Baskin v. Brown Appendix for Appellants

    APPENDIX FOR APPELLANTS

United States Court of Appeals
FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 586

W. P. BASKIN, et al., A ppellants,

versus

DAVID BROWN, on b eh a lf o f h im self a n d  o th e rs  similarly 
s itu a ted , A ppellee

On A ppeal from t h e  D istrict Court of t h e  U nited  S tates 
for t h e  E astern D istrict of S outh  Carolina

EUGENE S. BLEASE, 
Newberry, S. C.,

SIDNEY S. TISON, 
Bennettsville, S. C.,

GEORGE WARREN, 
Hampton, S. C.,

ROBERT MeC. FIGG, JR., 
Charleston, S. C.,

Attorneys for Appellants.

The R. L. Bryan Company, Legal Printers, Columbia, S. C.



INDEX TO APPENDIX
P age

Complaint.......................................... ............................  1

Temporary Restraining Order and Rule to Show Cause 
for Preliminary Injunction ....................................  14

Return to Rule to Show Cause Filed by Appellants . . . .  17

Testimony of David Brown, Given July 16, 1948 .........  21

Opinion Dated July 19, 1948 ..................... . .;............. 29

Order, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Dated 
July 19, 1948 ...........................................................  44

Order Amending Temporary Injunction, Dated July 22, 
1948 ........................... ................... .'......................... 53

Answer of Appellants, Filed July 29, 1948 ......... ..........  55

Affidavit of Appellant John E. Stansfield, Filed October 
20, 1948 ..........   62

Transcript of Hearing Held October 22, 1948 ..............  68

Order Dated October 22, 1948 ...................................... 69

Stipulation Filed November 23, 1948 ............................. 71

Opinion Dated November 26,1948 ...................... ............  74

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Dated 
November 26, 1948 ..................................................  80



APPENDIX FOR APPELLANTS

United States Court of Appeals
FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 586

W . P. B A S K IN , et  al., A ppellants, 

versus

DAVID BROWN, on behalf of himself and others similarly 
s itu a te d , A ppellee

On A ppeal from t h e  D istrict Court of th e  U nited  S tates 
for t h e  E astern D istrict of S outh  Carolina

COMPLAINT
1. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under sub­

division 1 of Section 41 of Title 28 of the United States 
Code, this being an action at law which arises under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, viz., Sections 
2 and 4 of Article I, and Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen 
and Seventeen of said Constitution and Sections 31 and 
43 of Title 8 of the United States Code, wherein the matter 
in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the 
sum of $3,000.00. The jurisdiction of this Court is also 
invoked under subdivision 11 of Section 41 of Title 28 of 
the United States Code, this being an action to enforce the 
right of a citizen of the United States to vote in the State 
of South Carolina. The jurisdiction of this Court is further



2 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

invoked under subdivision 14 of Section 41 of Title 28 of 
the United States Code, this being an action at law au­
thorized by law to be brought to redress the deprivation 
under color of law, statute, regulation, custom and usage 
of a state of rights, privileges and immunities secured by 
the Constitution of the United States, viz., Sections 31 and 
43 of Title 8 of the United States Code, all of which will 
appear more fully hereafter.

2. Plaintiff shows further that this is a proceeding 
for a declaratory judgment and an injunction under Section 
400 of Title 28 of the United States Code (Section 274d of 
the Judicial Code) for the purpose of determining a ques­
tion in actual controversy between the parties, to wit, the 
question whether the practice of the defendants in enforcing 
and maintaining the policy, custom and usage by which 
plaintiff and other Negro citizens similarly situated who 
are qualified electors are denied the right to enroll as mem­
bers of the Democratic Party of South Carolina; and are 
required to present general election certificates before 
voting in primary elections in South Carolina while en­
rolled members of the Democratic Party of South Carolina 
are not required to produce such certificates before voting 
in said primary elections; and as a condition precedent to 
voting in said primary elections are required to take an 
unreasonable oath, which oath has no direct bearing what­
soever upon the qualifications of the elector to participate 
in said primary elections, solely on account of their race or 
color, violates Sections 2 and 4 of Article I and Amend­
ments Fourteen, Fifteen and Seventeen to the Constitution 
of the United States.

3. All parties to this action, both plaintiff and defend­
ants, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
of South Carolina and are resident and domiciled in said 
state.

4. The plaintiff, David Brown, is a Negro, and native- 
born citizen of the United States and is more than twenty- 
one years of age, and a resident of Beaufort County, South 
Carolina, continuously for a period of more than fifty years



Appendix 3

prior to August, 1948, and lias in his possession a poll tax 
receipt. Plaintiff at all times mentioned herein was and is 
a duly and legally qualified elector under the Constitution 
and laws of the United States and of the State of South 
Carolina, and is subject to none of the disqualifications pro­
vided for voting under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States or of the State of South Carolina. Plaintiff 
is a believer in the tenets of the Democratic Party, has 
never voted for any candidates other than those of the 
Democratic Party, and meets all lawful requirements for 
enrollment in the Democratic Party of South Carolina and 
for voting in the Democratic primary of South Carolina.

5. This is a class action authorized by rule 23A of the 
Rules of Civil Procedure of the District Courts of the 
United States. The rights involved are of common and gen­
eral interest to the members of the class represented by 
the plaintiff, namely, Negro citizens of the United States, 
and residents of the State of South Carolina similarly- 
situated who are duly qualified electors under the Consti­
tution and laws of the United States and of the State of 
South Carolina and who meet all the lawful requirements 
for membership in the Democratic Party of South Carolina 
and to vote in the Democratic primaries of South Carolina 
and who are prevented from exercising their right to par­
ticipate in the elections of South Carolina solely because of 
their race and color. The members of the class are so 
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all 
before the court and for this reason plaintiff prosecutes this 
action in his own behalf and on behalf of the class without 
specifically naming said members herein.

6. Defendant, W. P. Baskin is State Chairman of the 
Democratic Party of South Carolina exercising its authority 
and enforcing the rules of the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina. Defendants J. Moore Mars, John E. Stansfield, 
W. T. Riley, Sr., Cal H. Strickland, J. K. Mayfield, Edgar 
A. Brown, W. Brantley Harvey, Rembert C. Dennis, J. A. 
Merritt, Oliver T. Wallace, Joe H. Hall, R. B. Caldwell, 
Ed. Redfearn, C. N. Plowden, J. M. Moorer, C. W. Coker, 
R. W. Scott, J. D. Parler, W. P. Yonce, Boyd Brown, H..



4 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

Van Epps, H. L. Smith, R. A. Jolley, P. R. Underwood, 
Randolph Murdaugh, F. A. Thompson, H. Klugh Purdy, 
N. S. Richards, James S. Wilson, James H. Sullivan, W. 
P. Basldn, Boyd Smith, J. Ivendree Williams, N. W. Edens, 
H. C. Brown, Dr. Y. M. Brown, Dr. W. A. Strickland, Julian 
S. Wolfe, G. Max Perry, Homer R. Long, Howard MeCravy, 
E. B. Boyle, R. A. Lybrand, E. L. Ard, W. B. Wilson, are 
members of the State Committee of the Democratic Party 
of South Carolina exercising its authority and enforcing 
the rules of the Democratic Party of South Carolina.

7. Defendants James P. Nickles, Abbeville County, 
Julian B. Salley, Jr., Aiken County, W. T. Riley, Sr., Al­
lendale County, E. H. Agnew, Anderson County, J. Carl 
Kearse, Bamberg County, Edgar A. Brown, Barnwell Coun­
ty, J. B. Cope, Beaufort County C. N. Clarke, Berkeley 
County, II. C. Geiger, Calhoun County, Francis F. Coleman, 
Charleston County, H. R. Swink, Cherokee County, W. C. 
Stone, Chester County, John A. Welsh, Jr., Chesterfield 
County, John G. Dinkins, Clarendon County, R. A. Durham, 
Colleton County, Cecil E. Harper, Darlington County, W. 
B. Hawkins, Dillon County, Joseph A. Kirby, Dorchester 
County, J. R. Folk, Edgefield County, T. K. McDonald, 
Fairfield County, Hugh L. Willcox, Florence, County, H. 
S. Parsons, Georgetown County, C. Victor Pyle, Greenville 
County, S. L. Brissie, Greenwood County, J. Herman Light- 
sey, Hampton County, J. C. Lewis, Horry County, H. Klugh 
Purdy, Jasper County, L. 0. Funderburk, Kershaw County, 
Lewis M. Clyburn, Lancaster County, James P. Sloan, 
Laurens County, Henry C. Jennings, Lee County, H. Odelle 
Harmon, Lexington County, W. B. Norton, Marion County, 
J. J. Evans Marlboro County, J. Fred Buzhardt, McCor­
mick County, B. V. Chapman, Newberry County, B. B. 
Mulkey, Oconee County, Rut L. Osborne, Orangeburg Coun­
ty, Julien D. Wyatt, Pickens County, Billy C. Coleman, 
Saluda County, Jesse W. Boyd, Spartanburg County, 
Shepard K. Nash, Sumter County, J. F. Walker, Union 
County, F. R. Hemingway, Williamsburg County, John M. 
Spratt, York County, are county chairmen of the Demo­
cratic party for their respective counties) exercising its



Appendix 5

authority and enforcing the rales of the Democratic party 
of South Carolina.

8. For many years the Democratic party of South 
Carolina has completely controlled the selection of federal 
and state officers. Since 1900 every Governor, member of 
the General Assembly, United States Representative and 
United States Senator for the State of South Carolina, 
elected by the people of South Carolina in the General 
Elections, was the nominee of the then existing Democratic 
party of South Carolina. During the past twenty-five years 
the Democratic party of South Carolina has been the only 
political party in that state to hold state-wide primaries for 
the selection of candidates for federal and state offices.

9. The only material and realistic elections in South 
Carolina are the Democratic Primaries. The only elections 
at which plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues can 
make a meaningful choice and exercise their right to vote 
are the Democratic primaries. The Democratic primary in 
South Carolina is an integral part of the election machinery 
of South Carolina.

10. The Democratic party of South Carolina is an or­
ganization acting for and on behalf of the people of South 
Carolina. The primary conducted by said organization for 
and on behalf of the people of South Carolina is the only 
election where the plaintiff and other qualified electors can 
express a meaningful choice in selecting federal and state 
officers. The defendants in performing their duties as officers 
of the Democratic party of South Carolina, including the 
conducting of primary elections, are performing an im­
portant governmental function essential to the exercise 
of sovereignty by the people and in doing so are subject to 
the provisions of the United States Constitution.

11. The Democratic party of South Carolina consists 
of clubs organized in each township, ward, voting precinct 
or other subdivision of the state. The members of these 
clubs are limited to white Democrats. At regular local club 
meetings, officers are elected, including county executive 
committee members, from each club and also the delegates



6 Baskin et a l, Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

to county conventions. County conventions are held in each 
county in the state where the delegates elect from its con­
vention officers, members of the state committee, and 
delegates to the state convention. The state convention is 
held shortly thereafter and these delegates from the county 
organizations eleet their presiding officers and the chairman 
of the state committee which is composed of one committee­
man from each county. At this convention rules and regu­
lations for the conduct of the party and primaries are 
adopted.

12. On the 19th of May, 1948 the regular convention of 
the Democratic party was held in Columbia, S. C. and at 
this convention rules were adopted in place of the con­
stitution and rules of the party previously in force. These 
rules are now in full force and effect. The present rules 
of the Democratic party of South Carolina adopted May 
19, 1948 provide the following qualifications for club mem­
bership :

“ 6. Qualifications for club membership in any club 
of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, shall be 
as follows, viz.: The applicant for membership shall 
be twenty-one (2 1) years of age, or shall become so 
before the succeeding general election, and be a white 
democrat, who subscribes to the principles of the Demo­
cratic Party of South Carolina, as declared by the State 
Convention. Pie shall be a citizen of the United States 
and of the State of South Carolina, and shall be able 
to read and write and interpret the Constitution of the 
State of South Carolina. No person shall belong to 
any club unless he has been a resident of the State of 
South Carolina for two (2) years, of the County for 
six (6) months prior to the succeeding general election, 
and of the club district sixty (60) days prior to the 
first primary following his offer to enroll. Provided, 
that public school teachers, and ministers of the gospel 
in charge of a regular organized church, shall be exempt 
from the provisions of this rule as to residence, if 
otherwise qualified.”



Appendix 7

13. The present rules of the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina adopted May 19, 1948 provide the following quali­
fications for voting in the primary elections:

“ 7. All duly enrolled club members are entitled 
to vote in the precinct of their residence, if they take 
the oath required of voters in the primary; and in 
conformity with the Order of Judge J. Waites Waring, 
United States District Judge, in the case of Elmore, 
etc., vs. Rice, et al., all qualified Negro electors of the 
State of South Carolina are entitled to vote in the pre­
cinct of their residence, if they present their general 
election certificates and take the oath required of voters 
in the primary. ’ ’
14. The present rules of the Democratic Party of South 

Carolina adopted May 19, 1948 provide the following oath 
to be taken by electors:

“ 36. The managers at each box shall require every 
voter to sign and deliver to them, before the voter casts 
his or her ballot, the following Voter’s Oath, which 
shall be filed and kept by the County Secretary as a 
permanent record:

‘I do solemnly swear that I am a resident of this 
club district, that I am duly qualified to vote in this 
primary under the rules of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, and that I have not voted before in 
this primary, and that I am not disqualified from voting 
under Section 2267 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 
1942, relating to disqualifying crimes.

I further solemnly swear that I believe in and will 
support the principles of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, and that I believe in and will support 
the social and educational separation of races.

I further solemnly swear that I believe in the 
principles of States’ Rights, and that I am opposed 
to the proposed Federal so-called F. E. P. C. law.

I further solemnly swear that I will support the 
election of the nominees of this primary in the ensuing



8 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

general election, and that I am not a member of any 
other political party.

Voter
15. The plaintiff is informed and believes and therefore 

avers that Defendant W. P. Baskin acting as State Chair­
man of the Democratic party of South Carolina, defendant 
members of the state committee of said party, defendant 
county chairmen of said party and others whose names 
are unknown to this plaintiff have conspired together to 
deprive plaintiff and other Negroes similarly situated of the 
effective exercise of their right to vote within the meaning 
of the United States Constitution. In furtherance of this 
conspiracy the defendants acting in concert adopted rules, 
including those set out in paragraphs 12-14 above, for the 
conduct of the party and its primaries have deprived the 
plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues the effective 
exereise of their right to vote. Unless redress is obtained 
from this Court defendants while acting in concert will 
continue to deprive plaintiff and others on whose behalf 
he sues of the effective exercise of their right to vote solely 
because of race and color and in violation of the Consti­
tution of the United States and for the deliberate purpose 
of discriminating against plaintiff and others on whose 
behalf he sues solely because of race and color and in the 
face of the clear mandates of this and other Federal Courts.

16. The rule of the Democratic Party of South Caro­
lina permitting enrolled members, which is restricted to 
white members, to vote in primary elections while requiring 
all Negro electors to present general election certificates 
as a prerequisite to voting is based solely on race or color, 
is an unequal application of 'rules for qualification for 
voting, is an unreasonable burden and limitation on the 
right to vote and is in violation of Article I  and Amend­
ments Fourteen, Fifteen and Seventeen of the Constitution 
of the United States and Sections 31 and 43 of Title 8 of 
the United States Code.

17. In denying to the plaintiff and other Negroes sim­
ilarly situated the right to enroll in said party clubs solely



Appendix 9

because of race and color, the defendants have effectively 
limited the right of plaintiff and others similarly situated 
to vote in primary elections to select federal and state 
officers without first producing general election certificates 
and have limited their otherwise participation in the election 
machinery of the State of South Carolina in violation of 
Article I and Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen and Seven­
teen of the Constitution of the United States and Sections 
31 and 43 of the United States Code.

18. The oath required of voters in primary elections 
“ that I  believe in and will support the social and educa­
tional separation of races” and “ I further solemnly swear 
that I believe in the principles of States’ Rights, and that 
I  am opposed to the proposed Federal so-called F. E. P. C. 
law” ’ is aimed directly at continuing the disfranchisement 
of plaintiff and other qualified Negro electors despite prior 
rulings of this and other Federal Courts, and is a test 
not relevant to qualifications to vote, is an unreasonable 
term and condition for the exercise of the right of suffrage, 
is based on race and color and is in violation of Article 
I and Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen and Seventeen of the 
United States Constitution and Sections 31 and 43 of Title 
8 of the United States Code.

19. The defendants and each of them are enforcing and 
will continue to enforce the rules of the Democratic party 
of South Carolina including those rules set out in para­
graphs 12-14 above and have refused to permit Negroes to 
enroll in said clubs and Democratic party and will require 
all Negro electors to produce general election certificates 
as a prerequisite to voting in the primary of August 10th 
and subsequent primaries, and will require all Negro elec­
tors to take the oath set out in paragraph 14 of this com­
plaint, all in violation of Article I and Amendments 
Fourteen, Fifteen and Seventeen of the Constitution of 
the United States and Sections 31 and 43 of Title 8 of the 
United States Code.

20. On August 10, 1948, the Democratic party of South 
Carolina will conduct a state-wide Democratic primary for



10 Baskin et a l, Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

the selection of nominees for state and federal offices. This 
primary will be conducted by the defendants as a part of 
the election machinery of the State of South Carolina, and 
unless redress is obtained from this Court, will be conducted 
pursuant to the rules of the Democratic party of South 
Carolina including those rules set out in paragraphs 12-14 
above.

21. Pursuant to the rules of the Democratic party of 
South Carolina as enforced by the defendants, plaintiff 
although previously enrolled as a member of the local club 
of Beaufort, S. C., was “ purged” from the enrollment books 
on or about July 2, 1948. As a result of this action pursuant 
to instructions of the defendants, plaintiff and others simi­
larly situated will be required to produce a general election 
certificate before being permitted to vote in the primary 
on August 10th and will be required to take the oath set 
out above in paragraph 14 all in violation of rights guaran­
teed by Article I and Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen and 
Seventeen of the United States Constitution and Sections 
31 and 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code.

22. There is between the parties an actual controversy 
as set forth above.

23. The defendants by their illegal and wrongful acts 
complained of herein damaged this plaintiff in the sum of 
and to the extent of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars.

