St. Helena Parish School Board v Hall Jurisdictional Statement

    No.

3n tlje
(Emtrt of tljp UniteD §tatpH

October Term 1961

St. Helena Parish School Board, Et Al, 
A ppellants

v.
Lawrence Hall, Et Al, A ppellees

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana,

Baton Rouge Division

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS.

Of Counsel:
CARRO LL BUCK,
M. E. CULLIGAN,
GEORGE M. PONDER,
JOHN E. JACKSON, JR., 
W ILLIA M  P. SCHULER, 
DOROTH Y W O LBRETTE,
L. K. CLEM ENT, JR.
H A R R Y  J. KRON, JR.,

Assistant Attorneys General.
ALB IN  P. LASSITER,

District Attorney,
Uth Judicial District,
State of Louisiana.

THOM PSON L. CLARKE,
District Attorney,
6th Judicial District,
State of Louisiana.

LOUIS H. PAD G ETT, JR.,
District Attorney,
26th Judicial District,
State of Louisiana.

JACK  P. F. GREM ILLION,
Attorney General,
State of Louisiana.

DUNCAN S. KEMP,
District Attorney,
21st Judicial District,
State of Louisiana.

W . SCOTT W ILKINSON,
Special Assistant
Attorney General.

VICTOR A . SACHSE,
Special Assistant
Attorney General.



1

SUBJECT INDEX

STATEMENT AS TO JURISDICTION................ 1
OPINION BELOW ...................................................  2
JURISDICTION .........................................................  2
STATUTES INVOLVED .........................................  2
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...............    3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..............................  4
THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE

SUBSTANTIAL .................................................  9
CONCLUSION ............................................................ 29
PROOF OF SERVICE .............................................  30
APPENDIX “ A ”  .............................    31
APPENDIX “ B” .......................................................... 61
APPENDIX “ C”  .........................................................  70

Authorities Cited:

A

Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F. 2d 97...................................  12
Aerated Products Co. of Philadelphia, Pa. v. Dept, 

of Health of New Jersey, et al, 159 Fed. 2d 
851 .........................................................................  10

Ash wander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297
U.S. 288, (concurring opinion)......................  27

Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School Dis­
trict, 241 Fed. 2d 230, cert, denied, 353 U.S.
938 .........................................................................  22

Page







IV

Plughes v. Caddo Parish School Bd., et al, 57 F.
Page

Supp. 508, affirmed 323 U.S., 685................ 17

I
In re School Code of 1919, 7 Boyce 406, 108 Atl.

39 ............................................................................ 20

J
James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331............13 & 17
James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 342.................. 17
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571.............. 27

K

Kee v. Parks, 153 Tenn. 306, 283 S.W. 751............ 20
Kelley v. Bd. of Ed. of Nashville, 270 F. 2d 209 

(C.A. 6th, 1959) cert, denied, 361 U.S. 924.. 22

L
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S.

682 .........................................................................  10
Liverpool, N. Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm, of Im­

migration, 113 U.S. 33................................ ...... 26
Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445..............................  19

M
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60.. 25
Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 Fed. 2d 364 (C.A.

5th 1960) ................................................... 17 & 23

N

New Haven Public Schools v. General Services Ad­
ministration, 214 Fed. 2d 592........................  11



V

Page
Noah, et al, v. Bd. of Ed., District of Columbia,

106 F. Supp. 988................ ............................... . 10
North Dakota-Montana Wheat Growers’ Associ­

ation v. U.S., 66 Fed. 2d 573, cert, denied,
291 U.S. 672................................................... . l i

O
Ohio v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445...................................  21

P

Parker v. Bd. of Ed. of Sumter County, 70 S.E.
2d 369 (Ga.) ......................................... ............  10

People v. Cowen, 283 111. 308, 119 N.E. 335, 
(1918) ..............................      20

People of State of New York, ex rel Hatch v. 
Reardon 204 U.S. 152......    26

Phelps v. Bd. of Ed., 300 U.S. 319.......................... 9

R

Rippey v. State of Texas, 193 U.S. 504......... ........ 19
Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U.S. 50 26

S

Salzburg v. State of Maryland, 346 U.S. 545.........  15
School Board of Charlottesville v. Allen, 240 F. 2d 

59 (C.A. 4th, 1956) Cert, denied, 77 S. Ct.
667 ..........................................................    22

Smith v. Hefner, 68 S.E. 2d 783 (N.C.) .............. . 10
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1................................  9



VI

State v. Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, 219 N.W. 858..... 21
State v. Briggs, 46 Utah 288, 146 Pac. 261..... ---- 21
State v. Lamont, 105 Kan. 134, 181 Pac. 617-------- 20
Stephan v. Louisiana Board of Education, 78 So.

2d 18 .....................................................................  10

T

Thomason v. Works Progress Administration, 138 
F. 2d 342 .................................... .................  11

Thompson v. School Board of Arlington, 144 F.
Supp. 239 (D.C. Va. 1956)................-........ -  22

Tyler v. Judges of Court of Registration, 179 U.S.
405 .........................................................................  27

U

United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17...................... 27

United States Department of Agriculture, et al, 
v. Hunter, et al, 171 Fed. 2d 793..... ........—  10

United States Department of Agriculture v. Re- 
mund, 330 U.S. 539..-....................................---- H

United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396............. 26

V

Virginian Railway Co. v. System Fed., 300 U.S.
515 ...................................................................... 26

Voeller v. Neilston Wholesale Co., 311 U.S. 531. 26

Page



Y

Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railway Co. v. Jack- 
son Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217..... .................. 26

Constitutional Provisions

La. Const, of 1921, Art. 19, Sec. 26, Amend. 11, 
U.S. Const............................................................... 10

La. Const, of 1921, Art. 12, Sec. 1................... 10
11th Amend., United States Constitution........ 10
14th Amend., United States Constitution.............  18

Statutes
28 USC 501.............................................................     io
28 USC 507...................................................................  10
Bill H.R. 6128, 85th Congress (original), Pages 

9 and 10.................................................................. 10
N.C. Private Laws, 1923, Ch. 37, Sec. 79...........  16
N.C. Sess. Laws, 1957, Ch. 960, Sec. 4................ 16
28 USC 1331.................................................................. 2
28 USC 1343.................................................................. 2
28 USC 2281.......................................................... 2 & 5
28 USC 2284.......................................................... 2 & 5
28 USC 2201.................................................................  2
28 USC 2202.................................................................  2
28 USC 1253.................................................................  2
Act 2, Second Extraordinary Session of the Loui­

siana Legislature of 1961...... .....4 & 5 & 7 & 8
Act 258 of 1958............................................................  6

Vll

Page



vm

Page
Miscellaneous

16 C.J.S. Const. Law, Sec. 142, Page 683.............. 20
16A C.J.S. Sec. 505, Page 314................ ................  13
16A C.J.S., Sec. 6, 512, Page 358.................. ..........  19
Congressional Record of 1957, Pages 11377 and 

11378 ................................................... ........... ...... 10
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 72, Page 1567.............. 16
Index, Digest of State Constitutions, Page 390.....  19
School Code of 1919, 7 Boyce 406, 108 Atl. 39.....  20



No.

Jtt tljr
(Enurt of ttje {Hmtrfo States

October Term 1961

St. Helena Parish School Board, Et A l, 
A ppellants 

v.
Lawrence Hall, Et A l, Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana,

Baton Rouge Division

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
ON BEHALF OF APPELLANTS.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Appellants, St. Helena Parish School Board, 
J. L. Meadows, Superintendent of the St. Helena 
Parish School Board, State of Louisiana, Jack P. F. 
Gremillion, Attorney General of Louisiana, Murphy 
J. Roden, Director of Public Safety of Louisiana, 
Duncan S. Kemp, District Attorney of St. Helena 
Parish, Louisiana, and R. D. Bridges, Sheriff of 
St. Helena Parish, State of Louisiana, appeal from the 
judgment of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge Divi­
sion, sitting as a three-judge Court, entered on the 
30th day of August, 1961, declaring unconstitutional 
Act 2 of the Second Extraordinary Session of the Lou­



2

isiana Legislature for 1961, and further enjoining 
appellants, and their successors, agents, representa­
tives, attorneys, and all other persons who are acting 
or may act in concert with them, from enforcing or 
seeking to enforce by any means, the provisions of 
said statute. Appellants submit this statement to 
show that the Supreme Court of the United States 
has jurisdiction of the appeal and that substantial 
questions are presented.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Baton Rouge 
Division, is not yet reported, however the judgment 
of the Court and reasons therefor are attached hereto 
as Appendix “A ” .

JURISDICTION

This proceeding was brought under:
28 USC 1331, 28 USC 1343, 28 USC 2281, 28 

USC 2284, 28 USC 2201 and 28 USC 2202.
The judgment and reasons therefor were entered 

on August 30, 1961, and Notice of Appeal was filed 
on September 11, 1961.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review 
this decision by direct appeal is conferred by 28 USC 
1253.

STATUTES INVOLVED

The statute involved is Act 2 of the Second Ex­
traordinary Session of the Louisiana Legislature of



3

1961. The aforesaid Act is set forth in full in Appen­
dix “ B” hereof.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.
Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject 

matter?

II.

Is this a suit against the State and thus one pro­
hibited by the Eleventh Amendment of the United 
States Constitution?

III.

Is not the United States participating herein 
without authority in law and equity?

IV.

Is not Act 2 of the Second Extraordinary Session 
of the Louisiana Legislature for 1961 constitutional 
and valid?

V.

Has not the United States failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted?

VI.

Have the complainants herein not failed to join 
indispensable parties?

VII.

Is not the relief sought by the complainants 
herein premature?



4

Does not Act 2 of the Second Extraordinary Ses­
sion of the Louisiana Legislature for 1961 meet all of 
the requirements of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lawrence Hall and numerous other complainants 
filed a complaint on September 4, 1952 against the St. 
Helena Parish School Board and J. L. Meadows, 
Superintendent of the St. Helena Parish School Board. 
The cause originally instituted has been litigated 
before the United States District Court for the East­
ern District of Louisiana, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and writs were refused 
by this Court on October 9, 1961.

On March 17, 1961 the State of Louisiana was 
made a defendant. See Appendix C.

A supplemental complaint under the same num­
ber, title and style was filed by original plaintiffs on 
March 30, 1961, which supplemental complaint 
attacked the constitutionality of Act 2 of the Second 
Extraordinary Session of the Louisiana Legislature 
for 1961, and a three-judge Court was convened, pur­
suant to the United States Code to adjudge the valid­
ity of the said statute and entertain Motion for Pre­
liminary Injunction enjoining appellants from im­
plementing or giving any effect to the provisions of 
the said Act.

VIII.



5

All appellants, with the exception of the St. 
Helena Parish School Board and J. L. Meadows, 
Superintendent of the St. Helena Parish School Board, 
State of Louisiana, who were original defendants, 
were joined as parties defendant by ex parte order of 
Court.

Jurisdiction of the supplemental complaint was 
invoked pursuant to 28 USC 2281 and 2284.

Hearing was held on the application for tempo­
rary injunction on April 14, 1961, after which the 
Court rendered the following per curiam:

“ The motions are overruled, in part because coun­
sel for the plaintiffs has made it clear that the 
plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin the holding of 
the election fixed for April 22,1961, in the Parish 
of St. Helena. The election has bearing in this 
case only as the initial step, under Act No. 2 of 
the Second Extraordinary Session of 1961, lead­
ing to the closing of public schools in St. Helena.
If Act 2 is unconstitutional, the defendants prop­
erly before the Court may be enjoined from 
carrying out the provisions of the law.
We have an open mind on the constitutionality 
of the statute. We point out, however, that na­
tional policy and state policy require us to scruti­
nize carefully any statute leading to the closing 
of public schools. When there is now such a mani­
fest correlation between education and national 
survival, it is a sad and ill-timed hour to shut 
the doors to public schools. And, now, when one 
of the principal functions of the state is to main-



6

tain an educational system, it seems strange in­
deed and anti-civilized to shift the major financial 
burden to private persons, many of whom cannot 
afford or can ill-afford to pay for private school­
ing even with the benefit of a grant-in-aid. We 
think that this case raises due process questions 
that have not been briefed.

