Le Clair v. O'Neil Response to Appellees' Motion to Dismiss and/or Affirm
Public Court Documents
October 6, 1969
Cite this item
-
Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Le Clair v. O'Neil Response to Appellees' Motion to Dismiss and/or Affirm, 1969. 2cbe4fc2-ba9a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/a407b660-22e5-4903-b73a-711342c9ac96/le-clair-v-oneil-response-to-appellees-motion-to-dismiss-andor-affirm. Accessed November 03, 2025.
Copied!
Jtt tfye
l&tprm? (Court of tht Initrit BUUb
October Term, 1969
No. 1315
A nn Marie Le Clair, Mary L inda L usk, Ruth Y adney,
Jill W atts, W illiam Pastreich, National W elfare Rights
Organization, Massachusetts W elfare Rights Organi
zation, W orcester W elfare Rights Organization, indi
vidually and on behalf of other persons similarly situated
a p p e l l a n t s ,
v.
George D. O ’Neil, Chief of Police of the City of Worcester,
W illiam T. B uckley, District Attorney for the City of
Worcester, R obert H. Quinn , Attorney General of the Com
monwealth of Massachusetts, John P. Guilfoil, Director
of the Worcester Welfare Service Office, Robert Ott,
Commissioner of Welfare for the Commonwealth of Mas
sachusetts, individually and in their official capacities
A PPE LLEE S.
ON A PPE A L FROM T H E U N IT E D STATES D ISTR IC T COURT
FOR T H E DISTRICT OF M ASSA C H U SE TTS
RESPONSE TO APPELLEES’
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR AFFIRM
M e l v y n Z a rr
A l l a n G. R odgers
L a w r e n c e K o t in
B a r b a r a Sc h w a r t z b a u m
80 Boylston Street
Of counsel: Boston, Massachusetts 02116
A n t h o n y G. A m s t e r d a m
St e p h e n B ardige
A n d r e w L. P h i l i p
Blanchard Press, Inc., Boston, Mass. — Law Printers
$n the
Supreme Court of the 3Ittttr& States
O ctober T erm , 1969
No. 1315
A n n M arie L e C lair , M ary L inda L u sk , R u t h V adney ,
J il l W atts, W illiam P astreich , N ational W elfare R ights
Organization , M assachusetts W elfare R ights Organ i
zatio n , W orcester W elfare R ights Organization , in d i
v idu a lly and on beh a lf o f oth er p erson s s im ilarly situated
a p p e l l a n t s ,
v.
George D. O ’N eil , Chief of Police of the City of Worcester,
W illiam T. B u c k le y , District Attorney for the City of
Worcester, R obert H. Q u in n , Attorney General of the Com
monwealth of Massachusetts, J o h n P. G u ilfoil , Director
of the Worcester Welfare Service Office, R obert Ot t ,
Commissioner of Welfare for the Commonwealth of Mas
sachusetts, individually and in their official capacities
APPELLEES.
ON A P PE A L FROM T H E U N IT E D STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR T H E D ISTRICT OF M A SSA C H U SE TTS
RESPONSE TO APPELLEES’
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR AFFIRM
Appellants prayed for a declaratory judgment of inva
lidity of the Massachusetts “ disturbers of the peace” law
9
(Complaint, |[4) and preliminary and permanent injunc
tions against appellees restraining their further enforce
ment of it (Complaint, t|3). The court below, in a single
opinion and judgment, denied all relief and dismissed ap
pellants’ complaint. Appellees contend that 28 IJ.S.C.
§1253 does not permit this Court to review the court be
low’s denial of declaratory relief in conjunction with its re
view of the denial of injunctive relief. Not only does
this contention make no sense, but it is surprising that it
should be advanced at all, in light of appellees’ citation
of such decisions of this Court as Zivickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241 (1967) and Cameron v. .Johnson, 390 TJ.S. 611
(1968).
This is not to say that this Court need reach the ques
tion of the necessity or propriety of injunctive relief: dec
laratory relief may be enough to remedy the denial of
federal constitutional rights complained of by appellants.
But appellees maintain that even declaratory relief is un
warranted, because the validity of the “ disturbers of the
peace ’ ’ statute can be ‘ ‘ resolved in a single state proceeding
on appeal from [the individual appellants’ ] convictions”
(Motion, p. 11). However true this may be in theory, it does
not square with experience. The prosecution of those indi
vidual appellants convicted of being “ disturbers of the
peace” in the no-record court have been dismissed, on
prosecution motion, by the criminal court of record.1 And
as was pointed out in the Jurisdictional Statement (p.
21), some such avoidance of the federal constitutional ques
tion was entirely predictable.
But, it may be asked, of what injury can the indivi
dual appellants or other members of the appellant orga
nizations complain if they can expect similarly favorable
dispositions in the courts! Appellants answer is that given
1 This was done on April 15, 1970, subsequent to the filing of Ap
pellants’ Jurisdictional Statement.
3
at pp. 19-21 of the Jurisdictional Statement. In summary, it
is simply that such subsequent relief in the coui’ts is inef
fective, by itself, to preserve First Amendment rights of
free speech, peaceable assembly and petition for redress
of grievances: it is ineffective to restore the lost oppor
tunity to communicate; it is ineffective to dispel the fear
of arrest and prosecution which deters others from parti
cipating.
As long as police throughout the Commonwealth are au
thorized to wield the kind of meat-ax statute challenged
here, citizens will steer far clear of the danger zone created
around dissident conduct which tends “ to annoy all good
citizens” (See Jurisdictional Statement, pp. 18-19).
It is this danger the court below failed to appreciate in
holding that appellants, representing welfare rights workers
throughout the Commonwealth in their continuing campaign
for a decent standard of living, lacked standing to chal
lenge this overhanging threat to the whole range of their
activities.
Respectfully submitted,
M elvyn / ' a in:
A llan Gf. R odgers
L aw rence K otin
B arbara S chwartzbattm
Of counsel:
80 Boylston Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02116
Attorneys for Appellants
A n t h o n y Gr. A msterdam
S teph en B ardige
A ndrew L. P h ilip