24. The plaintiff and others similarly situated and 
affected, on whose behalf this suit is brought, are suffering 
irreparable injury and are threatened with irreparable in­
jury in the future by reason of the acts herein complained 
of; they have no plain adequate or complete remedy to 
redress the wrong and illegal acts herein complained of 
other than this action for damages, and injunction; any 
other remedy to which plaintiff and those similarly situated 
could be remitted would be attended by such uncertainties 
and delays as to deny substantial relief, would involve 
multiplicity of suits, and would cause further irreparable 
injury, damage, vexation and inconvenience to the plaintiff 
and those similarly situated.



Appendix 11

25. Under the practice, custom and usage now being 
enforced by the defendants the plaintiff and others on whose 
behalf he sues are prevented from enrolling in the Demo­
cratic clubs of South Carolina and, unless a temporary 
restraining order is issued by this Court immediately, the 
rights of plaintiff and other qualified Negroes to enroll will 
be forever lost insofar as the August 10th election is con­
cerned. The defendants are enforcing and will continue to 
enforce the rules of the Democratic party of South Carolina 
including the rules set out in paragraphs 12-14 above and 
unless this Court issues a temporary restraining order im­
mediately the rights of plaintiff and others on whose behalf 
he sues to participate in the election machinery of South 
Carolina this year will receive irreparable injury.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays the Court 
that upon filing of this complaint, as may appear proper 
and convenient to the Court:

1. That this Court issue an order to the defendants and 
each of them to show cause why a preliminary injunction 
should not be issued restraining defendants and each of 
them, their agents, and employees from refusing to enroll 
Negroes as members of local clubs and the Democratic party 
of South Carolina solely because of race and color; and 
from denying to plaintiff and others on whose behalf he 
sues from full and complete participation in the Democratic 
party of South Carolina without distinction because of race 
and color; and from enforcing the rules of the Democratic 
party of South Carolina requiring Negro electors to pre­
sent general election certificates as a prerequisite to voting 
in the August 10th primary election; and from requiring 
the plaintiff and other Negro electors to take the following 
oath as a prerequisite to voting in said primary election:

“ I do solemnly swear that I am a resident of this 
club district, that I am duly qualified to vote in this 
primary under the rules of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, and that I have not voted before in this 
primary, and that I am not disqualified from voting 
under Section 2267 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 
1942, relating to disqualifying crimes.



12 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

I further solemnly swear that I believe in and will 
support the principles of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, and that I believe in and will support 
the social and educational separation of races.

I further solemnly swear that I believe in the 
principles of States’ Eights, and that I am opposed to 
the proposed Federal so-called F. E. P. C. law.

I further solemnly swear that I will support the 
election of the nominees of this primary in the ensuing 
general election, and that I am not a member of any 
other political party.

Votor
2. That this Court issue a temporary restraining order 

restraining defendants and each of them, their agents and 
employees from refusing to enroll Negroes as members of 
local clubs and the Democratic party of South Carolina 
solely because of race and color; and from denying to 
plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues from full and 
complete participation in the Democratic party of South 
Carolina without distinction because of race and color.

3. That this Court adjudge and decree, and declare the 
rights and legal relations of the parties to the subject matter 
in controversy, in order that such declaration shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

4. That this Court issue a permanent injunction for­
ever restraining and enjoining defendants and each of them, 
their agents and employees from refusing to enroll Negroes 
as members of local clubs and the Democratic party of 
South Carolina solely because of race and color; and from 
denying to plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues 
from full and complete participation in the Democratic 
party of South Carolina without distinction because of race 
and color; and from enforcing the rules of the Democratic 
party of South Carolina requiring Negro electors to present 
general election certificates as a prerequisite to voting in 
the August 10th primary election; and from requiring the



Appendix 13

plaintiff and other Negro electors to take the following 
oath as a prerequisite to voting in said primary election:

“ I do solemnly swear that I am a resident of this 
club district, that I am duly qualified to vote in this 
primary under the rules of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, and that I have not voted in this pri­
mary, and that I am not disqualified from voting under 
Section 2267 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1942, 
relating to disqualifying crimes.

I further solemnly swear that I believe in and will 
support the principles of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, and that I believe in and will support 
the social and educational separation of races.

I further solemnly swear that I believe in the 
principles of States’ Eights, and that I am opposed to 
the proposed Federal so-called F.E.P.C. law.

I further solemnly swear that I will support the 
election of the nominees of this primary in the ensuing 
general election, and that I am not a member of any 
other political party.

Voter
5. That the plaintiff have judgment for Five Thousand 

($5,000.00) Dollars damages.
6. That this Court will allow such costs herein, and 

such further, other additional or alternative relief as may 
appear to the Court to be just and equitable in the
premises.

CONSTANCE BAKER 
MOTLEY,

20 West 40th Street, 
New York, New York. 

Of Counsel

HAROLD R. BOULWARE, 
1109% Washington Street, 

Columbia, S. C. 
EDWARD R. DUDLEY,

20 West 40th Street,
New York, New York. 

THIJRGOOD MARSHALL, 
20 West 40th Street,

New York, New York. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

(Verification by Appellee omitted.)



14 Baskin et al.. Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND RULE TO 
SHOW CAUSE FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

It appearing from the verified complaint herein that 
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, and damage will 
result to plaintiffs before notice can be served and a hearing 
had on the application for a temporary restraining order 
contained in said complaint if defendants are not restrained 
from denying plaintiffs herein their right to enroll in the 
Democratic party clubs in the State of South Carolina on 
the same terms as white Democrats; and from denying 
plaintiffs their right to full and equal participation in the 
Democratic party primary to be conducted by defendants 
in the State of South Carolina on the second Tuesday in 
August, 1948, which primary is the only effective election 
held in that state for the election of state and federal offi­
cers; and from denying plaintiffs their right to the equal 
protection of the laws; and from denying plaintiffs their 
constitutionally protected right to vote free from any dis­
abilities because of race and color; and it appearing that 
the said defendants have ousted plaintiffs from membership 
in said Democratic party clubs and will continue to ex­
clude plaintiff and other Negroes unless restrained, and 
if such acts are committed by defendants, plaintiffs’ con­
stitutionally protected right to vote in said election will be 
irretrievably lost, and plaintiffs will be denied the equal 
protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and rights guaranteed by Article One and the 
Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution; and will 
be denied their constitutionally protected right to vote in 
said election solely because of their race and color, to the 
irreparable injury of plaintiffs, and in such case any judg­
ment which this Court may later issue on plaintiffs’ appli­
cations for a preliminary injunction or for a permanent in­
junction will be ineffective, it is

ORDERED, that defendants be and they are hereby 
ordered to show cause at 10:00 A.M. of the 16th day of 
July, 1948, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, 
why a preliminary injunction should not be granted herein, 
restraining the defendants, W. P. Baskin, James P. Nicldes,



Appendix 15

J. Moore Mars, Julian B. Salley, Jr., John E. Stansfield, 
W. T. Riley, Sr., E. H. Agnew, Cal H. Strickland J. Carl 
Kearse, J. K. Mayfield, Edgar A. Brown, J. B. Cope, W. 
Brantley Harvey, C. N. Clarke, Rembert C. Dennis, H. C. 
Geiger, J. A. Merritt, Francis F. Coleman, Oliver T. Wal­
lace, H. R. Swink, Joe H. Hall, W. C. Stone, R. B. Caldwell, 
John A. Welsh, Jr., Ed. Redfearn, John G. Dinkins, C. N. 
Plow den, R. A. Durham, J. M. Moorer, Cecil E. Harper, 
C. W. Coker, W. B. Hawkins, R. W. Scott, Joseph A. Kirby, 
J. D. Parler, J. R. Folk, W. P. Yonce, T. K. McDonald, 
Boyd Brown, Hugh L. Willcox, H. Van Epps, H. S. Par­
sons, H. L. Smith, C. Victor Pyle, R. A. Jolley, S. L. Brissie, 
P. R. Underwood, J. Herman Lightsey, Randolph Mur- 
daugh, J. G. Lewis, F. A. Thompson, H. Ivlugh Purdy, 
L. 0. Funderburk, N. S. Richards, Lewis M. Clyburn, James
S. Wilson James P. Sloan, James H. Sullivan, Henry C. 
Jennings, H. Odelle Harmon, Boyd Smith, W. B. Norton, 
J. Kendree Williams, J. J. Evans, N. W. Edens, J. Fred 
Buzhardt, H. C. Brown, B. V. Chapman, Dr. Y. M. Brown, 
B. B. Mulkey, Dr. W. A. Strickland, Rut L. Osborne, Julian 
S. Wolfe, Julien D. Wyatt, G. Max Perry, Billy C. Coleman, 
Homer R. Long, Jesse W. Boyd, Howard McCravy, Shepard 
Iv. Nash, E. B. Boyle, J. F. Walker, R. A. Lybrand, F. R. 
Hemingway, E. L. Ard, John M. Spratt, W. B. Wilson, 
their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all per­
sons in active concert or participation with them, from 
denying plaintiffs the right to enroll in the Democratic 
party clubs on the same terms as white Democrats; and 
from denying plaintiffs full and equal participation in the 
Democratic party primary to be held in the State of South 
Carolina on the second Tuesday in August, 1948; and from 
denying plaintiffs their constitutionally protected right to 
vote; and it is further

ORDERED, that until and including the 16th day of 
July, 1948, or until the further order of this Court, de­
fendants W. P. Baskin, James P. Nickles, J. Moore Mars, 
Julian B. Salley, Jr., John E. Stansfield, W. T. Riley, Sr., 
E. H. Agnew, Cal H. Strickland, J. Carl Kearse, J. K. 
Mayfield, Edgar A. Brown, J. B. Cope, W. Brantley Harvey,



16 Baskin et a,l., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

C. N. Clarke, Kembert C. Dennis, H. C. Geiger, J. A. Merritt, 
Francis F. Coleman, Oliver T. Wallace, H. E. Swink, Joe 
H. Hall, W. C. Stone, E. B. Caldwell, John A. Welsh, Jr., 
Ed. Eedfearn, John G. Dinkins, C. N. Plowden, E. A. 
Durham, J. M. Moorer, Cecil E. Harper, C. W. Coker, W. B. 
Hawkins, E. W. Scott, Joseph A. Kirby, J. D. Parler, J. E. 
Folk, W. P. Yonce, T. K. McDonald, Boyd Brown, Hugh 
L. Willcox, H. Van Epps, H. S. Parsons, H. L. Smith, 
C. Victor Pyle, E. A. Jolley, S. L. Brissie, P. E. Underwood, 
J. Herman Lightsey, Bandolph Murdaugh, J. G. Lewis, 
F. A. Thompson, H. Klugh Purdy, L. 0. Funderburk, 
N. S. Eichards, Lewis M. Clyburn, James S. Wilson, James 
P. Sloan, James H. Sullivan, Henry C. Jennings, H. Odelle 
Harmon, Boyd Smith, W. B. Norton, J. Kendree Williams, 
J. J. Evans, N. W. Edens, J. Fred Buzhardt, H. C. Brown, 
B. V. Chapman, Dr. Y. M. Brown, B. B. Mulkey, Dr. W. A. 
Strickland, But L. Osborne, Julian S. Wolfe, Julien D. 
Wyatt, G. Max Perry, Billy C. Coleman, Homer E. Long, 
Jesse W. Boyd, Howmrd McCravy, Shepard K. Nash, E. B. 
Boyle, J. F. Walker, E. A. Lybrand, B. E. Hemingway, 
E. L. Ard, John M. Spratt, W. B. Wilson, their agents, 
servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active 
concert or participation with them, are hereby restrained 
from denying plaintiffs the right to enroll in the Demo­
cratic party clubs on the same terms as white Democrats; 
and from denying plaintiffs full and equal participation in 
the Democratic party primary to be held in the State of 
South Carolina on the second Tuesday in August, 1948; 
and from denying plaintiffs their constitutionally protected 
right to vote; provided that plaintiff David Brown first give 
security in the sum of Five Thousand dollars ($5,000) in 
the form and manner required by law’.

/ s /  J. W aites W abing,
United States District Judge.

July 8, 1948.



Appendix 17

RETURN TO RULE TO SHOW CAUSE
The Defendants above named, other than those who 

have made separate returns, specifically reserving their 
right to answer fully and to demand a trial by Jury of the 
issues in this cause, in return to the rule to show cause, 
would respectfully show:

1. That these defendants deny so much of the allega­
tions of Paragraph 4 of the Complaint as alleges that the 
plaintiff, David Brown, meets all lawful requirements for 
enrollment in the Democratic Party of South Carolina, and 
for voting in the Democratic Primary of South Carolina. 
On the contrary these defendants allege, on information and 
belief, that the plaintiff, David Brown, is not a proper 
plaintiff, and may not maintain this action, in that said 
plaintiff is now, and was at the time of the commencement 
of the action, a member of another political party, whose 
announced principles are contrary to those of the Demo­
cratic Party of South Carolina. That said party of said 
plaintiff, since the commencement of this action sent dele­
gates to the Democratic National Convention in Philadel­
phia, and sought to have said delegates seated in the place 
and stead of the delegates of the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina.

2. These defendants further show that the several de­
fendants who are County Chairmen find themselves in dif­
ferent positions in reference to the application and enforce­
ment of the rules that may be generally classified as fol­
lows :

(a) In a number of counties no qualified negro 
electors have applied for enrollment;

(b) In other counties qualified negro electors have 
enrolled on the party books;

(c) In other counties qualified negro electors have 
been refused the right to enroll; and,

(d) In other counties qualified negro electors, 
contrary to the rules of the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina, did enroll on the books of the party and there-



18 Baskin et. al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

after their names under due procedure were purged
from the rolls.
These defendants would further show that they have 

in good faith followed the rules of the party and the pro­
visions of the Order of this Court in the case of Elmore v. 
Rice, and that they will continue to do so, and that any lack 
of uniformity in the actions of the party officials has been 
occasioned by various constructions placed by the several 
County Committees (who are not parties to this action) 
on the rules of the party and the application of said decision 
of the Court thereabouts.

4. These defendants would further deny that they have 
been, or are, denying, or intend to deny, the plaintiff or 
any member of the class for whom he sues the full and equal 
participation in the Democratic Primary to be held in the 
State of South Carolina on the second Tuesday in August 
1948; and thereabout allege and show that under the rules 
of the Democratic Party of South Carolina (a copy of which 
rules with the Platform and Principles of the party being 
hereto attached and made a part of this return) plaintiff 
and the class represented by him are afforded a position 
of advantage to that occupied by white democratic mem­
bers of the party in that qualified negro electors are, with­
out exception, afforded the right to vote in the Primary 
upon the presentation of their Registration Certificate, 
while white democrats are required to enroll at particular 
places and within limited time, and their right to so enroll 
is made contingent upon their being able to read and write 
and interpret the Constitution of the State of South Caro­
lina, which qualification is more stringent than that re­
quired to obtain a Registration Certificate under the Con­
stitution of South Carolina. These defendants pray ref­
erence to Rule 6 of the rules of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina and to Paragraph 12 of the Complaint 
where the said rule is correctly set out.

5. These defendants ■. deny that they have, or are, in 
any way denying to the plaintiff and the class represented 
by him, their constitutionally protected right to vote and



Appendix 19

thereabout would show that by Rule 7 of the rules of the 
Democratic Party of South Carolina their right to vote is 
fully protected and the Order of this Court in the case of 
Elmore v. Rice is recognized and followed. Reference is 
here had to said Rule 7 which is correctly set forth in Par­
agraph 13 of the Complaint.

6. These defendants whether as State Chairmen or 
State Committeemen or as County Chairmen specifically 
deny that they have been, or are, guilty of any conspiracy, 
or that they are acting in concert to deprive the plaintiffs 
of the effective exercise of their right to vote within the 
meaning of the United States Constitution. They show that 
the rules of the Democratic Party of South Carolina were 
not prescribed by these defendants but were adopted at a 
convention of the Democratic Party of South Carolina in 
a session duly assembled under its rules on May 19, 1948; 
that said rules confer upon these defendants limited pow­
ers and duties and authority, primarily as to Chairmen to 
preside at meetings of the respective county and state com­
mittees, and as State - Committeemen to act as an appeal 
board from decisions of the County Committees. That these 
defendants lack power to change the rules of the party, 
which rules were made and adopted by a convention of the 
Democratic Party of South Carolina consisting of approxi­
mately four hundred delegates from the county conventions 
of the forty-six counties of this State. Reference is again 
made to the said rules of the party as defining the limited 
powers, duties, and authority of these defendants.

7. These defendants would further show that under 
the rules of the Democratic Party of South Carolina the 
books for the purpose of enrollment were opened, after 
full advertisement to the public, on the fourth Tuesday in 
May 1948 and were officially closed on 22 June, 1948. That 
the plaintiff and those for whom he sues have had from the 
19th day of May 1948, when said rules were adopted and 
made public, to bring this action and to apply for a timely 
tem poral injunction. That they have waited until long 
after the closing date for enrollment to bring this action 
and to apply for a temporary injunction, and they are now



20 Baskin et a l, Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

guilty of laches and should not now be allowed a temporary 
injunction, when any relief which might be granted to them 
thereby would throw the party machinery into utter con­
fusion in view of the near approaching Primary which will 
be held on the 10th day of August, 1948.

8. These defendants specifically deny that the oath re­
quired of all persons casting their ballots (said oath being- 
referred to in Paragraphs 2 and 18 of the Complaint) is 
not relevant as to qualification to vote in the Primary con­
ducted by the Democratic Party of South Carolina, or that 
it is unreasonable, or that it is based on race, or color, or 
that it is aimed at disfranchising the plaintiff and other 
members of the class for whom he sues, or that it is con­
trary to prior decisions of the Federal Courts. They allege 
that the said oath is in accordance with the political think­
ing of the majority of the people of South Carolina and, 
specifically, the members of the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina and is in accordance with an established princi­
ple of government of the State of South Carolina in ref­
erence to the separation of the races which is engrafted into 
the Constitution of the State of South Carolina and in many 
of its laws, and is in accordance with recent decisions of 
this court recognizing the validity of such separation pre­
scribed by state law in the educational institutions of the 
State of South Carolina.

9. That these defendants, being only the State Chair­
man, County Chairmen, and State Committeemen of the 
Party, lack the power and authority to make changes in the 
party rules.

10. These defendants further allege that the plaintiffs 
have been accorded all the legal and constitutional rights 
to which they are entitled under the law. Every allegation 
of the Complaint to the contrary is here specifically denied.

11. These answering defendants further deny each 
and every allegations of the Complaint not herein above 
admitted or qualified except as to the residence of the plain­
tiff.



Appendix 21

WHEREFORE, these defendants pray that the rule 
be dismissed, and that the temporary restraining Order be 
vacated.

