English v. Lawrence Brief of Respondent Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari

    In The

B n p x m x  (Em trl n f  %  Mnxtxb B ta ttB
October Term, 1974

No. 74-1485
W illiam English, Jr.,

Petitioner
v.

Hon. Alexander A. Lawrence, Chief Judge, United 
States District Court for the Southern District of 
Georgia; Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company; 
and Brotherhood op Railway, A irline and Steam­
ship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Sta­
tion Employees,

Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SEABOARD COAST LINE 
RAILROAD COMPANY IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

FIFTH CIRCUIT

John W. Weldon 
Edward A. Charron 

Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
Company 

500 Water Street 
Jacksonville, Florida 32202

Malcolm Maclean 
Charles A. Edwards 

Hunter, Houlihan, Maclean, 
Exley, Dunn & Connerat, P. C. 

Post Office Box 9848 
Savannah, Georgia 31402

W I L S O N  -  E P E S  P R IN T IN G  C o .  . IN C . - R E  7 - 6 0 0 2  -  W A S H I N G T O N . D .  C .  2 0 0 0 1



I N D E X

INDEX ........... ........ ................. ...................................-__  I
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ____________________ ___ Ill
OPINION BELOW ____ __ ___________ __ -_________  1
QUESTION PRESENTED ........    2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED __________  2
STATEMENT OF THE CA SE______ _____________ _ 2
ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT’S HANDLING OF THIS
CASE IS JUSTIFIED BY THE FACTS______  6

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING PETITIONER’S APPLICATION 
FOR MANDAMUS ..........................    9

III. PETITIONER HAS SHOWN NO GROUNDS 
SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE GRANT­
ING OF HIS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI— 12

CONCLUSION ________________________________    12
APPENDIX
1. Hayes V. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company,

Order dated Dec. 9, 1968. (S.D. Ga.) _______ __ _ la
2. Hayes, Order dated Jan. 14, 1969. (S.D. Ga.)_____  12a
3. Hayes, Order dated Apr. 9, 1971 (S.D. G a.)........ . 17a
4. Hayes, Order dated Aug. 20, 1971 (5th C ir.)....... . 20a
5. English V. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company,

Order dated Aug. 17, 1971 (S.D. Ga.)_____ __   22a
6. English, Order dated Sept. 7, 1971 (S.D. Ga.)...... . 27a
7. English, Order dated Jan. 28, 1972 (S.D. Ga.)____ 30a
8. English, Order dated Aug. 7, 1972 (5th Cir.) .......  33a
9. English, Orders dated Sept. 1, 1972, Oct. 18, 1972,

and Oct. 24, 1972 (S.D. G a.)___________________  44a
10. English, Order dated Nov. 16, 1973 (S.D. Ga.).... 48a

Page



INDEX— Continued

11. Hayes, Order dated Nov. 19, 1973 (S.D. Ga.)___  52a
12. Hayes, Order dated Dec. 13, 1973 (S.D. Ga.).......  55a
13. Hamilton V. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Com­

pany, Order dated May 2, 1975 (S.D. G a.)____  57a
14. English, Order dated Dec. 13, 1973 (S.D. Ga.)......   59a
15. English, Order dated Jan. 31, 1974 (S.D. Ga.)___  61a
16. Hayes, Order dated Mar. 22, 1974 (S.D. Ga.)—...... 67a
17. Hayes, Order dated Jul. 1, 1974 (S.D. Ga.) ______  68a
18. Civil docket entries in Hayes (S.D. Ga.) ____  72a
19. Civil docket entries in Hamilton (S.D. Ga.)_____ 86a
20. Transcript of hearing in English, Apr. 15, 1975— 91a

II

Page



TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page

Banker’s Life & Gas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379
(1953) ________________________    12

Boles v. Union Camp Corp., Civil No. 2804 (S.D.
Ga., Savannah Div.) _________________________  9

Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954) __     7

Czuzka v. Rifkind, 160 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1947)-. 10
Electrical & Musical Industries, Ltd. v. Walsh, 249

F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1957)______________________ 10
In re English, No. 75-1209 (5th Cir., Feb. 27,

1975) .........     1
English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., Civil No, 691 

(S.D. Ga., Waycross Div.)
3 CCH EPD H8316 (S.D. Ga. 1971) .... . 3
4 CCH EPD If 7505 (S.D. Ga. 1971), aff’d as

modif., 465 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972) ........  3
4 CCH EPD 1f 7645 (S.D. Ga. 1972) ............. 4
5 CCH EPD If 8018 (S.D. Ga. 1972)................. 4
6 CCH EPD If 8970 (S.D. Ga. 1973)______  4
6 CCH EPD If 9033 (S.D. Ga. 1973) ...........  5
7 CCH EPD If 9121 (S.D. Ga. 1974) ...............  5

Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258 (1947) _______   10
Garan, Inc. v. Roydon, Wear, Inc., Civil No. 374-11

(S.D. Ga. 1974)__________   8
Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, Civil No.

1068 (E.D. La. ) ____________________ ___ 7
Hall v. West, 335 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964) _____ 7,10-11
Hamilton v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., Civil No.

474-69 (S.D. Ga., Savannah Div.) __________  5
Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., Civil No. 2371 

(S.D. Ga., Savannah Div.)
1 CCH EPD If 9936 (S.D. Ga. 1968) ................ 2
46 F.R.D. 49, 1 CCH EPD If 9953 (S.D. Ga.

1969) .......       3
3 CCH EPD If 8170 (S.D. Ga. 1971), app. 

dism’d, 3 CCH EPD If 8320 (5th Cir., Misc.
No. 2145, 1971)

in

3



IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES— Continued

6 CCH EPD H 8971 (S.D. Ga. 1973) ........ ...... 4, 5, 10
7 CCH EPD H 9248 (S.D. Ga. 1974)  ............  5
8 CCH EPD If 9553 (S.D. Ga. 1974) ...............  5

Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942) _____ ____  10
Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Comstock, 83 U.S. (16

Wall.) 258 (1873)___     11
Munn v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., Civil No. 474-

200 (S.D. Ga., Savannah Div.)_______________  8
Ex parte Newman, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 152

(1872) .............      11
Platt v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240

(1964) _________      10
Schwab v. Coleman, 145 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1944).. 10

not yet assigned (S.D. Ga., Waycross D iv.)..... 
Snowden v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., Civil No.
Stell v. Board of Public Education, Civil No. 1316 

(S.D. Ga., Savannah Div.)
334 F.Supp. 909 (S.D. Ga. 1971)............. . 8
446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir.), stay denied (U.S.,

(1971) ............................. ............ ......... .... . 8
450 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1971) ______________  8

Steward v. West, 449 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1971) .... 10
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa­

tion, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) ____________________ __ 8
United States v. Hall, 145 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.

1944) ----------- ------------------ ----------- -----------------  10
Wills v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967) ______  10
Zerilli v. Thornton, 428 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1970).. 10

STATUTES AND RULES
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 ............. .......... 2, 9
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amend­

ed, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. ............ ............. 2, 8, 9
Rule 19, Supreme Court Rules ............................. 12
Rule 21 (1), Supreme Court Rules---- --------- ,........  12

Page



V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page

OTHER AUTHORITIES
Bell, The Federal Appellate Courts and the All

Writs Act, 23 SW.L.J. 858 (1969) _______ ______ 10
Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Un­

der the All Writs Act, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 595 
(1973) .................................. ..................................  10



In The

8>uprm? (Emtrt uf %  Im teh Btntva
October Term, 1974

No. 74-1485

W illiam English, Jr.,
Petitioner

v.

Hon. A lexander A. Lawrence, Chief Judge, United 
States District Court for the Southern District of 
Georgia; Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company; 
and Brotherhood op Railway, A irline and Steam­
ship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Sta­
tion E mployees,

Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT SEABOARD COAST LINE 
RAILROAD COMPANY IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 

FIFTH CIRCUIT

OPINION BELOW

The Court of Appeals’ opinion is as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for writ of manda­
mus is DENIED.

{In re William English, Jr., 5th Cir. No. 75-1209, 
Feb. 27, 1975 (per curiam).)



2

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit clearly abused its discretion in determining 
that the factual circumstances presented to it in peti­
tioner’s application for writ of mandamus were insuffi­
cient to compel issuance of the writ.

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), as quoted in 
the Petition at p. 3, is the only relevant statute.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On July 31, 1968, counsel for petitioner herein filed a 
class action against Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Com­
pany (SCL), the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and 
Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Sta­
tion Employees (BRAG), and two local lodges of BRAC. 
That action, styled as Lorenzo' Hayes, et al. V. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company, et al., S.D.Ga. (Savannah 
Division) Civil Action No. 2371, is a class action pur­
suant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., challenging the then-existing divi­
sion of the craft of SCL employees represented by BRAC 
into two “ Groups” or “ Classes,”

On December 9, 1968, the Court defined the class rep­
resented by Hayes and the five other named plaintiffs as: 
“ Negro employes j[of SCL] at or near Savannah who 
belong to or are eligible for membership' in either of the 
two local defendant Brotherhoods by reason of job clas­
sification.”  Hayes V. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 1 CCH 
EPD § 9936 (S.D.Ga. 1968). A  certified copy of that 
order is reproduced in the Appendix as Exhibit 1. (here­
inafter, A -l) . This order was supplemented on January 
14, 1969 by an order adhering to the trial court’s prior



3

determination to require notice to members of the class. 
46 F.R.D. 49, 1 CCH EPD 19953 (S.D.Ga. 1969) ,[A-2]. 
A motion to certify the order for appeal was denied.

Hayes proceeded into discovery through 1969 and 1970, 
with the only significant activity in that case being SCL’s 
efforts to secure responses to discovery directed to the 
plaintiffs. Meanwhile, on November 18, 1969, plaintiffs’ 
counsel filed another action in the Way cross. Division of 
the Southern District of Georgia. This, second action, 
styled as William English, Jr. v. Seaboard Coast Line 
R.R., et at., Civil Action No. 691, named SCL and BRAG, 
as defendants along with two different local lodges of 
BRAC.

On April 9, 1971, the court ruled in Hayes that indi­
vidual white employees, whose seniority rights would be 
adversely affected should plaintiffs prevail, be joined as 
parties defendant. 3 CCH EPD '118170 (S.D.Ga. 1971) 
[A-3]. The Hayes action was therefore stayed until such 
time as the plaintiffs so amended their complaint. Plain­
tiffs’ appeal was dismissed as untimely, 3 CCH EPD 
U 8320 (5th Cir., Misc. No. 2145, Aug. 20, 1971) ![A -4], 
and the stay remained in effect.

Counsel for plaintiffs in the two cases then devoted 
their attention to English. The class was certified as: 
“ Negro employees of Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Com­
pany at or near Way cross, Georgia who belong to or are 
eligible for membership in either of the two defendant 
locals of BRAC, Number 5 and Number 1586, by reason 
of job classification.”  The question of joinder was re­
served pending the Hayes appeal. English v. Seaboard 
Coast Line R.R., 3 CCH EPD 1} 8316 (S.D.Ga. Aug. 17, 
1971) | A-5 !. After the Fifth Circuit dismissed the Hayes 
appeal, a similar joinder order issued in English, 4 CCH 
EPD 'll 7505 (S.D.Ga., Sept. 7, 1971) i[A-6]. The English



4

action was: stayed pending such joinder, and the plaintiff 
appealed.

While English was on appeal, the local lodges of BRAG 
were merged by court order dated January 28, 1972, 4 
CCH EPD 7645 j A-7j. The Fifth Circuit’s decision, 
affirming the joinder order as modified, issued on August 
7, 1972. 465 F.2d 43, 4 CCH EPD If 7931 (5th Cir. No. 
71-3362) |[A-8;]. Orders on remand were issued by the 
trial court on September 1, 1972 (ordering plaintiff to 
amend), October 18, 1972 (joining the Transportation- 
Communication Employees Union as a defendant), and 
October 24, 1972 (ruling on all other outstanding mo­
tions: and setting a trial date of January 8, 1973). 5 
CCH EPD '118018 (S.D.Ga. 1972) [A-9].

SCL and BRAG negotiated an agreement, effective 
March 1, 1973, which merged Groups 1 and 2 on a date- 
of-hire “ dovetail”  basis, thereby providing the seniority 
relief requested by the plaintiffs in both Hayes and Eng­
lish. This agreement was incorporated into a system- 
wide injunction (thus affecting all employees of SCL 
represented by BRAG, regardless of their non-member­
ship in either of the above-described classes) on Novem­
ber 16, 1973, 6 CCH EPD 8970 (S.D.Ga.) ,[A-10.]. On 
the same day, the stay in Hayes, now two and one-half 
years: old by virtue of plaintiffs’ inaction in that case, 
was dissolved as moot. 6 CCH EPD If 8971 (S.D.Ga.) 
IA-11J.

Plaintiffs in Hayes then attempted to amend their com­
plaint to join an additional defendant the United Trans­
portation Union (UTU), on grounds that two of the 
Hayes plaintiffs wished to become switchmen. Leave so 
to amend was denied by order dated December 13, 1973, 
6 CCH EPD If 9032 [A-12]. The two plaintiffs involved, 
Uley Hamilton and Godfrey M. Davis, later filed a sepa­
rate action against SCL and UTU on April 18, 1974;



5

this case, Savannah Division Civil Action No. CY474-69, 
was tried on May 5, 1975. Prior to that, however, an 
additional plaintiff Booker T. Snowden, sought to inter­
vene in the case. After the conclusion of two lengthy 
hearings, his case was transferred with the concurrence 
of all counsel to the Waycross Division. [A-13]. Post- 
trial submission of briefs and additional evidence are 
now pending in Hamilton.

In light of the systemwide nature of the injunctive 
order, SCL moved for expansion of the class to encom­
pass all black, former Group 2 employees of SCL; this 
motion was taken under advisement by the trial court 
by order dated December 13, 1973. English v. Seaboard 
Coast Line' R.R., 6 CCH EPD 'TT 9033 (S.D.Ga.) [A-14]. 
The injunction was modified by order dated January 31, 
1974 in English, 7 CCH EPD jf 9121 (S.D.Ga.) [A-15] ; 
that order incorporated an agreement providing fallback 
seniority rights to transferring employees whose trans­
fers were not completed. Then, on March 22, 1974, Eng­
lish and Hayes were consolidated, 7 CCH EPD U 9248 
(S.D.Ga.) [A-16].

Seniority relief for former employees, of the Savannah 
Union Station Company (which had been dissolved in 
1962) was provided by order in Hayes dated July 1, 
1974, 8 CCH EPD ff 9553 (S.D.Ga.) [A-17]. SCL then 
renewed its motion to compel answers to interrogatories 
in Hayes. (Answers were due on December 19, 1973 
See 6 CCH EPD If 8971 [A -ll] .)  The Court ordered 
that answer be made on or before August 31, 1974, but 
no answers have yet been filed despite a show-cause hear­
ing on October 1, 1974.

On August 22, 1974, petitioner’s; lead* counsel of rec­
ord, Jack Greenberg, Esq., wrote a letter to Chief Judge 
John R. Brown of the Fifth Circuit, asserting that “the 
determination of the rights of hundreds of other persons



6

depends on obtaining a decision in English."1 By per­
sonal letter to Mr. Greenberg on September 11, 1974, 
Chief Judge Brown assured Mr. Greenberg that he (Chief 
Judge Brown) had made inquiry and was satisfied that 
Judge Lawrence was “ doing the best that is possible.” 
Nonetheless, a petition for writ of mandamus was filed 
with the Fifth Circuit on January 23, 1975. That Court 
directed that the Clerk request Judge Lawrence to file a 
response to the petition.12

The Court of Appeals denied mandamus on February 
27, 1975. Both SCL and BRAG filed motions to dismiss 
the petition. (On February 20, 1975, that Court amend­
ed its rules by adding Rule 22, which forbids, extraordi­
nary writs bearing the name of the district judge and 
further states that, “ unless otherwise ordered, the judge 
shall be represented pro forma by counsel for the party 
opposing the relief, who shall appear in the name of the 
party and not that of the judge.” ) Rehearing was not 
sought by the petitioner, but these proceedings were in­
stituted seeking certiorari.

ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT’S HANDLING OF THIS CASE 
IS JUSTIFIED BY THE FACTS.

As the foregoing factual discussion demonstrates, the 
handling of this case and its sister cases can hardly be 
characterized as “ inaction.” Petitioner’s ad hominem at - 1 2

1 This position is somewhat anomalous in light of opposition by 
plaintiffs’ counsel to expansion of the class.

2 Petitioner contends in his statement of the “ Question Pre­
sented” that an answer was “ directed.” This is a misstatement. 
Moreover, it is unfair to criticize Judge Lawrence’s failure to re­
spond to the petition when Chief Judge Brown had already informed 
Mr. Greenberg that Judge Lawrence bore a “ tremendous caseload.” 
The mandamus proceeding would be yet another such case.



7

tacks upon the trial court cannot be allowed to obscure 
the fact that plaintiff English, as well as the hundreds 
of black employees of SCL who formerly held seniority 
in Group 2 of the clerical craft, had full opportunity to 
bid on former Group 1 positions since merger of the two 
groups effective March 1, 1973, and to utilize hire-date1 
seniority to do so. The docket entries for the time period 
since trial in English fill more than a page, while Hayes 
and Hamilton, both of which are parallel and overlapping 
actions, fill some six pages more. [See A-18 and A-19].

Petitioner’s argument strays far from, the mark in ac­
cusing the trial court of “a substantial nullification of 
Title VII in the Southern District of Georgia.” The con­
trast between Hall v. West, 335 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1964), 
and the facts here before the court is striking: Hall is 
one of a host of judicial opinions arising from the “mass­
ive resistance” campaign against school desegregation in 
Louisiana.3 The complaint in Hall V. St. Helena Parish 
School Board was filed a year1 before this Court’s deci­
sion in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), yet no hearings were held for ten years. 
This total lack of judicial action caused the Fifth Circuit 
to conclude that the “drastic and extraordinary remedy” 
of mandamus was necessary to compel the district court 
to order injunctive relief to disestablish the dual system 
of schools in the parish.

English is a different case: no injunction is now neces­
sary, because injunctive relief has been granted, there 
is no more Group 1/Group 2 division, and the BRAG 
lodges have been unified. All that remains to be deter­
mined is back pay claims and attorneys’ fees. Numerous 
hearings have been held, and no less than ten orders

3 Petitioners’ attorneys Greenberg and Nabrit, having been coun­
sel of record in all the Louisiana cases, are fully aware of the fac­
tual distinctions between Hill and the case at bar.



8

have issued in the EnglisEHayes-Hamilton trilogy since 
trial on the merits in English.

That Judge Lawrence follows the law in Civil Rights, 
matters can be ascertained for example by reference to 
the record in Stell V. Board of Public Education4— in 
which petitioner’s counsel represented the plaintiff.* 5

As Judge Lawrence observed in Garan, Inc. v. Roydon 
Wear, Inc., Civil No. 374-11 (S.D. Ga. 1974) at p. 3, 
n,3, the trial court is twenty-fourth, among all districts 
in the Nation in terms of civil filings per judge. An over­
whelming proportion of these are cases required to be 
“ expedited” or “given highest priority.”  This category 
of cases encompasses cases, arising under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, 1871, 1957, 1964, and 1968; actions pur­
suant to the Consumer Credit Protection Act; cases seek­
ing injunctive relief; in rem actions in admiralty; pray­
ers. for the convening of a three-judge court; various 
administrative appeals; school desegregation cases; and 
habeas corpus actions. During 1973 and 1974, Judge 
Lawrence issued at least 141 written opinions in. such 
expedited cases, not to mention the additional category 
of criminal cases which must be given priority due to 
the constitutional mandate of speedy trial.

