any preliminary injunction, the court’s order is provisional, and it will remain in 

effect only until the factual record can be developed more fully at trial.37 ER 1889.

At this stage of the case, until a permanent injunction is granted or denied, this Court is 

"foreclosed from fully reviewing the important questions presented. Review of an order granting 

or denying a preliminary injunction is much more limited than review of an order granting or 

denying a permanent injunction." Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Los 

Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 

1980). Such an order may be reversed only if the district judge exceeds the boundaries of his broad 

discretion in one of three ways: "(1) he may apply incorrect substantive law or an incorrect 

preliminary injunction standard; (2) he may rest his decision to grant or deny a preliminary 

injunction on a clearly erroneous finding of fact that is material to the decision to grant or deny the 

injunction; or (3) he may apply an acceptable preliminary injunction standard in a manner that 

results in an abuse of discretion." Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 724. In issuing the preliminary injunction 

in the present case, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in any of these ways.

(1) The district court’s order would be reversible for legal error "if the court did not employ 

the appropriate legal standards which govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction, ... or if, in

37The findings and conclusions before this Court on appeal are. of course, "not to be considered 
as foreclosing any findings and conclusions to the contrary based upon evidence which may be 
received at the trial on the merits." Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline & French Laboratories, 207 
F.2d 190, 199 (9th Cir. 1953).

34



applying the appropriate standards, the court misapprehended the law with respect to the 

underlying issues in litigation Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 724. As defendants appear to concede (see 

Cty. Br., pp. 19-20), the district court applied the appropriate preliminary injunction standards, 

determining not only that plaintiffs had established their probable success on the merits and the 

possibility of irreparable harm (ER 1960), but also that plaintiffs had raised serious questions on 

the merits and that the balance of hardships clearly weighed in their favor. ER 1949. See, e.g., 

Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609. 612 (9th Cir. 1989); Republic o f the Philippines v. 

Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1362 (9th Cir. 1988), cert, denied. 490 U.S. 1035 (1989); State o f Alaska v. 

Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir. 1988).

It is equally clear that the district court did not "misapprehend[ ] the law with respect to the 

underlying issues in litigation." Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 725. Defendants cannot reasonably be heard 

to argue that a federal court may never, in any circumstances, issue any injunctive relief against a 

local law enforcement agency. As this Court has held, "[fjederal district courts have equitable 

power to enjoin law enforcement agencies when such agencies have engaged in a persistent pattern 

of misconduct." Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 725 (citing Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 815-16 (1974); Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373-76 (1976); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-07 (1983)).

Defendants’ contentions on this appeal thus boil down to questions of degree and fine 

judgment in the application of precedents such as Rizzo and Lyons to the particular record in the 

case at bar. Especially at the preliminary injunction stage, those are questions peculiarly within the 

district court’s discretion. In any event, the record here is plain that this is precisely the kind of 

case in which a federal court can and should intervene to restrain a pervasive pattern of 

constitutional violations. See Section II infra.

(2) The district court did not "rest . . . [its] decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction 

on a clearly erroneous finding of fact ...." Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 724. The district court’s findings in 

the present case are supported by ample evidence in the record, and they are not "clearly 

erroneous" under Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. See Section III infra.



(3) The only other basis on which defendants can argue for reversal is that the district court, 

while applying the correct preliminary injunction standard and the correct rules of substantive law 

to properly determined facts, abused its discretion because its decision was not "based on 

consideration of the relevant factors" or because it committed "a clear error of judgment 

Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 725. In considering such arguments, which go to the heart of a district court’s 

discretion, this Court "will not reverse the district court’s order simply because [it] would have 

reached a different result. ... 'The [reviewing] court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for 

that of the [district court].’" Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 725 (citations omitted) (insertions in original). 

Here, the only grounds advanced by defendants to impugn the district court’s judgment are claims 

(a) that the court made certain procedural mistakes in issuing the injunction, and (b) that the form 

of the injunction is improper in some respects. These contentions provide no basis for reversal. 

See Section IV infra.

II. NO LEGAL RULE INVOKED BY DEFENDANTS REMOTELY REQUIRES REVERSAL
ON THIS RECORD.

Defendants treat Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and City o f Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 

U.S. 95 (1983), as though they overthrew the long-accepted power of the federal courts to enjoin 

local police officials, under appropriate circumstances, from committing flagrant, widespread, 

systematic violations of citizens’ constitutional rights. But neither Rizzo nor Lyons undermines this 

power, which was firmly established in such landmark cases as Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1938), 

and Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974). Rizzo recognizes, as did Hague and Allee, that "[isolated 

incidents of police misconduct . . . would not . . .  be cause for the exercise of a federal court’s 

injunctive powers," Allee, 416 U.S. at 815; and Lyons requires that a constitutionally cognizable case 

or controversy support the federal court's jurisdiction. See also Zepeda. 753 F.2d at 725. The 

conditions for injunctive relief spelled out in both cases are abundantly satisfied here.

A. RIZZO  DOES NOT BAR THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED 
BELOW.

In Rizzo, the Supreme Court found the record inadequate to support a permanent injunction

36



ordering Philadelphia’s Police Commissioner, Mayor, and other city officials to design and 

implement "’a comprehensive program for improving the handling of citizen complaints alleging 

police misconduct,’" id. at 365. Although that record showed a total of 19 incidents "occurring in 

the city of Philadelphia over a year’s time in which numbers of police officers violated citizens’ 

constitutional rights," id. at 368 (summarizing the figures at 367-68), the Court found no "common 

thread running through them," id. at 375 -  nothing equivalent to the "‘pervasive pattern of 

intimidation’ flowing from a deliberate plan by the named defendants to crush the nascent labor 

organizations [that had won injunctive relief in Hague and/l//ee]," ibid, (emphasis in original). To 

the contrary, only "[iIndividual police officers not named as parties to the action were found to have 

violated the constitutional rights of particular individuals," id. at 371 (emphasis in original); and 

"there was no showing that the behavior of the Philadelphia police was different in kind or degree 

from that which exists everywhere; indeed, the district court found 'that the problems disclosed by 

the record . . . are fairly typical of [those] afflicting police departments in major urban areas,’" id. 

at 375 (insertions in original).

