Richmond v JA Croson Company Brief of Amici Curiae
Public Court Documents
June 8, 1988
36 pages
Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Richmond v JA Croson Company Brief of Amici Curiae, 1988. cde9e561-c29a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/a256be41-3d68-46bb-9daa-555c8c712410/richmond-v-ja-croson-company-brief-of-amici-curiae. Accessed November 23, 2025.
Copied!
No. 87-998
In T he
$uprm? (ttmtrt nf % HUntteh States
October Term, 1987
City of Richmond,
Appellant,
J.A. Croson Company,
________ Appellee.
On Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
THE WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION AND
THE LINCOLN INSTITUTE FOR
RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
Daniel J. Popeo
Paul D. Kamenar *
W ashington Legal Foundation
1705 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 857-0240
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Washington Legal Foundation
and The Lincoln Institute for
Research and Education
* Counsel of Record
June 8,1988
W il s o n - Ep e s Pr in t in g C o . , In c . - 7 8 9 - 0 0 9 6 - W a s h in g t o n , D .C . 2 0 0 0 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................... iii
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE...................................... 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT..... ................ ............. 4
ARGUMENT................... 5
I. THERE HAS BEEN NO FINDING OR CRED
IBLE EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFIED DIS
CRIMINATION BY THE CITY OF RICH
MOND OR THE LOCAL CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY.............................................. 5
A. There Has Been No Finding That The City
Of Richmond Has Discriminated Against
Minorities In Its Contracting Practices...... 5
B. There Was No Credible Or Convincing Evi
dence Of Discrimination By The Local Con
tracting Industry.............................................. 7
1. The Mere Fact That Few Minority
Owned Construction Firms Belong To
Certain Contracting Trade Associations
Is No Evidence Of Discrimination By
The Local Construction Industry............ 8
2. The Comparison Between The Percentage
Of The Minority Population In Rich
mond And The Percentage Of Prime Con
tracts Awarded To Minority-Owned Con
tracting Businesses Is No Evidence Of
Discrimination Because It Ignores, Inter
Alia, The Percentage Of Subcontract
Work Awarded To Minorities And The
Percentage Of Minority-Owned Con
tractors ........................................................ 12
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
3. There Is No Evidence That There Even
Was Any “ Societal” Discrimination
Against Minority Contractors ........ 17
4. There Are Numerous Nondiscriminatory
Reasons To Explain The Number And
Size Of Minority-Contracting Firms....... 18
II. THE RICHMOND PLAN IS NOT NAR
ROWLY TAILORED TO REMEDY THE AL
LEGED DISCRIMINATION................. 21
III. RACE-CONSCIOUS PROGRAMS SUCH AS
SET-ASIDES ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE,
COSTLY TO SOCIETY, AND MORALLY RE
PUGNANT .................................................... 25
CONCLUSION.......... ............................................. 29
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
Associated General Contractors of California v.
City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922
(9th Cir. 1987) ................................. ................... 6, 15
Bradley v. School Board, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir.
1972) ........................................................................ 12
Croson v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181 (4th
Cir. 1985)..... 22
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 4448 U.S. 448 (1980)____passim
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936)....................................... 3
Hazlewood School District v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977)...................................................... 15
J. Edinger & Lon, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 802
F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1986).................................... . 7,15
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n
v. EEOC, 106 S.Ct. 3019 (1986) ........ ............... 7, 21
Michigan Road Builders Association, Inc. v. Milli-
ken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987)........... 6
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978)...... 8
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984).. ................... 9
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443
United States v. Paradise, 107 S.Ct. 1053 (1987).. 16,21
U.S. 193 (1979)..... 10
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S.
267 (1986) ............................. passim
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Ordinances:
U.S. Const, amend. XIV ................ ...........................
42 U.S. § 2000e (1982)..................... ........................
Va. Code Ann. §§ 40.1-58..........................................
Richmond, Va. Code Ch. 24.1, art. VIII-A (1983)
Other Authorities:
P. Bell, Blacks Must Take Responsibility For
Their Own Lives, 5 Lincoln Review (Summer
1984) ........................................................................
..passim
9
11
..passim
28
IV
General Accounting Office, Minority Firms on LPW
Projects: Mixed Results (1979)...... .................... 26
D. Gilliam, “ Fostering Black Enterprise,” Wash
ington Post, May 30, 1988, at B3 at col. 5....... 19, 20
Hearing Before The Subcomm. on Transportation
of the Senate Comm, on Environment and Pub
lic Works on The Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise Program of the Federal-Aid High
way Act, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)................. 27
J. Parker, “ The Times Has Come To Move De
cisively Toward A Truly Color Blind Society,”
6 Lincoln Review (Summer 1985)........... ............ 28
C. Pendleton, Affirmative Action & Individual
Freedom, 7 Lincoln Review (Summer 1986).... 28
P. Perlmutter, Minority Group Responses To Prej
udice & Discrimination, 8 Lincoln Review
(Winter 1988) .................................. 28
T. Sowell, Black Education, Myths and Tragedies
(1972) .......... 28
U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1982 Characteristics of
Business Owners .............................. 3
U.S. Bureau of the Census, PC80-1-B48, General
Population Characteristics, Virginia, Table 15
(1982)................................. .........I . . . ....................... 23
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1982 Survey of Mi
nority-Owned Business Enterprises: Black
(1985) ................................................................. 9
U.S. Civil Rights Commission, Selectd Affirmative
Action Topics in Employment and Business Set-
Asides, Vols. 1-2. (1985) .......... ............................. 25
Van Alystyne, Rites of Passage: Race, The Su
preme Court and the Constitution, 46 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 775 (1979) .......... ...................................... 29
Virginia Department of Minority-Owned Enter
prises, Minority Owned Businesses of Virginia
(1986) .............. ....................................................... io
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
In T he
(tart of tip Htttfrfr States
October Term, 1987
No. 87-998
City of Richmond,
Appellant,
J.A. Croson Company,
Appellee.
On Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE
THE WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION AND
THE LINCOLN INSTITUTE FOR
RESEARCH AND EDUCATION
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
The Washington Legal Foundation ( “ WLF” ) is a na
tional nonprofit public interest law center with more
than 120,000 members and supporters throughout the
United States. WLF engages in litigation and adminis
trative proceedings in matters promoting the free enter
prise system and the economic and civil liberties of indi
viduals and businesses.
