Alabama v. United States Motion to Dismiss or Affirm
Public Court Documents
January 1, 1970
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Alabama v. United States Motion to Dismiss or Affirm, 1970. 937b174f-b79a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/9f9efba8-81d6-4bbf-9e54-cd138a4067bb/alabama-v-united-states-motion-to-dismiss-or-affirm. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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I n t h e
Crntrt of % Inttefi Btntm
O ctobeb. T e r m , 1970
No. 732
S tate oe A labama, et al.,
v.
Appellants,
U n it e d S tates of A m erica , et al.,
Appellees.
on a ppea l fro m t h e u n it e d states district court
FO R T H E S O U T H E R N D IST R IC T OF ALABAMA
MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM
J ack Green berg
J am es M. N abrit , I I I
C h a rles S t e p h e n R alston
N orman C h a c h k in
L ow ell J o h n sto n
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019
V er n o n C rawford
A. J . C ooper, J r .
1407 Davis Avenue
Mobile, Alabama
Attorneys for Appellees
Ollie Mae Davis,
Betty Ann Davis,
James Allen Davis, and
Birdie Mae Davis
I N D E X
PAGE
Jurisdiction .................................................................... 1
Questions Presented ..................................................... 2
Statement ........................................... 2
A r g u m e n t
I. The Appeal Should Be Dismissed Because the
Case Was Not Required to Be Heard by a
Three-Judge Court ......................................... 6
II. The Decision Below Should Be Summarily
Affirmed as Clearly Correct .... 8
C o n c lu sio n .......................................................................................... 9
T able op A u t h o r it ie s
Cases:
Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962)......................... 6
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)..... 2
Carter v. West Feliciana School Board, 396 U.S. 226,
290 (1970) .................................................................... 4
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile
County, Oct. Term 1970, No. 436 .............................. 3
Ex Parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 361 (1940).......... . 6
Ex Parte Collins, 277 U.S. 565 (1928).......... ........... . 6
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,
391 U.S. 430 (1968) .......................................... ......... 2,3
11
PAGE
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)..................... 2
Jackson v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1968).......... 4
Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp.
458 (M.D. Ala, 1967) afPd sub nom. Wallace v.
United States, 389 U.S. 215 ................ .................... 3
Lee v. Macon County Board of Education (M.D. Ala.
Civ. No. 604-E) ........................................... ............... 4
Lee v. Nyquist, —— F. Supp.----- (Oct. 1, 1970)...... 8
Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970)..................... 7
North Carolina State Board of Education, et al. v.
Swann, et al., Oct. Term 1970, No. 498 ..................... 8
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co.,
292 U.S. 386 (1934) ....... ...... ........................ ............. 6
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)....................... 2
Rockefeller v. Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820
(1970) ........................................................................ 7
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. I l l (1965).............. 6
Statutes:
28 U.S.C. §1253 ...................................... ...................... 1
28 U.S.C. §2281 ............................................................ 2, 6
28 U.S.C. §2282 ...........................................................2, 6, 8
I n t h e
Supreme (Emut of % Intfrft £>tat?jg
O ctobeb T e r m , 1970
No. 732
S tate of A labama , et al.,
Appellants,
v.
U n ited S tates of A m er ic a , et al.,
Appellees.
O N A P P E A L FR O M T H E U N IT E D STA TES D IST R IC T COURT
FO R T H E S O U T H E R N D IS T R IC T OF ALABAMA
MOTION TO DISMISS OR AFFIRM
Appellees, pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rules of the Su
preme Court of the United States, move that the appeal
herein be dismissed on the ground that it is not within
the jurisdiction of the Court, or, in the alternative, move
that the final judgment and decree of the district court be
affirmed on the ground that it is manifest that the ques
tions are so unsubstantial as not to warrant further
argument.
Jurisdiction
Appellees submit that the Court does not have jurisdic
tion of a direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1253 because
the ease is not a “civil action, suit or proceeding required
by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a
district court of three judges” (emphasis added). Appel
lees’ argument in support of the contention that a three
judge court was not required appears infra in argument I.
2
Questions Presented
1. Whether the appeal should be dismissed on the ground
that no direct appeal from the district court is provided
where the case was not one required to be heard by a dis
trict court of three judges since the action was brought by
the State of Alabama to seek a declaratory judgment that
a state statute was constitutional and no injunction was
sought or granted as specified by either 28 U.S.C. §2281
or §2282?
2. Whether the judgment below that a part of the Ala
bama anti-bussing law was not constitutional should be
affirmed:
(a) on the ground that it violates the equal protection
clause by interfering with school boards’ affirmative duty
under Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
and Green v. County School Board of New Kent County,
391 U.S. 430 (1968), to eliminate dual school systems;
(b) on the ground that it effects a racial classification
which violates the principles stated in Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385 (1969), and in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967);
(c) on the ground that it violates the Supremacy Clause
by seeking to overturn the desegregation decisions of the
federal courts?
