McFerren, Jr. v. County Board of Education of Fayette County, Tennessee Brief for Appellants

    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

NO. 74-1031

JOHN J. McFERREN, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vs.

COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FAYETTE 
COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al..

Defendants-AppeHants.

Appeal from the United 
Western District of

States District Court for the 
Tennessee, Western Division

BRIEF.FOR APPELLEES

Of counsel:
JOSEPH P. HUDSON 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

AVON N. WILLIAMS, JR.
1414 Parkway Towers
404 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37219
JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
SYLVIA DREW 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019
Attorneys for Appellees



TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Table of Authorities................................... ii
Issues Presented for Review ..........................  1
Statement ............................................  2
ARGUMENT—

Introduction...........   6
I. The School Board Has Presented No 

Reason for Overturning The District 
Court's Disapproval Of Its Modified
Desegregation P l a n .......... . ............. 7

II. The District Court Did Not Abuse 
Its Discretion By Requiring The
School Board To Use A Consultant . . . . . . .  15

Conclusion . . . . . . . . .  .......... . . . . . . . .  16
Certificate of Service ................................  17

l



Table of Authorities

Cases:
?ag.e.

Bell v. West Point Municipal Separate School
Dist., 446 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1971) . . . . . . 13

Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 429
F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1970) ...................... . 4n

Chambers v. Iredell County Bd. of -Educ., 423
F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1970) ......................

Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile, 402
U.S. 33 (1971) . .......... . .................

Goss v. Board of Educ., 432 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir.
1973), cert, denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3423 (Jan.
21, 1974) .................................. COir-•

Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) . . . 8, 12
Hill v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d

583 (6th Cir. 1 9 6 8 ) ........................ . 8
Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489

F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973) ....................
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973) . . 16
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 

1973), cert, denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3595 (April 
22, 1974) .................................

Robinson v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 467 F.2d
1187' (6th Cir. 1972)........................

Robinson v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d
255 (6th Cir. 1971) ........................ . 8

Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th
Cir. 1968) ..................................

Seals v. Quarterly County Court of Madison
County, No. 73-1673 (6th Cir., April 23, 1974) . 4n

n



(cases)
Sloan v. 

433
Swann v. 

U.S

Statutes 
Title I,

F.R. Civ

Rule 9,

Table of Authorities (continued)

Page

Tenth School Dist. of Wilson County,
F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1970) . . ................  10, 11
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
. 1 (1971) .............. .................. . 3, 5, 9, 11,

12, 16

and Rules:
ESEA, 20 U.S.C. §§241a et secu . . . . . . . . .  2

. P. 52 . . .............. 8

U.S. Court of Appeals, 6th Cir. . . . . . . . .  7

i n



IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
NO. 74-1031

JOHN J. McFERREN, JR., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vs.

COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FAYETTE 
COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al.,

Detendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
______ Western District of Tennessee, ifestern Division_____

■ BRIEF FOR APPELLEES 

Issues Presented for Review
1. Did the District Court err in disapproving defendant 

school board's proposal to amend its desegregation plan, which 
amendment the Court found would have caused the discriminatory 
closing of a black school, and which would not have provided 
for comprehensive desegregation of defendants' system?

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in direct­
ing that the defendant school board consult with an outside 
expert and either "present a plan that will more completely



desegregate the school system, or explain why further changes 
on the existing plan are not required by the controlling auth­
orities [Swann and Davis]"?
\

Statement
This school desegregation suit, originally commenced in 

1965, appears before this Court for the second time. It was 
previously he;:rd on cross-appeals by the school board and a 
group of discharged black schoolteachers seeking their rein­
statement. 4:55 F.2d 199 (6th Cir.) , cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 
(1972). It has resulted in numerous hearings before the District
Court with respect to pupil desegregation, the discharged teacher

1/issues, and ancillary matters.

As appellants' brief correctly notes, the last District 
Court order approving a plan of pupil assignment for Fayette 
County was entered September 23, 1970; at that time, in accord­
ance with controlling precedent, a geographic-zoning plan was 
substituted for an ineffective freedom-of-choice decree (199a). 
After the school board on March 5, 1973 sought the District 
Court's approval to place portable facilities at various sites,
in order to conduct a compensatory education program under Title

1/ . . .I, ESEA, and to undertake certain additional construction at

1/ See, e.q., 17a, 23a [citations are to the printed Appendix 
on this appeal] (suspension of minor plaintiff) .

