Turk v. Franklin Special School District Court Opinion
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October 4, 1982

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Case Files, Bozeman v. Pickens County Board of Education. Turk v. Franklin Special School District Court Opinion, 1982. 5a216633-f192-ee11-be37-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9ea49c5b-5c70-4f88-aad7-57118c1e5a05/turk-v-franklin-special-school-district-court-opinion. Accessed July 16, 2025.
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218 Tenn. 6{0 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER,2d SERIES ment. Finding that excuse inadequate the court said: "Should we infer good cause for noncom- pliance mer"ely fiom a mistake in ealen- daring or fiom inattendance to office chorcs, we would seriously undermine the policy of the rules." Id. Counsel's good faith mistaken belief that the filing of a petition for rehearing de- layed the time for filing a cost bill has also been held not to be sufficient to establish "good cause" for an untimely filing. Laf- fey v, Northwest Airlines, Inc,, 5Bl F.Zl f22l (D.C.Cir.r9?8); Stnrn v. Unitd Srares Gypsum, Inc., 6ffi F.zd 865 (?th Cir.l9??). In SCern, supn aL 866, the only excuse proffered was that "@unsel ,reasonably and in good faith believe[d] it was timely . . . when we attcmpted to file it.,', Moreover, in Laffey, supra at 12\ the D.C. Circuit stated that "the sincerity of counsel,s belief as to timeliness . . . does not constitute 'good cause."' t3] We neither approve or disappmve of the result in the Federal cases cited, but we are in accord with the proposition that a showing of good cause requires more than a mere good faith belief that a r.outine office chore has been timely performed. The ser- vice of a copy of the notice of appeal filed in the trial court, on counsel of record and the clerk of the appellate court may be classified as a routine office chore. t4] Thus we arc compelled to the conclu- sion that the mere good faith intention and belief that notices were sent at the appro- priate time does not provide good cause under Rule 2l(b) for permitting an act to be done after the expiration of the time pre- scribed in the rules. The judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal is affirmed for the reasono ststed hercin. Costs are adjudged against Barrett Pruperties, Inc COOPER, BROCK, HABBISON and DROWOTA, JJ., concur. Jane TUBIL Plalntiff-Appellec, v. FRANKLIN SPECIAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al, Defendants-Appellante. Supreme Court of Tennessee. Oct. 4, 1982. Rehearing Denied Oct. ?i, L982. Teacher appealed her dismissal by school board. The Chancery Court, Wil- liamson County, Henry Denmark Bell, Chancellor, rever,sed that action and rein- stated teacher, and school distilct appealed. The Supreme Court, Fones, C.J., held that: (l) it was fundamental eror for school board to consider previous automobile acci- dent, teacher's absentee record or superin- tendent's charge that she had alcohol prob lem that requir"ed her acknowledgement of same and treatment therefore, where those charges were not specified in writing prior to hearing, and (2) tenured teacher,s arrest and conviction for driving under the influ- ence, accepting uncontradicted background explanation by teacher, was insufficient to support dismissal. Affirmed and remanded. 1. Schools ef4l(5) In hearing charge of conduct unbesom- ing member of teaching profession, namely, driving while intoxicated, it was fundamen- tal enpr for school board to consider prcvi- ous automobile accident, teacher's ab,sentee record or superintendent's charge that she had alcohol problem that required her ac- knowledgement of same and treatment therefor, where those charges were not specified in writing prior to hearing. T.C.A. S 49-1414. 2. Schoole €f4f(4) Tenur.ed teacher's arest and conviction for driving under the influence, accepting TUR uncontradicted backgror teacher, was insufficient al of t€acher of plaintifl W. Henry Haile, Hai Nashville, for defendant James D. Petenen, P Yost, Franklin, for plair OPINI( FONES, Chief Justict This case involves th the charge brought ag tenured teacher, pt grounds to support her school system. The school board dism on her appeal to the Williamson County, th versed and she was nein teacher. On January 5, 1981, School Superintendent, t a statistical-type report a DUI charge against launched his own inve closed that Mrs. Turk ht DUI on September 13, day sentence had beer tioned upon her attenr school, and that she ha car automobile accident was not charged with a as a nesult of that incit Mrs. Turk in for a conf 1981, and gave her a cl quishing tenure and acc status and counselling I concluded was an alcol signing her position as She declined to do eithr 1981, Brown filed the fo the school board: "I charge Jane Turl in the Franklin Spa with conduct unbeco the teaching prrfessi while intoxiested on 13, 1980, on a public I ]ERIES L Pblntiff-Appellee, v. 