WLF has a record of longstanding interest and in
volvement regarding the controversial issues of affirma
tive action, racial quotas, and reverse discrimination.
2
Firmly committed to the great principle that our Consti
tution is color-blind, WLF has consistently opposed the
self-contradictory notion that affirmative action plans,
supposedly designed to assure equal opportunity, may
legally justify intentional discrimination against individ
uals because of the color of their skin.
In its pursuit of its view that the equal protection
clause and the civil rights laws protect all citizens against
discrimination, WLF has filed briefs amicus curiae in
many of the leading Supreme Court cases in the area.
See e.g., Firefighters Local Union No. 1784. v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561 (1984); United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
The Lincoln Institute for Research and Education was
founded in 1978 to study public policy issues that im
pact on the lives of black middle America, and to make
its findings available to elected officials and the public.
The Institute, based in Washington, D.C., aims to re
evaluate those theories and programs of the past decades
which were highly touted when introduced, but have
failed to fulfill the claims represented by their sponsors
— and in many cases, have been harmful to the long-
range interest of blacks. The Institute is dedicated to
seeking ways to improve the standard of living, the qual
ity of life and the freedom of all Americans.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee J.A. Croson Company ( “ Croson” ) is incor
porated in the State of Ohio but has its principal place
of business in Richmond, Virginia. Because at least 51
percent of the stock of the corporation happens to be
owned by a nonminority, Croson’s bid of $126,530.00 for
the plumbing project, which was the only bid submitted,
was rejected by the City. Had Croson been owned and
controlled by an Eskimo, Aleut, Black, or Indian, the
City would have accepted Croson’s bid because under
3
Richmond’s Minority Utilization Plan ( “ Plan” ), the re
quirement that a minimum of 30 percent of a prime con
tract be subcontracted to minorities is satisfied if the
prime contractor is owned by a minority. Richmond, Va.
Code Ch. 24.1, art. VIII-A (1983).
Because Croson was not minority-owned, the only
other way Croson could obtain the contract was to sub
contract at least 30 percent of the dollar value of the
contract to a company whose owner happens to be a
minority member. Richmond, Ya. Code Ch. 24.1, art.
VIII-A (A ). Although Croson was ready, willing and
able to perform the entire contract at the bid price of
$126,530.00, a minority-owned subcontractor eventually
responded to Croson’s request for quotes which would
increase the cost of Croson’s bid by some $7,000, or ap
proximately 6 percent. The City denied Croson’s requests
both to raise its original bid to satisfy the minority sub
contract requirement and to waive the requirement.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled on
remand from this Court that the Minority Utilization
Business Plan on its face violated the Equal Protection
Clause1 because there was no evidence of discrimination
by the City of Richmond as required by Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), little evi
dence of any discrimination at all in the construction in
dustry, and that in any event, the Plan was not nar
1 Even though Croson is an Ohio corporation, it is well-settled that
a corporation is a “person” under the Equal Protection Clause as
well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). Only the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, which refers to “citizens” rather
than “persons” does not apply to corporations. Id. Amici note how
ever, that most businesses whether minority or nonminority owned,
are either sole proprietorships or partnerships, with the corporate
form of ownership accounting for less than 5 percent of the types
of ownership. See U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982 Characteristics
of Business Owners 16 (1985).
4
rowly tailored to redress any alleged discrimination. 822
F.2d 1355, 1360 (4th Cir. 1987).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The competitive bidding system is inherently nondis-
criminatory and race-neutral. The City, in awarding
prime contracts, and the prime contractor, in awarding
subcontracts, do so on the basis of the lowest bid, not the
color of the skin of the bidder. It is no surprise, there
fore, that the City could not show any discrimination
committed by it or by the local contracting industry. The
casual resort by the City to a few statistics to “prove”
discrimination is riddled with errors.
Among other things, the City mistakenly looked at only
the amount of prime contract dollars awarded to minor
ity-owned firms rather than the more relevant amount
of all subcontract dollars. In addition, the City erro
neously compared the dollar amount of contracts awarded
to the minority population as a whole, rather than the
number of minority construction contractors. It is sim
ply absurd to conclude that because Richmond’s popula
tion is approximately 50 percent black, that 50 percent
of all owners of construction contracting businesses
should be black. The set-aside program is thus a politi
cally motivated scheme that simply prefers certain ra
cial classes over others and is therefore violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.
Even if there were pervasive, identified discrimina
tion in the construction industry as the City simply con
cludes without any proof, the set-aside program is not
narrowly tailored to remedy this perceived problem.
Rather, the program simply provides an economic wind
fall to certain persons based on their race and is counter
productive and morally repugnant.
ARGUMENT
I. THERE HAS BEEN NO FINDING OR CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFIED DISCRIMINATION
BY THE CITY OF RICHMOND OR THE LOCAL
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY.
In its haste to adopt a 30 percent minority set-aside
program for its contracting practices, the City of Rich
mond made only a passing stab at trying to justify
it at the City Council hearing where it was adopted.2
Even the post hoc attempt to do so in its brief before
this Court fares no better. Not only did the City of
Richmond utterly fail to find that it had discriminated
against minorities in its contracting practices, there was
no finding or evidence of discrimination by the local
construction industry against minorities. Nor is there
even an allegation of “ societal” discrimination against
minorities. Rather, amici submit there are a number of
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons to explain the level
of minority-owned businesses in the construction indus
try.
5
A. There Has Been No Finding That The City Of
Richmond Has Discriminated Against Minorities In
Its Contracting Practices.
No one disputes the fact that there has been no finding
of discrimination by the City of Richmond against mi
norities in its contracting practices. The failure to find
any discrimination by the City comes as no surprise.
The competitive bidding process is inherently nondiscrimi
natory. Companies are awarded contracts by the City on
the basis of the lowest bid. The City does not care
whether the responsive and responsible bidder was a
company that was owned by a person or persons who
2 The City Council meeting and public hearing at which the
alleged problem of discrimination and the remedial Plan was debated
and enacted, took a mere one hour and forty-five minutes. See City
Brief at 4, n.3.
6
were white, black, Spanish-speaking, Indian, or Eskimo.
