Goosby v. Hempstead, New York Town Board Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees

    97-7403
IN THE tfWTED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

DOROTHY GOOSBY and SAMUEL PRIOLEAU, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

XAVIER MORALES and MILADYS MORALES,
Plaintiffs

v.

T O W N  BOARD OF THE T O W N  OF HEMPSTEAD, N E W  YORK; GREGORY P. 
PETERSON; RICHARD V. GUARDINO; PATRICK A. ZAGARINO; CURTIS FISHER; 
JOSEPH RA; ANTHONY SANTINO; JOSEPH KEARNEY, in their official capacities as 

members of the Town Board of the Town of Hempstead, 
Defendants-Appellants

NASSAU COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; JOHN DeGRACE; STEVEN SABBATH, in 
their official capacities as Commissioners of Elections of Nassau County,

Defendants.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF N E W  YORK

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NAACP LEGAL 
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. 

IN SUPPORT OF APPELLEES

ELAINE R. JONES, 
Director-Counsel 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
JACQUELINE A. BERRIEN 
VICTOR A. BOLDEN 
NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc.
99 Hudson Street 
Suite 1600
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

TODD A. COX 
NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc. 
1275 K Street N.W.
Suite 301
Washington, DC 20005 
(202) 682-1300

Counsel for Amicus Curiae



TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................

ARGUMENT ..............................................

I . The Language of Section 2 and the Decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and This Court Foreclose Defendants- 
Appellants' Contention That Because Most Black Hempstead 
Voters Are Democrats and A Majority of White Hempstead 
Voters Are Republicans, A Violation Of Section 2 Cannot 
Be Established......................................

II. Even If Partisan Political Behavior Is Relevant To The
Section 2 Inquiry, The Court Below Correctly Concluded 
That Evidence Concerning Partisan Voting Patterns In 
Hempstead Was Insufficient To Counteract The Extensive 
Evidence Of Electoral Discrimination Which Plaintiffs 
Presented..........................

CONCLUSION ...........

jL



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES

Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis,
976 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1 9 9 2 ) ...................  20, 21, 22

Bridgeport Coalition v. City of Bridgeport,
26 F.3d 271 (2nd Cir. 1994) ....................n f 14; 15

Bush v. Vera,
116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996)................................... !

Butts v. City of New York,
779 F . 2d 141 (2nd Cir. 1 9 8 5 ) ............................  24

Chisom v. Roemer,
501 U.S. 380 (1991) .....................................  5

City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55 (1982).....................................  2, 4

Clark v. Calhoun County,
21 F . 3d 92 (5th Cir. 1 9 9 4 ) ..............................  7

Goosby v. Town Bd. of the Town of Hempstead,
956 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1 9 9 7 ) ....................passim

Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General of Texas,
501 U.S. 419 (1991) .............................. 1, 8, 12

Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed.,
4 F .3d 1103 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 114 S.
Ct. 2779 (1994) .....................................  7, 28

Johnson v. DeGrandy,
512 U.S. 997 (1994) .................................passim

League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No.
4434 v. Clements,

999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993), cert, denied,
510 U.S. 1071 (1994) .............................. passim

Lewis v. Alamance County,
99 F . 3d at 6 1 5 ...............................................

Milwaukee Branch N.A.A.C.P. v. Thompson,
116 F . 3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997) ..........................  12

NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963) .....................................  1

i



N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Niagara Falls,
65 F.3d 1002 (2nd Cir. 1 9 9 6 ) ........................ passim

Rangel v. Morales,
8 F . 3d 242 (5th Cir. 1 9 9 3 ) ..............................  26

Sanchez v. Colorado,
97 F . 3d 1303 (10th Cir. 1996) ......................passim

Shaw v. Hunt,
116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996)...................................  1

Solomon v. Liberty County,
957 F. Supp. 1522 (N.D. Fla. 1 9 9 7 ) ...................... 6

Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Sessions,
56 F .3d 1281 (11th Cir. 1995), cert, denied, 116 S.
Ct. 704 (1996)............................................ 20

Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986)..................................... passim

United States v. Hays, 515,
515 U.S. 737 (1995)   1

United States v. Marengo County Comm'n,
731 F .2d 1546 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 469 U.S.
976 (1984)................................................  19

Vecinos de Barrio Uno v. City of Holyoke,
72 F . 3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995) ........................  10, 17

Voinovich v. Quilter,
507 U.S. 146 (1993)   5

Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego,
946 F . 2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1991) .......................... 28

Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124 (1971) ................................. 6, 20

Zimmer v. McKeithen,
485 F . 2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) ..........................  8

ii



STATUTES
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,

42 U.S.C. § 1973 ..................................... passim
Senate Report No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d

Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 ........... 4, 8

Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S . 53, S. 1761, S. 1975,
S. 1992, and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) ............................  2

Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S . 53, S. 1761, S. 1975,
S. 1992, and H.R. 3112 ................................. 2

iii



BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE NAACP LEGAL 
DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. ("LDF") is 

a nonprofit corporation chartered by the Appellate Division of the 

New York Supreme Court as a legal aid society. The Legal Defense 

Fund's first Director-Counsel was Thurgood Marshall. Since its 

inception in 1939, LDF has been committed to enforcing legal 

protections against racial discrimination and securing the 

constitutional and civil rights of African-Americans. See NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 422 (1963) (describing Legal Defense Fund as 

a "'firm' . . . which has a corporate reputation for expertness in 

presenting and arguing the difficult questions of law that 
frequently arise in civil rights litigation").

