Singleton v Jackson Municipal School District Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Public Court Documents
December 1, 1969
150 pages
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Singleton v Jackson Municipal School District Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 1969. f0441a8b-c49a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/a614ed15-7f3a-4531-bdfb-797eea8335f8/singleton-v-jackson-municipal-school-district-appendix-to-petition-for-writ-of-certiorari. Accessed December 04, 2025.
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APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
— OPINIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW
IN THE
dJmtrt of tlir litnituun States
October Term, 1969
No......... .......
DEREK JEROME SINGLETON, et al.,
V.
JACKSON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.
Petitioners,
CLARENCE ANTHONY, et al.,
V.
MARSHALL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION.
Petitioners,
LINDA STOUT, by her Father and Next Friend, BLEVIN STOUT, et al.,
y.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.
Petitioners,
DORIS ELAINE BROWN, et al.,
V.
Petitioners,
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF BESSEMER, et al.
BIRDIE MAE DAYIS, et al.,
V.
Petitioners,
BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF MOBILE COUNTY, et al.
NEELY BENNETT, et al., and ALLENE PATRICIA ANN BENNETT, a minor,
by R. B. BENNETT, her Father and Next Friend,
V.
Petitioners,
R. E. EVANS, et al. and BURKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.
SHIRLEY BIVINS, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
BIBB COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ORPHANAGE FOR
BIBB COUNTY, et al.
OSCAR C. THOMIE, Jb., et al.,
V.
HOUSTON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION.
Petitioners,
JEAN CAROLYN YOUNGBLOOD, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF BAY COUNTY, FLA.
LAVON WRIGHT, et al.,
V.
Petitioners,
THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF ALACHUA COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al.
I N D E X
PAGE
Appendix 1—
Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction (Filed
May 10, 1968) ....................................................... la
Appendix 2—
Order (Filed July 6, 1968) .................................. 8a
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ......... 14a
Order (Filed July 22, 1969) .................................. 35a
Appendix 3—
Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit (Dated June 26, 1969) .......................... 43a
Appendix 4—
Order (Filed August 5, 1969) .............................. 52a
Opinion of the Court (Filed August 5, 1969) .... 54a
Appendix 5—
Memorandum Opinion of the Court (Filed Augijst
5, 1969) ................................................................ . 67a
Order (Filed August 5, 1969) ................................ 72a
Appendix 6—
Order (Filed August 1, 1969) ................................ 73a
Appendix 7—
Order (Filed June 20, 1969) .................................. 79a
Order (Filed August 22, 1969) .............................. 85a
11
PAGE
Appendix 8—
Order (Filed August 12, 1969) .............................. 88a
Appendix 9—
Order (Filed August 12, 1969) ............... .............. 98a
Appendix 10—
Order (Filed March. 4, 1969) .................................. 105a
Order (Filed April 3, 1969) .................................. 108a
Appendix 11—
Order (Filed March 4, 1969) .................................. 112a
Order (Filed April 3, 1969) .................................. 115a
Appendix 12—
Opinion in Court of Appeals dated December 1,
1969 ......................................................................... 117a
Appendix 13—
Judgment of Court of A ppeals.............................. 141a
A P P E N D I X 1
Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction
(Filed May 10, 1968)
I n the
U nited States D istrict Court
F or the S outhern D istrict of M ississippi
Derek Jerome Singleton, et al.,
Appellants,
versus
Jackson M unicipal Separate S chool D istrict, et al.,
Appellees.
On July 6, 1967, this Court entered an Order herein plac
ing the Jackson Municipal Separate School District, Jack-
son, Mississippi, under the desegregation of public schools
provisions spelled out in the Jefferson decree, U.S. v. Jef
ferson County Board of Education (1966), 372 F.2d 836,
which Order contains provisions affecting new or expanded
school construction.
The Board of Trustees of the Jackson municipal school
district has current plans to add 22 classrooms and certain
other facilities to four formerly Negro elementary schools.
A motion filed March 18, 1968, allegedly on behalf of the
Negro class of plaintiffs set forth in the original cause, asks
for a preliminary and permanent injunction, to enjoin the
Board from the proposed additions; to enjoin the Board
to construct the additions at four formerly white schools
instead; and to assign to those formerly white schools the
overflow from the aforesaid formerly Negro schools.
A notice was filed on April 25, 1968 on the preliminary
injunction to be heard on May 2, 1968. As bids on the in
2a
tended construction are scheduled to be let on May 27 and
June 3, 1968, the matter was given a priority hearing.
In the aforesaid Jefferson case, at page 889, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals offered the statement that new
construction and improvements to the Negro school plant
attract no white students and diminish Negro motivation to
ask for transfer. This conclusion laid the foundation for
the requirement of Paragraph VII of the Order herein,
which provides:
“ The defendants, to the extent consistent with the proper
operation of the school system as a whole, shall locate any
new school and substantially expand any existing schools
with the objective of eradicating the vestiges of the dual
system.”
Plaintiffs contend that the proposed construction will
have the sole purpose of perpetuating what are now de facto
Negro schools in violation of Paragraph VII, and that un
der the recent holding of the Fifth Circuit dated April 18,
1968, in U.S.A. v. Board of Public Instruction of Polk
County, Florida, No. 25768, not yet reported, the defen
dants, before construction, are required to evaluate the
factors relating to possible steps in eradicating the former
dual system. Such an evaluation had not been made in that
case by Polk County Board before choosing a location for
a new school. The Court held that the Board must do so,
and the ruling went no further.
Defendants maintain that such an evaluation has been
made by the Jackson Board and that Paragraph VII must
be read together with that portion of Paragraph VI of the
order which provides, “ The physical facilities, equipment,
course of instruction, and quality of instructional material
shall be equal in all schools maintained by the district” ,
and that in careful consideration of the “proper operation
of the school system as a whole” , and mindful of the sig
Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction
3a
nificance of Paragraph VII, concluded that the proposed
additions would best serve the immediate and future needs
of the school children in the respective communities, and
would not impede the break-up of the dual system, but to
some extent would hasten its end by making available more
class rooms to children of either race in expanding nearby
areas.
Dr. Kirby Walker, Superintendent of Schools, was called
as a witness by plaintiffs. His testimony, his deposition, that
of Jesse L. Howell, director of personnel and pupil account
ing, records, maps, and reports brought to the hearing by
Dr. Walker, constituted the factual evidence. This evidence
is undisputed and is related by the Court as its findings.
A printed booklet shows some fifty-six classroom build
ings, exclusive of athletic stadiums, maintenance shops and
warehouses, in the school system. Of these thirty-nine are
elementary schools. For some twenty-years Jackson has
experienced a growth in its school enrollment, requiring
periodic construction programs financed by bond issues. Of
the last bond issue in 1964 producing $5,800,000.00, aug
mented by state funds, all has been used primarily in the
construction of secondary schools, except a remaining tag
end of approximately $750,000.00 earmarked for use in
1968. After its use, no new buildings or other added con
struction are contemplated until new studies are made of
population growths, following the 1970 census, the determi
nation of proposed extensions of the city geographical lim
its, the use or changed uses of land adjacent to interstate
highways now under construction in and around the city,
zoning ordinances of the city and county, and the ultimate
passage of new bond issues for such construction, all to be
considered together with the provisions of Paragraph VII.
The use of the funds remaining from the 1964 bond issue
was first considered in September 1967 by Mr. Walker and
Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction
4a
his staff of school principals, after the September enroll
ment showed capacity or near capacity enrollment at sev
eral elementary schools, including the four formerly Negro
schools involved herein, Brown, Dawson, Morrison and
Reynolds. Following a study of population density reports,
anticipated enrollments, and present facilities, this staff
recommended to the Board of Trustees that classrooms and
other facilities be added to these four schools and one other
not involved herein. The plans were first submitted to the
Board of Trustees in December 1967, some five months
after the Order of July 6, 1967. Air. Walker stated, and
the Court so finds, that the Superintendent, staff and Board
conducted their deliberations with Paragraph VII of the
Order in mind, and consulted the Board’s attorneys in con
nection with same. Estimates of costs and monthly progress
reports have now been prepared, and an opportunity for
bidding is to be made shortly. The names of the four for
merly Negro schools, their current capacity, current enroll
ment, number of rooms, and size of grounds are first listed
below, with like information as to four formerly white
schools listed last, which plaintiffs have brought into the
controversy.
Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction
School
Current
Capacity
Current
Enrollment
Present
Number
of Rooms Acreage
Brown 910 904 26 2.1
Dawson 665 598 19 6.28
Morrison 645 649 20 5.8
Reynolds 1190 1172 34 12.
Bradley 455 340 13 8.
Galloway 635 372 17 2.
Poindexter 375 223 13 3.6
Watkins 640 281 22 17.
5a
Of the total enrollment in the elementary schools, 9,912
students are in formerly Negro schools, and 11,491 students
are in formerly white schools. Of the total classrooms in
each of the above two groups, there is an average of 4 more
students per class in formerly Negro schools than in for
merly white schools, but the average for each is below the
school system standards of 35 normal students per class
room and 15 mentally handicapped or special students per
classroom. The intended added classrooms are 6 each for
Brown and Dawson, 6 rooms together with library and
larger lunch room at Morrison, and 4 rooms with a library
and auditorium at Reynolds. These additions will tend to
equalize the number of students per classroom as between
the two groups of schools, and to add to the formerly Negro
schools other facilities, such as libraries, which they are
now without. Additional acreage is also to be acquired at
the four formerly Negro schools. No additional classrooms
or facilities or acreage are scheduled for any of the four
formerly white schools; nor until this action was filed had
any been requested. As stated in the forepart of this opin
ion, plaintiffs say no added construction should be had at
any of the formerly Negro schools and that Negro students
should be assigned to the formerly white schools where
classrooms should be added to take care of the overflow from
the formerly Negro schools, this despite the fact that under
the present freedom of choice enrollment, no additional
space is needed at the formerly white schools.
If the intention of plaintiffs is to compel pupil assign
ment to the four previously white schools, the Board is pre
cluded from so doing under freedom of choice. Nor does
the Board furnish transportation to students living within
the city limits, nor is it required to under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title IV, Section 407 (a) (2)) and as held by
U.S. v. Jefferson, 372 F.2d at Page 880.
Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction
6a
A comparison of Brown, Dawson, Morrison and Reyn
olds, the former Negro schools, to the nearest formerly
white schools, Bradley, GalloAvay, Poindexter, and Watkins,
was shown. Brown is more than a mile from Galloway.
Dawson is a little less than a mile from Bradley. Morrison
is a mile from Watkins, and Reynolds is a mile from Poin
dexter. To compel elementary age students to assume these
additional distances, either by walking or other transporta
tion, when additions at the schools nearest them are avail
able, is neither reasonable nor practical. Plaintiffs add that
buses furnished by the School Board to some students who
live outside the city limits and who attend Dawson, pass
right by Watkins. The answer to this is that during any
appropriate choice period they could elect or could have
elected to attend Watkins.
The Board showed that it gave consideration to at least
two other practical factors; one, that population densities
as compiled by the Board, particularly as to Reynolds, are
growing in the area of the schools to he added to, and de
creasing in the neighborhoods of the formerly white schools.
The other was that the formerly white schools, being of
much older construction than the formerly Negro schools,
are structurally less suited to additions. As to Watkins, it
is more than forty years old, and is on Sixteenth Section
lands, the lease to wdiich expires in five years. Poindexter
is thirty-four years old. Bradley is twenty-three years old,
and was first built by a county school board and has been
enlarged once by the Jackson Board. None of these schools
was originally built with the possibility of additions in
mind. The cost of doing so would far outweigh the cost of
the proposed additions.
Mr. Walker states that the Board does not maintain that
additions to the formerly Negro schools will eliminate the
Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction
7a
dual system, but that such construction will facilitate inte
gration by making more classrooms available where they
are now needed for white or Negro children. This is the
practical problem faced by the Board in the utilization of
its remaining funds and its proposed solution is “ consistent
with the proper operation of the school system as a whole.”
The Court agrees. See Griggs v. Cook, 272 F. Supp. 163.
The motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.
s / Dan M. R ussell, Jr.
United States District Judge
Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction
Dated: May 9, 1968
8a
APPENDIX 2
Order
(Filed July 6, 1968)
I n the
U nited S tates D istrict Court
F or the N orthern D istrict of M ississippi
W estern D ivision
Civil A ction N o . WC 6819
Clarence A nthony , et al.,
v.
Plaintiffs,
M arshall County B oard of E ducation, et al.,
Defendants.
This cause having come on to be heard upon the com
plaint and motion for a preliminary injunction filed by
plaintiffs and also upon the separate answers and other
pleadings filed by both sets of defendants, and evidence
having been presented to the court in support of the mo
tion for preliminary injunction, and the court having con
cluded that said motion should be in part denied and in
part sustained in accordance with findings of fact and con
clusions of law made by the court at the conclusion of this
hearing, and in accordance therewith, it is :
Ordered:
As to H olly Springs M unicipal Separate S chool D is
trict :
(1) Except as hereinafter decreed, the plan of desegre
gation adopted by defendants representing Holly Springs
9a
Order
Municipal Separate School District, a copy thereof attached
as Exhibit “B” to the separate answer of said School Dis
trict and its representatives, including amendments to U 8
(subject to modification by this order) of such plan, is
hereby approved until the further order of this court, and
all injunctive relief seeking the adoption of a contrary plan
or plans for pupil school attendance is denied.
(2) To eliminate unconstitutionality in the present op
eration of the public schools within the Holly Springs Mu
nicipal Separate School District, defendants, Holly Springs
Municipal Board of Education, organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Mississippi, Robert P.
Crutcher, Dr. E. B. Warren, E. E. Greene, Dr. A. D.
Jones, and Leslie Tomlinson, members of the Holly Springs
Municipal Board of Education; and Joe F. Williams, Su
perintendent of the Holly Springs Municipal Public Schools,
are hereby preliminarily enjoined from maintaining, and
continuing to maintain, in the public schools within said
School District segregation by race of school faculties and
public transportation by race of school children, and said
defendants are ordered to submit to this court not later
than the 12th day of August, 1968, a plan or plans supple
mentary to their adopted plan of desegregation, Exhibit
“B” to their answer as amended, whereby the following
assignments, programs and arrangements will be instituted
and placed into effect for the 1968-69 school year, effective
upon the opening of school for such year, to-wit:
(a) The assignment of not less than 4 teachers of the
negro race to Holly Highschool, of not less than 4 teachers
of the negro race to Sally Cochran Elementary School, of
not less than 4 teachers of the white race to Sims High-
10a
Order
school, and not less than 4 teachers of the white race to
Frazier Elementary School. Defendants shall direct said
teacher assignments or re-assignments regardless of any
contrary term in teacher contracts; they shall be lawfully
protected in the making of any re-assignments under the
terms of this order and any such assigned, or re-assigned,
teacher shall be lawfully obligated to comply with the
directions of defendants. Defendants shall set forth in
its plan of faculty desegregation the name, race and teach
ing station of each faculty member assigned in accordance
with the terms of this order;
(b) The development of a school bus transportation plan
based upon territorial zones or other natural grouping of
pupil residence, which shall be without regard to race or
the school selected by any particular child, to the end that
all children living on designated bus routes, established
according to pupil residence, shall be transported in a
bus to either the Holly Highschool-Cochran Elementary
School location or to Sims Highschool-Frazier Elementary
School location. Insofar as practicable, overlapping routes
shall be eliminated, and all children of whatever race shall
be treated substantially alike as to seating capacity, bus
scheduling, length of route, riding time, etc., dependent
upon physical factors governing each particular bus route.
Said defendants shall include in their transportation plan
the name, race, and residence of each student proposed to
be transported on each school bus, the name of the school
to which such student will be transported, the designation
and length of the route, the number and capacity of each
bus, and other pertinent data to aid this court in deter
mining that compliance has been made with this paragraph
of its order.
11a
Order
As to M arshall County S chool D istrict:
(1) Except as hereinafter decreed, the plan of desegre
gation adopted by defendants representing Marshall County
School District, a copy thereof attached as Exhibit “B” to
the separate answer of said School District and its repre
sentatives, including amendments to 8 (subject to modi
fication by this order) of such plan, is hereby approved
until the further order of this court, and all injunctive re
lief seeking the adoption of a contrary plan or plans for
pupil school attendance is denied.
(2) To eliminate unconstitutionality in the present op
eration of the public schools within the Marshall County
School District, defendants, Marshall County Board of
Education, organized and existing under the laws of the
State of Mississippi; William R. Hurst, Sidney Person,
Mrs. Corrine Waldrip, Frank Davis, and Rev. Frank W il
son, members of the Marshall County Public Schools ; Stan
ley V. Mullikin, Superintendent of the Marshall County
Public Schools, are hereby preliminarily enjoined from
maintaining, and continuing to maintain, in the public
schools within said School District segregation by race of
school faculties and public transportation by race of school
children, and said defendants are ordered to submit to
this court not later than the 12th day of August, 1968,
a plan or plans supplementary to the adopted plan of
desegregation, Exhibit “B” to their answer as amended,
whereby the following assignments, programs and arrange
ments will be instituted and placed into effect for the
1968-69 school year, effective upon the opening of school
for such year, to-wit:
(a) The assignment of not less than 3 teachers of the
negro race to Byhalia Attendance Center, at least one of
12a
Order
whom must be assigned to teach in grades 9 to 12; of not
less than 3 teachers of the negro race to Potts Camp At
tendance Center, at least one of whom shall be assigned
to teach in grades 9 to 12; of not less than 2 teachers of
the negro race to Slayden Attendance Center; of not less
than 4 teachers of the white race to Henry Attendance
Center, at least one of whom shall be assigned to teach in
grades 9 to 12; of not less than 3 teachers of the white
race to Sand Flat Attendance Center, at least one of whom
shall be assigned to teach in grades 9 to 12; and at least
one teacher of the white race to Mary Reed Attendance
Center. Defendants shall direct said teacher assignments
or re-assignments regardless of any contrary term in
teacher contracts; they shall be lawfully protected in the
making of any re-assignments under the terms of this
order and any such assigned, or re-assigned, teacher shall
be lawfully obligated to comply with the directions of de
fendants. Defendants shall set forth in its plan of faculty
desegregation the name, race and teaching station of each
faculty member assigned in accordance with the terms of
this order;
(b) The development of a school bus transportation plan
based upon territorial zones or other natural grouping of
pupil residence, which shall he without regard to race or
the school selected by any particular child, to the end that
all children living on designated bus routes, established
according to pupil residence, shall be transported in a bus
to the most conveniently located school or schools, as each
child residing in a particular area may elect to attend.
Insofar as practicable, overlapping routes shall be elimi
nated, and all children of whatever race shall be treated
substantially alike as to seating capacity, bus scheduling,
length of route, riding time, etc., dependant upon the phys-
13a
Order
ical factors governing each particular bus route. Said
defendants shall include in their transportation plan the
name, race, and residence of each student proposed to be
transported on each school bus, the name of the school to
which such student will be transported, the dsignatioen
and length of the route, the number and capacity of each
bus, and other pertinent data to aid this court in determin
ing that compliance has been made with this paragraph
of its order.
This court shall take up and consider the sufficiency of
the school faculty assignments and school bus transporta
tion plans filed by each defendant on the 16th day of August,
1968, at 9 o’clock A.M. at Oxford, Mississippi.
The United States Marshal is hereby directed to serve
certified copies of this order on each of the defendants
named herein and to make return of service as herein
ordered on the original hereof.
This, the 6th day of July, 1968.
W illiam C. K eady
Chief Judge
United States District Court
14a
(Filed July 6, 1968)
P R O C E E D I N G S
B y the Court :
At this time the court makes its findings of facts and
conclusions of law on the application of the plaintiffs for
a preliminary injunction. I will treat on my finding of
facts first the Holly Springs Municipal Separate School
District and then the Marshall County School District, and
the conclusions of law will be equally applicable to both
districts.
The Holly Springs Municipal Separate School District
consists of the municipality of Holly Springs and a large
rural contiguous area comprising approximately 180 square
miles. It had a total enrollment, during the year just
closed, in its public schools of 2,473, of whom 1,868 were
Negro and 875 were white students. Thus according to
race there are more than two Negro children for each
white child attending these public schools.
The Holly Springs public schools consist of two previ
ously all-white and two all-Negro schools. The Sims High
School, attended all by Negroes, has grades 7-12 and has
a student body of 750. The Frazier Elmentary School, an
all-Negro school, has an enrollment of 1079, with grades
1-6. Both of these schools are located on the same site.
The Holly High School has a student body of 425 in
grades 7-12, of which 8 are Negroes. The Sally Cochran
Elementary School has a student body of 471, with grades
1-6, of which 13 are Negro students. The Holly High and
Sally Cochran schools are located on the same site. The
two school attendance centers are located within one mile
of each other.