Does Act 2 violate the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment by depriving children of 
the opportunity to obtain a public school educa­
tion? We divide this question into two sub-ques­
tions. (1) Is it implicit in today’s concept of due 
process that a child has a right to a public school 
education, even though there is no provision in the 
state constitution requiring the state to maintain 
a public school system? (2) In the fact situation 
this case presents, considering especially that the 
state now maintains and has for many years 
maintained a public school system, does Act 2 
violate due process if its effect is to deprive the 
children in St. Helena of a public school educa­
tion?

We raise a futher question. Is a statute constitu­
tional that, in effect, offers children (1) educa­
tion on an unconstitutional condition, that is, 
attendance at a segregated school, or (2) no educa­
tion at all?

The Court is cognizant of Act 258 of 1958 which 
provides for a grant-in-aid program. But is grant- 
in-aid an adequate constitutional substitute for 
public school education, particularly where such 
grant-in-aid will, in all probability, result in seg­
regated private schools? The Court suggests that



7

consideration be given to this question in the 
briefs to be filed.
The Court invites counsel for all parties to file 
briefs by Friday, May 5, 1961. The Court also 
invites the United States to file a brief as amicus 
curiae presenting the views of the United States.
Because of the time required for the filing of the 
briefs and the determination of the case, it is 
suggested that, irrespective of the result of the 
election, the Board agree not to proceed under 
Act 2 pending our decision in this case.”
On April 24, 1961, the Court issued the following 

orders:
“ This case came on for hearing on plaintiffs’ 
motion for temporary injunction restraining en­
forcement of Act 2 of the Second Extraordinary 
Session of 1961 of the Louisiana Legislature. 
The Court, finding that the motion raises serious 
constitutional questions, invited counsel for all 
parties to brief the questions presented. The 
United States was also invited to file a brief 
amicus. It appearing that questions presented by 
the motion may be of serious concern to the States 
of the United States;
IT IS ORDERED that the Attorneys General of 
the several states of the United States be, and 
they are hereby, invited by the court to file an 
amicus brief herein by June 5, 1961, covering 
the following questions:
1. Would the abandonment by a state of its public 
school system deprive children of rights guaran­
teed by the Due Process or Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?



8

2. Would the answer be the same if the abandon­
ment were on a local option basis after a vote 
of the electorate authorizing county school au­
thorities to close the public schools?
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of 
this Court mail certified copies of this order to 
the Attorney General of each State of the Union.”
On May 1,1961, the Court again issued orders, as 

follows:
“ This cause came on for hearing on plaintiffs’ 
motion for temporary injunction restraining en­
forcement of Act 2 of the Second Extraordinary 
Session of 1961 of the Louisiana Legislature.
It appearing that additional evidence may be 
required for adequate consideration of the serious 
constitutional questions presented by the motion,
IT IS ORDERED that the parties to this action 
and the United States supplement the record with 
additional documentary evidence, including affi­
davits and newspapers, covering the following 
subjects:
1. The legislative history of Act. 2.
2. The existing private school facilities in St. 
Helena Parish for white as well as Negro pupils.
3. The amount expended for public school facili­
ties in St. Helena Parish, the source of these funds, 
the bonded indebtedness of the St. Helena Parish 
School Board for school facilities, and the security 
for that indebtedness.
4. Any pertinent facts bearing on the constitu­
tional questions raised by the court.



9

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this additional
evidence be filed in the record not later than
May 22,1961.”
Pursuant to the orders of the Court numerous 

briefs amicus curiae were filed, as well as briefs on 
behalf of the parties litigant and on August 4, 1961, 
oral arguments were presented to the Court and there­
after, on August 30, 1961, the Court issued its deci­
sion holding Act 2 of the Second Extraordinary 
Session of the Louisiana Legislature for 1961 un­
constitutional and issued a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting appellants herein from enforcing or seeking 
to enforce by any means the provisions of the said 
statute.

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
ARE SUBSTANTIAL

On March 17, 1961, the Court by ex parte order 
on motion of the United States, under the guise of 
“ amicus curiae” ordered the State of Louisiana added 
as a party defendant herein. Copy of this order ap­
pears as Appendix C hereto. The United States is 
without any authority whatsoever in law or equity 
to participate piecemeal or otherwise in this litiga­
tion as a party litigant.

Higginbotham v. City of Baton Rouge 306 U.S 
535;

Butler v. Commonwealth of Pa. 10 How. 402;
Crenshaw v. United States 134 U.S. 99;
Phelps v. Board of Education 300 U.S. 319;
Dodge v. Board of Education 302 U.S. 74;
Snowden v. Hughes 321 U.S. 1;



10

Congressional Record of 1957 Pages 11377 and 
11378;

Bill H.R. 6128, 85th Congress (original) Pages 
9 and 10;

28 U.S.C. 501;
28 U.S.C. 507;
La. Const, of 1921, Article 12, Section 1; Amend­

ment 11, United States Constitution;
Hans v. State of La. 134 U.S. 1;
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp. 337 U.S. 

682;

Further, as the State of Louisiana was made 
a party defendant in this suit which from its com­
mencement was one prosecuted by citizens of one of 
the United States, jurisdiction failed. See: Louisiana 
Constitution of 1921, Article 19, Section 26, and the 
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.

Noah et al v. Board of Education, District of 
Columbia 106 Fed. Supp. 988;

Parker v. Board of Education of Sumter County 
70 S.E. 2d 369 (G a .);

Smith v. Hefner 68 S.E. 2d 783 (N. C .) ;
Stephan v. La. Board of Education 78 So. 2d 18;
Charlottesville v. Allen 240 Fed. 2d 59;
Aerated Products Co. of Philadelphia, Pa. v. De­

partment of Health of N. J. et al, 159 Fed. 
2d 851;

Ford Company v. Department of Treasury 323 
U .S .459;

Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig 294 U.S. 511;
U.S. Department of Agriculture, et al, v. Hunter, 

et al, 171 Fed. 2d 793;



11

U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Remund 330 
U.S. 539;

New Haven Public Schools v. General Service Ad­
ministration 214 Fed. 2d 592;

Herrin v. Farm Security Administration 153 Fed. 
2d 76;

Thomason v. Works Progress Administration 138 
Fed. 2d 342;

N. Dakota-Montana Wheat Growers’ Assn. v. U.S. 
66 Fed. 2d 573; certiorari denied; 291 U.S. 672;

Blackmar v. Guerre 342 U.S. 512;
Georgia Railroad and Banking Company v. Red- 

wine 342 U.S. 299.

Perusal of the Court’s temporary injunction (Ap­
pendix A ) readily reflects that the individual members 
of defendant board were cast in equity and the record 
shows that the individual members of the board were 
not made parties defendant hereto although they were 
found to be indispensable parties by judgment of the 
Court.

The Court below erred in deciding the constitu­
tional issues on facts not germane to the issues, as well 
as by misapplication of legal principles.

In its decision below the Court found that Act 2 
violated the equal protection clause of the United 
States Constitution in two respects; improper classi­
fication and illegal evasion.

Before proceeding to discuss these issues, it is 
necessary to eliminate one trend of thought which 
pervades the lower Court’s opinion. Throughout the



12

opinion the Court takes great pains to point out to 
what extent, private schools, if  organized, would con­
stitute state action.

“ This analysis of Act 2 and related legisla­
tion makes it clear that when the Legislature 
integrated Act 2 with its companion measures, 
especially the “ private” school acts, as part of a 
single carefully constructed design, constitution­
ally the design was self-defeating. Of necessity, 
the scheme requires such extensive state control, 
financial aid, and active participation that in 
operating the program the state would still be pro­
viding public education. The state might not be 
doing business at the old stand; but the state 
would be participating as the senior, and not 
silent, partner in the same sort of business. The 
continuance of segregation at the state’s public- 
private schools, therefore, is a violation of the 
equal protection clause.”  (Court’s opinion, page 
42).

“ This scheme of the Louisiana Legislature 
to deny school children constitutional rights is 
not new. It has been tried before, with similar 
results. In declaring such a scheme unconstitu­
tional, the Eighth Circuit, in Aaron v. Cooper, 
261 F. 2d 97, 106-107, relied heavily on this pro­
nouncement by the Supreme Court: ‘State sup­
port of segregated schools, through any arrange­
ment, management, funds, or property cannot be 
squared with the Fourteenth Amendment’s com­
mand that no State shall deny to any person with­
in its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’ 
Aaron v. Cooper, supra, 19. The ruling here must 
be the same.” (Court’s opinion, page 43).



13

This would merit serious consideration if the 
question before the Court were, are those schools 
discriminating in admitting students because of race, 
color or creed, but absent that question the Court’s 
discussion is rankest dicta and serves only to confuse 
the real constitutional issue which must be decided. 
'May a Parish constitutionally abandon a public school 
system?

Let us first consider whether Act 2 affects the 
Parish of St. Helena and its residents in such a 
manner as to constitute an illegal or unconstitutional 
classification, or, for that matter, any type of clas­
sification whatsoever.

As a general proposition the laws enacted by a 
State Legislature must apply equally to all persons 
within the confines of the State. There are, however, 
two methods by which the laws enacted by the State 
Legislature may vary within the State. First, the 
Legislature may enact laws applicable to a certain 
class or classes within its boundaries. Legislative 
classification if not palpably arbitrary and if it may 
reasonably be conceived to rest on some real and 
substantial difference or distinction bearing a just 
and fair relation to the Legislation is no denial of 
equal protection of the laws. 16A C.J.S. Section 505 
Page 314. This is the type of Legislation passed on 
by the Court in the case of James v. Almond, 170 
Fed. Supp. 331.

In that case the Legislature of the State of Vir­
ginia had passed an act permitting the Governor of



14

the State of Virginia to assume control of schools 
under certain conditions. Pursuant to that statute, 
the Governor by executive order seized control of 
certain schools integrated by the City of Norfolk. He 
then proceeded to order the desegregated schools not to 
open even though other schools in the city and state 
were open. The Court stated:

“ Tested by these principles we arrive at the in­
escapable conclusion that the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, having accepted and assumed the re­
sponsibility of maintaining and operating public 
schools, cannot act through one of its officers to 
close one or more public schools in a state solely 
by reason of the assignment to, or enrollment or 
presence in, the public school of children of dif­
ferent races or colors, and at the same time, keep 
other public schools throughout the state open on 
a segregated basis.”

According to the Court’s opinion, the Virginia 
Legislation would result in some of the children in 
the state attending public schools while the other 
children in the state would not be afforded the same 
privilege, thus not affording equal treatment within 
the political unit establishing the policy. Since there 
was no reasonable basis for the different treatment 
it was an illegal classification which denied to certain 
citizens of the State the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The second method by which different laws and 
different rules may prevail in various localities of the 
State is the “ home rule” or “ local option” statutes.



15

This type of Legislation is a permissive grant by the 
State to its political subdivisions to establish rules 
and/or regulations under which they choose to operate. 
“ Home rule”  permits localities, political subdivisions, 
etc., to adopt certain laws and rules by which it 
chooses to be governed. When the right of local option 
is exercised by a political subdivision of the State, 
there is no necessity of applying the rule of legislative 
classification since the rule, law or regulation will 
apply equally to all persons within the geographical 
or political unit, and consequently cannot result in 
denial of equal protection. The validity of the so-called 
“ home rule”  or “ local option” adoption of different 
rules within a political or geographical area was ap­
proved by the Supreme Court in the case of Salzburg 
v. State of Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, wherein the Court 
said:

“ There seems to be no doubt that Maryland could 
validly grant home rule to each of its 21 counties 
and to the City of Baltimore to determine this 
rule of evidence by local option.”
Again in the case of Greensboro v. Tonkins, 276 

Fed. 2d 890, the Court was faced with a problem 
where a municipality was going to cease to offer a 
certain service even though the same service was 
offered to their local citizens by other communities 
throughout the State. The Court held that the city 
could validly sell its swimming pool and cease opera­
tion thereof even though the sale was made pursuant 
to and authorized by a statute of the State of North 
Carolina.



16

“ North Carolina private laws 1923 Ch. 37, Sec­
tion 79 has amended N. C. Sess. Laws 1957 Ch. 
960, Section 4.”

In effect, the Court permitted the City of Greensboro 
to withdraw a service offered to the citizens of the 
City of Greensboro pursuant to a State statute, pro­
vided that it affected all citizens of that City the 
same, without regard as to how it affected the rest 
of the citizens of the State.