2/ 20 U.S.C. §§241a et seq..
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the Braden and Jefferson schools,— the plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Further Relief (2a) which, as amended and supplemented

4/on June 21, 1973,“ alleged, inter alia, that the public schools 
of Fayette County were not effectively desegregated (13a-16a).
The motion for further relief sought the adoption and implemen­
tation of a new elementary school desegregation plan consistent 
with Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 
(1971) and Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile, 402 U.S..
33 (1971) (19a-20a).

On August 3, 1973, the date of the hearing scheduled by 
the District Court to consider the parties' motions, and some 
few weeks prior to the start of the school term, the school 
board for the first time proposed a new plan of elementary pupil 
assignment for the Fayette Countv system (see 31a). Under this 
plan, the traditionally black Bernard Elementary School would 
be closed and its area added to a new, combined Jefferson- 
Somerville zone; certain relatively minor zone changes at other 
schools would be made; and the school board would proceed with 
its construction plans at Jefferson and Braden schools (Brief 
for Appellants, pp. 3-6).

3/ A line drawing of the county, showing the approximate loca­
tions of the elementary school facilities, is found in the 

separate Exhibit Appendix, at 3.
4/ On March 28, 1973, the District Court permitted the erection 

of the temporary buildings for Title I purposes, but postponed 
consideration of the school board's request to undertake permanent 
construction at Braden and Jefferson (12a-13a).

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The principal issue of concern to the parties and the
District Court was the board's sudden (see 86a-93a) request to
close the Bernard School, to which plaintiffs objected as
discriminatory and unnecessary (31a-33a). Defendants presented

5 /the testimony of a black man appointed to the school board- 
two weeks before the court hearing (34a), and the testimony of 
the school superintendent, in support of their request (34a-42a; 
84a-115a). Both sought to establish that the deteriorated

6/physical condition of the Bernard School warranted its closing;
however, neither was able to compare the condition of the Bernard
facility with all other county schools (40a-41a; 70a-71a; l'16a;

. 1/124a; 144a). Both were subjected to detailed cross-examination 
(42a-91a; 99a-105a; 116a-155a) by plaintiffs, who also intro­
duced photographs of each school facility (81a—82a; 114a~115a) 
as well as the testimony of other witnesses who had long famil­
iarity with the county school system (158a-196a).

After hearing the proof, the District Court ruled that the 
board's plan to close the Bernard School, transfer the black

5/ 46a; see Seals v. Quarterly County Court of Madison County, 
No. 73-1673 (6th Cir., April 23, 1974), slip op. at 5.

6/ See, e.g., Chambers v. Iredell County Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 
613 (4th Cir. 1970); Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 

429 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1970).
7/ Although appellants claim their proof with respect to the 
_ condition of the Bernard School was "largely uncontroverted" 
(Brief at 10), the testimony of their own witnesses was substan­
tially weakened by their responses on cross-examination. For 
example, the black school board member, who had no training or 
expertise in construction or maintenance of buildings (68a),

[continued]-4-



a Jefferson-Somerville pair, and maintain the existing, 57%-w'nite 
Braden school zone without change, except to enlarge the capacity 
of the school in the face of white population growth in western 
Fayette County (121a-122a), was racially discriminatory (202a- 
2 04a) .

elementary students residing within the former Bernard zone to
8/

The Court reviewed the status of desegregation in Fayette 
County in light of the commands of Swann and Davis (199a-202a), 
and concluded that further desegregation of the elementary schools 
was required (205a). The Court declined to adopt pairing pro­
posals suggested by the plaintiffs (204a) but announced that it 
would require the school board to employ a consultant and "come 
up with a plan that will more completely desegregate the school

9/system . . . "  (205a).

7/ [continued]
characterized Bernard as "rundown," "dangerous and hazardous,"
"broken from the bottom to the top" (40a-41a), and he sard the 
roof of the building was "really sagging" like "a sway-back 
horse" (70a). When shown a photograph of the school and asked 
to point out this serious sagging, however, he replied: "It's
a peculiar thing what a camera can do for a building. . . (83a).
Shown another view, he contended it revealed sinking rafters (84a); 
the photographs were studied by the District Court (ibid.). He 
also admitted that he had made no inquiry of the system's main­
tenance department to determine whether the building could be 
repaired (69a), even though it was his view that repairing the 
school, combining the Bernard and Braden zones, and pairing Jef­
ferson and Somerville, would be a more effective and fairer 
desegregation plan (85a-86a).
8/ The Fayette County system is between 80% and 85% black (110a,

204a).
9/ As previously noted, the Court's order required submission of

such a plan or an explanation why it was not required under law (26a).
— 5 —



Based upon the evidence, the District Court found also 
that the school board's policy of neglecting maintenance at the 
Bernard School (see 82a) left that facility in neeo. of repairs 
(203a), and it directed that the school be restored to sound 
condition in time for the opening of school (26a; 205a).