In short, the Philadelphia police were not shown to have targeted any racially or 

geographically distinct subpart of the community for intimidation: no named defendant had violated 

anybody’s constitutional rights; and the types and amounts of unconstitutional police conduct 

committed by officers unnamed as defendants were no greater than-cauki.be expected for any urban 

metropolis. The Rizzo plaintiffs’ "claim to 'real and immediate’ injury . . . [rested solely] on what 

one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the future because of that 

unknown policeman's perception of departmental disciplinary procedures." Id. at 372; see also id. 

at 376 (referring to "the actions of a small percentage of the police force"). Thus, Chief Judge 

Wallace in Zepeda was exactly right to describe Rizzo as holding simply that there is "no duty on 

[a] . . . police department to eliminate future misconduct by a small part of [the] police force." 

Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 725.

The facts of the present case contrast sharply with those in Rizzo. Here the plaintiffs have

37



alleged and documented multiple incidents of intimidation aimed at a specific population. 

Residents of Lynwood who are African-Americans and Latinos — and particularly those who are 

thought to be connected with "gangs" -  are the focus of repeated instances of police brutality. See 

pages 7-33 supra. Plaintiffs’ original complaint alleged 42 episodes of this kind within a three 

month period in an area populated by approximately 62,000 persons and policed by approximately 

125 deputies (see note 17 supra). By comparison, in Rizzo there were "some 20 [incidents] in all -- 

occurring at large in a city of three million inhabitants, with 7.500 policemen." Rizzo. 423 U.S. at 

373. Projecting the Lynwood rate of alleged incidents per officer, Philadelphia would have had to 

have, not 20, but 80,640 incidents a year to match it.38 39 Moreover, unlike Rizzo, where no named 

defendants were connected to unconstitutional incidents, here 21 deputies -  more than a sixth of 

the total number assigned to the Lynwood station -  were named as defendants. See page 8

39supra.

Also, unlike Rizzo, the Lynwood incidents have a "common thread running through them." 

Rizzo, 323 U.S. at 375. The police violence is aimed almost exclusively at racial minorities and is 

often accompanied by explicit racial taunts: "nigger," "wetback," and so forth. See pages 19-21 

supra. Particularly when minorities have the temerity to claim that their rights are being violated 

or to question a deputy’s authority, they are likely to be abused. See pages 26-26 supra. The district 

court found that "[t]he actions of many deputies working in the Lynwood sub-station are motivated 

by racial hostility," ER 1958, and that "many of the deputies and sergeants in Lynwood were out 

to intimidate and ridicule Blacks and Hispanics," ER 1959. It is the official policy of the LASD to

38The yearly abusive incident rate in Rizzo was 2.7 per 1000 officers (20 incidents/7500 officers 
x 1000). The rate in Lynwood for three months is 336 (42 incidents/125 officers x 1000). The yearly 
rate in the present case which would be comparable to the yearly rate in Rizzo is 1344 (336 x 4). 
The Philadelphia police force is 60 times the size of the force at the Lynwood station (7500/125). 
If the Lynwood rate were applied to a police force the size of Philadelphia's, it would produce 
80,640 incidents per year (1344 x 60).

39The declarations filed by the parties identify by name 45 additional deputies who were involved 
in the incidents of which plaintiffs complain. See page 8 supra. The record in this case thus 
implicates a total of 66 identified deputies, or more than 50 percent of all deputies assigned to the 
Lynwood station, in defendants' pattern of unconstitutional behavior.

38



target certain "gangs" for "special attention" by OSS deputies (see page 22 supra); the OSS or "gang" 

trailer at the Lynwood station is a frequent scene of vicious beatings (see page 23 supra); 

applications for search warrants executed with excessive force contain boilerplate averments about 

general "gang" behavior (see page 23 supra); persons suspected of "gang" connections are repeatedly 

abused by deputies (see pages 22-25 supra); the commander of the Lynwood station has said that 

he would be "disinclined" to investigate "gang" members’ complaints of police misconduct unless 

they first take a polygraph test (see page 30 supra) — a policy that the county defendants support 

as "not constitutionally unreasonable" (Cty. Br„ p 33); and it is hardly accidental that deputies view 

African-American and Latino men as putative "gang" members (see pages 22-23 supra). Where 

racial subgroups are singled out as the targets for "a "pervasive pattern of intimidation,’" Rizzo, 423 

U.S. at 375, quoting Allee, 416 U.S. at 812, this Court's precedents plainly recognize that injunctive 

relief is appropriate and consistent with Rizzo. E.g., Nicacio v. INS. 797 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1985); 

LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985); Zepeda, 753 F.2d 719.

Additionally, the pattern of unconstitutional intimidation here has been "causally linked" to 

LASD policies and to the responsible LASD officials named as defendants. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 

375. The district court specifically found "a direct link between departmental policy makers, who 

tacitly authorize deputies’ unconstitutional behavior, and the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs." ER 

1959. It further found that "[m]any of the incidents which brought about . . . [the] motion [for a 

preliminary injunction] involved a group of Lynwood area deputies who are members of a neo-nazi, 

white supremacist gang -  the Vikings -- which exists with the knowledge of departmental policy 

makers." ER 1958. Yet, in counterpoint to the LASD’s vigorous repressive campaign against 

minority-race "gangs," its response to the Vikings was to do nothing before the present lawsuit was 

filed, and almost nothing after. See pages 21-22, 31 supra. Complaints of police brutality are 

discouraged by deputies and their superiors (see pages 29-30 supra); and the LASD has neither 

changed nor reviewed its training policies or investigation techniques in the face of damage 

settlements and jury verdicts in police misconduct cases costing Los Angeles County $8.5 million

39



between 1986 and 1989 (see pages 32-33 supra). This sort of tacit authorization of notorious 

misconduct (see pages 31-32 supra) -  acts of misconduct "so persistent and widespread that they 

were the subject of prolonged public discussion or of a high degree of publicity," Bennett v. City of 

Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1984), on rehearing. 735 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc) -  

would clearly satisfy the requirements for governmental liability under Monell v. Department of 

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). See, e.g., 

Harris v. City o f Pagedale, 821 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1987); Samples v. City o f Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328 

(11th Cir. 1988). For similar reasons, it supplies the "causal link" required by Rizzo.