In discussing and commenting upon this decision, 
a commentator of the Harvard Law Review, Volume 
72, Page 1567, stated as follows:

“ It could be argued that since the municipality is 
merely a creation of the state, and since its power 
to sell is authorized by State statute, its action in 
closing the pool should be attributed to the state, 
thus presenting a situation similar to that of the 
James case, assuming that other municipal swim­
ming pools in the state remained open. Neverthe­
less, it appears that a municipality should be re­
quired to act only in relation to persons within 
its jurisdiction, and that it fulfills its constitu­
tional obligations when it treats all such persons 
equally. To require more would place a virtually 
impossible burden upon municipalities, and would 
tend to defeat the diversity which is one of the 
aims of local government. Thus, although discrimi­
nation by a municipality among its residents in 
the operation of recreational facilities is properly 
attributed to the state, it does not seem desirable 
to extend the ‘state action’ concept so as to trans­
form a nondiscriminatory municipal act into state 
discrimination under the fourteenth amendment.”



17

This distinction was again recognized by the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeal in the case of Montgomery v. 
Gilmore, 277 Fed. 2d 364. Here the Court again noted 
the difference and distinction between the application 
of a rule passed by a political subdivision to the persons 
located within that subdivision, and a general classi­
fication statute by the State affecting different classes 
in different ways. In footnote 4 of the case, the Court 
stated as follows:

“ In our opinion, the closing of all the public parks 
of the City does not violate the equal protection 
of the laws of the citizens of Montgomery, under 
the doctrines of James v. Almond, D.C.E.D. Va. 
1959 170 Fed. Supp. 331; James v. Duckworth, 
D.C.E.D. Va. 1959, 170 Fed. Supp. 342, and 
Harrison v. Day, 1959, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E. 2d 
636.”

The Federal Courts in this State have acknowl­
edged and the United States Supreme Court has af­
firmed the proposition that the various school boards 
within the State of Louisiana may, subject to a permis­
sive statute of the Legislature, adopt rules which 
would not be uniform throughout the State, but which 
would be completely uniform and equally administered 
within the unit of the parish itself.

Hughes v. Caddo Parish School Board, et al, 57 
F. Supp. 508, affirmed 323 U.S. 685.

In that case, the Legislature gave to each parish 
school board in the State the power to abolish high 
school fraternities and sororities and further to dis­



18

cipline any student who remained a member thereof. 
This statute was attacked on many grounds, one of 
which was that it was a violation of the equal pro­
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clause 
of the United States Constitution. The Court in com­
menting on the claim of denial of equal protection 
stated, on page 512:

“ In the instant case the student is a member of 
the fraternity chapter in Byrd High School where 
entrance and enrollment are sought. Because of 
the disciplinary measures which the State Legis­
lature and the Caddo Parish School Board are 
seeking to establish in the schools under their 
respective police authority, this student may be 
legally compelled to comply with these measures.”

“ The manner of application of the law becomes 
adsolutely uniform—  there is not even the sem­
blance of any discrimination as was alleged to 
exist in the Waugh case, and which was pressed 
before and considered by the Supreme Court of 
the United States.”

The statute involved in that case is quite similar 
to the one herein, in that the Legislature gave the per­
missive right to the various local school boards to 
adopt a certain set of rules and procedures. It was 
conceded in the case that the school boards throughout 
the State might not adopt the same practice, however 
if they did though, it would apply to all students 
within that political unit. That case and the one at bar 
cannot be distinguished with regard to the application 
of the equal protection clause.



19

The Court in the decision below attempts to dis­
tinguish the principles set forth in the local option 
liquor law cases. Rippey v. State of Texas 193 U.S. 
504 and Lloyd v. Dollison 194 U.S. 445.

The Court reasoned that the local option statutes 
were good in those matters only because the State had 
complete and absolute control over the distribution 
and sale of liquor. The converse is true. 16-A C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law, Section 6, 512 at page 358:

“ The constitutional guaranty of the equal pro­
tection of the laws is applicable to regulations 
with respect to intoxicating liquors and the sale 
thereof. However, the control of the sale, use, 
transportation, and consumption of intoxicating 
liquor, being peculiarly within the province of 
legislative powers, the regulation, or even the pro­
hibition thereof, does not necessarily deny anyone 
equal protection of the laws.”

The only difference between education and liquor 
trade, insofar as State control is concerned, is one of 
degree. The State may prohibit the sale or manufac­
ture of liquor, while it may not prohibit education, 
but this does not in the least prohibit it from delegating 
to localities the power which it does retain.

The final determination of educational policies in 
governmental units or subdivisions of the State is not 
foreign to Louisiana or to other states in the union. 
This may be done on a county basis, or as in many 
states by school districts. Index Digest of State Con­
stitutions, p. 390. It is generally recognized that a



20

state legislature may authorize residents of local school 
districts to vote upon bonding, finances and other 
matters of government connected with the operation 
of local schools. Kee v. Parks, 153 Tenn. 306, 283 S.W. 
751; In Re School Code of 1919, 7 Boyce 406, 108 Atl. 
39; State v. Lamont, 105 Kan. 134, 181 Pac. 617. A 
clear statement of the generally recognized rule as re­
gards local operation of schools is found in 16 C.J.S., 
Constitutional Law, Sec. 142, at page 683, where it is 
said:

“ The legislature may provide laws as to the es­
tablishment, division, alteration, enlargement, or 
abolition of schools and school districts, and the 
control of schools to take effect when adopted by 
a vote of the people of the district.”
In People v. Cowen, 283 111. 308, 119 N.E. 335 

(1918) the Illinois Supreme Court stated with refer­
ence to the legislative power to delegate to a local body 
the power to abolish a high school:

“ The legislature has supreme power over public 
corporations, and may divide, alter, enlarge, or 
abolish them as in the legislative judgment the 
public welfare may require. This power may be 
exercised by the Legislature itself by direct legis­
lation, or it may delegate the power to certain 
officers, courts, or the electors of a municipal-

The court concluded that the electors of a school 
district could properly vote to abolish a school.

The principle of local option is too well established 
to charge it with being contrary to the Federal Con­



21

stitution as such. Downs v. Boonton, 99 N.J. Law 40, 
122 A. 721; State v. Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, 219 N.W. 
858; State v. Briggs, 46 Utah 288, 146 Pac. 261; Ohio 
v. Dollison 194 U.S. 445.

It must be concluded that no constitutional objec­
tion can be raised to the closing of schools on a local 
option basis.

The other basis upon which the Court found Act 
2 unconstitutional is :

“ Most immediately, it is a transparent artifice 
designed to deny the plaintiffs their declared 
constitutional right to attend de-segregated 
schools.”

I f this is the doctrine of the United States Dis­
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, it 
is without a doubt novel, startling and entirely un­
founded in law. The Court in its holding here makes 
it mandatory that the parish furnish to the plaintiffs 
a public school and further that said public school 
must be desegregated. The basis for such a judicial 
pronouncement can be found neither in the law nor 
jurisprudence.

The Court herein apparently misconstrued the 
doctrine of the Brown case. The same was analyzed 
and its doctrine clearly set forth in the case of Briggs 
v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777, wherein the Court 
said :

“ . . . It is important that we point out exactly 
what the Supreme Court has decided and what



22

it has not decided in this case. It has not decided 
that the federal courts are to take over or reg­
ulate the public schools of the states. It has not 
decided that the states must mix persons of dif­
ferent races in the schools or must require them 
to attend schools or must deprive them of the 
right of choosing the schools they attend. What 
it has decided, and all that it has decided, is 
that a state may not deny to any person on ac­
count of race the right to attend any schools that 
it maintains. . . Nothing in the Constitution or 
in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away 
from the people freedom to choose the schools 
they attend. The Constitution, in other words, 
does not require integration. It merely forbids 
discrimination. . . .”

This interpretation of the Brown case has been 
adopted by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Avery v. Wichita Falls Independent School District 
241 Fed. 2d 330, certiorari denied 353 U.S. 938, as 
well as by other Federal Courts. Thompson v. School 
Board of Arlington, 144 F. Supp. 239 (D.C. Va. 1956), 
a ff ’d sub nom. School Board of Charlottesville v. Allen, 
240 F 2d 59 (C.A. 4th 1956), cert. den. 77 S. Ct, 667; 
Borders v. Rippey, 247 F2d 268 (C.A. 5th 1960); Cal­
houn v. Board of Education of Atlanta, 188 F. Supp. 
401 (D.C. Ga. 1959); Henry v. Godsell et al., 165 F. 
Supp. 87 (D.C. Mich. 1958); Kelley v. Board of Ed­
ucation of Nashville, 270 F. 2d 209 (C.A. 6th 1959), 
cert. den. 361 U.S. 924; Dove v. Parham, 181 F. Supp. 
504 (D.C. Ark. 1960); Holland v. Board of Public 
Instruction, 258 F2d 730 (C.A. 5th 1958); Montgom-



23

enj v. Gilmore, 277 F2d 364 (C.A. 5th 1960).
Additionally, the Court below has in effect pro­

claimed that the plaintiffs have an absolute, uncon­
ditional, constitutional right to attend a de-segregated 
school. This premise, that the plaintiffs have a right 
to attend a school at all, is again without support in 
law.

Appellants do not doubt that if public education 
were offered to some students in an area, it would 
have to be granted to all students on an equal basis, 
however the requisite of equality of a service fur­
nished does not obligate the state to furnish the service.

In the case of Everson v. Board of Education, 
330 U.S. 1, 21, the late Justice Jackson, stated:

“ The Constitution says nothing of education. It 
lays no obligation on the states to provide schools 
and does not undertake to regulate state systems 
of education if they see fit to maintain them.”
In addition to extending the doctrine of the 

Brown case, as stated above, the Court below in its 
opinion developed three new axioms which can be 
used for constitutional interpretation. They are uh- 
constitutionality by association, conjecture and priv­
ilege.

This Court for the past several years has on many 
occasions been confronted with the question of the 
validity of “ guilt by association” . The Court’s opinion 
below has developed a companion doctrine which 
might well be labeled “unconstitutionality by associa­
tion” . The Court in its opinion found that other acts



24

declared unconstitutional must necessarily pass their 
unconstitutionality on to Act 2.

“ The Louisiana Legislature has confected 
one ‘evasive scheme’ after another in an effort to 
achieve this end. This Court has held these un­
constitutional in one decision after another, af­
firmed by the Supreme Court. Yet they continued 
to be enacted into law. . .”

“ On its face, this section appears inoffensive. 
It is only after an analysis of the school closing 
measure, other sections of the act and related 
legislation that the purpose, mechanics, in effect 
of the clan emerged.”
The Court furnishes absolutely no authority for 

the proposition that it possesses the power to invali­
date acts of the sovereign state solely on the finding 
that those acts are part of a pattern or plan. No cri­
terion of standards were eluded to which might 
define this new principle. Presumably, the Court be­
lieves that because Louisiana has sinned constitu­
tionally before, every other act which its legislature 
subsequently enacts is likewise invested with the same 
infirmity to such an extent as to dispense with the 
necessity of individual adjudication. Negro plaintiffs 
have merely to shout the magic word “ pattern” , and 
invalidation follows as a matter of course.

We think the true rule is stated in Dove v. Par­
ham, 176 F. Supp. 242 reversed in part in other 
grounds, 271 Fed. 2d 132:

“ Implicit the rules applied in those cases and 
controlling in the Arkansas pupil placement law



25

being within constitutional boundaries is the 
principle, that a state plan for resistance to racial 
integration in its public schools, is without sig­
nificance as to the constitutionality of such laws 
if legitimate and constitutional means are used 
in the operation of the plan and the attainment 
of its objective.”