LDF has an extensive history of participation in efforts to 

eradicate barriers to the full political participation of African- 

Americans and to eliminate racial discrimination in the political 

process. LDF has represented parties or participated as amicus 
curiae in numerous voting rights cases before the United States 

Supreme Court and the United States Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., 
Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 

(1996); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995); League of

United Latin American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements, 999 

F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert, denied 510 U.S. 1071 

(1994); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991); Houston Lawyers'

Association v. Attorney General of Texas, 501 U.S. 419 (1991); and

1



Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). In addition, LDF

advocated for the legislative reversal of the decision in Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which was achieved through the 1982

amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See 
Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53, S. 1761, S. 1975, S. 1992, 
and H.R. 3112 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate 
Comm, on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1251-68 (1982) (statement of

Julius L. Chambers, President of the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc.)

Because of its longstanding commitment to the elimination of 
racial discrimination in the political process and the protection 

of the voting rights of African Americans, LDF has an interest in 

this appeal, which presents important issues concerning the 

interpretation and application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court's ultimate finding of vote dilution, and 

its resolution of all subsidiary factual issues should be affirmed 

unless they are "clearly erroneous. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 

30, 78-79 (1986); accord N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Niagara Falls, 65

F • 3d 1002, 1008. The district court's "application of legal

standards in reaching its finding is subject to de novo review." 
N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Niagara Falls, id.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Amicus adopts the Plaintiffs-Appellees' Counterstatement of

Facts.

2



SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Dorothy Goosby and Samuel Prioleau, African-American citizens 

and registered voters of the town of Hempstead, New York, 

successfully challenged the at-large system used to elect the 

members of the Town Board of Hempstead on the ground that it 

diluted minority voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the 

Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. See generally Goosby 
v. Town of Hempstead, 956 F. Supp. 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). The Town 

Board of Hempstead and its individual members acting in their 

official capacities urge this Court to reverse the decision of the 
district court.

The Defendants-Appellants do not dispute the district court's 

findings that voting in the Town of Hempstead is racially 

polarized; however, Defendants-Appellants assert that this 

racially polarized voting is the product of partisan politics, and 

is thus exempt from challenge under Section 2. See generally Brief 

of— Def endants - Appellant s at 13-45.1 There is no support in the 
language of Section 2, its legislative history, or the judicial 

decisions interpreting the statute, for the Defendants-Appellants' 
position, however.

Confronted with a clear statistical showing of persistent 

racially polarized voting, the district court correctly found that 

legally significant white bloc voting exists in Hempstead. In the 

face of undisputed evidence concerning racial differences in

lpor ease of reference, this argument will sometimes be 
referred to as the "partisanship defense."

3



candidate choices in Hempstead elections, the Defendants-Appellants 

could not eliminate racial considerations as an explanation for 

racially divergent voting patterns. The Defendants-Appellants 

offered no objectively verifiable analysis to support their 

contention that partisan politics were responsible for the proven 

racially polarized voting in Hempstead, nor did they rebut the 

compelling evidence of racial discrimination in the political 

process which the Plaintiffs-Appellees presented below.

The district court engaged in the "searching evaluation" of 

the evidence that is required in a Section 2 case,2 and it 

thoroughly considered the partisanship defense presented by the 

Town of Hempstead. However, the Court ultimately concluded --as 

it was compelled to do on the basis of the record before it -- that 

plaintiffs had shown, under the totality of circumstances present 

in the Town of Hempstead, that African-American voters have less 

opportunity to participate in the political process and elect their 

preferred candidates to the Town Board than white voters enjoy 
under the at-large election system.

ARGT7MKNT

I. The Language of Section 2 and the Decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court and This Court Foreclose Defendants- 
Appellants' Contention That Because Most Black Hempstead 
Voters Are Democrats and A Majority of White Hempstead Voters 
Are Republicans, A Violation Of Section 2 Cannot Be 
Established.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, 

was enacted "to help effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee

2S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982) (citation 
and internal quotation omitted).

4



that no citizen's right to vote shall 'be denied or abridged 

on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,'" 

Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152 (1993) (quoting U.S. 

Const., 15th Amendment). Section 2 was amended by Congress in 1982 

to expressly prohibit electoral practices and procedures with 

racially discriminatory results. Amended Section 2 "prohibits any 

practice or procedure that, 'interact[ing] with social and 

historical conditions,' impairs the ability of a protected class to 

elect its candidate of choice on an equal basis with other voters." 

Voinovich at 153, quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47

(1986) . Since the Voting Rights Act was enacted "for the broad 

remedial purpose of 'rid(ding] the country of racial discrimination 

in voting' . . . [it] . . . should be interpreted in a manner that

provides "the broadest possible scope' in combatting racial 

discrimination." Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S 380, 403 (1991) (quoting

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)); Allen v. 
State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969).

As amended, Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1973(b) authorizes a court to provide relief when, "based on the 

totality of the circumstances, it is shown that . . . members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) have less

opportunity than other members of the electorate . . .  to elect 

representatives of their choice." The Act provides no exception 

from its reach in circumstances where minority and non-minority

5



voters have different partisan political preferences.3 Nor does 

the legislative history support such an assertion. See Solomon v. 

Liberty County, 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1544-45 (N.D. Fla. 1997) 

("although the Senate Report makes repeated references to Whitcomb 
[v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)] and White [v. Regester, 412 U.S. 

755 (1973)], nowhere does it state that a section 2 plaintiff must 

demonstrate intentional discrimination," a factor not contained 

within the Act, but arguably required by Whitcomb) .