B. LYONS INTERPOSES NO OBSTACLE TO THE INJUNCTION.

Plaintiffs’ complaint below asserts claims for damages and equitable relief that unmistakably 

"involve the same operative facts and legal theory."' Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1423 

(9th Cir. 1987). These claims have not been severed. Hence, the case-or-controversy requirement 

of City o f Los Angeles v. Lyons is satisfied under the binding rule of Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 

(9th Cir. 1984).

In any event, Lyons failed to demonstrate a case or controversy of any equitable entitlement 

to injunctive relief because he had only been subjected to a police stranglehold on one occasion, 

when he was fortuitously stopped for a traffic violation. He offered no reason to believe that the 

unprovoked violence he had suffered would ever be repeated even if he was stopped again, see 461 

U.S. at 106; so he "was no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles," 

id. at 111.

That is manifestly not this case. Here, a number of plaintiffs have been repeatedly subjected 

to police brutality. See pages 24-25 supra. They have sometimes been mistreated again Because the 

deputies involved remembered them from prior episodes of mistreatment. See pages 15, 24-25 

supra. They have been mistreated in retaliation for their involvement in this lawsuit. See pages 24- 

26 supra. They have been mistreated because they are believed to be members of "gangs" that are 

singled out for "special attention" by OSS deputies assigned to the Lynwood station. See Section

40



11(A) supra. They have been mistreated because they are African-Americans or Latinos in 

Lynwood, called "niggers" and "wetbacks" while being beaten. See ibid. For the defendants to 

invoke holding of Lyons under these-circumstances is incomprehensible.

C. THE INJUNCTION DOES NOT TRESPASS ON ANY PRINCIPLE OF 
FEDERALISM.

Defendants alternatively extrapolate from Rizzo and from Lyons two versions of a 

proposition which those cases do not hold but which is said to follow from the references to 

federalism in their opinions. The more moderate version is that when a federal court is asked to 

issue an injunction against state law enforcement officials, "principles of comity and federalism must 

be weighed heavily in the balance of equities." Cty. Br., p. 27 (emphasis in original). We agree that 

this is a proper reading of the opinions. See Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 378-80; Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112.

But so did the district court. It approached the present case with the attitude that it did not 

"relish getting involved in a situation where the court is asked to indeed supervise ongoing law 

enforcement activities," ER 1949, and it framed its preliminary injunction with an eye to reducing 

to the absolute minimum any intrusion of its powers into local law enforcement. As a result, it 

preliminarily ordered the defendants simply to follow their own stated but disregarded policies and 

guidelines governing the use of force and searches. Ironically, this very self-restraint is now the 

basis for the defendants’ specious arguments that the district judge wrongly undertook to enforce 

state law instead of the Constitution. See section IV(B)(2) infra. Here we need only note that the 

county defendants’ claim that the district court "fail[ed] to accord any, much less the proper 

substantial weight to the principles of federalism and comity" (Cty. Br.. p. 30) and the deputy 

defendants’ equally categorical claim that "[njowhere in the transcript of the hearings, the 

preliminary injunction, or the judge’s post hoc findings . . .  is there any indication that he gave any 

weight to [considerations of federalism]" (Dep. Br., p. 21) are flatly belied by the very form of the 

injunction at which they rail.

The deputy defendants also make a far more extreme "federalism" argument. Citing 

Gonzales v. City o f Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983), they argue that after Rizzo and Lyons,

41



federal injunctions "to combat recurrent unlawful government misconduct . . . have been aimed at 

federal administrative agencies, where no principles of federalism or comity are involved" (Dep. Br., 

p. 20; emphasis in original) and that "[n]o case since Rizzo and Lyons has granted the type of 

injunctive relief against a local law enforcement agency . . . which was issued below" (Dep. Br., p. 

21; emphasis in original). This is wrong on all counts.

First, Gonzales merely reiterates the Lyons rule that "we must avoid interference with state 

and local law enforcement unless it is necessary to prevent policies that violate constitutional rights." 

722 F.2d at 482 (emphasis added). The Gonzales court engaged in precisely the kind of weighing 

process that the district court conducted in the present case: it asked whether the injunctive relief 

was "necessary to prevent the violation of constitutional rights" (id. at 481) and concluded that it 

was not, because of two considerations shown by the record: "the Peoria police are perfectly willing 

to comply with federal law, once it is made clear to them what their responsibilities are" (ibid.), and 

"there is no indication that the police intended to use the law as a pretext to harass persons of 

Mexican descent" (ibid.). These conclusions (which would be superfluous if the deputies’ reading 

of Gonzales were correct) paint a picture that is at the farthest end of the spectrum from the district 

court's conclusions here: (1) that a preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent the violation of 

constitutional rights (ER 1959-60); (2) that the defendants are not willing to comply with the 

Constitution (ER 1958-59); and (3) that their misconduct is "motivated by racial hostility" (ibid.).

Second, post-R/zzo, post-Lyons cases in this Circuit and elsewhere continue to award 

injunctive relief against state or local law enforcement officials under appropriate circumstances.

E. g.. McLaughlin v. County of Riverside. 888 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated and remanded for 

further consideration on the merits with no indication that injunctive relief is inappropriate. 114 L.Ed.2d 

49 (1991); NORML v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985), affd in part, modified in part, 796

F. 2d 276 (9th Cir. 1986); Eng v. Smith. 849 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1988); Lynch v. Baxley. 744 F.2d 1452 

(11th Cir. 1984).

Third, the deputies’ arguments -  based in part upon an exaggerated reading of Lyons and

42



in part upon the Peace Officers’ Bill of Rights (Dep. Br., pp. 31-33) -  ignore both the Supremacy 

Clause (U.S. Const., Art. VI. cl. 2) and the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment: "’The

Fourteenth Amendment . . . was avowedly directed against the power of the States,’ . . . and so 

permits a federal court to disestablish local government institutions that interfere with its 

commands." Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 L.Ed.2d 31, 56 (1990).