Throughout its opinion the Court pre-assumes to 
determine how Act 2 and other Acts of the State of 
Louisiana are to be inter-related, how they will be ap­
plied, how they will effect the petitioners as well as 
others in the parish, and their eventual effect upon 
the individual community and state. Conjecture, 
suspicion and clairvoyance are indeed strange ave­
nues by which to arrive at the constitutional deter­
mination of the validity of a sovereign state stat­
ute. This Court, in a recent case, frowned upon such 
methods of arriving at a determination of the consti­
tutionality of a statute when it said:

“ The very foundation of the power of the federal 
courts to declare Acts of Congress unconstitu­
tional lies in the power and duty of those courts 
to decide cases and controversies properly before 
them. This was made patent in the first case here 
exercising that power—  ‘the gravest and most 
delicate duty that this Court is called on to per­
form’. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177—  
180, 2 L. Ed. 60. This Court, as is the case with 
all federal courts, “ has no jurisdiction to pro­
nounce any statute, either of a state or of the 
United States, void, because irreconcilable with 
the constitution, except as it is called upon to ad-



26

judge the legal rights of litigants in actual con­
troversies. In the exercise of that jurisdiction, it 
is bound by two rules, to which it has rigidly ad­
hered : one, never to anticipate a question of con­
stitutional law in advance of the necessity of de­
ciding it; the other, never to formulate a rule of 
constitutional law broader than is required by the 
precise facts to which it is to be applied. Liver­
pool, New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co. v. Com­
missioners of Immigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 
S. Ct. 352, 355, 27 L. Ed. 899. Kindred to these 
rules is the rule that one to whom application of a 
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack 
the statute on the ground that impliedly it might 
also be taken as applying to other persons or 
other situations in which its application might 
be unconstitutional. United States v. Wurzbach, 
280 U.S. 396, 50 S. Ct. 167, 74 L. Ed. 58; Heald 
v. District of Columbia, 259 U.S. 114, 123, 42 
S. Ct. 434, 435, 66 L. Ed. 852; Yazoo & Mississippi 
Valley R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 
217, 33 S. Ct. 40, 57 L. Ed 193; Collins v. State 
of Texas, 223 U.S. 288, 295—  296, 32 S. Ct. 286, 
288, 56 L. Ed. 439; People v. State of New York 
ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160-161, 
27 S. Ct. 188, 190-191, 51 L. Ed. 415. Cf. Voeller 
v. Neilston Wholesale Co., 311 U.S. 531, 537, 61 
S. Ct. 376, 379, 85 L. Ed. 322; Carmichael v. 
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 513, 57 
S. Ct. 868, 874, 81 L. Ed. 1245; Virginian R. Co. 
v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 558, 57 S. Ct. 
592, 605, 81 L. Ed. 789; Blackmer v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 421, 442, 52 S. Ct. 252, 257, 76 
L. Ed. 375; Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 
271 U.S. 50, 54-55, 46 S. Ct. 375, 376-377, 70 L.



27

Ed. 827; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.S. 571, 
576, 35 S. Ct. 167, 169, 59 L. Ed. 364; Tyler v. 
Judges of the Court of Registration, 179 U.S. 
405, 21 S. Ct. 206, 45 L. Ed. 252; Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority 297 U.S. 288, 347- 
348, 56 S. Ct. 466, 483-484, 80 L. Ed. 688 (con­
curring opinion). In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 
249, 73 S. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. 1586, this Court 
developed various reasons for this rule. Very 
significant is the incontrovertible proposition 
that it ‘would indeed be undesirable for this 
Court to consider every conceivable situation 
which might possibly arise in the application of 
complex and comprehensive legislation.’ Id., 346 
U.S. at page 256, 73 S. Ct. at page 1035. The 
delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress 
unconstitutional is not to be exercised with refer­
ence to hypothetical cases thus imagined. The 
Court further pointed to the fact that a limiting 
construction could be given to the statute by the 
court responsible for its construction if an appli­
cation of doubtful constitutionality were in fact 
concretely presented. We might add that applica­
tion of this rule frees the Court not only from 
unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional is­
sues, but also from premature interpretations of 
statutes in areas where their constitutional ap­
plication might be cloudy.” U.S. v. Raines 362 
U.S. 17
Appellants, until the decision of the Court below, 

were of the opinion that all parts of the Constitution 
were of equal importance and that all privileges, rights 
and immunities granted to the citizens of the United 
States were equally protected. It was with conster­



28

nation we discovered the contrary, in the decision of 
the Court below:

“ Irrespective of the express terms of a statute, 
particularly in the area of racial discrimination, 
Courts must determine its purposes as well as its 
substance and effect.”  (emphasis supplied)
Absent the feeling of the Court, as expressed 

above, appellants feel that many of the questions 
raised and decided in this case would have never re­
ceived serious consideration, had they arisen in dif­
ferent context. The fact that the United States Gov­
ernment was the paladin of the plaintiffs or that 
the states involved had expressed disagreement of 
the Supreme Court decisions of late, or that the 
principles are here challenged by those who currently 
are special favorite of the laws, does not change the 
law. As appropriately stated by Mr. Justice Bradley, 
almost eighty years ago in the Civil Rights cases 109 
U.S.3:

“ When a man has emerged from slavery, and by 
the aid of the beneficient legislation has shaken 
o ff the inseparable concommitants of that state, 
there must be some stage in the progress of his 
elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, 
and ceases to be a special favorite of the laws, 
and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, must 
be protected in the ordinary modes by which 
other men’s rights are protected.”  (emphasis add­
ed)



29

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE it is respectfully submitted that 
this Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal and it is 
respectfully suggested this Court find this case an 
appropriate one for reversal and dismissal of the com­
plaint, dissolving and recalling the temporary injunc­
tion.

Of Counsel:
CARRO LL BUCK,
M. E. CULLIGAN,
GEORGE M. PONDER,
JOHN E. JACKSON, JR., 
W IL LIA M  P. SCHULER, 
DOROTH Y W O LBRETTE,
L. K . CLEM ENT, JR.
H A R R Y  J. KRON, JR.,

Assistant Attorneys General.
ALB IN  P. LASSITER,

District Attorney, 
i-th Judicial District,
State of Louisiana.

THOM PSON L. CLARKE,
District Attorney,
6th Judicial District,
State of Louisiana.

LOUIS H. PAD G ETT, JR.,
District Attorney,
26th Judicial District,
State of Louisiana.

R esp ectfu lly  subm itted,
JACK  P. F. GREM ILLION,

Attorney General,
State of Louisiana.

DUNCAN S. KEMP,
District Attorney,
21st Judicial District, 
State of Louisiana.

W. SCOTT W ILKINSON,
Special Assistant 
Attorney General.

V IC TO R  A . SACHSE,
Special Assistant 
Attorney General.



30

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, JACK P. F. GREMILLION, Attorney General 
for the State of Louisiana, and attorneys for appellants 
herein and a Member of the Bar of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, do hereby certify that 
copies of the foregoing Jurisdictional Statement for 
appellants were served upon the appellees through 
their counsel of record, herein below named, by 
placing the same in the United States mail, addressed 
to them at their offices with sufficient postage there­
to annexed:

Mr. A. P. Tureaud, 1821 Orleans Avenue, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, Mr. Robert L. Carter, 20 West 
40th Street, New York 18, New York, via air mail, 
and Mr. Jack Greenberg and Mr. Thurgood Marshall, 
10 Columbus Circle, New York, New York, via air 
mail.

JACK P. F. GREMILLION,
Attorney General,
State of Louisiana.



31

APPENDIX “A ”

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

BATON ROUGE DIVISION
No. 1068 CIVIL ACTION 

Lawrence Hall, Et A l, Plaintiffs 

v.
St. Helena Parish School Board, Et A l, 

Defendants

Thurgood Marshall 
A. P. Tureaud 
A. M. Trudeau, Jr.
Jack Greenberg

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Jack P. F. Gremillion, Attorney General of Lou­

isiana
L. K. Clement, Jr., Assistant Attorney General 
Weldon Cousins, Assistant Attorney General 
Michael E. Culligan, Assistant Attorney General 
John M. Currier, Assistant Attorney General 
John E. Jackson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General 
George Ponder, Assistant Attorney General 
William P. Schuler, Assistant Attorney General
W. Scott Wilkinson, Special Assistant Attorney 

General
Duncan Kemp, District Attorney for St. Helena 

Parish
E. Freeman Leverett, Deputy Attorney General 

of Georgia
Gordon Madison, Deputy Attorney General of 

Alabama
Leslie Hall, Deputy Attorney General of Alabama



32

Attorneys for Defendants
M. Hepburn Many, United States Attorney
Harold H. Greene, United States Department of 

Justice
Attorneys for United States of America,

Amicus Curiae
WISDOM, Circuit Judge, and CHRISTEN- 

BERRY and WRIGHT, District Judges:
Undeterred by the failure of its prior efforts, the 

Louisiana Legislature continues to press its fight for 
racial segregation in the public schools of the state. 
Today we consider its current segregation legislation, 
the keystone of which, the local option law, is under 
attack in these proceedings.

On May 25, 1960, this court entered its order 
herein restraining and enjoining the St. Helena Parish 
School Board and its superintendent from continuing 
the practice of racial segregation in the public schools 
under their supervision “ after such time as may be 
necessary to make arrangements for admission of 
children to such schools on a racially non-discrimina- 
tory basis with all deliberate speed.”  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed this judgment on Fedruary 9, 1961.1

On February 9, 1961, the very day of the af­
firmance of the order of this court,2 the Governor 
of the State called the Second Extraordinary Session

1St. Helena Parish School Board v. Hall, 5 C ir., 287 F . 2d 376.
“O rder o f  th is  cou rt req u ir in g  desegregation  o f  the B aton  R ou ge 

p u blic schools and f iv e  state trad e  schools w ere  a lso a ff irm e d  on Feb. 
9, 1961. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board v. Davis, 5 C ir., 287 
F . 2d 380 ; Louisiana State Board of Education v. Allen, 5 C ir., 287 
F . 2d 3 2 ; Louisiana State Board of Education v. Angel, 5 C ir., 287 F . 
2d 33.



33

of the Louisiana Legislature for 1961 into session 
to act “ relative to the education of the school children 
of the State * * * for the preservation and protec­
tion”  of state sovereignty. Within a few days of the 
call, he certified as emergency legislation what be­
came Act 2“ of that session, the local option law in 
suit, as well as related legislation designed to continue 
racial segregation in the public schools, in spite of the 
desegregation order of this court in this case in partic­
ular and desegregation orders in general. As is mani­
fest from the legislative history of the statute and 
an analysis of its provisions as these are related to 
cognate legislation, the sub-surface purpose of Act 2 
is to provide a means by which public schools under 
desegregation orders may be changed to “ private” 
schools operated in the same way, in the same build­
ings, with the same furnishings, with the same money, 
and under the same supervision as the public schools. 
In addition, as part of the plan, the school board of 
the parish where the public schools have been “ closed” 
is charged with responsibility for furnishing free 
lunches, transportation, and grants-in-aid to the 
children attending the “ private”  schools.

The statute in suit violates the equal protection 
clause on two counts. Most immediately, it is a trans­
parent artifice designed to deny the plaintiffs their 
declared constitutional right to attend desegregated 
public schools. More generally, the Act is assailable 
because its application in one parish, while the state 3

3La. R .S . 17 :350.



34

provides public schools elsewhere, would unfairly dis­
criminate against the residents of that parish, irre­
spective of race.

The language of the Supreme Court in Cooper v. 
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17, cannot be disregarded: “ The 
constitutional rights of children not to be discrimi­
nated against in school admission on grounds of race 
or color declared by this Court in the Brown case 
can neither be nullified openly and directly by state 
legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor 
nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes 
for segregation whether attempted ‘ingeniously or in­
genuously.’ Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132.”  
These words tell the Louisiana Legislature, as clearly 
as language can, that school children may not be 
denied equal protection of the laws, may not be dis­
criminated against in school admissions, on grounds 
of race or color. The Louisiana Legislature has con­
fected one “ evasive scheme”  after another in an effort 
to achieve this end. This court has held these un­
constitutional in one decision after another affirmed 
by the Supreme Court.4 Yet they continue to be enacted 
into law.

As with the other segregation statutes, in 
drafting Act 2 the Legislature was at pains to use 
language disguising its real purpose. All reference to

4See Bush v. Orleans Parish School Board, E .D . L a ., 138 F . Supp. 
337, a ffirm e d , 242 F . 2d 156 ; id., 163 F . Supp. 701, a ffirm e d , 268 F . 
2d 7 8 ; id ., 187 F . Supp. 42, a ffirm e d , 365 U .S . 569 ; id ., 188 F . Supp. 
916, a ff irm e d , 365 U .S . 569 ; id ., 190 F . Supp. 861, a ffirm e d , 366 U .S . 
2 1 2 ; id ., 191 F . Supp. 871, a ffirm e d , 366 U .S . 212 ; id ., 191 F . Supp. 
871, a ff irm e d , ------  U .S ............  (6 -1 9 -6 1 ) ; id., 194 F . Supp. 182.



