Camer v. Seattle School District No. 1 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division I

    No.

IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1989

DOROTHY CAMER for herself and MIKI CAMER; 
KIRK CAMER; and PEPI CAMER,

Petitioners,

SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION I 

STATE OF WASHINGTON

Dorothy Camer
Pro Se

9021 24th Ave SW 
Seattle WA 98106 
(206) 767-4229

SMITH & MIDGLEY 
Daniel Hoyt Smith 
2200 Smith Tower 
Seattle, WA 98104 
(206) 682-1948

Counsel for Pclitioners



i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Are students in compulsory attendance at public 
schools, and their parents, entitled to Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process protection against arbitrary 
denial of the minimum elements of a basic education 
mandated by state law, regulation, and contract 
principles?

2. May the state courts refuse to protect students’ 
and parents’ federally protected due process liberty and 
property interests against arbitrary deprivation of a 
minimum education, on the basis of restrictive state law 
interpretations of "standing," "res judicata," and the state 
legislature’s failure to create a "private cause of action" 
for violation of the basic education laws?



11

The parties are the Petitioners: Dorothy Camer,
parent; and Kirk Camer, Pepi Camer, and Miki Camer, 
students; and Respondents: Seattle School District No. 1; 
William M. Kendrick, Donald J. Steele, Robert L. Nelson, 
and David L. Moberly, past and current school 
superintendents; Patt Sutton, John Rasmussen, Richard J. 
Alexander, Barbara Beuschlein, Michael Preston, T. J. 
Vassar, Cheryl Bleakness, Suzanne Hittman, Dorothy 
Hollingsworth, Ellen Roe, Susan Harris, Elizabeth Wales, 
and Jerry Saulter, past and current school board directors; 
David Stevens, Charles Trujillo, Ellen Lew, Robert 
Andrew, Cheryl Chow, Albert Jones, Rachel Gray, Chris 
Kato, Barbara Herring, Alan Neman, Sonya Watson, 
Robert Gary, Kenneth Dorsett, Gertrude A. Beamon, 
Susan Hanson, Jewell Woods, and Shirley Hodgeson, past 
and current administrative and teaching personnel; and 
Michael Hoge and Phillip Thompson, school district legal 
counsel.

LIST OF PARTIES



Ill

Questions Presented............................................................. i

List of Parties........................................................................ii

Table of Authorities.............................................................v

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI........................................................... 1

OPINION BELOW .............................................................2

JURISDICTION..................................................................2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS INVOLVED............................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE......................................... 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE
W RIT...........................................................................7

1. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects
Against Arbitrary Denial of the
Legitimate Entitlement to Basic
Education Which is Explicitly
Guaranteed and Defined by State Law ..................... 7

2. The Washington State Courts Have Failed
to Recognize the Plaintiff School
Children’s Federally Protected Rights...................... 13

CONCLUSION..................................................................18

APPENDICES

Decision of State Court of Appeals...............................A -1

Order of State Supreme Court...................................A -10

TABLE OF CONTENTS



IV

Mandate of State Court of Appeals........................... A-10

Order of King Co. Superior Court.................................B-l

Final Order of King Co. Superior Court.......................B-6

Camer v. Brouillet, State Court of Appeals
Decision................................................................. C-l

Camer v. Eikenberry Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals................................................... C-6

Washington Constitution and Laws.............................. D-l



V

Cases

Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970)........................... 17

Allen v. McCrary, 449 U.S. 90(1980)............................ 15

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. 242 (1986)...............................................  17

Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).............................................. 7,9

Camer v. Seattle School District,
52 Wn. App. 531, 762 P.2d 356
(1988)........................................................................  2

Camer v. Stevens, 50 Wn. App. 1018
(1987)........................................................................  4

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247
(1978)................................................................  16, 17

City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239(1983)..................................... 8

Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986).....................  13

Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986).........................
13

De Shaney v. Winnebago County,
No. 87-54, 57 L.W. 4218
(Feb. 22, 1989)........................................................  9

Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160
(1941)......................................................................  18

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).............................  8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES



VI

Felder v. Casey, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988)...................... 15

Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, Ala.,
829 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1987)............................. 15

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)......................... 11, 15

Hampton v. City of Chicago,
484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973)................................. 14

Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983).......................... 16

Kentucky Department of Corrections v.
Thompson, 57 L.W. 4531,
(May 15, 1989).......................................................  12

Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp.,
456 U.S. 461 (1982)....................'...........................  15

Maine v. Thibotout, 448 U.S. 1
(1980)..........................................................  13

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803)...........................................  14

Martinez v. California,
444 U.S. 277(1980)...............................................  13

Matzker v. Herr, 745 F.2d 1142
(7th Cir. 1984)....................................................  8, 13

Migra v. Warren City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984).......................... 15

Millikan v. Board of Directors of Everett 
School District, 93 Wn.2d 522,
611 P.2d 414 (1980)...............................................  12

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)............................ 14

O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563
(1975)........................................................................  9



V l l

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)................................... 9

San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)........................... 10, 11

Seattle School District v. State,
90 Wn.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71
(1978)..................................................................  3, 14

Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District,
856 F.2d 594 (3rd Cir. 1988)................................... 9

Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 881
(11th Cir. 1987)......................................................... 8

Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)................................. 13

University of Tennessee v. Elliot,
106 S.Ct. 3220 (1986)............................................. 15

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)......................  10

Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974)........................................................... 9

Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982)....................................................................  8 ,9

Constitution

U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV............................... 2

Statutes

28U.S.C. 1257(a)............................................................  2

42U.S.C. 1983.....................................................  2, 4, 5, 6

RCW 28A.02.080...........................................................  5, 7

RCW 28A.05.010...............................................................  5



V l l l

RCW 28A.05.050...............................................................  5

RCW 28A.27.020.............................................................  12

RCW 28A.58.090.........................................................  5,12

RCW 28A.58.750...............................................................  5

RCW 28A.58.754.........................................................  5, 12

RCW 28A.58.758...............................................................  5

RCW 58A.58.090.............................................................  11

WAC 180-16.......................................................................  5

WAC 180-50.......................................................................  5

Other Authority

National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, A Nation at Risk: The 
Imperative for Educational Reform 
(1983)........................................................................  7

C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 271-73
(4th Ed. 1983).......................................................... 13

Chambers, Adequate Education for All: A 
Right, An Achievable Goal, 22 
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
Law Rev. 55 (1987)................................................. 10

Changing Course-A 50-State Survey of 
Reform Measures," Educ. Week 11 
(Feb. 6, 1985)........................................................... 10

Kirp & Yudof, Educational Policy and
the Law (2d Ed. 1982)............................................ 10

Moore’s Federal Practice 0.411...................................... 16



IX

Nahmod, Civil Rights And Civil Liberties 
Litigation, The Law Of 1983 (2nd 
Edition)...................................................................  14

Neuborne, "The Myth of Parity," 90 Harv.
L. Rev. 1105 (1977)................................................ 14

Ratner, "A New Legal Duty for Urban 
Public Schools: Effective Education 
and Basic Skills,"
63 Tex. L. Rev. 787 (1985)....................................  10

U.S. Department of Education, "The
Nation Responds" (May 1984).............................  10



N o._________

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES

October Term, 1989

DOROTHY CAMER for herself and MIKI Camer; 
KIRK CAMER; and PEPI CAMER,

Petitioners,

SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, et al.,

Respondents.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
WASHINGTON STATE COURT OF APPEALS, 

DIVISION I

The petitioners, Dorothy Camer, parent, and Kirk, 
Pepi, and Miki Camer, students, respectfully pray that a 
Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment and 
opinion of the Washington State Court of Appeals, 
Division I, entered in this proceeding on October 10, 
1988.



2

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Washington State Court of 
Appeals, dated October 10, 1988, is reported at 762 P.2d 
356, 52 Wn. App. 531 (1988) and is reproduced in 
Appendix A. The order denying reconsideration was filed 
December 7,1988. The Petition for Discretionary Review 
by the Washington State Supreme Court was denied on 
February 28, 1989. The Order and Mandate are 
reproduced in Appendix B. The Findings and 
Conclusions and Order of Dismissal by the trial court are 
also at Appendix B. The decisions in the two prior related 
cases are at Appendix C.

JURISDICTION

This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under the U.S. 
Constitution, Amendment XIV, 42 U.S.C. 1983; and 28 
U.S.C. 1257(a), to review a final judgment of the highest 
court of a state which conflicts with the decisions of this 
court on important federal constitutional issues.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

The United States Constitution, Fourteenth 
Amendment; Washington Constitution, Article 9, Section 
1. Title 42, United States Code, 1983. Revised Code of 
Washington, Chapter 28A. Washington Administrative 
Code, Chapter 180.

Excerpts of State Constitution and Laws are set forth 
in Appendix D.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners Kirk, Pepi, and Miki Camer were school 
children, required by law to attend the Seattle,



3

Washington, Public Schools. They entered the sixth, fifth, 
and kindergarten grades, respectively, in the Fall of 1978. 
Kirk and Pepi have now graduated from high school, and 
Miki has completed 9th grade. Parent Dorothy Camer 
became aware that the instruction provided in the schools 
which the children attended did not adhere to the 
advertised curriculum of the Seattle School District. After 
examining the Seattle School District’s published 
curriculum, she discovered that essential elements of the 
curriculum were not taught. She raised her concern with 
the teaching personnel and administrative staff but 
received no substantive explanation. While not denying 
the lack of instruction, they provided no rationale, nor 
cited any standards which were followed.

She continued to raise her concerns to state officials, 
e.g. the Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI), state 
legislators, senators and representatives, the local mayor 
and prosecutors. For the most' part she received little 
help except for one state senator who referred her to the 
state education laws. After studying the law and the 
record in Seattle School District v. State. 90 Wn.2d 476, 
585 P.2d 71 (1978), she brought suit in state court against 
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction and others, 
alleging that Kirk and Pepi had failed to achieve certain 
benchmarks and that they had been denied access to 
certain courses, in violation of state law and tort 
principles. She filed the action pro se in 1979 since she 
lacked the funds for legal counsel, on behalf of herself and 
the two older children.