Statement
This is a direct appeal by the State of Alabama from an
order by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama dismissing a complaint filed by Ala
bama seeking a declaratory judgment that a state statute
was constitutional. The defendants in that action, appellees
here, are the United States of America, officials of the
3
United States Departments of .Justice and Health, Educa
tion and Welfare responsible for enforcing statutes relat
ing to school desegregation, and the individual plaintiffs in
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile. County,
Oct. Term 1970, No. 436. It is on behalf of these individuals
that the present Motion to Dismiss or to Affirm is filed.
This case arises in the context of continuing efforts to
disestablish segregated schools in Mobile County and
throughout the State of Alabama. The history of these
efforts need not be repeated here, and appellees refer the
Court to the brief for petitioners filed in Davis v. Board of
School Commissioners of Mobile County, No. 436, and to
the decision of the Middle District of Alabama in Lee v.
Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D.
Ala. 1967), aff’d, sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389
U.S. 215. Suffice it to say that early this year the State of
Alabama, acting through its legislature, embarked on yet
one more attempt1 to interfere with the desegregation of
its public schools.
The device this time was Act No. 1, Special Session of
the Alabama legislature 1970, approved on March 4, 1970.
The statute, as the court below recognized (see Appendix A
to the Jurisdictional Statement herein, p. 18) was an at
tempt to limit school systems to so-called “freedom-of-
choice” plans2 in the face of decisions of this Court (Green
v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430) and of orders of vari
ous district courts entered in conformance to Green and
decisions of the Fifth Circuit.
1 See, Lee v. Macon County, supra, for accounts of earlier and
equally abortive attempts.
2 Thus, the statute purports to prohibit not only pupil assign
ment to achieve desegregation, but also the establishment, re
organization, or maintenance, of any school district, school zone,
or attendance unit for the same purpose.
4
Following passage of Act No. 1, the Mobile County
School Board, relying on it, announced that it would not
obey the order of the Southern District of Alabama en
tered following the remand of the Davis case after this
Court’s decision in Carter v. West Feliciana School Board,
396 U.S. 226, 290. The District Court quite properly re
quired the school board to conform to its order and held
that Act No. 1 was no more than an unlawful attempt
of the State legislature to annul the judgments of courts
of the United States (see, App. B, Jurisdictional State
ment, p. 22). Similarly, the three-judge federal court sit
ting in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education (M.D.
Ala. Civ. No. 604-E), refused on three occasions to modify
school desegregation orders to allow school boards to con
tinue to operate freedom-of-choice plans in purported re
liance on Act No. 1 (see, App. A, Jurisdictional State
ment, p. 19, n. 16).
At this point, the State of Alabama, through its Attor
ney General, commenced the present action. In its com
plaint, the state sought a declaratory judgment that Act
No. 1 was constitutional, modification of pending orders
in school desegregation cases, and an injunction against
federal officers to require them to act in accordance with
the Act’s provisions. No attack on the constitutionality
of any federal statute was made, nor was any injunction
sought against the enforcement of any such statute.
The district judge requested the chief judge of the Fifth
Circuit to appoint a three-judge court which would deter
mine in the first instance whether such a court was required
to hear the case. This was in accordance with a standing
policy of the circuit adopted because of the numerous re
quests for three-judge courts in the circuit and the result
ing difficulties such requests had engendered. See, Jackson
v. Choate, 404 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1968). The three-judge
5
court convened, heard the matter, and unanimously con
cluded that a three-judge court was not required under any
applicable statute. Thus, it remanded the case to the orig
inal single district judge, who adopted the decision of the
three-judge panel that Act No. 1 was not constitutional
and therefore dismissed the complaint for declaratory re
lief (App. A, Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 20-21.)
However, out of “an abundance of caution” and in order
to avoid any delays in resolving the important issues in
volved, the other two judges concurred in the single judge’s
order to assure that an appeal could be perfected to what
ever court was appropriate {Ibid). Simultaneous notices
of appeals were filed to this Court and to the Fifth Circuit.
On motion of Appellants, the Court of Appeals has de
ferred action on the appeal to it pending disposition of the
appeal here.
On the merits the court below held that Act No. 1 was
clearly an attempt to nullify decisions of this Court and
lower federal courts requiring school districts to act af
firmatively to disestablish segregated school systems by
whatever means were necessary, by limiting boards to so-
called “freedom-of-choice” plans. Such an attempt to inter
pose the state and block orders of federal courts violated
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United
States (Article YI). Therefore, the declaration requested
by the state was denied and the action dismissed.