'SPECIAL SCHOOL IBICT, ct el" ents-Appellants. )ourt of Tennessee. et. 4, 1982. )enied Oct. ?5,198P,. realed her dismissal by he Chancery Court, Wil- Henry Denmark Bell, rcd that action and rcin- d school district appealed. rrt, Fones, C.J., held that: rmental error for school prcvious automobile acci- sentee rccord or superin- ,hat she had alcohol prob her acknowledgement of nt therefore, where those specified in writing prior ) tenured teacher's arest 'driving under the influ- rcontradicted background rcher, was insufficient to remanded. 5) rge of conduct unbecom- ching prufession, namely, :icated, it was fundamen- bosrd to consider previ- rident, teacher'e aboentee :ndent's charge that she m that rrcquired her ac- I same and trcatment hoae charges were not ing prior to hearing. l) r'a anegt and conviction the influence, accepting uncontradicted background explanation by teacher, was insufficient to support dismiss- al of teacher of plaintiffs caliber. W. Henry Haile, Haile & Martin, P.A., Nashville, for defendants-appellants. James D. Petersen, Petensen, Buerger & Yost, Franklin, for plaintiff-appellee. OPINION FONES, Chief Justice. This case involves the issue of whether the charge brought against Mrs. Turk, a tenured teacher, provided sufficient grounds to support her dismissal from the school system. // The school board dismissed Mrs. Turk and on her appeal to the Chancery Court of Williamson County, that action was re- versed and she was reinstated as a tenured teacher. On January 5, 1981, James D. Brcwn, School Superintendent, read in a newspaper a statistical-type report of the disposition of a DUI charge against Mrs. Turk. Brown launched his own investigation that dis- closed that Mrs. Turk had been arrested for DUI on September 13, 1980, and a thirty day sentence had been suspended condi- tioned upon her attendance at a driving Echool, and that she had had a serious one car automobile accident on June 6, 1979, but was not charged with any violation of law as a rcsult of that incident. Brown ealled Mrr. Turk in for a conference in February, 1981, and gave her a choiee between relin- quishing tenure and accepting probationary status and counselling for what Brown had concluded was an alcohol problem, or re- signing her position as s tenured teacher. She declined to do either. On February 9, 1981, Brown filed the following charge with the school board: "I charge Jane Turk, a tenured teacher in the Franklin Special School District, with conduct unbecoming a member of the teaching profession, namely, driving while intoxicatcd on or about September 18, 1980, on a public highway in William- son County in violation of the laws of the State of Tennessee." Pursuant to Mrs. Turk's demand in ac- cord with T.C.A. S 49-1416, a hearing on that charge was held by the school board on March 23, 1981. Mrs. Turk had been a tenured teacher for about ten years and had recently gone thrrugh a separation and divorce from her husband, after approximately twenty years of marriage. She explained the events of Saturday, September 13, 1980, leading up to the DUI charge as follows: she had re- ceived a distress call from an old friend who also had a domestic problem, packed an overnight bag, and went to her friend's home. She had one strong vodka drink during a period of several hours while she visited her friend. Contrary to Mrs. Turk's understanding it developed that her friend's husband might return home that night, so Mrs. Turk departed to rcturn to her home after 9:fi) p.m. She had been on a crash diet, and on the way home she began to feel dizzy and pulled off the road. She miscal- culated and her right wheels ended up in a ditch. She remained in her vehicle in the ditch until two officers came by and upon investigation they charged her with driving while intoxicated. At the hearing before the board Mrs. Turk's attorney stated that Mrs. Turk would admit that she was driving under the influence of alcohol on September 13, 1980, as she had admitted to the Court when she was given a suspended sentence of thirty days with no fine. However, she took the position that that one incident that occurred on Saturday, not involving any third parties and having no nexus with her per{ormance as a third grade teacher, did not constitute conduct unbecoming a member of the tcaching profession in the legal sense, so as to justify dismissal. The school board attorney took the