D. ANDERSON V CREIGHTON DOES NOT REVERSE THE BALANCE OF 
EQUITIES THAT TIPS IN FAVOR OF ISSUANCE OF THE INJUNCTION.

Doctrinally, the Supreme Court's decision in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), has 

nothing to do with the issues presented in this case. Anderson’s qualified immunity doctrine applies 

only to actions for money damages and does not shield officers from suits for injunctive relief. E.g., 

Supreme Court o f Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 736-37 (1980); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 

U.S. 522, 537-38 (1984). There is no justification and no need to import Anderson into the law of 

preliminary injunctions, for Anderson is aimed at striking a balance between the vindication of 

constitutional rights and "the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation 

will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties." 483 U.S. at 638. In the injunctive 

context, the striking of that very balance is the function of the familiar, alternatively phrased test 

for preliminary relief set forth in, e.g., Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel. 859 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 

1988); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200- 

01 (9th Cir. 1980). And here, where both alternative prongs of the test were met -  with the district 

court finding specifically (1) that "we indeed have serious issues" and the balance of hardships 

"fall[s] on the side of the named plaintiffs" (ER 1949)40 and (2) that "[plaintiffs have established 

their probable success on the merits" and "have . . . established irreparable harm" (ER 1960) — 

resort to an Anderson analysis would be peculiarly superfluous.

But even if it were to be applied as an equitable consideration, the rule of Anderson would

40The district court also found that "the irreparable injury to plaintiffs that would result from 
the denial of a preliminary injunction far outweighs any possible injury that such relief could cause 
defendants." ER 1960.

43



present no obstacle to the preliminary injunction issued by the district court. Anderson protects 

only conduct that "a reasonable officer could have believed ... to be lawful, in light of clearly 

established law and the information the . . . officer[] possessed." 483 U.S. at 641. By holding the 

defendants only to the terms of "the Department’s own stated policies and guidelines regarding the 

use of force and procedures for conducting searches," ER 1899, the district court obviated any 

concern that a deputy will be penalized for good-faith conduct. Precisely the opposite of good-faith 

conduct was, of course, the basis for the preliminary injunction: the district court expressly found 

that "the actions of many deputies working in the Lynwood sub-station are motivated by racial 

hostility; these deputies regularly disregard the civil rights of individuals they have sworn to protect." 

ER 1958.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD.

A district court's findings of fact may not be reversed unless they are "elearly erroneous" 

within the meaning of Rule 52(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. -  Le., the findings must be affirmed unless "the 

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Under 

this standard,

If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the 
record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though 
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the 
evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the 
factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. ...

This is so even when the district court’s findings do not rest on credibility 
determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences 
from other facts.

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564. 573-74 (1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 

On appeal from an order granting a preliminary injunction, review of a district court’s

44



findings of fact is further limited by the absence of a "fully developed factual record,"41 Zepeda, . 

753 F.2d at 724. It is also limited by the relaxed evidentiary standards under which, contrary to 

defendants' arguments, the district court may consider news reports and other hearsay evidence that 

might not be admissible at a trial on the merits. This Court has made it clear that a district court 

"may give even inadmissible evidence some weight, when to do so serves the purpose of preventing 

irreparable harm before trial." Flynt Distributing Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389. 1394 (9th Cir. 1984). 

See also Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1363.

Defendants’ objection to the district court’s consideration of declarations and exhibits is also 

unpersuasive. It is well established in this Circuit that a preliminary injunction may be granted or 

denied on the basis of conflicting declarations submitted by the parties, and that the district court 

is not required to take oral testimony. See San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Kennedy, 412 

F.2d 541, 546 (9th Cir. 1969); Hoffrilz v. United States, 240 F.2d 109, 111 (9th Cir. 1956). The 

urgency required by a motion for a preliminary injunction makes such submissions appropriate; the 

weight to be given to such evidence is, of course, a decision left to the discretion of the district 

court. See Bracco v. Lackner, 462 F. Supp. 436, 442 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (citing C. Wright & A. 

Miller, 11 Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949, pp. 469-473).

As plaintiffs have demonstrated in the statement of facts above, the district court’s findings 

in the present case are not only plausible but fully supported by the record as a whole. These 

findings are not clearly erroneous, and they must therefore be affirmed.

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT’S APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS DID NOT
RESULT IN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

A. THE COURT FOLLOWED THE CORRECT PROCEDURES IN ISSUING THE 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.

Defendants have several complaints, all without merit, about procedural matters. First,

41As Chief Judge Wallace noted in Zepeda, in some cases parties appeal orders granting or 
denying motions for preliminary injunctions "in order to ascertain the views of the appellate court 
on the merits of the litigation," even though the disposition of such appeals "provides little guidance 
on the appropriate resolution of the merits." 753 F.2d at 724. In many cases, such appeals result 
in "unnecessary delay to the parties and inefficient use of judicial resources." Id.

45



defendants suggest that the district court’s order is entitled to less deference because plaintiffs did 

not file their motion for a preliminary injunction until ten months after they filed this lawsuit. Cty. 

Br., p. 21. The record shows, however, that the need for such a motion did not become clear until 

shortly before it was filed. Plaintiffs elected not to request a preliminary injunction when they first 

filed their complaint, hoping that the existence of the lawsuit would itself help to stem the deputies’ 

misconduct. However, while potentially dispositive defense motions were pending for eight months 

and all discovery was stayed for six months, counsel for plaintiffs were made aware that the pattern 

of abusive conduct was continuing. See CR 28-30, 34-36, 54-55. Plaintiffs filed their motion for a 

preliminary injunction only when it became clear that such an injunction was essential to prevent 

further irreparable injury. The plaintiffs cannot be faulted for waiting to file their motion until it 

was clearly necessary, and the district court cannot be faulted for considering and ruling on the 

motion when it was presented.

Second, defendants contend that the district court erred in issuing written findings of fact 

and conclusions of law after defendants had filed a notice of appeal. Cty. Br. pp. 22-23; Dep. Br. 

pp. 42-43. However, it is neither unusual nor erroneous for a district court to file written findings 

"after the entry of an order, or even after an appeal has been taken, provided there is no prejudice 

to the appellant." 7 Moore’s Federal Practice 11 65.12, p. 65-153 2d ed. (1991). The appellants here - 

- who failed to object in a timely fashion in the district court, but instead requested and obtained 

an extension of time from this Court in order to brief issues presented by the written findings and 

conclusions (Order of Oct. 16, 1991) -  can show no such prejudice.