It may further be observed that petitioner’s counsel 
appear as counsel of record in thirteen cases in the Sa­
vannah Division alone which have been filed subsequent 
to the English trial; only one of these (Munn v. Seaboard 
Coast Line R.R., an FELA action) is not a case which

i See, inter alia, 334 F.Supp. 909 (S.D. Ga. 1971); 446 F.2d 904 
(5th Cir. 1971), stay denied; 450 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1971).

5 During the course of Stell, Judge Lawrence was hung in effigy, 
attacked in the press, subjected to harassment both on the bench 
and at his home, and burdened by a wide variety of efforts to cir­
cumvent the mandate of Swann V. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).



9

must be expedited. Thus, in effect, petitioner’s counsel 
offer no- constructive solution to the trial court’s burden, 
but instead visit upon that court yet an additional im­
position via these proceedings.

Having remedied petitioner’s complaint with injunc­
tive relief, the trial court apparently feels that further 
orders are of less consequence in English than in cases 
yet unresolved. Nor is it accurate that the district court 
“ has not indicated when, or whether, the case will ever 
be decided;” at a hearing on April 15, 1975, concerning 
SCL’s pending motion for expansion of the class, Judge 
Lawrence again reiterated his intention to render deci­
sion in English imminently [A-20]. With trial set to 
commence in Boles v. Union Camp Corp. in early June,6 
it is difficult to determine what time is available for the 
court to devote to opinion writing; nonetheless, it seems 
apparent that time occupied in responding to letters; and 
petitions would further delay decision rather than serv­
ing to “ expedite the case in every way.”

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING PETITIONER’S APPLICATION FOR 
MANDAMUS.

Petitioner asserts; that the extraordinary relief de­
manded by him from the Court of Appeals; was mandated 
by the “ expediting” provisions of the 1972 Amendments 
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and by the 
All Writs Act. A  simple reading of the former evidences 
its total lack of applicability to the case at bar; hence, 
the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, is the only statutory 
authority for the relief prayed.

6 Another Title VII case filed by counsel for petitioner, Civil No. 
2804 (S.D. Ga)._ Rumor has it that this case may have been settled 
in part, but plaintiff’s counsel have refused to inform SCL’s coun­
sel as to the accuracy of that rumor.



10

However, as this Court cautioned in Platt v. Minnesota 
Min. & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245 (1964), “ extraordi­
nary writs are reserved for really extraordinary causes,” 
quoting, Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947). And 
as further observed in Wills V. United States, 389 U.S. 
90 (1967), the familiarity of a court of appeals with the 
practice of individual district courts within its circuit 
is relevant to the assessment for the need for mandamus. 
In response to the petition below, SCL pointed out that 
none of the four cases relied upon by petitioner 7 could 
be read to support the proposition that mandamus is 
available “ to compel a federal district judge to make a 
decision on the merits of his case.”

BRAC’s response cogently set forth the need for a 
petitioner to make “ a strong showing of the necessity for 
such relief,” 8 9 also noting that mandamus, is available 
“ only where there are exceptional circumstances amount­
ing to a judicial usurpation of power.” ® Now, before 
this Court, petitioner has. abandoned his reliance upon 
all of the cases previously cited except Kawato and 
Schwab (included in a thirteen-case string citation which 
lists only one decision rendered within the last twenty- 
four years), and instead contends that there are four 
controlling authorities: Judge Parker’s statements to a 
Congressional Committee; Hall v. West, 335 F.2d 481

7 Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942), Czuzka v. Rifkind, 160 
F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1947), United States v. Hall, 145 F.2d 781 (9th 
Cir. 1944), and Schwab v. Coleman, 145 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1944)— 
all of which were decided prior to amendment of the All Writs Act 
in 1949.

8 Citing, Stewart v. West, 449 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1971).
9 Wills v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967); Zerilli v. Thornton, 

428 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1970). See also, Electrical & Musical In­
dustries, Ltd. v. Walsh, 249 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1957); Note, Super­
visory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 Harv. 
L. Rev. 595 (1973) ; Bell, The Federal Appellate Courts and the All 
Writs Act, 23 Sw. L. J. 858 (1969).



11

(5th Cir. 1964); Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Comstock, 83 
U.S. (16 Wall.) 258 (1873); and Ex parte Newman, 81 
U.S. (14 Wall.) 152 (1872). None of these control the 
issues sub judice.

This Court’s decisions in Knickerbocker in 1873 and 
in Newman in 1872 likewise fail to support petitioner’s 
argument. In Knickerbocker, the district court conducted 
a, jury trial in a bankruptcy action; the company was 
adjudged bankrupt, whereupon its appeal to the Circuit 
Court was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Since the 
Circuit Court had not passed upon the company’s objec­
tions, mandamus was deemed proper but the writ of error 
was dismissed. In granting mandamus, this Court was 
exercising its inherent powers to issue an order com­
pelling the appellate court to act; it was not, as peti­
tioner here seeks, ordering the appellate court to redeter­
mine issues already resolved against the petitioner.

Newman, conversely, denied mandamus110 the quota­
tion included by petitioner conveniently omits the entire 
ratio decidendi of that case: that the Supreme Court 
will not undertake second-hand direction of actions of a 
trial court which have already been reviewed by the 
Court of Appeals. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 169-170.

Hall has been fully discussed supra, and is clearly in­
applicable to the case at bar. Judge Parker’s testimony91 
simply states that where mandamus is sought the Court 
of Appeals is empowered to act should the facts presented 
justify appellate intervention; it does not, even taken 
out of context in the manner adopted by petitioner, sup­
port the proposition that this Court should intervene after 
the Court of Appeals has seen no need to do so.

10 The opinions in both Knickerbocker and Newman were written 
by Mr. Justice Clifford.

11 Quoted in petitioner’s petition at p. 11.



12

III. PETITIONER HAS SHOWN NO GROUNDS SUF­
FICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE GRANTING OF HIS 
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

The hurdle before petitioner is far higher than he 
would admit: not only must it be shown that mandamus 
was required by the facts as presented to the Court of 
Appeals, but also it must appear that the Court of Ap­
peals “has so far sanctioned a departure from the ac­
cepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to 
call for an exercise of this Court’s power of supervision.” 
Cf., Banker’s Life & Cos. Co. V. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 
(1953), and Rule 19, S.CT.Rules.

In order that this Court could reach such a determina­
tion, it is submitted that a review of the record below 
would be mandated (as is in fact contemplated by Rule 
21(1) of the Court); such a withdrawal of the record 
would delay, rather than expedite, the trial court’s deci­
sion.

CONCLUSION

Thus, petitioner must, in order to secure a writ of 
certiorari, establish the following prerequisites: 1

(1) it must be shown that the trial court’s failure to 
issue a decision was wholly unjustified; (2) it must be 
determined that this delay was so exceptional as to con­
stitute a judicial usurpation of power; (3) it must ap­
pear that the denial of mandamus by the Court of Ap­
peals was a clear and apparent abuse of that court’s 
discretion; and (4) such an abuse of discretion must be 
a departure from the accepted and usual course of judi­
cial proceedings which is so flagrant that this Court 
should step in in a supervisory capacity to order the 
Court of Appeals to order the trial court to issue an 
order to provide relief which has already been provided.



13

Petitioner has failed to satisfy the Court of Appeals 
as to points (1) and (2), and has not set forth any alle­
gations sufficient to meet tests (3) and (4). Conse­
quently, the petition for writ of certiorari should be 
denied.

Respectfully submitted,

John W. Weldon 
Edward A. Charron 
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 

Company
500 Water Street 
Jacksonville, Florida 32202

Hunter, Houlihan, Maclean, 
Exley, Dunn & Connerat, P. C. 

Malcolm R. Maclean 
Charles A. Edwards

Post Office Box 9848 
Savannah, Georgia 31402



A PP E N D IX



la

tH 9936] Lorenzo Hayes et al., Plaintiffs v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al, Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of 
Georgia, Savannah Division. Civil No. 2371. December 
9, 1968.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964
Employment Discrimination Suit— EEOC Conciliation 

Efforts as Prerequisite to Suit— Adjudication Under Rail­
way Labor Act as Prerequisite to Suit— In a suit alleg­
ing that a railroad engaged in racial discrimination 
against certain Negro employees, the court reserved 
judgment, pending determinations in other court cases, 
on the question of whether efforts at conciliation by the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission were a pre­
requisite to the right to maintain a suit. The court also 
reserved judgment as to whether exhaustion of remedies 
under the Railway Labor Act was a prerequisite to a 
suit for racial discrimination under Title VII of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act.

Employment Discrimination Suit— Back Pay— Right to 
Jury Trial.— A railroad was not entitled to a jury trial 
to determine whether or not back pay should be awarded 
to Negro employees alleging racial discrimination on 
the part of the railroad. A  contention that proper pro­
cedure would require a jury trial for the back pay phase 
of the case and a bench trial with respect to the dis­
crimination issue was rejected on the grounds that such 
proceedings would thwart the will of Congress and frus­
trate the purposes of the legislation. It is for the court 
to determine the issue of discrimination and to award 
back pay if appropriate.

Employment Discrimination Suit— Back Pay— Propriety 
of Award to Members of Class Who Filed No Grievance

APPENDIX 1



2a

with EEOC.— In an employment discrimination suit, the 
court reserved judgment, pending rulings in other court 
cases, with respect to the issue of whether individual 
members of a class of complainants who had not filed 
individual grievances with the EEOC were entitled to 
back pay.

Employment Discrimination Suit— Timeliness of Suit— 
Interrogatories.— A motion by a railroad to dismiss a 
suit for employment discrimination on the ground that 
the suit was not timely filed in accordance with statutory 
requirements was dismissed where evidence indicated that 
the suit was timely filed. A motion to require the rail­
road to answer certain interrogatories before the com­
plaining parties answered the railroad’s interrogatories 
was denied.

Bobby L. Hill, E. H. Gadsden, Savannah, Georgia and 
Jack Greenberg, New York, New York, for Plaintiff.

Malcolm Maclean and Adams, Adams, Brennan & 
Gardner, Savannah, Georgia, for Defendant.

[Issues]

Lawrence, D. J .: Counsel for plaintiffs and the em­
ployer have filed helpful briefs. They are in sharp 
dispute on several fronts through the four main theatres 
of conflict appear to be:

1. Is “ a real endeavor” at mediation on the part of 
the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission a con­
dition precedent to the institution of a suit against an 
employer charged with racial discrimination?

2. Does the controversy over the alleged maintenance 
of a racially segregated and dual system of jobs and 
lines of progression belong before the National Media­
tion Board rather than the District Court?



3a

3. Is defendant the Railroad entitled to a jury trial 
on the issue of back pay to plaintiffs (and the class they 
represent) in the amount that would have been earned 
in absence of racial discrimination?

4. Is back pay awardable to members of a class who 
filed no individual grievance with the EEOC?

I. Does this Court lack jurisdiction because EEOC 
made no effort to mediate plaintiffs’ claim of discrimina­
tion?

If the Congress had made a deliberate effort at am­
biguity in lawmaking, it could hardly have succeeded 
better than in the instance of 42 U.S.C., § 2000e-5(a). 
The controversy in this Court is but an extension of the 
dichotomy of viewpoint in Congress on whether an at­
tempt by the Commission to secure voluntary compliance 
by an employer must precede litigation by the discrimi- 
natee. The courts have been just as sharply divided as 
Senators Javits and Ervin on this issue.* Cases which 
hold that Commission action is indispensable to jurisdic­
tion include Dent V. St. Louis—San Francisco Railway 
Co., [55 LC IT 9047] 265 F.Supp. 56; Mickel v. South 
Carolina State Employment Service, (4th Cir.), [55 LC 
U 9057] 377 F.2d 239 (and subsequently 57 LC [[9111).

On the other hand and directly to the contrary there 
are Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Company [58 LC T[ 9162] 
(7th Cir.) No. 16700, October 17, 1968; Johnson v. Sea­
board Coast Line Railroad (4th Cir.) [59 LC [[9177] 
No. 12154, October 29, 1968; Mondy v. Crown Zellerbach,

* Senator Ervin: “ . . . the aggrieved party cannot sue in the 
Federal Courts unless the commission . . . fails to adjust the mat­
ter by conciliation.”

Senator Javits: “ . . . that [conciliation] is not a condition prece­
dent to the action of taking a defendant into court.”  Quoted from 
Johnson V. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, [59 LC [[ 9177] 4th Cir., 
October 29, 1968.



4a

[56 LC H 9082] 271 F.Supp. 258 (E.D. La. 1967); Moody 
v. Albemarle Paper Co., [56 LC If 9070] 271 F.Supp. 27 
(E.D. N.C. 1967); Evenson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 
[55 LC H9053] 268 F.Supp. 29 (E.D. Va. 1967); Quarles 
V. Philip Morris, Inc., [55 LC 1} 9054] 271 F.Supp. 842 
(E.D. Va. 1967); Pena v. Hunt Tool Company, 58 LC 
1j 9123 (S.C. Tex. 1968); Wheeler v. Bohn Aluminum and 
Brass Company, [58 LC H 9137] 68 LRRM 2769 (W.D. 
Mich. 1968).

I am tempted to follow the majority viewpoint on this 
issue. However, since counsel advise me that the Dent 
case is now before the Fifth Circuit where it was 
argued some time ago I will reserve judgment until a 
decision in that case is handed down.

II. Is the controversy here one that must be adjudi­
cated under the Railroad Labor Act rather than in this 
Court?

Contending that it is, counsel for the Railroad lean 
heavily on Norman v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 58 LC 
U 9144. It was held in that case that a District Court 
is without jurisdiction to require all Negro employees 
in the train porter craft to be placed in the class of 
brakemen. In so holding the District Judge cited Howard 
v. St. Louis—San Francisco Railway Co., [53 LC H 9021] 
361 F.2d 905 where it was said that only the Mediation 
Board is empowered to make craft determinations.

Plaintiffs’ counsel assert that Norman “ stands alone in 
requiring exhaustion of non-Title VII avenues before re­
sort to relief under Title VII can be pursued” . They 
cite Dent V. St. Louis—San Francisco Railway, supra, 
where it held that a collective bargaining effort before 
the Railroad Adjustment Board is not a prerequisite to 
suit by aggrieved employees under Title VII.



5a

The Court here is not asked to reclassify crafts in the 
railroad industry but to rectify racial discrimination 
against Negroes as individuals within a craft. My in­
clination is to follow Dent. However, I will reserve de­
cision for a reasonable time pending disposition of the 
appeal in Dent. Certainly a decision should be forth­
coming shortly.

III. The Motion to Strike Defendant’s Demand for a 
Jury Trial on Issue of Back Pay

In its answer SCL prays for a jury trial on the issue 
of back pay. Plaintiff moved to strike the demand and 
to have the case placed on the non-jury calendar.

The Railroad argues that Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. 
500, and Dairy Queen 369 U.S. 465 require a jury trial 
on the issue of plaintiffs’ prayer for back pay. It con­
tends that where legal and equitable causes conjoin the 
legal issues are determinable by a jury and the presence 
of the equitable feature does not deprive a party of the 
right thereto. Citing Darkless V. Sweeny Independent 
School District, [57 LC 119121] 278 F.Supp. 632 (S.D. 
Tex., 1968), in which back pay was asked by Negro 
school teachers seeking reinstatement, they assert con­
fidently the right to jury trial in the present case.

On their part, plaintiffs say that to warrant a jury 
trial the claim must be of such a nature as would entitle 
a party to a jury at the time of the adoption of the 
Seventh Amendment. United States v. Louisiana, 339 
U.S. 699, 706; NLRB V. Jones & Laughlm Steel Corp. 
[1 LC 1117,017] 301 U.S. 1; Wirtz v. Jones, [51 LC 
IT 31,665] 340 F.2d 901. It is their further contention 
that the complaint involves the equity jurisdiction and 
powers of the Court and that as such a court may award 
money damages on an integral part of the decree so that 
complete relief may be had. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S.



6a

323, 338; Smith v. Hampton Training School for Nurses, 
[53 LC [[9019] 360 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir.). They point 
out that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated 
that Beacon Theatres, Dairy Queen and Thermo-Stitch 
(294 F.2d 486) do not “convert any money request” 
in injunction cases “ into a money claim triable by jury” . 
See Swofford v. B. & W ., Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 414.

The effect of the Seventh Amendment on Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 § 2000e-5(g)) has pro­
duced the usual clash of conflicting philosophies concern­
ing interpretation.

SCL contends that the gist of the action is the relief 
sought by plaintiffs in the way of back pay in the form 
of money damages and that injunctive relief is merely 
incidental to this legal, jury-triable issue. I disagree.

This case comes into this Court under Title VII and 
the gravamen of the complaint is injunctive and declara­
tory relief against racial discrimination in employment 
affecting plaintiffs and the class. Back pay is one of the 
modes of relief that a court can grant.

Certainly this appears to be the understanding of 
Congress as reflected by 42 § 2000e-5(g). The language 
of that section is:

“ If the Court finds that the respondent has in­
tentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging 
in an unlawful employment practice charged in the 
complaint, the Court may enjoin the respondent from 
engaging in such unlawful employment practice and 
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, 
which may include reinstatement or hiring of em­
ployees, with or without back pay (payable by the 
employer, employment agency, or labor organization, 
as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful em­
ployment practice).”



7a

Defendant maintained on oral argument that the proper 
procedure in this case would be to try the back pay 
or money judgment phase before a jury and then for the 
Court to proceed to decide whether racial discrimination 
exists in employment practices and whether defendant 
should be enjoined. To give such direction to Title VII 
cases would, in my view, thwart the will of Congress 
and to an extent frustrate the purposes of the legisla­
tion. Further and alternatively, it is hard to conceive 
of a more chaotic method of district court handling 
of an EEC case than for the judge to hold a non-jury 
trial, as he must, on the racial discrimination charges 
under the injunctive and declaratory relief features and 
thereafter refer to a jury the issue of back pay after a 
repetition of the same evidence.

The duty of the Court to enjoin discrimination where 
it finds unlawful employment practices to exist is un- 
raveably intertwined with the resulting money loss to a 
particular employee. Unequal opportunity in job clas­
sifications and in promotions, the establishment of new 
seniority list, dealing with historically segregated de­
partments, the equalization of pay in separate job clas­
sifications but comparable w ork -in  all of this a jury 
is at best ill-equipped to make determinations of so 
sophisticated issues involving so complicated computations.

What plaintiffs contend concerning jury trials under 
Title VII seems to be the view of most of the courts 
confronted with jury demands in back pay issues. Cases 
in which jury trial was denied include Anthony v. Brooks, 
67 LRRM 2897 [56 LC U 9090] (N.D. Ga., Sept. 18,
1967); Banks v. Local 136, C.A. 68-598 (N.D. Ala., 
January 29, 1967) and Lea v. Cone Mills, C.A. C-176- 
D-66 (M.D. N.C., March 25, 1968).*

* Quarles V. Philip Morris, [57 LC ff 9101] 279 F.Supp. 505 (E.D. 
Va., 1968) gives some idea of the complicated task that would 
confront a jury in ascertaining right to back pay and the amount 
thereof.