S. S. TISON,
Bennettsville, S. C.

EUGENE S. BLEASE, 
Newberry, S. C.

GEORGE WARREN,
Hampton, S. C.

ROBERT McFIGG, JR.,
Attorneys for Said Defend­

ants.
(Verification by appellant W. A. Baskin, and Rules, 

Platform and Principles attached as an Exhibit omitted.)

TESTIMONY OF APPELLEE, DAVID BROWN, GIVEN
JULY 16, 1948

David Brown, sworn:
D irect E xamination  

By Mr. M arshall :
Q. Mr. Brown, give your address, please ?
A. Beaufort, South Carolina, Box No. 62.
Q. How long have you lived in Beaufort County, South 

Carolina ?
A. Born and raised there.
Q. About how old are you, sir?
A. Fifty-six.
Q. And you have been a resident all your life ?
A. All my life.
Q. Of that county. You are the plaintiff in this case? 
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you at any time prior to the filing of this case 

enroll in the local Democratic party of Beaufort County? 
A. Yes, sir; I did.
Q. About when was that?
A. I don’t exactly know the date, but I was down there 

and enrolled my name on there.
Q. Approximately—was it this year?



22 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

A. Oh, yes, 1948.
The C o u r t : Prior to June 22? That’s the date when 

the books closed?
The W it n e s s : The 22nd?
Mr. Tison : The defendants will admit that.
The C o u r t : Admitted that he signed his name on the 

books prior to June 22, the date of closing.
Q. Subsequent to that time, did you receive a letter 

from the Beaufort County Executive Committee ?
A. I did.
Q. I show you what purports to be a letter signed by 

W. E. Nelson, Secretary of the Beaufort County Executive 
Committee, dated June 26, 1948, and ask you if you’ve seen 
it before?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you receive that letter?
A. I received it registered.
Q. Registered mail—and you received it?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. T is o n : Wouldn’t it serve some useful purpose— 

the defendants will admit that he received notice, that ac­
cording to that notice, he was given a hearing, and his name 
was purged from the book, as alleged in the complaint.

M r . M a rsha ll : We would respectfully prefer to have 
the letter itself in.

The Co u r t : Very good. Any objection to the letter?
Mr. T is o n : None at all.
The Cl e r k : Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 1.
The C ourt : Let me see the letter.
Q. Subsequent or after you received that letter, did 

you appear for the purpose of the question of being purged 
from the books?

A. Well, they didn’t—we employed our lawyers to 
come down, and after he come down, why they didn’t say 
anything to us, the members individually.

Q. Did you go to the hearing ?
A. Oh, yes, sir.
Q. Who was present at that hearing?
A. Well, Senator Harvey was there.



Appendix 23

Q. Senator who?
A. Harvey.
Q. Senator Harvey?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who else?
The Court : Is he one of the defendants here ?
M r. M a rsha ll : Yes, sir.
The Court : W. B. Harvey, State Senator from Bean- 

fort County?
The W it n e s s : Yes, sir.
Mr. M a rsha ll : Yes, sir, line 7 of the complaint.
Q, As a result of this meeting, what happened?
A. Well, he talked a little, concerning about that they 

treats the colored race good, and they try to satisfy them.
Q. What I  mean, Mr. Brown, what specifically was 

done as to your name on the enrollment books?
A. I understand—I didn’t see the books afterwards— 

I understand they be purged off.
Q. What I ’m trying to get, Mr. Brown, what did Mr. 

Harvey tell you concerning that book ? Did he say whether 
or not you would be purged or what?

A. Yes, he did.
Q. What did he say?
A. Someone else made a motion that the names be 

purged from the books.
Q. What happened in your presence ? Was that motion 

carried or not?
A. Yes, sir; the motion was carried.
Q. Are you a member of any other party of this state, 

any other political party ?
A. No, sir.
Q. I ’ll ask you specifically, are you or are you not a 

member of the Progressive Party of South Carolina?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You are a member of the Progressive Party of 

South Carolina?
A. Yes, sir, but a member of the—
Q. I don’t want to confuse you, Mr. Brown. There ap­

pear to be two parties here, one is the regular Democratic



24 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

party and the other, I  understand, is the progressive Demo­
crat.

A. Progressive Democrat.
Q. Are you a member of the Progressive Democratic 

Party?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever been a member of that party?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know anything about a group of delegates 

going to Philadelphia? Do you know anything about it?
A. No, sir; I don’t.
Q. Did you have anything to do with it?
A. No, sir; I didn’t send anybody.
Q. Have you ever voted for any candidate other than 

the candidates of the Democratic party in the general elec­
tion?

A. No, sir.
Cross E xamination

By Mr. T ison  :
Q. Do you know a man in Beaufort by the name of 

Hubert Bandall?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He, 1 believe, is a dupty sheriff of the County of 

Beaufort. Didn’t you have a conversation with him at your 
filling station in Beaufort on yesterday?

A. I didn’t have a conversation with him, he only come 
up there and asked me did I know how many members of 
this part31; I tell him I didn’t know.

Q. Didn’t you tell him then and there that you were a 
member of the Progressive Democratic Party in South 
Carolina ?

A. Did I tell him that?
Q. Yes—you were a member, not an officer?
A. He asked me was I an officer. I  told him no. I told 

him they’d have to see Dr. Kennedy—they were officers 
of it.

Q. You didn’t tell him you were a member of it?
A. I tell him I was a member of the club, not the one 

he said.



Appendix 25

Q. You deny that you told him then and there that you 
were a member of the Progressive Democratic party?

A. I didn’t tell him anything no more than that.
Q. More than what?
A. He asked me was I a member or was I an officer— 

I tell him no.
Q. My question to you was, didn’t he ask you then and 

there if you were a member of the Progressive Democratic 
Party, and didn’t you then and there tell him yes you were, 
or words to that effect? You know whether you did or not— 
answer it.

A. I forget what I did tell him. I really forget, because 
he come up there and picked me up off base.

Q. Who is the officer of the Progressive Democratic 
Party whose name you just mentioned?

A. I tell him he would have to see Dr. Kennedy.
Q. Dr. Kennedy—you know him?
A. Sure, I know him.
Q. You have attended the meetings with him and 

others?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. And that was a meeting of the Progressive Demo­

cratic Party? That’s correct, isn’t it?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And you would attend those meetings where?
A. Attend them in our church.
Q. Attend them in your church, and what other places?
A. That’s the only place we had them.
Q. Then the Progressive Democratic Party had meet­

ings of these in Beaufort in the church?
A. We didn’t have anywhere else.
Q. You attended those meetings in your church?
A. Not in my church, in a church—
Q. It wasn’t even your church—you went to that 

church because the Progressive Democratic Party was hav­
ing meetings—you didn’t go up there for worship—you 
went there because the Progressive Democratic Party was 
having meetings? That’s correct, isn’t it?

A. That’s correct; yes, sir.



26 Baskin et a!., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

Q. You attended those meetings off and on for a num­
ber of years?

A. Well, not number of years.
Q. You have attended them this year?
A. Yes.
Q. You attended some while the enrollment books of 

the Democratic Party of South Carolina were opened? You 
attended a meeting at that time when you discussed put­
ting your name on the Democratic club roll, didn’t you?

A. We had meetings before then.
Q. Yes, I know; but wasn’t it because of one of those 

meetings you decided to put your name on the Democratic 
club roll?

A. I decided before the meeting.
Q. Then you went to the meeting?
A. Yes.
Q. And it was discussed?
A. Yes, it was discussed.
Q. You know?
A. Sure.
Q. Then after discussing it at the Progressive Demo­

cratic Party meeting, you then put your name on the club 
books in Beaufort?

A. No, I was born and raised in Beaufort—my home.
Q. All right. Now, you remember about four years ago 

that your Democratic Party put up a candidate for the 
United States Senate in opposition to Senator Olin D. 
Johnston?

A. Well, I don’t know about that.
Q. You don’t recall that at all?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you vote that year?
A. I voted in 1944.
Q. In 1944?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And didn’t you in that year vote for the candidate 

of the Progressive Democratic Party—who was it—gen­
eral election?

A. They didn’t allow us to vote for anyone down there.



Appendix 27

Q. I ’m not talking about the primary—I ’m talking 
about the general election in November of 1944! In that 
general election you voted for the candidate of the Progres­
sive Democratic Party for the United States Senate!

A. At that particular time.
Q. What’s that!
A. At that particular time.
Q. At that particular time—yes—that’s what I ’m talk­

ing about—and you have, and I don’t doubt your right to 
do it, you have contributed to the cause and given money 
to the Progressive Democratic Party!

A. I don’t think so.
Q. I think just a little bit. Didn’t you take up some 

contributions when you had the meetings in the church!
A. We have a regular contribution for that.
Q. You would put your money in and contribute 

towards the cause of the Progressive Democratic Party, 
wouldn’t you? Isn’t that true?

A. Yes, I contributed.
Q. Yes. You employed an attorney to represent you 

before the Beaufort County Board, as to which you had a 
right—I make no question of that!'

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was that attorney?
A. Mr. Boulware.
Q. All right. And he was brought down by the Progres­

sive Democratic Party to represent you in this matter?
A. Yes, sir.

R e-direct E xamination

By Mr. M arshall :
Q. Mr. Brown, have you ever been invited to any meet­

ings of the Democratic Party in Beaufort County?
A. Not—you mean in the colored or white?
Q. The white people ?
A. No, sir.
Q. And as these questions go on—when I say “ Demo­

cratic Party”, I mean the party that excluded you all along 
and has always been white—when I say “ Progressive” , I  
mean the Progressive party, composed mostly of Negroes.



28 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

Now, has the main Democratic Party ever invited you to 
a meeting?

A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever at any time asked for participation 

in any of their—
A. No, sir.
Q. You have been a Democrat?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you say you have attended meetings of the 

Progressive Party?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I want to ask you once again—are you a member 

of that party?
A. I ’m a member of the colored group.
Q. You’re a member of the colored group?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Of the Progressive group?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far is your participation in that group?
A. I ’m not an officer; just a member.
Q. You are a member?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Heretofore you have been excluded from the other 

group ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In Beaufort is there any other Democratic organi­

zation that you could take part in other than the Progres­
sive group?

A. No, sir.
Q. You’ve been excluded from the white group all 

along?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When you went to register, or to enroll on the books, 

what prompted you to do that ?
A. I would have—
Mr. Tisox: We object to that, your Honor.
The Court : He can tell why he did. This is an equita­

ble proceeding.



Appendix 29

A. To be able to elect anyone I think is qualified 
towards running the city.

OPINION
Dated July 19, 1948

The question in this case is whether Negroes have the 
right to become members of the Democratic Party of the 
State of South Carolina and to be enrolled, take part in 
its organization and management, and vote in its primaries.

The action is based upon the alleged rights of the plain­
tiff under the Constitution of the United States and par­
ticularly under Article 1, Sections 2 and 4, and the Four­
teenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments. The jur­
isdiction of the court is invoked under Title 28 USCA Sec. 
41 (1, 11, 14), and a declaratory judgment with injunction 
is prayed for under'Title 28 USCA Sec. 400. It is alleged 
that the plaintiff and others in like situation have been de­
prived of the civil rights guaranteed them under Title 8 
USCA Sees. 31 and 43.

The plaintiff, David Brown, is a Negro, a native-born 
citizen of the United States, more than 21 years of age and 
a resident of Beaufort County, South Carolina, where he 
has resided for more than 50 years prior to August 1948. 
He alleges that he has paid his poll tax and is a duly and 
legally qualified elector under the Constitution and laws of 
the United States and of the State of South Carolina, and 
is subject to none of the disqualifications provided for vot­
ing under the Constitution and laws of the United States 
or of the State of South Carolina. Plaintiff further states 
that he is a believer in the tenets of the Democratic Party 
and meets the lawful requirements for enrollment in the 
Democratic Party and for voting in the primary conducted 
by the said Party. And he brings this suit as a class action, 
as authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure of the Dis­
trict Courts of the United States (Rule 23A), on behalf of 
himself and for others similarly situated. The defendant 
W. P. Baskin is State Chairman of the Democratic Party 
of South Carolina, and the various other defendants are the



30 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

members of the State Executive Committee and the Chair­
men of the respective County Committees throughout South 
Carolina (save only the County of Richland, whose officials 
are omitted from this suit).

The suit is brought by the plaintiff to test the legality 
of the action of the defendants in not permitting him and 
other Negroes to enroll as members of the Democratic 
Party in this State and to exercise their right to participate 
in primary elections of South Carolina, and he alleges that 
the defendants are exercising unlawful discrimination in 
refusing to allow him and others in like plight to exercise 
their rights and privileges in participating in the selection 
of Presidential Electors, United States Senators, Congress­
men, and other governmental officers.

It is unnecessary to set out here with any elaboration 
a description of the organization of the Democratic Party, 
with its conventions, executive committees, and other of­
ficials in the State of South Carolina, since all of those are 
more fully described and set forth in a case involving the 
question of the right of Negroes to vote in the Democratic 
Primaries, tried in this court about a year ago. In that case 
(Elmore v. Rice, 72 Fed. Supp. 516) the question arose as 
to whether the Democratic Party in South Carolina could 
be restricted to white persons or whether Negroes should 
be allowed to vote in primaries conducted by such Party. 
There the plaintiff was a resident of Richland County, and 
the defendants were the Democratic Chairman and Commit­
teemen in charge of the Party affairs in Richland County. 
This court decided in that case that

“ * # * the present Democratic Party in South 
Carolina is acting for and on behalf of the people of 
South Carolina; and that the Primary held by it is the 
only practical place where one can express a choice in 
selecting federal and other officials. Racial distinctions 
cannot exist in the machinery that selects the officers 
and lawmakers of the United States; and all citizens of 
this State and Country are entitled to cast a free and 
untrammelled ballot in our elections, and if the only 
material and realistic elections are clothed with the



Appendix 31

name ‘primary’, they are equally entitled to vote 
there.”
The Elmore case was affirmed by the Circuit Court of 

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on December 30, 1947, 165 
Fed. 2d 387, and thereafter certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court of the United States on April 19,1948,-----
U. S .--------.

On May 19, 1948, the regular convention of the Demo­
cratic Party for the State organization was held in Colum­
bia, South Carolina. The delegates to this convention were 
chosen by County Conventions, which had been made up 
of delegates from precinct or ward organizations, the man­
ner of which is more fully described in the Elmore case. 
That convention adopted certain rules for the government 
of the Party, in its organization, enrollment, management, 
and primary elections. It is important to quote certain parts 
of these rules in order to understand the issues in this 
cause.

“ QUALIFICATIONS FOR CLUB MEMBERSHIP 
6. Qualifications for club membership in any 

club of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, shall 
be as follows, Viz.: The applicant for membership shall 
be twenty-one (21) years of age, or shall become so 
before the succeeding general election, and be a white 
democrat, who subscribes to the principles of the Demo­
cratic Party of South Carolina, as declared by the State 
Convention. He shall be a citizen of the United States 
and of the State of South Carolina, and shall be able 
to read and write and interpret the Constitution of the 
State of South Carolina. No person shall belong to any 
club unless he has been a resident of the State of South 
Carolina for two (2) years, of the County for six (6) 
months prior to the succeeding general election, and of 
the club district sixty (60) days prior to the first pri­
mary following his offer to enroll. Provided, that pub­
lic school teachers, and ministers of the gospel in 
charge of a regular organized church, shall be exempt 
from the provisions of this rule as to residence, if 
otherwise qualified.”



32 Baskin et a l, Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

“ QUALIFICATIONS FOR VOTING 
7. All duly enrolled club members are entitled to

vote in the precinct of their residence, if they take the 
oath required of voters in the primary; and in con­
formity with the Order of Judge J. Waities Waring, 
United States District Judge, in the case of Elmore, 
etc., v. Rice, et al., all qualified Negro “ electors of the 
State of South Carolina are entitled to vote in the pre­
cinct of their residence, if they present their general 
election certificates and take the oath required of voters 
in the primary.”

“ GENERAL ENROLLMENT PROVISIONS 
11. Beginning with the year 1948, and every two 

years thereafter, there shall be a new general enroll­
ment of all club members, and books of enrollment for 
membership in the Party shall be opened by the secre­
tary of each club, or, by the enrollment committee as 
hereinafter provided, on or before the last Tuesday in 
May (see Rule 60) of each general election year. * * * 

“ Each applicant for enrollment shall in person 
write upon the club roll his full name and immediately 
thereafter his age, occupation and post office address, 
and if in a city or town, shall write the name of the 
street and the number of the house in which he resides 
if such designations exist in said city or town. * * *”

“ ORIGINAL ROLL TO BE DELIVERED TO 
MANAGERS

13. The original roll shall be delivered to the 
managers of the primary before the hour of opening 
the polls; and no person shall be allowed to vote at 
said primary whose name does not appear on said orig­
inal roll as herein required or who is not a qualified 
elector. * * *”

“ STATE COMMITTEE
18. * # * The State Committee is charge with

the execution and direction of the policy of the party 
of this State, subject to these rules, the principles de­
clared in the platform or principles and such instruc-



Appendix 33

tion, by resolution or otherwise, as a State convention 
may from time to time adopt, not inconsistent with 
these rules, and shall continue in office two years from 
the time of election or until their successors have been 
elected.

“ * * *' The committee shall nominate presi­
dential electors, and if any vacancy occur in the State 
ticket of electors, or of the National Executive Com­
mittee by death, resignation or other cause, the commit­
tee shall have the power to fill the vacancy; all by ma­
jority of the whole committee.”

Rule No. 35 provides for the managers to take and sign an 
oath, which is as follows:

“ We do solemnly swear that we will conduct this 
primary according to the rules of the party; and will 
allow no person to vote whose name is not regularly 
enrolled in. this club, or who is not qualified Negro 
elector, and we will not assist any voter to prepare his 
ballot and will not advise any voter as to how he should 
vote at this primary.”

“ OATH TO BE TAKEN BY VOTERS
36. “  * * * do solemnly swear that I am a resi­

dent of this club district, that I am duly qualified to vote 
in this primary under the rules of the Democratic 
Party of South Carolina, and that I have not voted 
before in this primary, and that I am not disqualified 
from voting under Section 2267 of the South Carolina 
Code of Laws, 1942, relating to disqualifying crimes.

“ I further solemnly swear that I (understand) be­
lieve in and will support the principles of the Demo­
cratic Party of South Carolina, and that I believe in 
and will support the social (religious) and educational 
separation of races.