Unlike the employment context where arguably the sub
jective impressions and biases of the employer may come
into play in the employment decision, the City looks at
the numbers on the bid sheet, not the numbers in the
minority population pool. Because there has been no
finding of discrimination by the governmental unit in
volved, the City cannot justify an arbitrary plan which
prefers prime contractors who are minority-owned or re
quires at least 30 percent of a contract awarded to a
nonminority to be given to minority subcontractors. As a
plurality of this Court held in Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), and as properly fol
lowed by the Fourth Circuit below:
This Court never held that societal discrimination
alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification.
Rather, the Court has insisted upon some showing of
prior discrimination by the governmental unit in
volved before allowing limited use of racial classifica
tions in order to remedy such discrimination.
476 U.S. at 274 (emphasis added). Because there was no
finding of any discrimination by the City of Richmond,
it could not set up a racially conscious plan. Accord As
sociate General Contractors of California v. City and
County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) ;
Michigan Road Builders Association, Inc. v. Milliken,
834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987).8 3
3 Amici take exception to the City’s reliance on Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), for a number of reasons. In the
first place, we believe Fullilove was wrongly decided and agree with
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion therein that the goal of society
is “ to eliminate entirely from governmental decisionmaking such
irrelevant factors as a human being’s race.” Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
547 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Secondly, Fullilove was only a facial
challenge to the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, and Chief
Justice Burger cautioned that the case did not address an applica
tion of a set-aside program. 448 U.S. at 486. Third, as noted infra,
Congress was legislating on a national scale pursuant to its constitu
7
B. There Was No Credible Or Convincing Evidence Of
Discrimination By The Local Contracting Industry.
Recognizing that the City has not engaged in discrim
ination, the City next argues that Wygant is inapplicable
to this case and that the existence of discrimination by
a vaguely defined “ contracting industry” is sufficient to
set up a race-conscious contracting system. The City ar
gues that it was a “ passive participant in that discrimi
nation” and can therefore institute its race-conscious
plan without violating the Equal Protection Clause. City
Brief at 40. Amici submit that even if Wygant does not
control this case— although we maintain that it does—
and that discrimination by the governmental unit in
volved need not be found, the City of Richmond has
nevertheless failed to provide credible or convincing evi
dence that there was, as it now claims, “ identified, pur
poseful discrimination in Richmond’s construction indus
try that had caused an extraordinary racial imbalance in
the awarding of city construction contracts.” City Brief
at 40.
The flimsy evidence that the City claims demonstrates
that the local construction industry discriminates against
minorities does not even come close to the requisite level
of the convincing evidence which this Court has held is
necessary to justify a limited race-conscious plan. See,
e.g., Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v.
EEOC, 106 S.Ct. 3019 (1986) (union found guilty by
compelling evidence of actual repeated and “ egregious”
violations of Title V II ) . The proper level or standard of
judicial review in a case like this is one of “ strict scru
tiny” in examining both the factual predicate of dis
crimination and whether the plan is “ narrowly tailored”
to remedy the discrimination and no more. As Justice
tional powers and its findings cannot be conveniently “borrowed” for
Richmond. Finally, this Court’s recent decision in Wygant, which
compelled this Court to remand the case to the Fourth Circuit in the
first place, limits the reach of Fullilove. See also J. Edinger & Son,
Inc. v. City of Louisville, Ky., 802 F.2d 213, 215 (6th Cir. 1986).
8
O’Connor correctly noted in her concurring opinion in
Wygant, "This standard reflects the belief, apparently held
by all members of this Court, that racial classification
of any sort must be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny,’ however
defined.” Id. at 1852, citing the various opinions in
Fullilove v. Klntzniek, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) and Regents
of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). As will be demonstrated, the Richmond Plan
does not even survive casual judicial scrutiny.
As the abbreviated City Council hearing on the adop
tion of the Plan (reproduced in the Joint Appendix)
clearly demonstrates, the only so-called “ evidence” of
discrimination by the local contracting industry was the
meaningless statistic that Richmond’s minority popula
tion, primarily black, constitutes approximately 50 per
cent of the total Richmond population, whereas less than
1 percent of the dollar amount of the City’s prime con
tracts were awarded to the lowest bidder who happened
to be minority-owned. See J.A. 41. The other meaning
less statistic adduced during the hearing and prominently
reproduced in chart form on page 22 of the City’s brief,
is the breakdown of the composition of members in some
of the various contractor trade associations in the Rich
mond and Virginia area that shows only a handful of
black members belonging to those organizations. From
these two meager and meaningless statistics, the City
leaps to the facile conclusion that there is “pervasive”
and “ identified, purposeful discrimination in Richmond’s
construction industry . . .” City Brief at 40. This is
utter nonsense.
1. There Mere Fact That Few Minority Owned Con
struction Firms Belong To Certain Contracting
Trade Associations Is No Evidence Of Discrimi
nation B y The Local Construction Industry.
Throughout the short City Council hearing, much at
tention was focused upon the fact that only a handful
of black-owned firms belonged to certain construction
9
trade associations, and in some cases, none at all. If the
City of Richmond is implying that these trade associa
tions discourage or do not allow black-owned construc
tion firms to join as members, the City is clearly wrong.
The unrebutted testimony of the various representatives
who testified at the City Council hearing indicates that
they welcome minority members and have sought them
out, but that they apparently do not want to join. See,
e.g., J.A. 38 (statement of A1 Shuman). In addition, it
would be violative of the anti-discrimination laws to ex
clude minority members. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1982);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
There is not a scintilla of evidence of any complaint or
lawsuit filed by any minority charging that he or she was
refused membership in any of the trade associations
listed in the City’s brief. Accordingly, these bald member
ship figures are completely irrelevant and do not lend any
support to the ipse dixit by the City that “ identified,
purposeful discrimination” exists in the construction in
dustry. City Brief at 23, 40.
It is not clear whether the City is also trying to use
the membership figures to demonstrate that the number
of minority-owned construction firms in Richmond is
small, and that the small number of such firms somehow
is itself evidence of discrimination by the industry.4
If that is the City’s position, a few facts are in order.
According to the Bureau of Census, there were 1,563
black-owned firms in the City of Richmond in all indus
tries in the relevant time period. U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1982 Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enter
prises: Black 88 (1985). Of those firms, there were 144
black-owned firms in Richmond in the construction in
dustry, hardly a “ small” number. Most of the black-
owned firms in Richmond were concentrated in the serv
4 “ The record in this case contains no finding on the precise num
ber of contractors in Richmond who were minority in 1983, though
. . . the number is ‘quite small.’ J.S. App. 7a.” City Brief at 23, n.37.