F in d in g s o f F acts a n d C o n c lu s io n s o f L aw
15a
Prior to September, 1965 these schools were completely
segregated according to race. For the school year 1965-
66 a freedom of choice plan was first adopted, and it had
the approval of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare. The first year the plan was in operation approxi
mately 20 students of the Negro race attended the formerly
all-white schools, but no white students attended the previ
ously all-Negro schools. This remained true for the second
year of the plan’s operation. During the year just concluded,
1967-68, 21 Negro students attended the previously all-
white schools in Holly Springs in the proportions I have
already stated. To this date no white students have at
tended either the Sims High School or the Frazier Ele
mentary School.
In May, 1967 the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare cut off assistance to the Holly Springs Municipal
Separate School District due to an alleged lack of compli
ance with HEW guidelines. The school board or district
did not contest this action, nor was any appeal taken from
that ruling.
The crux of the matter at that time appeared to depend
on whether there would be some measure of faculty de
segregation and, although teacher surveys were made by
school authorities looking to that end and talks were had
with representatives from the Department of Justice, noth
ing resulted. In only two instances has faculty desegrega
tion occurred in the Holly Springs public schools. One was
the case of a librarian of the Negro race employed as a
part time librarian at the Cochran Elementary School. The
other case was a white teacher of Spanish who taught
classes at both Sims High School and Holly High School.
Still operating under a freedom of choice plan, the school
district in May, 1968 sent out freedom of choice forms to
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
16a
all of the students, on which replies have been received
from approximately 2,500 pupils, leaving roughly 300 out
standing responses yet to he heard from.
On the basis of these known replies 60 Negro students
have signified their intention for the year 1968-69 to attend
the previously all-white Holly High School and Cochran
Elementary School. To date no white students have sig
nified their intention to go to all-Negro attended schools.
The evidence shows that the school board and its super
intendent have met and have given careful consideration
to their obligations and duties, and their position in this
court is that no plan of school attendance can feasibly work
in this district other than one based on freedom of choice.
It appears that they have considered alternative plans,
for the zoning of attendance areas and also for pairing
of certain schools according to grades.
The evidence shows that, as their studies indicate, be
cause of the high degree of residential mixing that prevails
throughout the Holly Springs District and considering the
capacity of the schools involved at the two attendance cen
ters under consideration and the natural territorial bound
aries that will have to be logically followed to produce
either a zoning plan or a pairing plan, there would under
either method at once result a heavy preponderance of
Negro pupils to white pupils in practically every school in
the district.
The court refers as evidentiary basis to Defendants’ Ex
hibit No. 7, prepared by the school superintendent, showing
that the only practical and logical division or zone line for
the two attendance centers within Holly Springs would be
one which would follow Highway 7 on the north and south
of the city and Memphis Street from north to south to
the intersection of Van Dorn, westward to Craft Street,
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
17a
and Craft Street south until it becomes Highway 7. This
major thoroughfare taken as a division line is shown in
red on the map introduced by the school superintendent.
West of that line under a zoning concept would lie the
Sims-Frazier school complex with a capacity of 1,680 stu
dents. East of that line would lie the Holly-Sally Cochran
school complex with a school capacity of 1,107.
By using that line, which appears to this court to he
necessarily controlled by the school capacity of the two
complexes, or by the use of any other line which would
have any logical relevance, it results from examination
of Defendants’ Exhibit No. 7 that for those children going
to the zone west of the line indicated there would be an
extremely heavy preponderance of Negro students, better
than three to one, almost three and a half to one. By the
same token there would result for the attendance in the
Holly-Sally Cochran School lying east of that line a ma
jority, although not as preponderant but nevertheless a
majority, of Negro students to white students. The ratio
would be 1.3 Negro to one white student.
If pairing of schools as to certain grades were resorted
to, the evidence also shows, from the same exhibit, that
there would result from the use of school buildings in a
sensible fashion in so far as education is concerned, that
is, from the standpoint of the composition and number
of grades and utilization of school plants, a preponderant
majority of Negro students over white students in every
school.
Of course these results stem from the basic fact, which
remains unchanged, that in this district there are more
than two Negro children for each white child of school age.
So it stands to reason that in the use of any formula based
either on zoning or pairing there will result a differential
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
18a
not materially varying in degree because, as it appears
from this undisputed evidence, these children live indis
criminately throughout the county and they are fairly well
distributed as to ages, in so far as concerns the balance
between the two races. This appears from the uncontra
dicted evidence in this case. There is no assault made by
the plaintiffs upon those hard, realistic, practical facts.
Now, in approaching the question the court finds that
there are various matters that need to be assessed and
considered regarding the feasibility of either of these plans
as a satisfactory alternate to the freedom of choice plan.
The superintendent Avas particularly articulate, in the opin
ion of this court, in that his experience had validated
studies that for whatever may be the cause there is a
substantially different achievement rate between white and
Negro children. It is a difference which seems to widen
as the child attains greater age.
In any event, it is clear from this evidence that an edu
cational program of any type has to be geared to the
average student group, and in considering a plan for Holly
Springs based either upon the attendance zoning or pair
ing, the educational effort, or the thrust of the curriculum,
would have to be directed to the average group. Under
either plan this would be necessarily lower than under a
freedom of choice plan. It would constitute a real and
serious injury to the educational function of the Holly
Springs schools if their educational curriculum has to be
drastically loAvered.
This court finds from the undisputed facts that such
would be the case under either an attendance zoning or
pairing of schools plan.
Also it is relevant to consider, and the court finds, that
on a basis of any available zoning or pairing plan in the
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
19a
Holly Springs District, considering the necessary results
of the school population, the percentage of Negro students
to those of the white race would clearly pass and exceed
all tolerance standards known to the educational field,
which are sometimes referred to in this evidence as trigger
points.
When these tolerance standards are passed, this court
is convinced there will result a loss in great numbers
of white students from heavily integrated schools. This is
a basic fact, one which this court does not have the time
nor the wisdom to analyze, but its reality can not be
ignored. Whites, regardless of what section of the country
in which they live, and particularly in Holly Springs, flee
and will flee from a public school operated under condi
tions found intolerable because of a disproportionately
high racial stratum. Without elaborating the point, sub
stantial and uncontradicted evidence exists that white
students will not long remain in a school system in all
schools of which Negro pupils heavily predominate.
This court finds that to force such results at this par
ticular juncture in the history of the school district either
through zoning or pairing will produce, not integrated
schools but all-Negro schools. The beneficial effects deemed
to flow from a biracial public school system would thus
be denied school children of both races.
These considerations have been regarded by the school
district, and which this court accepts, as valid, highly
persuasive factors overriding all other considerations, in
concluding that freedom of choice, where it is honestly
administered and carried out, is the most feasible method
for this district to achieve the end result of keeping within
a unitary school system the maximum number of educable
children of both races. Strengthening this conclusion is
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
20a
the added fact, as developed from this evidence, and which
this court finds to be valid, that should an immediate zon
ing and pairing in the Holly Springs schools be instituted,
with the likely and anticipated loss in great numbers of
white children from those schools, there would be a
genuine loss of community support for the public school
operation.
This court finds from this evidence and judicially knows
that local community support is vital for the morale, the
dignity and worth of a public school system. Where there
is no pride or backing on the part of the community in
its public schools, there result inevitably inferior, neglected
schools. Conversely, where the community’s interest is
strongly maintained in its local schools, such schools
are motivated and are able to do a better and more effi
cient job of public education.
Intelligent planning must be directed toward strengthen
ing the public schools in these days of ever increasing
responsibility thrown upon the average citizen of what
ever race to make democratic processes more effective, and
to that end there is no group that has a higher or greater
stake than the white community for the successful opera
tion of its public school system.
I find as a fact from this evidence, which is largely un
contradicted on this phase of the case, that the student
freedom of choice plan is a plan which, when weighed with
its alternatives, which I have discussed, promises the
most meaningful progress toward achieving desegrega
tion. That is not to deny the obvious fact that there would
be an immediate and substantial statistical integration
under either a zoning or a pairing plan, but mere statistics
would be of little value in the face of wholesale withdrawal
by white students from such heavily mixing as this court
finds will take place here.
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
21a
Therefore, the school board at Holly Springs has met
the heavy burden resting upon it, whatever its record for
past performance might be, so as to at this time justify
a valid preference for a freedom of choice plan. At this
particular juncture that plan will do more, in the opinion
of this court, from the standpoint of feasibility to ac
commodate all interests and to consolidate public support
importantly needed for the continuance of these schools
as they face future desegregation likely to occur at a
strikingly increasing rate under the freedom of choice
plan.
No one can adequately foresee those changes in im
portant social attitudes on the part of pupils, parents and
the public flowing from adjustments which relate to an
effective and working freedom of choice plan, but it can not
be overlooked that the rights of Negro children to enjoy
an improved education in a unitary, nondiscriminatory sys
tem of schools are bound up in this change of attitude on
the part of the white community.
In conclusion on this aspect of the findings, the school
board at Holly Springs must recognize that freedom of
choice is not, and can not be, an end of itself but is a
transitional method yet needed in order for this district
to be able to carry the burdens inherent here in success
fully converting to a biracial, unitary school system. So
much for the freedom of choice plan in the Holly Springs
schools.
I now find facts as to the two other important aspects
of the operation of this school system, first the faculty
and next the bus transportation.
At a time when the board of trustees was having dis
cussion with representatives of the Department of Jus
tice about some measure of faculty desegregation a teacher
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
22a
survey was conducted during- the summer of 1967, as I
recall, more than a year ago, at which time the teachers
of the Holly Springs schools were asked whether for the
good of the district they would be willing to teach in a
school other than the one that they were presently as
signed to. A substantial number, or approximately 40%
of those professional people, said that for the good of the
district they would teach at a different school.
Except for the one instance of the part time librarian
at Sally Cochran and also except for the divided efforts of
the white Spanish teacher there has been no faculty de
segregation.
Better than 60% of these schools’ funds for the payment
of teachers’ salaries comes from the State of Mississippi.
The balance is raised by local taxation. These defendants
are agents of the State in the selection of teachers and as
signment of teachers and they are under a constitutional
duty to desegregate the faculty in these schools operated
under the freedom of choice plan. The court finds that
there is a factual basis for discrimination having been
practiced in the selection of the faculty of the Holly Springs
schools which has been unconstitutional.
In these schools there is a full time instructional staff of
104 people. They have, except for the two instances I have
noted, been distributed to schools where the predominant
race was the race of the teacher. The court finds from the
facts in this case that these defendants can achieve a greater
measure of faculty desegregation and that this can be done
with the teachers that they have under contract for the year
beginning in September.
The court further finds that efforts can be made, in the
event those arrangements are not altogether and 100%
possible, to recruit teachers at this time to meet this affirma
tive obligation for faculty desegregation.
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
23a
I next go to the question of bus transportation. Until
recently a considerable number of students, called “ county
students”—about 228 in number—have been transported
from the area of Marshall County School District into the
Holly Springs Separate Municipal School District. That
aspect of the case need not concern us because the evidence
shows here that the Marshall County Board of Education
has, for reasons of economy and cost, terminated that ar
rangement, so that the bussing of 228 children from the out
side county district into the municipal school district need
not concern us at this time.
However, Holly Springs does transport a substantial
number of school children. As I have indicated earlier, it
has a large territorial expanse. In many ways it is as much
a rural district as it is a city district. It transports 281
children into the Holly High-Sally Cochran complex and
1,175 into the Sims-Frazier School complex.
This district has 18 busses. The evidence shows that
these bus routes, as heretofore composed and constructed,
all tied into a particular school and with the consequence
that there is considerable overlappng of routes. The trans
portation map of Holly Springs in evidence shows the ex
tent of this overlapping. All of the official information
from the superintendent’s office indicates that there are two
bus routes, one designated as Negro bus routes and the
other designated as white bus routes. These routes are
shown on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1, the so-called Negro city bus
routes being indicated in black and the so-called white city
but routes being indicated in red. It is apparent from this
evidence that they have existed a long time and that they
were developed for a truly dual, segregated school system.
100% of the money to defray the cost of that public trans
portation comes from the State of Mississippi, and these
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
24a
defendants in every sense of the word are acting as agents
of the State in administering school transportation funds
and the transportation equipment.
The evidence shows that to the extent there are children
of the Negro race attending either Sally Cochran or Holly
High they ride, I believe, two busses that take them and
presumably white children to those two schools. This evi
dence shows that that is the only variation from racial pat
terns in the school bus transportation plan. Again we have
residential mixing of the children throughout the district,
and those who are legally entitled to a free bus ride—under
Mississippi law they must be children living outside the
city limits and residing a mile or more from the nearest
school— should freely ride. There is no reason not to freely
allow them to.
The court finds from the facts in this case that these bus
transportation routes preexisted the freedom of choice plan
and there has been no affirmative effort by these defendants
to implement them in the light of the requirements of con
trolling federal cases. The court finds that there is an un
constitutional arrangement of school busses according to
race.
I next pass to findings of fact with respect to the Marshall
County School District. In the interests of brevity the basic
facts in this county school district mirror to some extent my
fact findings for the Holly Springs schools. There are some
differences which will be noted as I now proceed to take up
this county wide school district. It is a district that includes
all of Marshall County except for the land territory included
within the Holly Springs District. It has a current year’s
school population of 4,799 pupils, of whom 3,606 are Negro
and 1,193 are white.
There are some all-white schools in this district. For ex
ample, there is Potts Camp Attendance Center, grades 1-12,
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
25a
with 421 students, Slayden Attendance Center, grades 1-12,
with 322 students. There are some all-Negro schools. For
example, Henry Attendance Center, grades 1-12, with 1,685
students, Sand Flat Attendance Center, grades 1-12, with
1,111 students, Mary Reed Attendance Center, grades 1-8,
with 263 students, and Galena Attendance Center, grades
1-8, with 525 students.
The only school or attendance center in this county school
district with any biraeial composition is the Byhalia At
tendance Center, grades 1-12, with 22 Negro students there
out of a total of 472 enrolled pupils.
This district also adopted a freedom of choice plan in
August, 1965 at about the same time Holly Springs adopted
its. The plans were substantially the same in their general
undertaking. The first year of the plan’s operation six
students of the Negro race attended the former all-white
school at Byhalia, the second year 14, and the third year,
the year just closed, 22 Negro students attended the Byhalia
School. At no time have white students attended any of the
all-Negro schools.
Still operating on the freedom of choice plan, this district
as late as May, 1968, as I recall, sent out questionnaires to
the parents requesting an election or choice of schools to
attend for the session beginning in September, 1968. An ex
cellent response has already been received to these question
naires. On the basis of the known replies it is anticipated
that 64 Negro students will signify their intention to attend
previously all-white schools. There is reason to believe
that that number will increase when all of the replies have
been received.
In the interest of its obligations the board of trustees
of this district and its superintendent have met and have
considered their obligations and duties to adopt a consti-
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
26a
tutional plan for school attendance in these schools that
are widely scattered throughout the county. The maps in
evidence show that the Henry High Attendance Center
and Byhalia are about a mile apart physically, the Slay-
don and Sand Flat Attendance Centers are about three
miles apart, and the Potts Camp and Mary Reed Attend
ance Centers down in the southeast part of the county are
about a mile apart, and the Galena School is off by itself
in the southwest part, roughly speaking, of the county; but
they are widely scattered so as to serve children that come
from a large land mass both north and south of the Holly
Springs Separate School District, and also somewhat to
the west of it.
The evidence shows that if a zoning plan were adopted
in this district based on school classroom capacity and on
logical school division lines marked by highways or other
natural divisions separating elements of population from
one part of the county to the other, that the results in so
far as the composition of each one of these schools would
be even more strikingly deleterious, shall we say, than
would be true with respect to the Holly Springs municipal
schools.
Referring to Defendants’ Exhibit 12, put in by the su
perintendent Mullikin, and to the map in evidence and
to the evidence, which is uncontradicted, that this is a fair
and logical arrangement according to zones, this court
finds that there would exist at the Slayden Attendance
Center a majority of three to one Negro pupils to white,
at the Sand Flat Center the same majority, three to one,
at Galena a majority of ten to one, Negro over white, at
Mary Reed a majority of three to one, Negro over white,
at Henry a majority of four to one, Negro over white, at
Byhalia a majority of two to one, Negro over white.
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
27a
Only in the Potts Camp area would there be a variation,
for there zoning would produce a majority of whites, one
white to every statistical one-half Negro student.
Defendants’ Exhibit No. 13 would illustrate virtually
the same or not radically different results if a pairing plan
were used. Here again these results are to be naturally
expected when one takes into account the overall nearly
three to one ratio in Marshall County rural areas of Negro
to white.
The evidence with respect to this school district, although
not as well articulated as in the case of Holly Springs,
nevertheless points the way to the same factual conclu
sions : that at this time there is only one feasible, workable
method for operating the public schools in the Marshall
County School District. That plan should be pursued, it
must be pursued, for the benefit of both the Negro and the
white pupils. If that plan is rejected in favor of a plan
requiring immediate zoning or pairing there will result
first the definite educational injury to the system that I
mentioned earlier, caused by the lowering of curriculum
standards to meet the average of the students in each
class. Since we are here dealing with schools, that con
sideration is of utmost importance to this court. Likewise
we have applicable to this district the well known fact that
here, even more than in Holly Springs, the known tolera
tion points in racial mixing of classes will be vastly ex
ceeded. Here, even more than in Holly Springs, there
will result mass departure of white pupils from these pub
lic schools.
These are attitudes which can not be changed overnight,
and while these attitudes may not be inflexible or neces
sarily permanent in the minds of large segments of white
people, they do exist at this time so as to cause this court
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
28a
to conclude that in Marshall County immediate pairing or
immediate zoning would result in all-Negro student bodies.
The considerations of a factual nature I touched upon
with respect to Holly Springs apply here in so far as the
freedom of choice plan is concerned, and I find from these
facts that the freedom of choice plan, as presently insti
tuted, is the only feasible plan. I find that when I assess
and evaluate alternative plans, the institution of any such
in this district at this time will be injurious to the rights of
the school children of both races, particularly will it delay
the day when the school children of the Negro race will
achieve those salutary benefits deemed to flow from a truly
biracial and unitary school system.
I also conclude from the evidence here, largely uncon
tradicted, that there would be a loss of confidence on the
part of the public in the Marshall County public schools,
with a weakening of public support and a loss of pride in
those schools; that this would come at a time when to this
county it is most important that there be an increased
faith in the public school system as an instrument for
understanding and working out problems that press upon
people, of whatever race, in democratic processes.
It is reasonable to believe, and I so find from this evi
dence, that the further operation of the freedom of choice
plan in these schools will promote at a strikingly increas
ing rate desegregation of a biracial nature that can be
tolerated and that will result to the best interest of these
schools and the children who attend them.
I next pass to faculty assignments. The evidence here
is uncontradicted that there has been no faculty desegre
gation in any of these schools. Approximately 60 to 70
per cent of the operational budget of these schools which
pays the teachers’ salaries comes from the State of Missis-
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
29a
sippi. The remainder of that money is derived from local
taxation for the public funds. These defendants, in the
operation of these schools, are representatives of the
State and they are subject to constitutional duties.
In this county school system there are 155 full time
teachers paid with public funds. Because of the composi
tion of the student body we find that there are about two
and a half colored teachers to every one white teacher,
there being 100 Negro teachers and 45 white teachers in
this system.
It was put to this district over a year ago that there was
an obligation to have a measure of faculty desegregation.
At that time the superintendent of these county schools
conducted a questionnaire or survey among his teachers
to determine whether they would consider teaching in a
school which is predominately of a race other than their
own. There were a number of replies to this questionnaire.
45 teachers answered yes, 74 teachers answered no. The
affirmative answer was 37.88.
I do not know from the record how many of those
answering yes were of the white or the Negro race. Pre
sumably the greater part of those answering yes were of
the Negro race and not of the white race. This court
finds that there is evidence in this record to believe that
white teachers who are professional people are willing
to teach in schools other than of their own race and that
those teachers can be found in Marshall County, Missis
sippi.
From these facts there is no conclusion this court can
reach other than that there is a practice of unconstitu
tional segregation with respect to teachers.
I now pass to Marshall County school bus transporta
tion. School bus transportation is big business for this
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Laiv
30a
district. Each school day this district transports 4,506
children to these schools. Of that number 983 are white
students, 3,523 are Negro students.
The district owns 68 busses to transport these children
and is about to acquire 15 new busses.
Bus plans for the transportation of the school children
in this district have existed for some years. It is reason
able to conclude, and this court finds, that they pre
dated the freedom of choice plan, which was adopted in
August, 1965, that the only variation in that school bus
plan has been to utilize four busses to take to the Byhalia
school some 22 children of the Negro race. Those children
who have elected to go to that school ride in company with
white children. As regards the remainder of the school
children of this county, they are transported according to
race and according to the school that they attend.
There is a very great overlapping of these bus routes,
as plaintiffs’ exhibit would show, and from the informa
tion that is filed in the superintendent’s office and sub
mitted to the State there are separate bus routes for these
county busses. Green is the color for the routes that indi
cate the busses moving to the all-Negro schools, carrying
Negro passengers only. Yellow is the color indicating
the bus routes moving to the white county schools, carry
ing all-white except 22 Negro students attending Byhalia.