“ I further solemnly swear that I believe in the 
principles of States’ Rights, and that I am opposed to 
the proposed Federal so-called F. E. P. C. law.

“ I further solemnly swear that I will support the 
election of the nominees of this primary in the ensu-



34 Baskin et al., Appellants., v. Brown, Appellee

ing general election, and that I am not a member of 
any other political party.”

The words shown above in parentheses were in the form of 
oath adopted by the convention but were later deleted from 
the published for of oath as hereinafter described.

“ ONLY STATE CONVENTION MAY AMEND 
RULES

49. These rules may be amended or altered at the 
regular May convention or any State convention called 
specially for that purpose. Provided notice to amend 
be given the state chairman at least five (5) days be­
fore the convention.”
“ STATE COMMITTEE MAY MAKE ENFORCE­

MENT RULES
51. The State Committee may make any rules or 

regulations for the purpose of enforcing these rules 
not inconsistent herewith.”
The State Convention adjourned and has not met since, 

so that the rules therein adopted, parts of which are quoted, 
are now in effect.

At the trial of the cause, the State Chairman, Mr. W. 
P. Baskin, was called as a witness and was asked to ex­
plain why the two words shown in the above-referred-to 
oath, namely, “ understand” and “ religious” were removed 
from the form of oath as now printed. He stated that some 
question was raised as to their propriety and that the State 
Executive Committee, meeting in closed session, had au­
thorized him to delete them from the printed form of oath. 
He could not explain or give any reason why they were 
taken out except to say that they thought they were im­
material. He could not point out any authority granting to 
him or the State Executive Committee the right to amend, 
order, or change the rules adopted by the State Convention, 
but did say the Committee thought these changes imma­
terial. An examination of the rules adopted by the State 
Convention convinces me that neither the Chairman nor 
the Committee had a right to excise these words, and that 
the oath as printed above is the one that is really in effect



Appendix 35

until and unless amended by the State Convention. It is 
unnecessary to discuss further the power to delete or 
change this form since I am of the opinion that the whole 
oath is illegal and it is hereinafter discussed.

It is alleged by the complaint in this cause that the 
foregoing rules are violative of the rights of this plaintiff 
and others similarly situated in that they create a dual 
system of voting. Rule 6 above quoted states that qualifi­
cation for membership in the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina shall be limited to “ a white Democrat.” Rule 7 
provides for two classes to vote, the difference in the 
classes being entirely as to race. It provides first that duly 
enrolled club members are entitled to vote. That of course 
means white persons (See Rule 6). And second, “ All quali­
fied Negro electors,” provided they present general elec­
tion certificates and take the oath required of voters in 
the primary. The oath referred to for all voters to take is 
set forth in Rule 36 above quoted. The purport of this rule 
clearly is to require an oath supporting separation, segre­
gation and discrimination, according to race.

The complaint further shows that the plaintiff and 
a certain number of other Negroes did enroll on the enroll­
ment books in Beaufort County but that thereafter, on or 
about July 2, 1948, through the action of certain of the 
defendants their names were purged or stricken from the 
enrollment books and they are not accepted as enrolled 
members of the Democratic Party but have been told that 
they may vote in the primary election on August 10 only 
if they produce general election certificates and take the 
oath set forth hereinabove.

The complaint alleges that there is an actual contro­
versy between the parties and alleges damages in the sum 
of $5,000.00, and prays for a declaratory judgment and 
injunction.

A Rule to Show Cause was issued against all of the 
named defendants who have been served and appeared 
and made their return, and the matter is heard upon the 
pleadings and testimony taken on the issue of whether or 
not at this time a preliminary injunction should be issued.



36 Baskin et ul., Appellants, v . Brown, Appellee

The question of damages or permanent injunction will 
have to be deferred to a later date and will not be discussed 
herein.

It appears from certain of the returns made to the 
Rule to Show Cause and from the testimony taken in this 
case that in certain counties of South Carolina these rules 
as to enrollment have not been strictly followed, but certain 
counties have set up modifications of their own. Questions 
as to the power of the State Executive Committee and as 
to the power of the various County Executive Committees 
to make changes or to obey or disobey the rules adopted 
by the convention are not matters which have to be passed 
upon or decided by this court except as they may be per­
tinent in showing that some of the county officials are obey­
ing the laws of the United States rather than the rules 
made by the Democratic Party of South Carolina.

Separate Returns were made by C. Victor Pyle, County 
Chairman of the Democratic Party of Greenville County; 
Julian D. Wyatt, County Chairman of the Democratic 
Party of Pickens County; and James P. Sloan, County 
Chairman of the Democratic Party of Laurens County; in 
which they stated that these respective counties had not 
followed or obeyed the rules made by the State Convention 
and that they had opened their books of enrollment, ir­
respective of the classifications made by the rules, and 
allowed all citizens entitled to enroll to put their names 
upon the books, irrespective of whether they were whites 
or Negroes; that they had not required registration certif­
icates, and had not and would not require the taking of 
the oath hereinafter referred to. In other words, these three 
counties showed that they had kept their books open for 
various periods longer than that required by the Committee 
or State Convention; that they had entirely discarded all 
improper classifications as to race and that Negroes had 
been allowed to enroll upon exactly the same basis as 
whites, and that they would continue so to do and would 
be allowed to vote in the primaries without any discrimina­
tion as to race. The three County Chairmen ask that they 
be dismissed from this cause since they had followed the



Appendix 37

law rather than the Party rules long before the commence­
ment of this case. Plaintiff’s attorneys acquiesce in these 
prayers, stating that they are fully satisfied that the three 
named counties had in every way complied with the law and 
were managing their election machinery in conformity with 
the Constitution and laws of the United States.

I fully accept the statements of the three County 
Chairmen and commend their frankness, fairness and 
courage in obeying the law of the land rather than the dis­
torted and illegal rules of the State Party, and the three 
named Chairmen, to wit, C. Victor Pyle, Julian D. Wyatt, 
and James P. Sloan, are hereby discharged from any fur­
ther connection with the cause and they are dismissed 
therefrom.

H. Klugh Purdy, the County Chairman for Jasper 
County, made a separate Return in which he showed that 
he had not opened any enrollment books at all and was not 
following the State Convention rules, but that Jasper Coun­
ty had determined to hold a primary on the regular day 
set, namely, August 10, in which all parties, white or Negro, 
and irrespective of any race or creed, would be allowed to 
vote provided only that they presented County registration 
certificates and they would not be required to furnish poll 
tax receipts. This would seem to comply with the require­
ments and the complaint in this cause excepting as to the 
matter of the oath required by the State Convention. The 
Return by Mr. Purdy did not state what action the Jasper 
authorities would take in regard to the oath. Mr. Purdy 
was present in the court and said he did not think the oath 
would be administered and he himself wTas opposed to it 
but he could not definitely commit the Committee at this 
time. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss him will have to 
be refused and he will be continued as a defendant so that 
the requirement for the application of the oath will apply 
to Jasper County as well as to the others.

All of the defendants, save those above specifically 
noted, filed a Return which goes to the main issues in this 
case.

This Return for all the defendants, other than those 
specifically above referred to, is in effect a general denial,



38 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

and also states that the plaintiff, David Brown, had joined 
with a group consisting mostly or entirely of Negroes who 
called themselves the Progressive Democratic Party. It did 
appear that he had been attempting to join the Democratic 
Party and with other Negroes had attended meetings of a 
group which was called “ Progressive” for the purpose of 
being recognized in the Democratic Party so that they 
could get the right to vote in the only realistic elections that 
were held in this State, namely, the Democratic Party 
Primaries. I do not think that this affects the right of the 
plaintiff to apply to be enrolled or to enroll or to partici­
pate. It is not shown that the so-called Progressive Demo­
cratic Party was adverse to the Democratic Party but it 
appears to be a group who had not been allowed to join the 
regular organization and had joined together under a name 
for the purpose of trying to get in the Democratic Party. 
But even if it were construed to be a separate and adverse 
organization, political history is full of many specific 
instances of persons changing from one party to the other, 
and there is no reason why one should be debarred from 
joining an organization because he had joined, some other 
organization for the sole reason of attempting to get in the 
first-named one.

The scope of this ease seems to me to be quite narrow 
since most of the basic issues have been permanently and 
clearly decided and I would suppose them to be basic legal 
truths, well known not only to the legal profession but to 
all American citizens. The Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States provides:

“ Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in 
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction there­
of, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or im­
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”



Appendix 39

Title 8, USCA, provides:
“ Section 31. Race, color, or previous condition 

not to affect right to vote
All citizens of the United States who are other­

wise qualified by law to vote at any election by the 
people in any State, Territory, district, county, city, 
parish, township, school district, municipality, or other 
territorial subdivision shall be entitled and allowed 
to vote at all such elections, without distinction of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude; any constitu­
tion, law, custom, usage, or regulation of any State or 
Territory, or by or under its authority, to the contrary 
notwithstanding. ’ ’

“ Section 43. Civil action for deprivation of 
rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed­
ing for redress.”
It should be unnecessary to state that in this country 

of ours no racial distinction or discrimination can be made 
in an election for the choosing of presidential electors and 
our representatives in the National Congress. In many 
states primaries are held by political parties, and numerous 
questions have arisen as to the status of political parties 
and the primaries conducted by them. The leading cases 
on this subject are:

United States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 and Smith 
v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649.
The State of South Carolina formerly had constitu­

tional and legislative provisions governing the conduct of 
primaries in this State, but following the decision in Smith 
v. Allwright, supra, the legislature met at the call of the



40 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

Governor and all statutes were repealed and later constitu­
tional provisions cancelled so that there was no statutory 
creation or regulation of primaries or of political organiza­
tions conducting them. The officials of the Democratic 
Party of South Carolina took the position that their or­
ganization was in effect a private club and was not subject 
to the constitutional prohibition and regulations as to racial 
discrimination. This issue was raised and fully canvassed 
in the case of Elmore v. Bice, supra. In that case no ques­
tion was raised as to whether there could be racial discrim­
ination if the conduct of the primary was a public matter 
since it was thought that everybody now conceded that, 
but the sole reliance of the officials of the Democratic party 
was upon the theory that it was a private organization and 
not subject to the general law. In the opinions in that case 
there was no particular effort to lay down the general law, 
since it was assumed that everyone, even the officials of the 
State Democratic Party, were familiar with the basic law 
that racial discrimination could not be practiced in the 
conduct of elections. The decisions in the Elm,ore case were 
against the ‘ ‘ private club ’ ’ theory.

The action of the Democratic State Convention in May, 
1948 was therefore somewhat of a surprise to all who had 
any knowledge of the matter. The convention frankly set 
up two standards of qualifications for voting; one applic­
able to the members of the white race, and the other to 
Negroes. This of course was in direct contradiction of all 
law and custom, which must or should have been well 
known to any students or even casual inquirers in regard 
to such matters. Such a flagrant disregard of basic rights 
must have sprung from either gross ignorance or a con­
scious determination to evade the issue and to refuse to 
obey the law of the land. It is hardly credible that a con­
vention composed of a large number of persons, many of 
whom have had long years of experience and were experts 
in political matters and a number of whom had actually 
taken part in the presentation and hearings of the Elmore 
case as attorneys or witnesses, should have been so crassly 
ignorant. It would therefore seem that the action of the 
convention was a deliberate attempt to evade the apparent



Appendix 41

consequence of the Elmore case. This belief is further sup­
ported by the fact that no apparent attention was paid to 
the opinion that was filed in the Elmore case and only the 
bald language of the order was followed. The order in that 
case was based entirely upon the prayer of the complaint 
but the opinion discussed the whole matter of voting in 
primaries in this State, together with all of its implications, 
and this court said (72 Fed. Supp. at page 528):

“ The plaintiff and others similarly situated are 
entitled to be enrolled and to vote in the primaries 
conducted by the Democratic Party of South Caro­
lina.” (Emphasis added.)
Of course it is true that that case applied only to the 

officials of Richland County, South Carolina, but the law 
was clearly and succinctly stated, and anyone who can read 
the English language must have known what it meant. So 
it is apparent that the rules above quoted (Rules 6 and 7), 
which provide for a double standard for the enrollment and 
voting of whites and Negroes, is a clear and flagrant eva­
sion of the law as enunciated not only by this court but ap­
proved by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir­
cuit and by the Supreme Court of the United States.

And the oath which was adopted by the convention 
(Rule 36) is another attempt to evade the American prin­
ciple of allowing all persons to freely exercise the suffrage. 
To require, as a prerequisite to voting, that qualified elec­
tors take an oath subscribing to the views of the State Con­
vention and/or its Executive Committee, is a flagrant dis­
regard of the rights of American citizens to exercise their 
own views and opinions in the choice of representatives in 
their national government.

Neither in South Carolina nor in any other State in 
this union have American citizens as yet come to a pass 
where a group of party officials, in violation of basic Ameri­
can rights, can prescribe oaths, methods and a code of 
thought for voters. To carry this to its logical conclusion, 
it is wondered why the State Convention did not require 
an oath that all parties enrolling or voting should elect 
them in perpetuity and with satisfactory emoluments. The



42 Baskin et a l., Appellants, v . Brown, Appellee

one party system has reached its apex in this State where 
the right is claimed not only to segregate according to race, 
to prescribe different methods of gaining the right to vote, 
to forbid participation in the organization for government 
of the party, but to prescribe mental tests and set up a code 
of thought which, far from being a bill of rights, might 
rather be called a bill of persecutions.

It would be interesting to consider and discuss the 
mental process by which these decisions in the convention 
were arrived at, but that is a psychological rather than a 
legal problem. Our sole concern here is as to the legality of 
these actions of the convention and of the Executive Com­
mittee, since the latter seems to have arrogated to itself 
the right to amend, order, modify and construe the rules 
adopted by the convention, irrespective of the prohibition 
against such a power. (See Rules 49 and 51.)

And now to summarize the case. The decisions of this 
court, aproved by the higher courts, have clearly laid down 
the principle that the Democratic Party of South Carolina 
is performing a public function and conducts the true and 
realistic election wherein are chosen federal officials. This 
organization is not a private party or club and is subject 
to the laws of the United States and is not entitled to and 
is in fact prohibited from making any discrimination on 
account of race, color or creed in allowing enrollment, mem­
bership and full participation in its organization and in 
the election, whether called primary or by any other name, 
which it conducts for the choice of presidential electors 
and federal officials.

It is important that once and for all, the members of 
this party be made to understand—and that is the purpose 
of this opinion—that they will be required to obey and 
carry out the orders of this court, not only in the technical 
respects but in the true spirit and meaning of the same. 
This court is convinced that they are fully aware of what 
is the law, and it will not excuse further evasions, subter­
fuges or attempts to get around the same. It is time that 
either the present officials of the Party, or such as may be 
in the future chosen, realize that the people of the United 
States expect them to follow the American way of elections.



Appendix 43

It is believed that the great body of people in this State, as 
well as in this Nation, truly believe in the American ideals 
and methods, and it is hoped that the actions of the Party 
officials do not represent the true view of the people of 
South Carolina. But irrespective of whether that be true or 
not, it becomes the duty of this court to say to the Party 
officials that they will have to obey the true intent of the 
law, which is so clear and apparent that even they must 
know what it is, and that no excuse or evasion in the future 
will be tolerated.

An Order providing for a Temporary Injunction will 
be issued. This Order will provide that the books of enrolb 
ment for the Democratic Party Primary in the various 
counties in this State (save only Richland, Greenville, 
Pickens and Laurens Counties, the County officials of which 
have not been made parties or have been discharged from 
this cause) be forthwith opened for the enrollment of all 
persons who may be entitled to become electors and to 
exercise the right of suffrage under the Constitution and 
laws of the State of South Carolina irrespective of race, 
color or creed, and the defendants in this cause (save only 
those who have been dismissed herefrom) will be enjoined 
and restrained from debarring any such persons from 
putting their names upon the books in the respective Coun­
ty organizations, and enrolling, and taking part in such 
organizations by reason of their being whites or Negroes 
or by reason of any racial or religious difference whatso­
ever ; and from voting and freely exercising their right to 
vote in any election or primaries by whatever name called, 
wherein persons vote and choose presidential electors 
and/or United States Senators and/or United States 
Congressmen.

And they and all of them will be further restrained 
and enjoined from requiring any person seeking to enroll, 
to join or become members of the organizations above re­
ferred to, or to vote in the elections or primaries, to take 
the test oath, either in its original form or as amended, as 
set out in Rule 36 of the Rules of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, or any modification or other test oath re­
quiring a declaration of principles, understandings, or be-



44 Baskin et a l, Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

liefs, whereby the voters are required to adopt the views, 
desires, or principles laid down by the authors of such oath 
which may be in conflict with the rights of persons to exer­
cise their privilege of suffrage in accord with the law and 
spirit of the American Republic.

It is the intent of this opinion that the full spirit here­
of, as well as the mere letter, be obeyed so that the Dem­
ocratic organization of South Carolina and the primaries 
which it holds shall be freely open to all parties entitled 
to enter therein under the laws and Constitution of this 
country and State, without discrimination of race, color 
or creed. And any violation of the terms of the Order, or of 
the law as set forth in this opinion, by them or their succes­
sors in office, or those acting under them, will be considered 
a contempt and will be proceeded against and punished.

Findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order are 
being filed.

/s /  J. WATTES WARING, 
United States District Judge.

Charleston, S. C.
July 19, 1948

ORDER, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW

(Dated July 19, 1948)

ORDER
This cause came on to be heard in the matter of the is­

suance of a preliminary injunction and the Court having 
considered the verified returns of defendants C. Victor 
Pyle of Greenville County, James P. Sloan of Laurens 
County and Julien D. Wyatt of Pickens County, is is hereby

ORDERED that the Temporary restraining order here­
tofore entered is dissolved as to defendants C. Victor Pyle, 
James 0. Sloan, and Julien D. Wyatt and they and each 
of them are dropped as parties defendant and this action 
is hereby dismissed as to each of them.



Appendix 45

The Court having considered the verified complaint, the 
verified return of H. Klugh Purdy and the verified joint 
return of all defendants other than H. Klugh Purdy, C. 
Victor Pyle, James IT. Sloan and Julien D. Wyatt and the 
testimony of the plaintiff’s witnesses, the defendants hav­
ing rested their case without producing any witnesses, the 
Court makes the following

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. All parties to this action, both, plaintiff and defend­

ants are citizens of the United States and the State of South 
Carolina and are resident and domiciled in said state.