8a

If these decisions and 42-2000 e-5(g) of Title VII 
do not give due deference to the Seventh Amendment s 
preservation of the right of jury trial “ in Suits at 
common law” , higher courts will soon begin to inform 
me. I am of the opinion that denial thereof does not 
contravene the Constitution and therefore strike the de­
mand. Jones & Laughlin, suprct, and Mitchell v. DeMario 
Jewelry, Inc., [39 LC Tf 66,108] 361 U.S. 288 seem to 
tell me that I am not wrong in doing so.

IV. Is hack pay awardable to members of a class who 
filed no individual grievance with the EEOC?

SCL has moved to strike the plaintiffs’ prayer for back 
pay as it relates to members of the class on the ground 
that no complaint by them was made to EEOC and that, 
absent grievance procedures under Title VII, money 
awards cannot be made in this Court.

Here, again, we have conflicting interpretations. Bowe
V. Colgate-Palmolive Co., [56 LC It 9069] 272 F.Supp. 
332 (N.D. 111., 1968) indicates that without filing a 
grievance with EEOC there can be no back pay recovery. 
In Quarles V. Philip Morris, Inc., supra, pay adjust­
ment was allowed to a member of the class who had 
neither filed a charge with the Commission or intervened 
in the District Court action.

Judicial determination of the meaning of Title VII 
in this as well as in other areas is in flux. There is no 
necessity of meeting the issue at this time. While I 
have an inherent distaste for awarding sums of money 
to anonymous plaintiffs I will not at this stage translate 
predilection into decision but will reserve judgment in 
the hope that before the discovery procedures in this 
case are completed there will be a more compelling body 
of decisional law on the subject. Jenkins and Oatis are 
not determinative of the particular issue. It will be



9a

helpful if counsel will keep me informed of developments 
m the particular area of law.

V. I will consider now some of the grounds of con­
troversy by SCL’s motions to dismiss. Grounds 8-11 in­
volve the issue of timeliness under Title VII. According 
to a statement of counsel for plaintiffs at the oral argu­
ment, the action was brought within 30 days after receipt 
of written notice by the Commission of failure to obtain 
voluntary compliance. I assume that this announcement 
satisfies the Railroad. Accordingly, I overrule the mo­
tion to dismiss as to that ground.

Related motions are based on the claim of plaintiffs’ 
non-compliance with the requirements that the discrimina­
tion charge must be filed within 90 days of the practice 
complained of, the complaint filed within 180 days after 
such practice and more than 60 days after the filing 
of the charges with EEOC. The several motions ad­
dressed to such defects are overruled. Except in the 
case of the 30-day requirement, the time provisions under 
Title VII are generally held by the courts to be directory 
rather than mandatory. See Bent V. St. Louis, supra; 
Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, supra; Pullen 
V. Otis Elevator Company, 58 LC U 9133 (N.D. Ga.,
1968) ; Harris v. Orkin Exterminating Inc., 58 LC ft 9134 
(N.D. Ga., 1968); Kendricks v. American Bakery Co., 
58 LC 9146 (N.D. Ga., 1968).

VI. Class Action Feature

Under Rule 23 the court is required as soon as prac­
ticable to determine whether a class action is maintain­
able and to specify the class represented and to provide 
(here, pursuant to Rule 23 ( b) (3 ) )  for notice to its 
members. In a statement made during the argument coun­
sel for plaintiffs limit the class to Negro employees of the 
SCL at Savannah. I specify that the class represented



10a

by plaintiffs will include Negro employees at or near 
Savannah who belong to or are eligible for membership 
in either of the two local defendant Brotherhoods by 
reason of job classification. A form of notice and the 
manner of giving same will be presented for my con­
sideration by counsel.

VII. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Obtain Discovery Priority

On September 3, 1968, SCL served interrogatories and 
on October 21st the defendant unions directed interroga­
tories to plaintiffs. On November 15th the latter served 
interrogatories on SCL and at the same time they moved 
that the defendants be required to answer first although 
they were served last. The ground of the motion is that 
plaintiffs’ proof will come necessarily from defendants 
and that information as to segregated job classifications 
and the unions is exclusively within the knowledge of 
defendants.

It is perhaps true that much of the information sought 
in defendants’ interrogatories is already known to them. 
At the same time, a number of the questions (from casual 
inspection) are answerable by plaintiffs. They should do 
so on the basis of information readily available. If they 
are unable to answer some of these interrogatories it 
would raise serious doubt in my mind as to their being 
entitled to represent the class.

Plaintiffs’ motion for priority is denied and they are 
required to answer defendants’ interrogatories to the 
extent practicable and as soon as practicable.

VIII. Motion of SCL to Strike Allegation in 
Paragraph VIII of the Complaint

The defendant railroad moves to strike the allegation 
that the union bargaining contracts require it to give 
preference to sons of employers in the selection of ap­



11a

prentices. An affidavit by an officer of SCL disputes 
the existence of any such provision in the contracts. I 
do not think this issue can properly be resolved on motion 
to strike. I could treat the motion as one for partial 
summary subject and will do so unless plaintiffs in rea­
sonable time delete the allegation by amendment after 
satisfying themselves of the non-existence of the disputed 
contractual provisions. IX.

IX. Motion to Substitute Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
Company for the Two Railroad Defendants Who 

Have Merged

This motion as well as the amendment in that con­
nection is allowed.



[jf 9953] Lorenzo Hayes et al., Plaintiffs v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of 
Georgia, Savannah Division. Civil No. 2371. January 
14, 1969.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964
Employment Discrimination Suit— EEOC Conciliation 

Efforts as Prerequisite to Suit— Adjudication Under Rail­
way Labor Act as Prerequisite to Suit.— In a suit alleg­
ing that a railroad engaged in racial discrimination 
against certain Negro employees, a “ real endeavor” by 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to con­
ciliate the dispute was not a prerequisite to suit. More­
over, exhaustion of collective bargaining procedures un­
der the Railway Labor Act also was not a prerequisite to 
the suit.

Employment Discrimination Suit— Class Action— No­
tice to Members of Class.— A complaining employee 
properly represented a class of Negro employees of a 
railroad who belong to or were eligible for membership 
in a labor union. In addition, notice to all members of 
the class represented in the suit was required. Such no­
tice would not be futile since the class, was identifiable. 
Moreover, notice was considered by the court to be of value, 
since the litigation would affect the jobs of the class mem­
bers.

Issuing order supplementing decision in (DC Ga. 1968) 
1 EPD I] 9936.

Bobby L. Hill, and E. H. Gadsden, Savannah, Georgia, 
and Jack Greenberg, New York, New York, for Plain­
tiffs.

Adams, Adams, Brennan, Jay Gardner and Malcolm 
Maclean, Savannah, Georgia.

12a

APPENDIX 2



13a
✓

Lawrence, D. J .: In the order of this Court dated 
December 9, 1968 judgment was reserved on the issue 
of whether “ real endeavor” by the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission to mediate the grievance is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite for Federal Court actions by 
aggrieved employees under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. While I was tempted at the time to follow 
Choate V. Caterpillar Tractor Company [58 LC f[ 9162] 
(7th Cir.) No. 16700, October 17, 1968 and Johnson 
V. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad [59 LC f[ 9177] (4th 
Cir.) No. 12154, October 29, 1968, I decided to await the 
ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
in the appeal in James C. Dent and United States Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission v. St. Louis-San 
Francisco Railway Company, et al., [55 LC If 9047] 265 
F.Supp. 56.

That decision has now been handed down. The Court 
of Appeals for this Circuit says that “ a plain reading 
of the statute does not justify the conclusion that, as a 
jurisdictional requirement for a civil action by the ag­
grieved employee under Section 706(e), the Commission 
must actually attempt and engage in conciliation.”  See 
Dent, No. 24810 and two similar appeals consolidated 
with it, decided January 8, 1969. I

I now overrule ground 2 of Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss.

I also held up my decision in respect to Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that this Court is 
without jurisdiction because of non-exhaustion by plain­
tiffs of administrative remedies under the Railroad Labor 
Act. I had mistakenly supposed that this issue which 
was decided adversely to the defendant in Dent by the 
District Judge was involved in the appeal in that case. 
Under the circumstances, I rule that collective bargaining 
procedures before the Railroad Adjustment Board are



14a

not a requisite to suit by employees against the railroad 
under Title VII. Ground 3 of Defendant’s Motion to 
Dismiss is therefore overruled.

Class Action Notice

In the order of this Court dated December 9, 1968, 
I specified that plaintiffs properly represent a class con­
sisting of all Negro employees of the defendant Railroad 
at or near Savannah who belong to or are eligible for 
membership in either of the two local defendant Brother­
hoods. I directed counsel for defendants to present a 
form of notice and a suggested manner of giving same in 
accordance with Rule 23(b) (3).

Plaintiffs have moved to alter and amend the order so 
as to designate the class action as one unde”  23(b) (2). 
The result would be that no notice to the members would 
be required.*

At the time I ruled in respect to the class that the 
plaintiffs represent in this case I was aware that the 
action was brought pursuant to Rule 23(b) (2). I was 
also aware that the existence of questions of law or fact 
common to the members is alleged and that the prayers 
of the complaint include one for grant of back pay to 
the class.

I agree with the statement in the able memorandum 
filed on behalf of plaintiffs on this question that the 
allegations “abundantly meet all of the requirements of 
Rule 23(b) (2 ).” According to the Advisory Committee 
report, the reach of that sub-paragraph is illustrated 
by actions in the Civil Rights field when a defendant is 
charged with discrimination against a class whose mem­

* However, under Rule 23 the court may in any appropriate in­
stance enter orders requiring- notice to members of the class so 
that they may signify whether they consider the representation 
adequate and, if desired, intervene in the action. See 23(d)(2).



15a

bers are not easily capable of specific enumeration. See 
Jenkins V. United Gas Corporation, [58 LC ft 9154,] 400 
F.2d 28, 34. Here, the members of the specified class 
are not only capable of identification but are relatively 
small in number. I do not think (b ) (2) is intended to 
apply where the existence of racial discrimination may 
require varying solutions by the court under different 
factual situations as to employees. Final relief herein, 
for all I know, may predominantly involve the issue of 
money damages. In such cases (b) (2) non-notice is in­
appropriate. At least, that is the way I read the Ad­
visory Committee notes as to amended Rule 23.

I gathered at the oral argument that one of the chief 
complaints of plaintiffs concerning requirement of notice 
to the class specified is that it would be an exercise in 
futility. I disagree. I think notice to members of an 
identifiable, unnumerous class may be salutary and of 
value. I do not foresee any possible harm or hurt flowing 
from notice. I cannot understand the apparent reluctance 
of plaintiffs to let non-party employees know that litiga­
tion which may affect their jobs, including higher pay 
and promotion, is in progress. A disclosed rather than 
a secretive agency is preferable in such eases.

I therefore adhere to my original order specifying the 
class representation and providing for notice to members. 
In an area of law so shifting and unstable courts must 
feel their way. My order is, of course, alterable at any 
time prior to decision on the merits under Rule 23(c) 
( 1 ) .

In the alternative, plaintiffs have moved, pursuant to 
Title 28, § 1292(b), for certification for the purpose of 
an interlocutory appeal on this issue. In such a case the 
Court must find that an immediate appeal may materially 
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Being 
of the definite view that an interlocutory appeal upon



16a

the matter of (b) (3) notice to the class would have an 
opposite effect plaintiffs’ motion for certification of the 
issue is denied.

Similarly, the motion by Seaboard Coast Line to certify 
the jury question for immediate interlocutory appeal is 
denied. I am confident that by the time we get down to 
a hearing on the merits in this case the jury issue 
feature under Title VII will have been authoritatively 
dealt with on higher levels.



17a

[ft 8170;] Lorenzo Hayes et al., Plaintiffs v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District Georgia, 
Savannah Division. Civil No. 2371. April 9, 1971.

Railway Labor Act— Racial Discrimination
Seniority Rights— Parties to Suit— Union Representa­

tion— Class of Employees Affected.— An action brought 
by certain Negro employees against their employer and 
their bargaining representative claiming racial discrimina­
tion in employment opportunities is stayed to permit the 
joinder, as indispensable parties, of those white em­
ployees whose seniority rights would be affected by the 
relief sought and whose interests could not fairly and 
adequately be represented by the bargaining representa­
tive which had an equal duty to represent the complain­
ing employees.

Denying motion to dismiss for failure to join indis­
pensable parties (DC Ga. 1968) 1 EPD U 9936, 59 LC 
IT 9179, which was supplemented by order in (DC Ga.
1969) 1 EPD H 9953, 59 LC fl 9196, 46 F.R.D. 49.

Bobby L. Hill, Savannah, Georgia, for Plaintiffs.
Malcom. Maclean, Connerat, Dunn, Hunter, Houlihan, 

Maclean & Exley, P. C., Savannah, Georgia, for Defendant 
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company.

Pratt Adams, Savannah, Georgia, for Defendant Rail­
way and Steamship Clerks, Locals 1338 and 1587.

Lawrence, Ch. J .: Lorenzo Hayes, Smith B. Hamil­
ton, Godfrey M. Davis, Willie Campbell, Uley Hamilton 
and Lee H. Stephens, individually and on behalf of others 
similarly situated, are Negro employees of the Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company. They filed this class

APPENDIX 3



18a

action against their employer and against the Brother­
hood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, 
Express and Station Employees, Local #1338, BRAG, 
and Local #1587, BRAG, defendants, charging discrimi­
nation by the defendants. The complaint seeks an in­
junction, declaratory judgment, back pay, costs and at­
torneys’ fees.

The defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company 
filed a “Motion To Dismiss For Failure To Join Indis­
pensable Parties”  on October 14, 1970, alleging that 
there should be joined in this action “ those individual 
clerks employed by defendant Seaboard Coast Line whose 
seniority will be adversely affected by the relief de­
manded by plaintiffs.

Reference to the complaint discloses that to grant the 
prayers of plaintiffs’ complaint would require a judgment 
which would affect the seniority rights of the white 
employees.

In Banks v. SCL, et al, [3 EPD fl 8059,] 51 F.R.D. 
304 (1970), the Court held:

“ Since any order or judgment rendered in this 
case in favor of plaintiff and the class for which he 
sues would under plaintiff’s allegations place plaintiff 
and others in a higher possition of seniority than they 
are now enjoying, the judgment would necessarily 
change the status of the white employees in whose 
favor the alleged discrimination exists.

“ The Brotherhood has an equal duty to represent 
those members comprising the class which plaintiff 
represents as well as the white employees whose 
interest would be realigned by any order granting 
relief to plaintiff. It thus appears that the white 
employees’ interest is not the same as the Brother­
hood’s and that the Brotherhood cannot fairly and 
adequately represent the interest of the class.”



19a

The proper remedy for the lack of “ indispensable 
parties” is the joinder of those persons as parties de­
fendant. This Motion to Dismiss by the Seaboard Coast 
Line Railroad Company therefore will not be granted, 
but rather, as suggested by the plaintiffs, the action will 
be stayed until such time as the plaintiffs file an amend­
ment naming as respondent one or more of the white 
employees included in said class, whereupon this Court 
will pass an order pursuant to Rule 23(a) (c) providing 
for service upon said class to show cause why they 
should not be joined as respondents.

The defendant railroad filed a “ Second Motion to Dis­
miss For Failure to Join An Indispensable Party” on 
February 1, 1971. Carefully considering it and the at­
tached affidavit of A. S. Hubert, it is the Court’s opinion 
that what is sought to be presented is evidence that the 
defendant railroad inherited the classification relative to 
two of the plaintiffs and that it is a bona fide seniority 
system. Viewing it in this light, the Court overrules the 
motion without prejudicing the Seaboard Coast Line Rail­
road Company’s right to present such facts at the trial.



20a

['ll 8320] Lorenzo Hayes et al., Petitioners v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al., Respondents.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Misc. 
No. 2145. August 20, 1971.

On Application for Leave to' Appeal from, an Inter­
locutory Order of United States District Court, Southern 
District of Georgia, Savannah Division.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964

Seniority Rights— Court Action— Indispensable Parties 
— Time for Appeal.— Leave to appeal from an order re­
lating to a question of making white employees affected 
by relief sought parties to the action must be denied for 
lack of timely filing.

Denying leave to appeal from (DC Ga. 1971) 3 EPD 
IF 8170, which issued following rulings in (DC Ga. 1968) 
1 EPD IT 9936, 59 LC IT 9179, and (DC Ga. 1968) 1 EPD 
IT 9953, 59 LC If 9196, 46 F.R.D. 49.

Fletcher Farrington, Hill, Jones & Farrington, for 
Petitioners.

Edward Charron, and Charles Edwards and Malcolm 
Maclean, Connerat, Dunn, Hunter, Houlihan, Maclean & 
Exley, P. C., Savannah, Georgia, for Respondent Sea­
board Coast Line R, R. Co.

A. Pratt Adams, Adams, Adams, Brennan & Gardner, 
Savannah, Georgia, and James L. Highsaw, Highsaw & 
Mahoney, Washington, D. C., for Respondent Brother­
hood of Steamship and Railway Clerks, Freight Handlers, 
Express and Station Employees.

Before Brown, Chief Judge, Ingraham and Roney, 
Circuit Judges.

APPENDIX 4



21a

Per Curiam : It is ordered that leave to appeal from 
the interlocutory order of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Georgia entered on 
July 2, 1971, in the above styled and numbered cause, 
is hereby denied for want of jurisdiction. F. R. App. P., 
Rule 5(a) provides a ten-day period in which to file a 
petition for permission to appeal under § 1292(b). Rule 
26(b) provides that “ the court may not enlarge the time 
for filing . . .  a petition for permission to appeal.” Fil­
ing is not timely unless received by the Clerk within the 
time fixed. FRAP 25(a). Apparently mailed on July 12, 
1971, the petition did not reach the Clerk within ten days 
after July 2, the date of the district court certificate. 
Jack Neilson, Inc. v. Tug Peggy, 428 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.
1970). BorsJcey v. American Pad & Textile Co., 296 F.2d 
894 (5th Cir. 1961).



22a

['|f 8316] William English, Jr., Plaintiff v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al, Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of Geor­
gia, Waycross Division. No. 691. August 17, 1971.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964

Suit by Private Party— Class Action— Notices— Added 
Causes: of Action.— In an action brought by a private 
party claiming employment discrimination, the class rep­
resented by the complainant is defined as all Negro em­
ployees at a particular location of the railroad employer 
belonging to, or eligible for membership in, either of two 
defendant local unions, with notices to be given the class 
of plaintiffs, and leave granted to add causes of action 
under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 
2000e.

Suit by Private Party— Discovery Procedures— Statis­
tical Information— Attorneys’ Fees.— Requests of com­
plaining party for production of documents and for ad­
mission of facts are granted with limitations on the scope 
of the information sought to that relevant to the defined 
class represented in the action and with an allowance 
that the employer may qualify statistics furnished by 
providing explanations in the way of business necessities 
and the results of a good faith seniority system. A case 
of discrimination cannot be predicated solely upon mathe­
matical computations. Motions by both parties to compel 
attorneys’ fees regarding discovery measures were denied. 
42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e.

Fletcher Farrington, Bobby L. Hill, Hill, Jones & Far­
rington, Savannah, Georgia, and Morris J. Bailer, New 
York, New York, for Plaintiff.