35

race is eliminated, so that, to the uninitiated, the 
statute appears completely innocuous. For example, 
the first section of Act 2 reads:

“ In each parish of the state, and in each munici­
pality having a municipally operated school sys­
tem, the school board shall have authority to 
suspend or close, by proper resolution, the opera­
tion of the public school system in the elemen­
tary and secondary grades in said parish or 
municipality, but no such resolution shall be 
adopted by any such board until the question 
of suspending or closing the operation of such 
public school system in such grades shall have 
been submitted to the qualified electors of the 
parish or municipality, as the case may be, at 
an election conducted in accordance with the 
general election laws of the state, and the majority 
of those voting in said election shall have voted 
in favor of suspending or closing the operation 
of such public school system.”

On its face, this section appears inoffensive. It is only 
after an analysis of this school closing measure with 
other sections of the Act and related legislation that 
the purpose, mechanics, and effect of the plan emerge.5 6

(Irrespective of the express terms of a statute, 
particularly in the area of racial discrimination, courts 
must determine its purpose as well as its substance 
and effect.) “ A result intelligently foreseen and offer­
ing the most obvious motive for an act that will 
bring it about, fairly may be taken to have been a

5 A c t  2, o f  cou rse , m u st be read  w ith  oth er leg is la tion  in p a ri 
m ateria . See 2 Sutherland , S ta tu tory  C on stru ction  (3 rd  E d. 1 9 4 3 ),
§§5201-5202, pp . 529-539. See a lso  cases cited  in  N ote  4.



36

purpose of the act.”  Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 
713, 715. Moreover, “ acts generally lawful may be­
come unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful 
end.”  Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247, U.S. 
105, 114.” The defendants argue that we should not 
probe for the purpose of this legislation, that we 
should ignore the events which led up to and accom­
panied its passage, and determine its validity based 
on its language. But “ * * * we cannot shut our eyes 
to matters of public notoriety and general cognizance. 
When we take our seats on the bench we are not 
struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges 
what we see as men.” 7

The sponsors of this legislation, in their public 
statements, if not in the Act itself, have spelled out 
its real purpose.8 Administration leaders repeatedly 
said that the local option bill should not be con­
strued as indicating the state would tolerate even 
token integration. The law would be used in parishes 
either having or threatened with desegregation: Or­
leans, East Baton Rouge and St. Helena. Times- 
Picayune, February 20, 1961. The program for the

“See a lso Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U .S . 23 3 ; Go- 
million v. Lightfoot, 364 U .S . 339, 347-348; Rice v. Elmore, 4 C ir., 
165 F . 2d 387, 391; Baskin v. Brown, 4 C ir., 174 F . 2d 391, 393.

'M r . J u stice  F ie ld , s itt in g  as C ircu it Ju d ge , in  Ho Ah Kow v. 
Nunan, 9 C ir., 5 S aw yer 552, 560.

“In  L ou isian a , as m ost states, the leg is la tiv e  debates, com m ittee 
proceed in gs, and com m ittee  rep orts  are  n ot record ed  o ffic ia l ly . G oin g 
to  the n ext best record s , n ew sp ap ers, w e  fin d  in th e re co rd  o f  th is 
case a m ass o f  con tem p ora ry  n ew sp ap er articles , f ile d  b y  the p la in ­
t i f f s  and b y  am icus cu riae , b ea rin g  on the leg is la tive  h isto ry  o f  A c t  
2 and its  re la ted  m easures. A ff id a v its  fr o m  the au th ors  o f  the articles  
a ttest th e ir  a ccu ra cy . In  all in stances th ey  a re  p a r t  o f  th e o f f ic ia l  
record s. T h e ir  re lia b ility  is  evidenced b y  th e ir  substan tia l agreem ent.



37

legislative session which adopted Act 2 was worked 
out by the so called “ Liaison Committee,”  a committee 
charged with co-ordinating the administration’s seg­
regation strategy. Times-Picayune, February 11,1961. 
Representative Risley Triche, administration floor 
leader and sponsor of Act 2, told the House of Rep­
resentatives, “ The bill does not authorize any school 
system to operate integrated schools. We haven’t 
changed our position one iota. This bill allows the 
voters to change to a private segregated school sys­
tem. That’s all that it’s intended to do. I don’t think 
we want to fall into the trap of authorizing 
integrated schools by the votes of the people. 
This bill doesn’t allow that and we’re not falling 
into that trap.”  Times-Picayune, February 18, 1961. 
The president pro tern of the Senate explained 
the bill as follows: “ As I see it, Louisiana is entering 
into a new phase in its battle to maintain its segre­
gated school system. The keystone to this new phase 
is the local option plan we have under considera­
tion.” 9 Times-Picayune, February 20, 1961. And

"R epresentative  S a lvad or A n zelm o, one o f  the tw o  leg is la tors  to 
v o te  a ga in st A c t  2 declared  th a t in  a ctu a lity  the lo ca l op tion  w a s  a 
m isn om er; it  did n ot g iv e  the peop le  an option  because i f  th ey  voted 
to  keep the schools open , th ose schools w hich  a re  in tegrated  w ould  be 
fo r ce d  to  close  because state fu n d s  w ou ld  be cu t o f f .  R epresen tative  
A n zelm o sa id : “ T h ey  are  n o t g o in g  to  g e t an y  m on ey  i f  th ey  keep 
the schools open. W e  g iv e  them  n o choice. I sa y  th is  is a  had b ill 
because th e in tent is to  p os itive ly  k ill p u b lic education  in  L ouisiana. 
W e  w ill k ill the you th  o f  L ou isiana, w e  k ill the asp ira tion s and hopes 
o f  L ou isiana.

Y o u ’ll be haunted b y  th a t vote  th e rest o f  y ou r  life , because th .> 
p oor  peop le o f  th is state w ill n o t be able to  g e t  an education . In  
e f fe c t , w e  are  g iv in g  the peop le  n o  option  w hatever. T h e on ly  th in g  
w e a re  d o in g  is p rov id in g  the a pp aratu s to  close th e schools o f  th is 
state .”  Shreveport Times, F eb . 18, 1961.



38

segregation leader Representative Wellborn Jack was 
even more explicit: “ It gives the people an oppor­
tunity to help fight to keep the schools segregated. We 
are the ones who have been speaking for segregation. 
This is going to give the people in all 64 parishes the 
right to speak by going to the polls. This is just to 
recruit more people to keep our schools segregated, 
and we’re going to do it in spite of the federal govern­
ment, the brainwashers and the Communists.”  
Shreveport Times, February 18, 1961. In short, the 
legislative leaders announced without equivocation 
that the purpose of the packaged plan was to keep the 
state in the business of providing public education on 
a segregated basis.

The legislative scheme here, once revealed, is 
disarmingly simple. Section l 10 of Act 2 provides a 
means for “ closing” the public schools in a parish. 
Section 1311 of the Act provides that the school board 
may then “ lease, sell, or otherwise dispose of, for cash 
or on terms of credit, any school site, building or 
facility not used or needed in the operation of any 
schools within its jurisdiction, on such terms and con­
ditions and for such consideration as the school board 
shall prescribe.” Of course, to the extent that such 
conveyances, denominated “ sales,”  are for less than 
the fair value of the property, they are gifts constitut­
ing continuing state aid to “private” schools. Presum­
ably, this sale would be made to educational coopera­

10La. R .S . 17 :350.1 .
” La. R .S . 17:350.13 .



39

tives, created pursuant to Act 257 of 1958,12 which 
would operate the “ private”  schools with state money 
furnished by the grant-in-aid program provided for in 
Act 313 of the Second Extraordinary Session of 
I960.14

“ Under Act 3 of the Second Extraordinary Ses­
sion of 1960, the parish school boards would continue 
to supervise the “ private” schools, under the State 
Board of Education, by administering the grant-in- 
aid program of tuition grants payable from state and 
local funds. This act is identical with Act 258 of 1958, 
which was repealed, except that it omits the earlier 
explanation that tuition grants are available “where 
no racially separated public school is provided” and it 
deletes all other references showing its sub-surface 
purpose. Financial aid is direct from state to school: 
tuition checks are to be made out by the state jointly 
to the parent and the school.13 Under Section 121” of

12La. R .S . 17 :2801.
13La. R .S . 17 :2901.
“ A c t  9 o f  the Second E x tra ord in a ry  Session  o f  1961 tran sfers  

$2,500,000 fr o m  the P u blic W e lfa re  F u nd  to  the E du cation  E xpense 
G ra n t F u n d  fo r  g ra n t-in -a id  use, and A c t  10 o f  the sam e session 
(L a . R .S . 4 7 :3 1 8 ) tra n s fe rs  $200,000 m on th ly  fr o m  the sales ta x  co l­
lection s to the sam e fu n d  fo r  the sam e purpose.

“ T he la rg e  n um ber o f  C ath olic schools in  L ou isian a  presented 
the leg is la tu re  w ith  an insoluble problem . I f  th e tu ition  g ra n ts  are  
“ b en e fits  to  the ch ild ” , and n ot state su p p ort o f  th e schools, the 
leg is la tion  is d iscr im in a tory  on its  fa c e  in exclu d in g  ch ildren  atten d in g  
ch u rch  schools. I f  the g ra n ts  am ount to  state su p p ort o f  schools, 
su p p ort o f  re lig iou s in stitu tions is  proh ib ited  b y  the F ir s t  A m en d­
m ent— n ot to  speak o f  the fe d e ra l con stitu tiona l proh ib ition  aga in st 
state action  in su p p ortin g  segregated  schools o r  the state proh ib ition  
a ga in st spen din g pu blic fu n d s  f o r  p r iva te  purposes.

The am ount o f  each  g ra n t m a y  equal th e p er-d ay , per-stu den t 
am ount o f  state and loca l m on ey  expended on pu b lic  schools d u rin g  
the prev iou s year. I t  is determ ined b y  the g ov ern in g  au th ority  o f  the



40

Act 2 in suit, the state would also have the responsibil­
ity of furnishing such “ private” school children with 
school lunches and transportation, the cost of which 
would be borne by the state. The program is to be 
administered by the State Board of Education, with 
the assistance of each local board. In addition, in 
order to insure tenure for the teachers in the “pri­
vate”  schools, Section 1 of Act 4”  of the Second Ex­
traordinary Session of 1961 empowers the educational 
cooperatives to enter into contracts of employment 
with teachers for “ terms of at least five years, but 
not more than ten years.”  And to protect the salaries 
of the teachers, school bus drivers, school lunch 
workers, janitors and other school personnel of the 
“ private” schools, Section 2 of the same Act18 provides 
that such salaries shall not be “ less than or in excess 
of any minimum salary schedule or law heretofore

loca l school system . T h e g ra n t ap p lica tion  is  m ade to  such  a u th or ity  
on a fo r m  p rescr ibed  b y  the S tate  B oa rd  o f  E du cation . T h e g ra n t 
m u st he ap p roved  b y  the lo ca l a u th ority , b u t d isa p p rova l m a y  be 
appea led  th rou gh  the L ou isian a  cou rts . P aym ents are  to  be m ade 
jo in t ly  to  paren ts  and schools, in  a ccord a n ce  w ith  regu la tion s  prescr ibed  
b y  the State  B oard  o f  E du cation . T h e State B oard  o f  E d u cation  has 
gen era l m an agem en t o f  the g ra n t fun ds.

T h e h eavy  subsidy  p r iv a te  schools w ou ld  rece iv e  su g gests  the 
re levan ce  o f  Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore City, 
4 C ir., 149 F . 2d 212, cert, denied, 326 U .S . 721. In  th a t case  the 
C ou rt held th a t a  lib ra ry  school, o r ig in a lly  p r iv a te , w a s  con verted  
in to a  p u blic in stru m en ta lity  u pon  rece iv in g  a subsidy  am ou nting  to 
90 percen t o f  its costs. A lth ou g h  oth er fa c to r s  w ere  in volved , the 
C ou rt said th a t since the state h ad  sup p lied  th e m eans o f  econ om ic 
ex istence it had supplied  th e m eans b y  w hich  th e school w a s  able 
to d iscrim in ate . F r in g e  b en e fits  such  as f r e e  lu nch es a re  n o t analogous 
to tu ition  gran ts .

'•La. R .S . 17:350.12 .
17La. R .S . 17 :2830 .
18L a . R .S . 17 :2831 .