2. Plaintiff is a Negro, a native-born citizen of the 
United States and is more than twenty-one years of age; 
he is a resident of Beaufort County, South Carolina, and 
has been such for a period of more than fifty years prior to 
this year. Plaintiff is a duly and legally qualified elector 
under the Constitution and laws of the United States and 
the State of South Carolina, and believes in the tenets of 
the Democratic party.

3. Plaintiff meets all lawful requirements for enroll­
ment in the Democratic party of South Carolina and for 
voting in the Democratic primary of South Carolina.

4. Defendant, W. P. Baskin is State Chairman of the 
Democratic party of South Carolina exercising its author­
ity and enforcing the rules of the Democratic party of South 
Carolina. Defendants, J. Moore Mars, John B. Stansfield, 
W. T. Riley, Sr., Cal H. Strickland, J. K. Mayfield, Edgar 
A. Brown, W. Brantley Harvey, Rembert C. Dennis, J. A. 
Merritt, Oliver T. Wallace, Joe H. Hall, R. B. Caldwell, 
Ed. Redfern, C. N. Plowden, J. M. Moorer, C. W. Coker, 
R. W. Scott, J. D. Parler, W. P. Yonce, Boyd Brown, H. 
Van Epps, H. L. Smith, R. A. Jolley, P. R. Underwood, 
Randolph Murdaugh, F. A. Thompson, N. S. Richards, 
James S. Wilson, James H. Sullivan, W. P. Baskin, Boyd 
Smith, J. Kendree Williams, N. W. Edens, H. C. Brown, 
Dr. Y. M. Brown, Dr. W. A. Strickland, Julian S. Wolfe, 
G. Max Perry, Homer R. Long, Howard McCravy, E. B. 
Boyle, R, A. Lybrand, E. L. Ard, W. B. Wilson, are mem-



46 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

bers of the State Committee of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina.

5. Defendants James P. Nickles, Abbeville County, 
Julian B. Salley, Jr., Aiken County, J. Carl Kearse, Bam­
berg County, W. T. Riley, Sr., Allendale County, E. H. 
Agnew, Anderson County, Edgar A. Brown, Barnwell 
County, J. B. Cope, Beaufort County, C. N. Clarke, 
Berkeley County, H. C. Geiger, Calhoun County, Francis 
F. Coleman, Charleston County, H. R. Swink, Cherokee 
County, W. C. Stone, Chester County, John A. Welsh, Jr., 
Chesterfield County, John G. Dinkins, Clarendon County, 
R. A. Durham, Colleton County, Cecil E. Harper, Darling­
ton County, W. B. Hawkins, Dillon County, Joseph A. 
Kirby, Dorchester County, J. R. Folk, Edgefield County, 
T. K. McDonald, Fairfield County, Hugh L. Willeox, Flor­
ence County, H. S. Parsons, Georgetown County, J. Herman 
Lightsey, Hampton County, J. G. Lewis, Horry County, H. 
Klugh Purdy, Jasper County, L. O. Funderburk, Kershaw 
County, Lewis M. Clyburn, Lancaster County, Henry C. 
Jennings, Lee County, H. Odelle Harmon, Lexington Coun­
ty, W. B. Norton, Marion County, J. J. Evans, Marlboro 
County, J. Fred Buzhardt, McCormick County, B. V. Chap­
man, Newberry County, B. B. Mulky, Oconee County, Rut 
L. Osborne, Orangeburg County, Billy C. Coleman, Saluda 
County, Jesse W. Boyd, Spartanburg County, Shepard K. 
Nash, Sumter County, J. F. Walker, Union County, F. R. 
Hemingway, Williamsburg County, John M. Spratt, York 
County, are county chairmen of the Democratic Party for 
their respective counties.

6. There have been no material changes in either the 
conduct of the Democratic Party of South Carolina or its 
effectiveness in controlling the choice of federal and state 
officers from that as it appears in the record and decision 
in the case of Elmore v. Rice, et al.

7. The Democratic party of South Carolina consists of 
clubs organized in each township, ward, voting precinct or 
other subdivision of the state. The membership of these 
clubs has been limited to white Democrats. At regular local 
club meetings, officers are elected, including county execu­
tive committee members, from each club and also the dele-



Appendix 47

gates to county conventions. County conventions are held in 
each county in the state where the delegates elect from its 
convention officers, members of the state committee, and 
delegates to the state convention. The state convention is 
held shortly thereafter and these delegates from the county 
organizations elect their presiding officers and the chairman 
of the state committee which is composed of one committee­
man from each county. At this convention rules and regu­
lations for the conduct of the party and primaries are 
adopted.

8. On the 19th of May, 1948 the regular convention of 
the Democratic party was held in Columbia, South Caro­
lina and at this convention rules were adopted in place of 
the constitution and rules of the party previously in force. 
These rules admitted in evidence are now in full force and 
effect. The present rules of the Democratic party of South 
Carolina adopted May 19, 1948 provide the following quali­
fications for club membership:

“6. Qualifications for club membership in any club 
of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, shall be as 
follows, viz. : The applicant for membership shall be 
twenty-one (21) years of age, or shall become so before 
the succeeding general election, and be a white Demo­
crat, who subscribes to the principles of the Democratic 
Party of South Carolina, as declared by the State Con­
vention. He shall be a citizen of the United States, and 
of the state of South Carolina, and shall be able to 
read and write and interpret the Constitution of the 
State of South Carolina. No person shall belong to any 
club unless he has been a resident of the State of South 
Carolina for two (2) years, of the county for six (6) 
months prior to the succeeding general election, and of 
the club district sixty (60) days prior to the first pri­
mary following his offer to enroll. Provided, that public 
school teachers, and ministers of the gospel in charge 
of a regular organized church, shall be exempt from 
the provisions of this rule as to residence, if otherwise 
qualified. ’ ’



48 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Bkown, Appellee

9. The present rules of the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina adopted May 19, 1948 provide the following quali­
fications for voting in the primary elections:

“7. All duly enrolled club members are entitled to 
vote in the precinct of their residence, if they take the 
oath required of the voters in the primary and in com- 
formity with the Order of Judge J. Waties Waring, 
United States District Judge, in the case of Elmore, 
etc., v. Bice et al., all qualified Negro electors of the 
State of South Carolina are entitled to vote in the pre­
cinct of their residence, if they present their general 
election certificates and take the oath required of voters 
in the primary. ’ ’
10. The present rules of the Democratic Party of South 

Carolina adopted May 19, 1948 provide the following oath 
to be taken by electors:

‘ ‘ 36. The managers at each box shall require every 
voter to sign and deliver to them, before the voter casts 
his or her ballot, the following Voter’s Oath which 
shall be filed and kept by the County Secretary as a 
permanent record.

‘I do solemnly swear that I am a resident of this 
club district, that I am duly qualified to vote in this 
primary under the rules of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, and that I have not voted before in 
this primary, and that I am not disqualified from vot­
ing under Section 2267 of the South Carolina Code of 
Laws, 1942, relating to disqualified crimes.

I further solemnly swear that I (understand and) 
believe in and will support the principles of the Demo­
cratic Party of South Carolina, and that I believe in 
and will support the social, (religious) and educational 
separation of races.

I further solemnly swear that I believe in the prin­
ciples of States’ Rights, and that I am opposed to the 
proposed Federal so-called F. E. P. C. law.

I further solemnly swear that I will support the 
election of the nominees of this primary in the ensuing



Appendix 49

general election, and that I am not a member of any
other political party.

Voter
11. The words “ understand and” and the word “ re­

ligious” in parenthesis in the above oath appeared in the 
rules as adopted by the Convention but were subsequently 
deleted by the State Committee of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina.

12. The defendants are enforcing and intend to enforce 
the rules of the Democratic party of South Carolina set out 
in the three preceding paragraphs.

13. Prior to July 2, 1948 plaintiff David Brown was 
a duly enrolled member of the Democratic party of Beau­
fort County. On or about July 2, 1948 pursuant to the rules 
of the Democratic party of South Carolina as enforced by 
defendants, the plaintiff was “ purged” from the enrollment 
books of said party solely because of his race and color.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court makes the fol­
lowing :

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction in this cause under sub­

division 1 of section 41 of Title 28 of the United States 
Code, section 2 and 4 and Article I and Amendments Four­
teen, Fifteen and Seventeen of the United States Constitu­
tion and sections 31, and 43 of Title 8 of the United States 
Code; this Court also has jurisdiction of this cause under 
subdivision 11 and 14 of section 41 of Title 28 of the United 
States Code.

2. This is a class action authorized by rule 23 (a) of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of 
the United States.

3. The only material and realistic elections in South 
Carolina are the Democratic Primaries. The only elections 
at which plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues can 
make a meaningful choice and exercise their right to vote 
are the Democratic primaries. The Democratic primary in



50 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

South Carolina is an intergral part of the election machin­
ery of South Carolina.

4. The Democratic party of South Carolina is an 
organization acting for and on behalf of the people of South 
Carolina. The primary conducted by said organization for 
and on behalf of the people of South Carolina is the only 
election where the plaintiff and other qualified electors can 
express a meaningful choice in selecting federal and state 
officers. The defendants in performing their duties as of­
ficers of the Democratic party of South Carolina, including 
the conducting of primary elections, are performing an 
important governmental function essential to the exercise 
of sovereignty by the people and in doing so are subject to 
the provisions of the United States Constitution.

5. The enforcement of the rules of the Democratic 
party set out in the Findings of Fact and the continued en­
forcement of these rules will deprive plaintiff and others 
on whose behalf he sues of the effective exercise of their 
right to vote solely because of race and color in violation of 
Article I and Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen and Seventeen 
of the United States Constitution.

6. The rule of the Democratic party of South Carolina 
permitted enrolled members, which is restricted to white 
members, to vote in primary elections while requiring all 
Negro electors to present general election certificates as a 
prerequisite to voting is based solely on race or color, is an 
unequal application of rules for qualification for voting, is 
an unreasonable burden and limitation on the right to vote 
and is in violation of Article I and Amendments Fourteen, 
Fifteen and Seventeen of the Constitution of the United 
States and Sections 31 and 43 of Title 8 of the United States 
Code.

7. In denying to the plaintiff and other Negroes 
similarly situated the right to enroll in said party clubs 
solely because of race and color, the defendants have ef­
fectively limited the right of plaintiff and others similarly 
situated to vote in primary elections to select federal and 
state officers without first producing general election certi­
ficates and have otherwise limited their participation in the 
election machinery of the State of South Carolina in vio-



Appendix 51

lation of Article I and Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen and 
Seventeen of the Constitution of the United States and 
sections 31 and 43 of the United States Code.

8. The oath required of voters in primary elections 
“ that I  (understand and) believe in and will support the 
social (religious) and educational separation of races” and 
“ I further solemnly swear that I believe in the principles 
of States’ Rights, and that 1 am opposed to the proposed 
Federal so-called F. E. P. C. law” is aimed directly at con­
tinuing the disfranchisement of plaintiff and other qualified 
Negro electors despite prior rulings of this and other 
Federal Courts, and is a test not relevant to qualifications 
to vote, is an unreasonable term and condition for the exer­
cise of the right of suffrage, is based on race and color and 
is in violation of Article I and Amendments Fourteen, Fif­
teen and Seventeen of the United States Constitution and 
Sections 31 and 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code.

9. Plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues are 
suffering irreparable injury and are threatened with irre­
parable injury in the future by reason of the acts set out 
above; they have no plain adequate or complete remedy to> 
redress the wrong and illegal acts complained of other than 
by preliminary injunction.

ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the defendants, their 

agents, servants, employees and attorneys and all persons 
in active concert and participation with them be and they 
hereby are restrained and enjoined pending the determina­
tion of this action from:

1. Refusing to enroll Negroes as members of local 
clubs and the Democratic Party of South Carolina, be­
cause of race and color; and

2. From denying to plaintiff and others on whose 
behalf he sues from full and complete participation in 
the Democratic party of South Carolina without dis­
tinction because of race, color, creed, or condition; and

3. From enforcing the rules of the Democratic 
party of South Carolina requiring Negro electors to



52 Baskin et a t, Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

present general election certificates as a prerequisitive 
to voting in the August 10th primary election; and

4. From requiring the plaintiff and other Negro 
electors to take the following oath as a prerequisitive 
to voting in the said primary elections

“ I do solemnly swear that I am a resident of this 
club district, that I am duly qualified to vote in this 
primary under the rules of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, and that I have not voted before in this 
primary, and that I am not disqualified from voting 
under Section 2267 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 
1942, relating to disqualifying crimes.

I further solemnly swear that I believe in and will 
support the principles of the Democratic party of South 
Carolina, and that I (understand and) believe in and 
will support the social (religious) and educational 
separation of races.

I further solemnly swear that I believe in the 
principles of States’ Rights, and that I am opposed to 
the proposed Federal so-called F. E. P. C. law.

I further solemnly swear that I will support the 
election of the nominees of this primary in the ensuing 
general election, and that I am not a member of any 
other political party. ’ ’

Voter
5. From requiring of prospective voters in Democratic 

primaries of South Carolina any oath other than that of 
the prospective voter meets the qualifications as an elector 
as set out in the Constitution of South Carolina, and is a 
Democrat and will support the election of the nominees of 
the Democratic party at the ensuing general election.

6. It is further ordered that the enrollment books of 
the Democratic Party of South Carolina be reopened for 
the enrollment of individuals who meet the qualifications 
for electors as set out in the Constitution of South Carolina 
without distinction as to race, color, creed, or condition; and

(1) That these books be kept open until noon of 
July 31, 1948, excepting Sundays; and,



Appendix B3

(2) That these books be open for enrollment at the 
County Courthouse or in such other public, convenient 
and accessible place within or near to the County seat 
in each County as may be selected by the defendants; 
and

(3) That these enrollment books shall be kept open 
for purposes of enrollment during the following hours:

10:00 A. M. to 1:00 P. M. and 3:00 to 6:00 
P. M. of each day covered by this order.

Further details as to the exact places of opening the 
enrollment books or expenses incidental thereto need not be 
defined by the Court but the respective officials of the Demo­
cratic party of South Carolina, will be solely responsible 
for carrying out the terms of this order in letter and spirit.

It is further provided that plaintiff first give security 
in the sum of $5,000.00 for the payment of such costs and 
damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who 
is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained, 
such bond to be approved by the Court or by the Clerk of 
the Court.

/s /  J. WATIES WARING, 
Judge, United States District 

Court.
Charleston, S. C.,
19th July 1948.

ORDER AMENDING TEMPORARY INJUNCTION 
(Dated July 22, 1948)

On July 19, 1948, I filed an Order of Injunction in the 
above entitled cause relative to opening of enrollment books 
allowing parties to enroll and take part in the organization 
of the Democratic Party in this State, voting in the primary 
elections and other matters. Among other things, the Order 
(in paragraph numbered 4) enjoined the defendants from 
requiring the oath which was set forth in said Order and 
which is a part of the rules adopted by the State Demo­
cratic Party of South Carolina at its convention held on 
May 19,1948. And in Paragraph 5 of said Order, defendants



54 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

were enjoined from requiring voters to take an oath other 
than that the prospective voter meet certain conditions. It 
appeared to me, and still does, that said Paragraph 5 was 
sufficiently clear and distinct for anyone to understand its 
true meaning. However, it has come to my attention, for 
whatever motive or reason I do not know, that there seems 
to be confusion as to the meaning of this part of the Order, 
and I have therefore determined to clarify and amend the 
same by striking out Paragraph 5 of the Injunction Order 
and inserting a new paragraph in lieu thereof.

A careful reading of the Order, as originally drawn, 
should, I believe, convince any one that the intent of the 
same was not to lay down or set forth any particular oath, 
but primarily to forbid the oath referred to in Paragraph 
4, and to forbid any oath whatever, with certain exceptions, 
the exceptions being in effect what had heretofore been the 
form of oath used in the Democratic Party of this State. 
It was customary before the recent convention to require 
voters in the primaries to take an oath that they were en­
titled to vote and had not voted before, and that they would 
support the nominees of the primary. It was the intent of 
the Order that the Party might require some similar oath, 
if it desired, or any part thereof, or require no oath at all. 
But in order to clarify the same, it is

ORDERED that Paragraph 5 of the Injunction Order 
of this court dated and filed July 19, 1948, be and the same 
is abrogated and stricken therefrom, and in lieu of the same 
there is inserted a new Paragraph 5 to read as follows:

“ 5. From requiring voters or prospective voters 
in Democratic Primaries of South Carolina to take any 
oath setting out any beliefs or pledges as a prerequisite 
to enrolling and voting, except that the defendants may 
(but they are not required) require an oath in part or 
in whole containing the following:

1. That the voter has the requisite residence and 
has lived the legal time within the State, County and 
precinct, or other voting subdivision, and is qualified 
to vote at the primary election.

2. That he has not voted before in that particular 
election.



Appendix 55

3. That he pledge himself to support the nominees 
of that primary.
It is reiterated and distinctly understood that it is op­

tional with the defendants to require an oath containing the 
whole or any part or parts of the foregoing, or to forego 
requiring any oath at all.”

/s /  J. WATTES WARING, 
United States District Judge.

Charleston, S. C.,
July 22, 1948.

ANSWER OF APPELLANTS 
(Filed July 29, 1948)

The defendants herein, other than any who have made 
separate answers, specifically reserving their right to de­
mand a trial by jury of the issues in this cause, answering 
the complaint herein, respectfully allege and show:

FOR A FIRST DEFENSE:
That the rules of the Democratic Party of South Caro­

lina referred to in the complaint herein were adopted in 
the State Convention of the said Party on May 19, 1948, 
and were duly made known to the public and the press, and 
were printed and widely distributed, and these defendants 
are informed and believe that they were within a few days 
of that date well known to the plaintiff, and to others 
similarly situated; that the enrollment books of the Demo­
cratic Party of South Carolina were open, after full ad­
vertisement to the public, on the fourth Tuesday in May, 
1948, and were officially closed on the 22nd day of June, 
1948; that this action was not filed until the 8th day of July, 
1948, although the date set for the first primary of the 
Party in the said rules was August 10,1948; that the action 
is predicated upon the language of the rules adopted on 
the 19th day of May, 1948, as aforesaid; that the plaintiff, 
and those for whom he sues, have been guilty of unwar­
ranted delay in instituting this action, which delay has 
prejudiced the rights of these defendants and of all other



56 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

members of the Democratic Party of South Carolina; and 
that because of the laches of the plaintiff and those for 
whom he sues, the defendants respectfully submit that this 
action should not now be entertained by the Court, and that 
the said parties should be left to avail themselves of their 
legal remedies, if any, in the premises.

