Singleton v Jackson Municipal School District Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Public Court Documents
December 1, 1969

150 pages
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Singleton v Jackson Municipal School District Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 1969. f0441a8b-c49a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/a614ed15-7f3a-4531-bdfb-797eea8335f8/singleton-v-jackson-municipal-school-district-appendix-to-petition-for-writ-of-certiorari. Accessed April 27, 2025.
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APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI — OPINIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW IN THE dJmtrt of tlir litnituun States October Term, 1969 No......... ....... DEREK JEROME SINGLETON, et al., V. JACKSON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al. Petitioners, CLARENCE ANTHONY, et al., V. MARSHALL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION. Petitioners, LINDA STOUT, by her Father and Next Friend, BLEVIN STOUT, et al., y. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. Petitioners, DORIS ELAINE BROWN, et al., V. Petitioners, THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF BESSEMER, et al. BIRDIE MAE DAYIS, et al., V. Petitioners, BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF MOBILE COUNTY, et al. NEELY BENNETT, et al., and ALLENE PATRICIA ANN BENNETT, a minor, by R. B. BENNETT, her Father and Next Friend, V. Petitioners, R. E. EVANS, et al. and BURKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. SHIRLEY BIVINS, et al., Petitioners, v. BIBB COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ORPHANAGE FOR BIBB COUNTY, et al. OSCAR C. THOMIE, Jb., et al., V. HOUSTON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION. Petitioners, JEAN CAROLYN YOUNGBLOOD, et al., Petitioners, v. THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF BAY COUNTY, FLA. LAVON WRIGHT, et al., V. Petitioners, THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF ALACHUA COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al. I N D E X PAGE Appendix 1— Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction (Filed May 10, 1968) ....................................................... la Appendix 2— Order (Filed July 6, 1968) .................................. 8a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ......... 14a Order (Filed July 22, 1969) .................................. 35a Appendix 3— Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Dated June 26, 1969) .......................... 43a Appendix 4— Order (Filed August 5, 1969) .............................. 52a Opinion of the Court (Filed August 5, 1969) .... 54a Appendix 5— Memorandum Opinion of the Court (Filed Augijst 5, 1969) ................................................................ . 67a Order (Filed August 5, 1969) ................................ 72a Appendix 6— Order (Filed August 1, 1969) ................................ 73a Appendix 7— Order (Filed June 20, 1969) .................................. 79a Order (Filed August 22, 1969) .............................. 85a 11 PAGE Appendix 8— Order (Filed August 12, 1969) .............................. 88a Appendix 9— Order (Filed August 12, 1969) ............... .............. 98a Appendix 10— Order (Filed March. 4, 1969) .................................. 105a Order (Filed April 3, 1969) .................................. 108a Appendix 11— Order (Filed March 4, 1969) .................................. 112a Order (Filed April 3, 1969) .................................. 115a Appendix 12— Opinion in Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1969 ......................................................................... 117a Appendix 13— Judgment of Court of A ppeals.............................. 141a A P P E N D I X 1 Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction (Filed May 10, 1968) I n the U nited States D istrict Court F or the S outhern D istrict of M ississippi Derek Jerome Singleton, et al., Appellants, versus Jackson M unicipal Separate S chool D istrict, et al., Appellees. On July 6, 1967, this Court entered an Order herein plac ing the Jackson Municipal Separate School District, Jack- son, Mississippi, under the desegregation of public schools provisions spelled out in the Jefferson decree, U.S. v. Jef ferson County Board of Education (1966), 372 F.2d 836, which Order contains provisions affecting new or expanded school construction. The Board of Trustees of the Jackson municipal school district has current plans to add 22 classrooms and certain other facilities to four formerly Negro elementary schools. A motion filed March 18, 1968, allegedly on behalf of the Negro class of plaintiffs set forth in the original cause, asks for a preliminary and permanent injunction, to enjoin the Board from the proposed additions; to enjoin the Board to construct the additions at four formerly white schools instead; and to assign to those formerly white schools the overflow from the aforesaid formerly Negro schools. A notice was filed on April 25, 1968 on the preliminary injunction to be heard on May 2, 1968. As bids on the in 2a tended construction are scheduled to be let on May 27 and June 3, 1968, the matter was given a priority hearing. In the aforesaid Jefferson case, at