Section 2, as amended, was first construed by the United 

States Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles, a lawsuit which 

challenged multimember legislative election districts in North 

Carolina on the ground that they diluted the voting strength of the 

state's African-American citizens. In Gingles, the Supreme Court 

held that Section 2 plaintiffs must prove (1) that the minority 

group "is sufficiently large and geographically compact to

defendants-Appellants argue that because Congress' broad goal 
in modifying the Act in 1982 was to restore the law as it existed 
prior to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1982), amended 
Section 2 must be read to implement their reading of the Supreme 
Court's holding in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971). That 
case, they assert, rules out a finding of violation if African- 
American and white voters are adherents of different political 
parties. See, e.g., Defendants-Appellants' Brief at 21-23, 33-34 
71-74.

Even assuming arguendo that this interpretation of Whitcomb is 
correct, but see Solomon v. Liberty County, 957 F. Supp. 1522, 1544 
n. 39 (N.D. Fla. 1997) quoting League of United Latin American 
Citizens ̂ ["LULAC"] v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 900, 907 (5th Cir. 
1993) (King, J., dissenting), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1071, 114 S. 
Ct. 878 (1994), the means chosen by Congress to achieve its goal 
are encompassed within the language of the Act, which nowhere 
incorporates Whitcomb. Moreover, as we demonstrate infra, the 
interpretation of Whitcomb promoted by the defendants-appellants is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's construction of amended 
Section 2 in Gingles and subsequent decisions.

6



constitute a majority in a single member district"; (2) that the 

minority group is "politically cohesive"; and (3) that the white 

majority "votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it -- in the 

absence of special circumstances . . . usually to defeat the 

minority's preferred candidate." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51. More 
recently, in Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1010-11 (1994), the 
Supreme Court observed that:

Gingles provided some structure to the 
statute's 'totality of circumstances' test . .

[T] he three now-familiar Gingles factors 
(compactness/numerousness, minority cohesion 
or bloc voting, and majority bloc voting) . .

[were identified] as 'necessary 
preconditions' . . . for establishing vote 
dilution by use of a multimember district.

But if Gingles so clearly identified the 
three [factors] as generally necessary to 
prove a § 2 claim, it just as clearly declined 
to hold them sufficient in combination, either 
in the sense that a court's examination of 
relevant circumstances was complete once the 
three factors were found to exist, or in the 
sense that the three in combination 
necessarily and in all circumstances 
demonstrated dilution.

See also N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 1008 

(2nd Cir. 1995) (proof of the Gingles factors is "'generally 

necessary' to prove a § 2 violation . . . [but it is] not 

sufficient" to prove a violation) (citation omitted),4 Thus,

4But see N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d 1002, 
1019-20 n . 21 ("We agree . . . that 'it will be only the very
unusual case in which the plaintiffs can establish the existence of 
the three Gingles factors but still have failed to establish a 
violation of § 2 under the totality of circumstances'") (quoting 
Jenkins v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103,
1135 (3d Cir. 1993), cert, denied U.S.  , 114 S. Ct. 2779
(1994); accord Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F. 3d 92, 97 (5th Cir 
1994) .

7



Section 2 plaintiffs must show that under the "totality of the 

circumstances"5 present in the jurisdiction, they have less 

opportunity to participate in the political process and elect their 
preferred candidates than white voters enjoy.

The "authoritative source" for interpreting amended Section 2
is Senate Report No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in

1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43 n.7 (1986). The

Senate Report discusses the types of evidence which Congress

considered to be relevant to the ultimate determination of a

Section 2 violation, and which are considered by courts as part of

their evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. These

factors, also known as the "Senate Report factors,"6 are:

1. the extent of any history of official 
discrimination in the state or political 
subdivision that touched the right of the 
members of the minority group to register, to 
vote, or otherwise to participate in the 
democratic process;
2• the extent to which voting in the
elections of the state or political 
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political 
subdivision has used unusually large election 
districts, majority vote requirements, anti­
single shot provisions,- or other voting 
practices or procedures that may enhance the 
opportunity for discrimination against the 
minority group,-
4. if there is a candidate slating process, 
whether the members of the minority group have 
been denied access to that process,-
5. the extent to which members of the

542 U.S.C. § 1973(b).

6The Senate Report factors were derived from the factors 
identified as relevant to a vote dilution claim in the opinion of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer 
v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1973).

8



minority group in the state or political 
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination 
in such areas as education, employment and 
health, which hinder their ability to 
participate effectively in the political 
process;
6. whether political campaigns have been 
characterized by overt or subtle racial 
appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the 
minority group have been elected to public 
office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had 
probative value as part of plaintiff's 
evidence to establish a violation are: whether 
there is a significant lack of responsiveness 
on the part of elected officials to the 
particularized needs of members of the 
minority group. . . . [and] whether the policy 
underlying the state or political 
subdivision's use of such voting 
qualification, prerequisite to voting, or 
standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.

S. Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 28-29 (1982).

When the United States Supreme Court initially construed the 

1982 amendment in Gingles, it excluded from the analysis relevant 

to the third prerequisite (white bloc voting) any causal inquiry 

relating to voting patterns. See Solomon, 957 F. Supp. at 1545-46 

(Gingles Court's acceptance of bivariate ecological regression and 

extreme case analysis as sufficient to demonstrate white bloc 

voting negates causal inquiry) ,7 Nevertheless, Defendants- 

Appellants contend that Plaintiffs-Appellees should have been 

"require[d] to tie the defeat of black-supported Democrats to 

race<" Defendants-Appellants' Brief at 18. The Defendants-

7See also S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 36 (noting Congress' desire to 
eliminate requirement of proof of discriminatory intent in 
challenges filed under amended Section 2 on the ground that intent 
evidence is "unnecessarily divisive because it involves charges of 
racism on the part of individual[s or] . . . communities")

9



Appellants also contend that a "political explanation for why 

candidates supported by a majority of blacks lose . . . must be

given dispositive weight when deciding whether blacks have less 

political opportunity than others 'on account of race.'" Id. at 72 
(quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971).