FOR A SECOND DEFENSE:
That these defendants are informed and believe that 

the plaintiff and many of those for whom he sues are mem­
bers of another political party, namely, the Progressive 
Democratic Party, which Party is not in sympathy with the 
fundamental principles and governmental objectives of the 
Democratic Party of South Carolina, such as the opposition 
of the Democratic Party of South Carolina to the proposed 
Federal so-called FEPC Law, and other Federal laws 
usurping or encroaching upon the sovereignty of the States 
of the Union and the rights of the States and of the people 
preserved in and by the Tenth Amendment to the Con­
stitution of the United States, and such as the adherence 
of the Democratic Party of South Carolina to the prin­
ciple of States Rights, and such as the adherence of the 
Democratic Party of South Carolina to the social and 
educational separation of the races, and opposition to 
Federal law interfering with State and local laws in ref­
erence to the separation of the races; that the Democratic 
Party of South Carolina and these defendants and other 
members of it have the right to restrict membership in the 
said Party to those who are in sympathy with its principles 
and the purpose of fostering and effectuating them; and 
that these defendants are informed and believe that the 
plaintiff and other members of the Progressive Democratic 
Party, and other persons who do not adhere to and believe 
in the principles of the Democratic Party of South Caro­
lina, have no constitutional or legal right to membership 
in the Democratic Party of South Carolina.



Appendix 57

FOR A THIRD DEFENSE:
That this action is brought by the plaintiff in behalf 

of himself and others similarly situated; that the plaintiff 
is a person who presented himself for enrollment during 
the official enrollment period prescribed to the Democratic 
Party of South Carolina, and was actually enrolled, and 
his name was later stricken from the enrollment books; 
and that the Court, as to the right of enrollment on the 
books of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, is limited 
in this action to granting relief only to those who, like the 
plaintiff, presented themselves for enrollment while the 
books were properly open, and has either enrolled or was 
denied enrollment, and that the Court cannot and should not 
consider or grant relief to persons not similarly situated 
and who did not within the proper time assert their alleged 
right to enrollment.

FOR A FOURTH DEFENSE:
FIRST: These defendants, on information and belief, 

admit the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of the com­
plaint.

SECOND: Answering the allegations contained in par­
agraph 2 of the complaint, these defendants allege and show 
that the actual controversy between the parties in this action 
in reference to the right of the plaintiff and ohers similarly 
situated to enroll as members of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina should be confined to whether persons who 
duly presented themselves for enrollment during the official 
enrollment period are entitled to enroll as members of the 
said Party; and these defendants admit the remaining al­
legations of said paragraph.

THIRD: These defendants admit the allegations con­
tained in paragraph 3 of the complaint.

FOURTH: On information and belief, these defendants 
admit the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the com­
plaint, except the allegation that the plaintiff is a believer 
in the tenets of the Democratic Party, has never voted for 
any candidates other than those of the Democratic Party,



58 Baskin et a l, Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

and meets all lawful requirements for enrollment in the 
Democratic Party of South Carolina and for voting in the 
Democratic Primary of South Carolina, which allegations 
are denied on information and belief; and those defendants 
on the contrary allege on information and belief that the 
plaintiff does not believe in such principles and governmen­
tal objectives of the Democratic Party of South Carolina 
as the social and educational separation of the races, and 
such as the preservation of the sovereignty of the States 
of the Union and the rights of the States and of the people 
preserved in the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States, and such as the opposition of the said 
Party and its membership to the proposed Federal so-called 
FEPC Law, and such as the opposition of said Party and 
its membership to Federal Law interfering with State and 
local laws in reference to the separation of the races, and 
the Federal Laws usurping or encroaching upon the sov­
ereignty and the proper field of governmental activity of 
the Sovereign States of the Union, and those defendants 
are also informed and believe that the plaintiff is a member 
of another political party, namely, the Progressive Demo­
cratic Party, which has actually offered candidates in the 
General Election against candidates of the Democ.rative 
Party of South Carolina.

FIFTH: These defendants admit the allegations con­
tained in paragraph five of the complaint, except the allega­
tions setting forth the class represented by the plaintiff, 
which allegations are denied, and on the contrary these de­
fendants, on information and belief, allege and show that 
class represented by the plaintiff are Negro citizens of the 
United States and residents of the State of South Carolina 
who possess the qualifications of electors under the Con­
stitution of South Carolina, and who presented themselves 
for enrollment on the books of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina during the official enrollment period.

SIXTH: These defendants admit the allegations con­
tained in paragraphs, 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint.

SEVENTH: Answering the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 9 and 10 of the complaint, on information and



Appendix 59

belief these defendants deny the same, and on the con­
trary allege and show that the elections provided by law 
in South Carolina are the General Elections established 
by the Constitution and Statutes of that State; that that 
Constitution and those Statutes make no mention of, and do 
not provide for, and do not regulate, the Primaries held by 
the Democratic Party of South Carolina under party rules 
and procedure adopted at the Party’s State Convention; 
that the Democratic Party and the Democratic Primary 
do not become the property of every person in the State 
simply because the members of that Party have been the 
only ones who have had the character, ability, vigor and 
community of interests to associate themselves together as 
citizens to exercise their constitutional right to work to­
gether for public and governmental principles and objec­
tives; and any contention or holding to the contrary is 
believed by these defendants to be in derogation of their 
constitutional rights.

EIGHTH: These defendants admit the allegations con­
tained in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the complaint.

NINTH: Answering the allegations contained in para­
graph 15 of the complaint, these defendants deny the same.

TENTH: Answering the allegations contained in para­
graphs 16 and 17 of the complaint, these defendants, on 
information and belief, deny the same, and on the contrary 
allege and show that they did not and do not construe the 
decision in the case of Elmore v. Rice to hold that the 
Democratic Party of South Carolina was no longer a polit­
ical party which could restrict its membership to those in 
sympathy with its principles and the purpose of fostering 
and effectuating them, but only as holding that Negroes 
who were qualified electors must be given the right to vote 
in its primaries, which right was given by the rules adopted 
by the State Convention of the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina, and the requirement of producing General Elec­
tion certificates was merely a procedural requirement in 
reference to the persons seeking to vote evidencing their 
right to do so.



60 Baskin et a l, Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

ELEVENTH: Answering the allegations contained in 
paragraph 18 of the complaint, these defendants on infor­
mation and belief deny the same, and on the contrary allege 
and show that these defendants and all other members of 
the Democratic Party of South Carolina have the constitu­
tional right to associate themselves together in party mem­
bership for the purpose of supporting and working for law­
ful principles and governmental objectives in which they 
may believe, and to foster and effectuate which they may 
desire to work together, and that they have the right to 
make a condition of membership in such politcial party 
sympathy with its principles and the purpose of fostering 
and effectuating them, and that the oath prescribed by the 
State Convention, and referred to in said paragraph of the 
complaint, was a proper and legitimate exercise of that 
right, at least so far as enrolling and becoming members of 
the said Party is concerned, and that to deny them this right 
is to hold that they are compelled to admit to membership 
in their Party those who are not in sympathy with its prin­
ciples and governmental objectives, but seek only to thwart 
and destroy them. These defendants further show, on infor­
mation and belief, that it is well known, as set forth in Web­
ster’s New International Dictionary, 1927, under the words 
Democratic Party, that it is a party which has advocated a 
strict construction of the Constitution, sharp limitation of 
the powers of the Federal Government, and a broad con­
struction of the reserved rights of the States, along with 
other principles there referred to, and that the membership 
of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, as these de­
fendants are informed and believe, had and have the right 
to compel a prospective member of the Party to attest his 
ahderenee to such principles, either stated generally or 
specifically, in an appropriate manner as a condition of 
membership.



Appendix 61

TWELFTH: Answering the allegations contained in 
paragraph 19 of the complaint, these defendants, on infor­
mation and belief, allege and show that to the extent not 
prevented by a court order, it is their duty to enforce the 
rules of the Democratic Party of South Carolina adopted in 
its State Convention on May 19, 1948.

THIRTEENTH: Answering the allegations contained 
in paragraph 20 of the complaint, these defendants admit 
the same, except so much thereof as alleges that the said 
Primary will be conducted by the defendants as a part of 
the election machinery of the State of South Carolina.

FOURTEENTH: Answering the allegations contained 
in paragraph 21 of the complaint, these defendants on in­
formation and belief admit the same.

FIFTEENTH: These defendants admit the allegations 
contained in paragraph 22 of the complaint.

SIXTEENTH: These defendants deny the allegations 
contained in paragraph 23 of the complaint.

SEVENTEENTH: These defendants, on information 
and belief, deny the allegations contained in paragraph 24 
of the complaint.

EIGHTEENTH: Answering the allegations contained 
in paragraph 25 of the complaint, these defendants deny 
so much thereof as alleges that the party Primary is elec­
tion machinery of South Carolina, and that the plaintiff 
and others in whose behalf he sues are prevented from en­
rolling in the Democratic Clubs of South Carolina by any­
thing except the rules of the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina duly adopted in the State Convention of that Party 
on May 19, 1948; they admit that they are under the duty 
under said rules of enforcing them to the extent not made 
impossible by a court order; and on information and belief 
they deny the remaining allegations contained in said 
paragraph.



62 Baskin et al., Appellants, v. Brown, Appellee

WHEREFORE, Having fully answered said com­
plaint, these defendants pray that the same be dismissed.

/ s /  EUGENE S. BLEASE, 
Newberry, S. C.,

/ s /  SIDNEYS. TISON, 
Bennettsville, S. C.,

/s /  GEORGE WARREN, 
Hampton, S. C.,

/ s /  ROBERT McC. FIGG, JR., 
Charleston, S. C., 
Attorneys for the said De­

fendants.
(Verification by appellant, W. P. Baskin, omitted.)

AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLANT JOHN E. BTANSFIELD 
(Filed October 20, 1948)

AFFIDAVIT UNDER 28 U. S. C. A. SECTION 25

Personally appeared before me John E. Stansfield, 
who, being duly sworn, said that he is a party defendant 
in the above entitled cause; that he is informed and believes 
that Honorable J. Waties Waring, United States District 
Judge for the Eastern District of South Carolina, before 
whom this cause is pending and is scheduled to be heard, 
has a personal bias in favor of the plaintiff herein, and also 
has a personal bias and prejudice against this deponent and 
all other defendants herein who are contesting the claims 
of the plaintiff, by reason of each of which deponent is in­
formed and believes that the said Honorable J. Waties 
Waring, United States District Judge as aforesaid, may be 
prevented from or impeded in rendering judgment impar­
tially between the parties to this cause.

That the sources of deponent’s information and the 
grounds of his said belief are as follows:

On the hearing of the rule to show cause why a tempor­
ary injunction should not be issued in this cause, the said



A p p e n d i x 63

Judge Waring, before hearing from deponent’s counsel on 
the return filed on behalf of him and other defendants, made 
the following statement regarding this deponent and said 
other defendants, as shown by a transcript of said hearing 
made by a stenographer at the request of deponent’s coun­
sel, to wit:

“ So far as Greenville, Pickens and Laurens are con­
cerned, I want to say, gentlemen, that it is extremely grati­
fying to me to have these representatives, though there are 
only three and I feel ashamed that there are not more than 
three counties in this State which recognize the decisions 
made, not by me, because I have no private opinion in 
this, but the decisions made by the Circuit Court of Ap­
peals and the Supreme Court, but, much further than that, 
the supreme law of our land as true Americans. I feel proud 
that the governing body of these three counties will run, 
irrespective of any court action, without coercion, without 
any proceedings or anybody telling them what to do; that 
they’ve got sense enough, nerve enough and patriotism 
enough to make a true, fair and just decisions. Mr. Price, 
I thank you for your Return, not personally, but on behalf 
of the Government and on behalf of America. I ’m glad to 
see that some of our citizens realize that this country is an 
American country; that it is not a country of minorities, 
parties, groups, religions, creeds or races. I hope that the 
press will publish the whole or exerpts of the Return made 
by these three counties and my brief remarks in regards to 
them. ’ ’

At said hearing, the said Judge Waring, according to 
said transcript, made the following statements regarding 
deponent and said other defendants, to wit:

“ The leaders of the party—or a majority of them— 
chose to follow the Order and not look into the opinion, the 
rationale or the spirit. This could not have been ignorance. 
If it was ignorance, it was ignorance so crass as to be un­
believable—that a part of several hundred men and prac­
ticed politicians of this State, who have run the Democratic 
party of this State for many years, many of whose are 
practicing lawyers and practice in all courts. It could not 
have been that. It could not have been immature, juvenile



64 B a s k i n  et a t,  A p p e l l a n t s , v . B k o w n , A p p e l l e e

smartness. I would not accuse them of that. Therefore, it 
must have been a deliberate attempt to evade the spirit of 
the opinion.”

And also:
“ What does the oath mean? Nobody knows. Nobody 

knows to such an extent that they knowingly struck out the 
word ‘understand.’ They provided an oath that said ‘I 
understand and believe in’ and then the Committee got to­
gether and said, ‘Let’s take out the word “ understand” . 
These poor creatures have got to swear that they believe 
in something without understanding it.’ That strikes me as 
the most absurd thing I ever head of, and that’s the Demo­
cratic Party who is trying to represent us in this nation. I 
say thank Cod for Pickens, Greenville, Laurens and Jasper. 
There are some men who put their feet on the ground and 
stood up in public and said, ‘We are Americans and are 
going to obey the law.’ The rest of the State is going to obey 
the law. They ought to do it voluntarily—ought to be glad 
to do it. I t ’s a disgrace and a shame that you’ve got to come 
into Court and ask one judge to tell you to be an American 
and to obey the law.”

That notwithstanding the said statements, deponent 
and said other defendants preferred to assume that the 
cause might be impartially judged by the said Judge War­
ing after full hearing on the merits and arguments of coun­
sel thereon, and began preparations for the trial of this 
cause on Tueday, October 26th, 1948, the date fixed for its 
trial.

That subsequent to 10 days before the term during 
which the trial was to be had, to wit, on the 17th day of 
October, 1948, the Columbia State, a daily newspaper pub­
lished in the City of Columbia, S. C., carried in its columns 
the following article, to wit:

“ JUDGE WARING SAYS SOUTH NEEDS OUT­
SIDE ASSISTANCE TO SOLVE RACIAL PROBLEMS.

“ The New York Times:
“ The South should not be ‘let alone’ to deal with its 

racial problem in its own way, Federal Judge J. Waties 
Waring of Charleston, said yesterday.



A p p e n d i x 65

“ Judge Waring, who wrote the rulings that gave 
Negroes the right to vote in his state’s primaries this year, 
asserted that outside assistance was necessary.

“ Speaking at a luncheon in his honor, given by the 
New York chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, in the 
Hidston House, the jurist said:

“ ‘To me, the racial atmosphere of my part of the 
South is at present pretty dim. I believe i t’s going to im­
prove—that the sunlight is going to come in. But I don’t 
believe that the windows are going to be opened volun­
tarily. ’

“ The most discouraging aspect, Judge Waring said, 
is the attitude of the majority of white Southerners.

“ ‘The problem,’ he declared, ‘is to change the feeling, 
the sentiment, the creed, of the great body of white people 
of the South that a Negro is not an American citizen.’

“ Judge Waring, who noted that his family had lived in 
South Carolina since the Sixteen Fourties, added:

“ ‘Now, I believe that the Negro is an American citizen. 
And I don’t think that there’s any place in American democ­
racy for putting any citizen in a compartment according 
to his race or religion.’

“ Referring to his decisions in the United States dis­
trict court in Charleston, whch outlawed bans on Negro 
primary voting—decisions that have been upheld by higher 
courts—Judge Waring said:

“ ‘Not one man in public life has dared to support 
these decisions based on the fact that a Negro is entitled 
to vote as an American citizen. The few people in public 
life who have communicated with me have done so in letters 
marked “ strictly confidential.” That’s pretty bad.’

“ Although Southern Negroes have scored some gains 
in recent years, the jurist asserted, these were either forced 
by outside agencies or given as a favor, not a right.

“ This is true despite the efforts of liberal Southerners 
such as former Gov. Ellis Arnall of Georgia, Judge Waring 
declared.

“ Turning to Thurgood Marshall, attorney for the Na­
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People,



66 B a s k i n  et a l,  A p p e l l a n t s , v . B r o w n , A p p e l l e e

a member of the Lawyers Guild executive board who was 
seated near him, the judge said:

“ ‘The danger of Arnall and others is that they say: 
“ Let us alone and we’ll do it outselves.” Well, no Negro 
would have voted in South Carolina if you hadn’t brought 
a case.’

“ To the group as a whole, Judge Waring added:
“ ‘I say to you, go forward with your work, but you 

must be careful of your methods. A reformer who comes to 
the South and says the whole civilization there is wrong is 
making a mistake. On the other hand, don’t stay away.

“ ‘We have got to teach many people to want to im­
prove. The situation has got to be handled gently but firmly.

“ ‘My people have one outstanding fault—the terrible 
fault of prejudice. They have been born and educated to 
feel that a Negro is some kind of an animal that ought to 
be well-treated and given kindness, but as a matter of favor, 
not right. That’s not the kind of a conception that we should 
to the world.’

“ Paul O’Dwyer, president of the New York Lawyers 
Guild, and Federal Judge John C. Knox introduced Judge 
Waring.”

That when deponent learned from said newspaper 
article that the said Judge Waring had made, in part about 
this cause, the speech and statements therein referred to 
and quoted, and upon considering the same in the light of 
the said statements previously, made by him at said" hear­
ing, he came to the definite and positive conclusion that the 
said Judge Waring had a personal bias in favor of the plain­
tiff and his success in this cause, and a personal bias and 
prejudice against this deponent and said other defendants 
regarding the justiciable matter pending, as a result of 
which they cannot expect an impartial judgment of the is­
sues in the cause.

That deponent has not had access to the full matter 
contained in said speech in New York, N. Y., but from what 
information he has received from said newspaper article 
it appears that Judge Waring has a personal bias in favor 
of the plaintiff because he is a Negro, for whom “ the win­
dows” will not “ be opened voluntarily” , and whom “ the



A p p e n d i x 67

great body of the white people of the South” hold the feel­
ing, the sentiment, the creed “ that he is not an American 
citizen” , but “ have been born and educated to feel * * * 
is some kind of an animal” ; and that he has a personal 
bias and prejudice against this deponent and said other de­
fendants because they are “ white people of the South” , 
with “ one outstanding fault—the terrible fault of preju­
dice” , whom “ we have got to teach * * * to want to
improve” , and who have “ the feeling, the sentiment, the 
creed that a Negro is not an American citizen,” of whom 
the said Judge Waring has expressed himself in open Court 
as being ashamed.