page 889, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals offered the statement that new construction and improvements to the Negro school plant attract no white students and diminish Negro motivation to ask for transfer. This conclusion laid the foundation for the requirement of Paragraph VII of the Order herein, which provides: “ The defendants, to the extent consistent with the proper operation of the school system as a whole, shall locate any new school and substantially expand any existing schools with the objective of eradicating the vestiges of the dual system.” Plaintiffs contend that the proposed construction will have the sole purpose of perpetuating what are now de facto Negro schools in violation of Paragraph VII, and that un der the recent holding of the Fifth Circuit dated April 18, 1968, in U.S.A. v. Board of Public Instruction of Polk County, Florida, No. 25768, not yet reported, the defen dants, before construction, are required to evaluate the factors relating to possible steps in eradicating the former dual system. Such an evaluation had not been made in that case by Polk County Board before choosing a location for a new school. The Court held that the Board must do so, and the ruling went no further. Defendants maintain that such an evaluation has been made by the Jackson Board and that Paragraph VII must be read together with that portion of Paragraph VI of the order which provides, “ The physical facilities, equipment, course of instruction, and quality of instructional material shall be equal in all schools maintained by the district” , and that in careful consideration of the “proper operation of the school system as a whole” , and mindful of the sig Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction 3a nificance of Paragraph VII, concluded that the proposed additions would best serve the immediate and future needs of the school children in the respective communities, and would not impede the break-up of the dual system, but to some extent would hasten its end by making available more class rooms to children of either race in expanding nearby areas. Dr. Kirby Walker, Superintendent of Schools, was called as a witness by plaintiffs. His testimony, his deposition, that of Jesse L. Howell, director of personnel and pupil account ing, records, maps, and reports brought to the hearing by Dr. Walker, constituted the factual evidence. This evidence is undisputed and is related by the Court as its findings. A printed booklet shows some fifty-six classroom build ings, exclusive of athletic stadiums, maintenance shops and warehouses, in the school system. Of these thirty-nine are elementary schools. For some twenty-years Jackson has experienced a growth in its school enrollment, requiring periodic construction programs financed by bond issues. Of the last bond issue in 1964 producing $5,800,000.00, aug mented by state funds, all has been used primarily in the construction of secondary schools, except a remaining tag end of approximately $750,000.00 earmarked for use in 1968. After its use, no new buildings or other added con struction are contemplated until new studies are made of population growths, following the 1970 census, the determi nation of proposed extensions of the city geographical lim its, the use or changed uses of land adjacent to interstate highways now under construction in and around the city, zoning ordinances of the city and county, and the ultimate passage of new bond issues for such construction, all to be considered together with the provisions of Paragraph VII. The use of the funds remaining from the 1964 bond issue was first considered in September 1967 by Mr. Walker and Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction 4a his staff of school principals, after the September enroll ment showed capacity or near capacity enrollment at sev eral elementary schools, including the four formerly Negro schools involved herein, Brown, Dawson, Morrison and Reynolds. Following a study of population density reports, anticipated enrollments, and present facilities, this staff recommended to the Board of Trustees that classrooms and other facilities be added to these four schools and one other not involved herein. The plans were first submitted to the Board of Trustees in December 1967, some five months after the Order of July 6, 1967. Air. Walker stated, and the Court so finds, that the Superintendent, staff and Board conducted their deliberations with Paragraph VII of the Order in mind, and consulted the Board’s attorneys in con nection with same. Estimates of costs and monthly progress reports have now been prepared, and an opportunity for bidding is to be made shortly. The names of the four for merly Negro schools, their current capacity, current enroll ment, number of rooms, and size of grounds are first listed below, with like information as to four formerly white schools listed last, which plaintiffs have brought into the controversy. Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction School Current Capacity Current Enrollment Present Number of Rooms Acreage Brown 910 904 26 2.1 Dawson 665 598 19 6.28 Morrison 645 649 20 5.8 Reynolds 1190 1172 34 12. Bradley 455 340 13 8. Galloway 635 372 17 2. Poindexter 375 223 13 3.6 Watkins 640 281 22 17. 