APPENDIX 5



23a

Malcolm Maclean, Charles Edwards, Connerat, Dunn, 
Hunter, Houlihan, Maclean & Exley, P. C., Stanley Kars- 
man, Falligant, Doremus & Karsman, Savannah, Georgia, 
and James L. Highsaw, Highsaw & Mahoney, Washing­
ton, D. C., for Defendants,

Lawrence, Ch. J.: The motions of all parties were 
extensively argued by counsel this 13th day of August, 
1971, and it is Ordered as follows:

1. Defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
motion to define the class which plaintiff represents is 
granted. I specify that the class represented by plaintiff 
will include Negro employees of the Seaboard Coast Line 
Railroad Company at or near Waycross, Georgia, who 
belong to or are eligible for membership in either of the 
two defendant locals of BRAC, Number 5 and Number 
1586, by reason of job classification. Hayes v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company, [1 EPD jf 9953] 59 LO 
If 9196, page 6776, (1968).

2. Defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
motion to require notice to the class of plaintiffs, pursu­
ant to Federal Rules 23(b) (3), is granted. As I ruled 
in Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, [1 
EPD 'If 9936] 59 LC ‘If 9179, page 6720, (1969), the alle­
gations by defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Com­
pany “ abundantly meet all the requirements of Rule 23 
(b )(2 ). According to the Advisory Committee report, 
the reach of that subparagraph is illustrated by actions 
in the Civil Rights field when a defendant is charged 
with discrimination against a class whose members are 
capable of specific enumeration.” A form of notice and 
the manner of providing notice shall be presented for my 
consideration by counsel, in the same manner as notice 
was accomplished in Hayes v. Seaboard Coast Line Rail­
road Company.



24a

3. The motion by the defendant Seaboard to make in­
dividual white men who will be displaced or affected in 
any way by the plaintiff prevailing in this lawsuit par­
ties to this lawsuit is ordered held in abeyance until the 
Fifth Circuit has ruled in the case of Hayes v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company, 3 EPD If 8170, which is 
now on interlocutory appeal. See also Banks V. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company, [3 EPD f  8059] 51 FRD 
304 (N.D. Ga. 1970).

4. The motion of defendant Seaboard to compel an­
swers to its interrogatories filed June 3, 1971, is granted. 
Plaintiff is allowed thirty (30) days after service of de­
fendant Seaboard’s answers to interrogatories to provide 
the requested answers.

5. Plaintiff’s first motion for leave to amend, to add 
causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, is 
granted as to § 1981, there appearing to be no substan­
tial reasons in law or in fact for denying said amend­
ment. Caldwell V. National Brewing Co., 3 EPD ]j 8241 
(5th Cir., 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., [3 EPD 
H8019] 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir., 1970). As to 42 U.S.C. 
If 1983, plaintiff’s counsel assured me that its inclusion 
was a typographical error. All references to that statute 
are therefore ordered stricken from the pleadings in this 
case, and all motions related thereto are rendered moot.

6. Plaintiff’s counsel concurred with the Seaboard’s 
motions to strike all references to “apprenticeship” in the 
pleadings as it appears that defendants utilize no appren­
ticeship program, and said motions are granted. For the 
same reasons, defendant Seaboard Coast, Line Railroad 
Company’s motion to strike the references to racially seg­
regated toilets, washrooms, lockers and drinking foun­
tains is granted.

7. It appearing that arguments predicated upon the 
appropriate statute of limitations for claims arising un­



25a

der 42 U.S.C. § 1981 would be better dealt with in con­
junction with a determination of back pay claims at a 
later stage of this litigation, all motions relating to laches 
and the statute of limitations are held in abeyance until 
a future date to be determined by this Court.

8. A number of motions were advanced by all parties 
to compel the production of information by means of the 
discovery procedures provided by the Federal Rules. With 
respect to those motions, it is Ordered:

(a) The motion of plaintiff to compel answers to his 
second interrogatories to the Seaboard is granted as to 
interrogatories 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10(b), 10(c) and 18, and 
denied as to interrogatories 5(b),  5(c),  5(d) and 10(d). 
Orders respecting all other interrogatories involved in 
this motion are withheld pending an investigation by 
plaintiff as hereinafter described.

(b) Plaintiff’s “ Request for Production of Documents” 
dated June 10, 1971, is granted with the following quali­
fications: The scope of information sought shall be lim­
ited to that relevant to the class of plaintiff as defined 
in this order, and the requested documents will be pro­
vided by defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Com­
pany for inspection and copying by plaintiff’s counsel at 
a mutually convenient time within sixty (60) days, said 
inspection to take place where said documents are stored 
in Waycross, Georgia.

(c) That defendant Seaboard respond to plaintiff’s Re­
quests for Admission of Facts within sixty (60) days. 
The Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company may admit, 
deny, or give reasons for its inability to admit or deny, 
pursuant to Rule 36, and may append to its answers by 
footnote or addendum such qualifications or explanations 
as it deems necessary. However, the plaintiff will not be 
permitted to rely in this case upon statistics alone. This 
Court does not believe that a case of discrimination can



26a

be predicated solely upon mathematical computations. The 
defendant Seaboard must furnish the statistics requested 
by the plaintiff in his “Requests for Admission of Facts” 
but Seaboard may qualify its answers in the form of 
footnotes or addenda added to its answers which can 
provide the explanations advanced by counsel today, to 
wit: business necessity and that the statistics demon­
strate the results of a bona fide seniority system.

[9.— omitted by court.]
10. While plaintiff’s counsel and BRAC’s counsel ar­

gued their conflicting motions and responses at consider­
able length, at the conclusion of the hearing they were 
able to agree on what each would furnish the other and 
the Court sees no reason to clutter this judicial record 
further.

11. All motions by the defendants alleging failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies and as to improper or 
incomplete procedures by the Equal Employment Oppor­
tunity Commission are denied. Caldwell v. National 
Brewing Company, swpra.

12. Defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Com­
pany’s motion for summary judgment filed January 21, 
1971, is denied, it appearing that there are material 
issues of fact.

13. Plaintiff’s and defendant Seaboard’s motions to 
compel attorney’s fees regarding discovery measures are 
denied.



27a

![TT 7505] William English, Jr., Plaintiff v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of 
Georgia, Waycross Division. Civil No. 691. September 7,
1971.

Title YII— Civil Rights Act of 1964
Racial Discrimination— Railroad Employees— Seniority 

Rights— Indispensable Parties.— In view of the fact that 
the relief sought by a Negro railroad employee in an ac­
tion against the railroad and the union representing its 
employees would, if granted, affect the seniority rights of 
white employees, the action must be stayed pending 
amendment of the complaint to add one or more of the 
white employees included in the class that would be af­
fected. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 2000e.

Temporarily staying proceedings in (DC Ga. 1971) 3 
EPD fl 8316.

Fletcher Farrington, Bobby L, Hill, Hill, Jones & Far­
rington, Savannah, Georgia, and Morris J. Bailer, New 
York, New York, for Plaintiff.

Malcolm Maclean, Charles Edwards, Connerat, Dunn, 
Hunter, Houlihan, Maclean & Exley, P. C., Stanley Kars- 
man, Falligant, Doremus & Karsman, Savannah Georgia, 
and James L. Highsaw, Highsaw & Mahoney, Washing­
ton, D. C., for Defendants.

Lawrence, Ch. J .: William English, Jr., individually 
and on behalf of others similarly situated, is a Negro 
employee of the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company. 
He filed this class action against his employer and 
against the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, and Steam­
ship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Em­
ployees, Local # 5 , BRAC, and Local #1586, BRAC, de­

APPENDIX 6



28a

fendants, charging discrimination by the defendants. The 
complaint, filed under both Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, seeks an injunc­
tion, declaratory judgment, back pay, costs and attorneys’ 
fees.

The defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company 
filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispens­
able Parties” on October 12, 1970, alleging that there 
should be joined in this action “ those individual clerks 
employed by defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
Company whose seniority will be adversely affected by 
the relief demanded by plaintiff.”

On August 17, 1971, this Court rendered the following 
order [3 EPD If 8316]:

The motion by the defendant Seaboard to make 
individual white men who will be displaced or af­
fected in any way by the plaintiff prevailing in this 
lawsuit is ordered held in abeyance until the Fifth 
Circuit has ruled in the case of Hayes v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company, 3 EPD If 8170, which 
is now on interlocutory appeal. See also Banks V. 
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, [3 EPD 
j]8059] 51 FRD 304 (N.D. Ga. 1970).

Since that order, the Fifth Circuit has denied the Hayes 
appeal as untimely filed (Misc. No. 2145, August 20, 1971 
[3 EPD lf8320]).

Faced with the same fact situation in the Hayes case, 
supra,, this Court ordered the joinder of the individual 
white clerks as parties defendant, stating:

Reference to the complaint discloses that to grant 
the prayers of plaintiff’s complaint would require a 
judgment which would affect the seniority rights of 
the white employees. 3 EPD 1)8169, p. 6531 (1971).



29a

The Hayes decision was rendered in light of the order 
of the Northern District of Georgia in Banks V. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Co., 51 F.R.D. 304, 3 EPD 8059 
(1970):

Since any order or judgment rendered in this case 
in favor of plaintiff and the class for which he sues 
would under plaintiff’s allegations place plaintiff and 
others in a higher position of seniority than they 
are now enjoying, the judgment would necessarily 
change the status of white employees in whose favor 
the alleged discrimination exists.

The Brotherhood has an equal duty to represent 
those members comprising the class which plaintiff 
represents as well as the white employees whose in­
terest would be realized by any order granting relief 
to plaintiff. It thus appears that the white em­
ployees’ interest is not the same as the Brotherhood’s 
and that the Brotherhood cannot fairly and ade­
quately represent the interest of the class.

The same reasons obtain in the instant case. Therefore, 
the action will be stayed until such time as the plaintiff 
files an amendment naming as defendant one or more 
of the white employees included in said class, whereupon 
this Court will pass an order pursuant to Rule 23(a) 
providing for service upon said class to show cause why 
they should not be joined as defendants. Hayes V. Sea- 
boa,rd Coast Line Railroad Company, 3 EPD jf 8170, p. 
6531 (S.D. Ga. 1971).



30a

[IT 7645] William English, Jr., Plaintiff v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of Geor­
gia, Waycross Division. Civil No. 691. January 28, 1972.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964
Racial Discrimination— Segregated Local Unions— Con­

solidated Order.— Upon the evidence presented in an ac­
tion alleging unlawful discrimination in employment op­
portunities because of race, two local unions are directed 
to surrender their separate charters, to transfer the as­
sets and liabilities to a consolidated lodge, and to assign 
the officers of the respective locals to the consolidated 
lodge on a plan designed to provide transitional protec­
tion to members of the former locals in regard to rep­
resentation.

Issuing order in (DC Ga. 1971) 3 EPD 8316, fol­
lowing stay order at (DC Ga. 1971) 4 EPD ([7505.

Morris Bailer, Barry L. Goldstein, New York, New 
York and Fletcher Farrington, Hill, Jones & Farrington, 
Savannah, Georgia, for Plaintiff.

Conneratt, Dunn, Hunter, Houlihan, MacLean & Exley, 
P. C., Savannah, Georgia, for Defendant Seaboard Coast 
Line Railroad Co.

William J. Donlon, General Counsel, and Stanley Kars- 
man, Falligant, Doremus & Karsman, Savannah, Georgia, 
for Defendant Brotherhood of Railway and Airline Clerks.

Lawrence, Ch. J .: After evidence being presented it is 
ordered that: (1) Local Lodge No. 5 and Local Lodge No. 
1586 will immediately surrender the charters of their re­
spective local lodges to the Grand Lodge and the Grand 
Lodge will issue a new charter to the combined lodge.

APPENDIX 7



31a

(2) That all assets and liabilities of Lodges- 5 and 1586 
shall be transferred to the consolidated lodge to be used 
for the general purposes of the lodge except that no funds 
will be expended for attorneys’ fees in this cause of action 
until further order of the Court,

(3) That the officers of the merged lodge for term 
ending December 31, 1974, will be as follows: The cur­
rent President of Lodge No. 5 will be the President of 
the combined lodge. The current Vice-president of Lodge 
No. 1586 will be the Vice-president of the combined lodge. 
The current Secretary-Treasurer of Lodge No. 5 will 
be the Financial Secretary-Treasurer of the combined 
lodge. The current Recording Secretary of Lodge No. 1586 
will be the Recording Secretary of the combined lodge. 
The current Legislative Representative of Lodge No. 5 
will be the Legislative Representative of the combined 
lodge. The current Chairman of the Protective Committee 
of Lodge No. 5 will be the Chairman of the Protective 
Committee of the merged lodge. The current Chairman 
of the Protective Committee of Lodge No. 1586 will be 
appointed as Assistant Local Chairman of the combined 
lodge and will for the period set forth above retain his 
membership on System Board No. 3 with the full rights 
attached thereto.

(4) That the combined lodge will have sufficient mem­
bers on its Protective Committee to serve the former 
membership of Lodge No. 5 and the former membership 
of Lodge No. 1586.

(5) The present Trustees of Lodge No. 5 and Lodge 
No. 1586 will hold a meeting as soon as practical and 
will decide upon three members for the Board of Trustees 
of the merged lodge. The Trustee from the lodge which 
only has one Trustee chosen for the Board of Trustees 
of the merged lodge will become the Chairman of that 
Board of Trustees.



82a

(6) The agreement between the officers of Lodge No. 
5 and Lodge No. 1586 as set forth in a letter dated De­
cember 3, 1971, and signed by L. P. Buller will be effectu­
ated.

(7) That the merger and issuance of the new charter 
shall be effective as of January 1, 1972.



83a

[ft 7931] William English, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Sea­
board Coast Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants- 
Appellees.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, No. 71- 
3362. August 7, 1972.

On Appeal from United States District Court, Southern 
District of Georgia.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964
Racial Discrimination— Joinder of Parties— Seniority 

Rights— Adversely Affected Workers.— A district court’s 
stay of a court action pending amendment of a complaint 
to add one or more white employees, whose seniority 
rights would be affected if relief sought by a Negro em­
ployee against a railroad and the union representing its 
employees were granted, was affirmed. A contention that 
the white employees were not “parties to be joined if 
feasible” within the meaning of a federal procedural rule 
because the union would adequately represent the in­
terests of the white employees was rejected. The district 
court was justified in finding that, in the circumstances 
of this case, the seniority rights of the absent white em­
ployees would be affected adversely if the requested re­
lief was granted and that the union could not adequately 
and fairly represent the interests of both black and white 
members. Disposition of the case without the absent white 
employees who had an interest in the action could as a 
“practical matter impair or impede” their ability to pro­
tect their interests within the meaning of the federal rule. 
Since the district court did not specifically order joinder 
as required under federal rules, but only stay the action 
until such time as the plaintiff filed an amendment naming 
as defendant one or more of the affected white employees, 
the cause was remanded with direction to the court to

APPENDIX 8



34a

modify its order so as to specifically direct joinder. 42 
U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 2000e.

Back reference.— ft 2510.15.
Modifying, affirming and remanding (DC Ga. 1971) 4 

EPD jj 7505, issuing stay of order following ruling is­
sued in (DC Ga. 1971) 3 EPD fl 8316 and (DC Ga. 
1972) 4 EPD ff 7645.

Fletcher Farrington, Savannah, Georgia, Morris J. 
Bailer, New York, New York and Peter A. Janiak, Wash­
ington, D. C., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Stanley Karsman, Malcolm Maclean, Edward A. Char- 
ron, Charles A. Edwards, Mark M. Silvers, Jr., Savannah, 
Georgia and James L. Highsaw, Jr., Washington, D. C., 
for Defendants-Appellees.

Before B r o w n , Chief Judge, and Ge w in  and A in s ­
w o r t h , Circuit Judges.

Ge w in , C. J . : This is an interlocutory appeal under 
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) from, an order of 
the district court upon a “motion to dismiss for failure 
to join indispensable parties” made by Seaboard Coast 
Line Railroad Company (Seaboard), appellee.1 The dis­
trict court denied the motion but stayed the action.

1 Neither the district court’s order of September 7, 1971 nor its 
amended order of September 18, 1971 (in which it certified the 
order as appealable under 1292(b) specifically refer to Rule 19. 
However a failure to join a party under Rule 19 is a ground for a 
Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. Rule 12(b) (7) FRCP. Further­
more, the briefs of the parties make clear that the court’s decision 
was predicated upon that rule. Rule 19 is quoted below in perti­
nent part:

(a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject 
to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined 
as, a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief can­
not be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an 
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated



35a

until such time as the plaintiff files anamendment 
naming as defendant one or more of the white em­
ployees included in said class, whereupon this Court 
will pass an order pursuant to Rule 23(a) providing 
for service upon said class to show cause why they 
should not be joined as defendants.

English contends on appeal that the white employees are 
not parties to be joined if feasible under Rule 19(a) 
FRCP because the present union defendants adequately 
represent their interests. We reject that contention and 
affirm as modified and remand.

This employment discrimination suit was brought by 
the appellant William English, Jr., in behalf of himself 
and other similarly situated black employees of Sea­
board against Seaboard and against the Brotherhood of 
Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, 
Express and Station Employees (BRAC), Local Num­

that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that in­
terest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to 
a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or other inconsist­
ent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not 
been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If 
he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made 
a defendant, or, in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the 
joined party objects to venue and his joinder would render the 
venue of the action improper, he shall be dismissed from the action.

(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible. If 
a person as described in subdivision (a) (1) - (2) hereof cannot be 
made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good 
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, 
or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as 
indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: 
first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person’s absence 
might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the 
extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the 
shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened 
or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the persons’ 
absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have 
an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.



36a

ber 5 of BRAC and Local Number 1586 of BRAG. Eng­
lish and the class he represents are members of BRAC. 
At the time the suit was brought black employees were 
members of one local and the white employees of the 
other. Since that time the two locals have merged by 
order of the district court.2

The complaint was filed under both Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981.® The 
gist of the complaint is that there is “ across the board 
discrimination” by Seaboard and BRAC against English 
and his class. More specifically, the complaint alleges, “ a 
racially segregated, dual system of jobs and lines of pro­
gression” ; restriction of blacks to inferior jobs; unequal 
application of job requirements to blacks seeking tradi­
tionally white jobs; and a “ lock-in” seniority system 
which perpetuates racially identifiable dual job categories. 
The complaint further alleges that BRAC has breached 
its duty of fair representation in that it has participated 
or acquiesced in Seaboard’s discriminatory practices 
through collective bargaining agreements.

English and the members of his class are black em­
ployees of Seaboard in Way cross, Georgia; all employees 
and job classifications involved are within the BRAC 
craft unit for collective bargaining purposes. Within the 
craft unit there are two groups, Group 1 and Group 2, 
which English describes as “roughly corresponding to 
clerk’s and laborer’s jobs, respectively. Group 1 jobs pay 
better and are more prestigious than Group 2 jobs. The 
majority of whites hold Group 1 jobs, but there are no 
blacks in this group category.

E English V. Seaboard Coast Line RR, 4 CCH EPD 7645 (S D 
Ga. 1972).

s The original complaint referred only to Title VII. In a subse­
quent amendment, the 1981 claim was added, and jurisdiction was 
also invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1337.