The state court case was dismissed and, by an 
unpublished opinion, subsequently affirmed, on the 
grounds that (a) no damage action is created by the state 
Basic Education Act, (b) no common-law tort claim was 
stated because schools do not have a duty to "insure that 
every student"..."will be able to achieve every benchmark," 
and (c) that since Plaintiffs’ rights to a basic education 
under state law "are not disputed by the Defendants"



4

(App. C-2), that no justiciable controversy would justify a 
declaratory judgment.

While the appeal was pending in state court, Kirk 
Camer and Dorothy Camer alone brought a separate suit 
in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983. This suit was also 
dismissed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no 
disparate treatment on the basis of a suspect classification 
had been alleged to support an equal protection claim, 
that due process does not require notice to Kirk of 
optional honors classes, and that state law claims should 
be litigated in state court where they were pending, rather 
than federal court.

Pepi Camer completed the state history course the 
following year, without the instruction in the state 
constitution which is required by state statute as a 
prerequisite to graduation. When Ms. Camer was 
dismissed without a hearing both in the state and federal 
courts, she decided that she needed more evidence of the 
denial of instruction. She requested documents from the 
School District to support her complaints. When the 
school district denied her requests for access to 
documents, Ms. Camer filed suit under the State public 
disclosure act, and finally won in 1985. (Affd, Camer v, 
Stevens. 50 Wn.App. 1018 (1987)). She discovered 
numerous failures by defendants to meet the minimum 
requirements for a basic education, in violation of state 
law, regulations, and advertised promises.

In 1986, just before this action commenced, Miki 
Camer was scheduled to take the state history course. 
Ms. Camer hoped to ensure that Miki would receive the 
legally mandated instruction in the state constitution 
which had been arbitrarily denied her brother and sister. 
Ms. Camer again raised the issue to school administrators, 
the school board, Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
and Attorney General, with no success. A letter from the 
school superintendent acknowledged that the state 
constitution should be covered in the 8th grade state



5

history course but declined to provide any assurance that 
it would be. Letters from both the school district legal 
counsel and the president of the school board admitted 
that due process hearings are limited to disciplinary and 
special education issues, and that no administrative 
procedure is provided by defendants for handling 
instructional grievances. Miki has since completed the 
course under Defendant Jewell Woods without receiving 
the instruction in the state constitution. She was also 
denied the full hours of instruction required by state law 
(RCW 28A.58.754). Miki has not been a party to, or 
subject of, any prior lawsuit.

Invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, Petitioners brought action 
in King County Superior Court for injunctive and 
declaratory relief and damages under the state basic 
education laws, and the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Complaint alleged denial 
by the Respondents of the minimum basic education 
mandated by state laws and regulations, including, for 
example, the requirements for a minimum of six hours of 
instruction 180 days per year (required by RCW 
28A.58.754(2 and 5) and 28A.58.758(2)(c)); elements of 
the math and language arts curricula (promulgated under 
RCW 28A.58.090 and 28A.05.010); and instruction in the 
state constitution (required by RCW 28A.02.080; 
28A.05.050).

Kirk and Pepi Camer were permitted to graduate 
from the Seattle Schools with above average grades 
without the minimum basic education defined by the state 
laws (RCW 28A.58.750 through .754) and regulations 
(WAC 180-16 and -50) and in particular without the 
minimum requirements for graduation, such as the state 
constitution and elements of the language arts curriculum, 
and without the annual evaluation required by RCW 
28A.58.090. The Complaint further stated that these 
arbitrary denials of education deprived Plaintiffs of liberty 
and property without due process of law, and were in



6

violation of the civil rights of the students under 42 U.S.C. 
1983.

Respondents/Defendants neither denied the 
deprivation of instruction nor provided any explanation as 
to why it was lacking. Instead their defense was that even 
if the basic education had been denied, state law did not 
provide a private cause of action to students thus injured, 
that loss of education was not an injury, that defendants 
were immune under state law, and numerous technical 
defenses. The Superior Court dismissed the action on 
March 18, 1987. An appeal was filed with the state 
Supreme Court which remanded it to the state Court of 
Appeals, which affirmed the Superior Court decision.

The federal questions were timely and properly raised 
in the complaint, at 5-6; the Amended Complaint, 2-3, the 
Brief of Appellant at 27-29, the Reply Brief of Appellant, 
at 19, 22, the Petition for Review, at 8-9; the Reply of 
Petitioner, at 10. The trial court rejected the federal 
claims at App. B-3, and the Court of Appeals affirmed at 
A-7: 'The Camers do not state a claim under...the United 
States Constitution...Nor do the Camers...have...standing 
to bring an action for violation of constitutional 
provisions."

The Court of Appeals held that the legislature did not 
intend to create a judicial remedy under state law for 
denials of the specified basic education required to be 
provided to all students. It was held that this action was 
similar to those previously brought by Mrs. Camer for her 
older children against different parties based on different 
facts, so that "res judicata" should bar even the claim of 
Miki Camer, who had been involved in no prior action. 
Finally, and without explanation, the court found plaintiffs 
to have claimed insufficient injury to have "standing" to 
complain of violation of their constitutional rights.

A petition for discretionary review of the appellate 
court decision was filed and was denied by the 
Washington Supreme Court on February 28, 1989. We



7

now seek certiorari to review the decision of the Court of 
Appeals.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. The Fourteenth Amendment Protects Against Arbitrary 
Denial of the Legitimate Entitlement to Basic Education 
Which is Explicitly Guaranteed and Defined by State Law.

Our public schools have failed to adequately educate 
millions of students in the minimal skills needed to 
function in the social, economic, and political systems. As 
a result, "our nation is at risk." National Commission on 
Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Educational Reform (1983).

Today, education is perhaps the most important 
function of state and local governments. Compul­
sory school attendance laws and the great expendi­
ture for education both demonstrate our recogni­
tion of the importance of an education to our 
democratic society. It is required in the perfor­
mance of our most basic public responsibilities....it 
is the very foundation of good citizenship. In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the 
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity 
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a 
right which must be made available to all....

Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Plaintiff Dorothy Camer has, like many other parents, 

been deeply concerned about the quality of education in 
our public schools. Many proposals have been made for 
changing our schools-defining new goals or methods to 
achieve them. But before such changes are prescribed, a 
more fundamental question is whether the schools are 
performing their existing specific legal duties. If they are



8

out of control, and administrators are not held responsible 
for following their specific existing legal obligations, what 
good will it do to give them new ones?

When in a person is in custody of the state, she is 
entitled to attention to her medical needs. Estelle v. 
Gamble. 429 U.S. 97 (1976) ("deliberate indifference" to 
medical needs of convicted prisoners a violation of 
1983"). In Matzker v. Herr. 745 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 
1984), the court held that a pre-trial detainee’s due 
process right to be free from punishment is violated when 
a jailor fails "properly and reasonably to procure 
competent medical aid" for illness or injury. Thus, while 
the Eighth Amendment does not protect pre-trial 
detainees, or school children, the Due Process rights of an 
arrestee "are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment 
protections available to a convicted prisoner." City of 
Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.. 463 U.S. 239, 244 
(1983). And "persons who have been involuntarily 
committed are entitled to more considerate 
treatment...than criminals...Cf. Estelle." Youngberg. 457 
U.S. 310, 322-323 (1982).

It has been held that a child in custody of the state, 
states a cause of action under 1983 when state officials 
are deliberately indifferent to or act in reckless disregard 
of her welfare. Taylor v. Ledbetter. 818 F.2d 881 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (en banc). It was held there that the Georgia 
statutory scheme creates a legitimate entitlement to 
certain care, enforceable in federal court. The special 
relationship between plaintiff children and the agency 
employees and officials required by law to provide them 
with certain services "is an important one involving 
substantial duties and, therefore, substantial rights." Id., 
at 798. Under Washington law, the Camer children were 
required to attend school. RCW 28A. App. D-(fine 
and/or jail for violation of compulsory.education statute). 
"Because students are placed in school at the command of 
the state and are not free to decline to atttend, students



9

are in what may be viewed as functional! custody of the 
school authorities...." Stoneking v. bradford Area School 
District. 8 5 6  F . 2 d  5 9 4  ( 3 r d  C i r .  1988).
Compare De Shanev v. Winnebago County. No. 87-54, 57 
L.W. 4218 (Feb. 22, 1989) at 4219, n.2 (No claim of 
entitlement made below, no state custody, harm caused by 
third part).

This Court has held, in the context of mental 
institutions, that when the state exercises its power to 
deprive persons of liberty, a reciprocal right is created to 
the provision of the services for which the restraint on 
liberty is justified. See O’Connor v. Donaldson. 422 U.S. 
563 (1975) (no confinement without treatment);
Youngberg v. Romeo. 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (constitutional 
right to adequate care); cf. (right to treatment); Wyatt v. 
Aderholt. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (minimum 
standards of treatment). In Youngberg. supra, the Court 
found one committed to the custody of the state for care 
and treatment has a constitutional right to "such 
conditions of confinement [as] would comport fully with 
the purpose of respondent’s commitment." 457 U.S. at 
324. The plaintiff in Youngberg was found entitled to put 
on expert testimony as to whether the hospital officials’ 
decisions "were a substantial departure from the requisite 
professional judgment." Id., at n.31.

Minimum standards of education for those in 
compulsory custody of educational institutions are at least 
as important. In Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), this Court expressed the doubt "that any child 
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education." ]d. at 493. 
"Education provides the basic tools by which individuals 
might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of 
us all." Plvler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982). Some 
minimum "degree of education is necessary to prepare 
citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our 
open political system if we are to preserve freedom and



10

independence." Wisconsin v. Yoder. 406 U.S. 205, 221 
(1972). This Court also acknowledged the fundamental 
rights of parents that are impacted by compulsory 
schooling, and thus the gravity of the state’s 
responsibilities. Id. at 232.

Yet thousands of students attend schools that fail to 
enable students to master even basic skills. National 
Commission, supra. See also U.S. Department of 
Education, 'The Nation Responds" (May 1984); Ratner, 
"A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective 
Education and Basic Skills," 63 Tex. L. Rev. 787 (1985).