41

adopted by the legislature to govern the salaries or 
wages of any school teachers, school bus drivers, 
school lunch workers, janitors or any other school 
personnel.”  Acts 9 and 10 were enacted as emergency 
legislation on the same day Act 2 became law. Act 
9 provides for transfer of funds from the Public 
Welfare Fund to the Education Expense Grant Fund. 
Act 10 provides for allocation of sales tax revenues 
to the Education Fund.

Moreover, to make certain that the “ private” 
schools are not interfered with by persons who would 
accept desegregated education the Legislature 
adopted Act 31B and 5* 20 of the Second Extraordinary 
Session of 1961. Act 3 provides mandatory jail sen­
tences and fines for anyone “ bribing” parents to send 
their children to desegregated schools. It rewards in­
formers who report such action with the money col­
lected in fines. Act 5 provides mandatory jail sen­
tences for anyone inducing parents or school employees 
to violate state law, that is, by “ attending a school in 
violation of any law of this state.” This Act also re­
wards the informers. The Legislature at the same 
special session, apparently feeling that the St. Helena 
Parish School Board as constituted could be trusted 
to supervise the “ private”  school program but doubt­
ful about the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 
subject to the same desegregation order as St. Helena, 
passed Act T1 providing for the packing of the East

1,La. R .S . 14:119.1.
20L a . R .S . 17 :122.1 .
!1La. R .S . 17 :58 .



42

Baton Rouge Parish School Board with appointees of 
the Governor.

This analysis of Act 2 and related legislation 
makes it clear that when the Legislature integrated 
Act 2 with its companion measures, expecially the 
“ private” school acts, as part of a single carefully 
constructed design, constitutionally the design was 
self-defeating. Of necessity, the scheme requires such 
extensive state control, financial aid, and active partic­
ipation that in operating the program the state 
would still be providing public education. The state 
might not be doing business at the old stand; but the 
state would be participating as the senior, and not 
silent, partner in the same sort of business. The con­
tinuance of segregation at the state’s 'public-private 
schools, therefore, is a violation of the equal protec­
tion clause. This would be the case in any parish, 
should the schools be closed under Act 2. At St. 
Helena the discrimination would be immediate, 
obvious, and irreparable. See Appendix A. St. Helena 
is a poor parish. Its schools receive 97.1 per cent of 
their operating revenues from the state. We draw a 
fair inference from the record and facts, of which 
we may take judicial notice, that it would take ex­
traordinary effort for any accreditable private school 
to operate in St. Helena without substantial funds and 
participation from the state. It would be a miracle if 
a single accreditable private school for Negroes could 
be established in St. Helena within the foreseeable 
future. To speak of this law as operating equally is to



43

equate equal protection with the equality Anatole 
France spoke of: “ The law, in its majestic equality, 
forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under 
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.” 22 23

This scheme of the Louisiana Legislature to deny 
school children constitutional rights is not new. It 
has been tried before, with similar results.28 In de­
claring such a scheme unconstitutional, the Eighth 
Circuit, in Aaron v. Cooper, 261 F.2d 97, 106-107, 
relied heavily on this pronouncement by the Supreme 
Court: “ State support of segregated schools through 
any arrangement, management, funds, or property 
cannot be squared with the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
command that no State shall deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the Laws.” 
Cooper v. Aaron, supra, 19. The ruling here must be 
the same.

II
Act 2 runs afoul the equal protection clause in 

another respect. Though its immediate purpose is 
undoubtedly to circumvent the mandate of Brown24 * * * 
and our desegregation orders, thereby discriminating 
specifically against Negro school children, inevitably, 
another effect of the statute is to discriminate geo­
graphically against all students, white and colored,

22See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U .S . 12, 23.
23“ P r iv a te ”  schem es serv in g  to  cloak  state action  v io la tive  o f  the

F ifteen th  A m endm ent have a lso been exposed. See Terry v. Adams,
345 U .S . 46 1 ; Smith v. Allwight, 321 U .S . 649 ; Perry v. Cyphers,
5 C ir., 186 F . 2d 608; Rice v. Elmore, supra .

2,Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U .S . 483, 349 U .S . 294.



44

in St. Helena or any other community where the 
schools are closed under its provisions.

Applying familiar principles to the admitted 
facts, that conclusion seems inescapable. Thus, it is 
clear enough that, absent a reasonable basis for so 
classifying, a state cannot close the public schools in 
one area while, at the same time, it maintains schools 
elsewhere with public funds.2” And, since Louisiana 
here offers no justification for closure in St. Helena 
Parish alone, and no “ state of facts reasonably may 
be conceived to justify it,”  except only the unlawful 
purpose to avoid the effect of an outstanding judgment 
of the court requiring desegregation of the public 
schools there, it seems obvious that the present classi­
fication is invidious, and therefore unconstitutional, 
even under the generous test of the economic discrim­
ination cases. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420, 425-428, and cases there cited. But defendants re­
ject this simple and direct approach, alleging that 
it ignores what they deem controlling differences 
in the present legislation. Accordingly, we must ex­
amine the question at greater length.

To distinguish the other school closure cases, 
particular stress is laid on the local option feature of 
the statutory plan. Much is claimed for it. Indeed, 
conceding that a legislative or gubernatorial directive

‘‘ "James v. Almond, E .D . V a ., 170 F . Supp. 331, app ea l dism issed, 
359 U .S . 1006; Aaron v. McKinley, E .D . A rk ., 173 F . Supp. 944, a f ­
f irm ed  sub. nom ., Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U .S . 197 ; Bush v. Orleans 
Parish School Board, E .D . L a ., 187 F . Supp. 42, a ffirm e d , 365 U .S . 
569 ; id ., 188 F . Supp. 916, a ffirm e d , 365 U .S . 569.



45

closing the public schools in only one parish would be 
constitutionally invalid, defendants nevertheless 
maintain that there is no denial of equal protection 
when the same result is achieved through a decision 
of the local authorities rather than the central state 
government.20 The argument has two faces. First, it is 
said that the state legislature itself is guilty of no 
discrimination, since its statute treats all communities 
alike and imposes school closure on none. Then, chang­
ing the focus to the local scene, the contention is 
that when the parish school authorities close all their 
schools, having delt impartially with everyone within 
their limited jurisdiction, they cannot be accused of 
discriminating. And here defendants cite the swim­
ming pool and park cases. See Tonkins v. City of 
Greensboro, North Carolina, 4 Cir., 276 F.2d 890; 
City of Montgomery, Alabama v. Gilmore, 5 Cir., 277 
F.2d 364.

The St. Helena Parish School Board may not bt 
discriminating geographically when it expends the 
full measure of its power by closing all schools under 
its control, but that does not make the rule of Tonkins 
and Gilmore applicable. Indeed, even if recreation is 
viewed in the same constitutional light as public ed­
ucation, the rationale of those cases applies only 
when the facilities sought to be closed are locally 
owned, financed and administered, and the state it-

2“D efen dan ts  o f  cou rse  concede, as th ey  m ust, th at the a ct o f  
th e loca l school b oa rd  is “ sta te  a ction ”  w ith in  the scope o f  the F ou r 
teenth  A m endm ent. See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 
U .S . 278.



46

self is not directly concerned in their operation. See 
City of Montgomery, Alabama v. Gilmore, supra, 
368, n. 4. In such case, only local action is involved, 
and so long as the closure order is general and affects 
all residents equally, there is no discrimination at any 
level. But the same principle does not excuse in­
equalities in a statewide, centrally financed and ad­
ministered, system of public institutions.27

There can be no doubt about the character of 
education in Louisiana as a state, and not a local, 
function. The Louisiana public school system is ad­
ministered on a statewide basis, financed out of funds 
collected on a statewide basis, under the control and 
supervision of public officials exercising statewide au­
thority under the Louisiana Constitution and appro­
priate state legislation. The State Supreme Court has 
said so emphatically:

“ *** Public education is declared by the consti­
tution to be an affair of the state, and it assumes 
the whole responsibility of public education.***” 
Nelson v. Mayor, etc., of Town of Homer, 48 La. 
Ann. 258,19 So. 271.

Again in Hill v. DeSoto Parish School Board, 177 La. 
329,148 So. 248,250:

“ Under article 12 of the Constitution, section 1, 
(free public schools are part of the educational 
system of the state.Q In section 10 of that article 
it is provided that ‘The Legislature shall provide 
for the creation and election of parish school

37See cases cited  in N ote  25.



47

boards which shall elect parish superintendents 
for their respective parishes.’ Pursuant to this 
mandate, the Legislature of 1922, by Act No. 100, 
§ 17, created a parish school board for each of 
the parishes of the state and constituted them 
bodies corporate in law with full power and au­
thority to make rules and regulations for their 
own government not inconsistent with the rules 
and regulations of the state board of education. 
(These boards are public corporations and are 
created for the purpose of administering for the 
state the public school affairs of their respective 
parishes. Their functions are purely of a public 
character. In matters relating to the free public 
schools of their parishes, they are the governing 
authorities not only for the parish as a whole, 
but for each and all such school districts as may 
be created. They are state agencies, a part of the 
state government.***”  (Emphasis added.)

See State v. City of New Orleans, 42 La.Ann. 92, 7 
So. 674, 677; State v. Barham, 173 La. 488, 137 So. 
862, 864; Singelmann v. Davis, 240 La. 929, 125 So. 
2d 414, 417. See also Appendix A.

Despite defendants’ argument to the contrary, 
none of the recent amendments to Article XII of the 
Louisiana Constitution have affected the control of 
public education by the state. See Acts 747 and 752 of 
1954; Act 557 of 1958. Indeed, in its most recent form, 
that Article still provides for a single state system:

“ The Legislature shall have full authority to 
make provisions for the education of the school 
children of this State and/or for an educational



48

system which shall include all public schools and 
all institutions of learning operated by State 
agencies.***”
La. Const., Art. XII, § 1.

Public education remains the concern of the central 
state government, and ultimate control still rests with 
the State Legislature and the State Department of 
Education. The best proof of this is in the recent his­
tory of the New Orleans schools. See cases cited in 
Note 4, and State v. Orleans Parish School Board, 
La.App,, 118 So. 2d 471; Singelmann v. Davis, supra. 
See also La. R.S. 17:1-20; La. R.S. 17:151-166; La. 
R.S. 17:221-232; La. R.S. 17:261-268; La. R.S. 17:- 
335, 349.4; La. R.S. 17:351-395.6; La. R.S. 17:411- 
430; La. R.S. 17:441-1304. Nor does Act 2, here in­
volved, change the status of the public school system. 
Except in the matter of closure, there has been no 
decentralization; and where closure is ordered under 
Act 2, the elaborate state-controlled discriminatory 
scheme, described in Part I hereof, goes into effect. 
The funds, the supervision, the accreditation, still 
come from the state.28 The plain fact is that the state 
has not even made a pretense of abandoning its con­
trol of education to autonomous subdivisions.

In these circumstances, the true focus is not on 
the doings of any board, but rather on the action of 
the state government. The discriminatory scheme em­
bodied in Act 2 originated there. It is true that the 
Legislature has imposed no inequality, but its instru­

28See A p p en d ix  A .



49

ment encourages it, expressly permits it. And that is 
equally condemned." * * * no State may effectively 
abdicate its responsibilities by either ignoring them 
or by merely failing to discharge them whatever the 
motive may be.”  Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 
365 U.S. 715, 725. See also Terry v. Adams, supra, 
469 (opinion of Mr. Justice Black). Applying the 
rule of Brown to geographical discrimination, “ All 
provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or 
permitting such discrimination must yield to this 
principle.”  (Emphasis added.) Brown v. Board of 
Education, 349 U.S. 294, 298.

The equal protection clause speaks to the state. 
The United States Constitution recognizes no govern­
ing unit except the federal government and the state. 
A  contrary position would allow a state to evade its 
constitutional responsibility by carve-outs of small 
units. At least in the area of declared constitutional 
rights, and specifically with respect to education, the 
state can no more delegate to its subdivisions a power 
to discriminate than it can itself directly establish 
inequalities. When a parish wants to lock its school 
doors, the state must turn the key. If the rule were 
otherwise, the great guarantee of the equal protec­
tion clause would be meaningless.