37a

Under the collective bargaining agreement between 
BRAG and Seaboard, Group 1 seniority and Group 2 
seniority are kept separate. Group 2 seniority is not 
transferable to Group 1 in the event of transfer or pro­
motion. In view of the fact that all blacks are in Group 
2 no blacks have any usable seniority rights for Group 1 
jobs. Seaboard seeks to join the white clerks in Group 1 
whose seniority might be adversely affected should Eng­
lish prevail on the merits.4

The district court denied the motion to dismiss but 
stayed the action until such time as one or more white 
employees were joined. In doing so the court relied on 
one of its earlier decisions which reached a similar result, 
Hayes v. Seaboard Coastline R. R.5 * The rulings of the 
district court in both the instant case and in Hayes were 
based largely on Banks v. Seaboard Coast Line R. R:s In 
Banks the court ordered that if plaintiffs failed to join 
one or more of' the white employees the motion to dismiss 
would be granted.

The district court felt that in the circumstances of this 
case the seniority rights of the absent white employees 
would be affected adversely if the requested relief was 
granted and that the union could not adequately and 
fairly represent the interests of both black and white 
members. We view these conclusions as a finding under 
Rule 19(a) (2) (i) that disposition of the case without 
the absent white employees who have an interest in the

4 The following is from the brief of appellant English:
As relief, plaintiff seeks, inter alia, appropriate modification of 

the existing seniority system. Such relief would no doubt include 
an order allowing qualified Group 2 employees to exercise their 
accrued seniority rights in applying or bidding for transfer or 
promotion into Group 1 jobs, possibly in competition with present 
white Group 1 employees.

5 3 CCH EPD ff 8170 (S.D. Ga. 1971).
« [3 EPD H 8059] 51 F.R.D. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1970).



38a

action may as a “practical matter impair or impede” 
their ability to protect their interests.

Obviously Seaboard cannot and does not advance a 
serious claim that the District Court lacks plenary au­
thority to eradicate all remaining vestiges of racial dis­
crimination which infect collective bargaining agreements 
relating to the transfer and promotion of its employees. 
The power to effect employer-union color-blindness is in­
disputable.7 Likewise, Seaboard recognizes that this Court 
has formulated or approved the implementation of decrees 
accomplishing that result in a number of cases in which 
individual white union members were not joined as rep­
resentative defendants under Rules 19(a) and 23. United 
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 5 Cir., 1971 [3 EPD 
ir 8324] 451 F.2d 418, cert, denied, 1972, [4 EPD jf 7774]
____ XJ.S._____ , -------S. C t.--------, 31 L,Ed.2d 815; Vogler
v. McCarty, Inc., 5 Cir., 1971, [4 EPD jf 7581] 451 F.2d 
1236- Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers 
V. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, [2 EPD H 10,047] 416 F. 
2d 980, cert, denied, 1970, [2 EPD If 10,177] 397 U.S. 
919, 90 S. Ct. 926, 25 L.Ed.2d 100. Consequently, there 
is no room now for an argument that in all circumstances 
in which the implementation of a remedy may conceiv­
ably affect the employment interests of white union mem­
bers the District Court must find that the union alone 
does not adequately represent its white membership.

7 In a long series of cases beginning with Steele v. Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad Co., 1944, [1 EPD ff 9607] 323 U.S. 192, 65 S. 
Ct. 226, 89 L. Ed. 173 the Supreme Court of the United States 
“has emphatically and repeatedly ruled that an exclusive bargain­
ing agent under the Railway Labor Act is obligated to represent 
all employees in the bargaining unit fairly and without discrimi­
nation because of race and has held that the courts have power to 
protect employees against such invidious discrimination.” Conley 
V. Gibson, 1957, [1 EPD ff 9656] 355 U.S. 41, 42, 78 S. Ct. 99, ,
2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 82.



39a

Even in circumstances in which the union cannot ade­
quately represent both black and white members because 
the remedy ultimately devised may entail an irreconcil­
able conflict between the interests of those members, it 
is clear that Rule 19(a) has never required joinder in 
every case in which “ interests” of white persons may be 
adversely affected by a court decree terminating racially 
discriminatory practices. For example, within the con­
text of public school desegregation there are innumerable 
instances in which white children, parents and teachers 
will be deprived of “rights” (for example, the “right” to 
attend a neighborhood school) without ever having had 
the opportunity to participate directly in the judicial 
proceedings which divest them of those “rights.” More­
over, when these adversely affected groups have them­
selves taken the initiative by seeking to intervene under 
Rule 24, we have frequently declined to permit it. St, 
Helena Parish School Board v. Hall, 5 Cir., 1961, 287 
F.2d 376, 379, cert, denied, 368 U.S. 830, 82 S. Ct. 52, 
7 L.Ed.2d 33; Horton v. Lawrence County Board", of Edu­
cation, 5 Cir., 1970, 425 F.2d 735; Benett v. Madison 
County Board of Education, 5 Cir., 1970, 437 F.2d 554. 
We perceive no basis for the supposition that a union’s 
representation of its membership is different in principle 
from a school board’s representation of the community. 
In either case the defendant is being compelled to elimi­
nate the consequences of unlawful racial discrimination 
by taking measures inimical to the traditional advan­
tages of white persons having a vested interest in the 
status quo.

However, as a practical matter we must recognize that 
the elimination of racial discrimination in private em­
ployment frequently entails a much more involved, sub­
jective accommodation of competing black-white interests 
because of the limited number of job vacancies and the 
direct, immediate impact on employee interests that re­



40a

suits from any change in existing seniority levels:8 In 
such litigation the District Court may well regard indi­
vidual white representation as insurance that the ulti­
mate goal of terminating discrimination is accomplished 
in the most equitable and least disruptive manner possi­
ble. When an experienced Trial Judge reaches such a 
conclusion we cannot disregard it in the absence of com­
pelling and persuasive justification, particularly in light 
of the Court’s traditional broad discretion to order joinder 
under Rule 19. “ While this discretion may not have the 
constrictions of a clearly erroneous rule, we must be 
mindful that the district judge is closer to the arena and 
is often in a better position to survey the practicalities 
involved in the litigation.” Broussard v. Columbia Gulf 
Transmission Co., 5 Cir., 1968, 398 F.2d 885, 889.

We find no merit in the contention of English that 
since the white employees are not parties to the collec­
tive bargaining agreement they have no interest in this 
litigation. Black employees, not the company or the union, 
instituted this action. While the rights of employees may 
be affected adversely without their presence as a result 
of collective bargaining, a suit in federal court brought 
by black employees is simply a different situation. Rule 
19 permits the joinder of employees under proper circum­
stances; there is no such rule which applies to collective 
bargaining.

The remaining issue raised by English is that since 
white employees have not sought to intervene they must 
have no interest in participating in this litigation. There 
is no evidence before the court of any lack of interest by 
white employees in this suit. In any event, our concern 
here is not with, how white employees might feel person­
ally about joining in this litigation but whether joinder

8 United. States V. Jacksonville Terminal Co., supra, 451 F.2d at 
460 (dissenting opinion) ; Vogler V. McCarty, Inc., supra, 451 F.2d 
at 1239 (dissenting opinion).



41a

under Rule 19(a) was proper. We conclude that the dis­
trict court did not err in its finding that joinder is ap­
propriate.

However, the court here did not order joinder but in­
stead stayed the action until such time as. English filed 
an amendment naming as defendant one or more of the 
affected white employees. Such an order is not in full 
accord with the mandate of Rule 19(a). Under that rule 
the remedy for nonjoinder is joinder by order of the 
court.® When the court decides under Rule 19(a) that 
a person should be joined the court should direct the 
plaintiff to amend his complaint to add the person. Fail­
ure to comply with such an order may result in dismissal 
of the plaintiff’s action under Rule 41 (b) FRCP for 
failure of a party to comply with an order of court.9 10 11 
Dismissal under Rule 19 is proper only after it is shown 
that a 19(a) party cannot be joined and that in equity 
and good conscience the case should not proceed without 
such party. There is no indication here that the white 
employees could not be joined, hence a 19(b) determina­
tion was not required in the present posture of the case.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) has filed an amicus curiae brief in this appeal 
protesting11 that

9 See Ferguson V. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1970) ; 
Schutten V. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 869, 873 (5th Cir. 1970) ; 7 
Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure §§ 1609, 1611 —at 83, 108 
(1972).

10 Transit Casualty Co. V. Security Trust Co., 396 F.2d 803 (5th 
Cir. 1968) ; see Window Glass Cutters League V. American St. 
Gobian Corp., 428 F.2d 353 (3d Cir. 1970).

11 The EEOC also contends that if the white employees are to be 
joined, joinder should be under Rule 21 FRCP. While Rule 21 
might be used as a wholly separate means of joinder we find it un­
necessary to decide that question since we have already concluded 
that joinder under Rule 19(a) was appropriate.



42a

holding that white employees are indispensable to a 
federal court adjudication that a collective bargain­
ing agreement violates Title VII would perforce make 
white employees indispensable in the commission’s 
administrative process. Such a process would, we 
submit, inject parties into the Commission’s process 
which Congress contemplated would be represented 
by the parties to the collective bargaining agreement, 
(emphasis added.)

We make no finding of indispensability here. Only where 
joinder is not feasible must the court proceed under 19 
(b) to determine whether to proceed or dismiss for lack 
of an indispensable party. And only if the court decides 
that it must dismiss because of the absence of a 19(a) 
party is that party given the conclusory label “ indis­
pensable.”  12

Of course, we do not even faintly suggest that the ulti­
mate inability of the plaintiffs to join representative 
white defendants in a suit seeking an end to unlawful 
employment discrimination would necessitate or justify 
the dismissal of the action.113 And again we wish to 
emphasize that our decision does not mean that in every 
case of this type affected white employees must be joined 
under Rule 19(a). That determination must necessarily 
be made by the district court in consideration of the facts 
and circumstances of each particular case. We decide * V.

1:2 See Provident Bank & Trust Co. V. Patterson, 390 U.S. 103, 
19 L. Ed. 2d 936 (1968) ; Schutten v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 869, 
873 (5th Cir. 1970) ; 7 Wright, supra note 7, at § 1607.

33 The theory that such individuals are “ indispensable parties” 
under Rule 19 (b) has frequently encountered a hostile reception in 
the courts. United States v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., W.D. N.C. 
1972, 4 EPD If 7709; United States V. St. Louis-San Francisco Rail­
road Co., E.D. Mo., 1971, [3 EPD 1) 8263] 52 F.R.D. 276; cf. Bowe
V. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 7 Cir., 1969, [2 EPD If 10,090] 416 F.2d 
711 (sex discrimination) ; Thompson V. New York Central Railroad 
Co., S.D. N.Y., 1966, 250 F.Supp. 175.



43a

here only that upon the facts of this case we think the 
district court was justified in deciding that white em­
ployees should be joined.

Although we do not vacate the order of the district 
court, we remand the cause with directions that the court 
modify its order so as to specifically direct joinder of one 
or more of the white employees. This modification does 
not affect that portion of the court’s order made pur­
suant to Rule 23(a). We note in conclusion that this 
case is now over two years old and it is still in the plead­
ing stage. Without attempting to designate responsibility 
for this delay, we urge all concerned to proceed in good 
faith to bring this litigation to a close.

Modified. Affirmed and Remanded.



APPENDIX 9

HT 8018] William English, Jr., Plaintiff v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company, et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of 
Georgia, Waycross Division. Civil No. 691. September 1, 
1972, October 18, 1972 and October 24, 1972.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964—
Civil Rights Act of 1866

Racial Discrimination—Joinder of Parties— Seniority 
Rights— Adversely Affected Workers— Remedial Order.—  
A Negro plaintiff must join white fellow members of the 
union whose seniority would be adversely affected and the 
Judge has found that the defendant union cannot ade­
quately represent their interests. Order is entered pur­
suant to the mandate of a higher court. Defendant rail­
road’s motion for jury trial under 1866 Act is denied.

Back reference.—-jf 2510.15.

Issuing orders on remand in (CA-5 1972) 4 EPD 
IT 7931, which modified affirmed and remanded (DC Ga. 
1972) 4 EPD H 7461, issued after stay in (DC Ga. 1971) 
4 EPD V 7505, of order in (DC Ga. 1971) 3 EPD If 8316.

Fletcher Farrington, Jones, Hill and Farrington, Sa­
vannah, Georgia, for the Plaintiff.

Malcolm Maclean and Charles A. Edwards, Connerat, 
Dunn, Hunter, Houlihan, Maclean & Exley, P. C., Sa­
vannah, Georgia; Edward A. Charron, Jacksonville, 
Florida; Stanley Karsman, Falligant, Doremus & Kars- 
man, Savannah, Georgia; James L. Highsaw, Highsaw 
and Mahoney, Washington, D.C.; Barnard M. Portman, 
Smith and Portman, Savannah, Georgia, for the Defend­
ants.



Order of September 1, 1972
Lawrence, D. J .: This case was appealed to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
pursuant to the provisions of 28 USC § 1292(b). That 
Appeal having been decided, and the opinion and mandate 
of the Court of Appeals having issued, that opinion is 
hereby adopted as the opinion of this Court.

Wherefore it is hereby ordered that plaintiff William 
English amend his Complaint to join as defendants one or 
more white employees of Seaboard Coastline Railroad 
Company, whose seniority may be affected by the out­
come of this case. Failure of plaintiff to so amend his 
Complaint, within 30 days of the entry of this order, will 
result in dismissal of this case.

Order of October 18, 1972
Lawrence, D. J .: The above cause having come before 

the Court on motion of defendant Seaboard Coast Line 
Railroad Company to compel joinder of former members 
of the Transportation-Communication Employees Union 
in and near Waycross, Georgia, and briefs and argu­
ments of counsel having been received and considered;

It is Ordered, that the prior order of this Court dated 
September 1, 1972, is amended to join as parties defend­
ant all former members of the Transportation-Communi­
cation Employees Union in or near Waycross, Georgia 
who are now shown on the July 1, 1972, seniority roster 
for the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship 
Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Em­
ployees for the Waycross Division, Seaboard Coast Line 
Railroad Company;

Further Ordered, that defendant effect notice upon 
said former members of the T'CU in the same manner 
as was followed with respect to other Group I employees 
of SCL at or near Waycross.

45a



46a

Order of October 24, 1972

Lawrence, D. J .: The above matter having come
before the Court upon various motions of the parties, 
and briefs and arguments of counsel having been re­
ceived and considered,

It is Ordered:

1. Defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
motion for a jury trial of claims pursuant to the 1866 
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is denied for the 
reasons stated by Judge Smith in Williams v, Travenol 
Laboratories, Inc., [4 EPD If 7918] 344 F.Supp. 163 
(N.D. Miss. 1972).

2. On August 17, 1971, I ruled that “ the class rep­
resented by plaintiff will include Negro employees of the 
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company at or near Way- 
cross, Georgia, who belong to or are eligible for member­
ship in either of the two defendant locals of BRAC, 
Number 5 and Number 1586, by reason of job classifica­
tion.” 3 EPD f  8316 at p. 7071. Plaintiff now seeks to 
expand the scope of this litigation to encompass the entire 
Waycross Division. Defendant SCL in turn asks that the 
Court confine the action to the Stores Department in 
Waycross. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court 
denies both requests, and the prior ruling as to the scope 
of the case remains in effect.

3. Defendant SCL’s motions to compel plaintiff to de­
scribe in detail his proposed method for computation of 
back pay are denied at this time with the suggestion 
that such information is obtainable through interroga­
tories to obtain plaintiff’s theory.

4. Defendant SCL’s motions to dismiss the class ac­
tion and attorneys’ fees portions of the claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 are denied.



47a

5. The joinder of former Transportation-Communica­
tion Employees Union members at or near Waycross 
having been accomplished by amended order dated Octo­
ber 18, 1972, defendant SCL’s motion directed toward 
this end is moot.

6. Defendant SCL must supplement its answers to 
plaintiff’s first interrogatories by providing the informa­
tion requested therein as to all persons added to the scope 
of this litigation by hiring, transfer or seniority merger 
since the date of service of those interrogatories.

7. Plaintiff’s motions to compel answers to discovery 
are denied as moot.

8. Defendants Dell Beasley, et al. (the “white clerks” ) 
have filed motions to dismiss the complaint for failure 
to state a claim and for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
This Court’s order of September 7, 1971 ordered joinder 
of these employees under Rule 19. 4 EPD U 7505. The 
Fifth Circuit affirmed this ruling on August 7, 1972, 
(4 EPD 1j7931), whereupon I ordered compliance with 
the mandate of the Court of Appeals on September 1,
1972. There is no relief sought against these defend­
ants by way of injunctive relief or back pay, inasmuch 
as they were made parties under Rule 19 and the orders 
of this Court and the Fifth Circuit, and not pursuant 
to Rule 23(b) or (c). Their motions are denied.

9. Trial of this case shall be in two stages: The 
first, to commence January 8, 1973 in Savannah, shall 
deal solely with the question of discrimination vel non. 
All questions of remedy, injunction, back pay, and at­
torneys’ fees shall be reserved for hearing at a later 
date, after adequate time for preparation by all parties.



APPENDIX 10

[f[ 8970] William English, Jr., Plaintiff v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of 
Georgia, Waycross Division. No. 691. November 16,
1973.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Civil Rights Act of 1866

Racial Discrimination— Railroad— Seniority Systems— 
Bidding.— An agreement between a railroad and a union 
which modified a seniority arrangement was adopted. 
Members of one group were thereby enabled to bid for 
certain vacancies on the basis of company seniority.

Back reference.—H 2510.15

Adopting, after ruling in (DC Ga. 1972) 5 EPD 
I f  8018, remedial agreement in (DC Ga. 1972) 4 EPD 
If 7461, which was affirmed as modified in (CA-5 1972) 
4 EPD H7931, after stay in (DC Ga. 1971) 4 EPD 
I f  7505, of order in (DC Ga. 1971) 3 EPD I f  8316.

Fletcher Farrington and Bobby Hill, Savanah, Georgia, 
and Morris J. Bailer, New York, New York, for Plain­
tiffs,

Edward A. Charron, Jacksonville, Florida, Barnard 
Portman, Stanley Kasman, and Connerat, Dunn, Hunter, 
Houlihan, MacLean & Exley, Savannah, Georgia, and 
James L. Highsaw, Jr., Washington, D.C., for Defend­
ants,

Order

Lawrence, C. J .: By the attached agreement dated 
January 12, 1973, BRAC Groups 1 and 2 were merged 
on a date-of-hire basis over the entire SCL system, 
effective March 1, 1973. The effect of this agreement



49a

is to abolish the distinction made between Group 1 and 
Group 2, thereby affording to Group 2 employees, both 
white and black, the opportunity to bid on former Group 
1 vacancies on the basis of their seniority date established 
by the first day of their present continuous service with 
the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company or its prede­
cessor lines.

The memorandum of agreement between SCL and 
BRAC dated January 12, 1973 is hereby adopted by this 
Court and made a part of this order. The parties here­
to, their officers, agents, employees, servants and all 
other persons and organizations in active concert or par­
ticipation with them, are hereby permanently enjoined 
and restrained from engaging in any employment prac­
tice or course of conduct which interferes with or is con­
trary to this Order.

MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT 

Between the

Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company 

And its Employees Represented by

Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks,
Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees

January 12, 1973

The parties hereto having reached an understanding 
to abolish separate grouping of the classes of employees 
represented by the organization signatory hereto, effective 
March 1, 1973;
It Is Agreed That:

1. There shall be eliminated all references to Groups 
1 and 2 in the current working agreement of January



50a

1, 1968, or any currently effective amendments, supple­
ments or interpretations thereto.