5a Of the total enrollment in the elementary schools, 9,912 students are in formerly Negro schools, and 11,491 students are in formerly white schools. Of the total classrooms in each of the above two groups, there is an average of 4 more students per class in formerly Negro schools than in for merly white schools, but the average for each is below the school system standards of 35 normal students per class room and 15 mentally handicapped or special students per classroom. The intended added classrooms are 6 each for Brown and Dawson, 6 rooms together with library and larger lunch room at Morrison, and 4 rooms with a library and auditorium at Reynolds. These additions will tend to equalize the number of students per classroom as between the two groups of schools, and to add to the formerly Negro schools other facilities, such as libraries, which they are now without. Additional acreage is also to be acquired at the four formerly Negro schools. No additional classrooms or facilities or acreage are scheduled for any of the four formerly white schools; nor until this action was filed had any been requested. As stated in the forepart of this opin ion, plaintiffs say no added construction should be had at any of the formerly Negro schools and that Negro students should be assigned to the formerly white schools where classrooms should be added to take care of the overflow from the formerly Negro schools, this despite the fact that under the present freedom of choice enrollment, no additional space is needed at the formerly white schools. If the intention of plaintiffs is to compel pupil assign ment to the four previously white schools, the Board is pre cluded from so doing under freedom of choice. Nor does the Board furnish transportation to students living within the city limits, nor is it required to under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title IV, Section 407 (a) (2)) and as held by U.S. v. Jefferson, 372 F.2d at Page 880. Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction 6a A comparison of Brown, Dawson, Morrison and Reyn olds, the former Negro schools, to the nearest formerly white schools, Bradley, GalloAvay, Poindexter, and Watkins, was shown. Brown is more than a mile from Galloway. Dawson is a little less than a mile from Bradley. Morrison is a mile from Watkins, and Reynolds is a mile from Poin dexter. To compel elementary age students to assume these additional distances, either by walking or other transporta tion, when additions at the schools nearest them are avail able, is neither reasonable nor practical. Plaintiffs add that buses furnished by the School Board to some students who live outside the city limits and who attend Dawson, pass right by Watkins. The answer to this is that during any appropriate choice period they could elect or could have elected to attend Watkins. The Board showed that it gave consideration to at least two other practical factors; one, that population densities as compiled by the Board, particularly as to Reynolds, are growing in the area of the schools to he added to, and de creasing in the neighborhoods of the formerly white schools. The other was that the formerly white schools, being of much older construction than the formerly Negro schools, are structurally less suited to additions. As to Watkins, it is more than forty years old, and is on Sixteenth Section lands, the lease to wdiich expires in five years. Poindexter is thirty-four years old. Bradley is twenty-three years old, and was first built by a county school board and has been enlarged once by the Jackson Board. None of these schools was originally built with the possibility of additions in mind. The cost of doing so would far outweigh the cost of the proposed additions. Mr. Walker states that the Board does not maintain that additions to the formerly Negro schools will eliminate the Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction 7a dual system, but that such construction will facilitate inte gration by making more classrooms available where they are now needed for white or Negro children. This is the practical problem faced by the Board in the utilization of its remaining funds and its proposed solution is “ consistent with the proper operation of the school system as a whole.” The Court agrees. See Griggs v. Cook, 272 F. Supp. 163. The motion for a preliminary injunction is denied. s / Dan M. R ussell, Jr. United States District Judge Opinion Denying Preliminary Injunction Dated: May 9, 1968 8a APPENDIX 2 Order (Filed July 6, 1968) I n the U nited S tates D istrict Court F or the N orthern D istrict of M ississippi W estern D ivision Civil A ction N o . WC 6819 Clarence A nthony , et al., v. Plaintiffs, M arshall County B oard of E ducation, et al., Defendants. This cause having come on to be heard upon the com plaint and motion for a preliminary injunction filed by plaintiffs and also upon the separate answers and other pleadings filed by both sets of defendants, and evidence having been presented to the court in support of the mo tion for preliminary injunction, and the court having con cluded that said motion should be in part denied and in part sustained in accordance with findings of fact and con clusions of law made by the court at the conclusion of this hearing, and in accordance therewith, it is : Ordered: As to H olly Springs M unicipal Separate S chool D is trict : (1) Except