It is not necessary for this court to go into the de
ficiencies that may or may not exist in the equipment and
quality and riding time of the busses provided under this
dual plan. Sufficient is it to say that from this evidence
there is only one conclusion that can be honestly drawn
and that is that there exists a public transportation sys
tem provided for school children by the State of Missis
sippi which is based upon segregation and an unconstitu-
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
31a
tional application of those funds and that equipment to
the transportation of school children here.
That concludes my findings of fact. If I have been
verbose it is only because of my feeling of the importance
of this case to the people of this county, as well as my
obligation to find these facts in this case.
Following a recess that I will now declare I shall give
my separate conclusions of law and announce my decision.
The court is now in recess until 11:25.
B y the Court Crier:
The court is now in recess until 11:25.
(At 11:05, a.m., a recess was taken until 11:25, a.m.)
B y the Court :
Conclusions of law which will be common to both of
these districts may be stated as follows: the basic legal
issue is the constitutionality of the freedom of choice plan.
That plan has been specifically approved by the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, the court under which I operate,
in the case of The United States vs. Jefferson County Board
of Education, decided in an en banc opinion March 9, 1967,
and incorporating substantially the same provisions as
these plans of both of these defendants now before the
court.
On May 27, 1968 in the United States Supreme Court in
the case of Green vs. County School Board, there arose a
very serious critical examination of the feasibility of the
freedom of choice plan and it was rejected for New Kent
County, Virginia. It is my obligation to pay heed to what
was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Green case, and to carefully assess and weigh the feasi
bility of other alternative plans against the freedom of
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
32a
choice plan for the reason that the high court observed the
rate of desegregation was apparently too slow under the
freedom of choice plan and it imposed the burden of af
firmative action upon parents and pupils more than upon
the school board, where the obligation should rest.
In these cases I have as best I can assessed the alterna
tives to the freedom of choice plan and I have to the best
of my ability tried to weigh and evaluate the evidence
from the standpoint of which would be more feasible in
promoting meaningful desegregation as applied to the
terms of the Green decision.
The Green decision did not rule out freedom of choice
as unconstitutional but left to the trial court the obliga
tion and duty, as well as privilege, of looking at the evi
dence in a particular local school district and concluding
what the constitutional arrangements ought to be.
Under that authority I find, as a conclusion of law, that
the freedom of choice plans for the attendance of children
in these two school districts as presently adopted are legal,
are constitutional, and that there is no cause for injunc
tive relief to adopt a contrary plan or plans based upon
zoning or pairing.
However, in so concluding I am fully aware of the fact
that under the Green case there is thrust upon the District
Courts an even greater duty of giving a more critical
consideration to the progress of any school district in
eliminating its previously state-imposed segregated sys
tem of education. On all of the facts in this case I hold that,
under the command of the Green case, the most feasible
method of bringing meaningful desegregation to the school
districts now before the court will be under the freedom
of choice plan, which is to be honestly and faithfully admin
istered and carried out.
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
33a
My second conclusion of law relates to faculty desegrega
tion, which exists only in very small degree in the Holly
Springs Municipal School District and not at all with
the Marshall County School District. In this respect the
desegregation plans under which these defendants have
operated since August, 1965 have specifically called for the
elimination of faculty segregation but there has not been
performance to match those words. There has been oppor
tunity, but which went without taking. I conclude that
these school boards, these defendants here, are both under
the affirmative duty at this time to take action to desegre
gate the faculties of these schools subject to our jurisdic
tion, and as my yardstick and guideline for that require
ment I feel obliged to follow the principles and reasoning
laid down by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on June
3, 1968 in the case of The United States v. Board of Edu
cation of the City of Bessemer.
In that case the school district had long been in litiga
tion of this type and had falteringly achieved only a
modicum of faculty desegregation. The Fifth Circuit Court
in very clear language ruled that it is a major error of
the law for school boards to be governed in their racial
assignments by the desires or wishes of the teachers but
that the obligation rests upon school boards and those in
charge of schools to employ and to direct the assignment
of teachers who are paid out of public funds.
Under the rule of that case and according to the dic
tates of my own conscience I find that there is a failure
to constitutionally desegregate these two school faculties
and that both of these districts must without delay insti
tute a plan looking o a program of faculty desegregation.
In the order that I shall read following my conclusions of
law the details is of that plan and that faculty desegrega
tion will be spelled out.
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
34a
The third and last conclusion of law relates to school
bus transportation. On the uncontradicted facts in this
record this court can conclude only that there has been
a departure from constitutional standards, or a failure to
adhere to constitutional standards, in the transportation
of school children and that these districts have failed to
eliminate from their system segregation in bus transporta
tion to public schools, which is nothing more or less than
free transportation provided by a beneficent State for the
school children within a particular school district.
By saying free does not mean that it is not paid for by
someone. Of course it is, by the taxpayers of the State
as a whole.
My conclusion, therefore, of law is that these districts
must come forward with a plan of transportation no longer
based on race, no longer based even on a particular school,
but based upon residential patterns and upon concepts of
modern transportation, with the aim that all children will
be treated substantially alike, regardless of their race, and
with the aim of eradicating unconstitutional defects in
these systems.
Freedom of choice has no legitimate place in the trans
portation plan of students. The requirements have long
been established by law that public money must be spent in
a nondiscriminatory fashion. There is no court that may
hold to the contrary, and I can not conclude from these
facts anything except that there exists upon these defend
ants, as I have said, a positive and affirmative duty at
this time to initiate a new method of school transportation,
the details of which shall be spelled out in my order.
# # #
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
35a
Order
(Filed July 22, 1969)
In accordance with findings of fact delivered from the
bench at hearings conducted on June 30, 1969, and July
17, 1969, conclusions of law more fully set forth by this
court in United States of America v. Sunflower County
School District, No. GC 6637-K, by opinion released June
24, 1969; it is
Ordered
That the defendant, Holly Springs Municipal Separate
School District, its agents, officers, employees, successors
and all those in active concert and participation with them,
be and they are hereby permanently enjoined from dis
criminating on the basis of race or color in the operation
of the school system of the Holly Springs Municipal Sepa
rate School District. As hereinafter set out, they shall take
affirmative action to disestablish all school segregation and
to eliminate the effects of the dual school system.
I .
S tudent Desegregation
(1) F or the school year 1969-70, the school children of
the district shall be assigned to attendance centers as
follows:
(a) Grades 1 through 4 shall be assigned to attendance
centers on the basis of standardized tests given to the
students of such grades prior to the beginning of the
1969-70 school year by an outside disinterested testing
agency. Students entering the first four grades shall be
uniformly given the California Test of Basic Skills or a
comparable recognized achievement test. All tests shall
36a
Order
be scored by a disinterested agency and the results made
known to the school district prior to the commencement
of said school year. The 81 highest scoring students in
each of said grades shall be required during the 1969-70
school year to attend Sallie Cochran Elementary School,
and the remaining students in each of said grades shall be
required to attend Frazier Elementary School in Holly
Springs, Mississippi. Each student shall be required to
attend the attendance center to which his score assigns
him; provided, however, that in case of overcrowding,
school officials of the district may assign children to at
tend another school. During the month of April or May
of each school year hereafter beginning with April or
May 1970, the same or similar tests shall be given to each
student desiring to enroll in any one of the said four
grades during the next ensuing school year, and said tests
shall be scored and students assigned to schools as here
inabove provided.
(b) Students enrolled in grades 5 through 10 shall be
assigned to district schools in accordance with freedom of
choice of the individual student. Students in grades 11
and 12 shall also be assigned in accordance with freedom
of choice, provided, however, that the school district shall
first satisfy the positive desegregation requirements of
these two grades as next provided in (c).
(c) For the school year 1969-70 only, 20% of the en
rollment in grades 11 and 12 of the formerly all-white high
school located at Holly Springs shall be Negro students
assigned by the school district on the basis of proximity
of residence, freedom of choice or other method as it may
select.
37a
Order
(2) For the school year 1970-71, the school children of
the district shall be assigned to attendance centers as
follows:
(a) Grades 1 through 4 shall be assigned in accordance
with ( l ) (a ) above.
(b) Grades 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall be assigned to attendance
centers on the basis of test scores on a uniformly standard
ized achievement test as provided in ( l ) (a ) above, except
that said tests shall be administered in April or May of
each school year begnining with April or May 1970, and
also except that the 81 highest scoring students for grades
7 and 8 shall be assigned to Holly High School and the
remaining students in each of said grades shall be assigned
to Sims High School.
(c) Students enrolled in grades 9 to 12 shall be assigned
to attendance centers according to student’s freedom of
choice, provided, however, that the school district shall
first satisfy positive desegregation requirements of these
grades as next provided in (d).
(d) For the school year 1970-71 only, 20% of the en
rollment in grades 9 to 12 of the formerly all-white high
school located at Holly Springs shall he Negro students
assigned by the school district on the basis of proximity
of residence, freedom of choice or other method as it may
select.
(3) For the school year 1971-72 and thereafter, the
school children of the district shall be assigned to attend
ance centers as follows:
(a) Grades 1 through 8 shall be assigned in accordance
with ( l ) (a ) and (2 )(b) above.
38a
Order
(b) Grades 9 through 12 shall be assigned to attendance
centers uniformly on a nationally recognized standard
achievement test, with the 81 highest scoring students
assigned to Holly High School, and the remaining students
assigned to Sims High School.
(4) Notwithstanding the foregoing paragraphs ( l ) (a ) ,
(2 )(b) and (3 )(b), in event the number of students com
posing the higher scoring group shall, at the commence
ment of any school year, fail to utilize the maximum recom
mended capacity of available classroom space, the district
shall assign to that school such greater number of next
highest scoring students as may be needed to fully utilize
said capacity.
(5) New students entering any grade of the district’s
schools shall be given the tests for that grade and assigned
to schools according to their scores.
(6) Request for transfer by a student to attend school
in another attendance center of the district will be subjejct
to review by defendants and may be granted, but only if
the granting thereof will either 1) relieve a crowded school
condition; 2) assist a physically handicapped child; or 3)
promote desegregation. Moreover, defendants shall, on
request, permit any student to transfer from a school where
students of his race are a majority to any other school
within the system where students of his race are a minority,
and they may assign students on such basis; provided,
however, that such request for transfer may be denied in
the event the transfer would be to an already overcrowded
grade or center.
39a
Order
II.
F aculty and S taff Desegregation
Within the full extent of the district’s ability so to do,
including the availability of qualified personnel, not less
than one of every six classroom teachers of a different
race shall be employed and assigned to each of the schools
or attendance centers for the 1969-70 school year; and for
the 1970-71 school year and thereafter there shall be full
faculty and staff desegregation, to such an extent that the
faculty at each school is not identifiable to the race of the
majority of the students at any such school.
m .
T ransportation
The district shall provide a unitary plan for the trans
portation of school children based upon territorial zones
or other natural grouping of pupil residence, irrespective
of race, and seeking to eliminate insofar as practicable
overlapping or duplicating routes. All children of what
ever race shall be treated substantially alike as to seating
capacity, bus schedules, length of route, riding time, etc.,
depending upon the physical factors governing each par
ticular bus route.
IV.
Services, F acilities, A ctivities and P rograms
No student shall be segregated or discriminated against
on account of race or color in any grade, service, facility,
activity, or program (including transportation, athletics,
or other extracurricular activity) that may be conducted or
sponsored by the school in which the student is enrolled.
40a
Order
v.
New Construction
The defendants, to the extent consistent with the proper
operation of the school system as a whole, shall locate any
new school and substantially expand any existing schools
with the objective of eradicating the vestiges of the dual
school system.
VI.
P rotection of P ersons E xercising
R ights U nder T his Decree
Within their authority, school officials are responsible
for the protection of persons exercising rights under, or
otherwise affected by, this order. They shall, without de
lay, take appropriate action with regard to any student,
teacher or staff member who interferes with the successful
operation of the provisions of this order. Such interfer
ence shall include harassment, intimidation, threats, hos
tile words or acts, and similar behavior. I f officials of the
school system are not able to provide sufficient protection,
they shall seek whatever assistance is necessary from other
appropriate officials. Moreover, school officials may apply
to this court for protective orders against any person or
persons interfering with the execution of the terms of
this order.
VII.
Reports to the Court
(a) On or before October 15, 1969, and annually there
after, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the defend
ants shall submit the following reports to the court:
41a
Order
1. The name, race and teaching station of each member
of the faculty and staff of each attendance center of
the district; and
2. The number of children, by race, in attendance in
each attendance center of the district, by grades.
Said report shall disclose the range of test scores
for the children of each grade assigned to different
buildings, and indicating by number and by race
the children so assigned by test scores.
(b) On or before October 15, 1969, and quarterly there
after until otherwise ordered by the court, the defendants
shall submit the following reports to the court:
1. The name, race and age of each student who has been
granted a transfer on account of crowded school
situation or to aid a physically handicapped child,
giving the name of the school from which the student
transferred, the school to which the transfer was
made, and the grade involved.
2. The name, race and age of each student granted a
transfer in order to promote desegregation, the grade
involved, the name of the school from which the
transfer was granted, and the school to which the
transfer was made.
(c) That defendants when filing reports pursuant to
the provisions of this order shall serve duplicate copies
upon opposing counsel.
It is further Ordered
(1) Jurisdiction of this cause shall be, and the same
hereby is, retained for all purposes, and especially for the
42a
Order
purpose of entering any and all further orders which may
become necessary for the purpose of enforcing or modify
ing this order, either or both.
(2) The Clerk of this court shall he, and he hereby is,
directed to mail certified copies of this order by certified
mail to all counsel of record and to note such mailings on
the docket.
This, 22nd day of July, 1969.
W illiam C. K eady
Chief Judge
United States District Court
43a
APPENDIX 3
Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
(Dated June 26, 1969)
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
N o . 2 7 4 4 4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor-Ap pell ant,
versus
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees.
N o . 2 7 4 4 5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE CITY OF BESSEMER, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama
(June 26, 1969)
44a
Before BELL and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges and
ATKINS, District Judge.
BELL, Circuit Judge: These appeals contest the or
der of the district court denying further relief in the
Bessem er and Jefferson County Board of Education
school desegregation cases from the standpoint of re
quiring student assignments on a basis other than free
dom of choice. The appeals also complain of the denial
of relief with respect to school construction programs.
In the case of Bessemer, plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the construction of specific schools. We reverse and
remand for further proceedings.
These school boards were involved in the appeals
which resulted in the promulgation of the model de
cree in United States v. Jefferson County Board of
Education, 5 Cir., 1966, 372 F.2d 836, aff’d on rehearing
en banc, 380 F.2d 385, cert, den., 389 U.S. 840. The
m odel decree was entered in these cases on April 17,
1967. The motions for further relief sought to have
this decree modified with respect to the assignment
of students.1
Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
'These school systems were first before this court in United States
v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 5 Cir., 1965, 349 F.2d
1021; and United States v. City of Bessemer Board of Educa
tion, 5 Cir., 1965, 349 F.2d 10201. They were recently here on
a modification of the Jefferson decree with respect to faculty
assignments. United States v. Board of Education of the City of
Bessemer, 5 Cir., 1968, 396 F.2d 44. That same question is again
pending in this court. No. 26,582, United States, et al v. Board
of Education of the City of Bessemer; No. 26,583, United States,
et al v. Board of Education of the City of Birmingham; No.
26,583, United States et al v. Jefferson County Board of Edu
cation, argued and submitted November 21, 1968.
45a
The Jefferson model decree was promulgated to car
ry out the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education.
349 U.S. 294 (1955) which was to effectuate a tran
sition from dual school systems to unitary racially non
discriminatory systems. The model decree has resulted
in 3.45 per cent of the Negro students in the Bessemei
system attending school with white students for th<
year 1968-69. There are eleven schools in Bessemer:
one all white, four all Negro, and six desegregated
The school population of the Bessemer system for the
year 1968-69 was 8,615; 5,360 Negroes and 3,255 whites
In the Jefferson County system, 3.43 per cent of the
Negro students attended previously all white schools
in the year 1968-69. The school population was 65,659;
47,830 whites and 17,829 Negroes. There were 105
schools; 48 remained all white, 28 all Negro, and 29
were desegregated.
In no school in either system has a white student
chosen to attend a Negro school. There has been somt
assignment of both white and Negro teachers in each
system to teach in schools where their race is in th(
minority but not to a marked degree.
The Supreme Court handed down additional defini
tive decisions in the school law area in 1968. Green
v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia.
391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Education of
Gould, Arkansas, 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board
of Commissioners of the City of Jackson, Tennessee
391 U.S. 450 (1968). These cases emphasize the constitu
tional obligation of school boards to disestablish the
Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
46a
dual school system by converting immediately to uni
fied systems in which racial discrimination has been
com pletely eliminated. “The transition to a unitary,
nonracial system of public education was and is the
ultimate end to be brought about . . 391 U.S. at
p. 436. It was again stated that the burden was on
school boards to com e forward with plans to this end.
In Green it was made plain that the use of freedom
of choice would only be acceptable where . . it offers
real prom ise of aiding a desegregation program to
effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dual system
to a unitary, nonracial system. . .” . 391 U.S. at 440-441.
The court went on to hold that “ . . . if there are reason
ably available other ways, such for illustration as zon
ing, promising speedier and more effective conversion
to a unitary, nonracial school system, ‘freedom of
choice ’ must be held unacceptable.” 391 U.S. at 441.
This court has subsequently reviewed freedom of
choice plans in use in several school systems. The
tes has been in term s of the effectiveness to dises
tablish the dual system. In Adams v. Mathews, 5 Cir..
1968, 403 F.2d 181, 188, we said:
‘ ‘If in a school district there are still all-
Negro schools or only a small fraction of Ne
groes enrolled in white schools or no substan
tial integration of faculties and school activi
ties then, as a matter of law, the existing plan
fails to meet constitutional standards as estab
lished in Green.”
Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
See also Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of
47a
Mobile County, 5 Cir., 1969,____ F .2d_____ , [Nos. 26,886,
27,491, 27,260, slip opinion dated June 3, 1969]; Hall
v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969,____ F .2d_____ , [Nos. 26,450,
and 27,303, slip opinion dated May 28, 1969]; Anthony
v. Marshall County Board of Education, 5 Cir., 1969
------- F .2 d ------- [No. 26,432, slip opinion dated April 15,
1969]; United States v. lndianola Municipal Separate
School District, 5 Cir., 1969,____ F .2 d _____ , [No. 25,655,
slip opinion dated April 11, 1969]; Henry v. Clarksdale
Municipal Separate School District, 5 Cir., 1969, ____
F .2d -------, [No. 23,255, slip opinion dated March 6, 1969];
United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School
District, 5 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d 1086; Graves v. Walton
County Board of Education, 5 Cir. 1968, 403 F.2d 189;
Board of Public Instruction of Duval County v. Brax
ton, 5 Cir., 1968, 402 F.2d 900.
It is clear that the freedom of choice has not dis
established the dual school systems in Bessemer or
Jefferson County. The district court was of the view
that it would in time but this probability will not meet
the test of Green if there are other methods available
which will disestablish the dual system now. For aught
that appears, attendance zones would now accom plish
the objective insofar as student assignment is con
cerned. The district court is directed on remand to
consider zone assignments in each system.
The school construction program must also be con
sidered by the district court to the end of insuring
that the program will be used to disestablish the dual
system. The Bessem er school construction of which
plaintiffs com plain is well under way. The schools can
Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
48a
be desegregated in a meaningful manner on a zone
assignment basis and thus any discrimination flow
ing from site location can be dissipated.
The sum of these cases is that they must be con
sidered anew by the district court. In keeping with the
teaching of Green, the time is now at hand to dises
tablish the dual school systems in Jefferson County and
Bessemer. This will mean substantial changes in stu
dent and faculty assignment, in school bus routes, in
school and extracurricular activities including athletic
program s. Disestablishment, in the main, will com e
from local effort and through the cooperation of those
having a direct interest in the education process.
The passage of time has m ade the task of disestab
lishment m ore com plex. In Brown v. Board of Educa
tion, 347 U.S. 483, 495, (1954), the question of im ple
menting the decision was posed in term s of immediate
implementation or a deliberate speed concept. Fn. 13.
Immediate implementation was couched in terms of
admitting Negro children forthwith to schools of their
choice within the limits set by norm al geographic
school districting. This postulate was the subject mat
ter of the second Brown decision where instead the
deliberate speed concept was promulgated. 349 U.S.
£94, 298-99 (1955). This simple rem edy of im m e
diate student admission, thought to be too drastic then,
appears by hindsight and today’s standards, to be sim
ple indeed.