2. Each employee now holding seniority in Group 1 
or Group 2 on the effective date of this agreement shall 
be given as his seniority date in the district where he 
entered the employ of the Company or its predecessor 
companies, which is identified as his home district, his 
last date of entry into service on that district on a con­
tinuous basis on a position covered by the agreement 
with B.R.A.C. Employees who have left their home dis­
trict and have established another seniority date in an 
elective district shall not have such seniority disturbed 
in the elective district.

3. After seniority dates have been established in ac­
cordance with paragraph 2 hereof, the names of all em­
ployees now appearing on separate Group 1 and Group 
2 rosters for each district where there are parallel Group 
1 and 2 rosters shall be dovetailed, on seniority basis, 
into a single roster for each such district. Employees 
who appear on both rosters shall be given the oldest date 
on the dovetail roster. In the merging seniority dates, 
two or more employees are found to have the same date 
they shall be placed on the dovetailed roster in the order 
of their birth dates, with the oldest employee shown first.

4. No employee shall, in the operation of this agree­
ment, be entitled to displace other employees; however, 
they shall thereafter be entitled to place themselves in 
accordance with the provisions of the current working 
agreement.

5. Recognizing that the initial issuance of rosters pur­
suant to this agreement may result in disputes about es­
tablished seniority dates, it is agreed that the initial 
issue of rosters shall be open to protest for a period of 
one hundred twenty (120) days from date of posting. 
If no protest is registered within that period, the date



51a

shown shall be regarded as correct and not subject to 
further protest.

6. All agreements, amendments, supplements, or inter­
pretations in conflict with the provisions of the Memoran­
dum Agreement are hereby cancelled insofar as the conflict­
ing portions are concerned.



52a

[H 8971] Lorenzo Hayes et al., Plaintiffs v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of 
Georgia, Savannah Division. November 19, 1973.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964
Racial Discrimination— Railroad Industry— Court Ac­

tion.— A race bias suit against a railroad and the unions 
was to proceed toward trial. Certain alleged discrimina- 
tees bringing suit were not to be dismissed from the 
suit nor was the railroad to get partial summary judg­
ment.

Back reference.—-If 2510.15.
Issuing rulings on pretrial motions in (DC Ga. 1968) 

1 EPD If 9936, and motions in (DC Ga. 1968) 1 EPD 
H 9953, 46 F.R.D. 49, following denial of appeal in (CA- 
5 1971) 3 EPD H 8320, from (DC Ga. 1971) 3 EPD 
I f  8170.

Bobby L. Hill, Savannah, Georgia, and Jack Green­
berg, New York, New York, for Plaintiffs.

Adams, Adams, Brennan & Gardner, Savannah, Geor­
gia, and James L. Highsaw, Jr., Washington, D.C., for 
Defendants.

Order

Lawrence, C. J .: The above action having come be­
fore the Court upon motions of the parties as described 
below, and briefs and arguments of counsel having been 
received and considered, it is ORDERED:

1. On April 9, 1971, the Court stayed this action 
pending joinder of individual white employees as parties 
defendant (3 EPD H 8170); an appeal from that order

APPENDIX 11



53a

was denied by the Fifth Circuit (3 EPD If 8320). Coun­
sel for the parties herein then proceeded to trial with 
similar issues in English v. Seaboard Coast Line Rail­
road Company, Waycross Division, Civil Action No. 
691. On January 12, 1973, SOL and BRAC entered into 
an agreement merging Group 1 and Group 2 on a date- 
of-hire basis; that agreement has now been incorporated 
into an order of this Court dated November 16, 1973 
[6 EPD || 8970]. Therefore, it appears that the stay is 
no longer necessary; the order of April 9, 1971 is ac­
cordingly vacated.

2. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s fourth 
motions, for limitation of back pay, are reserved for 
decision at or following trial.

3. SCL’s fifth motion, for joinder of the United Trans­
port Service Employees, is dismissed as moot, the Court 
having been advised that the UTSE has been merged 
into the defendant BRAC.

4. SCL’s sixth motions, with respect to dismissal of 
parties plaintiffs, are denied in light of the Fifth Cir­
cuit’s en banc decision on rehearing in Huff v. N. D.
Cass Co., ------  F.2d ------ , 6 EPD |j 8800 (slip op. dated
September 4, 1973), it appearing that regardless of the 
standing or employment status of the individual the class 
action is, as a general rule, allowed to proceed absent 
compelling reasons to the contrary.

5. SCL’s motion for partial summary judgment is 
denied. The motion is based on allegations that two of 
the plaintiffs, Lee H. Stephens and Willie Campbell, stated 
on deposition that their complaint stemmed from the dis­
solution of the Savannah Union Station Company and 
the consequent loss of seniority of SUSCO employees upon 
their assimilation into the operations of the Atlantic Coast 
Line and Seaboard Air [Coast] Line Railroad Com­



54a

panies. This motion creates a question of fact more 
appropriate for resolution at trial.

6. SCL’s motion to compel answers to its second in­
terrogatories is granted, but costs and attorneys’ fees are 
denied. Plaintiffs are ordered to respond fully to said 
interrogatories within thirty days of the date of this 
order, all objections thereto having been waived.



55a

[TT 9032] Lorenzo Hayes, Plaintiff v. Seaboard Coast 
Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of 
Georgia, Savannah Division. No. 2371. December 13, 
1973.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964
Court Action— Railroad Race Bias— Motion to. Join 

Union as Additional Defendant— Denial of Motion.—A 
local union was not to be added as a defendant to a race 
bias case against a railroad and others where it would 
delay the commencement of the trial and the pretrial 
discovery had been substantially completed.

Back reference.—TF 2510.15.
Issuing additional rulings on pretrial motions in (DC 

Ga. 1968) 1 EPD 9936, following orders in (DC Ga. 
1973) 6 EPD U 8971, and (DC Ga. 1968) 1 EPD U 9953, 
46 F.R.D. 49, and denial of appeal in (CA-5 1971) 3 
EPD U 8320, from (DC Ga. 1971) 3 EPD ff 8170.

Bobby L. Hill, Savannah, Georgia, and Jack Green­
berg, New York, New York, for Plaintiffs.

Adams, Adams, Brennan & Gardner, Savannah, Geor­
gia, and James L. Highsaw, Jr., Washington, D.C., for 
Defendants.

Lawrence, D. J .: This case came on for its last pre­
trial hearing. Plaintiffs announced they were withdraw­
ing their motion for a preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs have filed a motion to join the United Trans­
portation Union as a party defendant pursuant to Rule 
19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for 
leave to file an amended complaint attached to the 
motion. The defendant Brotherhood of Railway, Airline

APPENDIX 12



and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and 
Station Employees (BRAC) has filed a response in op­
position to the motion and a supporting memorandum of 
points and authorities. The Court, upon consideration of 
the motion and the opposition thereto and having heard 
argument of counsel, finds that the grant of the motion 
would unduly delay the disposition of this case in which 
discovery has been substantially completed and which has 
been set for trial commencing April 15, 1974, at 10:00 
A.M.

It is therefore Ordered that Plaintiffs’ motion be and 
it hereby is denied.

It is Further Ordered, that Plaintiffs’ motion to com­
pel answers to their requests for admission of facts is 
granted, and Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company 
is ordered to respond to said requests on or before Jan­
uary 1, 1974.



57a

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

SAVANNAH DIVISION 

Civil Action No. CV4-74-69

[Filed in office, U.S. District Court, Southern District of 
Ga., May 2, 1975, Betty W. Hall, Deputy Clerk]

Uley Hamilton, Godfrey Davis and Booker T.
Snowden,

APPENDIX 13

Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER

In this case Booker T. Snowden made a motion to inter­
vene. This was allowed subject to objections. Objections 
were filed by defendants SCL and UTU. A  hearing was 
had on these objections.

At the hearing plaintiff’s counsel Fletcher Farrington 
moved orally that plaintiff Snowden’s claim be severed 
and transferred to the Waycross Division. This was con­
curred in by counsel for defendants SCL and UTU.

It appeared from statements by plaintiff’s counsel that 
plaintiff’s records with the SCL are in Waycross and that 
defendants’ witnesses who are knowledgeable about the 
facts in this case are also located in Waycross. Further­
more, plaintiff Snowden is assigned to the Waycross Divi­
sion of the SCL. It would be a waste of judicial effort 
for him to dismiss and refile his complaint in Waycross. 
Accordingly, it is ordered that Booker T. Snowden’s claim



is severed from that of Plaintiffs Hamilton and Davis and
to that extent the defendants’ objections are sustained.

The Clerk is instructed to send all records in the file 
connected with Booker T. Snowden’s claim to the Way- 
cross Division along with a copy of this order. This should 
include Booker T. Snowden’s attempt at intervention, the 
objections filed by the UTU and SCL, the motions and 
answer filed by the SCL, the briefs filed by the SCL and 
UTU, Booker T. Snowden’s deposition, and a transcript 
of the hearing before this Court on the objections to 
Booker T. Snowden’s intervention in which the parties 
agreed to this order.

In open Court this 2nd day of May, 1975.

/ s /  Alexander A. Lawrence 
Chief Judge,
U.S. District Court 
Savannah Division, Georgia



59a

i[ff 9033] William English, Plaintiff v. Seaboard Coast 
Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of Geor­
gia, Waycross Division. No. 691. December 13, 1973.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Civil Rights Act of 1866

Racial Discrimination— Court Action— Class Action— 
Deferral of Ruling.— Whether to expand the class of Ne­
gro railroad employees was deferred until possible con­
sultation with judges handling other bias cases against 
the same railroad.

Back reference.— 2510.15.
Deferring ruling on motion to expand class in (DC Ga. 

1972) 4 EPD ]j 7461, which was affirmed as modified in 
(CA-5 1972) 4 EPD H 7931, after issuance of order in 
(DC Ala. 1973) 6 EPD H 8970, and rulings in (DC Ga. 
1972) 5 EPD U 8018, (DC Ga. 1971) 4 EPD U 7505, and 
(DC Ga. 1971) 3 EPD fl 8316.

Fletcher Farrington and Bobby Hill, Savannah, Geor­
gia, and Morris J. Bailer, New York, New York, for 
Plaintiffs.

Edward A. Charron, Jacksonville, Florida, Barnard 
Port-man, Stanley Karsman, and Connerat, Dunn, Hunter, 
Houlihan, MacLean & Exley, Savannah, Georgia, and 
James L. Highsaw, Jr., Washington, D. C., for Defend­
ants.

Order
Lawrence, D. J .: The above matter having come before 

the Court on motion of Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
Company (SCL) for expansion of the class represented 
by plaintiff to all Negro employees of defendant Sea­

APPENDIX 14



board Coast Line Railroad Company, represented by de­
fendant Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship 
Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Em­
ployees (BRAC), and formerly members of BRAC’s 
Group 2 or 3 with SCL or its predecessor lines, and 
briefs and arguments of counsel having been received, 
it is

Ordered that the matter is under consideration of this 
Court but may require that this Court confer with Chief 
Judge Eugene A. Gordon and Judge Hiram H. Ward of 
the Middle District of North Carolina, in whose court are 
pending Doctor V. SCL [6 EPD 8877] and King v. SCL 
and with Judge Robert R. Merhige, Jr. of the Eastern 
District of Virginia in which Coleman v. SCL is situated.



61a

0  9121] William English, Jr., Plaintiff v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of Geor­
gia, Way cross Division. No. 691. January 31, 1974.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Civil Rights Act of 1866

Racial Discrimination— Railroads— Seniority Systems— 
Agreement— Modification.— A labor agreement was modi­
fied to remedy a racially biased seniority system by al­
lowing carryover seniority for transferring employees 
and by giving seniority preference to certain groups of 
transferees. “ Fall-back” rights allowed employees not 
completing transfers to retain seniority. 42 U.S.C. Secs. 
1981 and 2000e.

Back reference.— If 2670.

Amending (DC Ga. 1973) 6 EPD U8970, which was 
adopted after ruling in (DC Ga. 1972) 5 EPD j[ 8018, 
remedial agreement in (DC Ga. 1972) 4 EPD ff 7461, 
which was affirmed as modified in (CA-5 1972) 4 EPD 
I f  7931, after stay in (DC Ga. 1971) 4 EPD f f  7505, of 
order in (DC Ga. 1971) 3 EPD H 8316.

Fletcher Farrington, Savannah, Georgia, and Morris 
J. Bailer, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
Inc., New York, New York, for Plaintiff.

Stanley M. Karsman, Savannah, Georgia, and James 
L. Highsaw, Washington, D.C., for Defendant Locals 5 
and 1586, Brotherhood of Railway Steamship Clerks.

Edward A. Charron, General Counsel, and Malcolm 
Maclean, Savannah, Georgia, for Defendant Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company.

APPENDIX 15



62 a

Barnard M. Portman, Savannah, Georgia, for Inter- 
venors.

Order
Lawrence, D. J .: An agreement dated January 12,

1973, merging BRAG Groups 1 and 2 over the entire 
SCL system, effective March 1, 1973, was adopted by 
Order of this Court on the 16th day of November, 1973.

The memorandum of agreement referred to above is 
hereby amended pursuant to the terms of a memorandum 
of agreement between SCL and BRAC dated January 30,
1974, attached hereto and incorporated by reference here­
in. Said agreements as amended are hereby adopted by 
this Court and made a part of this Order. The parties 
hereto, their officers, agents, employees, servants and all 
other persons and organizations in active concert or par­
ticipation with them, are hereby permanently enjoined 
and restrained from engaging in any employment prac­
tice or course of conduct which interferes with or is 
contrary to this Order.

MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT

Between the
SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY

and
All that Craft or Class of Clerical,

Office, Station and Storehouse Employees 
Represented by the

BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE AND 
STEAMSHIP CLERKS, FREIGHT HANDLERS, 
EXPRESS AND STATION EMPLOYEES

Rule 13 of the current Clerks’ working agreement, 
effective January 1, 1968, is changed, modified and 
amended to read as follows:



63a

(A) Employees making application for positions bulle­
tined on other seniority districts will, if  they possess 
sufficient fitness and ability, be given preference on a 
seniority basis over non-employees or employees not cov­
ered by these rules to any vacancy not filed by an em­
ployee holding seniority in the district where the vacancy 
occurs,

(B) Employees transferring under this rule will carry 
with them all seniority to the new seniority district 
and their name and date will be dovetailed onto the 
roster. Seniority established in the former seniority 
district will be forfeited and the employee’s name re­
moved from the former seniority district roster.

(C) Employees desiring to transfer under this rule 
will do so in writing to the Carrier official responsible 
for the assignment of employees in the seniority district 
to which a transfer is desired, with a copy to the em­
ployee’s immediate supervisor and to the officer issuing 
the seniority roster on which the employee’s name ap­
pears. A brief resume of the service record must be 
prepared by the employee and accompany the request, 
such resume to be prepared on form supplied by the 
Carrier, copy of which is attached and made a part of 
this agreement. An employee will be permitted to make 
a request for a specific vacancy, at a specific location, 
or a request general in nature for any vacancy that may 
occur in the seniority district to which transfer is de­
sired. Those employees filing an application for transfer 
prior to time a vacancy is bulletined shall be given pref­
erence over those who file for a transfer during or after 
the vacancy is bulletined. Where an employee has made 
a specific or general request for a vacancy, such re­
quest will expire on the following December 31st, or 
upon the employee’s failure to accept a position as the 
senior qualified applicant. Written notification must be 
extended to the applicant within five (5) calendar days



64a

of the close of the bulletin period, and acceptance or 
rejection shall be signified in writing, within five (5) 
calendar days from the date of notification. An employee 
whose request for transfer has expired may renew same 
at any time.

(D) The provisions of Rule 12 of the current working 
agreement shall be applicable to an employee transferring 
from one seniority district to another. However, where 
an employee is disqualified on the position to which trans­
ferred in the new seniority district, fail-back rights are 
contemplated and such employee may elect to have sen­
iority restored on former district roster by filing notice 
of such election in writing with Carrier official issuing 
the seniority roster, with copy to the General Chairman, 
within five (5) calendar days from the date of dis­
qualification. If such an election is not filed within said 
period, the employee shall retain seniority on the dis­
trict to which transferred.

(E) All employees who transferred from one seniority 
district to another prior to the effective date of this 
amendment shall not have disturbed their seniority as 
now held; however, any employee desiring to have the 
earliest district seniority transferred to the district where 
currently employed may elect to do so by filing such 
election in writing, within thirty (30) calendar days 
from the effective date of this agreement, with Carrier 
officials issuing the involved seniority rosters, with copy 
to the General Chairman. An employee not making such 
election will use seniority as shown on roster where 
currently employed for bidding, displacement and trans­
fer purposes, except where an employee is returning from 
an elective district to the employee’s former district, 
whereupon seniority in the elective district will be for­
feited.



65a

(F) An employee who fails for any reason to utilize 
the provisions of Paragraph (E) hereof within the time 
specified therein, because of absence due to being on 
vacation, leave of absence, furloughed or occupying ex­
cepted or official position, shall be permitted to exercise 
the option set forth in (E) above, within the thirty (30) 
calendar day period immediately following return to 
service on a position under the provisions of this agree­
ment.

(G) No employee shall, in the operation of this agree­
ment, be entitled to displace other employees; however, 
they shall thereafter be entitled to place themselves in 
accordance with the provisions of the current working 
agreement.

(H) Any employee who prior to this agreement was 
not required to change seniority districts or residence to 
maintain protective benefits will not be required to do so 
by operation of this agreement.

(I) Revised seniority rosters necessitated by the ap­
plication of this amendment shall be issued as soon as 
possible after the expiration of the thirty (30) calendar 
day period provided in Paragraph (E) hereof and, if 
issued prior to July 1, 1974, shall be regarded as meet­
ing the requirements of Paragraph 5(a) of the current 
working agreement, except that such rosters shall be 
open to protest for a period of 120 calendar days from 
the date of posting. If no protest is registered within 
that period, the date shown shall be regarded as correct 
and not subject to further protest.

(J) A copy of this agreement shall be posted on all 
bulletin boards and placed in bulletin books at all loca­
tions where bulletins for clerical positions are ordinarily 
and customarily displayed for a period of not less than 
sixty (60) calendar days from the effective date of this 
agreement.



66a

(K) All agreements, amendments, supplements, or in­
terpretations in conflict with the provisions of this Memo­
randum Agreement are hereby cancelled insofar as the 
conflicting portions are concerned.

The changes in the existing collective bargaining agree­
ment set forth above shall become effective March 1, 1974, 
or ten (10) calendar days from the date (whichever 
comes later) the Honorable Judge Lawrence approves this 
modification in the seniority system.



67a

APPENDIX 16

[If 9248] Lorenzo Hayes et ah, Plaintiffs v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al„, Defendants,

United States District Court, Southern District of 
Georgia, Savannah Division. No. 2371. March 22, 1974.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964
Racial Discrimination— Railroad Industry— Court Ac­

tion.— A racial discrimination suit filed against a rail­
road company was consolidated with a related court ac­
tion under which questions of seniority and employment 
status of certain employees were to be decided. 42 U.S.C. 
2000e.

Back reference.— If 2510.15.
Issuing order directing consolidation with English v. 

Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. (DC Ga. 1971) 3 FPD 
If 8316.