6
ARGUMENT
I.
The Appeal Should be Dismissed Because the Case
Was Not Required to Be Heard by a Three-Judge Court.
It is now axiomatic that the statutes dealing with three-
judge courts (and with appeals to this Court therefrom)
are to be narrowly construed against the necessity for
convening such courts. See, Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S.
31, 33 (1962). Taking that approach, it is clear that this
was not a case “required” to be heard by a three-judge
court under either 28 U.S.C. §2281 or §2282.
With respect to §2281 we point out four requisites for a
three-judge court which are settled by this court’s deci
sions :
1. There must be a request for an injunction to restrain
the enforcement of a “state statute.” Ex Parte Collins, 277
U.S. 565 (1928); Ex Parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940).
2. The injunction must be sought “upon the ground of
the unconstitutionality of such statute.” Swift & Co. v.
Wickham, 382 U.S. I l l (1965).
3. The suit must seek to restrain an “officer of such
State.” Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Packing
Co., 292 U.S. 386 (1934).
4. The suit must seek an injunction on the ground that
the statute itself is unconstitutional and not merely on the
ground that a statute has been used in an unconstitutional
manner. Ex Parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 361 (1940).
The present case does not satisfy any of these four requi
sites for a three-judge court under 28 U.S.C. §2281. We
7
examine the case in terms of the relief sought in the com
plaint and the relief granted in the court below.
The complaint filed by the State of Alabama did not
meet either the first or second requisites. There was no
claim or even suggestion that any state law should be
enjoined or that any state law was unconstitutional. On
the contrary, the state asserted the validity under the
federal constitution of Act No. 1 and claimed that it was
a basis for granting them relief. Thus, the action sought
(1) a declaration that the act was constitutional, and (2)
modification of school desegregation orders to conform
with the act.
Similarly, requisite three was not met, since the state
did not seek to restrain any state officers (the request for
an injunction against certain federal officers will be dis
cussed below). Bather, the whole object of the suit was
to permit state school officials to operate school systems
in certain ways. Finally, the fourth requisite wTas ipso
facto not fulfilled since no claim was made as to the un
constitutionality, on its face or as applied, of any state
statute.
Further, none of these requisites was fulfilled by any
of the responsive pleadings filed by the defendants in this
action. No cross-complaint was filed that challenged the
constitutionality of the statute or that asked for an in
junction against its enforcement. The lower court simply
denied the declaration requested by Alabama and there
fore dismissed the complaint. Since even a declaration of
unconstitutionality, without an injunction, is insufficient
to give this Court jurisdiction over a direct appeal (Rocke
feller v. Catholic Medical Center, 397 U.S. 820 (1970);
Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S. 427 (1970)), surely a re
fusal to give a declaration of constitutionality is not ap
pealable under §1253.
8
With respect to 28 U.S.C. §2282, it is likewise plain that
this action was not required to be heard by a three-judge
court. No injunction was sought against “any Act of
Congress for repugnance to the Constitution of the United
States.” Injunctive relief was sought against certain fed
eral officers, viz., officials of the Departments of Justice
and Health, Education and Welfare. However, the order
sought was to require those officers to conform their ac
tions to the requirements of the Alabama statute once it
had been held to be constitutional. No challenge whatso
ever to the constitutionality of any federal statute was
made by any party to this litigation.
II.
The Decision Below Should Be Summarily Affirmed
as Clearly Correct.
For the reasons set out above, appellees believe it is
clear that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal,
and it should be dismissed. However, if this Court does
reach the merits we believe the decision of the court below
should be summarily affirmed as clearly correct. We will
not here discuss at length the reasons for affirmance since
they have been presented fully to this Court in the case
of North Carolina State Board of Education, et al. v. Swann,
et al., Oct. Term 1970, No. 498. We respectfully refer the
Court to the Brief for Appellees in that case, to the deci
sion below herein, and to the decision of the Western Dis
trict of New York in Lee v. Nyquist,----- F. Supp. ------
(October 1, 1970), which struck down the New York statute
on which the Alabama statute in question here was modeled
(Copies of the decision in Lee v. Nyquist have been filed
with this Court in No. 498).
9
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the appeal should be dis
missed for want of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, the
decision below should be affirmed without further briefing
or argument.
Respectfully submitted,
J ack G reenberg
J am es M. N abr.it , III
C h a rles S t e p h e n R alston
N orm an C h a c h k in
L ow ell J o h n sto n
10 Columbus Circle
Suite 2030
New York, New York 10019
V er n o n Crawford
A. J . C ooper , J r.
1407 Davis Avenue
Mobile, Alabama
Attorneys for Appellees
Ollie Mae Davis,
Betty Ann Davis,
James Allen Davis, and
Birdie Mae Davis
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