The recognition of this crisis has led to a nationwide 
educational reform movement, as state commissions and 
legislatures have proposed and enacted numerous reform 
initiatives. A principal product of this movement has 
been the enunciation of minimum legal standards for 
basic education, creating substantive rights as defined 
under state law. See Chambers, Adequate Education for 
All: A Right, An Achievable Goal, 22 Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Rev. 55, 61 (1987)('These 
standards present us with an opportunity to define a right 
to a minimally adequate education.") Standards are 
essential to monitor performance of school teachers and 
administrators, as well as that of students. A majority of 
states have now enacted minimum criteria for evaluating 
and judging the education actually provided to students. 
See "Changing Course-A 50-State Survey of Reform 
Measures," Educ. Week 11 (Feb. 6, 1985); Kirp & Yudof, 
Educational Policy and the Law (2d Ed. 1982).

The definition of the precise content of a basic 
minimum education is an ongoing process. It has been 
pointed out that the right to an adequate education is 
rooted in the meaningful exercise of the freedom of 
expression and the right to participate in state elections 
on an equal basis with other voters, and basic minimal 
skills are necessary for the enjoyment of these rights. San



11

Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 37(1973).

In San Antonio v. Rodriquez. 411 U.S. 1 (1973), "only 
relative differences..." in education were challenged. 
There was "no charge...that the system fails to provide 
each child with an opportunity to acquire the basic 
minimum skills..." Id- at 36. The issue here is precisely 
the denial of the absolute minimum of education which 
the Seattle School District has defined (in compliance 
with the requirement of state law, RCW 58A.58.090) to 
be mandated to be provided to all students. This is the 
"identifiable quantum of education (which) is a 
constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful 
exercise of either (the right to speak or the right to vote)" 
that this Court indicated in San Antonio v. Rodriquez 
would merit the court’s protection.

Then, in Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565 (1975) the 
Court found the Fourteenth Amendment to be violated 
by arbitrary deprivation of education to which a student is 
entitled under state law. It rejected the contention "that 
because there is no constitutional right to an education at 
public expense, the Due Process Clause does not protect" 
students. Id. at 572. The Court found rather that "on the 
basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate claims 
of entitlement to a public education. [State statutes] 
direct local authorities to provide a free education to all 
residents between five and twenty-one years of age, and a 
compulsory attendance law requires attendance for a 
school year of not less than 32 weeks." Id. at 573.

Although Ohio may not be constitutionally 
obligated to establish and maintain a public school 
system, it has nevertheless done so and it has 
required its children to attend. Those young 
people do not ‘shed their constitutional rights’ at 
the schoolhouse door. Tinker v. Des Moines 
School District. 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). ‘The* 
Fourteenth Amendment as now applied to the



12

states, protects the citizen against the state itself 
and all of its creatures-boards of education not 
excepted.’ West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette. 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). The authority 
possessed by the state...though concededly very 
broad, must be exercised consistently with 
constitutional safeguards. Among other things, the 
state is constrained to recognize a student’s 
legitimate interest to a public education as a 
property interest which is protected by the Due 
Process Clause...The Due Process Clause also 
forbids arbitrary deprivations of liberty.
Id. at 574. The Court therefore held that loss of even 

a few days of education triggered the protections of the 
Due Process Clause against arbitrary deprivations of 
liberty and property. Implicit in the recognition of such 
entitlements is the requirement that they may not be 
infringed except for "cause." Id., at 587, n.4 (Powell, 
dissenting).

And under Washington law, the legally required 
curriculum is not discretionary with the school districts or 
teachers, who have no authority to "ignore or omit 
essential course material or disregard the course 
calendar." Millikan v. Board of Directors of Everett 
School District. 93 Wn.2d 522, 611 P.2d 414 (1980). 
Compare Kentucky Department of Corrections v. 
Thompson. 57 L.W. 4531, 4534 (May 15, 1989) ("explicitly 
mandatory language...forces a conclusion that the state 
has created a liberty interest....The regulations here, 
however, lack the requisite relevant mandatory 
language.") The violation of legitimate expectations and 
entitlements in this case all arise from unequivocally 
mandatory language. See Statement, supra, at 4-5. 
(RCW 28A.05: "compulsory courses"; RCW 28.02.080: 
"study of constitutions compulsory"; RCW 28A.58.754: 
"program requirements"; RCW 28A.58.090: "study
learning objectives...shall be locally assessed annually."



13

RCW 28A.27.020: "compulsory school attendance-
school’s duties upon juvenile’s failure to attend.")

Here, the intentional actions of defendants deprived 
plaintiffs of essential elements of a basic minimum 
education, over a number of years, without any cause or 
justification. What is alleged is the arbitrary exercise of 
governmental power, not mere negligence. Cf. Daniels v. 
Williams. 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 106 
S.Ct. 668 (1986).

Certiorari should be granted to clarify and establish 
the important federal Due Process right to receive at least 
the minimum prescribed educational program for which 
school children are taken from their parents and put in 
the custody of the schools.

2. The Washington State Courts Have Failed to 
Recognize the Plaintiff School Childrens’ Federally 
Protected Rights.

The Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution compels state courts to hear and decide 
1983 cases submitted to them. Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 

U.S. 386 (1947). State courts determining 1983 claims 
submitted to them must apply the relevant substantive 
federal rules, not state law. C. Wright, Law of Federal 
Courts 271-73 (4th Ed. 1983). See Maine v. Thibotout, 
448 U.S. 1, 10 n .ll  (1980). As a corollary, in Martinez v. 
California. 444 U.S. 277 ( 1 9 8 0 )  ; ,  t h e  Court clearly 
stated that:

Conduct by persons acting under color of state law 
which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. 1983...cannot 
be immunized by state law. The construction of 
the federal statute which permitted a state 
immunity defense to have controlling effect would 
transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory 
promise; and the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution insures that the proper construction



14

may be enforced....The immunity claim raises a 
question of federal law.

Id. at 284 n.8 ('quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 
F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1973) (refusing to apply Illinois 
immunity law in a 1983 action), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 
917 (1974)).

Unfortunately, many civil rights plaintiffs are 
handicapped in state court by antipathy towards, and lack 
of competence in connection with, such claims on the part 
of state courts. See Neuborne, "The Myth of Parity," 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1977). This may be particularly true 
when a case is brought by a so-called unpopular plaintiff 
or raises controversial and politically sensitive matters, or 
both. Nahmod, Civil Rights And Civil Liberties 
Litigation, The Law Of 1983 (2nd Edition), at 1.13.

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), this Court 
recognized that one of the reasons 1983 was enacted, 
was the lack of enforcement in the states of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights "by reason of prejudice, passion, 
neglect, intolerance, or otherwise." ]d., at 180.

In this case, plaintiffs received short shrift from the 
state courts, which barely mentioned their federal claims. 
Neither of the two primary grounds for dismissal under 
state law justified disregard of the federal wrongs 
complained of.

First, the determination that the state legislature did 
not intend to create a "private cause of action" for 
violations of the State’s Basic Education Act cannot 
immunize the responsible state employees. Martinez, 
supra. Just as the legislature cannot abridge 
constitutional rights by its enactments, it cannot curtail 
mandatory provisions by its silence. See Seattle School 
District v. State. 90 Wn.2d 476, at 503 n. 7, 585 P.2d 71 
(1978), citing Marburv v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
163 (1803). The explicit purpose of 1983 is to create a 
"private cause of action," and "the Supremacy Clause 
imposes on state courts a constitutional duty to proceed in



15

such a manner that all the substantial rights of the parties 
under controlling federal law are protected." Felder v. 
Casev. 487 U.S. 101 L.Ed.2d 123, 146 (1988). In Goss 
v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565 (1964), this Court rejected the 
argument that state law discretion granted to school 
principals limited the due process rights of school 
students. Once the entitlement is created by state law, the 
federal constitution limits the circumstances under which 
it can be taken away. This principle was disregarded by 
the state court in limiting 1983 causes of action to those 
in which the state legislature has created a "private right 
of action."

Likewise, the second principal holding, that these 
claims are barred by res judicata under state law, conflicts 
with federal principles of res judicata. In Allen v. 
McCrary. 449 U.S. 90, 95 n.7 (1980), this Court held that 
the Full Faith and Credit Statute requires federal courts 
to apply state issue preclusion rules in 1983 actions only 
when the party against whom issue preclusion is sought 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues 
actually decided in a prior state court proceeding. In 
Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 
75 (1984), it was held that the same principles apply to 
claim preclusion. Id. at 84. Cf. University of Tennessee v. 
Elliot. _  U.S. _ ,  106 S.Ct. 3220, 3227 (1986); Giellum v. 
City of Birmingham. Ala.. 829 F.2d 1056, 1063 (11th Cir. 
1987).

In Allen, the Court said that "other factors, of course, 
may require an exception to the normal rules of collateral 
estoppel in particular cases." Id. at 95 n. 7. Kremer v. 
Chemical Constr. Corp.. 456 U.S. 461 (1982) held: "The 
state must, however, satisfy the applicable requirements 
of the Due Process Clause. A state may not grant 
preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally 
infirm judgment, and other state and federal courts are 
not required to accord full faith and credit to such a 
judgment." Kremer. supra. 456 U.S. at 482. Thus, "even



16

when issues...are preclusive under state law, 
redetermination of [the] issues [may nevertheless be] 
warranted if there is reason to doubt the quality, 
extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in prior 
litigation." Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983) at 317- 
18. (1983) claim not barred by state preclusion rule for 
failure to raise in prior litigation.) Here, the Camers were 
barred on the theory they "could have discovered" the 
violations earlier (but see Statement at 5, supra).. An 
examination of the prior opinions in the appendix clearly 
reveals that thiis is a case where the state court was 
"unwilling or unable to prortect federal rights." Haring. 
4 6 2  U . S .  a t  3 1 4 ,  c i t i n g  c a s e s .