10
ices and retail trade industries. Id. (See Appendix hereto
for the various industry categories). But the fact that
only a handful of the 144 black-owned construction firms
decided to join the selected trade associations listed is not
evidence of discrimination. The other black-owned firms
may have voluntarily joined other associations that may
cater to their special needs, such as the National Associa
tion of Minority Contractors Associations, the Metropolitan
Business League, Richmond Minority Assistance Center, or
the Virginia Minority Supplier Development Council, Inc.
See Virginia Department of Minority-Owned Enterprises,
Minority Owned Businesses of Virginia (1986). After
all, the fact that slightly less than half of all the lawyers
in America belong to the American Bar Association does
not mean the ABA has discriminated against the other
half. Nor does it mean that the National Bar Associa
tion which is composed primarily of black lawyers dis
criminates against white lawyers.
Unable to make anything out of the membership
figures, the City in desperation casts a wider net at the
“well documented history of racial discrimination through
out the nation’s construction industry.” City Brief at 23.
Here is where the City’s analysis falls completely apart.
In an attempt to shore up the paucity of any evidence of
discrimination by the local contracting industry, the
City tries to use discrimination found on a national scale
as justification for its local remedial program. The obvi
ous defects with this tactic are at least threefold:
a. The City of Richmond is not the Congress and can
not legislate on a national scale. Any justification for
its remedial plan must be based on discrimination found
within its city limits, especially because the construction
industry is inherently diffuse and locally based.
The City’s attempt in its brief to borrow heavily on
the findings made by this Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448 (1980), United Steelworkers of America v.
11
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and a number of studies
that show that “black workers for years have been ex
cluded from the skilled construction trade unions” (City
Brief at 23) is thus unavailing.
b. Amici do not dispute the prior judicial findings that
trade and craft labor unions have discriminated against
minorities. Hiring halls have been used by the unions
to supply union workers to construction sites on a daily
or project basis. If the unions exclude blacks, or if
blacks become union members but are not selected for
jobs at the hiring hall, they are unfairly denied the
opportunity to work in the construction industry and
develop their skills. This documented problem of historical
discrimination by the craft unions, especially in the indus
trial cities of the Northeast, however, has no relevance
to Richmond. The City has overlooked the simple but
important fact that Virginia is a “ right to work” state
and has been one since 1947. Union membership is not
required as a condition of employment. Va. Code Ann.
§§ 40.1-58 to 69 (1986). Thus, while Virginia employers
could technically enter into an exclusive hiring hall con
tract with a labor union, they are unlikely to do so in a
right to work state such as Virginia.
c. There was no evidence produced at the City Coun
cil hearing of any construction company (or labor union
for that matter) having discriminated against blacks.
Not a single black contractor testified complaining of dis
crimination. Even in its post hoc rationalization, the
City’s attorneys are unable to cite in their brief to a single
example of discrimination or even alleged discrimination
by any of Richmond’s nonminority-owned construction
firms. No lawsuit, court order, administrative complaint,
or even an anecdote has been cited indicating that any
minority has ever been discriminated against by any
Richmond-area construction company. The only case the
City could cite as evidence of discrimination in the con
12
tracting industry is an irrelevant 15-year-old school de
segregation court case. City Brief at 26, n.45 (citing
Bradley v. School Board, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972)).
Amici submit that the Fourth Circuit below was being
more than charitable when it characterized the City’s
evidence of discrimination in the construction industry
as being “spurious” and “nearly weightless.” 15 822 F 2d
1355, 1359 (4th Cir. 1987).
2. The Comparison Between The Percentage Of The
Minority Population In Richmond And The
Percentage Of Prime Contracts Awarded To
Minority-Owned Contracting Businesses Is No
Evidence Of Discrimination Because It Ignores,
Inter Alia, The Percentage Of Subcontract Work
Awarded To Minorities And The Percentage Of
Minority-Owned Contractors.
The centerpiece of the City’s proof of allegedly “ identi
fied, purposeful discrimination in Richmond’s construc
tion industry” is the mere fact that less than one percent
of the City’s prime contracts were awarded to minority-
owned firms, whereas the population of Richmond is ap
proximately 50 percent black. This statistic, like the
membership statistic discussed above, is meaningless and
deceptive for any number of reasons. The following
analysis will consider some of the flaws on both sides of
this equation.
a. ' There is no discussion as to how many times
minority-owned firms have submitted bids to the City
in order to begin to make any comparison. If the
* Even the dissent in Wygant noted that there were specific and
numerous valid complaints of discrimination against minority teach
ers by the Jackson Board of Education in the early 1970’s, and that
tensions in the schools had escalated to violent levels.” 106 S.Ct.
1842, 1859 (dissenting opinion by Marshall, J. joined by Brennan
and Blackmun, JJ.). Nothing even remotely similar can be said of
the construction industry in Richmond.
13
minority-owned contractors in existence do not regularly
submit bids and perhaps decide to concentrate instead
on private rather than public construction projects,8 the
award of the contracts to the nonminority-owned con
tractors who do bid on the project is not surprising, and
is certainly not evidence of any discrimination in the
local construction industry.
b. If minority-owned contractors do submit bids regu
larly but are rejected because their bids are higher than
the nonminority-owned firms, that too is no evidence of
discrimination. As noted earlier, the competitive bid
process is inherently non-discriminatory and race neu
tral. Nor does such a result indicate that the local con
struction industry discriminated against minorities by
being able to bid lower than them on a project.
c. The City’s reliance on the less than one percent
figure of the dollar amount of prime contracts awarded
to minority-owned businesses is totally misleading be
cause it fails to take into account the percentage of all
public contract dollars reaching minority-owned firms via
sub-contracts awarded by the nonminority firms. Just
as it is in the City’s interest to award prime contracts
to the lowest bidder, so too is it in the interest of the
prime contract to subcontract out certain work where
feasible to the lowest bidder.6 7 Viewed in this light, the
record shows that the percentage of city contract dollars
reaching minority-owned businesses was “seven or eight
[percent] on the overall . . . [and] is in the 20’s, some
where between 17 and 22 [percent], I believe [for con
tracts under the Community Development Block Grants
6 In the construction industry, approximately 75 percent of the
business is in the private sector and 25 percent in the public sector.
U.S. Dept, of Commerce, Survey of Current Business S-7 (April
1988).
7 Certain kinds of major construction projects such as road paving
simply do not lend themselves to being subcontracted out.