The appellate courts that have addressed this issue have 

rejected the position urged by Defendants-Appellants here, and for

good r e a s o n --  it is wholly inconsistent with the language of

Section 2, the legislative history, and the decisions of the 

Supreme Court. The en banc opinion of the Fifth Circuit in LULAC 
v. Clements, which defendants-appellants cite repeatedly in support 

of their argument, in fact offers no support for their extreme 

position. In LULAC, the en banc Fifth Circuit Court held that 

minority voters' overwhelming affiliation with the Democratic party 

was the best explanation for the defeat of minority-preferred 

judicial candidates in the Texas judicial elections at issue. 

However, contrary to the position advanced by Defendants-Appellants 
here, the LULAC Court did not adopt a blanket rule that a 

"partisanship" defense precludes plaintiffs from proving the third 

G'ingles precondition or necessarily rebuts all other evidence which 

demonstrates that under the totality of circumstances, minority 

voters have less opportunity to participate in the political 

process and to elect their preferred candidates than white voters. 

See also Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995) 

(evidence that racially polarized voting "can most logically be 

explained by factors unconnected to the intersection of race with

10



the electoral system . . . does not automatically [result in a

victory for the defendants]. Instead, the Court must determine 

whether, based on the totality of circumstances, the plaintiffs 

have proven that the minority group was denied meaningful access to 
the political system on account of race").

As discussed more fully infra in Part II, the factual

circumstances relating to partisan affiliation and identification

in Texas, which the Court addressed in LULAC, are significantly

different from the situation in the Town of Hempstead; a mechanical

application of the LULAC holding to the Hempstead facts would

violate the requirement that judicial analysis of Section 2

evidence must encompass an "intensely local appraisal" of the

political life of the defendant jurisdiction. Gingles, 478 U.S. at

78; Bridgeport Coalition v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 275

(2nd Cir. 1994). Moreover, the LULAC Court explicitly held that

a correlation between the partisan affiliation and race of voters

in a jurisdiction neither automatically precludes a finding of

legally significant racially polarized voting nor necessarily
negates an ultimate finding of vote dilution:

[W] e recognize that . . . partisan affiliation 
may serve as a proxy for illegitimate racial 
considerations. . . . Plaintiffs are . . .
entirely correct in maintaining that courts 
should not summarily dismiss vote dilution 
claims in cases where racially divergent 
voting patterns correspond with partisan 
affiliation as "political defeats" not 
cognizable under § 2.

LULAC, 999 F.2d at 860-61.

Other federal appellate courts have similarly rejected the

11



position urged by the Defendants-Appellants here. For example, in 

Lewis v. Alamance County, the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the issue 

of causation of racially polarized voting is "irrelevant in the 

inquiry into the three Gingles preconditions," 99 F.3d 600, 615 

n . 12 (4th Cir. 1996), cert, denied 65 U.S.L.W. 3766 (1997). See 
also Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1313 "(10th Cir. 1996) ("at 

the threshold, we are simply looking for proof of the correlation 

between the race of the voter and the defeat of the minority's 

preferred candidate"); id., at 1315-16 (examination of "'the 

reasons for, or causes of, voting behavior' . . . .  [is] not 

relevant" at the threshold stage of the § 2 inquiry) ; cf. Milwaukee 
Branch N.A.A.C.P. v. Thompson, 116 F.3d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1997) 

("A district judge should not assign to plaintiffs the burden of 

showing why the candidates preferred by black voters lost; it is 

enough to show that they lost, if white voters disapproved these 

candidates en masse") (emphasis in original). The court below thus 
properly refused to consider information concerning the 

relationship between the race and partisan affiliation of 

Hempstead's voters as part of its analysis of the third Gingles 
factor.

However, the district court considered this information as 

part of its evaluation of the "totality of circumstances." Cf. 
Lewis v. Alamance County, 99 F.3d at 615 n.12 (causation evidence 

is "relevant in the totality of the circumstances inquiry"); 

Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d at 1313 ("[T]he searching evaluation

12



done in the totality of circumstances perhaps reveals" voters' 

motivations for their decisions at the polls) . As part of its 

consideration of the "totality of the circumstances" in this case, 

the district court thoroughly considered the partisanship defense 

presented by the Town of Hempstead, but it ultimately concluded -- 

as it was compelled to do on the basis of the record before it -- 

that plaintiffs had shown, under the totality of circumstances 

present in the Town of Hempstead, that African-American voters have 

less opportunity to participate in the political process and elect 

their preferred candidates to the Town Board than white voters 
enjoy under the challenged election system.

Comprehensive examination of the facts is precisely what the 

"totality of circumstances" requirement of Section 2 demands; 

nevertheless Defendants-Appellants have invited this Court to 

ignore the full array of evidence presented here by arguing that 

the existence of partisan differences between the majority of black 

voters and the majority of white voters trumps all other evidence 

in the "totality of circumstances" calculus. Again, this approach 
is plainly wrong under governing authority.

The Supreme Court has consistently held that plaintiffs are 
not required to prove any particular Senate Report factor or 

combination of factors in order to prevail in a Section 2 case.8 

Conversely, no single factor is to be accorded decisive weight in 

the Section 2 calculus. See, e.g., Houston Lawyers Association,

Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Gingles, "the list of 
[Senate Report] factors 'is neither comprehensive nor exclusive 
478 U.S. at 45 .