ARGUMENT

Introduction
On this appeal, the school board questions the District 

Court's ruling in three particulars: disapproving the board's
request to amend its desegregation plan by closing Bernard Schcol 
and making the other changes outlined; declining to permit the 
board, on the evidence before the Court, to reconstruct a 
portion of the Jefferson School and to expand the capacity of 
the Braden School; and directing the board to obtain the services 
of an outside consultant in preparing a new desegregation plan 
for its elementary schools. Although the board's brief attempts 
to separate the Jefferson—Somerville pairing, which it contends 
would “improve" desegregation in the county, from the Bernard 
School closing, it is clear that the entire package— including 
the construction at Jefferson necessary to accommodate the 
reassigned Bernard students and the expansion of Braden was 
presented to the District Court as a unified proposal. The 
District Court observed the witnesses, heard the evidence, and 
(with his long familiarity with the Fayette County school system)

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rejected the proposal:
But we do know that the total 
combination of what the Board 
approves would risk or would 
build in further racial discrim­
ination against black people in 
this county. (206a)

On this record, the factual findings and legal rulings of 
the District Court are clearly correct; and the Court did not 
abuse its discretion in recjuiring the board to consult with an 
outside expert to draft a new desegregation plan. The judgment 
should be affirmed. indeed, we respectfully suggest that upon 
study of the briefs, the ruling below should be upheld without 
oral arcfument (see Rule 9, U.S. Court of Appeals, 6th Cir.) .

I
The School Board Has Presented 
No Reason For Overturning The 
District Court's Disapproval Of 
Its Modified Desegregation Plan

Nothing in the Brief for Appellants supports reversal of 
the district court's judgment in this matter. While we deal 
below with the individual arguments of the school- board, we think 
it proper, first, to sketch the context of this Court's review.

In the first place, the findings and judgment of the 
District Court carry with them presumptions of correctness, 
subject to reversal by this Court only if "clearly erroneous." 
Goss v. Board of Educ., 482 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.

-7-



denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3423 (Jan. 21, 1974); Robinson v. Shelby 
County Bd. of Educ., 467 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1972); Northcros3 
v. Board of Educ. of Memphis, 489 F.2d 15 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3595 (April 22, 1974); F.R. Civ. P. 52; cf.
Newburg Area Council, Inc, v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th 
Cir. 1973). The "clearly erroneous" doctrine is particularly 
appropriate in this case, since defendants' and plaintiffs' wit­
nesses clashed on various factual matters, including the condition 
and repairability of the Bernard School, and the burden placed 
upon black students if it were closed.

Furthermore, the burden of proof was upon the school author­
ities to justify their proposed modified desegregation plan, in 
terms both of its effectiveness, Green v. County School Bd., 391 
U.S. 430 (1968); Robinson v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 442 F.2d 255 
(6th Cir. 1971), and of its fairness. In particular, a proposal 
to close a black school as part of a desegregation plan places 
a heavy burden upon school officials to show the absence of dis­
criminatory motivation and impact. Brief for Appellants, at 10.
The principle is the same as that applied in teacher discharge 
cases. E.g., McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ., supra; Hill v.
Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968);
Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968).

These two principles combine to insulate the District Court's 
judgment from reversal unless egregious error or misinterpretation

-8-



of the evidence is demonstrated. This the school board has failed
to do.

The board argues, first (Brief for Appellants, p. 9) that 
the District Court's decision impinges upon school authorities' 
need for "considerable flexibility in exercising their discretion 
to locate and maintain public schools," and refers to the dis­
cussion in Swann, 402 U.S., at 20-21. But the board distorts 
the Supreme Court's meaning, for what the Court was emphasizing 
in the passages to which reference is made was the vast potential 
for racial, discrimination in site selection and construction 
practices. Significantly, the Court commented:

. . In addition to the classic pattern
of building schools specifically intended 
for Negro or white students, school 
authorities have sometimes, since Brown, 
closed schools which appeared likely to 
become racially mixed through changes in 
neighborhood residential patterns. This 
was sometimes accompanied by building 
new schools in the areas of white subur­
ban expansion farthest from Negro popula­
tion cen :ers in order to maintain the 
separatian of the races with a minimum 
departure from the formal principles of 
"neighborhood zoning." . . . Upon a proper 
showing a district court may consider this 
in fashioning a remedy.
. . . In devising remedies where legally
imposed segregation has been established, 
it is the responsibility of local auth­
orities and district courts to see to it 
that future school construction and 
abandonment is not used and does not serve 
to perpetuate or re-establish the dual 
system. . . . (402 U.S., at 21.)(emphasis
supplied)