posi- tion that since Mrs. Turk had pled guilty to the factual portion of the charge, it was then appropriate on the issue of punishment to go into the details of the automobile accident that Mrs. Turk had in June, 1979, her absentee rccond, and whether or not she TURK v. FRANKLIN SPECLAL SCHOOL DIST. Tenn. 219 Clt. rs, T.nn- Clo S.wzd 2lt 220 Tenn. 640 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTE& 2d SERIES was an alcoholic or had a sufficient alcohol problem to reguire trcatment or counsel- ling. Despite continuous objections by Mrs. Turk's attorney that those charges wete not properly before the board, the chairman ignored his objections and allowed the board attorney full reign. As a result, the details of the June, 1979, accident were fully explored and the board's attorney thereafter rcferrcd to Mrs. Turk's "two DUI's." Brown was allowed to testify about Mn. Turk's absenteeism, which he described as the worst in the system, with- out noting that part of her absenteeism was attributable to the injuries she received in the 1979 accident and part as a r€sult of her not knowing her status following Brown's lodging of the charge on June 7, 1981. Brown was also allowed to testify as fol- lows: "But as I told Mrs. Turk in our second conference that anytime you have two charges . . . two accidents that are di- rectly related to a DUI, particularly with a penon that is as bright, as intelligent as Jane Turk, she has got a problem. And the only way that she can deal with that problem and the only way I can help her deal with that problem is that firtt she has to admit she has a prnoblem. But she was not willing to do that." The learned chancellor was of the opinion that the Board gave substantial considera- tion to the June, 1979, accident, but he concluded that even if the written charges had included that incident, there was no showing of a substantial adverse affect upon Mrs. Turk's capacity and fitness as a tcacher which would have justified her dis- charge. tU We are of the opinion that it was fundamental emor for the board to consider the June, 1979, accident, or her absentee rccord, or the superintendent's charge that she had an alcohol prublem that required her acknowledgement of same and treat- ment therefor, because those charges were not specified in writing prior to the hearing. T.C.A. S 49-1414 provides that when cherges arc made to a board of edueation seeking dismissal of a teacher, "the charges shall be made in writing specifically stating the offenses which arc charged." In Potts v. Gibson, % Tenn. 321, 469 S.W.2d 130 (197f) Special Justice McAmis writing for the Court interpretcd that statutory re- quirement as follows: "[t]he charges must be'specifically statcd with substantial certainty; yet the tech- nical nicety required in indictments is not necessary'. The procedure prescribed by the stat- ute is designed to insure the teacher a full hearing before the Boatd upon every issue under consideration by that body. To accomplish this the first essential is a notice sufficient in substance and form to fairly apprise the teacher of the charge against him and enable him to prepare his defense in advance of the hearing. 'Where the contents of the notice are ambiguous and obscurc, so that the teach- er is not clearly informed of the naturc of the charge, the notice is generally held insufficient.' City of Knoxville Board of &lucation v. Markelonis (1970), Tenn. App., 460 S.W.2d 362. To comport with notions of fair play and due process and to constitute notice in the legal sense the means employed should equal or exceed that which one desirous of actually informing the oppo- site party would employ. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust b.,339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 6512,94 L.&1. 865, cited in Burden v/ Burden, 44 Tenn.App. 312, 313 S.W.zd 566." Id. at 3?f,469 S.W.ZI at 13i|. IVe find that the board acted in flagrant disregard of the statutory rcquirement and fundamental fairness in considering mat- ters that should have been specifically charged in writing. l2l St"ipp"d of those charges, the Sep tember 13, 1980, incident, accepting as we must the uncontradicted background expla- nation of Mrs. Turk, was insufficient to support the dismissal of a tenurrcd teacher of Mrs. Turk's ealiber, as found by the chancellor, in which we @ncur. In that regard the chancellor found as follows: vol "It is further unool fore the June, 1fr19, a after through the SePt ing event and to the d petitioner discharged teacher capablY. Thn she was considercd to er by the suPerintend teacherc. She was v her students and thei spirational teacher. conviction in the news licity attendant to the charge