13



501 U.S. at 426 (noting that state's interest in maintaining at- 

large system for the election of trial judges "is merely one factor 

to be considered in evaluating the 'totality of circumstances'"; 

cf. Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1026 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) ("[C]ourts must always carefully and searchingly review 

the totality of the circumstances, including the extent to which 

minority groups have access to the political process"). See also 
Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d at 1324 ("Each facet [of evidence] 

must be considered under the totality, and the absence of one 

factor doesn't necessarily cancel out the presence of another").
The district court correctly held that

neither the existence (or non-existence) of 
racial bias in the community nor the strength 
of the correlation between partisan politics 
and divergent voting patterns can be 
dispositive in a Section 2 case. Rather, they 
are simply among the many factors to be 
considered in determining whether, under the 
totality of the circumstances, an at-large 
scheme has impaired the ability of black 
voters in the Town to participate equally in 
Town Board elections.

956 F. Supp. 326, 352-53 (citations omitted). Despite the clear 

admonition of the Supreme Court that the Section 2 inquiry should 

never be limited to a single factor, Defendants-Appellants have 

urged this Court to adopt precisely such an approach. See, e.g., 
Defendants-Appellants' Brief at 36 ("[A]n inquiry through the 

totality of the circumstances for the reasons for white voter 

rejection of minority-preferred candidates is unnecessary where the 

pattern of the vote is partisan. . . . The undisputed evidence 

regarding the partisan pattern of the vote here is dispositive of

14



plaintiffs' vote dilution claim.") (emphasis supplied); id., at 70 

("Even assuming that the District Court's conclusions were correct 

on the existence of racial appeals, the exclusion of blacks from 

the Republican Party slating process, and insensitivity of the Town 

officials to black concerns, these factors neither singularly nor 

in combination establish that racial concerns, rather than partisan 

ones, have led to the defeat of candidates supported by the black 

electorate or have led to any inability of blacks to participate 
equally in the political process").

The district court did not disregard Defendants-Appellants' 
argument that partisan affiliation, rather than race, accounts for 

the consistent defeat of African-American candidates in the Town of 

Hempstead. Rather, the court considered this information in 

precisely the manner that it was required to under Gingles, 
DeGrandy, and other binding precedents: as one -- but only one -- 

factor in the assessment of the totality of circumstances present 

in Hempstead's political sphere. The district court did not treat 
Appellant's argument as the trump to all other proof presented by 

the plaintiffs, and it correctly recognized that elevating the 

partisanship explanation to the level of importance urged by the 

Appellants would vitiate and undermine the results standard set 

forth in amended Section 2. Its decision should be affirmed.

Defendants-Appellants' attempt to elevate the partisanship issue 

above every other single or combined element of the totality of 

circumstances analysis is clearly prohibited by Gingles and 
DeGrandy.

15



Not only is the approach promoted by the Defendants-Appellants 
in conflict with Supreme Court precedent, it is also at odds with 

the decisions of this Court. In N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Niagara 
Falls, this Court, citing Gingles and DeGrandy, reaffirmed the 

importance and necessity of a comprehensive judicial inquiry in 
Section 2 cases:

[I]n deciding whether § 2 has been violated, 
courts are to engage in a "searching and 
practical evaluation of the 'past and present 
reality'." . . . The Supreme Court recently
emphasized that . . . [c]ourts are required to 
look explicitly at the totality of the 
circumstances, because "ultimate conclusions 
about equality or inequality of opportunity 
were intended by Congress to be judgments 
resting in comprehensive, not limited, 
canvassing of relevant facts."

65 F.3d at 1008 (citations omitted). The district court here 

engaged in precisely the "searching and practical evaluation" which 

this Court and the Supreme Court demand in a Section 2 case. Its 

ultimate finding that the Town of Hempstead's at-large election 

system denies the Town's African-American voters an equal 

opportunity to participate in the political process and elect their 

preferred candidates to the Town Council is well supported by the 
record, and should be affirmed.

In Bridgeport Coalition v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271 (2d 

Cir. 1994), a Section 2 challenge to the reapportionment of the 

Bridgeport City Council filed by African-American and Hispanic 

registered voters and residents of Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 

Court concluded that the "evidence relating to the three . 

Gingles factors weighs substantially in favor of the finding of

16



vote dilution." 26 F.3d at 277. This Court also affirmed the 

trial court's "findings relating to the history of race relations 

in Bridgeport and to the other factors which may be considered as 

part of the 'totality of the circumstances' enmeshed with the 

voters' rights issues in the City." Id. The evidence presented by 

the Plaintiffs-Appellants here was similarly compelling, and the 

district court's findings of racially polarized voting are 

similarly supported by the record. The factual findings of the 

district court were not erroneous and its decision, like the trial 

court's decision in the Bridgeport case, should be affirmed by this 
Court.

Finally, a decision from the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Tenth Circuit is especially instructive concerning the 

proper resolution of the issues raised by the Defendants- 

Appellants. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted -- and 

rejected -- the same argument advanced by Defendants-Appellants 
here:

Dr. Zax [the defendants' expert witness] 
concluded [that] Hispanics vote for Democrats 
and Democrats don't beat Republicans in HD 69 

Dr. Zax concluded, "political 
affiliation is the single most important 
factor that distinguishes between the vote 
outcomes in precincts that are heavily 
Hispanics [sic] and heavily Anglo in House 
District 60." . . . [This] inquiry sidesteps
Gingles' primary analytic focus under § 2 . .

[and] in this case, the theory does not 
appear to be supported by present or 
historical fact.

17



Sanchez v. Colorado, 97 F.3d at 1318.9 Similarly, in this case, 

neither "present or historical fact[s]" support the conclusion that 

Hempstead's African-American citizens enjoy the same opportunity as 

whites to participate in the political process and elect their 

preferred candidates to the Town Board. The district court's 

finding that Hempstead's at-large election system violates Section 
2 of the Voting Rights Act should be affirmed.