From the standpoint of local cooperation, neithei
of the school boards here have Negro m embers. This
Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
49a
means that help from such sources will not be available
to assist in disestablishing the dual systems. The plain
tiffs in each case are, however, represented by Negro
lawyers who reside in the Birmingham area and are
familiar with the school systems and the neighborhood
patterns. The school boards and their attorneys can
receive valuable assistance from these lawyers in for
mulating disestablishment plans. It becam e clear on
oral argument in this court that the development of
such a plan in each system can be readily accomplished
by local effort2 and this will be particularly true under
the leadership of the district court.
The district court, in addition to this type of assis
tance, will also have available the resources of the
Office of Education of the United States Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare under the terms
of the following order which is similar to the order
issued on June 3, 1968 in Davis v. Board of School
Commissioners of Mobile County supra. The order is
also similar to the order issued in Wittenberg v. Green
ville County School District, CA No. 4396, D.C.S.C. dat
ed March 1, 1969, and, on remand in the Louisiana
cases considered in Hall v. United States, supra. More
over, it appeared from oral argument that assistance
in formulating disestablishment plans m ay be avail
able from the University of Alabama.
The order of the district court in each case is reversed
and the cases are remanded to the district court with
the following direction:
Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
2There was testimony that white students would not attend formerly
Negro schools. This is not a legal argument. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
50a
1. The cases shall receive the highest priority.
2. The district court shall forthwith request the Of
fice of Education of the United States Department of
Health, Education and Welfare to collaborate with the
defendant school boards in the preparation of plans
to disestablish the dual school systems in question.
The disestablishment plans shall be directed to student
and faculty assignment, school bus routes if transpor
tation is provided, all facilities, all athletic and other
school activities, and all school location and construc
tion activities. The district court shall further require
the school boards to make available to the Office of
Education or its designees all requested information
relating to the operation of the school systems.
3. The required disestablishment plans for the re
spective systems shall be effective for the beginning
of the 1969-70 school term and shall be com pleted and
approved by the district court no later than August
5, 1969.
4. The district court shall enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law regarding the efficacy of any plan
which is approved to immediately disestablish the dual
school system in question. Jurisdiction should be re
tained, however, under the teaching of Green, 391 U.S.
at 439 and Raney, 391 U.S. at 449, until it is clear
that disestablishment has been achieved. 5
5. A copy of such findings, conclusions, and orders
as are entered, together with copies of disestablish
ment plans, shall be lodged with the clerk of this court.
Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
51a
Because of the urgency of formulating and approv-
ing plans to be effective for the 1969-70 school term
it is ordered as follows: The mandate of this court
shall issue immediately and will not be stayed pending
petitions for rehearing or certiorari. This court will
not extend the time for filing petitions for rehearing
or briefs in support of or in opposition thereto. Any
appeals from orders or decrees of the district court
on remand shall be expedited. The record on any appeal
shall be lodged with this court and appellants’ brief
filed, all within ten days of the date of the order or
decree of the district court from which the appeal is
taken. Appellee’s brief shall be due ten days thereafter.
The court will determine the time and place for oral
argument if allowed. No consideration will be given
to the fact of interrupting the school year in the event
further relief is indicated.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Adm. Office, U.S. Courts— Scofields’ Quality Printers, Inc., N. O., La.
52a
APPENDIX 4
Order
(Filed August 5, 1969)
I n the
U nited States District Court
F or the N orthern D istrict of A labama
S outhern D ivision
Civil A ction N o. 65-396
L inda S tout, by her father and next friend, B levin S tout,
Plaintiff,
U nited S tates of A merica,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v.
Jefferson County B oard of E ducation, et al.,
Defendants.
On the basis of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law set out in separate opinion of the court, in this cause
this day entered and filed,
It is, therefore, Ordered, A djudged and Decreed by the
court as follows:
(1) That the plan for integration of the Jefferson County
School System filed by the Jefferson County Board of Ed
ucation in this cause on August 1, 1969, be and the same
hereby is approved.
53a
Order
(2) That the objections to the plan filed on behalf of the
plaintiffs be and the same hereby are overruled and denied.
(3) The motion of the Jefferson County Board of Educa
tion to dismiss this cause is treated and considered as a
petition for summary judgment and the court hereby finds
and declares that the plan filed by the Jefferson County
Board of Education does immediately disestablish the dual
system and does immediately establish a unitary system in
Jefferson County. Jurisdiction is retained in this case for
the limited and restricted purpose of supervising the ad
ministration of the plan of the County Board as filed and
herein and hereby approved.
(4) That the petitions for intervention filed in this cause
on behalf of David Borello, et al., be and the same hereby
are denied.
(5) Prior orders entered in this cause to the extent con
sistent with the new plan filed by the County Board and
herein approved are to remain in effect. The County School
Board hereby is required to report to this court, with copy
to the parties, any changes in zone boundaries made pursu
ant to Chapter TV, Part D (p. 19), of the County School
Board plan.
D one and Ordered this 5th day of August, 1969.
/ s / C. H. A llgood
United States District Judge
54a
(Filed August 5, 1969)
This cause comes on to be heard on the reports filed by
the Jefferson County Board of Education (County Board)
and the Office of Education of the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW ), to disestablish
the dual school system in Jefferson County, Alabama, to
formulate and present a plan for the establishment of a
unitary school system including students, facuties, trans
portation, all facilities, athletics and other school activities
and school location and construction. In addition to its re
port, the County Board has filed a motion to dismiss the
subject action, setting out that the zoning attendance plan
proposed in its report effectively establishes a unitary
school system in Jefferson County that complies with every
judicial and constitutional requirement and to eliminate
all vestiges of the dual system. The reports were prepared
and filed under order of this court and entered on June 27,
1969, by Chief Judge Seybourn H. Lynne acting pursuant
to mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit issued in this case on June 26, 1969, which
said order directed:
“1. That the defendants be and they are hereby re
quired to prepare plans to disestablish the dual school
systems presently being maintained in Jefferson
County, Alabama, and forthwith to request the Office of
Education of the United States Department of Health,
Education and Welfare to collaborate with them in the
preparation thereof.
“2. That such plans shall be directed to (a) student
and faculty assignment, (b) school bus routes, (c) all
facilities, (d) all athletic and other school activities,
and (e) all school location and construction activities.
O p in io n o f th e C o u rt
55a
“3. That defendants be and they are hereby re
quired to make available to the Office of Education, or
its designees, all requested information relating to the
operation of such school system.
“4. That the disestablishment plans required hereby
shall be effective for the beginning of the 1969-1970
school term and shall be completed and filed in the of
fice of the Clerk of this court on August 1, 1969, and
shall be submitted for the approval of the court at
10:00 a.m., on August 4, 1969. All interested parties
shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard on such
date, and only on such date, with respect to objections
or exceptions to such plans.”
The plans of the County Board and HEW were timely
filed in this court on August 1, 1969, and were set for hear
ing as directed and ordered on August 4, 1969. The order
of the Fifth Circuit further directed that the plans for dis
establishment of the dual system and creation of the uni
tary system “ shall be considered and approved by the Dis
trict Court no later than August 5, 1969.”
All parties appeared in court on August 4, 1969, through
their respective attorneys of record.
The plaintiffs filed objections to the integration plan sub
mitted by the County Board which were heard together with
the reports and plans filed by the County Board and HEW.
Petitions for intervention were filed in this cause on behalf
of David Borello, etc., et al., by Ralph E. Coleman, Esq.; an
oral petition for intervention was recorded and urged on
behalf of parents residing in Pleasant Grove by John
Schmarkey, Esq. The petitions for intervention having
been considered and understood by the court, same were
denied.
Opinion of the Court
56a
Opinion of the Court
B ackground of the Case
This case commenced by a complaint filed on behalf of
the individual plaintiffs in this court on June 4,1965. With
in less than a month, a plan for desegregation was filed by
the County Board which, in the opinion of this court, com
plied with the law as then construed by the District Court
and by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Following hear
ing, the plan, as filed, with modifications, was approved by
the District Court. The Justice Department appealed to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 17, 1965,
the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court in
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 349
F.2d 1021:
“For further consideration in light of Singleton v.
Jackson Municipal Separate School District, et al, 5
Cir. 348 F.2d 729, decided by this court on June 22,1965,
and Price v. Denison Independent School District
Board of Education, et al, 5 Cir., 348 F.2d 1010, decided
by this court on July 2, 1965.”
Within ten days the County Board filed its amended plan
to conform to the decision of the Fifth Circuit. The plan
was approved by this court and the Government appealed.
This appeal led to the uniform “Model Decree” and the de
cision of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jefferson
County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, affirmed on re
hearing en banc (3/29/67), 380 F.2d 385. Following and
pursuant to that decision, the District Court entered “ the
model decree” set out by the Fifth Circuit on April 17, 1967.
The plaintiff and the Justice Department then filed a mo
tion seeking a modification of the Jefferson decree with re
spect to faculty assignments. On June 3, 1968, in United
States v. Board of Education of the City of Bessemer, 396
Opinion of the Court
F.2d 44 (which was consolidated with the Jefferson case),
the Fifth Circuit reversed the order of the District Court
and directed accelerated faculty integration. The action
taken by the County Board with respect to this order was
submitted to the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jefferson
County Board of Education, Fifth Circuit, No. 26584.1 The
Fifth Circuit remanded that case to this court for action
in connection with the subject proceeding. The United
States, intervenor, filed a motion seeking to require the
County Board to file another plan for the desegregation of
schools in the County System based on geographical zoning.
This court sustained “ Freedom-of-Choice” in Jefferson
County and its administration by the County Board, but,
following appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed on June 26,
1969. The District Court issued the subject order pursuant
to that mandate of the Fifth Circuit.
The testimony of record in these proceedings admittedly
shows that not a single complaint was communicated to the
County Board by any citizen of Jefferson County—white
or Negro— regarding the “Freedom of Choice” plan or its
administration by the County Board. Following hearing
on the “Freedom-of-Choice” plan and its administration in
the County System, Chief Judge Seybourn H. Lynne, in his
memorandum opinion of March 7, 1969, specifically noted
that:
“ There is not a whisper of evidence that any pupil of
either race has been harrassed, intimidated or influ
enced in any manner in the exercise of his choice of a
school . . . ”
1 Consolidated with No. 26582, United States v. Board of Edu
cation of the City of Bessemer, and No. 26583, United States v.
Board of Education of the City of Birmingham.
58a
In addition, the County Board continuously has taken speci
fied accelerated and meaningful steps toward the integra
tion of its school system and has achieved remarkable re
sults in the face of many difficulties.
It is further noted that every plan filed by the County
Board generally satisfied the standards or guidelines es
tablished by HEW and the Fifth Circuit at the time the
plans were filed in the District Court, hut as noted by the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Board of Education of the
City of Bessemer, 396 F.2d 44, 49:
“And the moving finger having writ was soon writing
everywhere.”
The result was that while the plans were substantially in
keeping with the appellate decision at the time they were
filed in the District Court, the position of the appellate
court was being modified pending the appeal, and when
the appeals reached the Fifth Circuit remandment fol
lowed with additional corrections.
The Jefferson County School Board has had a very
short time in which to perform a herculean task. They
have met their responsibilities and submitted a plan which
this court finds in full compliance with the mandate of
the Fifth Circuit.
It is recognized that under the circumstances some
minor adjustments may have to be made. Some changes
in the plan not affecting its basic purpose and intent may
be required. These matters can be worked out and agreed
upon by the School Board and HEW, without further
burden to this court and to the Court of Appeals. This
plan ends the dual system of schools in Jefferson County.
In this court’s opinion, it meets the requirements set out
Opinion of the Court
59a
in the mandate of the Fifth Circuit. It should end litiga
tion.
It is my thought that further litigation in this case for
any reason other than that reserved by the court would
serve no good purpose.
Objections were filed on behalf of the United States
Department of Justice requesting and suggesting that the
court’s order include a provision retaining in effect pro
visions of earlier orders not inconsistent with the new
plan and requiring periodic reports. The court has care
fully considered these objections and has incorporated
herein substantial and material portions of the Depart
ment’s suggestions.
The court has carefully studied the reports and plans
for integration filed by the County Board and HEW, has
heard evidence with respect to the plans and the argu
ments of counsel and makes the following findings of fact,
conclusions of law and order herein.
F indings of F act
(1) The plans submitted by the County Board and HEW
follow identical geographical zones. As directed by the
Fifth Circuit, the County Board made available to HEW
all requested information, including the subject plan filed
by the County Board which HEW has approved, in sub
stance. 2
(2) The plan of the County Board effectively eliminates
all vestiges of the dual school system in Jefferson County
and creates a unitary system that complies with all judicial
and constitutional requirements.
Opinion of the Court
60a
(3) In considering and fixing school attendance zones,
the County Board correctly used and applied the following
pertinent factors:
(a) Capacity of the schools.
(b) Geographical and natural boundaries.
(c) Condition of facilities.
(d) Residence of students.
(e) Boundary lines of other school systems.
(f) Accessibility.
(g) Separate cities.
(h) Accreditation.
(i) Permanency of descriptions.
All of these factors were applied by the County Board
without discrimination to disestablish the dual and create
an effective unitary school system.
(4) That approval and execution of the plan effectively
establishes a unitary system of schools in Jefferson County
is evidenced by the following statistical result. The Fifth
Circuit having previously noted in Bessemer:
Opinion of the Court
“As figures speak and when they do courts listen.”
Students Attending and Projected in the
Jefferson County School System 1968-1972
Year White % Negro % Total
1968-69 48,032 73.% 17,765 27.% 65,797
1969-70 50,223 73.9% 17,731 26.1% 67,954
1970-71 50,452 74.4% 17,393 25.6% 67,845
1971-72 50,469 74.8% 17,001 25.2% 67,470
61a
In the 1967-68 school year, 350 Negro students attended
predominantly white schools in the County System. In
1968-69, 615 Negro students, or 3.43%, attended County
Schools in integrated situations. The County Board plan
(if it can be accomplished) results in the following amazing
figures.
In 1969-70, 13,174 of 17,731 Negro students, or 74.29%,
will attend County Schools in integrated situations.
In 1970-71, 14,812 of 17,393, or 85.16%, of the Negro
students will attend County Schools in integrated
situations.
In 1971-72, all—100%—of the Negro students will be
attending schools in integrated situations. 5
(5) Under the proposed plan, the faculty of the County
System will be completely integrated. During the 1967-68
school year, only ten teachers in the County System taught
in integrated situations in six schools. In the period of
less than two months following the decision of the Fifth
Circuit on June 3, 1968, in Bessemer, this number had
been increased by the County Board to 133 teachers in
92 schools, of which 93 teachers were assigned to teach
in 66 schools attended predominantly by white students
and 40 white teachers were assigned to teach in 26 schools
attended predominantly by Negro students. Ninety-two of
the 105 schools in the County System then had integrated
facilities. The remaining thirteen schools each had six
teachers or less and were small schools located in remote
rural sections of the county. The composition of the
faculty, by race, in the County System, for each of the
years 1968-1972, as projected, under the County Board
plan, would be as follows:
Opinion of the Court
62a
Faculty Teaching and Projected in the Jefferson County
School System 19Q8-72
Opinion of the Court
Year White % Negro % Total
1968-69 1,789 72.1% 692 27.9% 2,481
1969-70 1,762 72.5% 668 27.5% 2,430
1970-71 1,780 71.9% 697 28.1% 2,477
1971-72 1,842 72.5% 700 27.5% 2,542
Approval and execution of the County Board plan would
result in the following number and percentage of integra
tion among the faculty of the County System: 6
Non-
Year Integrated % integrated % Total
1969-70 2,403 99.0% 27 1.0% 2,430
1970-71 2,464 99.5% 13 .5% 2,477
1971-72 2,533 99.6% 9 .4% 2,542
(6) Under the County Board plan, eighteen schools in
the county would be closed to accomplish integration, be
ing specifically Mt. Olive Junior High, Roebuck Plaza Ele
mentary, Mineral Springs Elementary, Alden Elementary,
Docena North, Mulga North, Leeds Primary, Westfield
High, Pleasant Grove Elementary, Overton, Wilkes, Rob-
ertstown, Zinnerman, Johns, Hooper City, Pipe Shop, Red
Ore and Raimund Elementary. The present market
value of these schools is $1,260,101.70. Their replacement
cost is reliably estimated to be $4,090,000.00. To complete
the construction that will be reasonably necessary to fully
implement the County Board plan will result in construc
tion costs of $13,856,000. The County Board does not have
the funds with which to accomplish this tremendous and
required construction program.
63a
The County Board has adopted and followed a “pay as
you go” program and constructs additional facilities where
students are in attendance. Its proposed construction plans
are directed toward the implementation of the integration
plan filed with this court.
(7) The plaintiffs introduced no evidence in support of
their objections. The County Board introduced testimony
specifically relating to and answering each objection. The
court finds that the objections are without merit and likely
were prompted, to a substantial extent, by a misunderstand
ing on the part of plaintiffs of the integration plan filed by
the County Board. The evidence of record establishes that
students will not be bussed out of their zones passed schools
consisting largely of members of the opposite race. Fur
ther, the evidence establishes that the County Board has no
new construction plans except those related to the plan as
filed. There is no evidence to sustain plaintiffs’ objection
and statement that Negro students would be bussed by white
schools in order to attend Negro high schools. To the con
trary, the evidence is and the court finds that there are no
white schools or Negro schools upon execution of the plan,
but only schools. The dual system and all vestiges thereof
has been effectively eliminated and a unitary system has
been created in the County School System. The testimony
clearly shows and the court finds that Negro principals are
being retained in a number of the county schools, being
those at Brighton, Moton, Raimund, Wenonah and Rose-
dale. The court finds that the plaintiffs’ objections are with
out merit and there is no evidence in the record to sustain
same.
It is obvious that objections filed are not supported by the
facts in this case. This is due to the apparent lack of fa
miliarity with the proposed plan. The court is well aware
Opinion of the Court
64a
of the fact that the time schedule in this case does not allow
sufficient time to study and analyze the plan. However, the
record does show that Attorney Clemon and his associates
were consulted from time to time during the preparation
of this plan and that he and his associates did approve of
the plan, in substance.
(8) The court finds, as suggested by the United States
Department of Justice, that provisions of earlier orders in
this cause not inconsistent with the new plan be continued
and that the County Board be required to report to the court
and to the parties “ any changes in zone boundaries made
pursuant to Chapter IV, Part D (p. 19) of the County
School Board plan.”
Since the court will retain jurisdiction to supervise the
effect and administration of the plan, it deems presently
unnecessary any orders relating to construction of facilities
since admittedly all construction is related directly to the
plan and no new construction presently is proposed by the
County Board except that specifically set out in and made
an integral part of the proposed plan.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes
the following:
Opinion of the Court
Conclusions of L aw
(1) That the integration plan filed by the County Board
complies with all judicial and constitutional requirements
for the abolition of all vestiges of the dual school system and
the establishment of an effective unitary school system in
Jefferson County, including, but not limited to, student and
faculty assignment, transportation, all facilities, all ath
letics and other school activities, and all school location and
construction activities.
65a
(2) The plan of the County Board should be and hereby
is approved as filed.
It should be noted that the plan of the County Board has
met with the approval of HEW. In addition, the plan has
the approval of Dr. Bascomb Woodward, Director, Bureau
of School Services, of the University of Alabama, who was
requested by HEW to carefully analyze the plan. Dr.
Woodward expressed the opinion that the plan completely
disestablishes all vestiges of the dual system and creates
an effective unitary system of schools in Jefferson County.
Contemporaneously with its plan, the County Board
filed a motion to dismiss this proceeding alleging (correctly)
that the plan complied with every judicial and constitutional
requirement to accomplish a unitary school system for
Jefferson County. It is the opinion of this court that “all
litigation must sometime come to an end,” but in the subject
case, the Fifth Circuit noted that:
“ The district court shall enter findings of fact and con
clusions of law regarding the efficacy of any plan which
is approved to immediately disestablish the dual school
system in question. Jurisdiction should be retained,
however, under the teaching of Green, 391 U.S. at 439
and Raney 391 U.S. at 449, until it is clear that dis
establishment has been achieved.”
The court is treating the motion of the County Board to
dismiss as a petition for a summary judgment that the
County Board plan complies with all judicial and constitu
tional requirements and the court hereby finds and declares
that the attendance zone plan filed by the County Board
does immediately disestablish the dual school system and
does immediately establish a unitary system in Jefferson
County.
Opinion of the Court
66a
Opinion of the Court
The court retains jurisdiction of this case for the limited
and restricted purpose of supervising the administration of
the plan of the County Board as filed and herein and hereby
approved.
An express order of this court will be entered accordingly.
This 5th day of August, 1969.
/ s / C. H. A llgood
United States District Judge
67a
APPENDIX 5
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
(Filed August 5, 1969)
I n the
U nited S tates D istrict Court
F or the N orthern D istrict of A labama
S outhern D ivision
Civil, A ction N o. 65-366
D oris E laine B rown, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
U nited States of A merica,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v.
B oard of E ducation of the City of B essemer, et al.,
Defendants.