as hereinafter decreed, the plan of desegre gation adopted by defendants representing Holly Springs 9a Order Municipal Separate School District, a copy thereof attached as Exhibit “B” to the separate answer of said School Dis trict and its representatives, including amendments to U 8 (subject to modification by this order) of such plan, is hereby approved until the further order of this court, and all injunctive relief seeking the adoption of a contrary plan or plans for pupil school attendance is denied. (2) To eliminate unconstitutionality in the present op eration of the public schools within the Holly Springs Mu nicipal Separate School District, defendants, Holly Springs Municipal Board of Education, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Mississippi, Robert P. Crutcher, Dr. E. B. Warren, E. E. Greene, Dr. A. D. Jones, and Leslie Tomlinson, members of the Holly Springs Municipal Board of Education; and Joe F. Williams, Su perintendent of the Holly Springs Municipal Public Schools, are hereby preliminarily enjoined from maintaining, and continuing to maintain, in the public schools within said School District segregation by race of school faculties and public transportation by race of school children, and said defendants are ordered to submit to this court not later than the 12th day of August, 1968, a plan or plans supple mentary to their adopted plan of desegregation, Exhibit “B” to their answer as amended, whereby the following assignments, programs and arrangements will be instituted and placed into effect for the 1968-69 school year, effective upon the opening of school for such year, to-wit: (a) The assignment of not less than 4 teachers of the negro race to Holly Highschool, of not less than 4 teachers of the negro race to Sally Cochran Elementary School, of not less than 4 teachers of the white race to Sims High- 10a Order school, and not less than 4 teachers of the white race to Frazier Elementary School. Defendants shall direct said teacher assignments or re-assignments regardless of any contrary term in teacher contracts; they shall be lawfully protected in the making of any re-assignments under the terms of this order and any such assigned, or re-assigned, teacher shall be lawfully obligated to comply with the directions of defendants. Defendants shall set forth in its plan of faculty desegregation the name, race and teach ing station of each faculty member assigned in accordance with the terms of this order; (b) The development of a school bus transportation plan based upon territorial zones or other natural grouping of pupil residence, which shall be without regard to race or the school selected by any particular child, to the end that all children living on designated bus routes, established according to pupil residence, shall be transported in a bus to either the Holly Highschool-Cochran Elementary School location or to Sims Highschool-Frazier Elementary School location. Insofar as practicable, overlapping routes shall be eliminated, and all children of whatever race shall be treated substantially alike as to seating capacity, bus scheduling, length of route, riding time, etc., dependent upon physical factors governing each particular bus route. Said defendants shall include in their transportation plan the name, race, and residence of each student proposed to be transported on each school bus, the name of the school to which such student will be transported, the designation and length of the route, the number and capacity of each bus, and other pertinent data to aid this court in deter mining that compliance has been made with this paragraph of its order. 11a Order As to M arshall County S chool D istrict: (1) Except as hereinafter decreed, the plan of desegre gation adopted by defendants representing Marshall County School District, a copy thereof attached as Exhibit “B” to the separate answer of said School District and its repre sentatives, including amendments to 8 (subject to modi fication by this order) of such plan, is hereby approved until the further order of this court, and all injunctive re lief seeking the adoption of a contrary plan or plans for pupil school attendance is denied. (2) To eliminate unconstitutionality in the present op eration of the public schools within the Marshall County School District, defendants, Marshall County Board of Education, organized and existing under the laws of the State of Mississippi; William R. Hurst, Sidney Person, Mrs. Corrine Waldrip, Frank Davis, and Rev. Frank W il son, members of the Marshall County Public Schools ; Stan ley V. Mullikin, Superintendent of the Marshall County Public Schools, are hereby preliminarily enjoined from maintaining, and continuing to maintain, in the public schools within said School District segregation by race of school faculties and public transportation by race of school children, and said defendants are ordered to submit to this court not later than the 12th day of August, 1968, a plan or plans supplementary to the adopted plan of desegregation, Exhibit “B” to their answer as amended, whereby the following assignments, programs and arrange ments will be instituted and placed into effect for the 1968-69 school year, effective upon the opening of school for such year, to-wit: (a) The assignment of not less than 3 teachers of the negro race to Byhalia