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*

The Supreme Court's discussion is but a restatement of the 
principles expressed by this Court in Sloan v. Tenth School Dlst. 
of Wilson County, 433 F.2d 587, 589, 590 (6th Cir. 1970), affirming 
a district court's retention of jurisdiction in order to supervise 
future construction:

. . . Courts of Appeals have recognized the
possibility of the construction of new 
schools and the expansion of existing facil­
ities creating or preserving the racial 
segregation of pupils in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the possi­
bility of a school board selecting sites 
for new schools in order to effect an 
incorporation of existing residential segre­
gation into the school system. . . . school
construction planning [may be] designed to 
reinforce trends in population growth 
regardless of whether such planning rein force[s] 
and extend ( s] residential racial segregation .
. . . (emphasis supplied)

The excerpts from both opinions describe the factual situ­
ation before the District Court in this case: the school board
was proposing to close a black school in the northwest section 
of the county, an area toward w’hich white population growth was 
moving (109a, 122a, 126a). The black students residing within 
the school's present attendance area would be included in a new 
zone for two paired elementary schools to the east, with a 
resulting pupil population 80% black (Exhibit App., at 5); to 
the west of the present Bernard zone, the formerly white Braden 
Elementary, now the "whitest" school in the county (203a), would 
be unaffected by the reallocation of the Bernard zone. But in 

the context of the system-wide proportions, maintenance of this

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*

disproportionately white school, the district court found, would 
not only "incorporate existing residential segregation" but would 
attract additional white families to the area (204a), thus 
"extend[ing] residential racial segregation" in the county.
Indeed, the evidence showed that this was the Superintendent's 
expectation: the population growth in the Braden zone is mostly
white (109a); the Superintendent expected the increase in 
population in that area to bring Braden to capacity this year 
(ibid.) and to necessitate expansion of the facility (the construe 
tion proposed in the board's plan) in the future (110a, 126a).

The record shows there are over 200 vacant spaces at 
Jefferson (12.S<i) , permitting a general, realignment of the 
Jefferson-Somerville-Bernard-Braden zone lines in an eastward 
and southward direction, increasing desegregation at each facil­
ity by adding black students to Somerville and white students to 
Braden, and obviating the necessity for additional construction. 
(See Exhibit App., at 3). Alternatively, plaintiffs' proposal 
to pair Bernard and Braden, and Jefferson and Somerville, would 
achieve these ends. The alternative selected by the school board 
results in the greatest degree of continued segregation, based 
upon existing and projected residential patterns. The District 
Court was clearly authorized, indeed required, by Swann and Sloan 
to reject it.

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*

The board's argument (Brief for Appellants, at 10) that the 
District Court was obligated to allow the Braden-Jefferson-Somer- 
ville pairing because, viewed in isolation from the remainder of 
the county, it would "increas[e]" desegregation, is untenable 
in the light of the obligation to desegregate "root and branch," 
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) and to achieve 
"the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation" throughout 
the school system, Swann, supra; Davis, supra.

The school board next argues that the District Court's 
conclusion that the proposal to close Bernard was if cX cially 
discriminatory is clearly erroneous. None of the "overwhelming 
(and largely uncontroverted) proof" is cited in the board's 
argument (Brief for Appellants, at 10) .. In its Statement of 
Facts, however, the board makes a serious misrepresentation, 
consistent with its tactical defense of calling a black school 
board member to dispel thoughts of racial motivation. Mr. Maclin 
did not, as the board's brief (at 5) suggests, initiate the 
proposal to close the Bernard School. That decision had been 
made by the school board prior to his appointment (64a, 98a). At 
the first board meeting following his appointment, under the 
impression that Bernard School was definitely to be closed (64a, 
67a), he did make the motion to assign the Bernard students to 
the Jefferson-Somerville pair (41a-42a, 64a).

Furthermore, the record contains substantial evidence from 
both Mr. Maclin and plaintiffs' witnesses, which the District

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Court could properly have credited in determining that Bernard 
was to- be .closed because of opposition from Braden white parents 
who did not wish to send their children to Bernard if the schools
were paired (see 87a, 162a-165a). Bell v. West Point Municipal 
Separate School Dist., 446 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1971). The 
District Court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that the 
board's plan "is discriminatory in its overall purpose" (204a).