Order
Lawrence, C. J .: The above action having come before 

the Court upon motions of Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
Company, and briefs and arguments of counsel having 
been received and considered, it is

Ordered, that this action be and hereby is consolidated 
with the pending action in the Way cross Division of this 
Court styled as “ William English, Jr. v. Seaboard Coast 
Line Railroad Company, et al., Civil Action No. 691,” for 
trial in the second stage of that ease; and it is

Further Ordered that, as this Court has previously 
ruled, all allegations with respect to the seniority or em­
ployment status of former Savannah Union Station Com­
pany employees shall be dealt with at such trial.



68a

[If 9558] Lorenzo Hayes et al., Plaintiffs v. Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company et al., Defendants.

United States District Court, Southern District of 
Georgia, Savannah Division. No. 2371. July 1, 1974.

Title VII— Civil Rights Act of 1964
Racial Discrimination— Railroad Industry— Seniority 

Transfer— Settlement Agreement.— A settlement agree­
ment was to be implemented resolving the issue of senior­
ity transfer between a railroad and its predecessor as 
raised in a court action for racial discrimination. 42 
U.S.C. Sec. 2Q00e.

Back reference.-—ft 1376.
Approving settlement in (DC Ga. 1968) 1 EPD If 9936, 

and supplemental decision in (DC Ga. 1969) 1 EPD 
If 9953, 46 F.R.D. 49, after denial of motion to dismiss 
(D.C. Ga. 1971) 3 EPD If 8170, and denial of leave to 
appeal in (CA-5 1971) 3 EPD If 8320, and issuance of 
rulings in (DC Ga. 1973) 6 EPD If 8971, (DC Ga. 1973) 
6 EPD If 9032, and (DC Ga. 1974) 7 EPD ff 9248.

Fletcher Farrington, for Plaintiffs.

Hunter, Houlihan, Maclean, Exley, Dunn & Connerat, 
and W. Donlon, for Defendants.

Order

Lawrence, Ch.J.: The above matter having come be­
fore the Court upon stipulation of the parties for entry 
of the attached agreement, it is

ORDERED, that the attached agreement and stipula­
tion is made an order of this Court, and the parties here­
to, their agents, employees, and persons acting in concert

APPENDIX 17



69a

with them, are hereby enjoined from interfering with or 
disregarding the provisions thereof.

Stipulation

The parties to this action hereby stipulate and agree 
as follows:

That, in consideration of the agreement between De­
fendants Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company and 
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks 
attached hereto as Exhibit “A ” and made a part hereof, 
plaintiffs expressly agree to waive, abandon and forego 
any claim of racial discrimination, including any claim 
for monetary compensation, because the seniority of for­
mer employees of Savannah Union Station Company was 
not transferred to Defendant SCL’s predecessor lines 
upon the hiring of those employees by SCL’s predecessor 
lines, i.e. the SAL and the ACL.

Exhibit “A ”

MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT

BETWEEN

SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD COMPANY 
AND ITS EMPLOYEES REPRESENTED BY 
BROTHERHOOD OF RAILWAY, AIRLINE & 

STEAMSHIP CLERKS

The parties signatory hereto having conferred and 
reached an understanding this date to place former Sa­
vannah Union Station employees on Seaboard Coast Line 
Railroad Company’s seniority roster as of dates held on 
former Savannah Union Station seniority rosters,



70a

It Is Hereby Agreed That:
1. Employees whose names, along with their current 

SCL and former SUS seniority dates, appear hereinbelow 
are the employees covered by this agreement.

SCL Seniority SUS Seniority
Name Date Date

Group I
A. S. Hubert* 4-01-62 12-08-39
V. Burke (Rogers) ** 4-04-62 10-12-42
R. F. Clark 4-04-62 3-08-43
P. M. Rowell x 4-05-62 1-17-44
J. B. Anderson ** 4-06-62 5-06-44
C. E. DeLoach 4-07-62 10-25-45
R. B. Saturday (Bridges) ** 4-07-62 8-12-56
A. L. Smith * 4-08-62 9-26-56

Group II
J. E. Rickenbacker ** 6-02-62 7-02-29
A. Williams ** 6-03-62 4-20-35
W. L. Stringer 6-05-62 8-09-42
L. H. Stevens ** 6-04-62 7-04-43
R. West ** 6-08-62 10-11-45
R. Williams 6-08-62 5-03-50
W. Campbellx 6-06-62 12-11-45
F. Moore ** 6-09-62 10-18-48
E. Maloy x 6-07-62 9-01-49
W. R. Butler 6-10-62 9-01-49
F. Wilson 6-11-62 11-14-49

Telegraphers
W.M. Saturday # 4-06-62 10-19-42
B. V. Burnside 4-07-62 6-21-44
H. L. Wallace x 4-08-62 6-20-45

* Occupying non-contract position
** Leave of Absence—AMTRAK
* Disability Annuity
*  Occupying Train Dispatcher position



71a

2. Effective immediately, employees named above will 
have their original SUS seniority dates, as indicated 
above, and their names will hereafter appear on their 
respective Savannah Division seniority rosters in the or­
der of their SUS seniority.

3. No employee shall, in the operation of this agree­
ment, be entitled to displace other employees; however 
they shall hereafter be entitled to place themselves in ac­
cordance with the provisions of the current working 
agreement.

4. Recognizing that the initial issuance of rosters pur­
suant to this agreement may result in dispute about 
established seniority rosters, it shall be open to protest for 
a period of 90 days from the date of posting. If no pro­
test is registered within that period, the dates shown 
shall be regarded as correct and not subject to further 
protest.

5. This agreement is made to dispose of, or in contem­
plation of the disposal of certain pending litigation, and 
will not establish a precedent, and will not be referred 
to by either party in the handling of any other matter, 
seniority entitlement, or otherwise which is not directly 
related to this specific transaction.



72a

APPENDIX 18

CIVIL DOCKET
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

No. 2371
Lorenzo Hayes, Smith B. Hamilton, Godfrey M. Da­

vis, W illie Campbell, Lee H. Stephens, individually 
and on behalf of others similarly situated

Vs.
Seaboard A ir Line Railroad Company, a corporation; 

Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, a corpora­
tion; Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship 
Clerks, Freight Handlers and Station Employees, 
an unincorporated association; Local Lodge No. 1338, 
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 
Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, 
an unincorporated association; Local Lodge No. 1587, 
Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, 
Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, 
an unincorporated association.

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1968
July 31 Filing original Complaint seeking permanent in­

junctive action. J. S. 5 card prepared.
July 31 Preparing copies and issuing Summons for service.
Aug. 6 Filing Marshal’s Return of Service.
Aug. 20 Filing and entering Order granting all Defendants 

an additional fifteen days to file pleadings.
Sept. 3 Filing defendants Answer, with certificate of 

Service.
Sept. 3 Filing Defendant Interrogatories with Certificate 

of Service.



73a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1968 
Sept. 3 Filing Defendants Motion to Strike, Motion to Stay 

Action, and to Dismiss a complaint with a Cer­
tificate of Service.

Sept. 6 Filing Answer of defendants other than Seaboard 
Air Line Railroad Co. and Atlantic Coast Line 
Railroad Company with certificate of service there­
on.

Oct. 10 Motion to Substitute Proper Party-Defendant and 
to Amend Complaint.

Oct. 10 
Oct. 10

Motion to Strike Demand for Jury Trial.
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike De­
mand for Jury Trial.

Oct. 21 Interrogatories of Defendants other than Seaboard 
Air Line Railroad Company and Atlantic Coast 
Line Railroad Company.

Nov. 7 Filing Affidavit by Defendant, Seaboard Air Line 
Railroad Co.’s Director of Labor relations’s affi­
davit in support of motion to Dismiss or stay the 
case because of lack of efforts by the Equal Em­
ployment Opportunity Commission to conciliate, 
with certificate of service attached.

Nov. 18 Filing Plaintiffs’ First Interrogatories to Defend­
ant, Seaboard Coast Line RR. Co., with certificate 
of Service upon opposing counsel.

Nov. 18 Filing Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s Motion 
to Dismiss., with certificate of service.

Nov. 18 Filing Plaintiffs’ Motion for an order of Court 
for an order staying the filing of answers to inter­
rogatories hereto served by Seaboard Coast Line 
Railroad Company, with certificate of service.

Nov. 19 Filing Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
Objections to Plaintiff’s Motion in regard to In­
terrogatories with certificate of service thereon.



74a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1968
Nov. 22 Filing Defendant’s Affidavit in support of motion 

to strike with certificate of service.

Dec. 2 Filing Plaintiffs’ SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORAN­
DUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO DIS­
MISS. Copy of Mem. given to Law Clerk.

Dec. 9 Filing Opinion and Order of Court allowing Mo­
tion to Strike Defendant’s Demand for a Jury 
Trial on Issue of back pay, Motion of SCL yo 
Strike Allegation in Par. VIII of the Complaint 
and Motion to substitute Seaboard Coast Line RR. 
Co. for the Two Railroad Defendants who have 
merged.

Dec. 19 Filing Motion to Alter or amend the Order of 
12/9/68 or in the alternative to certify question 
for purpose of an interlocutory Appeal. Copy to 
Law Clerk.

Dec. 19 Filing Memorandum in support of motion to alter 
or amend.

1969

Jan. 6 Filing Defendant’s objections to Plaintiffs’ Motion 
to amend the order of 12/9/68 or to certify ques­
tion for appeal; Defendant’s Motion to Certify 
Denial of Jury trial for purpose of interlocutory 
appeal. Copy served on Law Clerk.

Jan. 14 Filing Supplemental Order of this Court ruling on 
various Motions. Notice of filing and copy of the 
order served on Counsel for all parties.

Jan. 15 Filing Defendant Railroad’s Motion to Limit back 
pay claims to Class Members who filed EEDC 
grievances.



75a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1969
Jan. 17 Filing Order of Court ordering that Notice of Class 

Action be given pursuant to Rule 23c (2) R.R.C.P. 
with exhibits attached. Copy of order and Notice 
of filing served on Counsel for all parties.

April 1 Filing Certificate of Service by Mr. Malcolm Mac- 
lean, Attorney for Defendants in accordance with 
the Court’s Order of February 14, 1969 that a 
copy of the Notice of Pendency of Action and Re­
quest for Exclusion to each of the persons named 
in the aforesaid Order of Court.

Sept. 22 Filing Plaintiffs’ Answers to Interrogatories Pro­
pounded by Defendant Seaboard Coast Line Rail­
road Company, with certificate of service thereon.

Sept. 22 Filing Plaintiffs’ Answer to Interrogatories Pro­
pounded by Defendant, Brotherhood of Railway 
and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers Express 
and Station Employees with certificate of serv­
ice thereon.

1970
April 17 Filing Amendment to Answer of Defendant Sea­

board Coast Line Railroad Company, with order 
of Court allowing the amendment filed subject to 
objections and with certificate of service.

April 17 Filing Defendant’s Second Interrogatories pro­
pounded to Plaintiff, with certificate of service.

April 20 Filing answer of defendant Seaboard Coast Line 
Railroad Co. to Interrogatories served by Plaintiffs 
with verification and certificate of service at­
tached thereto.

June 2 Filing Answer of Defendant Seaboard Coast Line 
Railroad Co. to Interrogatory 1(b) served by 
Plaintiff, with certificate of service.



76a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1970
Aug. 25 Filing Defendant’s First Amendment to Answer to 

First Interrogatories served by Plaintiff on De­
fendant, by adding two sentences to Interrogatory 
No. 13 and No. 14, with certificate of service.

Oct. 15 Filing Motion of SEABOARD COAST LINE 
RAILROAD COMPANY to Dismiss for Failure of 
Plaintiff to join indispensible parties with certifi­
cate of service.

Oct. 15 Filing SEABOARD COAST LINE RAILROAD 
COMPANY’S Request for Admissions of Facts 
with certificate of service attached thereto.

Oct. 27 Filing Defendant’s First Amendment to Request 
for Admission of Facts. With Certificate of Serv­
ice thereon.

1971
Feb. 1 Filing Defendant, Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 

Go’s Second Motion to Dismiss for failure to join 
indispensable parties. Copy to Law Clerk.

Feb. 16 Filing to take deposition of James E. Wolfe at 
10:00 A.M. on the 25th day of March at his home 
at 226 Holmes Avenue, Clarendon Hills, 111.
The deposition will be taken by the Defendant, with 
certificate of service.

Feb. 23 Filing Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Join Indispens­
able Parties with Certificate of Service.

Feb. 25 Filing Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Entered on Motion docket and delivered copy to 
Law Clerk.

March 18 Filing Defendant’s Memorandum in opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Copy delivered to 
the Law Clerk.

March 22 Filing Plaintiff’s Requests for admissions.



77a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1971
March 25 Filing Memorandum in opposition to Second Mo-

April 8

tion to Dismiss for Failure to join indispensable 
parties. Copy to the Law Clerk.
Filing Defendant’s Requests for Admission of Doc­
uments, with Notice to Plaintiff’s Attorney.

April 9 Filing and entering Order of Court overruling De­
fendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to join in­
dispensable parties and suggesting that the action 
be stayed until such time as the Plaintiffs file an 
amendment naming as one of the respondents one 
or more of the white employees included in this 
action. The Court overrules this motion without 
prejudicing the Defendant Railroad’s right to 
present such facts at the trial of the case.
Copy of order mailed to Counsel for Plaintiff and 
to Counsel for the Brotherhood of Railway & 
Steamship Clerks & Etc.

April 20 Filing and entering Motion to alter or amend the 
order of April 9, 1971 or in the alternative to 
certify the question for purpose of an interlocu­
tory appeal, with certificate of Service attached 
thereto.

April 23 Filing Answers to Plaintiffs’ request for Admis­
sions, with cert, of service.

April 29 Filing Defendant’s Notice to Take Testimony of 
Willie Campbell, Uley Hamilton and Lee H. Ste­
phens, before Mrs. Gloria Kitchings, N.P., at 10:00 
A.M., May 19, 1971, at 1004 Savannah Bank Bldg., 
Savannah, Ga., with certificate of service.

April 29 Filing Defendant’s Notice to Take Testimony of 
Lorenzo Hayes, Smith B. Hamilton and Godfrey 
M. Davis before Mrs. Gloria Kitchings, N.P., on 
May 18, 1971, at 10:00 A.M., at 1004 Savannah



DATE PROCEEDINGS

1971
Bank Bldg., Savannah, Ga., with certificate of 
service.

May 28 Filing Motion of Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
Company to require Plaintiffs to Answer Inter­
rogatories. Copy delivered to the Law Clerk.

June 7 Filing Sealed Deposition of Lorenzo Hayes taken 
on the 18th day of May, 1971 by Defendants.

June 7 Filing Sealed Deposition of Godfrey M. Davis, 
taken by Defendants, on the 18th day of May, 1971.

June 7 Filing Sealed Deposition, taken by Defendants, on 
the 18th day of May, 1971 of Smith B. Hamilton.

June 29 Filing and entering Motion to Plaintiff to deter­
mine sufficiency of defendant’s objections to Plain­
tiff’s requests for admissions, compel answers, and 
award expenses of motion, with Certificate of 
Service.

July 2 Filing and entering order of this Court ordering 
that Plaintiff’s Motion to Alter or amend, is de­
nied, except insofar as it requests that the question 
requiring white clerks to be joined as party de­
fendants in this action be joined, as party defend­
ants under Title VIII, 42 USC, Section 2000e, et. 
seq. be certified for interlocutory appeal; order 
further certifying that the above question shall be 
presented to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit, Notice of filing and copy of 
order mailed to all counsel this date.

July 12 Filing Defendant Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
Company’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
with certificate of service thereon.

July 16 Filing Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Docu­
ments, with certificate of service thereon.



79a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1971
July 29 Filing Defendant Seaboard Coast Line RR. Co.’s 

Reservation of Rights to Respond or object to 
Plaintiffs’ request for Production of Documents, 
with cert, of service. Copy to Law Clerk.

Aug. 24 Filing true copy of order issued by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
denying Plaintiff’s leave to appeal from the inter­
locutory order of the District Court, Southern Dis­
trict of Georgia on July 2, 1971 for want of juris­
diction.

Oct. 21 Filing Plaintiff’s Memorandum in opposition to 
Seaboard’s Motion for partial Summary Judgment.

1972 
Feb. 28 Filing Notice of Defendant to take the testimony 

of Willie Campbell on March 28, 1972 with Notice 
to Plaintiff’s Attorney. Issued deposition subpoena.

April 4 Filing sealed Deposition of Willie Campbell, taken 
on March 28th, 1972 taken by the defendants.

April 26 Filing Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
Second Amendment to its Answer, with certificate 
of service thereon.

April 26 Filing Defendant’s Fourth Motion stating that they 
(Seaboard Coast Line RR.) move the court for an 
order limiting all back pay sought under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, with certificate 
of service thereon. (Or in the alternative, for an 
order limiting such back pay to July 1, 1965.)

May 3 Filing Defendant’s Second Request for Admission 
of Documents, with Notice of filing and certificate 
of service.

May 3 Filing Defendant’s Fifth Motions— 1. To issue an 
order making the United Transport Service Em­
ployees, AFL-CIO a party Defendant, with pro­
posed order, to direct issuance of process and



80a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1972
served upon Defendant and 3. Requiring Plaintiff 
to serve and file an amended complaint to this ef­
fect, with certificate of service and affidavit of 
Charles Edwards.

May 9 Filing Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
Motion to Dismiss Lorenzo Hayes as a party 
Plaintiff and to Dismiss Willie Campbell as party 
Plaintiff, with certificate of service. Entered on 
Motion docket and Attorney furnished the Law 
Clerk with a copy of the Motions.

June 15 Filing Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Request 
for Production of documents.

June 16 Filing Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth Motions.

1973

Feb. 1 Filing Motion of Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
Company to amend its answer, with attached 
Order of Court allowing motion, subject to objec­
tions. Notice of filing and copy of Order served 
on Counsel.

Nov. 8 Filing Plaintiff’s Motion in the alternative for re­
assignment of case to a Circuit or a District Judge 
for hearing.

Nov. 8 Pre-trial hearing called this date. Attorneys for 
parties present. Discussion on each side’s position 
made to the Court. Mr. Farrington Attorney for 
the Plaintiff presented the above motion for re­
assignment of this case to another Judge, Court 
stated that he will sign order for appointment of 
another Judge, Hearing in recess.



81a

DATE

1973
Nov. 9

Nov. 9 

Nov. 16

Nov. 16 

Nov. 16

Nov. 19 

Nov. 19

PROCEEDINGS

Filing Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co.’s Re­
sponse in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion in the 
Alternative for Reassignment of case.
Filing Coast Line Railroad’s Company’s Memoran­
dum in opposition to Motion for Reassignment.
Filing Notice of and Motion for Plaintiff for Pre­
liminary Injunction, with memorandum Agree­
ment between Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. 
and its employees represented by Brotherhood of 
Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight 
Handlers, Express and Station Employees and 
certificate of service.
Filing Plaintiffs’ Motion to join Defendant United 
States Transportation Union as a Defendant, with 
copy of First amended Complaint, with certificate 
of service.
Filing Interim Order, Plaintiffs having moved to 
add party Defendant, the United Transportation 
Union and setting hearing on all of the motions 
filed this date to be held at 10:00 A.M. in the 
United States Courthouse, Savannah, Georgia on 
December 12, 1973. (Plaintiff’s Attorney to serve 
copy of motions and order setting hearing).
Notice of hearing set for December 12 next mailed 
to all Counsel of record with order setting the 
hearing.
Filing and entering Order of Court on motions; 
that Order of 4-9-71 is accordingly vacated, SCL’s 
motion for limitation of back pay are reserved for 
decision at or following trial; SCL’s fifth motion 
is dismissed as moot; SCL’s sixth motions are de­
nied ; SCL’s motion for partial summary j udgment 
is denied; and SCL’s motion to compel answer to



82a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1973
its second interrogatories is granted, but costs and 
attorneys fees are denied. Plaintiffs are ordered to 
respond fully to said interrogatories within thirty 
days of the date of this order, all objections there­
to having been waived. Notice of filing and copy of 
Order served on counsel.