Attendance Center, at least one of 12a Order whom must be assigned to teach in grades 9 to 12; of not less than 3 teachers of the negro race to Potts Camp At tendance Center, at least one of whom shall be assigned to teach in grades 9 to 12; of not less than 2 teachers of the negro race to Slayden Attendance Center; of not less than 4 teachers of the white race to Henry Attendance Center, at least one of whom shall be assigned to teach in grades 9 to 12; of not less than 3 teachers of the white race to Sand Flat Attendance Center, at least one of whom shall be assigned to teach in grades 9 to 12; and at least one teacher of the white race to Mary Reed Attendance Center. Defendants shall direct said teacher assignments or re-assignments regardless of any contrary term in teacher contracts; they shall be lawfully protected in the making of any re-assignments under the terms of this order and any such assigned, or re-assigned, teacher shall be lawfully obligated to comply with the directions of de fendants. Defendants shall set forth in its plan of faculty desegregation the name, race and teaching station of each faculty member assigned in accordance with the terms of this order; (b) The development of a school bus transportation plan based upon territorial zones or other natural grouping of pupil residence, which shall he without regard to race or the school selected by any particular child, to the end that all children living on designated bus routes, established according to pupil residence, shall be transported in a bus to the most conveniently located school or schools, as each child residing in a particular area may elect to attend. Insofar as practicable, overlapping routes shall be elimi nated, and all children of whatever race shall be treated substantially alike as to seating capacity, bus scheduling, length of route, riding time, etc., dependant upon the phys- 13a Order ical factors governing each particular bus route. Said defendants shall include in their transportation plan the name, race, and residence of each student proposed to be transported on each school bus, the name of the school to which such student will be transported, the dsignatioen and length of the route, the number and capacity of each bus, and other pertinent data to aid this court in determin ing that compliance has been made with this paragraph of its order. This court shall take up and consider the sufficiency of the school faculty assignments and school bus transporta tion plans filed by each defendant on the 16th day of August, 1968, at 9 o’clock A.M. at Oxford, Mississippi. The United States Marshal is hereby directed to serve certified copies of this order on each of the defendants named herein and to make return of service as herein ordered on the original hereof. This, the 6th day of July, 1968. W illiam C. K eady Chief Judge United States District Court 14a (Filed July 6, 1968) P R O C E E D I N G S B y the Court : At this time the court makes its findings of facts and conclusions of law on the application of the plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction. I will treat on my finding of facts first the Holly Springs Municipal Separate School District and then the Marshall County School District, and the conclusions of law will be equally applicable to both districts. The Holly Springs Municipal Separate School District consists of the municipality of Holly Springs and a large rural contiguous area comprising approximately 180 square miles. It had a total enrollment, during the year just closed, in its public schools of 2,473, of whom 1,868 were Negro and 875 were white students. Thus according to race there are more than two Negro children for each white child attending these public schools. The Holly Springs public schools consist of two previ ously all-white and two all-Negro schools. The Sims High School, attended all by Negroes, has grades 7-12 and has a student body of 750. The Frazier Elmentary School, an all-Negro school, has an enrollment of 1079, with grades 1-6. Both of these schools are located on the same site. The Holly High School has a student body of 425 in grades 7-12, of which 8 are Negroes. The Sally Cochran Elementary School has a student body of 471, with grades 1-6, of which 13 are Negro students. The Holly High and Sally Cochran schools are located on the same site. The two school attendance centers are located within one mile of each other. F in d in g s o f F acts a n d C o n c lu s io n s o f L aw 15a Prior to September, 1965 these schools were completely segregated according to race. For the school year 1965- 66 a freedom of choice plan was first adopted, and it had the approval of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. The first year the plan was in operation approxi mately 20 students of the Negro race attended the formerly all-white schools, but no white students attended the previ ously all-Negro schools. This remained true for the second year of the plan’s operation. During the year just concluded, 1967-68, 21 Negro students attended the previously all- white schools in Holly Springs in the proportions I have already stated. To this date no white students have at tended either the Sims High School or the Frazier Ele mentary School. In May, 1967 the Department of Health, Education and Welfare cut off assistance