her have so shows, had no adver capacity to maintain spect in her classes." The result in this cas strued as a ruling tht while intoxicated convir cumstances be deemec matter of law to suPl tenured teacher under I The judgment is affir is remanded to the Cha liamson County for anY that may be approPrir adjudged against tht School District. COOPER, BROCK, DROWOTA, JJ., concur -/-O\-[o I rntull\r VOLUNTEEB S INC" AP v. Marthe B. OIllEN, Revenue for thc Si et el" A1 Supreme C,ourt OcL 18, Taxpayer sought Commissioner of Reve ERIES rriting specifically stating h arc charged." In Potts rnn. 821, 469 S.W2d 180 rtice McAmis writing for rcted that statutory re- w8: rust be'apecifically stated certainty; yet the tech- rired in indictments is not : prescribed by the stat- to insure the teacher a re the Board upon every sideration by that body. ds the first essential is a in aubetance and form to Le teacher of the charge enable him to preparr his rce of the hearing. ntents of the notice are bscure, so that the teach- nformed of the nature of notice is generally held ty of Knoxville Bufi of larkelonis (1970), Tenn. 862. ith notions of fair play and to constitute notice se the means employed exceed that which one rlly informing the oppo- I employ. Mullane v. Bank & TYust b.,339 652,94 L.&1. 865, cited den, 4,[ Tenn.App. 812, Id. at 329, 469 S.W.zd board acted in flagrant rtutory requirement and ss in considering mat- have been specifically thooe charges, the Sep eident, accepting as we ictcd background expla- rk, was insufficient to rl of a tenured teacher iber, as found by the we ooncur. ire chancellor found as *"It i. further uncontradicted that be' fore the June, l9?9, accident and there- after through the September drunk driv' ing event and to the day of her discharge petitioner discharged her duties as a teacher capably. Thrtughout this period she was considered to be a capable teach- er by the superintendent and her fellow teachers. She was viewed bY manY of her students and their parents as an in' spirational teacher. The notice of her conviction in the newspaper and the pub- licity attcndant to the proceedings to dis' charge her have so far as the record shows, had no adverse effect upon her capacity to maintain discipline and re- spect in her classes." The result in this case is not to be con- strued as a ruling that a single driving while intoxicated conviction will in all cir' cumstances be deemed insufficient as a matter of law to support dismissal of a tenured teacher under the statute. The judgment is affirmed and this cause is remanded to the Chancery Court of Wil- liamson County for any further proceedinp that may be appropriate. The costs are adjudged against the Franklin Special School District. COOPER, BROCK, HARBISON and DROWOTA, JJ., concur. VOLUNTEER STRUCTURES, INC., Alpellant, Martha B. OISEN, Commiseloner of Revenue for the State of Tenneesee, et al, APPelleee. Supreme C,ourt of Tennegsee. Oct. 18, 1982. Taxpayer sought review of denial by Commissioner of Revenue of claim for re- VOLUNTEER STRUCTURES, INC. v. OISEN CltGrr, Tcntl'O{,SWrdzll Tenn. nl fund of sales and us€ taxes. The F4uity Court, Davidson Crcunty, Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr., Chancellor, entercd judgment dismiss' ing taxpayer's petition, and appeal was tak- en. The Supreme Court held that denial by the Commissioner of claim for refund of sales and use taxes paid was not subject to judicial rcview under Tennessee Uniform Administrative Prccedures Act. Affirmed. Taxation c=l3llS Denial by Commissioner of Revenue of claim for refund of sales and use taxes paid was not subject to juflicial review under Tennessee Uniform Administrative Proce' dures Act. T.C.A. SS a-$-f19(c), 67-2301, 67-2303 tn 67 -%112, 67-303i|' Hugh C. Howser, Sr., Hugh C. Howser, Jr., Edmund W. TurnleY, III, Howser, Thomas, Summers, BinkleY & Archer, Nashville, for appellant. Kathryn Behm C,elauro, Asst. Atty. Gen., William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellees. OPINION PER CURIAM. This appeal presents the primary ques- tion: Is the action of the Commissioner of Revenue denying a claim for rnefund of sales and use taxes paid subject to judicial re- view under the Tennessee Uniform Admin' istrative Procedures Act? The chancellor held it wa8 not and dismiss€d appellant'a petition. We affirm the action of the chan' cellor. Volunteer Structures, Incorporatcd filed a claim with the Commissioner of Revenue for refund of sales and use tax allegedly paid as "a Itsult of a miscalculation as to which of Volunteer's products wele subject to a gales tax." The claim was denied by the commissioner becauge no refunds had been made and no credits iseued to return