14
(CDBG)].” J.A. at 16 (statement of City Manager
Manuel Deese).
It is amici’s, understanding that the 7 or 8 percent
overall figure only accounts for the subcontract work
allocated to the CDBG. In other words, the City had no
figures on the dollar amount of subcontract work being
given to minorities on non-CDBG work, and simply took
the 20 percent work on CDBG and divided into the total
amount of all contracting dollars. If the City took into
account the dollar amount of subcontracts going to minor
ities, and assuredly there were some, the overall 7 or 8
percent figure would be higher. Thus, if the City’s at
tempt to show discrimination is by looking at the total
amount of city dollars reaching the pockets of minority-"
owned businesses, the more appropriate figure is the
7-20 percent figure rather than the 'prime contract per
centage of less than one percent, especially where the
remedy chosen is a subcontract minority set-aside pro
gram.
d. The City’ŝ comparison of prime contracts awarded
to minorities with the percentage of minorities in the
general population of Richmond to prove discrimination
is totally inappropriate. It makes no sense whatsoever
to look at the general population statistics and expect
that there should be a correlation to the percentage
of that group in a particular occupational field such as
public construction anymore than one would expect to
see a statistical similarity in any other discrete occupa
tion. Does the fact that Richmond’s population is 50
percent black mean that 50 percent of all tax attorneys in
Richmond should be black, or 50 percent of all speech
therapists, or 50 percent of all piano tuners? It would
be a statistical oddity indeed to find each occupational
category to contain the same or approximate ratio of
minorities as there are in the general population. To
suggest that statistical discrepancies constitute discrim
ination in discrete occupational categories, particularly
15
ones requiring ownership of the business as in this ease,
is pure sophistry.
If one is trying to build a discrimination case solely
on statistics, and amici do not think it can be done in an
inherently neutral competitive bidding system, the more
relevant comparison is not with the general population,
but as the court below noted, “between the number of
minority contracts and the number of minority contrac
tors . . . . ” 822 F.2d at 1359 (emphasis in original).
Accord J. Edinger & Lon, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 802
F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1986) (no evidence of statistical
disparity between “percentage of qualified minority busi
ness contractors” and “percentage of bid funds”
awarded) ; Associated General Contractors of California
v. City and County of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th
Cir. 1987).® See also Hazlewood School District v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977), where this Court looked
at the difference between the number of those employed
and the qualified labor pool, not the general population.
But even the comparison between the percentage of bid
funds awarded and percentage of qualified minority
business contractors may be an overly generous one be
cause of the nature of the contracting system. To illus
trate, assume that minorities were awarded over 40
percent of the number of contracts or subcontracts but
those contracts were small item contracts such that in
the aggregate, they account for only 10 percent of the
total dollar amount of all contracts awarded over a pe
riod of time. Thus, a few large turnkey projects awarded
competitively and nondiscriminatorily to a nonminority
firm will skew the percentages if large and small con
tracts are lumped together. Yet the lower 10 percent
figure is hardly evidence of discrimination. The Rich
mond Plan nevertheless guarantees minorities a right,
in effect, to 100 percent of the number of contracts at a 8
8 Not surprisingly, the City nowhere cites in its brief, let alone
attempts to deal with, the Edinger and San Francisco opinions.
16
minimum of 30 percent value for each separate contract.
Thus, the unique features of the contracting system
underscore the inherent flaws in trying to “prove” dis
crimination by using simplistic aggregate figures. To
put it another way, in the personnel employment situa
tion, for example, only one person can hold one position
or slot at a time. Thus, there is a one-to-one relationship
on both sides of the employment statistical equation. In
the contracting system, however, contracts have widely
differing dollar values and are not fungible.
Contracts have widely different purposes as well. Some
construction contracts may be for plumbing work as in
the instant case, or for the paving of public roads. Not
all contractors are equipped or qualified to bid on all
contracts. In the employment context, however, a teacher
is a teacher (see Wyant, supra), or a policeman is a
policeman. See United States v. Paradise, 107 S.Ct. 1053
(1987). Their duties and qualifications can be adjudged
to be the same for each such occupation. Not so in the
construction industry. Consequently, even the use of the
percentage of the existing qualified minority contractors
may be an inflated yardstick to use in this case.
e. Because a comparison of the percentage of the
total dollar amount of contracts awarded to minority con
tractors with the percentage of qualified minority con
tractors in the Richmond area is a better indicator of
the existence of any discrepancy than the use of general
population statistics, the question that remains is, what
is the percentage of qualified minority contractors in
Richmond. The only evidence in the record is a national
figure of 4.7 percent. J.A. 35 (Statement of Patrick
Murphy). If this 4.7 percent figure applies to Richmond,
then minority-owned firms in Richmond, which were get
ting at least 7 percent of the contract dollars before the
Plan was adopted, were receiving a disproportionately
greater share than their numbers would apparently war
rant. Even if the percentage of the minority-owned firms
17
in Richmond is actually double (9.4 percent) or triple
(14.1 percent) the national average, the percentage of
contract dollars already awarded to such firms, i.e., 7 to
20 percent, would be still within a reasonable range,
considering the vagaries of the contracting system as
previously described.
Thus, even if minority contractors constitute 6 percent
of all the contractors, and receive only 3 percent of the
dollar value of all contracts, that result cannot be called
discrimination any more than it would be to say that
there is discrimination against qualified firms that are
owned by white males over the age of 65 because they
too may constitute 6 percent of all contractors yet re
ceive only 3 percent of the dollar value of all contracts.
Accordingly, the 30 percent figure mandated by the
City not only “ emerged from the mists” as the Fourth
Circuit properly noted, 822 F.2d at 1360, but the figure
is grossly out of line with the results one would expect
in Richmond from a race-neutral contracting system.
3. There Is No Evidence That There Even JFas
Any “Societal” Discrimination Against Minority
Contractors.
Not only has the City failed to show “purposeful, iden
tified discrimination” in the construction industry in
Richmond, there is no evidence or even any allegation
that there was “societal” discrimination that explains the
small number of minority contractors. There is no allega
tion, for example, that minorities, because of the color
of their skin, were denied credit or loans from banks to
obtain the needed capital to start up a contracting busi
ness. There is no allegation that vendors refused to rent
or sell trucks or equipment to blacks so that they may
equip their companies. There is no allegation that busi
ness schools or colleges denied them admission. Indeed,
there is a host of federal and state laws that prohibit
such discrimination.