II. Even If Partisan Political Behavior Is Relevant To The Section 
2 Inquiry, The Court Below Correctly Concluded That Evidence 
Concerning Partisan Voting Patterns In Hempstead Was 
Insufficient To Counteract The Extensive Evidence Of Electoral 
Discrimination Which Plaintiffs Presented.
Appellants in any event failed to show below that the 

motivation behind the consistent support that Hempstead's white 

electorate has given white-preferred candidates over black- 

preferred candidates is attributable to partisan politics. The 
district court found:

[T]here is no dispute that every minority- 
preferred candidate for Town Council-member 
lost to the majority-preferred candidate as a 
result of white voters voting for candidates 
the black voters did not support.
Accordingly, there is a persistent pattern of 
racially polarized voting in Town Board 
elections that consistently has resulted (and 
will result in the future) in the defeat of 
the minority-preferred candidate.

Goosby v. Town Bd. of the Town of Hempstead, 956 F. Supp. 326, 351

(E.D.N.Y. 1997) . Confronted with a clear statistical showing of

persistent racially polarized voting, the district court correctly

9Sanchez was a lawsuit brought by Hispanic plaintiffs which 
alleged that the post-1990 Census redistricting of Colorado State 
House District 60 diluted Hispanic voting strength, in violation of 
Section 2.

18



held that legally significant white bloc voting (the third Gingles 
prerequisite) exists in Town Board elections.

Such a statistical showing of racially polarized voting is not

easily overcome when the totality of the circumstances is examined:

[T]his framework imposes a high hurdle for 
those who seek to defend the existing system 
despite meaningful statistical evidence that 
suggests bloc voting along racial lines. See 
Jenkins, 4 F.3d at 1135. We predict that 
cases will be rare in which plaintiffs 
establish the Gingles preconditions yet fail 
on a section 2 claim because other facts 
undermine the original inference. In this 
regard, we emphasize that establishing vote 
dilution does not require the plaintiffs 
affirmatively to disprove every other possible 
explanation for racially polarized voting.

Uno v. City of Holyoke, 12 F.3d 973, 983 (1st Cir. 1995) (footnote

omitted) . Thus, even if it were valid to inquire into the

motivation underlying the voting behavior of Hempstead's

electorate, "[t]he surest indication of race-conscious politics is
a pattern of racially polarized voting." United States v. Marengo
County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1567 (llth Cir.), cert, denied, 469

U.S. 976 (1984). In this case, defendants-appellants were unable

to offer any objectively verifiable analysis demonstrating that

partisan affiliation could account entirely for these racially

divergent election results. In fact, courts have accepted

Partisanship as a defense and upheld a challenged plan against a
Section 2 claim only in cases in which partisan preferences could

be identified, through objective, quantifiable proof, as a

consistent factor dominating minority and white voting patterns
over a series of elections.

19



Thus, the Fifth Circuit's decision in LULAC v. Clements, on 

which defendants rely, expressly limited attempts to explain away 

losses by minority-preferred candidates based on partisanship to 

statistically proven straight-ticket partisan voting. in that 

case, statistical proof demonstrated that Hispanic voters preferred 

Anglo Democrats to Hispanic Republicans, 999 F.2d at 877-878, that 

black voters were more likely to support white Democrats than black 

Republicans, and that black Republicans were being elected just as 

frequently as white Republicans. 999 F.2d at 877-78. In addition, 

unlike in the present case, the Court noted the Texas Republican 

party's history of recruiting minorities, as well as white, 
judicial candidates. Id. at 861.

Similarly, in Baird v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 976 

F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1992), the Seventh Circuit recognized that black 

voters' preference for white Democrats over black Republicans, and 

white voters' preference for black Republicans over white 

Democrats, did not alone establish a Section 2 violation, where 

black candidates had been able to win seats on the governing body 

in proportion to their numbers in the population. Cf. Whitcomb, 
403 U.S. at 379, 380 n.29 (noting past electoral success of black 

candidates in Marion County, Indiana). In Baird, the court also 

found that black voters did not cohesively support black candidates 

if they were Republican, and white voters only rejected black 

candidates who were Democrats. Id at 361. The Seventh Circuit 

held that because the Republican Party dominated council elections 

in Indianapolis, and black Republican candidates of that party

20



could win as readily as white Republican candidates, the results 

did not necessarily demonstrate racially polarized voting, even if 

black voters did not support the successful black Republican 

candidates. Id. See also Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc), 
cert, denied, 116 S. Ct. 704 (1996) (fact that white voters gave 

more support to black Democratic candidates than white Democratic 

candidates weakened claim of racially polarized voting)

Finally, the court in Baird held that black voters could not 

prove vote dilution because the 29-member City-County Council 

already included a proportional number of majority-black single­

member districts, and black Republicans also had proportional 

success in winning even the four at-large council seats that were 

the subject of the Section 2 challenge. 976 F. 2d at 360. See 

also De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1012 n.10 (noting that blacks in 

Indianapolis enjoyed slightly greater-than-proportional 
representation under the plan challenged in Baird) .

There is no similar proof in this case. Unlike LULAC, no 

statistical evidence indicated that black voters would prefer white 

Democrats to black Republicans in the probative Town Board 

elections. There is also no evidence that, before the commencement 

of the voting rights lawsuit, the Republican Party actively 

recruited minority candidates. Cf. LULAC at 861 (noting Republican 

recruitment of minority judicial candidate). To the contrary, the 

Republican Party nominated its first black Town Board candidate 
only after this lawsuit was filed.