That this deponent has consulted his counsel as early 
as practicable after he received knowledge of said news­
paper article, speech and statements, and this affidavit has 
been prepared and filed as expeditiously thereafter as 
possible.

/ s /  JOHN E. STANSFIELD.
SWORN to and subscribed before me 

this 19th day of October, 1948.
T. ALEX HEISE (LS)

Notary Public for South Carolina.

CERTIFICATE
We, the counsel for John E. Stanfield and numerous 

other defendants in this cause, hereby certify that the af­
fidavit of the said John E. Stanfield and application under 
28 U.S.C.A. Section 25 are made in good faith.

/ s /  EUGENE S. BLEASE,
/s /  SIDNEY S. TISON,
,/s/ GEORGE WARREN,
/s /  ROBERT MeC. FIGG, JR., 

Counsel for defendant John 
E. Stanfield and other de­
fendants.



6 8  B a s k i n  e t  a l ,  A p p e l l a n t s , v . B r o w n , A p p e l l e e

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
(Held October 22, 1948)

Hearing held this 22nd day of October, 1948, at 10 
o’clock a.m., in the United States Court Room at Charles­
ton, South Carolina, with

Hon. J. Waties Waring, U. S. District Judge, Pre­
siding.

Appearances:
Messrs. Thurgood Marshall and Harold R. Boulware, 

for the Plaintiff.
Messrs. S. S. Tison, George Warren, and Robert McC. 

Figg, Jr., for the Defendants.
The Court : The first matter to be taken up is the peti­

tion on one of the defendants, John E. Stansfield. Do you 
gentlemen represent him?

Mr. T ison  : Yes, sir.
The C ourt : I have read the petition and statements and 

will hear from you on the matter if you care to discuss it.
Mr. T ison  : We do not care to argue the motion your 

Honor.
The Co u r t : There are two parts to it. The first com­

plains of my decision. Well, I am of the opinion that the 
decision was right. It is in conformity with the opinions in 
other cases, which have been affirmed. It is the plain law 
of the land, and certainly it is the law in this case as this 
case hasn’t been appealed from. The second one seems to 
be on the ground that I spoke in New York at a Lawyers 
meeting, which I did, based on some newspaper reports, 
which are mostly correct, and the address was to the effect 
that I was in favor of enforcing the law. I assume that if 
I  had made a speech that I believed in enforcing the law 
against murder, I would have to disqualify myself from 
trying a murder case on this theory. I suppose that if I had 
said I was in favor of enforcing the revenue laws, I  couldn’t 
try any of the numerous illicit distilling violations. There 
is nothing to the motion. Petition dismissed. Let us proceed 
to the other motions in this case.



A p p e n d i x 69

(Brief arguments were made by counsel for both plain­
tiff and defendants on the motion to amend the complaint 
by withdrawing the paragraph pertaining to money dam­
ages and the prayer of the complaint asking for $5,000 
money damages; also on the motion to strike demand for 
jury trial.)

the Court stated that orders would be filed on the 
motions.

(Hearing adjourned.)

ORDER DATED OCTOBER 22, 1948
The above entitled case was commenced by filing and 

service of a complaint praying for declaratory judgment, 
injunction and money damages; the prayer including both 
preliminary and permanent injunction. A hearing was had 
on the question of preliminary injunction resulting in an 
opinion and order filed July 19,1948.

The other questions involved in the case were left in 
obeyance. In the making up of the calendar for the current 
October term of court the case was set for a hearing on the 
jury calendar in response to a request by the defendants 
for a jury trial.

Thereafter, the plaintiff, through his attorneys gave 
notice of a motion praying leave to amend the complaint 
by striking therefrom the allegations for money damages 
and the prayer for such damages, and, based upon that mo­
tion being granted for the case to be stricken from the jury 
calendar and set on the non-jury calendar for trial of the 
equitable issues.

In the meantime a petition and affidavit was filed by 
one of the defendants, namely John E. Stansfield of Aiken, 
South Carolina, charging prejudice and bias and asking 
that I disqualify myself. The basis for this petition appears 
to be that my decision on the preliminary injunction did not 
agree with his views, it being adverse to the position of the 
defendants; and in addition that I had made public state­
ments that I believed in the enforcement of the Constitution 
and laws of the United States relative to the equal protec­
tion of the rights of citizens to vote regardless of race or



70 B a s k i n  et a l,  A p p e l l a n t s , v . B r o w n ,  A p p e l l e e

religion. The prayer of this petition is entirely without 
merit and I refuse to disqualify myself.

Passing to the plaintiff’s motions, undoubtedly he 
wishes to withdraw his claim for money damages should be 
allowed so to do and this will be granted. Defendants ’ coun­
sel have pointed out the fact that the complaint contains 
a number of allegations that would sustain the cause of 
action on the law side of the court and entitle them to a 
trial by jury, as well as allegations pertaining to the prayer 
for a declaratory judgment and equitable relief. It there­
fore seems appropriate in granting the motion to strike 
out the allegations and prayer for money damages to state 
that only the equitable issues will be passed upon in this 
case and that any legal cause of action which would entitle 
the parties to a trial by jury is abandoned; and that is the 
intention of this order. The further motion to strike from 
the jury calendar must therefore also be granted and the 
case will be set for a hearing on the non-jury calendar. Ac­
cordingly, it is

ORDERED, that the petition of John E. Stansfield 
praying that the present Judge disqualify himself from 
hearing this case be and the same is refused and the peti­
tion dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the prayer in the 
motion of the plaintiff to strike from the complaint the al­
legations claiming money damages and that portion of the 
prayer for relief asking for money damages be, and the 
same is, granted. It being distinctly understood that the 
cause of action for legal relief is eliminated from this com­
plaint and the allegations of the complaint are responsive 
solely to the equity relief prayed for in the nature of a de­
claratory judgment and such order of permanent injunction 
as may be determined upon.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the cause be 
stricken from the jury calendar and set upon the non-jury 
calendar and that the same be heard in the Courtroom at



A p p e n d i x 71

Charleston, South Carolina on Tuesday, November 23,1948, 
at 10 o’clock in the forenoon.

/s /  J. WATIES WARING,
United States District Judge.

Charleston, S. C.,
October 22, 1948.

ST IPU L A T IO N  F IL E D  NOV EM BER 23, 1948
It is hereby agreed and stipulated by and between the 

counsel for the plaintiff and defendants that the following 
facts are true and accurate and should be made a part of 
the record herein without formal proof thereof:

1. The testimony taken at the hearing of July 16, 1948 
for a preliminary injunction in this case shall be considered 
a part of the record of this hearing.

2. The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States and 
the State of South Carolina and a resident of Beaufort 
County, South Carolina for more than 50 years. He has 
paid his poll tax and at all times herein material was and 
is a duly and legally qualified elector under the Constitution 
and laws of the United States and the State of South Caro­
lina and is subject to no disqualifications.

3. The plaintiff believes in the principles of the Dem­
ocratic party of South Carolina, except those relating to the 
separation of the races and the so-called federal F. E. P. C. 
law. He believes that all states rights are subject to the 
paramount authority of the constitution of the United 
States.

4. The defendant Senator W. P. Baskin, as chairman 
of the Democratic party of South Carolina, the defendant 
members of the State Committee, and the defendant County 
Chairman, all acting in their official capacities as officers of 
said party, have been enforcing the rules of said party ex­
cept in so far as they were restrained by the preliminary 
injunction heretofore issued in this case. Unless said pre­
liminary injunction is continued or a permanent injunction



72 B a s k i n  et al., A p p e l l a n t s , v . B r o w n , A p p e l l e e

is issued defendants will enforce these rules unless they 
are repealed or amended by the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina.

5. The copy of the rules, platform and principles of 
the Democratic party of South Carolina filed by defendants 
are accurate and correct copies adopted by the Democratic 
party of South Carolina on May 19, 1948.

6. Prior to 1943 primaries were held in South Carolina 
by the Democratic Party of that State in conformity with 
the statutes of the State (enacted under authority of Article 
II, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State) and of the 
rules of the said Party adopted at State Conventions held( 
every two years.

7. A number of the statewide statutes regulating the 
primaries of political parties in South Carolina were re­
pealed at the 1943 Session of the General Assembly of 
South Carolina, effective June 1, 1944. On April 20, 1944, 
the General Assembly of South Carolina passed approxi­
mately 150 acts repealing all existing statutes which con­
tained any reference directly or indirectly to primary elec­
tions within the State, including an act calling for the re­
peal of Section 10 of Article II of Constitution of South Car­
olina (1895), the only Constitutional provision mentioning 
primary elections, and set in motion and machinery to re­
peal that provision. Subsequently, and on February 14, 
1945, the Constitution of South Carolina was so amended by 
Ratification by the General Assembly of South Carolina of 
said Constitutional Amendment.

8. The 1944 Special Session of the General Assembly 
of South Carolina was called by the Governor for the 
specific purpose of repealing all statutes relating to pri­
mary elections.

9. The 1944 Convention of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, following the same procedure as in past 
general election years, on May 17, 1944, repealed the old 
rules and adopted new rules governing the party.

10. The 1944 rules made no change as to the rules for 
membership in the party and voting in the primary which 
limited membership and voting in primary as in the 1942



A p p e n d i x 73

rule to persons more than 21 years of age who were white 
Democrats.

11. The 1946 rules extended the age limit to all white 
Democrats over 18 years of age, and added some other 
minor changes but were substantially the same as those 
of 1944.

12. The general method of operating the Democratic 
Party of South Carolina such as election of delegates to 
County and State Conventions, election of officers, exec­
utive committeemen, and holding of County and State 
Conventions has been in the same general manner since 
April, 1944, as before that time.

13. There has been no material change since April, 
1944, in the manner in which primary elections have been 
conducted in South Carolina from the manner in which 
they were conducted prior to April, 1944.

14. During the past 25 years the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina has been the only political party in South 
Carolina which has held state-wide primaries for nomina­
tion of candidates for Federal and State offices.

15. Although the officers of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina vary from, year to year, the membership 
remains essentially the same.

16. The Democratic Party of South Carolina has al­
ways restricted its membership to white persons and until 
1948 restricted the eligibility to vote in the primaries to 
white persons.

17. In each general election year, the Democratic Party 
of South Carolina repeals all existing rules and adopts new 
rules for the conduct of the party and primaries for the 
ensuing years.

18. All primaries in South Carolina prior to and sub­
sequent to April, 1944, have been conducted in conformity 
to the rules promulgated by the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina in each successive general election year up to 
1948. In 1948 the primaries were conducted in conformity 
to the rules of the Democratic Party except as restrained 
by the preliminary injunction in this case.



74 B a s k i n  et al., A p p e l l a n t s , v . B r o w n , A p p e l l e e

19. There is no General Election ballot in South Caro­
lina. The only printed ballots available in General Elections 
in South Carolina are ballots prepared by the political 
parties giving only the names of their respective candi­
dates.

20. Since 1900 every United States Representative, 
United States Senator and member of the General Assem­
bly of the State of South Carolina, except one Senator and 
two members of the lower house elected by the people of 
South Carolina in the General Elections was a nominee of 
the then existing Democratic Party of South Carolina.

21. In 1946 for the office of Governor 290,223 votes 
were cast in the first Democratic Primary held in August; 
253,589 votes were cast in the second primary held on 
September 3, 1946; and only 26,326 votes were cast in the 
General Election for the office of Governor.

/s / HAROLD R. BOIJLWARE,
/ s/ THURGOOD MARSHALL, 

Attorneys for Plaintiff, 
/s / S. S. TISON,
/s / ROBERT McC FIGG, Jr.,
/s / GEORGE WARREN,

Attorneys for Defendants.
Charleston, South Carolina 
23 November 1948

OPINION DATED NOVEMBER 26, 1948
The plaintiff in this action is a Negro residing in 

Beaufort County, South Carolina, a native born citizen of 
the United States, more than 21 years of age, who is a duly 
and legally qualified elector under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States and of the State of South Caro­
lina, has paid his poll tax and is subject to none of the dis­
qualifications provided for voting under the laws of the 
Nation or the State. He signed the books of enrollment of 
the Democratic Party in South Carolina, but subsequently 
his name was erased therefrom and the party officials in­
formed him that he would not be permitted to enroll as a



A p p e n d i x 75

member of the party, and that he could participate in the 
primary elections to be held in South Carolina only as pro­
vided in the rules and provisions adopted by the Dem­
ocratic Party in its 1948 convention.

This action was brought against William P. Baskin, 
State Chairman of the Democratic Party of South Carolina 
and a large number of other parties, some of whom were 
members of the State Executive Committee and some of 
whom were the Chairmen of the various county committees.

The matter came on for a hearing on a prayer for a 
temporary injunction and resulted in an Order granting 
such injunction based upon the Opinion, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law filed July 20, 1948. (See Brown v. 
Baskm, 78 Fed. Supp. 933.) The Injunction Order was 
modified in some particulars by Order filed July 22, 1948.

The matter now comes before me on the prayer of the 
complaint for an Order of permanent injunction. At the 
hearing in July the County Chairmen of three counties of 
South Carolina made returns showing that they had fully 
complied with the law and on the showing made were dis­
missed as party defendants. At the hearing for permanent 
injunction the County Chairman of Eidgeland County has 
made a like showing and has been dismissed by separate 
Order. The case remains for consideration against the 
other defendants.

All of the facts are quite fully set out in the Opinion 
referred to and need not be repeated here. At the hearing 
a stipulation was entered into that all of the testimony 
taken on the application for a preliminary injunction 
should be considered and various other facts and condi­
tions were stipulated. The Court will take judicial notice of 
the fact that the temporary injunction was obeyed by the 
parties and that a primary election was had and no reports 
of violation were made to this Court. It is a matter of com­
mon knowledge that a large number of Negroes voted after 
having been enrolled as provided in the Order for Pre­
liminary Injunction. No new facts or circumstances were 
introduced at this hearing and the matter was submitted 
after argument.



76 B a s k i n  et a l,  A p p e l l a n t s , v . B r o w n , A p p e l l e e

On behalf of the defendants it was argued that the 
form of oath and rules that had heretofore been adopted 
by the State Party (see Opinion in Brown v. Baskin, supra, 
at page 936-7) were fully justified and not forbidden by 
any rule of law. The argument is in great part based upon 
the private club theory, namely that the State Democratic 
Party not being now covered by any statutes of the State 
of South Carolina, was and is a private organization that 
could make its own rules and by-laws; and that this Court 
did not have the power or authority to rule as to who should 
be admitted whether on racial or other grounds. But the 
private club theory has been completely outlawed and de­
molished by the decisions resulting from a case brought a 
little over a year ago in this court, see Elmore v. Rice, 72 
Fed. Supp. 516; Rice v. Elmore, 165 Fed. (2d) 387, cer­
tiorari denied, 333 U. S. 875, and while the attorneys for the 
defendants state that they realize this Court is bound to 
and will follow those decisions, they still maintain that 
they do not believe they were justified, and that the rules 
adopted by the convention of the Democratic State Party 
were not in conflict with the Constitution and Laws of the 
United States. I hold distinctly otherwise. And so no real 
attempt has been made to justify the rules as to qualifica­
tions for voting and enrolling, namely Rules #6 and #7, 
quoted in full in the Opinion in the case above cited at page 
936.

But on behalf of the Committee it is still argued that 
there is justification of the oath required prospective en- 
rollees upon the ground that the party authorities had a 
right to require a declaration of principles and to require 
an oath from prospective members pledging their allegiance 
to the principles of the Democratic Party of South Carolina 
in supporting the social, religious and educational separa­
tion of races and also in the principles of States Rights and 
that the enrollee is opposed to “ the proposed Federal so- 
called FEPC law” .

As discussed in my former Opinion in this case con­
sidering the rules and proposed oath, it is crystal clear that 
there was and could be but one reason for the adoption of



A p p e n d i x 77

the same, namely the classification of voters according to 
their being white or Negro, resulting in having two dif­
ferent methods of qualifications for voting and further 
resulting in the complete denial to one group of member­
ship in the party and no voice in its management or the 
election of its officials or even a representation in its pre­
cinct, county or state gatherings or conventions. To say 
that these rules conform or even pretend to conform to the 
law as laid down in the case of Elmore v. Rice is an ab­
surdity. Under the rules adopted by the State Party a 
Negro could never become a member, could never attend 
any meetings, could never have any vote in the election of 
the officials in charge of the party affairs, could never have 
a vote or even a voice in the adoption of rules, platforms 
or any part whatsoever in the government of the party. In 
other words, he was granted the privilege of voting at a 
primary election under certain conditions and upon certain 
qualifications, not applicable to white voters or voters of 
any other race under rules, terms and conditions in the 
adoption of which he had no part. We cannot escape the 
inevitable conclusion that this is no way complied with and 
was in contravention of the law of the land as enunciated 
by our courts in prior decisions and distinctly laid down in 
the Elmore case.