On April 17, 1967, in this case this court entered the
precise mandated decree issuing from the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F. 2d 836,
adopted on rehearing en banc, 380 F. 2d 385. Motions were
filed on behalf of the plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenor
for an order requiring the defendants to adopt and imple
ment a plan of pupil assignment based on criteria other
than “Freedom of Choice” , and after appeal, in case
No. 27444 on June 26, 1969, the Court of Appeals for the
68a
Fifth Circuit promulgated another decree wherein it found
that the “Freedom of Choice” had not disestablished the
dual school system in Bessemer.
The order of the Court of Appeals directed this court
to require the School Board to file a plan to disestablish
the dual system and to request the office of the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare to
collaborate with the defendant School Board in the prepara
tion of such plans. Precise dates for the filing of such
a plan were set out.
An order of this court was issued on the 27th day of
June, 1969, in compliance with the mandate of the appel
late court. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare filed a plan on Friday, August 1, 1969. This plan
only contemplated the initial step and in such plan stated:
“ The demographic and geographic complexities of
Bessemer require a much greater detailed examination
than is normally required in desegregation plan
development. The present size, location, and organiza
tion of the schools require an intensive facilities and
site survey in greater depth than is normally required.
The lack of public and school-supported transporta
tion necessitates a more in depth, time distance route
survey. More collaboration and interaction is needed
between the HEW team and local officials in order to
develop a terminal plan that may require a complete
reorganization of the entire school system.”
The court was informed that this change necessitated
the Bessemer Board deadline for filing its plan to be ex
tended to Monday, August 4, 1969, and an order was
entered to this effect.
In chambers, the Departmnet of Health, Education and
Welfare and the Justice Department agreed that the
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
69a
Bessemer plan was acceptable as a temporary measure
and in open court the attorneys for the United States sub
sequently confirmed this agreement. The Bessemer Plan
only varied in relatively small details from the HEW plan.
The current regulations of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare on school integration do not re
quire total integration for the 1969-1970 school year where
either the entire school system is more than 50 percent
Negro or where a construction project is in construction
which would affect the school integration plan. The Besse
mer School System meets both of these tests. In addition
to the percentage, it has under construction a large school
which is planned to house grades 7 through 12, the enroll
ment capacity of about 1,300 students.
The plans show that there are 5,200 colored students and
2,951 white students in the Bessemer School System. Of
the white students, 587 attend Greenwood Elementary
School, which is located four to five miles from the nearest
other city school. This school is also attended by students
from Jefferson County under a special agreement with
the County Board of Education. There are no colored
students in the area, within the city limits. Any colored
students who would attend this school would, of necessity,
be zoned in under the county zoning plan. The results
then show that in the heart city, those capable of being
in school, in integrated schools, would only be 2,364 white
students. The percentage of these whites and colored in
this area is 32 percent white and 68 percent colored.
Excluding the Greenwood Elementary School, the City
of Bessemer at present operates four all Negro schools
and six schools attended by children of both races which
in the past have been all white. All faculties in the system,
at all schools, were integrated during the past year.
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
70a
Under the Bessemer plan all of the formerly white
schools within the City of Bessemer will be integrated with
the exception of Greenwood. All other schools will be
integrated from 15 to 38 percent of capacity and a total of
35 percent of the students attending these schools will be
Negro during the coming school year. The faculties and
staffs of all schools will be desegregated and in no case will
the racial composition of the staff or faculty indicate that
a school is intended for Negro or white students.
On this date, August 5, 1969, counsel for the individual
plaintiffs filed “ Objections to the Temporary Plan Offered
by the City of Bessemer.” No evidence was introduced at
the hearing in support of these objections and counsel for
the individual plaintiffs agreed that additional time would
be required to develop a terminal plan for the Bessemer
School System.
Memorandum Opinion of the Court
F indings or F act
(1) The interim plan submitted by the Bessemer School
Board meets the requirements of the Fifth Circuit mandate
to the extent reasonably possible at this time, and the
court agrees with the observation of the Justice Depart
ment, HEW and the Bessemer School Board that additional
time, collaboration and interaction is needed between the
parties to develop a terminal plan that may require the
complete reorganization of the entire school system. 2
(2) The interim plan of the Bessemer School Board, as
agreed by HEW and the Justice Department, is acceptable
as a temporary measure and further time will be required
to effect a plan that will create a completely unitary system
in Bessemer. The court, at the suggestion of the parties,
finds that such a plan might reasonably be formulated and
filed by November 15, 1969.
71a
Conclusions of L aw
(1) That the interim plan as submitted by the Bessemer
Board of Education is the best and most effective plan that
could reasonably be formulated within the time allowed
and, to that extent, complies with the mandate issued pur
suant to the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
entered in this cause of June 26, 1969.
(2) Action on the objections filed by and on behalf of
the individual plaintiffs should be stayed pending the final
report from the Bessemer School Board. 3
(3) All parties having agreed that additional time is
required for the Bessemer Board “ to develop a terminal
plan” , this court should give effect thereto in the absence
of some compelling reason to the contrary which does not
exist.
An express order of this court will be entered accordingly.
This 5th day of August, 1969.
/ s / C. H. A llgood
United States District Judge
72a
Order
(Filed August 5, 1969)
On the basis of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law set out in a separate memorandum opinion of the
court, in this cause this day entered and filed,
It is, therefore, Ordered, A djudged and Decreed by the
court as follows:
(1) That the interim plan for the integration of the
Bessemer School System filed by the Bessemer Board of
Education on August 4,1969, be and the same hereby is
approved.
(2) That action on the objections to the plan filed on
behalf of the individual plaintiffs on August 5, 1969, be
and the same hereby is stayed and will be considered at
the time the terminal plan of the Bessemer Board is filed
and presented to the court.
(3) That the Bessemer School Board be and it hereby
is given until November 15, 1969, to prepare and file with
this court a terminal plan to eliminate all vestiges of the
dual system and to effectively establish a unitary plan for
the operation of the Bessemer School System.
(4) The Bessemer Board of Education shall continue
to collaborate with the Office of Education of the United
States Department of Health, Education and Welfare in
the preparation of a final plan to disestablish the dual
school system, and that such plan shall be filed by November
15, 1969.
(5) Jurisdiction is retained until it is clear that the dis
establishment of the dual system has been achieved.
D one and Ordered this 5th day of August, 1969.
/ s / C. H. A llgood
United States District Judge
73a
APPENDIX 6
Order
(Filed August 1, 1969)
I n the
U nited States D istrict Court
F or the Southern D istrict or A labama
S outhern D ivision
Civil A ction No. 3003-63
B irdie M ae Davis, et al.,
and
Plaintiff,
U nited States of A merica,
by Ramsey Clark, Attorney General, etc.,
Plaintiff -Inter venor,
v.
B oard of S chool Commissioners of
M obile County, et al.,
Defendants,
and
T wtla F razier, et al.,
Intervenors.
It is difficult for one unschooled in the field of education
to implement a plan to operate the Mobile County Public
School System in any fashion, but I am confronted with
doing just that in what I hope will he a practical and
workable way within the law.
74a
Order
The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have inter
preted the law. We may agree with their interpretation or
not, but we must follow it.
In approaching this task, which is without doubt the most
difficult as well as important that I have ever encountered,
I have called upon any and every source at my command
for assistance.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, with
inadequate time, has filed a plan with which I can agree
in part and disagree in part. It contains some provisions
which I think are both impractical and educationally un
sound. HEW readily acknowledges that this plan is not
perfect and invites the School Board to suggest improve
ments. The School Board has filed absolutely no plan for
the assistance of the court. The professional staff of the
Mobile Public School System did, as authorized by the
School Board, work with HEW in attempting to formulate
such a plan, but their efforts did not meet with the ap
proval of the School Board. The court has the benefit of
such work, but wishes to make it clear that such was never
approved by the School Board, though the end results in
many areas were substantially in accord with HEW.
With eight years of litigation, entailing countless days
and weeks of hearings in court, it has been clearly estab
lished that the Mobile County School System must forth
with be operated in accordance with the law of the land.
What this school system needs is to educate children legally,
and not to engage in protracted litigation. After all, the
children are the ones in whom we should be most inter
ested. With this in mind, I get to the business at hand.
The plan filed by HEW calls for its implementation by
the beginning of the 1969-70 school term of all rural schools
and all metropolitan areas west of Interstate Highway 65.
75a
Order
It clearly states that its plan for all metropolitan areas
east of 1-65 cannot possibly be implemented before the
1970-71 school term. In this, the court is in complete agree
ment.
As to the rural schools and all metropolitan areas west
of 1-65, the Court Orders, A djudges and Decrees the fol
lowing plan under which the Mobile County School System
will operate, beginning with the school term of 1969-70:
I .
Attendance area zones for all rural schools of the Sys
tem, elementary, junior high and high schools, are directed
in accordance with maps hereto attached, marked Exhibits
1, 2 and 3.
II.
Attendance area zones for the metropolitan schools lo
cated west of 1-65, elementary, junior high and high schools,
are directed in accordance with maps hereto attached,
marked Exhibits 4, 5 and 6.
III.
Attendance area zones for the metropolitan elementary
and junior high schools located east of Interstate Highway
65 shall be the identical zones as those utilized for the past
school year, 1968-69.
IV.
The metropolitan senior high schools located east of In
terstate Highway 65, including the Toulminville High
School, shall operate under the freedom of choice desegre
gation plan and each student shall attend the school which
was selected during the recent choice period of May, 1969;
76a
Order
however, every senior high school student living west of
Interstate Highway 65 must attend the senior high school
serving his attendance area, notwithstanding the student’s
choice to attend a high school located east of Interstate
Highway 65.
V.
The court is not satisfied with the Plan set out by HEW
for the metropolitan schools lying east of 1-65 for imple
mentation for the 1970-71 school term. The court knows
that further study will result in a far better and more
practical, as well as legal, plan.
VI.
The School Board is hereby ordered to file with the court,
not later than December 1, 1969, a suggested desegregation
plan for all of the metropolitan schools located east of
1-65. This plan shall be formulated by the School Board
in consideration of the mandate of the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals of June 3, 1969 and after further study and col
laboration with HEW officials. The School Board is hereby
ordered to file a detailed progress report to the court on
October 10, 1969 and November 20, 1969 outlining the steps
taken in formulating the plan.
The court fervently hopes that the decree herein entered
and the plan of December 1, 1969 will end further litigation
for the public school system of Mobile County.
VII.
F aculty
For the 1969-70 school term and subsequent years, the
faculty of each school, including the principals, teachers,
tearcher’s aides, and other staff members wTho work directly
Order
with the children, shall have a racial composition not iden
tifiable as a school for negro or white students.
For the upcoming year, the School Board shall assign,
as far as is educationally feasible, the staff described above
so that the racial composition of each school’s faculty shall
reflect substantially, the racial composition of the teachers
in the entire school system.
Staff members who work directly with children, and pro
fessional staff who work on the administrative level, shall
be hired, assigned, promoted, paid, demoted, dismissed and
otherwise treated without regard to race, color, or national
origin, except to the extent necessary to erase segregation.
I f there is to be a reduction in the number of principals,
teachers, teacher-aides or other professional staff employed
by the school district, which will result in a dismissal or
demotion of any such staff members, the staff member to be
dismissed or demoted must be selected on the basis of
objective and reasonable non-discriminatory standards from
among all the staff of the school district. In additions, if
there is any such dismissal or demotion, no staff vacancy
may be filled through recruitment of a person of a race,
color, or national origin different from that of the indi
vidual dismissed or demoted, until each displaced member
who is qualified has had an opportunity to fill the vacancy
and has failed to accept an offer to do so.
“ Demotion” as used above includes any reassignment (1)
under which the staff member receives less pay or has less
responsibility than under the assignment he held previ-
ouly, (2) which requires a lesser degree of skill than did
the assignment he held previously, or (3) under which the
staff member is asked to teach a subject or grade other
than one for which he is certified or for which he has had
substantial experience within a reasonably current period.
78a
Order
In general and depending upon the subject matter involved,
five years is such a reasonable period.
VIII.
The Toulminville School for the year 1969-70 is to be
operated in the same grade level as it was last year.
IX.
The five per cent transfer provision for children of minor
ity groups set out in the court’s plan of last year is com
pletely deleted.
X.
P ublic N otice
The School Board shall publish or cause to have pub
lished in the local newspaper, the complete text of this
decree and the maps, identified as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
and 6, to this court’s decree. The decree and maps shall
be published once a day for three consecutive days, alter
nating the morning and evening editions of the newspaper.
In addition, the School Board shall post or cause to he
posted in a conspicuous place in each school in the System,
and at the offices of the School Board, copies of the map
outlining the particular school’s area attendance zone. This
notice provision also applies to those elementary and junior
high schools, east of 1-65, which shall operate under last
year’s attendance area zones.
Dated: August 1, 1969.
/ s / Daniel H. T homas
79a
APPENDIX 7
Order
(Filed June 20, 1969)
I n the
U nited States D istkict Court
F or the Southern D istrict of Georgia
A ugusta D ivision
Civil A ction N o. 1369
N eely B ennett, et al.,
vs.
Plaintiffs,
R. E. E vans, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil A ction No. 1443
A llene P atricia A nn B ennett, a minor by R. B. Bennett,
her father and next friend, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
B urke County B oard of E ducation, et al.,
Defendants.
These two cases were consolidated by me for hearing
under an order entered on May 8, 1969. In the first action
(No. 1369) petitioners attacked the constitutionality of the
Georgia statutes governing election of school board mem
bers by grand juries. Plaintiffs also sought ancillary dam-
80a
Order
ages. The complaint did not expressly seek desegregation
of the dual system of white and black schools. Petitioners
did allege, however, that they and other Negroes are de
nied the full and equal benefit of public education in Burke
County, free of discrimination or segregation because of
their race or color.
A Three-Judge Court which was convened in No. 1369
dissolved itself and left future questions to a single district
judge. The constitutional issue in a similar case is noiv
before the Supreme Court of the United States.
The other case (No. 1443) which is brought by some of
the same plaintiffs attacks the “ freedom of choice plan” in
existence in Burke County and seeks injunctive relief from
the operation of a compulsory bi-racial school system. An
evidentiary hearing was held in this case, involving the
desegregation issue only, at Augusta on June 17th.
I announced my views at the completion of the evidence
and now formalize them by Findings of Fact and Conclu
sions of Law. I also expressed my intentions as to an
interlocutory order. The order which appears at the end
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law utilizes
the provisions of Title 42, §2000c-2, United States Code,
providing for expert technical assistance by the Office of
Education in the preparation, adoption and implementa
tion of plans for desegregation of public schools.
F indings of F act
1. Burke County, Georgia, at the last census had a popu
lation of 20,596 inhabitants of whom 13,699 were Negroes
and 6,927 were whites. 2
2. During the 1968-69 school year the total school popu
lation was 5,433 of whom 1,586 were white students and
81a
Order
3,847 black. Negroes comprise 70.1% of the school enroll
ment.
3. There are eleven schools in the public school system.
Of these seven are Negro and four are white. The Burke
County system is organized, and always has been, as a dual
one based upon race. Since the school year 1965-66 a free-
doom of choice plan has been in existence. Prior to that
time only colored students to seven schools.
4. Under the freedom of choice plan no white student
attended during the past year any Negro School. No Ne
groes attended two of the four white schools. Out of a
total enrollment of 782 pupils there were 27 colored stu
dents at Waynesboro Elementary. Three Negroes attend
Waynesboro High School which has a total enrollment of
380.
5. The percentage of Negro students in other than en
tirely black schools is approximately 0.7% of the total
colored pupil population.
6. During the 1968-69 school year the number and race
of the students enrolled at the eleven schools was as
follows:
Pupils Pupils
School Grades White Black
Cousins (Sardis) ............. ..... 1-8 0 366
Girard (Girard) ............... ..... 1-8 0 336
S. R. Dinkins (Midville) ........ 1-8 0 359
Palmer (Keysville) ......... ..... 1-8 0 214
Gough (Gough) ................. ..... 1-7 0 349
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Order
School Grades
Pupils
White
Pubils
Block
Blakeney Elementary .......
(Waynesboro)
..... 1-7 0 1126
Blakeney High ..................
(Waynesboro)
.... 8-12 0 915
Waynesboro Elementary ...... 1-8 755 27
Waynesboro H igh ......... ..... .... 9-12 377 3
Sardis-Girard-Alexander ..
(Sardis)
.... 1-12 357 0
Midville Elementary ......... .... 1-7 49 0
7. The total number of faculty members in the Burke
County school system is 212 of whom 139 are Negro. No
white teachers teach in black schools. No black teachers
teach in white schools.
8. The school bus system is maintained on a segregated,
duplicative and overlapping basis.
9. In 1966 H.E.W. cut off Federal assistance funds to the
Burke County system, which aid amounted at that time to
$209,340.58 annually.
10. Six of the seven Negro schools have lost accredita
tion because, or mainly because, of over-crowded conditions.
Conclusions of L aw
1. The defendants have discriminated against Negro stu
dents on account of their race in violation o f the Four
teenth Amendment in the operation of the Burke County
system by maintaining a dual school system based on race.
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Order
2. Until the freedom of choice plan not a single white
child, and this is the invariable pattern, has chosen to
attend the traditionally Negro schools. More than 99% of
the colored children continue to attend all-Negro schools.
This is constitutionally unacceptable. Green v. County
School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968);
Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School, 391 U.S.
443 (1968); United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate
School District, et al., (5th Cir., April 11, 1969); United
States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School District,
et al., (5th Cir., February 4,1969); Adams et al. and United
States v. Mathews et al., (5th Cir.), 403 F.2d 181.
3. The existing freedom of choice approach offers no
hope of achieving at any time in the near future the degree
of integration necessary to satisfy the demands of the
Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in these and other
decisions.
4. “ It is an affirmative duty of each school board in this
circuit to abolish the vestiges of state-compelled segre
gation and to establish a unitary system which achieves
substantial desegregation . . . At the very least this
means that this school board has an obligation to see
that schools in this district remain no longer all-Negro
schools or all-white schools enrolling only an infini
tesimal fraction of Negro students.”
United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School
District, supra.
O b d e e
It is ordered that the Board of Education of Burke
County shall promptly submit to the Office of Education,
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Order
H.E.W., the existing methods of operation of the System
and shall seek to develop by July 30, 1969, in collaboration
and co-operation with the experts in the Office a workable
and acceptable plan of desegregation and operation of the
schools consonant with the practical and administrative
problems faced by the Board. If such a plan can be agreed
upon by July 30th, this Court will approve same unless
the Plaintiffs at a hearing makes a satisfactory showing
that the plan does not meet constitutional standards. If
no plan is developed within the period referred to, the
Office of Education is respectfully requested to submit to
the Court as soon as practicable their recommendations
for a workable plan. Absent a showing by the parties at
a hearing, this Court will, after due consideration of any
plan so submitted by the Office of Education, enter a de
cree. Such a hearing will be held at Savannah on August
8, 1969 at 10:00 o ’clock a.m.
The Court expresses the earnest hope that an acceptable
plan will evolve— one which, while satisfying judicial inter
pretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, will not produce,
through overnight revolution, complete disruption and an
end product of a second or third rate education for the
children of Burke County.
This June 20th, 1969.
A lexander A . L awrence
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Southern District of Georgia
85a
Order
(Filed August 22, 1969)
There came on to be heard on August 15, 1969 the matter
of approval of the interim plan of desegregation of schools
in the public school system of Burke County, Georgia de
veloped by the Burke County Board of Education in col
laboration with the Office of Education of the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare and submitted pursuant
to the order passed herein on June 20, 1969 to be effective
for the 1969-70 school year; and it appearing that the
proposed plan is acceptable to and has the approval of
the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Edu
cation and Welfare as applicable to that particular school
year; and after hearing from counsel for plaintiffs and
defendants, no satisfactory showing having been made why
such plan should not be approved;
I t is ordered that said interim plan be and the same is
hereby approved to be effective for the school year 1969-70
with the Board of Education of Burke County to take the
necessary steps to implement the same in all respects, which
plan is substantially as follows:
Student Desegregation
1. All predominantly white schools will be brought up to
capacity with Negro students so as to result in a minimum
of 68 Negro students assigned to and enrolled in Waynes
boro High School, a minimum of 167 Negro students as
signed to and enrolled in Sardis-Girard-Alexander Elemen
tary and High School, a minimum of 89 Negro students
assigned to and enrolled in Waynesboro Elementary School
and a minimum of 35 Negro students assigned to and en
rolled in Midville Elementary School.
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Order
2. Vocational Department at Blakeney High School to
serve the entire County with the schedule to be worked
out by the Burke County Board of Education.
Desegregation of Faculty and other Staff
3. Full desegregation of faculty and other staff in the
grades affected by the assignments of students as above,
including district-wide desegregation of faculty and other
staff in each school to at least 7 white and 14 Negro of
the recommendation contained in Part 1 of Section III as
set forth on page 4 of the document transmitted to the
Court by the United States Office of Education, H.E.W.,
under date of August 11, 1969.