21



Moreover, unlike Baird, blacks do not enjoy a share of the 

seats on the town board in proportion to their population in the 

town and there is no evidence that black Republicans have been 

elected to the Republican-dominated town board as readily as white 

Republicans. Indeed, for 86 years, from 1907 until 1993, no black 

person had ever been elected to serve on the Town Board. There was 

only one election in which a black candidate was preferred by a 

bare majority of white voters, and that was an election which the 

district court properly discounted due to the special circumstances 
surrounding it.10

Defendants-Appellants' statistical evidence regarding racially 

polarized voting here actually confirmed the racial disparities in 

elections that Plaintiffs-Appellees' expert found. Goosby, 956 F. 
Supp. at 337 and 348. Thus, it is undisputed that African-American 

and white voters in Hempstead have preferred different candidates 

in Town Board elections, and that voting has been racially 
polarized.

10The black candidate who won this election was initially 
appointed to the position in 1993 and ran for re-election as an 
incumbent. Incumbency has been recognized as a special 
circumstance. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 57. In addition, this 
appointment and subsequent election are suspect, as they occurred 
after the lawsuit challenging the at-large system commenced. 
Congress recognized that jurisdictions might seek to escape the 
strictures of Section 2 by just such a manipulation of the 
political process: " [T]he majority citizens might evade the 
section e.g., by manipulating the election of a 'safe' minority 
candidate." Senate Report at 29, n. 115, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207. 
Cf. N.A.A.C.P. v. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F. 3d 1002, 1005, 1018 
n.18 (although first black council member was not elected until 
after the lawsuit was filed, "[tjhere was no dispute that [he was 
the] black voters' candidates of choice."). Gingles, 478 U.S. at

22



Under these circumstances, it is simply unrealistic to argue 

that the consistent, deep disparities between black and white 

voters in the support they give to black candidates -- disparities 

that have persisted over time -- could somehow be unconnected to 

race. In fact, the district court made numerous findings 

concerning the impact of race upon political life in the Town of 

Hempstead. For example, the Court found that Hempstead is 

extremely segregated, and its black population is isolated. See id. 

at 334 and 357. The tension from this racial separation has been 

amplified over the past fifteen years by an influx of black 

citizens from the Borough of Queens, which partially borders 

Hempstead. The district court found that the in-migration of 

black citizens from Queens has "result[ed] in some troubling 

appeals to racism in campaign materials." Id. at 342. In 

addition, evidence presented at trial showed that the Town Board 

has not been responsive, and at times, has been blatantly 

insensitive to the unique needs of the black community by, inter 
alia, refusing to adopt an affirmative action policy, not 

responding to charges of racial discrimination in Town hiring, and 

failing to take action when it learned that a trophy bearing the 

symbol of the Ku Klux Klan was on display in the fire department. 

Id. at 344-345. These findings led the district court properly to 

conclude that the use of the at-large election system actually 

fostered, if not directly caused, this lack of responsiveness: 

"At-large elections mean that no Town Council member is accountable 

for neglecting the needs of their communities. No one has the

23



political incentive to breach the 'oneness' of the current Town 

government." Id. at 352.11 Indeed, the district court found that 

the facts suggested that "the black communities, on balance, have 

been to a significant extent neglected by the Town government, and 

the political processes by which that might be corrected are not 

equally open to the participation of blacks in the Town -- even 
black Republicans." Id. 352, 353.

In addition, the district court held that

[u]nder the functional view of the political 
process mandated by Section 2, [one of] the 
most important factors bearing on a [Section 
2] challenge to a multimember system [is] the 
extent to which minority group members have 
been elected to public office in the 
jurisdiction. . . . [T]he most critical fact 
in this regard is that until the election of 
Curtis Fisher in 1993, no African-American was 
ever elected to the legislative body at issue 
in this case.

Id. at 342-43. Thus, this case certainly does not present a 

situation where the "persistent proportional representation" of the 

plaintiffs' group defeats a finding of legally significant white 

bloc voting under Gingles. 478 U.S. at 77.12 The lack of 

proportionality is always relevant to the Section 2 inquiry: "[I]n 

evaluating the Gingles preconditions and the totality of the

“ See also Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141, 148 (2nd 
Cir. 1985) (recognizing that "the use of at-large elections instead 
of single-member districts . . . may have the effect of denying 
areas with large concentrations of minority voters the opportunity 
to pool their strength and elect members of their class from such 
areas").

“ Indeed, in Gingles, black candidates previously had been 
elected to office in all of the legislative districts where a 
Section 2 violation was found. 478 U.S. at 74 & nn. 35 & 36.

24



circumstances a court must always consider the relationship between 

the number of majority-minority voting districts and the minority 

group's share of the population." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 

997, 1025 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 

(citation omitted). While not alone dispositive, a "[l]ack of 

proportionality is probative evidence of vote dilution." Id. See 
also, Gingles, 478 U.S. at 99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the 

judgment) ("the relative lack of minority electoral success under 

a challenged plan, when compared with the success that would be 

predicted under the measure of undiluted minority voting strength 

the court is employing, can constitute powerful evidence of vote 

dilution"). The district court's ultimate finding of vote dilution 

is further supported by the evidence presented concerning the 

success of minority candidates in the Town of Hempstead, and it 
should be affirmed.

Defendants-appellants attempt to dismiss all of this proof by 
assigning partisan labels to the disparate white and black voting 

blocs in the Town of Hempstead, and completely attributing patterns 

of legally significant racially polarized voting to "non-racialM 

partisan politics. As their evidence that partisanship rather than 

race accounts for the persistent defeat of black preferred 

candidates, appellants only offer a basic racial breakdown of the 

two predominant political parties. Reciting the percentages of the 

white and black electorate which are Democrats and Republicans, 

they simply note that the majority of whites are Republicans and 

the majority of blacks are Democrats, and conclude that blacks lose

25



because they occupy a small percentage of an already politically 

small, predominantly white Democratic voting bloc.13 However, 

Defendants-Appellants' contention that the black voters are unable 

to effectively express their political preference because they are 

a smaller portion of a weak political party is unavailing. 