The proposed oath cannot be said to have any purpose 
other than the exclusion of Negro voters. It is common 
knowledge that in the face of determined and stout opposi­
tion, particularly in a number of the states in the Southern 
section of this country and more especially in the State of 
South Carolina, the Negro has made some slow advances, 
step by step in gaining his civil rights. Much of this has 
been won by determined effort and legal battles. In 1944 as 
a result of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Smith v. Alhvrighb, 321 U. S. 649, the then Gov­
ernor of South Carolina called an Extraodinary (and it 
was extraodinary) session of the General Assembly of 
South Carolina and repealed all laws relating to primaries. 
The Governor stated quite frankly what the purpose of this 
was and made no bones of the fact that the intention was 
to keep the primary elections in South Carolina limited



78 B a s k i n  et a t,  A p p e l l a n t s , v. B r o w n , A p p e l l e e

to whites and to discriminate against Negroes. See Opinion 
in Elmore v. Rice, supra, at page 520. This declaration 
made openly by Governor Johnston in 1944 is carried on 
in veiled language and covertly in the rules and the oath 
adopted by the Democratic Party in convention assembled 
in 1948. It is common knowledge of which this Court may 
take judicial cognizance that the proposed Federal FEPC 
is legislation proposed to prevent discrimination of em­
ployment according to race. Of course, everyone knows 
that a Negro would not take a solemn oath that he is op­
posed to legislation that would remove discrimination 
against him. And there are even stronger reason why he 
would not take an oath that he believes in and will support 
“ the social, religious and educational separation of races” . 
Mr. Baskin and his fellow members of the 1948 Convention 
adopted in evasive language the brutally frank statement 
of Governor Johnston in 1944. As heretofore announced in 
the cases referred to and in the prior Opinion filed in this 
cause, this Court is of the opinion and holds that the Dem­
ocratic Primary election in South Carolina is the true, 
realistic election at which presidential electors, United 
States Senators and Congressmen are chosen. And the 
Democratic Party as constituted cannot in the conduct of 
such elections make any racial or religious discrimination. 
And its patent and flagrant attempt to bar qualified Ne­
groes from participating in full membership in the party 
and casting ballots in the primaries is illegal. And the 
party officials have no right to make any division or discrim­
ination amongst the citizens of the State because they are 
white, black or of any other race or color.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States when adopted (and later implemented by the 
various statutes preserving and protecting civil rights) was 
primarily adopted for the protection of members of the Ne- 
groe race who were then recently freed from slavery and 
who, having been thus emancipated, were granted the fran­
chise. Slaughter-House Cases 16 Wall 36, 81 (1873); 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1880). And re­
lying upon and summarizing the decisions of those cases 
the Supreme Court of the United States has recently held



A p p e n d i x 79

the covenants relative to real estate ownership and use 
restricting the same according to race cannot be enforced, 
since they are contrary to the equal protection of the laws 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Shelly v. 
Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (May 3,1948). Speaking for the Court 
Chief Justice Vinson at page 23 says:

“ The historical context in which the Fourteenth 
Amendment became a part of the Constitution should 
not be forgotten. Whatever else the framers sought to 
achieve, it is clear that the matter of primary concern 
was the establishment of equality in the enjoyment of 
basic civil and political rights and the preservation of 
those rights from discriminatory action on the part of 
the States based on considerations of race or color. 
Seventy-five years ago this Court announced that the 
provisions of the Amendment are to be construed with 
this fundamental purpose in mind. Upon full considera­
tion, we have concluded that in these cases the States 
have acted to deny petitioners the equal protection of 
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
And the late Chief Justice Stone in Himbayashi v. 

United States, 320 U. S. 81 at page 100 says:
“ Distinctions between citizens solely because of 

their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded upon the doc­
trine of equality. For that reason, legislative classifica­
tion or discrimination based on race alone has often 
been held to be a denial of equal protection.”
And in the same cases in a concurring Opinion Mr. 

Justice Murphy writes at page 110:
“ Distinctions based on color and ancestry are 

utterly inconsistent with our traditions and ideals. 
They are at variance with the principles for which 
we are now waging war. We cannot close our eyes to 
the fact that for centuries the Old World has been 
torn by racial and religious conflicts and has suffered 
the worst kind of anguish because of inequality of 
treatment for different groups. There was one law for 
one and a different law for another.”



80 B a s k i n  et al., A p p e l l a n t s , v . B r o w n , A p p e l l e e

I find that the plaintiff has acted promptly and proper­
ly in bringing this cause and is not to be considered negli­
gent or guilty of laches. The case had to be brought because 
of the acts of the defendants in adopting and attempting 
to maintain illegal rules and regulations trying to deprive 
the plaintiff and others in like plight of their rights as 
citizens. And the claim that the plaintiff is not entitled to 
become a member of the Democratic Party because of his 
futile and fruitless attempts to be admitted into the com­
pany of citizens in this State is without foundation or au­
thority. It is quite apparent that the defendants and those 
working with them deliberately set out to continue a form 
of racial discrimination in the conduct of primary elections 
in this State. This is illegal and must be stopped. Since 
they were fully advised as to the law of the land after the 
decisions of the Elmore case and its affirmance by the Ap­
pellate Courts, it is apparent that they will abide by, obey 
and enforce the law, only if and when they are required to 
do so by some judicial or other authority. It is further ap­
parent that it is absolutely necessary that an Order of In­
junction be issued carrying out the views and opinions as 
expressed in the Opinion and Order heretofore filed on the 
matter of a temporary injunction and the opinions herein 
expressed. Appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and an Order of Injunction will issue.

/s / J. WATIES WARING, 
United States District Judge.

Charleston, S. C.
November 26, 1948.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDEE

(Dated November 26, 1948)

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. All parties to this action, both plaintiff and defend­

ants are citizens of the United States and the State of South 
Carolina and are resident and domiciled in said state.



A p p e n d i x 81

2. The plaintiff is a citizen of the United States and 
the State of South Carolina and a resident of Beaufort 
County, South Carolina for more than 50 years. He has paid 
his poll tax and at all times herein material was and is a 
duly and legally qualified elector under the Constitution 
and laws of the United States and the State of South Caro­
lina and is subject to no disqualifications.

3. The plaintiff believes in the principles of the Demo­
cratic party of South Carolina, except those relating to the 
separation of the races and the so-called Federal F. E. P. C. 
Law. He believes that all states rights are subject to the 
paramount authority of the Constitution of the United 
States.

4. Plaintiff meets all lawful requirements for enroll­
ment in the Democratic Party of South Carolina and for 
voting in the Democratic Party of South Carolina.

5. The defendant W. P. Baskin, as Chairman of the 
Democratic Party of South Carolina, the defendant mem­
bers of the State Committee, and the defendant County 
Chairmen, all acting in their official capacities as officers of 
said party, have been enforcing the rules of said party ex­
cept insofar as they were restrained by the preliminary in­
junction heretofore issued in this case. Unless said prelim­
inary injunction is continued or a permanent injunction 
is issued defendants will enforce these rules unless they are 
repealed or amended by the Democratic Party of South Car­
olina.

6. There have been no material changes in either the 
conduct of the Democratic Party of South Carolina or its ef­
fectiveness in controlling the choice of Federal and State 
Officers from that as it appears in the record and decision 
in the case of Elmore v. Rice, et al.

7. The Democratic Party of South Carolina consists 
of clubs organized in each township, ward, voting precinct 
or other subdivisions of the State. The membership of these 
clubs has been limited to white democrats. Each election 
year regular local club meetings are held, officers are 
elected, including county executive committee members 
from each club and also delegates to county conventions. 
County conventions are held in each county in the state



82 B a s k i n  et al., A p p e l l a n t s , v. B r o w n ,  A p p e l l e e

where the delegates elect from its convention officers, mem­
bers of the state committee, and delegates to the state con­
vention. The state convention is held shortly thereafter and 
these delegates from the county organizations elect their 
presiding officers and the chairman of the state committee 
which is composed of one committeeman from each county. 
At this convention rules and regulations for the conduct of 
the party and primaries are adopted.

8. On the 19th of May, 1948, the regular convention of 
the Democratic Party was held in Columbia, South Caro­
lina, and at this convention rules were adopted in place 
of the constitution and rules of the party previously in 
force. These rules admitted in evidence are now in full force 
and effect, except as restrained by the preliminary injunc­
tion heretofore issued in this case. The present rules of the 
Democratic Party of South Carolina adopted May 19, 1948, 
provide the following qualifications for club membership: 

“6. Qualifications for club membership in any club 
of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, shall be as 
follows, viz: The applicant for membership shall be 
twenty-one (21) years of age, or shall become so before 
the succeeding general election, and be a white Demo- 
crate, who subscribes to the principles of the Demo­
cratic Party of South Carolina as declared by the State 
Convention. He shall be a citizen of the United States, 
and of the State of South Carolina, and shall be able 
to read and write and interpret the Constitution of the 
State of South Carolina. No person shall belong to any 
club unless he has been a resident of the State of South 
Carolina for two (2) years, of the county for six (6) 
months prior to the succeeding general election, and of 
the club district sixty (60) days prior to the first pri­
mary following his offer to enroll. Provided, that public 
school teachers, and ministers of the gospel in charge 
of a regular organized church, shall be exempt from 
the provisions of this rule as to residence, if otherwise 
qualified. ’ ’



A p p e n d i x 83

9. The present rules of the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina adopted May 19, 1948, provide the following qual­
ifications for voting in the primary elections:

“ 7. All duly enrolled club members are entitled to 
vote in the precinct of their residence, if they take the 
oath required of voters in the primary and in conform­
ity with the Order of Judge J. Waties Waring, United 
States District Judge, in the case of Elmore, etc., v. 
Bice, et al., all qualified Negro electors of the State of 
South Carolina are entitled to vote in the precinct of 
their residence, if they present their general election 
certificates and take the oath required of voters in the 
primary. ’ ’
10. The present rules of the Democratic Party of South 

Carolina adopted May 19, 1948 provide the following oath 
to be taken by electors:

‘ ‘ 36. The managers at each box shall require every 
voter to sign and deliver to them, before the voter 
casts his or her ballot, the following Voter’s Oath which 
shall be filed and kept by the County Secretary as a 
permanent record.

“ ‘I do solemnly swear that I am a resident of this 
club district, that I am duly qualified to vote in this 
primary under the rules of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, and that I have not voted before in 
this primary, and that I am not disqualified from vot­
ing under Section 2267 of the South Carolina Code of 
Laws, 1942, relating to disqualifying crimes.

I further solemnly swear that I (understand and) 
believe in and will support the principles of the Dem­
ocratic Party of South Carolina, and that I believe in 
and will support the social (religious) and educational 
separation of faces.

I further solemnly swear that I believe in the prin­
ciples of States’ Eights, and that I am opposed to the 
proposed Federal so-called F. E. P. C. Law.

I further solemnly swear that I will support the 
election of the nominees of this primary in the ensuing



84 B a s k i n  et a t,  A p p e l l a n t s , v . B r o w n ,  A p p e l l e e

general election, and that I am not a member of any 
other political party.

. Voter.”
11. The words “ understand and” and the word “ re­

ligious” in parenthesis in the above oath appeared in the 
rules as adopted by the Convention but were subsequently 
deleted by the State Committee of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina.

12. Prior to July 2, 1948 plaintiff David Brown was a 
duly enrolled member of the Democratic Party of Beaufort 
County. On or about July 2, 1948 pursuant to the rules of 
the Democratic Party of South Carolina as enforced by de­
fendants, the plaintiff was “ purged” from the enrollment 
books of said party solely because of his race and color.

13. The Democratic Party of South Carolina has al­
ways restricted its membership to white persons and until 
1948 restricted the eligibility to vote in the primaries to 
white persons.

14. All primaries in South Carolina prior to and sub­
sequent to April 1944, have been conducted in conformity 
to the rules promulgated by the Democratic Party of South 
Carolina in each successive general election year up to 1948. 
In 1948 the primaries wTere conducted in conformity to the 
rules of the Democratic Party except as restrained by the 
preliminary injunction in this case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This court has jurisdiction in this cause under sub­

division 1 of Section 41 of Title 28 of the United States 
Code, Section 2 and 4 and Article 1 and Amendments Four­
teen, Fifteen and Seventeen of the United States Constitu­
tion, this Court also has jurisdiction of this cause under 
subdivision 11 and 14 of Section 41 of Title 28 of the United 
States Code.

2. This is a class action authorized by Buie 23 (a) of 
the Buies of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the 
United States.



A p p e n d i x 85

3. The only material and realistic elections in South 
Carolina are the Democratic Primaries. The only elections 
at which plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues can 
make a meaningful choice and exercise their rights to vote 
within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States are the Democratic Primaries. The Demo­
cratic Primary in South Carolina is an integral part of the 
election machinery of South Carolina.

4. The Democratic Party of South Carolina is an or­
ganization acting for and on behalf of the people of South 
Carolina. The primary conducted by said organization for 
and on behalf of the people of South Carolina is the only 
election where the plaintiff and other qualified electors, 
can express a meaningful choice in selecting federal and 
state officers. The defendants in performing their duties 
as officers of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, in­
cluding the conducting of primary elections, are perform­
ing an important governmental function essential to the 
exercise of sovereignty by the people and in doing so are 
subject to the provisions of the United States Constitution.

5. The enforcement of the rules of the Democratic 
Party set out in the Findings of Fact (and the continued 
enforcement of these rules) would deprive plaintiff and 
others on whose behalf he sues of the effective exercise of 
their right to vote solely because of race and color in viola­
tion of Articles I and the Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen 
and Seventeen of the United States Constitution.

6. The rule of the Democratic Party of South Caro­
lina permitting enrolled members, which is restricted to 
white members, to vote in primary elections while requir­
ing all Negro electors to present general election certifi­
cates as a prerequisite to voting is based on race and color, 
in an unequal application of rules for qualification for 
voting, is an unreasonable burden and limitation on the 
right to vote and is in violation of Article I and Amend­
ments Fourteen, Fifteen and Seventeen of the Constitution 
of the United States and Sections 31 and 43 of Title 8 of 
the United States Code.



8 6  B a s k i n  et a t,  A p p e l l a n t s , v. B r o w n , A p p e l l e e

7. In adopting the rule denying to the plaintiff and 
other Negroes similarly situated the right to enroll in said 
party clubs solely because of race and color, the defendants 
effectively limited the right of plaintiff and others similarly 
situated to vote in primary elections to select federal and 
state officers without first producing general election certi­
ficates and otherwise limited their participation in the elec­
tion machinery of the State of South Carolina in violation 
of Article I and Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen and Seven­
teen of the Constitution of the United States and Sections 
31 and 43 of the United States Code.

8. The oath required of voters in primary elections 
“ that I (understand and) believe in and will support the 
social (religious) and educational separation of races” and 
“ I further solemnly swear that I believe in the principles 
of States Eights, and that I am opposed to the proposed 
Federal F. E. P. C. law” is aimed directly at continuing 
the disfranchisement of plaintiff and other qualified Negro 
electors despite prior rulings of this and other Federal 
Courts, and is a test not relevant to qualifications to vote: 
is an unreasonable term and condition for the exercise of 
the right of suffrage; is based on race and color and is in 
violation of Article I and Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen 
and Seventeen of the United States Constitution and Sec­
tions 31 and 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code.

9. Plaintiff has taken sufficient steps to protect his 
rights in the premises and is not guilty of laches.

10. Plaintiff and others on whose behalf he sues are 
threatened with irreparable injury in the future by reason 
of the acts set out above; they have no plain adequate or 
complete remedy to redress the wrong and illegal acts com­
plained of other than by permanent injunction and are en­
titled to protection in their civic rights by the issuance of 
an Order for Permanent Injunction.

ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the defendants to 

wit, W. P. Baskin, James P. Nickles, J. Moore Mars, Julian 
B. Salley, Jr., John E. Stansfield, W. T. Riley, Sr., E. H.



A p p e n d i x 87

Agnew, Cal H. Strickland, J. Carl Kearse, J. K. Mayfield, 
Edgar A. Brown, J. B. Cope, W. Brantley Harvey, C. N. 
Clarke, Rembert C. Dennis, H. C. Geiger, J. A. Merritt, 
Francis F. Coleman, Oliver T. Wallace, H. R. Swink, Joe 
H. Hall, W. C. Stone, R. B. Caldwell, John A. Welsh, Jr., 
Ed. Redfearn, John G. Dinkins, C. N. Plowden, R. A. Dur­
ham, J. M. Moorer, Cecil E. Harper, C. W. Coker, W. B. 
Hawkins, R. W. Scott, Joseph A. Kirby, J. D. Parler, J. R. 
Folk, W. P. Yonce, T. K. McDonald, Boyd Brown, Hugh 
L. Willcox, H. Van Epps, H. S. Parsons, H. L. Smith, R. A. 
Jolley, S. L. Brissie, P. R. Underwood, J. Herman Lightsey, 
Randolph Murdaugh, J. G. Lewis, F. A. Thompson, L. 0. 
Funderburk, N. S. Richards, Lewis M. Clyburn, James S. 
Wilson, James H. Sullivan, Henry C. Jennings, H. Odelle 
Harmon, Boyd Smith, W. B. Norton, J. Kendree Williams, 
J. J. Evans, N. W. Edens, J. Fred Buzhardt, H. C. Brown, 
B. V. Chapman, Dr. Y. M. Brown, B. B. Mulkey, Dr. W. A. 
Strickland, Rut L. Osborne, Julian S. Wolfe, G. Max Perry, 
Billy C. Coleman, Homer R. Long, Jesse W. Boyd, Howard 
McCravey, Shepard K. Nash, E. B. Boyle, J. F. Walker, 
R. A. Lybrand, F. R. Hemingway, E. L. Ard, John M. 
Spratt, W. B. Wilson, together with their agents, servants, 
employees and attorneys and all persons in active concert 
and participation with them be and they hereby are per­
manently restrained and enjoined from:

1. Refusing to enroll Negroes as members of local 
clubs of the Democratic Party of South Carolina, because 
of race and color; and

2. From denying to the plaintiff and others on whose 
behalf he sues from full and complete participation in the 
Democratic Party of South Carolina without distinction be­
cause of race, color, creed, or condition; and

3. From enforcing the rules of the Democratic Party 
of South Carolina requiring Negro electors to present gen­
eral election certificates as a prerequisite to voting in any 
primary election unless the same requirement applies to all 
other persons; and

4. From requiring the plaintiff and other Negro elec­
tors to take the following oath as a prerequisite to voting 
in primary elections:



88 B a s k i n  et al., A p p e l l a n t s , v . B r o w n , A p p e l l e e

“ I do solemnly swear that I  am a resident of this 
club district, that I am duly qualified to vote in this 
primary under the rules of the Democratic Party of 
South Carolina, and that I have not voted before in this 
primary, and that I am not disqualified from voting 
under Section 2267 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 
1942, relating to disqualifying crimes.

I further solemnly swear that I  (understand and) 
believe in and will support the principles of the Demo­
cratic Party of South Carolina, and that I believe in and 
will support the social (religious) and educational 
separation of races.

I further solemnly swear that I belive in the prin­
ciples of States’ Eights, and that I am opposed to the 
proposed Federal so-called F. E. P. C. law.

I further solemnly swear that I will support the 
election of the nominees of this primary in the ensuing 
general election, and that I am not a member of any 
other political party.

Voter.
5. From requiring of members of the Democratic Party 

or of prospective voters in Democratic Primaries in South 
Carolina any form of pledge or oath which attempts to re­
quire them to support racial or religious discrimination in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,

6. From ordering or maintaining any different re­
quirements for exercising the right of suffrage in Demo­
cratic Primary elections and in party participation because 
of race or religion.

Plaintiff may tax and enter judgment for costs.
Let a copy of this Order be forthwith served upon each 

of the Defendants.
/s /  J. WATIES WARING,

United States District Judge.
Charleston, S. C.,
November 26, 1948.