It is f u r t h e r o rdered that the Board of Education of
Burke County proceed promptly to consult and collaborate
with the Office of Education of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare toward the development of a work
able and acceptable plan of desegregation and operation of
the schools in said County for the 1970-71 school year
consonant with the practicable and administrative prob
lems involved, and satisfying the constitutional require
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment as judicially inter
preted, and to submit such plan to the Court for consider
ation and approvul as soon as the same shall have boon
developed and agreed upon. Should no such plan be agreed
upon and submitted by the Burke County Board of Educa
tion as herein provided within a reasonable time hereafter,
the Court shall thereupon require the Office of Education of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to pre
pare and submit to the Court its plan and recommendation
following which the Court shall take appropriate action for
the adoption and approval of a plan to be effective for the
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Order
1970-71 school year which shall be acceptable to the Court
as meeting constitutional standards.
The Court retains jurisdiction for the passage of such
further orders as may be appropriate with respect to any
relief to which any party may hereafter be entitled in the
premises.
This day of August, 1969.
/ s / A lexander A . L awrence
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Southern District of Georgia
88a
APPENDIX 8
Order
(Filed August 12, 1969)
I n the U nited States D isteict Court
F or the M iddle D istrict of Georgia
M acon D ivision
Civil A ction N o. 1926
Shirley B ivins, et al.,
v.
Plaintiffs,
B ibb County B oard of E ducation and
Orphanage for B ibb County, et al.,
Defendants.
B ootle, District Judge:
The schools in the Bibb County system began their de
segregation program on a graduated basis, certain grades
by certain years, under order of this court dated April 24,
1964. Later by order dated June 29, 1967 a Jefferson-type
decree was entered requiring compulsory freedom of choice
by all students and desegregation of all grades commencing
with 1967-68.
On June 28, 1968, plaintiffs, encouraged by and citing,
Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430,
20 L. ed. 716 decided May 27, 1968, filed their Motion for
further relief. An evidentiary hearing was held on August
19, 1968. Then on September 16, 1968 this court issued an
interim order reciting that
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Order
(1) of the total of 58 schools 34 had been desegregated
as to students, and 55 as to faculty;
(2) 20% of the Negro students were attending formerly
all-white schools;
(3) freedom of choice was complete and unfettered;
(4) no student choosing to attend a school where his
race was in the minority was being denied his right
to do so;
(5) 62% of all students were then attending bi-racial
schools;
(6) that four formerly all-white schools had virtually
reached the overall countywide ratio of 60% to 40%
Negro;
(7) that one formerly all-white school had obtained
the ratio of 53% Negro and 47% white;
(8) that ten other formerly all-white schools then
ranged in Negro student attendance from 9% to 26%;
(9) that out of a total faculty of 1614, 139 were then
teaching in schools of predominantly the opposite race,
and ordering the defendants to reassess the situation and
submit by November 28,1968 a plan showing what they pro
posed to do in light of then current court decisions.
Accordingly, on November 29, 1968 defendants replied
that unquestionably in their judgment the freedom of choice
plan is the only one by which a “unitary, non-racial system”
for Bibb County can be obtained on a permanent basis, that
in order to attain such a system so far as students are con
cerned, such a system as to faculty must first be attained,
that great progress was being made in all respects and
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Order
particularly with reference to obtaining faculty cross-overs,
that these faculty cross-overs were being obtained even on
a voluntary basis, that the cross-overs of 139 mentioned in
the interim order had already (by November 29, 1968) in
creased to 181 (with 307 seen possible by June 1, 1969).
The plan accompanying this response proposed and strongly
advocated the continuance of the freedom of choice plan
and recited:
“ The freedom of choice for students has progressed
very satisfactorily, except for the failure of white stu
dents to choose all-Negro schools for attendance.
“The prospects are bright for continued integration
of Negro students into formerly all-white schools; and,
if some satisfactory method can be attained to expe
dite integration of the faculties in the Negro schools,
integration of students in these schools will improve.”
Forwarded to the court with this response and proposed
plan were certain brochures, some of them containing pho
tographs, which defendants’ staff had been keeping concern
ing integrated activities at these schools including
“ 1) Workshop and seminar for desegregation;
“2) Sports;
“3) Steering Committee for Curriculum Development;
“4) ‘Inkwell,’ weekly newspaper of A. L. Miller Senior
High School, Friday, October 4, 1968;
“ 5) ‘The Lasseter Lantern,’ weekly newspaper of Las-
seter High School, Friday, October 25, 1968;
“ 6) Loose-leaf notebook with pictures of various inte
grated classrooms from various schools, showing stu
dents at work;
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Order
“ 7) Loose-leaf notebook showing ‘some of the integrated
activities of Bibb County Schools, as reflected in news
releases, etc.’ ;
“8) Loose-leaf notebook with pictures showing further
integration in various schools, etc. of the system;
“9) Loose-leaf notebook disclosing additional pictures
of classrooms and activities in the schools.”
Plaintiff filed no objections to the proposed plan of
November 29, 1968 except such as are contained in their
“Motion for Further Relief” filed June 4, 1969. This latest
motion for further relief makes no contention that freedom
of choice is not really free, admits that over 20% of the
Negro students in the County are attending formerly all-
white schools, complains that actually too many Negro stu
dents have chosen to attend four of the formerly all-white
schools and lists the following figures:
“ 1968 Choice P eeiod
School R ace T otal
(1) Alexander II White 341
Negro 266
(2) J. W. Burke White 489
Negro 254
(3) Clisby White 384
Negro 197
(4) Winship White 254
Negro 284
92a
“ 1969 Choice P eriod
S chool
(1) Alexander II
(2) J. W. Burke
(3) Clisby
(4) Winship
Order
R ace T otal
White 268
Negro 357
White 315
Negro 333
White 295
Negro 263
Whdte 196
Negro 342.”
So it is that the gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint, if not
their sole complaint (other than not enough faculty inte
gration) is the fact that thus far no white students have
chosen to attend any of the 20 formerly all-Negro schools.
They thus argue that freedom of choice is not working, or
is not working fast enough, to suit them and they pray for
attendance zoning plus consolidation of grades or schools
or both.
Defendants’ response to this June 4, 1969 Motion for
Further Relief tiled June 17, 1969, alleged, inter alia, that:
1. Twenty-seven per cent of the Negro students are now
attending previously all-white schools and that by Septem
ber 1, 1969 this will be increased to at least 30%;
2. The 139 faculty cross-overs above mentioned had
increased to 184 (118 Negroes and 66 whites) with an esti
mate of at least 239 by September 1, 1969; 3
3. Plans have been completed for the operation begin
ning 1969-70 of a driver education center at a formerly
all-Negro High School for 600 students completely inte-
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Order
grated, and that plans were underway for a complete
duplication of this program at another of the formerly all-
Negro High Schools also beginning 1969-70.
4. There was a steady improvement in the quality of
education in the formerly all-Negro schools;
5. That included in the general presentments of the Bibb
County Grand Jury for the October and December Terms,
1968 was the following:
“ The Bibb County Board of Education is to be com
mended for the programs and over-all performance of
all phases of the system along with the good race
relations that exist in the schools.
“We find that the present plan of freedom of choice
for students is working well and it is hoped that the
courts will see fit to let this plan prevail. Progress has
also been made in the integration of teachers and will
continue under the present program.”
An amended response filed July 7, 1969 alleged, inter
alia, (1) that the faculty cross-over figure had already
reached 231 and revised the estimate for September 1, 1969
from 239 to 278; (2) that a Summer School program was
then being conducted involving an enrollment of 5,373
students, 673 whites and 4,700 Negroes; that of these, 82
white and 623 Negro students were in the Head Start
Program conducted at seven centers, one at a formerly all-
Negro school and six at formerly all-white schools; that all
seven would have been at formerly all-Negro schools except
that the United States required that these six be at for
merly all-white schools; that of this Summer enrollment
500 white and 1,500 Negro students were involved in a
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Order
library program conducted at nine centers, 8 formerly all-
Negro and 1 formerly all-white, with some white students
participating at each of the eight formerly all-Negro
centers; of the remaining students participating in this
program 21 whites attended Hamilton, formerly all-Negro,
8 whites attended Maude Pye, formerly all-Negro, 1 white
attended Hartley formerly all-Negro, and 8 whites attended
Ballard Hudson Jr., formerly all-Negro, and at Winship
School there were 41 white and 59 Negro students.
An evidentiary hearing was held on July 7 and July 8,
1969. At this hearing there was admitted into evidence
over the objections of plaintiffs all of the brochures and
photographs above mentioned. The evidence adduced amply
proved and established all of the factual allegations con
tained in the above mentioned pleadings of the defendants
and I find the facts to be as so alleged and as above recited.
At the conclusion of that hearing this court requested
the defendants to study the Green case carefully and to
submit proposed amendments to their present freedom of
choice plan setting forth what additional steps they can
take and are willing to take (meaning without impairing
the educational efficiency of the schools, of course) in order
to disestablish the racial identifiability of these 20 formerly
all-Negro schools.
Accordingly, on July 18, 1969, defendants filed their
“Proposed Amendments to Present Freedom of Choice
Plan” consisting of eight typewritten pages. The plaintiffs
have filed their written objections to these proposed amend
ments and all these matters have been carefully considered.
The proposed amendments speak for themselves. A very
brief discussion will suffice.
Paragraph 1 will effectually prevent resegregation of
any school by permitting defendants to limit the right of a
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Order
child to transfer to any school where his or her race in
that school exceeds the percentage that the child’s race
occupies county-wide.
Paragraph 2 sets forth fifteen additional steps defendants
propose to take to eliminate completely and permanently
any racial identification that may still persist with respect
to any of the schools in the system, as follows:
(a) driver education courses in 2 formerly all-Negro
High Schools and a formerly all-Negro Junior High
School;
(b) a Pre-Vocational Laboratory-Oriented Program in
formerly all-Negro Elementary schools;
(c) special reading clinics in formerly all-Negro ele
mentary schools;
(d) continuance of “ Summer School Learning Adven
tures 1969” almost exclusively in all-Negro schools;
(e) Confining the regular Summer School program of
1970, and thereafter if feasible, to formerly all-Negro
schools;
(f) prompt study of feasibility and desirability of
closing certain of the formerly all-Negro schools;
(g) issuing certificates and diplomas by the System
without identifying the name of any particular school;
(h) rotating seminars for gifted students throughout
the system with emphasis on holding same at formerly
all-Negro schools;
(i) encouraging joint school activities involving stu
dents from both formerly all-Negro and all-white
schools, such meetings to be scheduled wherever fea
sible at formerly all-Negro schools;
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Order
(j) studying the feasibility of constructing an Instruc
tional Materials Center for joint use by teachers and
students of both races;
(k) doing away with the unintentional and (until
recently) unnoticed survival of the ancient practice
of listing white and Negro schools separately in the
System’s Yearbook;
(l) holding in-service meetings of teachers primarily
at formerly all-Negro schools;
(m) complete integration of transportation facilities
including assignment of some Negro bus drivers to
busses primarily having white students;
(n) soliciting public cooperation in supporting the plan
as amended;
(o) periodic review of these measures and careful
attention and study of other action that might be under
taken in the future.
Paragraph 3 proposes in view of recent appellate deci
sions binding upon this court, including United States v.
Baldwin County Board of Education, 5 Cir. 1969, ------ F.
2d ------ , [No. 27281, July 9, 1969], immediate faculty in
tegration to the extent that the race of at least 1 of every
5 faculty members in a school must be different from the
race of the majority of the faculty members of that school.
This court hereby approves the proposed amendments
and hereby makes said proposed amendments a part of
said plan.
This court finds that the defendants are acting in good
faith in the premises and that the plan as hereby amended
has '“ real prospects for dismantling the (former) state-
imposed dual system ‘at the earliest practicbale date’ ” .
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Order
Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430,
20 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968), and that it will do so “ in any way
that will improve rather than disrupt the education of the
children concerned.” H.E.W.’s Statement of Policy, July
4, 1969.
This court further finds as facts and concludes as matters
of law: (a) that this plan as hereby amended will be
effective “to effectuate a transition to a racially nondis-
criminatory school system.” Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301;
Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430,
28 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968). This assumes, of course, as this
court has a right to assume and expect, full and complete
compliance with said plan as amended; (b) said plan is
adequate “to convert [the former dual system] to a unitary
system in Avhich racial discrimination a [would] will be
eliminated root and branch” ; Green, supra; (c) the plan as
amended “promises realistically to work now” , Adams, et
al. v. Matthews, et al, 5 Cir. 1969,------ F. 2d ------- [No. 26501,
August 26,1968], (d) inasmuch as the defendants are acting
in good faith and the plan has real prospects for disman
tling the former state-imposed dual system at the earliest
practicable date “ it provide(s) effective relief.” Green v.
School Board of Neiv Kent County, supra.
For this court’s appraisal and appreciation of freedom
of choice as being entirely lawful and the best and fairest
method yet suggested for accomplishing desegregation, see
memorandum opinion in the case of Hilson, et al v. Ousts,
et al, in Civil Action No. 2449, Macon Division, August 8
1969.
This memorandum is intended to suffice as findings of a
fact and conclusions of law.
So Ordered, this 12th day of August, 1969.
/ s / W . A. B ootle
United States District Judge
98a
APPENDIX 9
Order
(Filed August 12, 1969)
I n the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
F oe the M iddle D istrict of Georgia
M acon D ivision
Civil A ction N o. 2077
Oscar C. T homie, J r ., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
H ouston County B oard of E ducation,
Defendant.
B ootle, District Judge:
The schools of this system are operating under a freedom
of choice plan approved by this court originally on May 20,
1965. That plan was on a graduated basis, desegregating
certain classes by certain years. The plan was accelerated
by a further decree of April 24, 1967. Later and on Sep
tember 7, 1967 “ as of” June 22, 1967, a full Jefferson-type
decree was entered desegregating all grades commencing
1967-68 and requiring all students both white and Negro
to exercise free choice annually. Then on June 28, 1968,
inspired by and relying upon, Green v. School Board of
New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 20 L. Ed. 716, decided
May 27, 1968, plaintiffs filed their Motion for Further
Relief complaining that during the March, 1968 choice
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Order
period only 17.9% of the 3,210 Negro students had chosen
to attend previously all-white schools and that no white
students had chosen to attend previously all-Negro schools.
They seek some form of forcible assignment of students as
by zoning, or pairing “designed to effect racially balanced
schools.”
Defendants’ response to the Motion alleged that the
March, 1968, choice percentage was approximately 19%
rather than 17.9%, as alleged; that freedom of choice had
not failed, and that in any event defendants would be un
able to perform and comply with a decree such as plain
tiffs sought.
On August 19, 1968 an evidentiary hearing was held.
On September 30, 1968, an interim order was issued
correctly reciting that considerable progress had been made
under the Jefferson decree; that of the total of 23 schools,
16, had been desegregated as to students and 20 as to
faculty; that 18.8% of the Negro students were attending
formerly all-white schools, counting 53 Negro students re
questing and approved for enrollment in previously all-
white schools but who as of September 6, 1968 had not
enrolled in any school in the system and whom the school
authorities were attempting to locate (if these 53 are not
counted the correct percentage would be 17.2); freedom of
choice is really free and unfettered; 77.7% of all students
were attending bi-racial schools; total enrollment was
15,512, 12,217 (78%) white and 3,295 (22%) Negro; in
one formerly all-white school Watson Elementary 23.3%
enrollment was Negro, and that as to faculty 25 persons
out of a total of 668 had crossed-over, exclusive of 8 white
persons working systemwide in all schools. Said order
invited the defendants to reassess the situation and submit
an amended plan.
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Order
The defendants’ response, filed November 27, 1968, sub
mitted that freedom of choice was working satisfactorily
and that the suggested alternative methods were not rea
sonably available, and were not feasible. It submitted fur
ther that the condition of having only Negro students in a
few schools would “ resolve itself as students transfer, Ne
gro faculty transfer out and white faculty transfer in.”
A second interim order dated June 18, 1969 requested
up-to-date information and defendants responded on June
25, 1969, inter alia, that whereas there were 33 faculty
cross-overs in 1968-69 they planned 43 for 1969-70, 33 Ne
gro and 10 white.
On June 25, 1969 plaintiffs filed their second Motion for
Further Relief seeking zoning and consolidation of grades
or schools or both. A second evidentiary hearing was held
on July 8, 1969, at the conclusion of which the court
ordered the defendants to file proposed amendments to
their freedom of choice plan setting forth all steps they
thought they could safely take toward disestablishing the
racial identifiability of all the schools in this system in
cluding a fair and somewhat liberal transfer of faculty
members, meaning of course without impairing the educa
tional efficiency of the schools. The plaintiffs were also
invited to file a proposed plan. And the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare was invited to confer with
defendants and file a proposed plan except that if all three
could agree, only one plan would be necessary, or if any
two and only two could agree on a plan, then only two
plans would be necessary. H.E.W. filed a proposed plan
and so did the defendants. The plaintiffs did not. The
defendants have filed many detailed specific objections to
the H.E.W. plan which was based on zoning, pairing and
consolidation, alleging that it is unworkable and would dis
rupt the system bringing chaos and confusion.
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Order
The ease is now ready for a final order insofar as an
order in a school case is ever final.
This memorandum is intended to suffice as findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
I find the facts to be as recited in the pleadings of the
defendants and as stated and summarized above. I find
additonally that the faculty ratio is approximately 20%
Negro and 80% white, with substantial vacancies now
existing, approximately the same as the student enrollment
recited above as 22% Negro and 78% white. Defendants
have many and difficult problems in faculty recruitment.
An unusually large percentage of faculty comes from out
side the County. In a good faith effort to achieve faculty
desegregation in the fall of 1968, 9 additional Negro teach
ers were assigned to teach in white schools but resigned.
This brings us now to a brief discussion of the defen
dants’ proposed amendments. They cover six typewritten
pages and speak for themselves.
Paragraph 1 deals with the faculty and this court is
convinced that the defendants have conscientiously, with
respect to faculty integration as well as with respect to all
other matters dealt with in said proposed amendments,
fairly gauged their own. ability with respect to going as
far as they safely can in an effort to disestablish the racial
identifiability of all schools in the system without impair
ing the educational efficiency of the system. In substance,
they propose to achieve a ratio of five Negro teachers to
one white teacher in all of the formerly all-Negro schools
in the system, transferring to the formerly all-white schools
all Negro teachers displaced by the white teachers. All
staff meetings and all faculty meetings will be integrated
as will all teacher in-service meetings.
Paragraph 2 deals with students and points out that
at the end of the free choice period recently held 21.1% of
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Order
the Negro students have chosen to attend formerly all-
white schools. This figure will jump to 28% this fall when
grades 9— 12 in the Pearl Stephens High School, formerly
all-Negro, is phased out causing some 204 Negro students
to be moved into two formerly all-white schools. Addition
ally, Elberta School, presently attended only by Negro stu
dents, will be discontinued thereby giving its 176 Negro
students the further opportunity to choose formerly all-
white schools if they so desire. Additionally, consideration
is being given to the feasibility of phasing out the seventh
and eighth grades in Pearl Stephens School, formerly all
Negro, thus necessitating the choice of some other school
by those students. School bus transportation is to be
completely nonsegregated. Resegregation is to be avoided
by the Board’s being authorized to restrict pupil transfers
and the exercise of freedom of choice to a reasonable ap
proximation of the race ratio existing in the school popu
lation.
Paragraph 3 lists eight additional steps to be taken by
the defendants, namely: (a) the initiation of a minimum
of 15 interchanges of classes per school term for seventh
and eighth grade students in industrial arts, home econom
ics, and academic activities between Rumble and Tabor
Junior High Schools, formerly all-white, and Pearl Ste
phens School, formerly all-Negro; (b) the initiation of a
minimum of 15 such exchanges per school term in classes
in vocational and academic activities in the Perry area in
predominantly Negro and predominantly white schools; (c)
the initiation of an exchange of students at the elementary
level from formerly all-white schools to formerly all-Negro
schools, and vice versa, it being contemplated that all
classes in the formerly all-Negro schools will have this
experience during the school year and that necessarily a
103a
Order
comparable number of classes from the formerly all-wbite
schools will make the exchange over into the formerly all-
Negro schools; (d) the initiation, if defendants’ application
for funds therefor is granted, of a comprehensive driver
training program to be held daily on a fully integrated
basis; (e) joint meetings once each quarter on a rotation
basis between the schools of student councils, newspaper
staffs, annual staffs, and class officers in the seventh through
twelfth grades; (f) converting Elberta School, formerly
all-Negro, into an Adult Basic Educational Learning Cen
ter fully integrated; (g) the holding of the Summer School
program exclusively at formerly all-Negro schools at the
elementary level; and (h) a feasibility study looking to
ward closing certain other formerly all-Negro schools and
finding further activities to eradicate racially identifiable
schools.
Defendants represent to the court that these proposed
amendments are wise and prudent at this time and that
their implementation will not cause a deterioration in the
quality of education provided to the students in the system.