It would obviously violate due process to bind Miki 
Camer with the results of prior litigation to which she was 
not party, and at which none of the facts or claims she 
raises here were at issue. The fact that her mother was a 
prior litigant of similar claims, and also appears in a 
representative capacity here, cannot justify visiting the 
sins of the parents upon the children. The requirements 
for a finding of privity are clearly absent. See Moore’s 
Federal Practice 0.411:

Nor should the interest of beneficiary C, whom F 
represents by virtue of a separate fiduciary 
relationship, be at stake when F litigates as 
representative of B. This is the rationale 
supporting the rule as to different capacities. And 
it has been adopted by the Restatement. 
(Restatement of Judgments (1942) 80b.")
A third major conflict with applicable federal 

principles appears in the holding of the state Court of 
Appeals that insufficient injury or damage is claimed for 
plaintiffs to have "standing to bring a cause of action for 
violation of constitutional provisions." Appendix A-13. 
This is in direct conflict with Carey v, Piphus. 435 U.S. 247 
(1978), a case brought against school board members for 
violation of due process rights, in which the Court held



17

that a cause of action is stated even in the absence of 
evidence of actual injury, justifying an award of at least 
nominal damages. Declaratory and injunctive relief, as 
well as attorney’s fees, would likewise be expected to 
follow. While the Court in Carev held that damages are 
not to be "presumed," the Court pointed out the 
difference between presumed damages and inferred 
damages. 435 U.S. at 264, n. 22. ("The Court’s comment 
in Seaton, that ‘humiliation can be inferred from the 
circumstances as well as established by the testimony,’ 
491 F.2d, at 636, suggests that the Court considered the 
question of actual injury to be one of fact.") Numerous 
cases are then cited upholding such "inferred damage" 
awards. Id. And, of course, on a motion for summary 
dismissal, as is in this case, a motion may not be granted 
where the moving party’s submissions had not foreclosed 
the possibility of the existence of certain facts from which 
‘it would be open to a jury...to infer from the 
circumstances’" that the elements of the claim had been 
established." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 
249 (1986), quoting Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 158 
(1970).

As the Court concluded in Carev: "By making the 
deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages 
without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the 
importance to organized society that those rights be 
scrupulously observed." 435 U.S. at 266.

The failure of the state courts in this case to observe 
these rights, or to recognize and follow controlling federal 
law, is a serious threat to the Supremacy Clause and the 
continuing vitality of 42 United States Code 1983 as a 
minimum safeguard for individual rights. If allowed to 
stand, the decision below will leave low level school 
administrators and officials free to arbitrarily deny 
essential elements of education for any reason 
whatsoever, or for no reason at all. The political efforts 
leading to legislative reform mean nothing if the judiciary



18

leaves the executive free to ignore the law at its whim or 
fancy. The promised benefits that justify compulsory 
education, and the Due Process clause itself, become "a 
teasing illusion, like a munificent bequest in a pauper’s 
will." Edwards v. California. 314 U.S. 160,186 (1941).

Certiorari should be granted to remedy the important 
conflicts with controlling decisions of this Court.

CONCLUSION

Date: May 25,1989.

Respectfully Submitted,

Dorothy Camer SMITH & MIDGLEY

9021 24th Ave SW 
Seattle WA 98106 
(206) 767-4229

Pro Sc Daniel Hoyt Smith 
2200 Smith Tower 
Seattle, WA 98104 
(206) 682-1948

Counsel for Petitioners



A-l

APPENDIX A

DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION I 

STATE OF WASHINGTON

Dorothy Camer,for herself and Miki Camer;Kirk Camer; 
and Pepi Camer,Appellants v. Seattle School District No.l, 

et al.,Respondents

No. 21269-9-1
52 Wn.App. 531, 762 P.2d 356 (1988)

Filed October 10, 1988

Scholfield, C. J. — Dorothy Camer and her three 
children appeal the superior court judgment dismissing 
their claims against the Seattle School District and 
numerous named individuals. We affirm.

FACTS

On June 30,1986, Dorothy Camer and her three child­
ren brought an action for declaratory judgment against the 
Seattle School District and numerous named individuals. 
By their complaint, the Camers sought a declaratory 
judgment to test the adequacy of the conduct of school 
district personnel with relation to their responsibilities 
under Washington’s Basic Education Act. The complaint 
alleged the violation of specific statutes, including the 
failure of the Seattle Public Schools to teach the state con­
stitution, lack of an adequate process for resolving grie­
vances, failure to develop student learning assessments, use 
of arbitrary procedures for discipline, failure to provide an 
optimum learning atmosphere, failure of the principals to 
supervise the educational program, failure to provide the 
designated instruction, failure of the school directors to 
enforce the laws, squandering of public funds, fraud and 
conspiracy, failure of the District to provide for the safety 
and welfare of students and failure of the District to



A-2

provide a uniform school system. By amendment to the 
complaint filed September 23,1986, another defendant, 
Jewell Woods, was added.

In April 1980, Dorothy Camer brought a suit against 
the District,the Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI), 
and a number of District personnel (many of whom are 
named as defendants in the present suit) on behalf of her 
two children. Camer v. Brouillet. (King County Cause No. 
80-2-05307-8), affd. 31 Wn. App. 1097, review denied, 97 
Wn. 2d 1042 (1982). She objected to the fashion in which 
the District had implemented the student learning objec­
tives (SLO’s) law, RCW 28A.58.090, and the Washington 
Basic Education Act of 1977,RCW 28A.58.750. Mrs.Camer 
asserted that both children had been denied adequate in­
struction, that her children’s schools had failed to provide a 
"healthy environment conducive to education" and a 
program to meet the "individual and collective needs of the 
plaintiffs and their fellow students," and that the children 
had been denied their right to a basic education under the 
Washington Constitution, article 9, section 1. She further 
asserted her frustration with available administrative 
processes. She sought damages and a declaratory judgment 
on basic education as defined by the SLOs, and prayed for 
relief based on RCW 28A.58.750 et seq. Summary judg­
ment was granted against Mrs.Camer. The judgment was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which denied Mrs.Cam- 
er’s claim for a declaratory judgment on the ground no 
justiciable controversy was present. The court also held she 
had no standing to bring a private cause of action under the 
SLOs, and that she had no standing to sue for educational 
malpractice. The Supreme Court denied review.

Mrs. Camer brought a similar suit in federal court, 
including among the defendants the Attorney General, the 
King County Prosecuting Attorney, the SPI, and other 
school officials. Camer v. Eikenberrv. U. S. Dist. Ct. Cause 
No. C81-682M (W.D. Wash. 1982), affd . 703 F.2d 574 (9th 
Cir. 1983), cert, denied. 464 U.S. 828 (1983). In the federal



A-3

action, Mrs. Camer alleged that her son Kirk had been 
denied equal access to programs offered by the District and 
had been denied instruction in various elements of the 
published curriculum necessary to attain the SLOs for his 
grade, including those related to Washington State 
government. The United States District Court dismissed 
the case, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Cir­
cuit in an unpublished opinion. The United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari.

On December 15, 1986, the trial court entered an 
order of dismissal and summary judgment dismissing all of 
the Carners’ claims in the present action, but reserving to 
the Carners the opportunity to replead their claims of fraud 
and conspiracy within 30 days. The trial court granted 
attorney’s fees to defendants on the ground that a number 
of the Carners’ allegations and claims were frivolous and 
specifically found that the Carners second amended 
complaint seeking to add Jewell Woods as a defendant was 
frivolous on its face.

On January 14, 1987, the Carners repleaded their 
claims of fraud and conspiracy. On March 18, 1987, the 
court filed an order of dismissal and summary judgment 
regarding the fraud and conspiracy claims. This appeal 
timely followed. The Carners first sought direct review 
from the Washington Supreme Court, which was denied.

RES JUDICATA

Res judicata ensures the finality of decisions. A final 
judgment on the merits bars parties or their privies from 
relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in 
that action. Mellor v. Chamberlin. 100 Wn 2nd, 643, 645, 
673 P.2d 610 (1983). The rule is stated as follows:

In Washington res judicata occurs when a prior 
judgment has a concurrence of identity in four 
respects with a subsequent action. There must be



A-4

identity of (1) subject matter; (2) cause of action; (3) 
persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons 
for or against whom the claim is made.

Mellor v. Chamberlin, supra at 645.

In applying these criteria to the facts at bar, we find 
that this case is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The 
present case and Camer v. Brouillet. supra are so 
substantially similar that there is no clear basis for 
distinguishing them. First, in both cases the subject matter 
pertains to the adequacy of the manner in which school 
administrators are implementing the constitutional and 
statutory directives regarding education. Secondly, 
although the cause of action is not phrased in identical 
terms, in both cases the plaintiffs essentially argued the 
same issue--that the school district and administrators are 
not following statutory and constitutional requirements 
regarding curriculum and administration. The same
statutes and constitutional provisions are relied upon in 
both cases. Furthermore, their claim that the Washington 
State Constitution was not taught could have been raised in 
a prior lawsuit, even though no Camer child had yet 
graduated, because at the time of the suit they could have 
discovered whether teaching the state constitution was in 
the curriculum. Third, although an additional Camer child 
is a plaintiff in the present action, we hold that the persons 
and parties are essentially the same. Counsel for Camer 
claims that res judicata does not apply because Miki, a 13- 
year-old child named as plaintiff in this case, was not 
involved in any of the previous cases. However, the quality 
of the plaintiff is the same in both cases. See Rains v. State. 
100 Wn.2d 660, 664, 674 P.2d 165 (1983). If we adopted 
the Camers’ reasoning on this issue, each time another 
Camer child entered the Seattle school system, they would 
have the right to bring exactly the same complaint and have 
it heard through the judicial system. Finally, the persons 
against whom the claim is made, the District, adminis­
trators, and teachers are qualitatively the same parties for



A-5

purposes of applying the doctrine of res judicata. See 
Rains v. State, supra. The Camers may not now relitigate 
issues that were or could have been raised in the prior 
actions.

PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION

The next issue before us is whether RCW 28A.02.080 
and RCW 28A.05.050 create a judicially enforceable duty, 
on the part of local school districts, to teach the state 
constitution to public school students. We find that the 
Camers have not shown that a private right of action exists.