The consequence is that the local option device 
cannot save Act 2. Nothing in the cases cited by de­
fendants suggests that it can. Indeed, in upholding 
local option liquor laws in Rippey v. Texas, 193 U.S. 
504, and Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445, the Court



50

specifically rests its decision not on the local option 
feature of the challenged legislation but, expressly, 
on the proposition that the same result would be 
constitutionally permissible if achieved by direct 
action of the legislature, because “ The State has 
absolute power over the subject.” 193 U.S. at 510; 194 
U.S. at 448-449. The crucial question goes to the 
substance of the legislation that is being enacted by 
the local option device. If it violates the equal pro­
tection clause or any other constitutional provision, 
enactment by local option will not save it. More 
recently, the Court has emphasized that whenever 
differences are constitutionally inoffensive, it is imma­
terial how they come into being, whether by local 
option or through a classification made at the central 
legislative level. See Ft. Smith Light Co. v. Paving 
Dist., 274 U.S. 387, 391; Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 
U.S. 545, 552-553.28 In short, whatever inequalities 
result from the implementation of Act 2 must be 
attributed directly to the Louisiana Legislature. As 
defendants themselves concede, whatever may be the 
rule with regard to the privilege of dispensing alcoholic 
beverages, the state itself cannot discriminate in the

2,T h e  h o ld in g  o f  S a lsbu rg  v. M ary lan d  p erm ittin g  th e state to  
trea t d if fe re n t ly , f o r  d if fe r e n t  loca lities , the ru le  a g a in st adm issib ility  
o f  illeg a lly  obta in ed  evidence n o lon g er  obta in s in  v iew  o f  Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U .S . 643. A ccord in g ly , re lian ce  on th a t decision  f o r  the 
p rop os ition  th a t th ere  is  n o  con stitu tion a l in h ib ition  to  g eog ra p h ic  
d iscr im in ation  in  the area  o f  c iv il r ig h ts  is m isp laced . S a lsbu rg  
w a s  n o t a lo ca l op tion  case, f o r  it  in volved  s im p ly  an  endorsem ent o f  
th e c la ss ifica tion  m ade b y  the leg is la tu re  itse lf  in  tr ea tin g  its sub­
d iv is ion s ; the C ou rt em phasized th a t the m a tter w a s  p u re ly  “ p r o ­
ced u ra l”  and “ lo ca l.”  H ere, the substan tive  c la ss ifica tion  is  d iscr im ­
in atory , and re lian ce  is  h ad  on loca l op tion  to  save the legis la tion .



51

field of education. There is, of course, greater freedom 
to classify geographically when the state is regulating 
a private activity than when it is conferring a govern­
mental benefit. When the state provides a benefit, 
it must do so evenhandedly. “ Such an opportunity, 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 
493.

There can be no question about the actual in­
equality in educational opportunities that will follow 
closure of the public schools in St. Helena Parish, 
or any other community that invokes the Act. Grants- 
in-aid, no matter how generous, are not an adequate 
substitute for public schools. See Missouri ex rel. 
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337. If a private school 
system could be established in St. Helena under the 
aegis of the state, there would still be lacking the 
organizational and administrative advantages, as well 
as economies, of operating as a member of a state 
system. There would be a total lack of the accredita­
tion that is automatic in the case of a public school 
but absent in the case of a private school except when 
the school has met educational standards over a period 
of years. Moreover, under the Louisiana plan these 
subsidies would afford entry to segregated schools 
alone. See James v. Almond, supra, 337. Compare 
Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward 
County, S.D. V a .,..... ......F.Supp................  (8 /25 /61 ).

Finally, the requirement of a popular referendum 
on the question of closure adds nothing to the chal­



52

lenged statute. One of the purposes of the Constitu­
tion of the United States was to protect minorities 
from the occasional tyranny of majorities. No plebi­
scite can legalize an unjust discrimination.30 “ One’s 
right to life, liberty, and property * * * and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections.”  Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638. See Boson 
v. Rippy, 5 Cir., 285 F.2d 43, 45.

This is not the moment in history for a state 
to experiment with igorance. When it does, it must 
expect close scrutiny of the experiment. For the 
reasons stated, we conclude that Act 2 of the Second 
Extraordinary Session of the Louisiana Legislature 
for 1961 is unconstitutional. The court will prepare 
a temporary injunction restraining its enforcement.

/s/John Minor Wisdom,
United States Circuit Judge
/s/Herbert W . Christenberry,
United States District Judge
/s /J . Skelly Wright,
United States District Judge

New Orleans, Louisiana 
August 30,1961

30N o one in  th e L ou isian a  L eg is la tu re  cou ld  h ave con sidered  an 
election  under A c t  2 as a b on a  f id e  loca l op tion  or  as a  p op u la r  r e f ­
erendum . P ublished rep orts  f o r  St. H elena  show ed 1461 w h ite  and 
111 n eg ro  voters  e lig ib le  to  vote . E lection  retu rn s show ed 1147 votes 
f o r  and 56 a g a in st a u th or iz in g  th e School B oard  to  c lose  the schools. 
T h is is like h a v in g  on ly  the cats  v o te  on a p rog ra m  f o r  k itten s and 
y ou n g  m ice. “ T h e r ig h t  o f  n egroes  to  attend th e pu b lic  schools w ith ­
ou t d iscrim in ation  u pon  the g rou n d  o f  ra ce  can n ot be m ade to  depend 
u pon  the con sen t o f  th e  m em bers o f  the m a jo r ity  ra ce .”  Kelley v. Board 
of Education of City of Nashville, M .D . T enn., 159 F . Supp. 272, 278.



53

Appendix A

The legislative program for closing those public 
schools under court order to desegregate (the schools 
reopening as segregated private schools subsidized by 
the state) has an inseparable connection with certain 
background facts. Although these facts are in the 
background they dominate the picture as a whole and 
especially dominate the St. Helena scene. All are 
within a proper factual frame of reference for an 
understanding of the picture.

The red dirt hills of St. Helena Parish are on the 
Mississippi state line, east of East Feliciana Parish, 
west of Tangipahoa Parish, north of Livingston 
Parish, and about one hundred miles north-northwest 
of New Orleans. According to the 1960 census, St. 
Helena has a population of 9,162, an increase of 79 
over 1950. There are 4076 white persons and 5086 
colored persons in the parish. The largest community, 
Greensburg, has a population of about 425. The Lou­
isiana Almanac and Fact Book (1956), describing St. 
Helena, states: “ St. Helena is the center of short leaf 
and loblolly pine production. The principal crops are 
cotton and corn.” See also Rand McNally Commercial 
Atlas (1960) p. 192. In an earlier proceeding the dis­
trict attorney for St. Helena Parish told the court: 
“ St. Helena is strictly a country parish with no in­
dustries whatsoever, where the only industries are 
welfare and politics.” The estimated 1960 per capita 
income (after taxes) of St. Helena was $894 against 
$1474 for the state and $1974 for the nation. Sales



54

Management Annual Survey of Buying Power, May 
10, 1961, pp. 156, 157, 690. Figures for 1960 show 
852 public welfare grants to 1325 persons in St. 
Helena at an annual cost of $768,000. Louisiana Pub­
lic Welfare Statistics, State of Louisiana Public Wel­
fare Department, June 1961, Table 14, p. 20.

All of Louisiana’s parishes receive substantial 
support from the state: a total for all parishes of 77 
percent, 72 percent through direct support and 5 per­
cent through state payment of school taxes on exempt 
homesteads. In 1957-58 state support of school opera­
tions amounted to 85 percent of operating revenues, 
82 percent through direct state support for school 
operations. In 1957-58 only two of Louisiana’s 67 
school systems provided more than 30 percent of 
their operating revenues from local sources. In 1957- 
58 St. Helena received 97.1 percent of its public school 
operating revenues from state and federal sources; 
only two other parishes received a greater percentage 
of non-local aid to public schools. See Financing Pub­
lic Schools, a PAR study published by the Public A f­
fairs Reserch Council of Louisiana (1959) p. 11, 12, 
30-31. See also Circular No. 4615, Aug. 20, 1960, 
Louisiana State Department of Education and Bul­
letins 887 and 904 of the Louisiana State Department 
of Education.

The Louisiana Constitution (Article 12, Section 
14) requires three-fourths of the State Public School 
Fund to be distributed to the parish school boards in 
the proportion that the number of educable children,



55

from six to eighteen years of age inclusive, bears to 
the total number of such educable children in the 
state. The affidavit of J. L. Meadows, Superintendent 
of the St. Helena Parish School Board filed in the 
record, shows that for 1959-60 St. Helena received 
from this fund $159,280. The other one-fourth of the 
State Public School Fund, known as the “ Equalization 
Distribution Fund” , assures sufficient revenues to 
permit every parish school system to maintain a mini­
mum or foundation educational program. The ap­
proved formula for distributing this fund is under the 
State Board of Education and is established under 
rules and regulations set forth in the Constitution of 
Louisiana, Article XII, Section 14. Mr. Meadows 
stated that the St. Helena School Board received 
$683,312 from this fund for 1960-61; $20,000 from 
other state sources; and $24,774 from the five mill ad 
valorem tax authorized for the operation and mainte­
nance of the schools in St. Helena. According to Mr. 
Meadows, for 1958-59 the St. Helena School Board 
had a deficit of $110,000.

Bulletin 904, the 110th Annual Report of the 
State Department of Education of Louisiana 1958-59 
shows that the St. Helena School Board received 
$901,080 from state, federal, and special sources; 
(Table 111, p.173) $47,548 from parish sources (Table 
111, p. 177). Total expenditures, balances, and over­
drafts for 1958-59 amounted to $1,363,009 (Table 111,
p. 261).

As of January 30, 1959, the annual inventory of



56

Louisiana Public School property, published by the 
State Department of Education, showed $344,067,058 
as the total cost of the buildings, sites, and equipment 
for all white schools, and $131,255,672 for all negro 
schools; $555,711 for white schools in St. Helena and 
$483,308 for negro schools. Bulletin 904, Department 
of Education, Table XIII, pp, 319-320.

The total indebtedness as of June 30, 1959, of all 
school boards in the 67 school districts in Louisiana 
was $325,007,869; $961,773 in St. Helena, secured 
by a special tax for construction. Bulletin No. 904, De­
partment of Education, Table VII, p. 279.

There are very few private schools in Louisiana 
except in parishes having a large Catholic population. 
There are no private schools for white or negro stu­
dents in St. Helena and none in the adjacent 
parishes (except for three Catholic elementary schools 
for white students in Tangipahoa). See Louisiana 
School Directory, Session 1960-61, Bulletin No. 923, 
State Department of Education of Louisiana.

There is a close correlation between the state­
wide effort to raise the educational level in Louisiana 
and the necessity for state aid to parishes having a 
sub-par econcomy. Among the fifty  states, in terms 
of percentage, Louisiana ranks 50th from the top in 
the number of its citizens, 25 years or older, having 
five years schooling; 44th in the number of persons 
having four years of high school; 48th in the success 
of its citizens in passing Selective Service Mental 
Tests; 48th in those 14 years or older able to read.



57

But in 1959 it ranked first among the states in the 
ratio of state expenditures for schools to personal in­
come; seventh in the ratio of state revenues to state 
aid to schools; third in the estimated revenue from 
state sources per instructional staff member ($6,678); 
and fifth in revenues from state sources per pupil 
($298). Research Report 1960-R1, Ranking of the 
States, National Education Association. This mighty 
effort on the part of Louisiana is a phase of the edu­
cational problem that is often overlooked. Contin­
uance of the effort at comparable level by private 
persons, commendable as it might be, would impose a 
disproportionately heavy burden on such parishes as 
St. Helena.

These statistics demonstrate beyond a doubt that 
public education in Louisiana is not, as the defendant 
contends, a matter of local concern. The system is 
based on the concern of the whole state for all its 
citizens. It could not have developed without the state; 
it could not have been operated except by the state. 
A  parish such as St. Helena receives 97.1 percent 
state (and some federal) help because the state as a 
whole has a direct interest in equalizing educational 
opportunities so as to aid under-privileged parishes. 
St. Helena receives $405.73 from the state for each 
pupil (taking the average daily attendance) as 
against $332.33 the Orleans Parish School Board re­
ceives per pupil— because the state is not willing to 
allow the St. Helena school children to receive an edu-



58

cation inferior to the education offered school children 
in New Orleans.