They represent to the court further that in their opinion
nothing further can be accomplished at this time without
placing in jeopardy the quality of education provided for
the children of the County.
This court hereby approves the proposed amendments
and hereby makes said proposed amendments a part of
said plan.
This court finds that the defendants are acting in good
faith in the premises and that the plan as hereby amended
has “ real prospects for dismantling the (former) state im
posed dual system ‘at the earliest practicable date.’ ”
Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430,
20 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968), and that it will do so “ in a way
104a
Order
that will improve rather disrupt the education of the chil
dren concerned.” H.E.W.’s Statement of Policy, July 4,
1969.
This court further finds as facts and concludes as matters
of law: (a) that this plan as hereby amended will be effec
tive “ to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscrimina-
tory school system.” Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301; Green v.
School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 20 L. Ed.
2d 716 (1968). This assumes, of course, as this court has
a right to assume and expect, full and complete compli
ance with said plan as amended; (b) said plan is adequate
“ to convert [the former dual system] to a unitary system
in which racial discrimination [would] will be eliminated
root and branch” ; Green, supra; (c) the plan as amended
“ promises realistically to work now,” Adams v. Mathews,
403 F. 2d 181 (5th Cir. 1968), (d) inasmuch as the defen
dants are acting in good faith and the plan has real
prospects for dismantling the former state-imposed dual
system at the earliest practicable date “ it provide(s) effec
tive relief.” Green v. School Board of New Kent County,
supra.
For this court’s appraisal and appreciation of freedom
of choice as being entirely lawful and the best and fairest
method yet suggested for accomplishing desegregation, see
memorandum opinion in the case of Hilson, et al. v. Ousts,
et al., Civil Action No. 2449, Macon Division, August 8,
1969.
So Ordered, this 12 day of August, 1969.
W . A. B ootle
United States District Judge
105a
APPENDIX 10
Order
(Filed March 4, 1969)
I n the U nited States D istrict Court
F or the Northern District of F lorida
M arianna D ivision
M arianna Civil A ction No. 572
Jean Carolyn Y oungblood, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
U nited States of A merica,
vs.
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
T he B oard of P ublic I nstruction of
B ay County, F lorida, et al.,
Defendants.
The Court has concluded that there was no need what
soever for an evidentiary hearing for consideration of
defendants’ proposed plan for school year 1969-70. Every
conceivable scrap of factual data about the operation of the
schools under the defendants’ jurisdiction has been placed
upon the record, including a detailed so-called “ dot map”
showing the residences of school children and the location
of the schools. In addition, the record is replete with statis
tics which show precisely the racial composition of each
school with respect to pupils, teachers and administrative
personnel. There are simply no more relevant facts to be
obtained. Every request for information and data by either
106a
Order
party has been buttressed by an order of the Court and has
been complied with.
At hearing on this motion, counsel suggested that evi
dence might be presented by experts to advise the Court
what, in their opinion, would be the best solution to the
various problems. By denying this motion for evidentiary
hearing, counsel is not precluded from filing with the Court
any suggestions supported by scholars or experts in any
field and the same will be fully considered. This may be
made part of counsel’s brief if it is so desired.
In the final analysis, however, the posture of this litiga
tion for this year simply calls for a judicial decision which
must be made by the Court upon the facts now thoroughly
and fully developed.
Moreover, there is a time factor involved here. This
school system is operating under a Jefferson-type decree
which went into effect September 1967. Further protracted
delays could only lead to the waste of public funds for
educational purposes in the necessary planning for the open
ing of the schools in September 1969, together with attend
ant utter confusion for thousands of school children, fac
ulty, and those charged with the administration of the
public schools. Realizing this, this Court in January 1969
directed that all basic data needed by either party be made
part of the record as soon as practicable. A schedule was
established looking first to a hearing on April 10. Upon
reconsideration, the Court determined that this schedule
was too slow and was accelerated to the point that all the
factual data was required to be filed much earlier. Under
the direction of the Court the defendants filed their plan
under the accelerated schedule. Counsel for plaintiffs have
made oral motion for an opportunity to file further brief
or comment with respect to the proposed plan heard and
107a
Order
considered on March 3, 1969 and this is granted under a
schedule whereby all briefs, by both plaintiffs and defen
dants, will be filed by March 14, 1969.
Done and Ordered in Chambers at Tallahassee this 4th
day of March 1969.
G. H arrold Carswell
Chief Judge
108a
Order
(Filed April 3, 1969)
All facts were fully developed upon this record showing
the composition of the various schools under the jurisdic
tion of this defendant Board of Public Instruction by race
with respect to both students and teachers. The plaintiffs
and plaintiff-intervenor both moved for the defendant to
file a “dot map” showing the location of children by race
within the system and the location of the various school
buildings to which they were to be assigned. Numerous
hearings have been held with counsel present and all of the
various proposals have been considered, including plan sub
mitted by the defendant Board and filed herein on Feb
ruary 20, 1969, together with objections to such plan by
plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor.
The record shows that the Jefferson type decree under
which this school system has operated since April 19, 1967
has resulted in substantial desegregation throughout the
county. It is clear, however, that 4 of the 26 schools under
the jurisdiction of this Board, 3 of them being elementary,
are attended by Negroes only, i.e., Shaw, Patterson, Harris,
and Rosenwald Junior High School. (There are some white
kindergarten students presently enrolled at Patterson Ele
mentary School.)
The Board has proposed basically that steps be taken
to bring about the racial integration of these particular
schools. The Court concludes that the only alternative
which has been suggested that is likely to eliminate segre
gation in these particular areas would require either
jerrymandered districts or extensive bussing, neither of
which are practicable or commensurate with the conduct of
educational purposes for small children. Moreover, the
Court concludes that there would actually be substantially
109a
Order
less integration in the system as a whole if the rigid
requirements proposed by plaintiff-intervenor and plain
tiffs were put into effect with no relevant benefit to pupils
or teachers alike.
It is, therefore, upon consideration, hereby
Ordered:
1. Insofar as it is not inconsistent with the specific
requirements of this order the decree of this Court dated
April 10, 1967 and filed April 19, 1967, remains in full
force and effect.
2. The defendant Board of Public Instruction of Bay
County, Florida, and the defendant Superintendent of Pub
lic Instruction of Bay County, Florida, he and they are
hereby directed as follows:
(1) That special attention shall be given to the four
schools found to be all or predominantly Negro, namely
Patterson Elementary School, Shawr Elementary School,
Harris Elementary School, and Rosenwald Junior High
School, in an effort to attract white students under freedom
of choice to choose one of said schools, including but not
limiting its action as follows:
(a) Upon application the Board shall allow any Negro
student in these four schools to transfer to any other school
in the county during the school year 1969-70 or subsequent
years conditioned only on space being available in the school
requested or unless strong and compelling reasons appear
to deny said request.
(b) Upon application the Board shall allow at any time
during the 1969-70 school year or subsequent school years
the transfer into any of these four schools by any white
110a
Order
student conditioned only on space being available or unless
strong and compelling reasons appear to deny said request.
(c) The Board shall establish such programs in these
four schools to make them more attractive for students of
all races. These programs shall include but not be limited
to remedial reading programs, the use of para-professional
assistants to teachers in each of the four schools, up-grading
of the library facilities, including films and laboratory
equipment.
(d) The Board is directed to make substantial increase
in the desegregation of the faculty in each of the above
four schools. The Board shall attempt to procure said
desegregation voluntarily but should that fail involuntary
assignments shall be made. The Board shall have a mini
mum of one-third and no more than one-half of the faculty
in each of the said four schools of a different race than
predominates in the school body in each of the said four
schools.
(e) The Board shall schedule athletic events between all
athletic teams represented by the above-named predomi
nantly Negro schools and all predominantly white schools
throughout the county 1969 and subsequent years.
3. For long range planning the Board is directed that
new school sites shall be selected in geographic locations
where the likelihood of racial integration would be the
normal result in the neighborhood surrounding the site. 4
4. No substantial additions may be made to the physical
plants of Shaw Elementary School, Harris Elementary
School, Patterson Elementary School, and Rosenwald Ju
nior High School while the same are all Negro or nearly
all Negro in the composition of their respective student
111a
Order
bodies. The Board shall, however, keep these physical
plants in repair and minor renovations are not prohibited
to existing facilities where needed for a proper educational
program in said schools.
5. The Board is directed to work toward the establish
ment of school zones in the county so as to accomplish a
student body composition of approximately 20% Negroes
in all of the schools of Bay County, with the exception of
rural outlying communities where there are either no Ne
groes or very few Negroes, or no whites or very few whites,
in residence there.
6. The choice period as set forth by the decree of this
Court filed April 19, 1967 is hereby amended to provide
that freedom of choice period shall begin on April 14, 1969
and end on May 16, 1969.
7. The defendant Board is hereby authorized to reassign
any and all students who have previously chosen to attend
a school where their race is in a minority to the same school,
or where appropriate by grade advancement or for other
compelling reasons, to another school where their race is
in a minority. The only exception to this shall be for good
and compelling reasons.
8. This order is effective as of this date for the opera
tion of the school year 1969-70. 9
9. The Court retains jurisdiction of this cause for the
entry of such further orders as may be advisable.
D one and Ordered in Chambers at Tallahassee this 3rd
day of April 1969.
G. H arrold Carswell
Chief Judge
112a
APPENDIX 11
Order
(Filed March 4, 1969)
I n the U nited States D istrict Court
F or the N orthern D istrict of F lorida
Gainesville D ivision
Gainesville Civil A ction N o. 367
L avon W right, a minor, by R everend T. A. W right,
her father and next friend, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
B oard of P ublic I nstruction of A lachua County,
F lorida, as public body corporate, et al.,
Defendants.
The Court has concluded that there was no need what
soever for an evidentiary hearing for consideration of de
fendants’ proposed plan for school year 1969-70. Every
conceivable scrap of factual data about the operation of
the schools under the defendants’ jurisdiction has been
placed upon the record, including a detailed so-called “ dot
map” showing the residences of school children and the
location of the schools. In addition, the record is replete
with statistics which show precisely the racial composition
of each school with respect to pupils, teachers and admin
istrative personnel. There are simply no more relevant
facts to be obtained. Every request for information and
113a
Order
data by either party has been buttressed by an order of
the Court and has been complied with.
At hearing on this motion, counsel suggested that evi
dence might be presented by experts to advise the Court
what, in their opinion, would be the best solution to the
various problems. By denying this motion for evidentiary
hearing, counsel is not precluded from filing with the Court
any suggestions supported by scholars or experts in any
field and the same will be fully considered. This may be
made part of counsel’s brief if it is so desired.
In the final analysis, however, the posture of this litiga
tion for this year simply calls for a judicial decision which
must be made by the Court upon the facts now thoroughly
and fully developed.
Moreover, there is a time factor involved here. This
school system is operating under a Jefferson-type decree
which went into effect September 1967. Further protracted
delays could only lead to the waste of public funds for
educational purposes in the necessary planning for the
opening of the schools in September 1969, together with
attendant utter confusion for thousands of school children,
faculty, and those charged with the administration of the
public schools. Realizing this, this Court in January 1969
directed that all basic data needed by either party be made
part of the record as soon as practicable. A schedule was
established looking first to a hearing on April 10. Upon
reconsideration, the Court determined that this schedule
was too slow and was accelerated to the point that all the
factual data was required to be filed much earlier. Under
the direction of the Court the defendants filed their plan
under the accelerated schedule. Counsel for plaintiffs have
made oral motion for an opportunity to file further brief
114a
Order
or comment with respect to the proposed plan heard and
considered this date and this is granted under a schedule
whereby all briefs, by both plaintiffs and defendants, will
be filed by March 18, 1969.
Done and Ordered in Chambers at Tallahassee this 4th
day of March 1969.
/ s / G. H arrold Carswell
Chief Judge
115a
Order
(Filed April 3, 1969)
After full development of all pertinent facts concerning
the operation of the public schools under the jurisdiction
of the defendant Board of Public Instruction of Alachua
County, Florida, and after several hearings with counsel
for all the parties being present and heard, the Court finds
that the factual data on this record fully supports the
Court’s conclusion that the plan for the operation of the
public school system of Alachua County under the juris
diction of this defendant as filed with this Court on Feb
ruary 28, 1969, should be approved.
The Court finds that the freedom of choice plan under
which this system has operated since September 1967 has
worked effectively in all but a very few instances. It is
apparent that the freedom of choice plan has not worked
effectively, or rather not at all, in three elementary schools,
i.e., Duval, Williams, and A. Quinn Jones. The Court con
clude that the establishment of arbitrary zone lines at this
point, however, would definitely result in substantially less
integration in the system then is now the case and even
more importantly, this Board, through its plan filed Feb
ruary 28, 1969, has effectively come forward with concrete
proposals which will eliminate the last vestiges of segrega
tion throughout the entire system. The Court notes with
particular emphasis that the county system is being divided
into four broad zones and that as soon as buildings are
completed, all now funded and some under construction,
the plan will be fully effective and operative, and no later
than 1971.
Due to the fortuitous geographical distribution of the
races in Alachua County, Florida, and the foresight of the
Board in good faith compliance with the Constitutional
mandate upon it segregation will be eliminated if this plan
is carried out. There simply will be no black or white
schools within the ambit of the Board’s jurisdiction, just
116a
Order
schools. While percentages of racial population of the
schools, either students or faculty, is not arbitrarily re
quired, it is clear that the school children and teachers
will bear a fair and reasonable relationship to the popula
tion as a whole of the entire county in each school building.
It is difficult to conceive of a plan which would more nearly
meet Constitutional requirements in this regard. There is
no basis whatsoever for suspecting that the Board will not
fully comply with the provisions of the plan here approved.
On the contrary the Court specifically finds that this Board
has operated in all good faith in an effort to meet fully
the requirements of the law. It is, therefore, upon considera
tion, hereby
Ordered:
1. The plan proposed for the operation of the schools
under the jurisdiction of the defendant, the Board of Public
Instruction of Alachua County, Florida, he and it is hereby
approved and adopted by this Court and by this reference
made a part of this order.
3. Insofar as it is not inconsistent with the specific re
quirements of this order the Decree of this Court dated
and filed April 25, 1967 remains in full force and effect.
4. The Court retains jurisdiction of this cause for the
entry of such further orders as may be necessary or
advisable.
D one and Ordered in Chambers at Tallahassee this 3rd
day of April 1969.
/ s / C. H arrold Carswell
Chief Judge
117a
APPENDIX 12
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
N o . 2 6 2 8 5
DEREK JEROME SINGLETON, ET AL,
versus
Appellants,
JACKSON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE
SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
N o . 2 8 2 6 1
CLARENCE ANTHONY, ET AL,
versus
Appellants,
MARSHALL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
118a
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
N o . 2 8 0 4 5
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
versus
CHARLES F. MATHEWS, ET AL,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
N o . 2 8 3 5 0
LINDA STOUT, by her father and next friend
BLEVIN STOUT, ET AL,
Plaintiff s-Appellants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
versus
JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees,
DORIS ELAINE BROWN, ET AL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
versus
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY
OF BESSEMER, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees.
119a
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
N o . 2 8 3 4 9
BIRDIE MAE DAVIS, ET AL,
Plaintiff*-Appellant*,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
versus
BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF
MOBILE COUNTY, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellee*,
TWILA FRAZIER, ET AL,
Defendants-Intervenor-Appellee*.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
N o . 2 8 3 4 0
ROBERT CARTER, ET AL,
Plaintiff s-Appellants,
versus
WEST FELICIANA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees,
SHARON LYNNE GEORGE, ET AL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
C. WALTER DAVIS, PRESIDENT, EAST FELICIANA
PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellee*.
120a
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
N o . 2 8 3 4 2
IRMA J. SMITH, ET AL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
CONCORDIA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
N o . 2 8 3 6 1
HEMON HARRIS, ET AL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Appellees,
versus
ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SCHOOL BOARD,
ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees-Cross Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
121a
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
N o . 2 8 4 0 9
NEELY BENNETT, ET AL,
versus
Appellants,
R. E. EVANS, ET AL,
Appellees,
ALLENE PATRICIA ANN BENNETT, a minor, by
R. B. BENNETT, her father and next friend,
Appellants,
versus
BURKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
N o . 2 8 4 0 7
SHIRLEY BIVINS, ET AL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
BIBB COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
ORPHANAGE FOR BIBB COUNTY, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
122a
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
N o . 2 8 4 0 8
OSCAR C. THOMIE, JR., ET AL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
HOUSTON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
N o . 2 7 8 6 3
JEAN CAROLYN YOUNGBLOOD, ET AL,
Plaintiff s-Appellants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
versus
THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION
OF BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
123a
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1 , 1969
N o . 2 . 7 9 8 3
LA VON WRIGHT, ET AL,
Plaintiff s-Appellants,
versus
THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF
ALACHUA COUNTY, FLORIDA, ET AL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
(D ecem ber 1,1969)
Before BROWN, Chief Judge, WISDOM, GEWIN, BELL,
THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINS
WORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN,
CARSWELL, and CLARK, Circuit Judges, EN BANC.*
PER CURIAM: These appeals, all involving school
desegregation orders, are consolidated for opinion pur
poses. They involve, in the main, com m on questions of
law and fact. They were heard en banc on successive
days.
‘ Judge Wisdom did not participate in Nos. 26285, 28261, 28045,
28350, 28349 and 28361. Judge Ainsworth did not participate in
No. 28342. Judge Carswell did not participate in Nos. 27863 and
27983. Judge Clark did not participate in No. 26285.
124a
Following our determination to consider these cases
en banc, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education,
1969,____ U.S______, 90 S.Ct_____ , 24 L.Ed.2d 19. That de
cision supervened all existing authority to the contrary.
It sent the doctrine of deliberate speed to its final rest
ing place. 24 L.Ed.2d at p. 21.
The rule of the case is to be found in the direction to
this court to issue its order “ effective immediately de
claring that each of the school districts . . . m ay no
longer operate a dual school system based on race or
color, and directing that they begin immediately to
operate as unitary school systems within which no per
son is to be effectively excluded from any school be
cause of race or color.” We effectuated this rule and
order in United States v. Hinds County School Board,
5 Cir., 1969,____ F.2d____ , [Nos. 28,030 and 28,042, slip
opinion dated Nov. 7, 1969]. It must likewise be effectu
ated in these and all other school cases now being or
which are to be considered in this or the district courts
o f this circuit.
The tenor of the decision in Alexander v. Holmes
County is to shift the burden from the standpoint of
tim e for converting to unitary school systems. The
shift is from a status of litigation to one of unitary oper
ation pending litigation. The new modus operandi is to
require immediate operation as unitary systems. Sug
gested modifications to unitary plans are not to delay
implementation. Hearings on requested changes in uni
tary operating plans m ay be in order but no delay in
conversion m ay ensue because of the need for m odifi
cation or hearing.
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
125a
In Alexander v. Holmes County, the court had unitary
plans available for each of the school districts. In ad
dition, this court, on remand, gave each district a limi
ted time within which to offer its own plan. It was ap
parent there, as it is here, that converting to a unitary
system involved basically the m erger of faculty and
staff, students, transportation, services, athletic and
other extra-curricular school activities. We required
that the conversion to unitary systems in those districts
take place not later than Decem ber 31, 1969. It was the
earliest feasible date in the view of the court. United
States v. Hinds County, supra. In three of the systems
there (Hinds County, Holmes County and Meridian),
because of particular logistical difficulties, the Office of
Education (HEW) had recom m ended two step plans.
The result was, and the court ordered, that the first
step be implemented not later than Decem ber 31, 1969
and the other beginning with the fall 1970 school term.
I
Because of Alexander v. Holmes County, each of the
cases here, as will be later discussed, must be con
sidered anew, either in whole or in part, by the district
courts. It happens that there are extant unitary plans
for some of the school districts here, either Office of
Education or school board originated. Some are operat
ing under freedom of choice plans. In no one of the dis
tricts has a plan been submitted in light of the prece
dent of Alexander v. Holmes County. That case resolves
all questions except as to mechanics. The school dis
tricts here m ay no longer operate dual systems and
must begin im m ediately to operate as unitary systems.
The focus of the m echanics question is on the accom -
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
126a
plishment of the im m ediacy requirement laid down in
Alexander v. Holmes County.
Despite the absence of plans, it will be possible to
m erge faculties and staff, transportation, services, ath
letics and other extra-curricular activities during the
present school term. It will be difficult to arrange the
m erger of student bodies into unitary systems prior to
the fall 1970 term in the absence of m erger plans. The
court has concluded that two-step plans are to be im
plemented. One step must be accom plished not later
than February 1,1970 and it will include all steps neces
sary to conversion to a unitary system save the m er
ger of student bodies into unitary systems. The student
body m erger will constitute the second step and must
be accom plished not later than the beginning of the
fall term 1970.’ The district courts, in the respective
cases here, are directed to so order and to give first
priority to effectuating this requirement.
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1 , 1969
To this end, the district courts are directed to re
quire the respective school districts, appellees herein,
to request the Office of Education (HEW ) to prepare
•Many faculty and staff members will be transferred under step one.