RCW 28A.02.080 provides in relevant part that the 
study of the Constitution of the State of Washington shall 
be a condition prerequisite to graduation from the public 
and private high schools of this state. RCW 28A.05.050 
requires the State Board of Education to prescribe a 1-year 
course of study in the history and government of the United 
States, and the equivalent of a 1-semester course of the 
study of the State of Washington’s history and government. 
Accordingly, WAC 180-50-120 and -130 were adopted, 
which require all schools to provide a 1-semester high 
school level course in Washington history and government, 
including "a study of the Washington state Constitution", 
WAC 180-50-120(2), and a similar 1-year course in United 
States history and government. The Camers argue that the 
Seattle School District does not comply with these 
requirements.

In Cort v. Ash. 422 U.S. 66, 78, 45 L.ED. 2d 266, 95 S. 
Ct 2080 (1^75), the Court adopted the following test for 
determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a 
statute not expressly providing one:

In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in 
a stature not expressly providing one, several factors 
are relevant. First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for 
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted," . . .



A-6

Second, is thee any indication of legislative intent, 
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or 
to deny one? . . .  Third, is it consistent with the under­
lying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such 
a remedy for the plaintiff? . . .  And finally, is the cause 
of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an 
area basically the concern of the States, so that it 
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action 
based solely on federal law? (Citations omitted.)

Assuming for the sake of argument that the Camers 
are within the class for whose especial benefit the statute 
was enacted, the language of the statutes cited by Camer is 
devoid of any expression or indication of an intent on the 
part of the Legislature to create a private cause of action 
for damages. Nor has Camer cited legislative history show­
ing such a legislative intent.

Generally, the statutory scheme indicates to the 
contrary. RCW 28A.58.090 provides for periodic reviews 
of curriculum and the SLOs by school district boards of 
directors, the SPI, and the State Board of Education. 
These matters are, by practical necessity, largely discre­
tionary with those charged with the responsibilities of 
school administration. Courts and judges are normally not 
in a position to substitute their judgment for that of school 
authorities, Millikan v. Board of Directors. 93 Wn.2d 522, 
611 P.2d 414 (1980), nor are we equipped to oversee and 
monitor day-to-day operations of a school system.

Moreover, implying a private cause of action would not 
be consistent with the purposes of a legislative scheme, 
which seeks to set up general guidelines for producing an 
ample education for Washington state citizens as mandated 
by Const., art. 9, section 1, to be administered within the 
discretion of the school board and its officers. The legisla­
ture has limited judicial review to designated persons 
aggrieved "by any decision or order of any school official or 
board ..."  RCW 28A.88.010.



A-7

The present administrative setup involving the Board 
of Education and the Superintendent of Public Education, 
provides a proper chain of accountability for education and 
is adequate to address the problems. Finally, the Legis­
lature can impose sanctions against the district that fails to 
comply in the discharge of its duties by withholding its 
funding. WAC 180-16-195(3).

The Carners’ allegations do not state a cause of action 
arising under either the Washington or the United States 
Constitutions. Const, art. 9, section 1 imposes a judicially 
enforceable affirmative duty on the State to make ample 
provision for the education of children. Seattle School 
Dist. 1 v. State. 90 Wn.2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). The 
Carners do not allege facts which constitute a violation of 
this provision. Nor do the Carners show actual damage or 
injury, and therefore, they have no standing to bring a 
cause of action for violation of constitutional provisions. 
See Seattle School Dist. 1 v. State, supra at 494.

The Carners also make additional assignments of error. 
First, the Carners assign error to the trial court’s finding 
that most of the actions or inactions alleged by the Carners 
fall within the broad discretionary authority of the Seattle 
School District, its administrators, and its certified staff, all 
of whom are public officers and therefore are immune from 
liability for such decisions. Next, the Carners assign error to 
the trial courts’s finding that the Carners did not make 
proper service on any of the individuals defendants except 
Kenneth Dorsett, Michael Hoge, William Kendrick, Chris 
Kato, David Stevens, Jewell Woods and Elizabeth Wales. 
The Carners also assert that the trial court erred in finding 
that their claims against the individual defendants were 
barred by the statute of limitations. Finally, the Carners 
argue that the trial court erred in finding that the Carners 
failed to state a claim for fraud and in finding that the 
Carners cannot recover for educational malpractice.



A-8

It serves no purpose to discuss these assignments 
individually, when all of them are disposed of by our 
holding that this action is barred by res judicata and that 
there is no private cause of action for the complaints that 
the Camers make in this case.

FRIVOLOUS CLAIM AS TO JEWELL WOODS

The Camers also argue that their claim as to Jewell 
Woods was not frivolous and that an award of attorney’s 
fees is unauthorized prior to litigation.

Former RCW 4.84.185 states in pertinent part:

In any civil action, the court having jurisdiction may, 
upon final judgment and written findings by the trial 
judge that the action . . . was frivolous and advanced 
without reasonable cause, require the nonprevailing 
party to pay the prevailing party the reasonable 
expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred in 
opposing such action . . .

The Camers cite Whetstone v. Olson. 46 Wn App 308, 732 
P.2d 159 (1986) as support for their argument that attor­
ney’s fees may not be awarded under RCW 4.84.185 for de­
fending a frivolous action when the case is dismissed prior 
to the plaintiffs’ presentation of their entire case. How­
ever, RCW 4.84.185 was amended in 1987 to include orders 
on summary judgment.

Statutes generally operate prospectively unless 
remedial in nature. A statute is remedial when it relates to 
practice, procedure or remedies and does not affect a sub­
stantive or vested right. Miebach v. Colasurdo. 102 Wn.2d 
170, 180-181, 685 P.2d 1074 (1984). We deem attorney’s 
fees to be remedial in nature and therefore give the statute 
retroactive effect.



A-9

In the present case, the amended complaint adding 
Jewell Woods as a defendant alleged that Woods arrived 
late to an appointment with Mrs. Camer and refused to 
allow Mrs. Camer to copy her lesson plans, which con­
tained no material covering the constitution. These facts 
do not state a cause of action that can be supported by any 
rational argument on the law or facts. Therefore, we find 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
attorney’s fees to Woods.

FRIVOLOUS APPEAL

RAP 18.9(a) authorizes the appellate court, on its own 
initiative, to order sanctions against a party who brings an 
appeal for the purpose of delay. Sanctions may include, as 
compensatory damages,an award of attorney’s fees to the 
opposing party. See RAP 18.9, Comment, 86 Wn.2d 1272 
(1976); Bill of Rights Legal Found, v. Evergreen State 
College. 44 Wn App. 690,723 P.2d 483 (1986). In determin­
ing whether an appeal is brought for delay under RAP 
18.9(a), "our primary inquiry is whether, when considering 
the record as a whole, the appeal is frivolous,re., whether it 
presents no debatable issues and is so devoid of merit that 
there is no reasonable possibility of reversal." Streater v. 
White,26 Wn.App.430, 434, 613 P.2d 187 (1980). All doubts 
as to whether an appeal is frivolous should be resolved in 
favor of the appellant. Streater v. White, supra at 435.

In applying these criteria, we find that this appeal is 
frivolous. This case presents essentially the same claims 
and issues on which the Camers were defeated in two prior 
cases. Nevertheless, the Camers have persisted in appeal­
ing this case even though they present no debatable issues 
and their position is so devoid of merit that there is no 
possibility of reversal.

Judgment affirmed.



A-10

ORDER

OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

Camer, et al, Petitioners, v. Seattle School District 1, et 
al, Respondents, No. 55807-8. Petition for review of a 
decision of the Court of Appeals, Oct. 10, 1988, 52 Wn App 
531. Denied Feb. 28, 1989.

MANDATE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 

No. 21269-9-1 Camer v. Seattle School

The State of Washington to: The Superior Court of the 
State of Washington in and for King County.

This is to certify that the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals of the State of Washington, Division I, filed on 
October 10, 1988 became the decision terminating review 
of this court in the above entitled case on March 17, 1989. 
This cause is mandated to the superior court from which 
the appeal was taken for further proceedings in accordance 
with the attached true copy of the opinion.

Mandate after opinion is filed. Petition for review 
denied on February 28, 1989. Order denying motion for 
reconsideration entered on December 7, 1989. Pursuant to 
a commissioner’s ruling entered on Novem ber 2, 1988, it is 
ordered that costs in the amount of Five hundred Thirty- 
Two and 17/100 ($532.17) shall be taxed against appellants 
Camer in favor respondent Seattle School District No. 1; 
no costs awarded to respondent Sonia Watson.



B-l

APPENDIX B

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON 
FOR KING COUNTY

Dorothy Camer,for herself and Miki Camer; Kirk Camer; 
and Pepi Camer, Plaintiffs v. Seattle School District No.l et

al., Defendants 
No. 86-2-11966-3

ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER, having come on for hearing before 
the undersigned Judge Gerard M. Shellan on November 
13„ 1986, on motions of defendant Seattle School District 
No. 1 and other served defendants for dismissal or 
summary judgment, for dismissal of claims against 
individual defendants, and for dismissal of claims of fraud 
and conspiracy; and, on December 15, 1986, on further 
motion of defendants for attorneys’ fees and terms; defen­
dants having been represented at the hearings on said 
motions by Karr, Tuttle, Koch, Campbell, Mawer, Morrow 
& Sax, P.S. and Lawrence B. Ransom, and Brown-Mathews 
and Jackie R. Brown,, their attorneys; plaintiffs appearing 
at said hearing through plaintiff Dorothy Camer, pro se; 
the court having heard the arguments of counsel and the 
pro se plaintiffs; and the court having reviewed and 
considered the following:

Plaintiffs’ petition for declaratory judgment, violation 
of civil rights and other relief; Plaintiffs’ amended 
summons; Plaintiffs’ second amendment to complaint; Affi­
davits of service submitted by plaintiffs; defendants’ motion 
to dismiss claims against individual defendants, together 
with attachments which included alleged affidavits of 
service; sworn statement by Michael Hoge in support of 
defendants’ motion for dismissal or for summary judgment; 
defendants’ memorandum in support of motion for