The failure to file such written findings and conclusions contemporaneously with an order 

granting a preliminary injunction does not deprive a district court of power to hold those violating 

the order in civil contempt. Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. United Mine Workers o f America, 476 F.2d 

860, 862 (3d Cir. 1973). Although as a matter of sound judicial administration the same issue 

generally should not be put before two courts at the same time, see 9 Moore’s Federal Practice 

11 203.11, p. 3-48 (2d ed. 1991), a district court does not lose all jurisdiction to act on an issue simply

46



because that issue has become the subject .of a notice of appeal -  especially where, as here, the 

district court’s action aids the appellate court by clarifying the issues on appeal. See, e.g., 

Masalosalo v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1983); Matter o f Thorp, 655 F.2d 997 (9th 

Cir. 1981).

An appellate court should consider written findings and conclusions that were issued after 

an appeal was filed but before it has been briefed and argued. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 78 

(1938). In Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the court held that 

the filing of a notice of appeal did not divest Judge Kozinsky, sitting in the Central District of 

California, of jurisdiction to issue written findings and conclusions two and a half months after he 

orally granted an injunction. Hybritech, 849 F.2d at 1450 (applying Ninth Circuit law and rejecting 

claims that differences between written and oral findings required reliance on oral findings only). 

As the court in Hybritech recognized, "reduction of the oral ruling into written findings and 

conclusions aids [appellate] review." Id. See also Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 862 F.2d 890, 895 (1st 

Cir. 1988) (findings and conclusions issued two months after order considered on appeal). To hold 

otherwise would elevate form over substance, and would result in unnecessary delay in resolving the 

substantive issues on this appeal.42

Finally, defendants consistently seek to portray the district judge as unfair to them and 

"totally hostile to their mission." Dep. Br„ p. 3. The record shows, however, that the district judge 

initially declined even to permit plaintiffs to file their claims as part of a pre-existing action {see 

Appellees’ Request for Judicial Notice on Appeal, pp. 13-14), and did not "relish getting involved 

in a situation where the court is asked to indeed supervise ongoing law enforcement activities." ER 

1949. He reluctantly concluded, however, that he could not "overlook the evidence that's been

42The cases on which defendants rely are clearly distinguishable. See Griggs v. Provident 
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982) (dictum in case involving district court's consideration 
of motion to alter or amend judgment after appeal filed); Chemlawn Services Corp. v. GNC Pumps, 
Inc., 823 F.2d 515, 527-18 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (district court failed to make any findings or conclusions, 
oral or written, until five months after issuance of preliminary injunction and two and one-half 
months after filing of notice of appeal).

47



presented so far." Id.

In deciding to grant the preliminary injunction, the district judge carefully weighed the 

interests of all parties.43 See ER 1911, 1949-50, 1960. He declined to issue an order in the form 

requested by plaintiffs (see Supp. ER 1593; ER 1880), and he took particular care to shape his 

order so as to safeguard the rights and concerns of individual deputies (ER 1951 j44 and to honor 

defendants’ request that the court not issue an injunction limited to the Lynwood station (ER 1934- 

37). By requiring the defendants temporarily to follow their own policies and guidelines, his order 

not only minimized the degree of federal intrusion into the operation of the Sheriffs Department, 

but also limited the impact on individual deputies by insuring that they would not be expected to 

do anything more than comply with rules with which they were already quite familiar. The record 

as a whole demonstrates that the district judge carefully considered the rights and interests of all 

parties, and that he issued the most limited form of relief that was appropriate under the 

circumstances.

B. THE SCOPE OF THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS PROPER.

1. The Court Did Not Order Any Classwide Relief.

Contrary to defendants’ contentions (see Cty. Br., p. 51; Dep. Br„ pp. 43-44), the preliminary 

injunction issued by the district court does not require defendants to follow their policies and 

guidelines with respect to anyone other than the named plaintiffs. The district judge stated on the

43Defendants argue that the district court did not describe with sufficient particularity its 
consideration of their interests and concerns. See Dep. Br., pp. 7-8, 26-27. In fact, the district court 
followed this Court's direction to "’identify the harms which a preliminary injunction might cause 
to the defendants and ... weigh these against plaintiffs threatened injury."' Caribbean Marine 
Services Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668. 676 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum 
Commission v. National Football League, 634 F.2d at 1203). Contrary to defendants' contention, 
nothing in Carribean Marine or any other decision of this Court requires a district court to expressly 
state each and every way in which the parties’ interests might be affected by a preliminary 
injunction.

44Among the possible harms advanced by defendants and accommodated by the district court 
were concerns that deputies might be endangered if the court imposed rules that conflicted with 
existing policy (ER 371), and that individual deputies might be hampered in defending the damage 
claims against them if they were identified by name in the court's order (ER 1935).

48



record that "we don't even have the class that's been certified here," and that "there would not be 

any sort of injunctive relief towards a class yet, but [only for the benefit of] all the named 

individuals." ER 1929. The district court's written findings also expressly noted that no class 

certification motion had been filed. ER 1958.45 Thus, unlike the order in Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 729, 

the order in the present case did not grant relief to any persons who were not before the court.46

2. The Court’s Order Is Narrowly Tailored To Minimize Federal Intrusion And 
Is Limited To The Scope Of The Probable Constitutional Violations 
Established By The Record.

The district court heard argument and received extensive evidentiary submissions from the 

parties in order to define the boundaries of preliminary relief pending a full trial on the merits. 

Declining to grant relief in the form requested by plaintiffs, the court ultimately confined the 

preliminary injunction to the defendants' own policies and guidelines.

After preliminarily finding that LASD deputies in Lynwood had engaged in a pattern of 

widespread constitutional violations to the detriment of plaintiffs, the court voiced its concern that 

any interim injunction requiring defendants to conform to the Constitution be practicable and 

"simple." ER 1949. Defendants contended that their own stated policies already addressed the full 

scope of plaintiffs' concerns. See ER 1916-18. While arguing that they had not violated the 

Constitution, defendants identified precisely which of their own policies in their opinion governed 

the allegedly unconstitutional behavior, filing jointly with plaintiffs a document entitled, "Parties’ 

Joint Submission Regarding Sheriff Department Policies Relevant to Proposed Preliminary

45On October 28. 1991, after issuance of the district court's order and written findings, plaintiffs 
filed a motion for class certification. Supp. ER 230 (CR 162).

46The district court's order is not specifically limited by its terms to the individual named 
plaintiffs. If this Court concludes that the order itself must include an explicit limitation, the Court 
may clarify or modify the injunction in that respect pending a ruling by the district court on 
plaintiffs’ pending motion for class certification. See Nelson v. IBEWLocal 46, 899 F.2d 1557, 1564- 
65 (9th Cir. 1990).