Nov. 20 Filing SCL’s Eighth Motions—to dismiss all claims, 
to stay this action, to grant SC'L its attorneys’ fees, 
costs and expenses, with certificate of service.

Nov. 20 Filing Brief in support of SCL’s eighth Motions, 
with certificate of service.

Nov. 20 Filing Interrogatories to Members of the Class 
represented by Lorenzo Hayes, et. al. with certifi­
cate of service.

Nov. 26 Filing Response of Defendants Brotherhood of 
Railway and Airline Clerks, et. al. to motion of the 
Plaintiffs to join the United Transportation Union 
as a party defendant, with certificate of service.

Nov. 26 Filing Response to Defendants Brotherhood of 
Railway and Airline Clerks, et. al. in opposition 
to Plaintiffs’ Motion in the alternative for re­
assignment of case, with certificate of service at­
tached.

Nov. 28 Filing Response of Defendants Brotherhood of 
Railway and Airline Clerks, et al in opposition to 
Motion of Plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction 
with exhibit order attached.

Dec. 5 Filing Response of Defendants Brotherhood of 
Railway and Airline Clerks, et. al., in support of 
Def. SCL RR Company’s Eighth Motions, with 
certificate of service attached.



83a

DATE

1973 
Dec. 12

Dec. 13

Dec. 21 

1974
March 18

March 22

PROCEEDINGS

Hearing on all matters still pending and filed after 
pre-trial hearing held 11-8-73. Attorneys present 
and presented arguments. Trial set for April 15th, 
1974, Monday at 10:00 A.M.
Filing Order of Court on Plaintiffs Motion to join 
the United Transportation Union as a party De­
fendant and for leave to file an amended complaint 
attached to the motion. Motion is denied; further 
ordering that Plaintiffs’ Motion to compel answers 
to their requests for admission of facts is granted 
and Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. is ordered 
to respond to said requests on or before January 1, 
1974. Copy mailed to all Counsel for the parties.
Filing Second Answers to Plaintiffs’ Requests for 
Admission of Facts, certificate of service.

Filing Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
Ninth Motions, to consolidate this action with Way- 
cross #691 and for an Order granting SCL’s mo­
tion for partial summary judgment, with RULE 
NISI attached ordering that plaintiffs show cause 
before this Court on March 22nd, 197U, at 3:30 
P.M. why said motions should not be granted, 
with certificate of service attached.
Filing Order of Court on motions of Seaboard 
Coast Line Railroad Company and briefs and ar­
guments of Counsel ordering that this action be 
and is hereby consolidated with pending action in 
the Way cross Division of this Court styled as 
“William English, Jr. v. Seaboard Coast Line Rail­
road Company, et al action No. 691 for trial in the 
second stage of that case and further ordering all 
allegations with respect to the seniority or employ­
ment status of former Savannah Union Station



84a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1973

Company Employees shall be dealt with at such 
trial. [Copy of order mailed to all Counsel of Rec­
ord in this case and in the Waycross C /A  691].

May 30 Filing SCL RR Company’s response to Plaintiff’s 
Amendment to this proposed Order and Plaintiff’s 
proposed conclusions of Law attached, with cer­
tificate of service.

July 1 Filing Stipulation and agreement between Defend­
ants, Seaboard Coast Line RR. Co. and Brother­
hood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks to 
waive, abandon and forego any claim of racial dis­
crimination, including any claim for monetary com­
pensation, because the seniority of former em­
ployees of Savannah Union Station Company was 
not transferred to Defendant SCL’s predecessor 
lines upon the hiring of those employees by SCL’s 
predecessor lines, i.e. the SAL and AC'L., with 
list of employees covered by agreement, with order 
of Court ordering the parties hereto, their agents, 
employees, and persons acting in concert are here­
by enjoined from interfering with or disregarding 
the provisions thereof. (Copy of order mailed to 
Counsel)

July 16 Filing Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
Renewal of Motion to compel answers to interroga­
tories, with certificate of service.

July 16 Filing and entering Order of Court that deft’s mo­
tion to compel answers to interrogatories is al­
lowed and plaintiff is ordered to answer said inter­
rogatories fully, in writing, under oath, on or be­
fore August 31, 1974. Notice of filing and copy of 
Order served on all parties.



85a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1974
July 18 Filing Seaboard Coastline Railroad C'o’s Motion to 

Compel Answers to interrogatories, with certificate 
of Service.

July 18 Filing and entering Order of Court that each indi­
vidual member of the class represented by plain­
tiffs answer said interrogatories fully, in writing, 
under oath, on or before August 31, 1974. Notice 
of filing and copy of Order served on all parties.

Aug. 28 Filing Motion of Plaintiffs to reconsider and va­
cate orders of July 16 and July 18, 1974., with 
certificate of service.

Sept. 4 Filing Rule Nisi ordering that plaintiffs show 
cause before this Court on Tuesday, the 1st day of 
October, 1974 at 2:00 PM why motion of Seaboard 
Coastline RR Co.’s Motion for Sanctions and re­
sponse to Motion for reconsideration, FILED THIS 
DATE, should not be granted. Copy of Rule Nisi 
and notice of filing served on counsel.

Oct. 1 Hearing held this date on pending Motions called 
this date. Attorneys present. Both sides presented 
arguments to the Court. Court will not compel an­
swers at this time, should be reserved for second 
stage. All other motions held until Court completes 
opinion in the English case, Waycross C /A  691.



86a

APPENDIX 19 

CIVIL DOCKET

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
No. CV474-69

Uley Hamilton and Godfrey M. Davis

vs.
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company, a corpora­

tion; United Transportation Union, an unincorpo­
rated association; Local Lodge Number 1031, United 
Transportation Union, an unincorporated association.

Suit brought in equity authorized and instituted against 
defendant SCL pursuant to Title VII of the Act of Con­
gress known as “ The Civil Rights Act of 1964” , 42 U.S.C. 
/§ § 2000e, el seq. and for declaratory judgment as to rights 
established under legislation. Also pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

'§ 1981

DATE PROCEEDINGS _____________

1974
April 18 Filing Original Complaint, preparing copies, issu­

ing summons and delivered to U.S. Marshal for 
service.

J. S. 5 Card Prepared
April 30 Filing Answer of SCL RR Co., with exhibits at­

tached and certificate of service thereon.
April 30 Filing Defts. SC'L RR Co., Motions to Dismiss, For 

an Order of Court pursuant to Rule 23, For an 
Order of Court requiring notice to be given to all 
members of the alleged class, an Order requiring 
pltfs to describe in detail the members of the class, 
For trial by jury, and to Strike, with certificate of 
service thereon.



87a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1974
April 30 Filing SCL RR Co.’s Brief in support of motions, 

with certificate of service attached.
May 6 Filing Motion of Defts, United Transportation Un­

ion and Local Lodge #1031, United Transportation 
Union for an order enlarging the time in which to 
file defensive pleadings, consented to by plaintiff’s 
attorney, with ORDER OF COURT attached allow­
ing motion and ordering that defts have until June 
1, 1974 to serve and file their defensive pleadings.

May 6 Filing Plaintiffs motion to Amend complaint with 
proposed order attached, with certificate of serv­
ice thereon.

May 6 Filing and entering Order of Court granting mo­
tion of pltf to amend Complaint. Notice of filing 
and copy of Order served on all counsel.

May 16 Filing U.S. Marshal’s return on service of Com­
plaint.

May 17 Filing ANSWER of Defendants United Transpor­
tation Union and Local Lodge No. 1031, United 
Transportation Union, with certificate of service.

May 23 Filing Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
First Interrogatories to Plaintiff, Godfrey M. Da­
vis with Notice and certificate of service.

June 27 Filing Plaintiff’s Notice to take deposition of De­
fendant Corporation at 10 :00 A.M., Monday July 
8, 1974 at the offices of Plaintiff’s Attorneys, Hill, 
Jones and Farrington, Savannah, Georgia.

July 5 Filing Plaintiff Godfrey’s Answer to Defendant 
Seaboard Coast Line First Interrogatories.

July 5 Filing Plaintiff, Davis’s Answers to Defendant 
Seaboard Coast Line First Interrogatories.

July 11 Filing Request for admission of documents by 
defts, SCL, with certificate of service.



88a

DATE
1974 

July 15

July 15

July 15 

July 15

July 22

Aug. 1

Aug. 1 
Not Re­

corded

Aug. 5

Aug. 9

1975
March 10 

March 10

PROCEEDINGS

Filing Plaintiffs First Interrogatories to Defend­
ant & Certificate of service.
Plaintiff Godfrey Davis’ First Supplemental An­
swers to Defendant Seaboard Coast Line’s First 
Interrogatories & certificate of service.
Plaintiffs’ Motion in the alternative for reassign­
ment of case & certificate of service.
Filing Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
Second Motions, with certificate of service. (To 
Dismiss or in Alternative for Plaintiffs to decide 
whether they wish to proceed as pltfs in #2371.)
Filing Plaintiff’s Response to Seaboard Coast Line’s 
request for Admission of Documents.
Filing and entering Seaboard Coastlines Railroad 
Co’s Third Brief, with certificate of service.
Case called for hearing this date on pending mo­
tions. Arguments made by counsel for the parties. 
Court took under advisement. Another hearing— 
probable evidentiary—will be set at some later 
date.
Filing Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company’s 
Amendment to Motion to Dismiss, with certificate 
of service.
Filing Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company’s 
answers to Plaintiffs’ First Interrogatories, with 
certificate of service.

Filing Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint to 
add Booker T. Snowden, Party-Plaintiff.
Hearing on re-arguments called this date. At­
torneys present for the parties. Arguments pre­
sented to the Court; Plaintiff’s Atty. filed his 2nd



89a

DATE PROCEEDINGS
1974

motion to amend the complaint. Defendant object­
ed to the motion to amend. Issue in question is 
that blacks should be allowed to switch crafts and 
carry over seniority from last craft. Court over­
ruled Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Court will hold evidentiary hearing at 9 :30 A.M. 
on May 5th, 1975 possibly two days.

March 10 Filing Defendant, Seaboard Coast Line RR Co.’s 
Objection to the attempted “Rule 20(a) Amend­
ment of the complaint to join Booker T. Snowden 
as an intervening party Plaintiff,

March 13 Filing Third Motions of Seaboard Coast Line Rail­
road Co. to Dismiss.

March 13 Filing Defendant, Seaboard Coast Line Railroad 
Co.’s Answer to Plaintiffs’ Second Motion to 
Amend Complaint.

March 28 Filing Deposition of Mr. B. T. Snowden, taken by 
defendants, at the offices of Hunter, Houlihan, Mac- 
lean, Exley, Dunn & Connerat, on March 20th, 
1975 at 12:00 Noon.

April 10 Filing Objections of United Transportation Un­
ion, Defts, to the joinder of Booker T. Snowden 
as a party pltf or in the alternative Motion for 
Summary Judgment, with certificate of service.

April 15 Filing Brief of United Transportation Union, De­
fendants, in support of objections to addition of 
Booker T. Snowden as party plaintiff, with cer­
tificate of service.

April 15 Hearing on Motion objecting to intervention of 
Booker T. Snowden as a party plaintiff. Attorneys 
present, arguments presented to the court by both 
sides. Court sustains objection to intervention. 
Atty Farrington will prepare order transferring 
Snowden to Way cross Seniority Roster.



90a

DATE PROCEEDINGS

1975
May 1 Filing Transcript of proceedings taken April 15, 

1975 in Savannah, Ga. before the Hon. Alexander 
A. Lawrence, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court. 
(Pursuant to Order of May 2, this transcript 
mailed to Waycross Div.)

May 2 Filing and entering Order of Court that the clerk 
is instructed to send all records in the file con­
nected with Booker T. Snowden’s claim to the Way- 
cross Division along with a copy of this Order, this 
includes Snowden’s attempt at intervention, the 
objections filed by UTU and SC'L, the motions and 
answer filed by SCL., the briefs filed by SCL and 
UTU, Snowden’s deposition and a transcript of 
the hearing held before the court on the objec­
tions to Snowden’s intervention. Notice of filing 
and copy of Order served on all counsel.

May 5 Pursuant to above order of court, pleadings, as 
set out in order, are hereby transferred to Way- 
cross Division this date.

May 5 Case called for non-jury trial before the Court this 
date on merits of the case this date. Opening

Recorded statements made to the Court by both sides. Wit­
nesses called, sworn and remained in the Court­
room. Plaintiffs’ witnesses began testifying and 
introduced evidence to the Court at 10:20 A.M. and 
resumed at 2:00 P.M. after lunch. Plaintiff rested, 
Defendants’ Witnesses began testifying and intro­
ducing evidence to the Court at 2 :22 P.M. and con­
cluded at 4:40 P.M. [Exhibits introduced into evi­
dence: Plaintiffs—Three and Defendant— 19] 
[Defendant’s Exhibit No. 18 stored in vault be­
cause of bulk].



91a

APPENDIX 20

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

SAVANNAH DIVISION 

English, et al.

vs.

Seaboard Coastline Railroad

Proceedings before the Honorable Alexander A. Lawrence, 
U.S. District Judge, Southern District of Georgia, 

Savannah, Georgia, on April 15, 1975.

APPEARANCES:
For Seaboard Coastline Railroad 

Malcolm Maclean 
Savannah Bank Building 
Savannah, Georgia

For English, et al.
Fletcher Farrington 
208 East 34th Street 
Savannah, Georgia

[3] THE COURT: Now, Mr. Maclean had another
matter.

MR. MACLEAN: Well, Sir, you’ve pretty well dis­
couraged me on it, but I’ll be glad to bring it up again. 

THE COURT: He’s after me to . . .
MR. MACLEAN: I told Fletcher that I . . .
THE COURT: In a class action, include everybody up

and down the line . . .
MR. MACLEAN: And the reason for that is, if  Your 

Honor please. You know and Mr. Farrington knows that



92a

the reason for that is that in the beginning, we though 
we were gonna have one ease, and maybe two, in Georgia 
and it turns out we don’t have it that way. We have ’em 
here, we’ve got ’em in the Middle District of North Caro­
lina, in the Eastern District of Virginia and there was 
another one filed the other day in Jacksonville. And, it 
is our feeling—you have issued three orders, as I re­
call— Four orders that have to do with the whole class. 
You have— You’ve issued an order that put together 
groups one and two, and that wasn’t just in here. That 
order is—is— is to do with the contract between the rail­
road and the union and they have put those two classes 
together. There is no longer groups one and two, and 
that’s true from Miami to Birmingham, to Richmond. 
You’ve issued some more orders in connection with some 
people that Fletcher represents in Jacksonville that were 
put into the Hayes case because we wanted an order in 
this case—the Hayes and English case-—Anyhow, an order 
in this Court that deals with what’s goin’ on in Jackson­
ville. We had another order about some [4] trainmen 
out here, or the terminal people at uh— the Savannah 
station. We have— Everything that— Every order that’s 
connected with that contract that’s been issued has been 
issued from this Court. It will be a . . .

THE COURT: Well, I . . .
MR. MACLEAN: . . .  remarkable situation if we have

a District Judge in— in one state or one division of this 
country issuing one set of orders about- that contract, and 
different places issuing other orders. What we suggest 
is that if you take it and—then— the people in Virginia 
can either try the case down here, or they can just go 
ahead and try ’em in the Court in the Eastern District of 
Virginia, and the same thing holds true for Mr. Doctor 
in the Middle District of North Carolina. But if we have 
a— That case is on Appeal like that, and the BRAG— 
the BRAC people are presently dismissed. But that’s— 
that question is appealed to the Fourth Circuit. But, if



93a

the class is all in one place, we won’t have this— the 
anomalous position of different Judges— I mean, you—  
as I understand from this great book— learned book—  
the bench warmers— everybody’s ent— Every District 
Judge can say whatever they want about anything, sub­
ject to the correction by the Circuits. So, there’s no 
reason why the three District Judges before whom this 
contract is can’t come to different opinions about every­
thing about it, which would leave the Union and the 
Railroad in a very odd fix. And, what we’re tryin’ to 
do is— You’re quite right, because you [5:] told me we 
should have thought of this to begin with. Well, we 
should have. That’s true. But lackin’ , uh— We didn’t 
know it was gonna end up like this, and it’s like a lot of 
other things. Mr. Kissinger didn’t know that his Middle 
East policy—his Far East policy was gonna fall to pieces. 
We just didn’t foresee this. But now that it’s upon us, we 
—it seems to us that the only rational way to administer 
justice in this, or to come to some kind of conclusion to 
this case is for some District Judge to— to say, “ I’m going 
to be in charge of the contract.”  And, you have already 
assumed that position. And what we ask now is that you 
issue an order and say that that’s where we are. And, 
if you don’t want to do it, my other proposition is that 
you issue an order sayin’, “ I deny your order.”

THE COURT: Well, what you’re talkin’ to me about
this morning—was you foresaw, and perhaps correctly, 
that I wasn’t going to extend class beyond the Savannah 
and the Way cross particular areas, that you wanted me 
to certify the question that . . .

MR. MACLEAN: Yes, Sir. My argument then . . . 
I— I didn’t see any enthusiasm since I’ve been tryin’ to 
sell this particular package. You didn’t—haven’t seemed 
to be taken much with the idea, so it occurred to me that 
then— the thing to do would be— We made a formal mo­
tion, and we’ll be happy to prepare an order. Fletcher 
has gone up on a certified question in the English case,



94a

and well try and go up on [6] the same issue this 
time. . . .

THE COURT: Well, I can’t delay that case any 
longer and I’m tryin’ to bring it to a head, and that’s___

MR. MACLEAN: Well Sir, I’ll tell you somethin’
else Mr. Farrington and— Mr. Farrington can correct 
me if I’m mistaken. It’s my understanding from Mr. 
Farrington the other day,— he said once you decided, 
he’d join me in asking you to assume jurisdiction over 
the whole class . . .

THE COURT: All right, well— let— let that come 
when it does, and I hope that will be soon.

MR. MACLEAN: All right, Sir. Well, I just . . .
THE COURT: That’s all I can do for the present.
MR. MACLEAN: All right. Well, I. . . . No, that’s.

THE COURT: Well, you can take this off the record.



95a

I certify that the foregoing six pages of typewritten 
testimony in this case were taken down by me and tran­
scribed under my supervision and I further certify that 
it contains a true and correct transcript of testimony in 
the case English, et al. vs. Seaboard Coastline Railroad.

I certify that I am a disinterested party to this action 
and that I am not of kin or counsel to any of the parties 
hereto.

T h is ----------o f ----------------------, 1975.

James P. DeLoach, Jr. 
Official U. S. Court Reporter 
Southern District of Georgia 
Savannah, Georgia.

CERTIFICATE