B-2

dismissal or summary judgment, together with attachments 
A to K, which include prior litigation,, court orders and 
correspondence; defendants’ reply memorandum in 
support of motion for summary judgment; defendants’ 
supplemental memorandum in support of motion to 
dismiss claims against individual defendants; ’supplemental 
memorandum in support of motion to dismiss fraud and 
conspiracy claims, together with Exhibit A attached to it, 
which is a letter; plaintiffs memorandum opposing 
dismissal of individual defendants; affidavit of Joan Marie 
White; plaintiffs memorandum opposing dismissal of fraud 
and conspiracy charges, to which is attached the transcript 
of an oral decision of the superior court arising out of the 
1982 cause, Camer v. Stevens: affidavit of the plaintiff 
regarding when she realized defendants’ activities 
constituted a fraud; plaintiffs’ memorandum opposing 
dismissal or summary judgment, with attachment which in­
cludes a copy of a judgment arising under the 1982 cause, 
Camer v. Stevens: affidavit of the plaintiff opposing 
summary judgment; affidavit of Kirk Camer; affidavit of 
Miki Camer, with attachments; affidavit of L. Christine 
Foss; affidavit of Rochelle V. Leopard, with attachments 
and correspondence; affidavit of Barbara E. Robertson, 
with attachments; affidavit of Patricia L. Turner, with 
attachment, including letters from Group Health and 
certain exhibits; affidavit of Karimu White; affidavit of 
Malika M. White; affidavit of Nancy A. Winston, with 
attachments; corrections to plaintiffs memoranda opposing 
defendant’s motion to dismiss for various reasons, together 
with attachments; affidavit of Pepi Camer, with 
attachments; supplement to memorandum opposing 
defendants’ motion to dismiss for various reasons, together 
with a second affidavit of the plaintiff to support 
memoranda opposing dismissal; and all other papers 
properly filed by any party to these proceedings; and the 
court being otherwise fully advised; now therefore,

The court does make the following FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS:



B-3

1. Many of the issues raised by plaintiffs in this case are
the same or similar to those that were raised in previous 
cases brought by the same plaintiff: Camer v. Brouillet. 
King County Cause No. 80-2-05307-8, (Oct. 8, 1980),, affd 
by unpublished opinion. 21 Wn. App. 1097 (1982), and 
Camer v. Eikenberrv. United States District Court Cause 
No. ' C81-682M. (W.D. Wash. 1982), a f f ' d  by
unpublished opinion. 703 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1983), cert 
denied, 464 U.S. 828, 104 S.Ct. 102„ 78 L.Ed. 2d 106 
(1983).

2. Plaintiffs’ allegation of fraud and conspiracy have 
not been pleaded with the particularity required under Civil 
Rule 9(b).

3. Plaintiffs’ allegations, and the record before this 
court, do not contain any showing of damages to any 
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs children.

4. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not state an individual 
private cause of action for educational malpractice, and 
Washington courts do not in any event recognize an 
individual cause of action for educational malpractice.

5. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not state a private cause of 
action under Chapter 28A RCW in general,, under 
Washington’s Basic Education Act in particular, or under 
any other state or federal statutes.

6. Plaintiffs allegations do not state a cause of action 
arising under either the Washington or the United States 
Constitutions.

7. Most of the actions or inactions alleged by plaintiffs 
fall within the broad discretionary authority of the Seattle 
School District, its administrators, and its certificated staff, 
all of whom are public officers.



B-4

8. The court is not equipped to oversee and monitor 
day-to-day operations of a public school system.

9. None of plaintiffs’ allegations of fraud, conspiracy, 
improprieties,, wasting of funds, lack of discipline, or lack 
of due process rises to an actionable valid cause of action 
which can be brought by a private individual.

10. To the extent that plaintiffs’ allegations do state 
valid complaints against the Seattle School District or its 
administrators or certified staff, litigation of such 
complaints is barred by the 30-day limitations period set 
forth in RCW 28A.88.010.

11. A number of the plaintiffs’ allegations and claims 
are frivolous.

12. Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, seeking to 
add Jewell Woods as a defendant, is frivolous on its face.

13. Plaintiffs have not made personal service of original 
process in the manner required by Civil Rule 4 and 
applicable state statutes on any of the individual defendants 
except Kenneth Dorsett, Michael Hoge, William Kendrick, 
Chris Kato, David Stevens, Jewell Woods and Elizabeth 
Wales.

14. There are no genuine issues of material fact 
remaining for trial.

NOW THEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing 
findings and conclusions,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED as follows;

1. Defendants’ motion for dismissal is granted;

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 
granted;



B-5

3. Defendants’ motion for dismissal of claims against 
individual defendants is granted against all individual 
defendants for the reason that the allegations against the 
individual defendants are based on exercise of discretion by 
said defendants.

4. Defendants’ motion for dismissal of claims against 
individual defendants is granted as to all defendants except 
Kenneth Dorsett, Michael Hoge, William Kendrick, Chris 
Kato, David Stevens,, Jewell Woods,, and Elizabeth Wales 
for the reason that all except these seven listed defendants 
have not been personally served with original process.

5. Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims of fraud and 
conspiracy is granted and all plaintiffs’ claims of fraud and 
conspiracy are hereby stricken and dismissed; provide that, 
the court shall retain jurisdiction for thirty (30) days from 
the date of this order to provide plaintiffs with the requisite 
particularity, if plaintiffs wish to attempt to do so.

6. Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and terms 
based on frivolous claims is granted.

7. Defendants shall recover from plaintiffs the sum of 
$250.00 for terms and attorneys’ fees and $125.00 for 
taxable costs, for a total judgment against plaintiffs and in 
favor of defendants in the amount of $375.00.

8. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment 
in favor of defendants in this matter consistent with the 
above orders.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 15th day of December, 
1986.

Signed by Gerard N. Shellan, Judge

Prepared by Lawrence B. Ransom, Attorney for 
defendant.



B-6

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON 
FOR KING COUNTY

Dorothy Camer, or herself and Miki Camer; Kirk Camer; 
and Pepi Camer, Plaintiffs v. Seattle School District No.l et

al., Defendants 
No. 86-2-11966-3

ORDER OF DISMISSAL AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

REGARDING FRAUD AND CONSPIRACY CLAIMS

THIS MATTER, having come on for hearing before 
the undersigned Judge Gerard M. Shellan on March 18, 
1987, on motion of defendant Seattle School District No. 1 
and other served defendants for dismissal or summary 
judgment on plaintiffs’ claims of fraud and conspiracy; 
defendants having been represented at the hearing on said 
motions by Karr, Tuttle, Koch, Campbell, Mawer, Morrow 
& Sax, P.S. and Lawrence B. Ransom, their attorneys; 
plaintiffs appearing at said hearing through plaintiff 
Dorothy Camer, pro se: the court having heard the 
arguments of counsel and the pro se plaintiff and the court 
having reviewed and considered the following:

1. Defendants Motion for Dismissal or Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims of Fraud and Conspiracy;

2. Plaintiffs’ statement of Particularities of Fraud, filed 
on January 14,1987, including all attachments thereto;

3. All of the materials that were considered by the 
court as referenced in the court’s Order of Dismissal and 
Summary Judgment dated December 15, 1986; and

4. All other papers properly filed by any party to these 
proceedings;

and the court being otherwise fully advised;



B-7

NOW THEREFORE, the court does reach the 
following Conclusions:

1. There are no genuine issues of material fact 
regarding plaintiffs’ claims based on allegations of fraud 
and conspiracy;

2. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law on all of plaintiffs’ claims based on allegations of fraud 
and conspiracy.

NOW THEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing 
conclusions, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 
AND DECREED as follows:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Dismissal or Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Claims of Fraud and Conspiracy is 
granted;

2. Defendants shall not be entitled to any further 
affirmative relief at the trial court level, including costs and 
attorneys’ fees, other than as set forth in the court’s Order 
of Dismissal and Summary Judgment dated December 15, 
1986;

3. Combining this Order with the court’s Order of 
Dismissal and Summary Judgment dated December 15,
1986, all of the plaintiffs claims against all defendants are 
now, finally, dismissed with prejudice.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 18th day of March,
1987.

Signed: Gerard M. Shellan, Judge

Prepared by: Lawrence B. Ransom, Attorney for the 
Defendants

i



C-l

APPENDIX C

DECISION
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIVISION I, 

STATE OF WASHINGTON

Dorothy Camer, for herself and Kirk Camer and Pepi 
Camer, Appellants v. Frank Brouillet et al., Respondents

No. 10227-3-1, Unpublished 
Filed June 7,1982

CORBETT, J. — Dorothy Camer, individually and as a 
parent and guardian, appeals a summary judgment that 
dismissed her complaint seeking damages for the alleged 
denial of a basic education for her children.

The complaint alleges that in June of 1979, Kirk 
completed the 6th grade and Pepi completed the 5th grade 
at Jefferson School in the Seattle School District. Their 
report cards indicated satisfactory or better work. 
However, both children failed to achieve certain student 
learning bench marks for their grade level due to an alleged 
failure by the school district to provide adequate instruc­
tion. Plaintiff further alleges that the school staff failed to 
provide a healthy environment conducive to education and 
to provide a program to meet the individual and collective 
needs of plaintiff’s children and their fellow students. She 
concludes with the allegation that because the Seattle 
School District failed to properly implement the STudent 
Learning Objective law, RCW 28A.58.090 and .092, and the 
Basic Education Act, RCW 28A.58.750, plaintiff’s children 
were not provided with a constitutionally guaranteed basic 
program of education, as required by article 9, section 1 of 
our state constitution. In support of her complaint, plaintiff 
submits a long record of correspondence as evidence of her 
attempts to bring alleged instructional deficiencies to the 
attention of the defendants. Her most specific objections 
were (1) a disciplinary measure that separated boys and



C-2

girls at recess, (2) a school practice of not obtaining excuses 
from parents for absences and tardiness, and (3) failure of 
her children to meet "bench mark" learning objectives. The 
trial court found that there was not issue of material fact,, 
and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted.