49



Injunction Order."47 ER 1741-58.

The district court properly found that enforcement of the policies identified by the 

defendants themselves was necessary to protect against further violations of the Constitution.4® 

In substance, the terms of the preliminary injunction in the present case closely resemble the search 

procedures approved in Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 723, with additional terms necessitated by the factual 

record here on the use of force. The district court’s order is thus tailored — far more narrowly than 

defendants suggest — to the probable constitutional violations demonstrated by the record.

It was well within the district court's power to order, at this preliminary stage, that 

defendants comply with policies which defendants themselves promulgated and which all parties to 

the litigation agreed were relevant to the relief requested by plaintiffs.47 * 49 Indeed, plaintiffs 

requested far more extensive relief than the district court granted to insure defendants’ compliance 

with the Constitution pending a final disposition of this case. See Supp. ER 209-16; ER 1593.

The preliminary injunction was properly based on "the lower court’s factual findings of

47The joint submission sets forth policies and guidelines which state in part that deputies should 
"knock and announce authority and purpose and ... must wait a reasonable time to allow any 
occupants within to come to the door before forcing entry"; that deputies "shall not cause 
unnecessary damage to ... property" and that the "interior of locations searched should be left in 
approximately the same condition they were in" prior to a search; that deputies shall not "willfully 
subject any person ... to cruel treatment or willfully neglect necessary humane action"; that deputies 
"shall use force only when necessary and fully justified by circumstances"; that deputies shall not use 
terms that would "defame or demean the nationality or culture of any individual" and shall not 
"speak disparagingly of the nationality, color, creed, or belief of any person"; that deputies must 
"photograph all subjects and suspects that are taken into custody"; and that deputies must make 
reports to their supervisors "[i]n all cases where personnel are required to use physical force." ER 
1741-58.

^Defendants discuss in their briefs in this Court a number of additional LASD policies and 
guidelines that were not included in the parties' joint submission to the district court. See, e.g., Cty. 
Br., p. 46; Dep. Br„ pp. 30. 34. To the extent that these additional policies go beyond the stated 
policies which the parties agreed below were relevant to plaintiffs' constitutional claims, they fall 
outside the scope of the district court's order.

49The order under review here is "apreliminary injunction [which] may be a ’broad’ prohibition, 
as it is intended to be temporary, and necessarily at times lacks the degree of precision which may 
be required of a final decree." Johnson v. Radford, 449 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis in 
original) (noting that claims of overbreadth may be presented at a final hearing on the merits, 
where the trial court can consider defining the boundaries of a permanent injunction more sharply).

50



[LASD] practices violative of the fourth amendment and its finding that the [LASD] reasonably 

could be expected to continue the practices... ." Zepeda, 753 F.2d at 726. These findings establish 

that LASD deputies utilize "terrorist-type tactics" against plaintiffs within the jurisdiction of the 

Lynwood station, thus requiring the minimally intrusive relief ordered -- adherence to policies which 

defendants themselves claim would assure the cessation of any terrorist-type tactics. It is at the very 

least unseemly for defendants to object to the scope of a preliminary injunction consisting of 

nothing more than an order that they follow their own prophylactic measures.

Contrary to defendants' arguments, moreover (see Cty. Br.. pp. 4, 7. 21, 23), the district 

court’s order in no way contravenes Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 

(1984). Pennhurst held that federal courts are without jurisdiction to redress violations of state law 

by state defendants. 465 U.S. at 106, 124. The court of appeals in Pennhurst ordered injunctive 

relief based solely upon a pendent state law claim asserted by the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court 

reversed, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred "the claim that [state officials] violated state 

law in carrying out their official duties ...." Id. at 103 (italics in original; boldface added).

In the present case, only federal constitutional violations are at issue. The plaintiffs did not 

allege and the district court did not find a violation of any state law or departmental policy or 

guideline. Rather, the district court ordered compliance with defendants’ own stated policies 

regarding the- use of force and the conduct of searches as a temporary method of enforcing 

plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights. Pennhurst has nothing whatsoever to say about such an order.

3. The Geographic Scope Of The Order Derives From Defendants' 
Representations To The Court Below.

Defendants' contention in this Court that the preliminary injunction improperly covers 

LASD employees beyond the law enforcement jurisdiction of the Lynwood station requires another 

repudiation of their position in the court below. The geographic scope of the district court’s order 

reflects that court's deference to defendants' own factual representations to the court.

Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction that would bind deputies acting "within the 

jurisdiction of the Lynwood station." ER 1889. See also Supp. ER 200, 209; ER 1593. Defendants,

51



however, vigorously attacked this request, representing to the district court that "plaintiffs’ artificial

and meaningless limitation to deputies assigned to the Lynwood station does not accord with the

operational practices or training of the Sheriffs Department (in which personnel are freely assigned

and transferred) CR 76, p. 26. They also asserted that, due to their assignment policies, an

injunction limited to the Lynwood station would "interject confusion into law enforcement

operations" (ER 1934), and that "[fjrom a practical point of view, ... it would be impossible for the

court to issue such an injunction ...." ER 1936-37. The district court properly exercised its

discretion to fashion a preliminary injunction that would alleviate defendants" concerns.

The application of the court’s order to LASD employees beyond the Lynwood station is also

fully consistent with Rule 65(d), Fed. R. Civ. P., which provides that an injunction is binding "upon

the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those

persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by

personal service or otherwise." Rule 65(d) is

derived from the common-law doctrine that a decree of injunction not only binds 
the parties defendant but also those identified with them in interest, in "privity" with 
them, represented by them or subject to their control. In essence it is that 
defendants may not nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders 
and abettors, although they were not parties to the original proceeding.

Regal Knitwear v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9,14 (1945) (successors and assigns bound by injunction because

they may be "instrumentalities through which defendant seeks to evade an order or may come

within the description of persons in active concert or participation with them in the violation of an

injunction"). See United States v. Crookshanks, 441 F. Supp. 268, 269 (D. Ore. 1977) ("a court can

enjoin non-parties whose actions threaten to interfere with compliance with prior orders of the

court"). See also ICC v. Rio Grande Growers Co-op, 564 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977).