It will be necessary for final grades to be entered and for other
records to be completed, prior to the transfers, by the trans
ferring faculty members and administrators tor the partial
school year involved. The interim period prior to February 1,
1970 is allowed for this purpose.
The interim period prior to the start of the fall 1970 school
term is allowed for arranging the student transfers. Many stu
dents must transfer. Buildings will be put to new use. In some
instances it may be necessary to transfer equipment, supplies
ot libraries. School bus routes must be reconstituted. The period
allowed is at least adequate for the orderly accomplishment
of the task.
127a
plans for the m erger of the student bodies into unitary
systems. These plans shall be filed with the district
courts not later than January 6, 1970 together with such
additional plan or modification of the Office of Educa
tion plan as the school district m ay wish to offer. The
district court shall enter its final order not later than
February 1, 1970 requiring and setting out the details
of a plan designed to accom plish a unitary system of
pupil attendance with the start of the fall 1970 school
term. Such order may include a plan designed by the
district court in the absence of the submission of an
otherwise satisfactory plan. A copy of such plan as is
approved shall be filed by the clerk of the district court
with the clerk of this court.2
The following provisions are being required as step
one in the conversion process. The district courts are
directed to make them a part of the orders to be entered
and to also give first priority to implementation.
The respective school districts, appellees
herein, must take the following action not later
than February 1,1970:
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1 , 1969
2In formulating plans, nothing herein is intended to prevent the
respective school districts or the district court from seeking the
counsel and assistance of state departments of education, uni
versity schools of education or of others having expertise in the
field of education.
It is also to be noted that many problems of a local nature
are likely to arise in converting to and maintaining unitary
systems. These problems may best be resolved on the community
level. The district courts should suggest the advisability of bi-
racial advisory committees to school boards in those districts
having no Negro school board members.
128a
DESEGREGATION OF FACULTY AND
OTHER STAFF
The School Board shall announce and imple
ment the following policies:
1. E ffective not later than February 1, 1970,
the principals, teachers, teacher-aides and
other staff who work directly with children at
a school shall be so assigned that in no case
will the racial composition of a staff indicate
that a school is intended for Negro students or
white students. For the remainder of the 1969-70
school year the district shall assign the staff
described above so that the ratio of Negro to
white teachers in each school, and the ratio of
other staff in each, are substantially the same
as each such ratio is to the teachers and other
staff, respectively, in the entire school system.
The school district shall, to the extent neces
sary to carry out this desegregation plan, direct
m em bers of its staff as a condition of continued
employment to accept new assignments.
2. Staff m em bers who work directly with chil
dren, and professional staff who work on the ad
ministrative level will be hired, assigned, pro
moted, paid, demoted, dismissed, and other
wise treated without regard to race, color, or
national origin. 3
3. If there is to be a reduction in the number
of principals, teachers, teacher-aides, or other
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1 , 1969
129a
professional staff employed by the school dis
trict which will result in a dismissal or demo
tion of any such staff m embers, the staff m em
ber to be dismissed or demoted must be se
lected on the basis of objective and reasonable
non-discriminatory standards from among all
the staff of the school district. In addition if
there is any such dismissal or demotion, no
staff vacancy m ay be filled through recruit
ment of a person of a race, color, or national
origin different from that of the individual dis
missed or demoted, until each displaced staff
m em ber who is qualified has had an oppor
tunity to fill the vacancy and has failed to ac
cept an offer to do so.
Prior to such a reduction, the school board
will develop or require the development of non-
racial objective criteria to be used in selecting
the staff m em ber who is to be dismissed or de
moted. These criteria shall be available for
public inspection and shall be retained by the
school district. The school district also shall
record and preserve the evaluation of staff
m em bers under the criteria. Such evaluation
shall be m ade available upon request to the
dismissed or demoted employee.
Demotion as used above includes any re
assignment (1) under which the staff m em ber
receives less pay or has less responsibility than
under the assignment he held previously, (2)
which requires a lesser degree of skill than did
the assignment he held previously, or (3) under
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1 , 1969
130a
which the staff m em ber is asked to teach a
subject or grade other than one for which he is
certified or for which he has had substantial
experience within a reasonably current period.
In general and depending upon the subject
matter involved, five years is such a reason
able period.
MAJORITY TO MINORITY
TRANSFER POLICY
The school district shall perm it a student at
tending a school in which his race is in the m a
jority to choose to attend another school, where
space is available, and where his race is in the
minority.
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
TRANSPORTATION
The transportation system, in those school
districts having transportation systems, shall
be com pletely re-examined regularly by the
superintendent, his staff, and the school board.
Bus routes and the assignment of students to
buses will be designed to insure the transporta
tion of all eligible pupils on a non-segregated
and otherwise non-discriminatory basis.
SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND
SITE SELECTION
All school construction, school consolidation,
and site selection (including the location of any
tem porary classroom s) in the system shall be
131a
done in a manner which will prevent the re
currence of the dual school structure once this
desegregation plan is implemented.
ATTENDANCE OUTSIDE SYSTEM
OF RESIDENCE
If the school district grants transfers to stu
dents living in the district for their attendance
at public schools outside the district, or if it
permits transfers into the district of students
who live outside the district, it shall do so on a
non-discriminatory basis, except that it shall
not consent to transfers where the cumulative
effect will reduce desegregation in either dis
trict or reinforce the dual school system.
See United States v. Hinds County, supra, decided N o
vem ber 6, 1969. The orders there em brace these same
requirements.
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
II
In addition to the foregoing requirements of general
applicability, the order of the court which is peculiar
to each of the specific cases being considered is as fol
lows:
NO. 26285 — JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI
This is a freedom of choice system. The issue pre
sented has to do with school building construction. We
enjoined the proposed construction pending appeal.
132a
A federal appellate court is bound to consider any
change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened
since the judgment was entered. Bell v. State of Mary
land, 378 U.S. 226, 84 S.Ct. 1814, 12 L.Ed.2d 822 (1964). We
therefore reverse and remand for com pliance with the
requirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the
other provisions and conditions of this order. Our order
enjoining the proposed construction pending appeal is
continued in effect until such time as the district court
has approved a plan for conversion to a unitary school
system.
NO. 28261 — MARSHALL COUNTY AND HOLLY
SPRINGS, MISSISSIPPI
This suit seeks to desegregate two school districts,
Marshall County and Holly Springs, Mississippi. The
district court approved plans which would assign stu
dents to schools on the basis of achievement test scores.
We pretermit a discussion of the validity per se of a
plan based on testing except to hold that testing cannot
be employed in any event until unitary school systems
have been established.
We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re
quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the
other provisions and conditions of this order.
NO. 28045 — UNITED STATES V. MATTHEWS
(LONGVIEW, TEXAS)
This system is operating under a plan approved by
the district court which appears to be realistic and
workable except that it is to be implemented over a
period of five years. This is inadequate.
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
133a
We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re
quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the
other provisions and conditions of this order.
NO. 28350 — JEFFERSON COUNTY AND
BESSEMER, ALABAMA
These consolidated cases involve the school boards
of Jefferson County and the City of Bessemer, Alabama.
Prior plans for desegregation of the two systems were
disapproved by this court on June 26,1969, United States
of America v. Jefferson County Board of Education,
et a l ,____F .2d _____ (5th Cir. 1969) [No. 27444, June 26,
1969], at which time we reversed and remanded the
case with specific directions. The record does not re
flect any substantial change in the two systems since
this earlier opinion, and it is therefore unnecessary to
restate the facts. The plans approved by the district
court and now under review in this court do not com ply
with the standards required in Alexander v. Holmes
County.
We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re
quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the
other provisions and conditions of this order.
NO. 28349 — MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA
On June 3, 1969, we held that the attendance zone and
freedom of choice method of student assignment used
by the Mobile School Commissioners was constitution
ally unacceptable. Pursuant to our mandate the dis
trict court requested the Office of Education (HEW)
to collaborate with the board in the preparation of a
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
134a
plan to fully desegregate all public schools in Mobile
County. Having failed to reach agreement with the
board, the Office of Education filed its plan which the
district court on August 1, 1969, adopted with slight
modification (but which did not reduce the amount of
desegregation which will result). The court’s order
directs the board for the 1969 - 1970 school year to close
two rural schools, establish attendance zones for the 25
other rural schools, make assignments based on those
zones, restructure the Hillsdale School, assign all stu
dents in the western portion of the metropolitan area
according to geographic attendance zones designed to
desegregate all the schools in that part of the system,
and reassign approximately 1,000 teachers and staff.
Thus the district court’s order of August 1, now before
us on appeal by the plaintiffs, will fully desegregate all
of Mobile County schools except the schools in the
eastern portion of metropolitan Mobile where it was
proposed by the plan to transport students to the
western part of the city. The district court was not sat
isfied with this latter provision and required the board
after further study and collaboration with HEW of
ficials, to submit by Decem ber 1, 1969, a plan for the
desegregation of the schools in the eastern part of the
metropolitan area.
The school board urges reversal of the district court’s
order dealing with the grade organization of the Hills
dale School and the faculty provisions.
We affirm the order of the district court with direc
tions to desegregate the eastern part of the metropoli
tan area of the Mobile County School System and to
otherwise create a unitary system in com pliance with
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
135a
the requirements of Holmes County and in accordance
with the other provisions and conditions of this order.
NO. 28340 — EAST AND WEST FELICIANA
PARISHES, LOUISIANA
East Feliciana is operating under a plan which closed
one rural Negro elementary school and zoned the four
remaining rural elementary schools. All elementary
students not encompassed in the rural zones, and all
high school students, continue to have free choice. Ma
jority to minority transfer is allowed on a space-avail
able basis prior to beginning of the school year.
The plan has not produced a unitary system. We re
verse and remand for com pliance with the require
ments of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other
provisions and conditions of this order.
West Feliciana is operating under a plan approved
for 1969-70 which zones the two rural elementary
schools. These schools enroll approximately 15 per cent
of the students of the district. The plan retains “ open
enrollment” (a euphemism for free choice) for the
other schools. The plan asserts that race should not be
a criterion for employment or assignment o f person
nel. However, the board promises to seek voluntary
transfers and if substantial com pliance cannot be ob
tained by this method it proposes to adopt other means
to accom plish substantial results.
This plan has not produced a unitary system. We re
verse and remand for com pliance with the require
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
136a
ments of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other
provisions and conditions of this order.
NO. 28342 — CONCORDIA PARISH, LOUISIANA
The plan in effect for desegregating this school dis
trict has not produced a unitary system. It involves
zoning, pairing, freedom of choice and som e separation
by sex. We pretermit the question posed as to sex
separation since it m ay not arise under such plan as
m ay be approved for a unitary system.
This plan has not produced a unitary system. We re
verse and remand for com pliance with the require
ments of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other
provisions and conditions of this order.
NO. 28361 — ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST
PARISH, LOUISIANA
This school district has been operating under a free
dom of choice plan. The parish is divided into two sec
tions by the Mississippi River and no bridge is located
in the parish. The schools are situated near the east
and west banks of the river.
A realistic start has been m ade in converting the
east bank schools to a unitary system. It, however, is
less than adequate. As to the west bank schools, the
present enrollment is 1626 Negro and 156 whites. The
whites, under freedom of choice, all attend the same
school, one of five schools on the west bank. The 156
whites are in a school with 406 Negroes. We affirm as to
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
137a
this p art o f the plan . W e do not b e lieve it n e c e ssa ry to
divide this sm a ll n u m b er of w hites, a lread y in a de
se greg a te d m in ority position, a m o n g st th e five schools.
We reverse and remand for com pliance with the
requirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the
other provisions and conditions o f this order.
NO. 28409 — BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA
The interim plan in operation here, developed by
the Office of Education (HEW ), has not produced a uni
tary system. The district court ordered preparation of
a final plan for use in 1970-71. This delay is no longer
permissible.
We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re
quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the oth
er provisions and conditions of this order.
NO. 28407 — BIBB COUNTY, GEORGIA
This is a freedom of choice system on which a special
course transfer provision has been superimposed.
Special courses offered in all-Negro schools are being
attended by whites in substantial numbers. This has
resulted in some attendance on a part time basis by
whites in every all-Negro school. Some three hundred
whites are on the waiting list for one of the special
courses, remedial reading. The racial cross-over by
faculty in the system is 27 per cent.
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
138a
The order appealed from continues the existing plain
with certain modifications. It continues and expands
the elective course program s in all-Negro schools in
an effort to encourage voluntary integration. The plan
calls for a limitation of freedom of choice with respect
to four schools about to becom e resegregated. Under
the present plan the school board is empowered to limit
Negro enrollment to 40 per cent at these schools to
avoid resegregation. Earlier a panel of this court af
firm ed the district court’s denial of an injunction a-
gainst the quota provision of this plan pending hearing
en banc. The prayer for injunction against continuation
of the quota provision is now denied and the provision
m ay be retained by the district court pending further
consideration as a part of carrying out the require
ments o f this order.
It is sufficient to say that the district court here has
em ployed bold and imaginative innovations in its plan
which have already resulted in substantial desegrega
tion which approaches a unitary system. We reverse
and remand for com pliance with the requirements o f
Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions
and conditions of this order.
NO. 28408 — HOUSTON COUNTY, GEORGIA
This system is operating under a freedom of choice
plan. Appellants seek zoning and pairing. There is also
an issue as to restricting transfers by Negroes to for
m erly all-white schools. Cf. No. 28407 — Bibb County,
supra. In addition, appellants object to the conversion
of an all-Negro school into an integrated adult educa
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
139a
tion center. As in the Bibb County case, these are all
questions for consideration on remand within the scope
of such unitary plan as m ay be approved.
W e reverse and remand for com pliance with the re
quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the
other provisions and conditions of this order.
NO. 27863 — BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA
This system is operating on a freedom of choice plan.
The plan has produced im pressive results but they fall
short of establishing a unitary school system.
We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re
quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the
other provisions and conditions of this order.
NO. 27983 — ALACHUA COUNTY, FLORIDA
This is another Florida school district where im
pressive progress has been made under a freedom of
choice plan. The plan has been implemented by zoning
in the elementary schools in Gainesville (the principal
city in the system ) for the current school year. The
results to date and the building plan in progress should
facilitate the conversion to a unitary system.
We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re
quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the
other provisions and conditions of this order.
Opinion in Court o f Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
140a
III
In the event of an appeal or appeals to this court
from an order entered as aforesaid in the district
courts, such appeal shall be on the original record and
the parties are encouraged to appeal on an agreed
statement as is provided for in Rule 10(d), Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure (F R A P ). Pursuant to
Rule 2, FRAP, the provisions of Rule 4(a) as to the time
for filing notice of appeal are suspended and it is
ordered that any notice of appeal be filed within fifteen
days of the date of entry of the order appealed from
and notices of cross-appeal within five days thereafter.
The provisions o f Rule 11 are suspended and it is order
ed that the record be transmitted to this court within
fifteen days after filing of the notice of appeal. The
provisions of Rule 31 are suspended to the extent that
the brief of the appellant shall be filed within fifteen
days after the date on which the record is filed and the
brief of the appellee shall be filed within ten days after
the date on which the brief of appellant is filed. No
reply brief shall be filed except upon order of the court.
The times set herein m ay be enlarged by the court up
on good cause shown.
The mandate in each of the within matters shall
issue forthwith. No stay will be granted pending peti
tion for rehearing or application for certiorari.
REVERSED as to all save Mobile and St. John The
Baptist Parish; AFFIR M E D as to Mobile with direc
tion; AFFIR M E D in part and REVERSED in part as to
S*t. John The Baptist Parish; REM ANDED to the dis
trict courts for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Adm. Office, U.S. Courts— Scofields’ Quality Printers, Inc., N. O., La.
Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969
141a
APPENDIX 13
Judgment of the Court of Appeals
I n t h e
U nited States Court of A ppeals
F or the F ifth Circuit
October T erm, 1969
No. 28407
D.C. Docket No. CA 1926
S hirley B ivins, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
B ibb County B oard of E ducation and Orphanage
F or B ibb County, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
Before Brown, Chief Judge, W isdom, Gew in , B ell, T horn-
berry, Coleman, Goldberg, A insworth, Godbold,
Dyer, Simpson, M organ, Carswell, and Clark,
Circuit Judges, E n B anc.*
* Judge Wisdom did not participate in Nos. 26285, 28261, 28045,
28350, 28349 and 28361. Judge Ainsworth did not participate in
Nos. 28342. Judge Carswell did not participate in Nos. 27863 and
27983. Judge Clark did not participate in No. 26285.
142a
This cause came on to be heard en banc on the transcript
of the record from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia, and was argued by counsel;
O n Consideration W hereof, It is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the judgment appealed from
in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed and that
this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said
District Court for compliance -with the requirements of
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 1969,
------U .S .------- , 90 S .Ct.------ , 24 L.Ed.2d 19, and the other
provisions and conditions of the order of this Court this
day entered.
It is further ordered that appellees, School Board, pay
the costs on appeal in this Court.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals
December 1, 1969
Issued as Mandate: December 1, 1969
N O T E : Judgments identical to the above were entered in the fol
lowing cases: Bennett v. Evans (and Bennett v. Burke
County Board of Education) (S.D. G a .); Thomie v. Hous
ton County Board of Education (M.D. G a .); Youngblood
v. The Board of Public Instruction of Bay County, Fla.
(N.D. F la ) ; Anthony v. Marshall County Board of Edu
cation (N.D. M iss.); Wright v. Board of Public Instruc
tion of Alachua County, Fla. (N.D. F la .); Stout v. Jeffer
son County Board of Education and Brown v. Board of
Education of the City of Bessemer (N.D. Ala.).
143a
I n the
U nited States Court of A ppeals
F or the F ifth Circuit
October T erm, 1969
No. 28349
D.C. Docket No. CA 3003-63
J u d g m e n t o f th e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls
B irdie M ae Davis, et al.,
Plaintiffs- Appellants,
U nited States of A merica,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
versus
B oard of S chool Commissioners of M obile County, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
T wila F razier, et al.,
Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
144a
Before B rown, Chief Judge, W isdom, Gew in , B ell, T horn-
berry, Coleman, Goldberg, A insworth, Godbold,
Dyer, Simpson, M organ, Carswell, and Clark,
Circuit Judges, E n B anc.*
This cause came on to be heard en banc on the transcript
of the record from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, and was argued by counsel;
O n Consideration W hereof, It is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the order of the District Court
appealed from in this cause be, and the same is hereby
affirmed with directions to desegregate the eastern part of
the metropolitan area of the Mobile County School System
and to otherwise create a unitary system in compliance with
the requirements of Holmes County and in accordance with
other provisions and conditions of the order of the Court
this day rendered.
It is further ordered that appellee, School Board, pay
the costs on appeal in this Court.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals
December 1, 1969
Issued as Mandate: December 1, 1969
* Judge Wisdom did not participate in Nos. 26285, 28261, 28045,
28350, 28349 and 28361. Judge Ainsworth did not participate in
Nos. 28342. Judge Carswell did not participate in Nos. 27863 and
27983. Judge Clark did not participate in No. 26285.
145a
I n the
U nited States Coubt of A ppeals
F ob the F ifth Cibcuit
Octobeb T eem, 1969
No. 26285
D.C. Docket No. CA 3379
J u d g m e n t o f th e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls
Deeek Jebome Singleton, et al.,
Appellants,
versus
Jackson M unicipal Sepaeate S chool D isteict, et al.,
Appellees.
APPEAL FEOM THE UNITED STATES DISTEICT COUBT
FOE THE SOUTHEBN DISTEICT OF MISSISSIPPI
Before B eown, Chief Judge, W isdom, Gew in , B ell, T hoen-
beeey, Coleman, Goldbeeg, A inswoeth , Godbold,
Dyee, Simpson, M oegan, Caeswell, and Claek,
Circuit Judges, E n B anc.*
This cause came on to be heard en banc on the transcript
of the record from the United States District Court for the
* Judge Wisdom did not participate in Nos. 26285, 28261, 28045,
28350, 28349 and 28361. Judge Ainsworth did not participate in
Nos. 28342. Judge Carswell did not participate in Nos. 27863 and
27983. Judge Clark did not participate in No. 26285.
146a
Southern District of Mississippi, and was argued by
counsel;
On Consideration W hereof, It is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the judgment appealed from in
this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed and that this
cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said
District Court for compliance with the requirements of
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 1969,
TT.S.------ , 90 S.Ct.------ , 24 L.Ed.2d 19, and the other
provisions and conditions of the order of this Court this
day entered.
It is further ordered that the order of this Court enjoin
ing the proposed construction pending appeal is continued
in effect until such time as the District Court has approved
a plan for conversion to a unitary school system.
It is further ordered that appellees, School Board, pay
the costs on appeal in this Court.
Judgment of the Court of Appeals
December 1, 1969
Issued as Mandate: December 1, 1969
MEILEN PRESS INC. — N. Y. C. 219