18
Even the dissenting judge in the Fourth Circuit below
in this case admitted that “ there was no suggestion before
the Council that . . . the minimal presence of minority
contractors in that endeavor was caused by such ‘societal’
discriminatory factors as past inferior education or lack
of access to social institutions.” 822 F.2d at 1366
(Sprouse, J., dissenting).
Since there was no discrimination by the City, no cred
ible evidence of discrimination by the Richmond “ con
tracting industry,” and not even allegations of “societal”
discrimination, we are left with a case, which the City
and their supporting amici may find hard to accept, sug
gesting no discrimination at all. Consequently, the al
leged discrimination in this case is far weaker than the
“ societal” discrimination found in the Wygant case which
this Court ruled was insufficient to justify a race-conscious
remedial plan.
4. There Are Numerous Nondiscriminatory Reasons
To Explain The Number And Size Of Minority-
Contracting Firms.
Just as Justice Powell noted in Wygant that there are
“ numerous explanations for a disparity between the per
centage of minority students and the percentage of mi
nority faculty, many of them completely unrelated to dis
crimination of any kind,” 106 S.Ct. at 1848, so too in
this case are there numerous nondiscriminatory reasons
to explain the difference between the percentage of the
minority population of Richmond and the percentage of
minority-owned contracting businesses.
Unlike the task of seeking employment which requires
very little capital (e.g., cost of transportation to job in
terviews), starting one’s own business, especially one in
the construction industry, is a very expensive and risky
proposition requiring substantial capital. A simple fact
of life is that as a class of people, blacks do not have
as much assets as those owned by whites. In 1984,
19
“ [m]edian assets owned by blacks were only 9 percent
of those owned by whites.” D. Gilliam, “ Fostering Black
Enterprise,” Washington Post, May 30, 1988, at B3 at
col. 5 (citing “ The Color Line and Quality of Life In
America.” ). While the City and its supporting amici
would no doubt quickly ascribe “ racial discrimination”
to that statistical disparity too, one finds that Asians,
West Indians, and Ethiopians (the latter two groups
having the same skin color as American blacks), fare
much better in opening businesses here than U.S. Blacks.
Id. Indeed, one may even argue that the Great Society
giveaway programs of the 1960’s led blacks to place un
due dependence on the government, causing a decline in
self-reliance, skills, and motivation so necessary for start
ing one’s own business.9
The respected Booker T. Washington Foundation and
other self-help black groups are trying to improve the
economic status of the black community with economic
education rather than through cries of “ discrimination”
and government handouts or quotas. In so doing, these
groups are trying to identify the true causes for the low
amount of black enterprise and. seeking to remedy them.
Charles Tate, the executive director of the Booker T.
Washington Foundation stated that “ Equity capital
9 There may be cultural differences that explain the various suc
cesses of certain groups in certain industries. As noted black scholar
Thomas Sowell observed:
Some groups that have been tremendously successful in some
activities have been utter failures in other activities requiring
no more talent. Even such an economically successful urban
group as American Jews had an unbroken string of financial
disasters in farming, while immigrants from peasant back
ground succeeded . . . . [U]nless we are prepared to deny free*
choice to the supposed beneficiaries of “affirmative action,” it is
arbitrary social dogma to expect an even distribution of results.
T. Sowell, Dissenting from Liberal Orthodoxy: A Black Scholar
Speaks for the “Angry Moderates.” (American Enterprises Insti
tute, Dec. 1976).
20
shortage in the black communities is the major reason
that the level of business and economic development are
low.” Washington Post, supra. In addition, “ [mjistrust
of each other is a key problem . . . Blacks have tradition
ally shied away from pooling their money to go into
economic ventures . . . Id. Even in the Washington,
D.C. area with “ about a million blacks . . . with a level
of education and professional achievement in the black
community probably unmatched in the United States,
local black business ownership and black-controlled eco
nomic development are woefully small.” Id. It is not
surprising, therefore, that blacks in the Richmond area
do not own a larger number of contracting businesses
due to reasons having nothing to do with discrimination.
As for the viability of contracting businesses once they
start, that too involves additional capital, cash flow, bond
ing requirements, and the like. In other words, once a
black-owned business is started, it faces the same prob
lems faced by a nonminority to keep the business viable.
But in a free enterprise system, success is never guaran
teed. Businesses, both black and white, struggle and
oftentimes fail.
There may be a host of other nondiscriminatory rea
sons why blacks do not form construction companies.
The very risk of such venture, combined with a profit
ability of less than 10 percent, may lead them into
more profitable lines of self-owned business like retail
ing or personal services where capital requirements may
also be lower. See Appendix hereto for a break down of
black-owned firms in Richmond. Or they may be content
to be an employee and rise up the ladder in their chosen
career. After all, many successful corporate executives
are mere employees and do not “ own” the companies they
work for.
In short, the statistical disparity between black-owned
construction firms in Richmond, Virginia and the black
population in Richmond is certainly not evidence of “pur
21
poseful, identified discrimination” in the local construc
tion industry.
II. THE RICHMOND PLAN IS NOT NARROWLY
TAILORED TO REMEDY THE ALLEGED DIS
CRIMINATION.
Assuming that the City’s meager statistics constitute
firm evidence of pervasive, identified racial discrimina
tion in the contracting industry, that alone does not mean
that the City is free to set up any kind of race-conscious
remedy. On the contrary, any such plan must be narrowly
tailored to remedy the specific effects of the discrimina
tion and no more. Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1849-50. In this
case, the Richmond plan falls far short of satisfying this
test.
A. In the first place, it is unclear precisely what the
City is trying to accomplish by this plan. If they believe
that the low number of minority-owned firms is due to
discrimination, and that they want to increase the num
ber of firms, then this plan does not accomplish that at
all. All that this plan is designed to do is to give 30
percent of the city’s contracting dollars to existing mi
nority firms in the form of a windfall. Thus, this situa
tion is totally unlike the remedial measures upheld in the
employment context such as in Paradise and Sheet Metal
Workers cases where additional minorities are neces
sarily brought into the workforce. Nor is there any pre
tense made by the City that the 30 percent set-aside pro
gram will attract new firms into the business. As noted
earlier, there are many reasons that inhibit the forma
tion of new construction firms. Amici doubt that a tem
porary set-aside program will necessarily be a sufficient
inducement to blacks to start their own firms.