Defendants themselves established the factual predicate for binding LASD employees

outside of Lynwood as potential "aiders and abettors." Under defendants' representations

concerning the operations of the Sheriffs Department, it was necessary for the district court to

enjoin all LASD employees throughout Los Angeles County in order to guard against nullification

52



of the preliminary injunction when such employees perform police services in Lynwood. See Regal 

Knitwear, 324 U.S. at 14. Defendants should be estopped from taking the inconsistent position in 

this Court that the injunction is overbroad.

Assuming no bad faith misrepresentation, defendants at the very least should direct their 

present concerns not to this Court but to the court below. Any further factfinding can only be 

made by that court and, in any event, will undoubtedly be addressed at the trial on the merits. At 

this time, however, defendants have no legitimate basis for claiming overbreadth on the very record 

they created in the district court.50

C. THE DISTRICT COURTS ORDER COMPLIES WITH THE FORMAL 
REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 65(d). FED. R. CIV. P.

Rule 65(d), Fed. R. Civ. P.,51 sets forth the formal requirements for an injunction. "The 

primary purpose of Rule 65(d) is to assure adequate notice to parties faced with the possibility of 

contempt." Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438, 1450 (9th Cir. 1989), cert, 

denied sub nom. San Francisco Firefighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco, 111 S.Ct. 

248 (1990). This Court "has not taken a rigid approach to Rule 65(d)," id. at 1450; even where an 

order may be technically defective, it will be upheld so long as the record as a whole demonstrates 

that the order in fact provides adequate notice. Id; Henry Hope X-Ray Products, Inc. v. Matron 

Carrel, Inc., 674 F.2d 1336, 1343 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Professional Assn, o f College Educators 

v. El Paso Community College District, 730 F.2d 258, 273 (5th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 881 

(1984) (Rule 65(d) does not demand "'unwieldy' specificity, but only that the injunction be framed

50If the Court concludes — in light, of defendants' abandonment of their position below — that 
the preliminary injunction should be limited (as plaintiffs originally proposed) to the jurisdiction 
of the Lynwood station, the Court may modify the injunction in that respect pending further 
hearings below. See Nehon v. IBEW Local 46. 899 F.2d at 1564-65 (affirming injunction while 
deleting overbroad terms).

5I"Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for 
its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to 
the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon 
the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those 
persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by 
personal service or otherwise." Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d).

53



so that those enjoined will know what conduct the court has prohibited").

The order in the present case satisfies all the formal requirements of Rule 65(d), and the 

record clearly demonstrates that the order provides adequate notice to defendants.

1. The District Court’s Oral And Written Findings Of Fact And Conclusions 
Of Law Set Forth The Reasons For Issuance Of The Preliminary Injunction.

Rule 65(d)’s requirement of a statement of reasons is satisfied if the record as a whole 

shows that the parties clearly understood the basis for the injunction. Lawrence v. St. Louis-San 

Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588. 591 (1927); Combs v. Ryan's Coal Co.. 785 F.2d 970. 978-79 (11th 

Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 853 (1986) (citing Ross-Whitney, 207 F.2d at 198 (9th Cir. 1953)). 

The record in the present case contains both oral32 (ER 1948-51) and written33 (ER 1957-61) 

findings and conclusions that leave no doubt as to the district court’s reasons for issuing the 

preliminary injunction. Indeed, even where findings are insufficient or entirely absent, the appellate 

court is not foreclosed "from examining the record to determine if sufficient evidence supports the 

issuance of injunctive relief." Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86 n.58 (1974).

2. The District Court’s Order Is Sufficiently Specific In Its Terms, And It 
Describes In Reasonable Detail The Acts Sought To Be Restrained.

The purpose of the specificity requirement of Rule 65(d) is twofold: to insure that

defendants receive adequate notice of what is enjoined, and to allow meaningful appellate review. 

Schmidt v. Lessard. 414 U.S. 473, 476-77 (1974). Both of these purposes are served by the order 

in the present case.

Defendants contend that the distriet court’s order is not sufficiently specific because it

52As this Court has recognized, even oral findings and conclusions are sufficient under Rules 
52(a) and 65(d), Fed. R. Civ. P. Davis, 890 F.2d at 1451.

33Where there are both oral and written findings and conclusions, "the rule in this Circuit is that 
the formal findings of fact and conclusions of law supersede the oral decision." White v. Washington 
Public Power Supply System, 692 F.2d 1286, 1289 n.l (9th Cir. 1982). There is, in any event, no 
contradiction between the district court’s initial oral findings and the later written findings. Nor 
is there any contradiction between the district court's general finding that plaintiffs' evidence is 
more credible and the court’s reliance on defendants' assertion that limiting injunctive relief to 
Lynwood alone would be infeasible and unworkable. See Section IV(B)(3) supra.

54



orders them to "[fjollow the Department's own stated policies and guidelines regarding the use of 

force and procedures for conducting searches."54 55 ER 1889. While "’[o]rdinarily an injunction 

should not incorporate by reference another document,’" Davis, 890 F.2d at 1450 (quoting Henry 

Hope X-Ray, 674 F.2d at 1343), this Court has affirmed an order that incorporated by reference 

"department rules already binding on officers" because "[i]t is unlikely the officers could argue they 

were unaware of those rules." Davis, 890 F.2d at 1450. See also Henry Hope X-Ray, 674 F.2d at 

1341 (incorporation by reference to sealed appendix): Combs, 785 F.2d at 97 (incorporation by 

reference to agreement attached to complaint); Perfect Fit Industries v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 

800, 804 (2d Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 832 (1982) (incorporation by reference to unattached 

"Exhibits 2 and 3").

In the present case, after counsel for the county defendants represented to the district court 

that the preliminary injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs was already covered by existing LASD 

policies (see ER 1916-18), the court directed the parties to identity the specific policies and 

guidelines involved. ER 1918-22. Counsel for the parties subsequently conferred and submitted 

a joint statement to the court, amounting to a stipulation, which set forth each specific item of relief 

sought by plaintiffs in conjunction with the language of each LASD policy and guideline the parties 

agreed was relevant. ER 17417'’ The district court's order preliminarily enjoins the defendants 

to follow these "stated" policies and guidelines "regarding the use of force and procedures for 

conducting searches." ER 1889.