Defendants-Appellants' expert conceded that "there was a pattern of 
racial polarization," but he also contended that "there was a 

stronger pattern of political partisanship, which had the secondary 

effect of racial polarization, because blacks preferred Democratic 

candidates and whites preferred Republican candidates." Id.

This conclusion, rather than disproving the existence of 

racially polarized voting, simply begs the question. There is no 

dispute here concerning the racial differences in candidate choices 

in Hempstead elections: experts for both sides agree that black 

and white voters in Hempstead prefer different candidates. In 

election after election, black and white voters have supported 

different candidates, and under the challenged at-large scheme, the 

candidates preferred by Hempstead's African-American voters have

“Actually, rather than undercutting appellees' case, the small 
number of registered black voters may assist in establishing the 
degree of vote dilution in this case. As Gingles recognizes, the 
level of white bloc voting necessary to defeat minority-preferred 
candidates will 'vary from district to district according to a 
number of factors,' including the percentage of minority registered 
voters. 478 U.S. at 55-57. In this case, because there are so few 
registered black Democratic voters, there are fewer black voters in 
Hempstead to offset the impact of the white bloc vote, thus, 
amplifying the dilutive effect of the white bloc voting. See 
Rangel v. Morales, 8 F.3d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 1993) ("if the 
minority group constitutes only a small fraction of the total 
number of registered voters, it may be, relatively speaking, easier 
for the members of that group to establish their effective 
submergence in a white majority.").

26



been consistently defeated. As discussed above, it is irrelevant 

to the analysis of the third Gingles factor, to explain why an 

otherwise cohesive black electorate votes for particular candidates 

and why a white electorate votes as a bloc against the black 

preferred candidate. In any event, the Defendants-Appellants' 

labored discussion presents no objectively verifiable support for 

their theory that partisan affiliations are wholly responsible for 

election outcomes in Hempstead, nor have Defendants-Appellants 

persuasively eliminated racial considerations as an explanation for 

the proven racially polarized voting in Hempstead. The district 

court's finding of legally significant racially polarized voting 

(i.e., that Hempstead's white electorate votes consistently as a 

bloc to defeat the candidates of choice of a politically cohesive 
black electorate) should therefore be affirmed.

Despite the strength of the Section 2 case presented by the 

Plaintiffs-Appellees below, Defendants-Appellants contend that 

"[t]he failure of minority-preferred candidates in the Town has 

nothing to do with race and everything to do with the small 

percentage of the population that is black and blacks' alignment 

with the unsuccessful political party." Defendants-Appellants' 

Brief at 43-44. Following this logic, the clear inability of 

Hempstead's black voters to elect candidates of choice in contested 

elections under the at-large system -- a phenomenon which 

Defendants-Appellants concede is present in Hempstead -- can never 

be remedied, or alternatively, could only be ameliorated if black 

voters would ignore their true preferences and cast their ballots

27



for the white Republican candidates who regularly prevail under 
this at-large system.

However, as numerous Courts have held, the requirements of the 

Voting Rights Act are not met if "'[c]andidates favored by blacks 

can win, but only if the candidates are white.'" Jenkins v. Red 
Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 4 F.3d 1103, 1128 n. 22 (3rd 

Cir. 1993), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 2779 (1994), quoting Smith v. 
Clinton, 687 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (E.D. Ark.) (three-judge court), 

aff d mem., 488 U.S. 988 (1988). See also Westwego Citizens for

Better Government v. City of Westwego, 946 F. 2d 1109, 1119 n.15

(5th Cir. 1991); cf. City of Niagara Falls, 65 F.3d at 1015-1016 

(acknowledging that minority-preferred candidates often will be 

members of the minority group, but declining to ignore elections in 

which no black candidates ran, and concluding that white candidates 

are sometimes the choice of minority voters). By amending Section 

2 for the specific purpose of addressing minority vote dilution, 

Congress deliberately expanded the relevant political universe by 

treating as legitimate and worthy of equal recognition the 

political choices of black voters. See S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 28-29 

(recognizing that "members of the minority group" may have 

"particularized needs" which could be neglected by officials who 

are elected exclusively or overwhelmingly by members of the 

majority group); cf. Goosby, 956 F. Supp. at 344-45 (finding that 

Plaintiffs-Appellees "established a significant lack of 

responsiveness to the particularized needs of blacks in the Town 

[of Hempstead]"). These principles are not nullified simply because

28



African-American and white voters in Hempstead are largely 
adherents of different political parties.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc., respectfully prays that this Court will 
affirm the decision of the district court.

Respectfully submitted,

ELAINE R. JONES 
Director-Counsel 

NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
JACQUELINE A. BERRIEN 
VICTOR A. BOLDEN 
NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc. 
99 Hudson Street 
Suite 1600 
New York, NY 10013 
(212) 219-1900

TODD A . COX
NAACP Legal Defense and 

Educational Fund, Inc. 
1275 K Street N.W.
Suite 301
Washington, DC 20005 
(202) 682-1300

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

29



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Brief of Amicus

Curiae in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees have been served by first

class United States mail, postage paid, addressed to the following:

Evan H. Kriniek., Esq. Katharine I. Butler, Esq.
Rivkin, Radler & Kremer University of South
EAB Plaza Carolina Law School
Uniondale, NY 11556-0111 Columbia, SC 29208

This 26th day of January, 1998.