B. If the economic viability of all minorities in Rich
mond is the concern of the City, this plan certainly does
not address that issue. In other words, this Plan is only
concerned with the minority who owns the firm, not the
22
people who may be employed. Nonminority firms may
employ more blacks than the minority firms such that
the total amount of dollars going to all minorities as
wages may actually decline because of the set-aside pro
gram. During the hearings on this plan, Councilmember
Gillespie asked whether the proponents of the measure
have “assessed the impact that this [plan] is going to
have on employment among blacks, which is one of our
most significant problems.”
MR. DEBSE: I can’t assess that. . . .
* * * *
MR. GILLESPIE: Since you don’t know, and
since it is a problem in our City, is it worth assess
ing the impact before we act on the bill?
MR. DEESE: I don’t think that’s necessary.
J.A. at 44-45.
C. Not only does the plan neither increase the number
of minority firms nor increase minority employment,
giving instead a windfall to existing minority firms, but
also the windfall is not even limited to minority firms in
the Richmond area. During the Council hearings on this
measure, representatives of the contracting industry in
dicated how difficult it was to locate qualified minority
firms in the area. Even in the instant case, the Croson
company had solicited subcontract bids from minority
firms located in Pittsburgh and North Dakota. See
Croson v. City of Richmond, 779 F.2d 181, 183, n.4 (4th
Cir. 1985). It is amici’s understanding that the current
experience under the Richmond plan is that in order to
satisfy the 30 percent set-aside provision, there is exten
sive use of minority firms located in Atlanta or Phila
delphia. How does this practice allegedly remedy the
alleged discrimination in Richmond? What compelling
interest does Richmond have to assist minority firms in
other states?
D. Another broad feature of the plan is that the 30
percent set-aside figure can be satisfied by using any
23
minority firm and not just one owned by blacks. Thus,
firms owned by an Eskimo, Aleut, Hispanic, or Oriental
would satisfy the city’s plan, without a single black firm
being aided.10
This overreaching aspect of the plan is clearly not
narrowly tailored to remedy the alleged discrimination
against the black community. Justice O’Connor simi
larly criticized the race-conscious plan struck down in
the Wygant case that included Orientals, Indians, and
other minorities as illustrative of the “ undifferentiated
nature of the plan. There is no explanation of why the
Board chose to favor these particular minorities. . . .
Moreover, respondents have never suggested— much less
formally found— that they have engaged in prior, pur
poseful discrimination against members of each of these
minority groups.” 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1852, n.13 (O’Con
nor, J., concurring).
E. The 30 percent figure is an arbitrary number that,
as previously noted, bears no appropriate relationship
to the relevant class, i.e., the number of minority-owned
firms. Further evidence of the arbitrariness of the per
centage selected is that the Richmond Plan has set a 20
percent figure as a goal for minority contracting for all
city contracts other than construction contracts. See
Plan Article VIII-A ( A ) , para. 2.
F. While the Richmond plan does have a waiver pro
vision, that feature in and of itself will not salvage an
otherwise overly broad remedy. Indeed, in the case at
bar, Croson was denied a waiver as well as the oppor
tunity to raise his bid to accommodate the excessive
mark-up of some $7,000 offered by the minority firm,
Continental Hose Company. 822 F.2d at 1357.
10 Amici note that there are only three Eskimos and two Aleuts
living in Richmond, out of a population of some 220,000. U.S.
Bureau of the Census, PC80-1-B48, 1980 General Population Char
acteristics, Virginia, Table 15 (1982).
24
This restrictive use of the waiver provision is cer
tainly not the kind discussed in the Fvllilove case where
Chief Justice Burger noted that “ as to specific contract
awards, waiver is available to avoid dealing with an
MBE who is attempting to exploit the remedial aspects
of the program by charging an unreasonable price, i.e.,
a price not attributable to the present effects of past
discrimination.” 448 U.S. 448, 488. There is no similar
provision in the Richmond Plan to prevent such wind
falls going to minority firms, and as described in the
following section, minority set-asides have proven to be a
costly program to taxpayers and other elements of so
ciety. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit below was cor
rect in doubting that “ any waiver, let alone the restric
tive waiver provisions in this case, could cure the ob
jectionable aspects of the Richmond ordinance.” 822 F.2d
1355, 1361.
G. If the City’s concern is to eliminate discrimination
in the construction industry, a narrowly tailored remedy
would be to simply debar all contractors from the bid
ding process who discriminate against minorities in em
ployment, or who refuse to deal with minority contrac
tors who have given them the lowest bid price on a sub
contract.
Accordingly, the Plan is defective because it is not
narrowly tailored in a number of respects to remedy the
alleged discrimination. Amici submit, however, that the
Court need not even address the issue of whether the
Plan is narrowly tailored since the predicate finding of
firm evidence of discrimination is simply lacking.
25
III. RACE-CONSCIOUS PROGRAMS SUCH AS SET-
ASIDES ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, COSTLY
TO SOCIETY, AND MORALLY REPUGNANT.
The widespread use of minority set-asides by a number
of cities and states has produced a wealth of evidence
showing that these programs have deleterious effects on
the economy and society. In addition, they are morally
repugnant because they are designed to prefer certain
members of society simply because of the color of their
skin. In a free, competitive, color-blind society, there
should be equality of opportunity, not equality of results.
In 1985, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission undertook
a comprehensive study of the experience gained during a
decade of the use of minority set-asides. Hearings were
held on March 6-7, 1985 and are reproduced in two in
formative volumes entitled “ Selected Affirmative Action
Topics in Employment and Business Set-Asides” (here
inafter “ Set-Asides” ). Numerous witnesses testified on
both sides of the issue, and some common sense notions
of the competitive contracting system were revealed. For
example, Kurt A.J. Monier of the Associated Specialty
Contractors, Inc., noted that:
Subcontractors are not and should not be selected
on the basis of race, sex, or other nonrelevant cri
teria by any prime contractors with enough good
judgment to remain in business unless such selection
is mandated by government edict. In practice, the
subcontractors are selected on the basis of their com
petitive price and ability to perform the work. [Set-
asides] are nonsolutions to nonproblems that threaten
to eliminate subcontractor competition on government
work.
Set-Asides, Vol. 2 at 243.