54According to the county defendants, the proposed orders submitted by plaintiffs (Supp. ER 
209; ER 1593) apparently do not suffer from the same infirmity. See Ctv. Br„ p. 9 (plaintiffs' initial 
proposed order required "all defendants and their employees and agents while within the 
jurisdiction of the Lynwood Sheriffs substation to follow various specific procedures ...") (emphasis 
added); id., p. 14 (plaintiffs' modified proposed order "included specifics ...") (emphasis added). The 
individual deputy defendants, on the other hand, take the position that courts cannot enjoin police 
misconduct under virtually any circumstances. See Dep. Br.. p. 30 (claiming the "virtual 
impossibility of fashioning an injunction against police misconduct which would be broad enough 
to allow flexibility but which would be specific enough to delineate prohibited from permissible 
actions").

55The parties also filed separate statements supplementing their joint submission. ER 39, 41.

55



Like the fire department officers in Davis who were ordered to follow "already binding" 

rules. "[i]t is unlikely the [LASD] officers could argue they were unaware of these rules." 890 F.2d 

at 1450. Indeed, by issuing a preliminary injunction requiring defendants to follow their own 

policies and guidelines regarding use of force and search procedures, which their counsel had 

"stated" for the record, the court insured that deputies would not have to learn yet another set of 

rules, but could conduct themselves in accordance with rules with which they were already 

presumably quite familiar. The policies and guidelines to which the district court's order refers are 

the defendants' own, and they were identified by the parties themselves in submissions made to the 

court immediately before the order was issued. See Perfect Fit Industries, 646 F.2d at 809 

(defendant's own reference to unattached exhibits incorporated by reference in injunctive order 

revealed that defendant knew precisely what was at issue).

The order here is therefore very different from the "abstract conclusion of law", found too 

vague in International Longshoremen’s Association v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Association, 389 U.S. 

64, 69-70 (1967). The order’s reference in the present case to defendants’ "own stated policies and 

guidelines" (ER 1889) gives the defendants adequate notice of what they are required to do and 

what they are prohibited from doing.

The order in the present case also allows this Court to know precisely what it is reviewing. 

Unlike the order in Schmidt v. Lessard which directed defendants to refrain from enforcing "the 

present Wisconsin scheme," 414 U.S. at 476. the order here directs the defendants to follow policies 

and guidelines that were specifically identified on the record. Also unlike the order in Schmidt, the 

order in the present case is not a permanent injunction entered on the basis of a "comprehensive 

opinion" after a final determination on the merits. 414 U.S. at 474. Rather, the order under review 

here is "a preliminary injunction [which] may be a 'broad' prohibition, as it is intended to be 

temporary, and necessarily at times lacks the degree of precision which may be required of a final

56



decree."56 Johnson v. Radford. 449 F.2d 115. 117 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis in original) (noting that 

claims of overbreadth may be presented at a final hearing on the merits, where the trial court can

consider defining the boundaries of a permanent injunction more sharply).57

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs-appellees request that the Court affirm the order of the 

district court. If the Court concludes that there is any defect in the form of the district court’s 

order, plaintiffs-appellees request that the Court modify the order accordingly.

Dated: November 13. 1991.

Respectfully submitted.

NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND 
EDUCATIONAL FUND. INC.

PATRICK O. PATTERSON 
BILL LANN LEE 
KEVIN S. REED 
CONSTANCE L. RICE

JULIUS L. CHAMBERS 
CLYDE E. MURPHY 
MARINA C. HSIEH 
ALAN JENKINS

ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM

HUGH MANES

Patrick O. Patterson 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees

'6We agree with defendants that an injunction cannot sweep so broadly that it enjoins new 
violations "unlike and unrelated to that with which [the defendant] was originally charged." NLRB 
v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426. 436 (1941). See Nelson v. IBEW Local 46, 899 F.2d 1557. 
1564 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying NLRB v. Express Publishing). It is equally well established, however, 
that "[a] federal court has broad power to restrain acts which are of the same type or class as 
unlawful acts which the court has found to have been committed or whose commission in the 
future, unless enjoined, may fairly be anticipated from the defendant's conduct in the past." NLRB 
v. Express Publishing, 312 U.S. at. 435.

■ If this Court concludes that the district court should have stapled a copy of the relevant 
policies to its preliminary injunction, this Court may remedy the defect by issuing its own order that 
the incorporated policies be attached to the injunction and served on the affected parties. See 
Davis, 890 F.2d at 1450-51.

57



STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

Counsel for plaintiffs-appellees are not aware of any related cases pending in this Court.

\ ■ <„ u.
Patrick O. Patterson

Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellees

58



PROOF OF SER V IC E

On this date, a copy of the Brief for Appellees was served on 
the following persons in the manner set forth below:

DE WITT W. CLINTON,
County Counsel 
S. ROBERT AMBROSE,
Assistant County Counsel 
PATRICK T. MEYERS,
Principal Deputy County Counsel 
648 Hall of Administration 
500 West Temple Street 
Los Angeles, CA 90012
COTKIN, COLLINS & FRANSCELL 
F. James Feffer, Esq.
201 North Figueroa Street, 
Suite 1100
Los Angeles, CA 90012

GREINES, MARTIN, STEIN &
RICHLAND
Martin Stein
Timothy T. Coates
Robert A. Olson
9601 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 544 
Beverly Hills, CA 90210
MORRIS, POLICH & PURDY 
Robert S. Wolfe, Esq.
801 South Grand Ave., 17th 
Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017

Certificate of Kevin S. Reed
I certify that I am a citizen of the United States and am 

employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am 
over the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action, and 
I am a member of the bar of this Court. I certify that on this 
date, I electronically transmitted a copy of the Brief for 
Appellees from the New York office to the Los Angeles office of the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., and that I directed 
that copies of the brief be printed in Los Angeles and personally 
served on the morning of November 13, 1991, on Robert A. Olson and 
Robert S. Wolfe at the above addresses.

1



I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true
and correct.

Executed on November 13, 1991.

Kevin S. Reed

Certificate of Clyde E. Murphy
I certify that I am a citizen of the United States and am 

employed in the County of New York, State of New York. I am over 
the age of eighteen years and not a party to this action. I 
certify that on this date, I directed that a copy of the Brief for 
Appellee be sent via Federal Express from the New York office of 
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., to all of the 
foregoing counsel for Appellants at the above addresses.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 
and correct.

Executed on November 13, 1991.

2