Likewise, the evidence with respect to the unrepairability 
of the Bernard structure is not so one-sided as to make clearly 
erroneous the District Court's finding that Bernard is not "a 
hazardous school" (205a). The repair estimate cited in the 
board's brief (at 11) was admitted over objection (101a-105a) 
and the District Court specifically rejected its reliability as 
an indication of the soundness of the Bernard structure (205a, 
211a). None of the plaintiffs' witnesses (who were as qualified 
in construction and maintenance of buildings as Mr. Maclin) felt 
Bernard was ready to fall down, or suffered from anything except 
the "benign neglect" of the Fayette County School Board over the 
years (178a, 182a, 187a, 192a-193a).

Finally, the board argues (Brief, at 11) that there is no 
support for a finding that closing Bernard and merging its zone 
into a Jefferson-Somerville pair would put a disproportionate 
busing burden on black children. The board cites school-to-

school distances, not the lengths of travel which would be 
required of children living within the zones. When these are

-13-



considered, the pattern is very clear. The Superintendent 
himself admitted that a single Braden-Bernard paired attendance 
zone would be smaller than the Jefferson-Somerville zone (120a), 
much less the Bernard-Jefferson-Somerville zone— although he 
refused to estimate actual busing distances (121a). He later 
reiterated that travel distances would be less in a Braden-Bernard 
pairing (132aj and said that pairing Jefferson and Somerville 
without the Bernard zone included would bring about more effec­
tive desegregation (137a). The plaintiffs who reside in north­
western Fayette County viewed the board's proposal as discriminatory 
because of the extensive distance to Somerville, as compared to 
Braden (182a, 186a-187a). The District Court1s finding that the
proposal was discriminatory cannot realistically be characterized

10/as clearly erroneous.

In summary, we repeat that the school board has totally 
failed to demonstrate that the findings and conclusions of the 
District Court were clearly erroneous and reversible. The 
District Court has extensive familiarity with the long history 
of racial discrimination in Fayette County; his efforts to insure 
that blacks are not unfairly treated in the desegregation process 
are commendable.

10/ The board also refers in passing (Brief for Appellants, at 
11) to the "poor road conditions surrounding and leading to 

Bernard School." The difference between the board's plan and a 
Braden-Bernard pairing is merely that under the former, only 
black students will use those roads, while under the latter both 
black and white children will (177a).

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II

' The District Court Diet Not
Abuse Its Discretion By Requiring 
The School Board to Use A Consultant

The board's entire argument on this issue is contained
in a single sentence:

Defendants especially contend that the 
imposition upon Defendants of the cost 
and burden of hiring yet another expert 
to come up with yet another plan for 
desegregation is unwarranted and constitutes 
an abuse of discretion. (Brief for Appel­
lants, at 12).

To the contrary, the District Court demonstrated greater modesty 
than plaintiffs believe was warranted under the circumstances. 
The school board had defaulted in its obligation under Swann to 
come up with an acceptable plan; instead, it proposed a discrim­
inatory scheme whose total impact would have been to increase 
desegregation slightly at three schools, leave unchanged the 
composition of four schools, and reduce desegregation at three 
schools (Brief for Appellants, at 6-7; 132a-140a). Plaintiffs 
proposed contiguous pairings which would far more effectively 
have desegregated the Fayette County elementary schools (see 
132a-140a; Exhibit App. at 11). In its discretion, the District 
Court declined to order implementation of the pairings "without 
further study" (204a) and directed the board to undertake such 
study with the assistance of a consultant. Surely this modest 
directive was within the power of the District Court upon the

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board's failure to produce an acceptable plan. See Swann, 
supra, 402 U.S., at 24-25.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the 

District Court should be affirmed; and, upon submission of 
documentation with their Bill of Costs, reasonable attorneys' 
fees as well as the costs of this appeal should be awarded to 
the plaintiffs. Norihcross v. Board of Educ.. , 412 U.S. 427 (1973).

Respectfully submitted.
- i ;  . ?  /  / Q F

•-C' ' ^

AVOW K. WILLIAMS, JR. 
1414 Parkway Towers
404 James Robertson Parkway 
Nashville, Tennessee 37219

Of counsel:
JOSEPH P. HUDSON 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10019

JACK GREENBERG 
JAMES M. NABRIT, III 
NORMAN J. CHACHKIN 
SYLVIA DREW 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 100IS
Attorneys for Appellees

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 8th day of May, 1974, I 
served two copies of the Brief for Appellees in this cause upon 
counsel for the appellants herein, by depositing same in the 
United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows:

G. Wynn Smith, Jr., Esq.
Canada, Russell & Turner
1213 Union Planters Bank Building
Memphis, Tennessee 38103

i

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r