Plaintiff contends that she has a right to seek 
interpretation of the Basic Education Act and the Student 
Learning Objectives law under the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgment Act. RCW 7.24. In her complaint, she prays for 
declaratory relief affirming the right of all students to a 
basic education and equal opportunity to receive all the 
services of the school district. These rights are provided for 
by article 9 of our state constitution and are not disputed by 
the defendants. Before the court’s declaratory judgment 
power can be invoked, there must be a justiciable 
controversy. Port of Seattle v. State Utilities & 
Transportation Comm’n., 92 Wn.2d 789, 806, 597 P.2d 383 
(1979). This requires:

(l)...an actual, present and existing dispute, or the 
mature seeds of one, as distinguished from a possible, 
dormant, hypothetical, speculative, or moot dis­
agreement, (2) between parties having genuine and 
opposing interests, (3) which involves interests that 
must be direct and substantial, rather than potential, 
theoretical, abstract or academic, and (4) a judicial 
determination of which will be final and conclusive.

Diversified Industrial Development Corp. v. Ripley. 82 
Wn.2d 811, 815, 514 P.2d 137 (1973). The statutory 
purpose of the act and the indication that it should be 
liberally construed does not make the issuance of a 
declaratory judgment mandatory. The granting of a 
declaratory judgment is discretionary. King County v. 
Boeing. 18 Wn.App. 595, 601-02, 570 P.2d 713 (1977). The 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant



C-3

the requested decree in the absence of a justiciable 
controversy.

Plaintiff next contends that she has standing to bring a 
private cause of action under the Student Learning 
Objectives law. The statute does not expressly provide for 
a private remedy. She relies on Cort v. Ash. 422 U.S. 66, 
78, 45 L.Ed.2d 26, 95 S.Ct. 2080 (1975) as authority for an 
implied remedy. The relevant factors as set out in the Cort 
decision are: (1) Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose 
especial benefit the stature was enacted? (2) Is there any 
indication of legislative intent to create or deny such a 
remedy? (3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes 
of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy? Id. at 78. 
Examination of the Senate and House Journals relative to 
the legislation in question discloses no clear legislative 
intent to create a duty enforceable in tort flowing from the 
Seattle School District or the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction to individual pupils or their parents.

The traditional rule is that a regulatory statute 
imposes a duty on public officials which is owed to the 
public as a whole, and that such a statute does not 
impose any duties owed to a particular individual 
which can be the basis for a tort claim.

Baerlein v. State. 92 Wn.2d 229, 231, 595 P.2d 930 
(1979), citing Halvorson v. Dahl. 89 Wn.2d 673, 574 P.2d 
1190 (1978). The purpose of the Student Learning 
Objectives so as to provide (a) economies in management 
and operation and quality education, and (b) a measurable 
guide by which to gauge actual student attainment. 
Assuming only for argument that plaintiffs children, by 
virtue of their status as students, fall within a particular and 
circumscribed class of persons to be benefited by the 
statute, the language and legislative history of the statute 
are devoid of any intention on the part of the legislature to 
create a private cause of action for damages. Therefore, 
the court need not inquire further as to whether such a



C-4

right exists. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington. 442 U.S. 
560„ 576, 61 L.Ed.2d 82, 99 S.Ct. 2479 (1979); California v. 
Sierra Club. _  U.S. _ ,  68 L.Ed.2d. 101, 110, 101 S.Ct. _  
(1981). The plaintiff has failed to submit any state of facts 
which, by statute or constitutional provision, would entitle 
her to relief. The trial court did not err in so finding.

Plaintiff further contends that she has standing to seek 
judicial relief under the traditional concepts of tort. There 
are three elements of actionable neglience: (1) existence of 
a duty, (2) breach thereof, and (3) damages proximately 
caused thereby. Lewis v. Scott. 54 Wn.2d 851, 341 P.2d 488 
(1959). Existence of a duty is a question of law and not of 
fact. Bavman v. Clearwater Power Co.. 15 Wn.App. 566, 
568, 550 P.2d 554 (1976). Interpretation of the statutes 
relied upon by the plaintiff is also a question of law for the 
court. State ex rel. Humiston v. Meyers. 61 Wn.2d 772, 777, 
380 P.2d 735 (1963); Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe. 90 Wn.2d 123, 
130, 580 P.2d 246 (1978); McFadden v. Elma County Club. 
26 Wn.App. 195, 203, 613 P.2d 146 (1980).

The plaintiffs cause of action sounds in "educational 
malpractice," an issue of first impression in this state. The 
defendants cite cases from other jurisdictions that have 
considered the issue and have declined to recognize an 
actionable "duty of care" in persons and agencies who 
administer the public educational process. See  Peter W. v. 
San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist.. 131 Cal Rptr. 854, 860, 60 
Cal.App.3d 823 (1976); Donohue v. Copiague U. Free Sch. 
Dist.. 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 878„ 64 A.2d 29 (1978), affd, 418 
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979). We do not find it necessary to decide 
if such an action exists in the State of Washington until a 
more appropriate case is presented to us. The plaintiff has 
failed to establish a breach of duty on the part of the 
defendants. The Seattle School District’s duty to educate 
under the Basic Education Act and to make achievement 
reports under the Student Learning Objective statute does 
not include a duty to insure that every student, including 
the children of the plaintiff, will be able to achieve every



C-5

bench mark. The action was properly dismissed by the trial 
court for failure to state facts giving rise to a cause of 
action.

Affirmed.

T. Patrick Corbett, J.

We Concur: Herbert Swanson, Ward Williams

A majority of the panel having determined that this 
opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate 
Reports but will be filed for public record pursuant to 
RCW 2.06.040, IT IS SO ORDERED.

Chief Judge

»



C-6

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Kirk Camer, minor, and Dorothy Camer, parent and 
guardian, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Ken O. Eikenberry, et al., 

Defendants-Respondents

No. 81-3587

MEMORANDUM (DO NOT PUBLISH)

Decided February 16,1983

Before: Duniway, Fletcher and Ferguson, Circuit 
Judges.

Dismissal of this action, involving a high school math 
honors program and an eighth grade social studies course, 
is justified if plaintiffs’ claims were "so attenuated and 
unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, . . .," 
Newburvport Water Co. v. Newburvport. 193 U.S. 561, 579 
(1904), or "frivolous," Bell v. Hood. 327 U.S. 678, 683 
(1946); Baker v. Carr. 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962). The 
district court properly dismissed that action.

Plaintiff Dorothy Camer does not claim that her son 
was treated differently from other students in his classes, 
school, or school district or that he was denied an education 
on the basis of a suspect classification. Therefore the equal 
protection claim is unsubstantiated.

The plaintiffs’ due process claims are also 
unsubstantial. There is no property interest, protect by due 
process, in being notified of every educational offering the 
state makes available to those who ask or in receiving a 
given level of instruction. Due process protects only those 
entitlements which the state has established and main­
tained. See Goss v. Lopez. 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (due 
process protects entitlement to public education).



C-7

Furthermore, no claim presented arises under federal 
statutes. These claims will lie, if at all, only in state court, 
where proceedings are being held. Dismissal was therefore 
proper. Gully v. First National Bank. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).

AFFIRMED.



D-l

APPENDIX D

WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION AND LAWS 

CONSTITUTION ARTICLE IX

Section 1 PREAMBLE. It is the paramount duty of 
the state to make ample provision for the education of all 
children residing within its borders, without distinction or 
preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.

Section 2 PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM. The legisla­
ture shall provide for a general and uniform system of 
public schools. The public school system shall include 
common schools, and such high schools, normal schools, 
and technical schools as may hereafter be established. But 
the entire revenue derived from the common school fund 
and the state tax for common schools shall be exclusively 
applied to the support of the common schools.

REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON

28A.02.080 STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONS 
COMPULSORY-REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT. 
The study of the Constitution of the United States and the 
Constitution of the state of Washington shall be a condition 
prerequisite to graduation from the public and private high 
schools of this state. The state board of education acting 
upon the advice of the superintendent of public instruction 
shall provide by rule or regulation for the implementation 
of this section.

28A.05.010 COMMON SCHOOL CURRICULUM- 
FUNDAMENTALS IN CONDUCT. All common schools 
shall give instruction in reading, penmanship, orthography, 
written and mental arithmetic, geography,, English 
grammar, physiology and hygiene with special reference to 
the effects of alcoholic stimulants and narcotics on the



D-2

human system, the history of the United States, and such 
other studies as may be prescribed by rule or regulation of 
the state board of education. All teachers shall stress the 
importance of the cultivation of manners, the fundamental 
principles of honesty, honor, industry and economy, the 
minimum requisites for good health including the beneficial 
effect of physical exercise, and the worth of kindness to all 
living creatures.

28A.05.050 HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT IN 
HIGH SCHOOLS. To promote good citizenship and a 
greater interest in and better understanding of our national 
and state institutions and system of government, the state 
board of education shall prescribe a one-year course of 
study in the history and government of the United States, 
and the equivalent of a one-semester course of study in the 
state of Washington’s history and government. No person 
shall be graduated from high school without completing 
such courses of study: P r o v i d e d  That students in the 
twelfth grade who have not completed such a course of 
study in Washington’s history and state government 
because of previous residence outside of the state may have 
the foregoing requirement waived by their principal.

28A.27.010 ATTENDANCE MANDATORY - AGE - 
PERSONS HAVING CUSTODY SHALL CAUSE 
CHILD TO ATTEND PUBLIC SCHOOL - CHILD 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ATTENDING SCHOOL - 
EXCEPTIONS-EXCUSED TEMPORARY ABSENCES
(1) All parents in this state of any child eight years of age 
and under eighteen years of age shall cause such child to 
attend the public school of the district in which the child 
resides and such child shall have the responsibility to and 
therefore shall attend for the full time when such school 
may be in session___

28A.27.020 SCHOOL’S DUTIES UPON 
JUVENILE’S FAILURE TO ATTEND SCHOOL - 
GENERALLY If a juvenile required to attend school



D-3

under the laws of the state' of Washington fails to attend 
school without valid justification recurrently or for any 
extended period of time, the juvenile’s school, where 
appropriate shall:
(1) Inform the juvenile’s custodial parent,, parents or 
guardian by a notice in writing in English and, if different, 
in the primary language of the custodial parent, parents or 
guardian and by other means reasonably necessary to 
achieve notice of the fact that the juvenile has failed to 
attend school without valid justification recurrently or for 
an extended period of time;
(2) Schedule a conference or conferences with the custodial 
parent, parents or guardian and juvenile at a time and 
place reasonably convenient for all persons included for the 
purpose of analyzing the causes of the juvenile’s absences; 
and
(3) Take steps to eliminate or reduce the juveniles’s 
absences. These steps shall include, where appropriate, 
adjusting the juvenile’s school program or school or course 
assignment, providing more individualized or remedial 
instruction,, preparing the juvenile for employment with 
specific vocational courses or work experience, or both, and 
assisting the parent or student to obtain supplementary 
services that might eliminate or ameliorate the cause or 
causes for the absences from school.