These then are dominating facts: (1) there are 
no existing private schools in St. Helena; (2 ) adequate 
facilities, buildings, and equipment, to be anywhere 
nearly equivalent to existing public school facilities 
would cost in excess of one million dollars; (3) the 
present annual local contribution of $47,000 is a far 
below the present annual operating expense of over a 
million dollars; (4) excluding fringe expenses, in 
order to equal the allowance the state now turns over 
to St. Helena, tuition for each child would amount to 
$405.73. It is dead certain, therefore, that absent ac­
tive, extensive unconstitutional state support of pri­
vate schools, closing of public schools in St. Helena 
under Act 2 will mean the end of school education for 
all children in the parish, white and negro, except a 
handful of well-to-do white children. This then is the 
legislature’s option: segregated schools contrary to 
the equal protection clause— or no schools.



59

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

BATON ROUGE DIVISION
No. 1068 CIVIL ACTION 

Lawrence Hall, Et Al, Plaintiffs 
v.

St. Helena Parish School Board, Et Al, 
Defendants

TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
This case came on for hearing on motion of the 

plaintiffs for temporary injunction, restraining the 
enforcement of Act 2 of the Second Extraordinary 
Session of the Louisiana Legislature for 1961.

It being the opinion of this court that all Lou­
isiana statutes which would directly or indirectly 
require or permit segregation of the races in the 
public schools are unconstitutional, in particular, the 
aforesaid Act 2.

IT IS ORDERED that the St. Helena Parish 
School Board and the members thereof, J. H. Meadows, 
St. Helena Parish Superintendent of Schools, their 
successors, agents, representatives, attorneys, and all 
other persons who are acting or may act in concert 
with them, be, and they are hereby, restrained, en­
joined and prohibited from enforcing or seeking to 
enforce by any means the provisions of Act 2 of the 
Second Extraordinary Session of the Louisiana Leg­
islature for 1961.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that copies of this 
temporary injunction shall be served forthwith upon



60

each of the defendants named herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs 

herein file a bond in the amount of One Hundred 
Dollars ($100) as required by Rule 65 (c), F.R.Civ.P.

/s/John Minor Wisdom,
United States Circuit Judge.
/s/Herbert W . Christenberry,
United States District Judge.
/s /J . Skelly Wright,
United States District Judge.

New Orleans, Louisiana 
August 30,1961.



61

APPENDIX “B”

ACT 2
HOUSE BILL NO. 1

An Act to provide that in each parish of the state 
and each municipality having a municipally oper­
ated school system, the school board shall have 
authority to suspend or close the operation of the 
public school system in the elementary and second­
ary grades after an election has first been held 
at which a majority of the qualified voters voting- 
in said election have authorized such suspension 
or closing; to provide that such election shall be 
held in accordance with the general election laws 
of the state; to make provision relative to the 
calling of said election; to provide for the manner 
in which the suspension of such operation of the 
public school system in such grades may be ter­
minated ; to provide the content of the propositions 
appearing on the ballot in such election; to provide 
for the promulgation of the returns of said elec­
tion; to provide that this Act shall not limit the 
authority of school boards to provide school lunches, 
transportation of school children or grant-in-aid 
scholarships to children in attendance at private 
schools; to authorize the lease or sale of any school 
property by parish or city school boards; to pro­
vide that this Act shall be in addition to other 
laws on the same subject matter and shall not 
be held to repeal same; to authorize the abolition 
of school taxes by school boards, except taxes 
dedicated and needed to retire outstanding school 
bonds in parishes and municipalities where the 
suspension or closure of the public schools has 
been authorized by vote of the qualified electors;



62

and to make provision for the effective date of 
this Act.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana:

Section 1.

In each parish of the state, and in each munici­
pality having a municipally operated school system, 
the school board shall have authority to suspend or 
close, by proper resolution, the operation of the public 
school system in the elementary and secondary grades 
in said parish or municipality, but no such resolution 
shall be adopted by any such board until the question 
of suspending or closing the operation of such public 
school system in such grades shall have been submitted 
to the qualified electors of the parish or municipality, 
as the case may be, at an election conducted in ac­
cordance with the general election laws of the state, 
and the majority of those voting in said election shall 
have voted in favor of suspending or closing the opera­
tion of such public school system.

Section 2.

The election provided for in Section 1, of this 
Act may be called by each parish or municipal school 
board on its own initiative, but upon the petition of 
ten per cent of the qualified electors of said parish 
or municipality, as the case may be, the school board 
shall call said election within ten (10) days after the 
date on which the petition is received by said board. 
The board shall determine and fix the date on which 
such election shall be held, which date shall be not less



63

than thirty (30) nor more than sixty (60) days after 
the date on which the election is called.

Upon failure of the school board to call and fix 
the date of said election as above provided, the Parish 
Board of Supervisors of Elections may issue a procla­
mation to provide therefor.

Section 3.

The petition referred to in the preceding Section 
shall be addressed to the parish or municipal school 
board, as the case may be, and shall be in sub­
stantially the following form :

PETITION
TO: (Name of parish or municipal school board)

The undersigned qualified electors respectfully 
request that you call an election to submit, in the 
manner provided by law, to the qualified electors of
__________ Parish (or municipality in case the school
system is operated by a municipal school board), 
the following proposition:

TO AUTHORIZE T H E ....................PARISH (or
municipal) SCHOOL BOARD TO SUSPEND OR 
CLOSE THE OPERATION OF THE PUBLIC 
SCHOOL SYSTEM IN THE ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY GRADES IN SAID PARISH (or mu­
nicipality in case of a municipally operated school 
system).

Signature Address Date

Signatures may be made on more than one sheet



64

of paper but each such sheet of any such petition 
shall reproduce above the signatures the same matter 
as is on the first sheet. Each qualified elector sign­
ing such petition shall sign his or her own name in 
his or her own handwriting and shall write his or her 
address and the date on which his or her signature 
was affixed.

Section 4.

The petition, or petitions, shall be filed with the 
Registrar of Voters and when so filed shall become 
a public record and cannot be returned to the pro­
ponents or signers thereof.

The Registrar of Voters shall cause the petition 
to be published in the Official Journal of the parish 
or municipality, as the case may be, at the earliest 
possible time. The expense of such publication shall 
be paid by the school board to which the petition 
is addressed. Where multiple petitions are submitted, 
the portion appearing above the signatures shall be 
reproduced only once in the publication.

Section 5.

The Registrar of Voters shall examine the petition 
and attach thereto his sworn verification showing:

(1) The date the petition was filed in his office ;
(2) Copy of the Official Journal showing publica­

tion of the Petition;
(3) The number of qualified electors of the parish 

or municipality, as the case may be, on the registra­
tion rolls as of the date of the filing of the petition,



65

which date shall be used by him in ascertaining 
whether the petition contains the required number of 
signatures;

(4) That he has examined each signature for its 
genuineness by comparing the signature on the petition 
with the signature of the same person on the regis­
tration rolls;

(5) The total number of genuine signatures of 
qualified electors on the petition; and

(6) The number of signatures on said petition 
which are not genuine.

The said Registrar of Voters shall file the peti­
tion, with his sworn verification, with the school 
board to which it is addressed.

Section 6.

The school board with which the petition is filed 
by the Registrar of Voters shall endorse or cause to 
be endorsed thereon the day, month and year the 
petition was received by said board.

If the petition conforms to the provisions of this 
Act, said board shall order the election by proper 
resolution. Said resolution may be adopted at either 
a regular or special meeting of said board, held not 
less than ten (10) days after the date on which the 
petition was received from the Registrar of Voters.

Section 7.

When the election provided for in this Act has 
been ordered, the following propositions, and no others, 
shall be printed upon the ballot:



6 6

FOR the proposition to authorize th e ....................
Parish (or municipal) School Board to suspend or 
close the operation of the public school system in the 
elementary and secondary grades in said parish (or 
municipality in case of a municipally operated school 
system).

AGAINST the proposition to authorize the
..................... Parish (or municipal) School Board to
suspend or close the operation of the public school 
system in the elementary and secondary grades in 
said parish (or municipality in case of a municipally 
operated school system).

Voting machines shall be used in such election 
in the manner provided by the voting machine laws 
contained in Chapter 5 of Title 18 of the Louisiana 
Revised Statutes of 1950.

Section 8.

The election provided for in this Act shall be 
supervised by the Board of Supervisors of Elections 
for the parish in which the election is called. Said 
Board of Supervisors shall appoint three commissioners 
and one clerk to preside over the election at each 
polling precinct. These appointees shall be qualified 
electors and residents of the precinct in which they 
serve.

Section 9.

The board calling the election shall promulgate 
the result thereof by resolution adopted at its first 
regular or special meeting following the date of the



67

election and shall publish said result in the official 
Journal of the parish or municipality, as the case 
may be.

Section 10.

Except as otherwise specifically provided in this 
Act, the provisions of the general election laws of 
this state shall govern the call, conduct and promulga­
tion of the result of any election held pursuant to 
the authority contained in this Act.

Section 11.

Each parish or municipal school board which 
has suspended the operation of the public school sys­
tem in the elementary and secondary grades pursuant 
to the authority contained in this Act, may terminate 
such suspension and resume the operation of such 
school system only after having been authorized to 
do so by a further election to which all of the provi­
sions of this Act shall be applicable except that the 
propositions printed upon the ballot shall be as follows:

FOR the termination of the suspension of the 
operation of the public school system in the elemen­
tary and secondary grades in ..... ..............  Parish (or
municipality in case of a municipally operated school 
system).

AGAINST the termination of the suspension of 
the operation of the public school system in the 
elementary and secondary grades i n ....................Par­
ish (or municipality in case of a municipally operated 
school system).



6 8

Section 12,

Nothing contained in this Act shall operate or 
be construed to limit or impair the authority of any 
school board to provide school lunches, transporta­
tion of school children or grant-in-aid scholarships 
to children in attendance at private schools.

Section 13.

Any parish or city school boards may lease, sell, 
or otherwise dispose of, for cash or on terms of credit, 
any school site, building or facility not used or needed 
in the operation of any schools within its jurisdiction, 
on such terms and conditions and for such considera­
tion as the school board shall prescribe.

Section 14.

School boards, in parishes or municipalities in 
which such election to suspend or close the public 
schools is carried by a majority of the votes cast 
therein, may close their schools and may thereafter 
abolish school taxes, except such taxes as are dedicated 
and needed to service and retire their outstanding 
school bonds.

Section 15.

If any part or parts, Section, sentence, clause or 
phrase of this Act, or the application thereof, to any 
person or circumstance, is for any reason declared 
unconstitutional, such declaration shall not affect the 
validity of the remaining portions of this Act which 
shall remain in force as if such Act had been enacted 
with the unconstitutional part or parts, Section, sen­



69

tence, clause, phrase, or such application thereof elimi­
nated, and to this end the provisions of this Act are 
declared to be severable; and the Legislature of Lou­
isiana hereby declares that it would have enacted 
this Act if such unconstitutional part or parts had 
not been included herein, or if such application had 
not been made.

The provisions of this Act are in addition to other 
laws on the same subject matter and shall not be held 
to repeal same except in a case of conflict and then 
only to the extent of such conflict.

Section 16.

The necessity for the immediate passage of this 
Act having been certified by the Governor to the Legis­
lature while in session, in accordance with Section 27 
of Article III of the Constitution of Louisiana, this 
Act shall become effective immediately upon approval 
by the Governor.

Approved: February 20, 1961 at 11:35 A.M.



70

APPENDIX “C”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 

BATON ROUGE DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION No. 1068

Lawrence Hall, E t Al ., Plaintiffs

v.

St. Helena Parish School Board, A nd J. L.
Meadows, Superintendent, Defendants.

ORDER ADDING PARTIES DEFENDANT
IT APPEARING from the motion of the United 

States amicus cunae herein, that it is in the interest 
of justice to add as parties defendant in this action 
the STATE OF LOUISIANA; JIMMIE H. DAVIS, 
Governor of Louisiana; JACK P. F. GREMILLION, 
Attorney General of Louisiana; MURPHY J. RODEN, 
Director of Public Safety of Louisiana; DUNCAN S. 
KEMP, District Attorney of St. Helena Parish; and 
R. D. BRIDGES, Sheriff of St. Helena Parish,

IT IS ORDERED that each of them be and they 
are hereby added as parties defendant in this action, 
and the marshal is directed to serve upon each of 
them a copy of this order together with a copy of the 
motion and petition of the United States.

New Orleans, Louisiana, March 17th 1961.
/s /J . Skelly Wright
United, States District Judge

2605-B, 10-61