Joan G. Haworth, an economist and researcher, re
viewed the employment statistics between 1972 and 1982
and found that the minority share of self-employed work
26
ers remained constant at 6.2 percent. In the construc
tion industry, however, the field most targeted by set-
aside programs, the minority share of self-employed
workers declined from 5.8 percent in 1972 to 5.4 percent
in 1982. Set-Asides, Vol. at 80-81.
The reasonable conclusion that minority set-asides pro
vide a windfall to existing minority-owned firms rather
than to help develop new minority businesses is also
borne out by other studies. An investigation of the prin
cipal beneficiaries of the set-aside programs has revealed
that:
their median annual sales and after-tax profits are
respectively, $741,000 and $32,500, and they are
nearly as profitable as nonminority businesses of com
parable size. These larger scale minority enter
prises . . . have benefited most from set-asides, and
they cannot— as a group—be accurately characterized
as “ deprived.”
Set-Asides, Vol. 1 at 149 (statement of Professor Timothy
Bates, Professor of Economics, University of Vermont).
This information suggests that the set-aside programs
have primarily benefited wealthier minority group mem
bers— the ones least in need of government assistance.
In addition to the fact that set-asides seem to be
counterproductive, there is also evidence that their neg
ative economic impact is also felt. According to a 1979
General Accounting Office report on the public work set-
aside program upheld in Fullilove, it was discovered that
the “price quotes of minority firms averaged about 9
percent higher than normal prices.” GAO, Minority Firms
on LPW Projects: Mixed Results 18 (1979). See also Set-
Asides, Vol .2 at 274-75 (testimony of G. Paul Jones, Jr.,
citing 30 percent cost differential between set-aside par
ticipant and low bidder) ; id. at 246 (statement of Kurt
A.J. Monier) (citing 300 percent cost differential between
27
minority participant in Small Business Administration’s
Section 8(a) program and nondisadvantaged bidder.)
Besides being ineffective and costly to the taxpayers
who pay for the government contracts, the set-aside pro
grams necessarily impact on non-minority businesses,
many of which are small and have been placed under
economic pressure because of these programs. For exam
ple, Ralph D. Stout, Jr., who twice served on President
Carter’s White House Conference on Small Business, tes
tified before the Civil Rights Commission about the ex
perience of his subcontracting company, Southern Seed
ing Service, which performs erosion control or grassing
work on the highways of North Carolina. Although he
had been successful in the past in receiving bids, the
set-aside programs had “ literally legislated [his com
pany] out of the marketplace.” Set-Asides, Vol. 2 at
135. See also Hearing Before the Sub comm. on Trans
portation of the Senate Comm, an Environment and
Public Works on The Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
Program of the Federal-Aid Hightvay Act, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 334 (testimony of John C. Vande Velde, owner
of Warning Lites of Illinois noting that because of set-
asides, that his lower bid prices were not accepted and
that his business’s success rate in bidding on contracts
dropped from about 40 percent to 3 percent from 1984
to 1985).
If the goal of society is to provide equal opportunity
to minorities, the goal is best accomplished not by set-
asides in the contracting industry, but by ensuring that
all invitations for bids for government contracts receive
the widest circulation in the minority business com
munity. That of course is the true essence of “ affirma
tive action” , i.e., to affirmatively provide opportunities,
not results, to the minority community. The City of
Richmond has numerous agencies and services that pro
vide such outreach to the minority community for which
they are to be commended. Virginia was the first
28
state to have a Department of Minority-Owned Enter
prises to provide education and managerial assistance to
minorities.
However, a set-aside program is simply a quick fix
that does not address the true needs of the minority busi
ness community.11 Worse, they are nothing more than a
racial quota and as such, are morally repugnant in a
society professing to treat everyone as individuals rather
than classifying them by the color of their skin. Such
programs are even objected to by minorities who regard
the preferential treatment as stigmatizing. As Professor
Thomas Sowell wrote in Black Education, Myths and
Tragedies 292 (1972) :
What all the arguments and campaigns for quotas
are really saying, loud and clear, is that black people
just don’t have it, and that they will have to be
given something in order to have something. The
devastating impact of this message on black people
— particularly black young people— will outweigh
any few extra jobs that may result from this
strategy.
11 See also P. Bell, Blacks Must Take Responsibility For Their
Own Lives, 5 Lincoln Review, Summer 1984, at 39; P. Perlmutter,
Minority Group Responses To Prejudice & Discrimination, 8 Lincoln
Review, Winter 1988, at 21; C. Pendleton, Affirmative Action & In
dividual Freedom, 7 Lincoln Review, Summer 1986, at 23; J. Parker,
“ The Time Has Come To Move Decisively Toward A Truly Color
Blind Society,” 6 Lincoln Review, Summer 1985, at 1.
29
CONCLUSION
This Court should reject the City’s argument for what
it is : fuzzy thinking and statistical voodoo to justify a
politically motivated racial spoils system that is morally
wrong, violates fundamental notions of fairness, and de
nies persons equal protection of the law. Competitive
bidding in the contracting process is quintessential^ non-
discriminatory.
In affirming the court below, this Court would do well
to heed the suggestion of Professor William Van
Alstyne:
[0]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now:
by a complete, resolute, and credible commitment
never to tolerate in one’s own life— or in the life or
practices of one’s government— the differential treat
ment of other human beings by race. Indeed, that
is the great lesson for government itself to teach: in
all we do in life, whatever we do in life, to treat
any person less well than another or to favor any
more than another for being black or white or brown
or red, is wrong. Let that be our fundamental law
and we shall have a Constitution universally worth
expounding.
Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court
and the Constitution, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 809-810
Respectfully submitted,
Daniel J. Popeo
Paul D. Kamenar *
W ashington Legal Foundation
1705 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 857-0240
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
Washington Legal Foundation
and The Lincoln Institute for
Research and Education
* Counsel of Record
(1979).
June 8,1988
APPENDIX
SURVEY OF BLACK-OWNED FIRMS:
RICHMOND, VA.
TOTAL OF BLACK-OWNED FIRMS: 1,563
Agricultural services, forestry, fishing,
and mining ..................................................................... 12
Construction ........................................................................ 144
Manufacturing ................................................................... 12
Transportation & public utilities....... ............................. 98
Wholesale trade ............... 2
Retail trade ......................................................................... 354
Finance, insurance, & real estate ................... 106
Selected services ................................................................ 690
Industries not classified.... :............................................... 145
la
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau op the Census, 1982 Survey of
Minority-Owned Business Enterprises: Black 88
(1985).