28A.58.090 STUDENT LEARNING OBJECTIVES - 
PROGRAM IDENTIFYING AND ESTABLISHING, 
SCOPE-REVIEW AND REPORTS. Every school district 
board of directors, being accountable to the citizens within 
its district as to the education offered to the students 
therein, shall, based on the timeline established by the 
superintendent of public instruction, develop a program 
identifying student learning objectives for their district in all 
courses of study included int he school district programs. 
The school district must evidence community participation 
in defining the objectives of such a program. The program 
of student learning objectives shall assure that the district’s 
resources in the educational program, such as money, facili­



D-4

ties, time, materials and personnel, are used so as to 
provide both economies in management and operation, 
and quality education in all subject areas and courses. The 
learning objectives shall be measurable as to the actual 
student attainment; student attainment shall be locally 
assessed annually and the student learning objectives 
program shall be reviewed at least every two years in 
developing and reviewing the learning objectives, districts 
shall give specific attention to improving the depth of 
course content within courses and in coordinating the 
sequence in which subject matter is presented...

28A.58.101 GOVERNMENT OF SCHOOLS, 
PUPILS, EMPLOYEES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
FOR-DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES ENFORCE­
MENT. Every board of directors unless otherwise speci­
fically provided by law, shall:
(1) Enforce the rules and regulations prescribed by the 
superintendent of public instruction and the state board of 
education for the government of schools, pupils and 
certificated employees.
(2) Adopt and make available to each pupil, teacher, and 
parent in the district reasonable written rules and regu­
lations regarding pupil conduct, discipline, and rights, 
including but not limited to short-term and long-term 
suspensions. Such rules and regulations shall not be 
inconsistent with law or the rules and regulations of the 
superintendent of public instruction or the state board of 
education and shall include such substantive and proced­
ural due process guarantees as prescribed by the state 
board of education under RCW 28A.04.132. Commencing 
with the 1976-77 school year, when such rules and regula­
tions are made available to each pupil, teacher and parent, 
they shall be accompanied by a detailed description of the 
rights, responsibilities and authority of teachers and 
principals with respect to the discipline of pupils as 
prescribed by state statutory law, superintendent of public 
instruction and state board of education rules and 
regulations and rules and regulations of the school district.



D-5

For the purposes of this subsection, computation of 
days included in "short-term" and "long-term" suspensions 
shall be determined on the basis of consecutive school days.

(3) Suspend, expel, or discipline pupils in accordance 
with RCW 28A.04.132.

28A.58.750 BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 1977 - 
PROGRAM CONTENTS-AS MEETING CONSTITU­
TIONAL REQUIREMENTS. This 1977 amendatory act 
shall be known and may be cited as 'The Washington Basic 
Education Act of 1977". The program evolving from the 
Basic Education Act shall include (1) the goal of the school 
system as defined in RCW 28A.58.752, (2) those program 
requirements enumerated in RCW 28A.58.754, and (3) the 
determination and distribution of state resources as defined 
in RCW 28A.41.130 and 28A.41.140.

The requirements of the Basic Education Act are 
deemed by the legislature to comply with the requirements 
of Article IX, section 1 of the state Constitution, which 
states that "It is the paramount duty of the state to make 
ample provision for the education of all children residing 
within its borders, without distinction or preference on 
account of race, color, caste, or sex", and are adopted pur­
suant to Article IX, section 2 of the state Constitution, 
which states that "The legislature shall provide for a general 
and uniform system of public schools. The public school sy­
stem shall include common schools, and such high schools, 
normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be 
established. But the entire revenue derived from the com­
mon school fund and the state tax for common schools shall 
be exclusively applied to the support of the common 
schools."

28A.58.752 BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 1977 - 
GOAL. The goal of the Basic Education Act for the schools 
of the state of Washington set forth in this 1977 
amendatory act shall be to provide students with the



D-6

opportunity to achieve those skills which are generally 
recognized as requisite to learning. Those skills shall 
include the ability:
(1) To distinguish, interpret and make use of words, 
numbers and other symbols, including sound, colors, shapes 
and textures;
(2) To organize words and other symbols into acceptable 
verbal and nonverbal forms of expression, and numbers 
into their appropriate functions;
(3) To perform intellectual functions such as problem 
solving, decision making, goal setting, selecting, planning, 
predicting, experimenting, ordering and evaluating; and
(4) To use various muscles necessary for coordinating 
physical and mental functions.

28A.58.754* ** BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 1977 - 
DEFINITIONS-PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS-PRO- 
GRAM ACCESSIBILITY-RULES AND REGULA­
TIONS.
(1) for the purposes of this section . . .
(a) The term "total program hour offering" shall mean 
those hours when students are provided the opportunity to 
engage in educational activity planned by and under the 
direction of school district staff, as directed by the 
administration and board of directors of the district...
(d) Each school district shall make available to students in 
grades seven through eight, at least a total program hour 
offering of one thousand nine hundred eighty hours. A 
minimum of eighty-five percent of the total program hour 
offerings shall be in the basic skills areas of read- 
ing/language arts (which may include foreign languages), 
mathematics, social studies, science, music, art, health and 
physical education. A minimum of ten percent of the total 
program offerings shall be in the area of work skills, The 
remaining five percent of the total program hour offerings

*Laws thus marked have been excerpted to minimize
the volume of reproduction.



D-7

may include such subjects and activities as the school 
district shall determine to be appropriate for the education 
of the school district’s students in such grades;
(3) Each school district shall make available to students in 
grades nine through twelve at least a total program hour 
offering of four thousand three hundred twenty hours...
(5) Each school district’s kindergarten through twelfth 
grade basic educaton program shall be accessible to all 
students who are five years of age, as provided by RCW 
28A.58.190, and less than twenty-one years of age and shall 
consist of a minimum of one hundred eighty school days 
per school year in such grades as are conducted by the 
school district, and one hundred eighty half-days of 
instruction, or equivalent, in kindergarten...

28A.58.758* BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 1977 - 
DISTRICT SCHOOL DIRECTORS AS 
ACCOUNTABLE FOR PROPER OPERATION OF 
DISTRICT-SCOPE-RESPONSIBILITIES-PUBLICA- 
TION OF GUIDE.
(1) It is the intent and purpose of this section to guarantee 
that each common school district board of directors, 
whether or not acting through its respective administrative 
staff, be held accountable for the proper operation of their 
district to the local community and its electorate. In 
accordance with the provisions of Title 28A RCW, as now 
or hereafter amended, each common school district board 
of directors shall be vested with the final responsibility for 
the setting of policies ensuring quality in the content and 
extent of its educational program and that such program 
provide students with the opportunity to achieve those 
skills which are generally recognized as requisite to 
learning.
(2) In conformance with the provisions of Title 28A RCW, 
as now or hereafter amended, it shall be the responsibility 
of each common school district board of directors, acting 
through its respective administrative staff, to:
(a) Establish performance criteria and an evaluation pro­
cess for its certificated personnel, including administrative



D-8

staff, and for all programs constituting a part of such 
district’s curriculum___
(c) Determine the amount of instructional hours necessary 
for any student to acquire a quality education in such 
district, in not less than an amount otherwise required in 
RCW 28A.58.754, or rules and regulations of the state 
board of education.. . .
(e) Establish final curriculum standards consistent with law 
and rules and regulations of the state board of education, 
relevant to the particular needs of district students or the 
unusual characteristics of the district, and ensuring a quality 
education for each student in the district...
(3) In keeping with the accountability purpose expressed in 
this section and to insure that the local community and 
electorate have access to information on the educational 
programs in the school districts, each school district’s board 
of directors shall annually publish a descriptive guide to the 
district’s common schools. This guide shall be made 
available at each school in the district for examination by 
the public. The guide shall include, but not be limited to, 
the following: . . .
(b) A summary of program objectives pursuant to RCW 
28A.58.090

28A.58.760* BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 1977 - 
CERTIFICATED TEACHING AND
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF AS ACCOUNTABLE FOR 
CLASSROOM TEACHING - SCOPE 
RESPONSIBILITIES - PENALTY.
(1) It is the intended purpose of this section to guarantee 
that the certificated teaching and administrative staff in 
each common school district be held accountable for the 
proper and efficient conduct of classroom teaching in their 
school which will provide students with the opportunity to 
achieve those skills which are generally recognized as 
requisite to learning.
(2) In conformance with the other provisions of Title 28A 
RCW, it shall be the responsibility of the certificated



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teaching and administrative staff in each common school 
to:
(a) Implement the district’s prescribed curriculum and 
enforce, within their area of responsibility, the rules and 
regulations of the school district, the state superintendent 
of public instruction, and the state board of education, 
taking into due consideration individual differences among 
students, and maintain and render appropriate records and 
reports pertaining thereto___
(d) Require excuses from the parents, guardians, or 
custodians of minor students in all cases of absence, late 
arrival to school, or early dismissal.
(e) Give careful attention to the maintenance of a healthful 
atmosphere in the classroom.
(g) Evaluate each student’s educational growth and 
development and make periodic reports thereon to 
parents, guardians, or custodians and to school 
administrators.

Failure to carry out such requirements as set forth in 
subsection (2)(a) through (g) above shall constitute 
sufficient cause for discharge of any member of such 
teaching and administrative staff.