to the Holly Springs Municipal Separate School District due to an alleged lack of compli ance with HEW guidelines. The school board or district did not contest this action, nor was any appeal taken from that ruling. The crux of the matter at that time appeared to depend on whether there would be some measure of faculty de segregation and, although teacher surveys were made by school authorities looking to that end and talks were had with representatives from the Department of Justice, noth ing resulted. In only two instances has faculty desegrega tion occurred in the Holly Springs public schools. One was the case of a librarian of the Negro race employed as a part time librarian at the Cochran Elementary School. The other case was a white teacher of Spanish who taught classes at both Sims High School and Holly High School. Still operating under a freedom of choice plan, the school district in May, 1968 sent out freedom of choice forms to Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 16a all of the students, on which replies have been received from approximately 2,500 pupils, leaving roughly 300 out standing responses yet to he heard from. On the basis of these known replies 60 Negro students have signified their intention for the year 1968-69 to attend the previously all-white Holly High School and Cochran Elementary School. To date no white students have sig nified their intention to go to all-Negro attended schools. The evidence shows that the school board and its super intendent have met and have given careful consideration to their obligations and duties, and their position in this court is that no plan of school attendance can feasibly work in this district other than one based on freedom of choice. It appears that they have considered alternative plans, for the zoning of attendance areas and also for pairing of certain schools according to grades. The evidence shows that, as their studies indicate, be cause of the high degree of residential mixing that prevails throughout the Holly Springs District and considering the capacity of the schools involved at the two attendance cen ters under consideration and the natural territorial bound aries that will have to be logically followed to produce either a zoning plan or a pairing plan, there would under either method at once result a heavy preponderance of Negro pupils to white pupils in practically every school in the district. The court refers as evidentiary basis to Defendants’ Ex hibit No. 7, prepared by the school superintendent, showing that the only practical and logical division or zone line for the two attendance centers within Holly Springs would be one which would follow Highway 7 on the north and south of the city and Memphis Street from north to south to the intersection of Van Dorn, westward to Craft Street, Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 17a and Craft Street south until it becomes Highway 7. This major thoroughfare taken as a division line is shown in red on the map introduced by the school superintendent. West of that line under a zoning concept would lie the Sims-Frazier school complex with a capacity of 1,680 stu dents. East of that line would lie the Holly-Sally Cochran school complex with a school capacity of 1,107. By using that line, which appears to this court to he necessarily controlled by the school capacity of the two complexes, or by the use of any other line which would have any logical relevance, it results from examination of Defendants’ Exhibit No. 7 that for those children going to the zone west of the line indicated there would be an extremely heavy preponderance of Negro students, better than three to one, almost three and a half to one. By the same token there would result for the attendance in the Holly-Sally Cochran School lying east of that line a ma jority, although not as preponderant but nevertheless a majority, of Negro students to white students. The ratio would be 1.3 Negro to one white student. If pairing of schools as to certain grades were resorted to, the evidence also shows, from the same exhibit, that there would result from the use of school buildings in a sensible fashion in so far as education is concerned, that is, from the standpoint of the composition and number of grades and utilization of school plants, a preponderant majority of Negro students over white students in every school. Of course these results stem from the basic fact, which remains unchanged, that in this district there are more than two Negro children for each white child of school age. So it stands to reason that in the use of any formula based either on zoning or pairing there will result a differential Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 18a not materially varying in degree because, as it appears from this undisputed evidence, these children live indis criminately throughout the county and they are fairly well distributed as to ages, in so far as concerns the balance between the two races. This appears from the uncontra dicted evidence in this case. There is no assault made by the plaintiffs upon those hard, realistic, practical facts. Now, in approaching the question the court finds that there are various matters that need to be assessed and considered regarding the feasibility of either of these plans as a satisfactory alternate to the freedom of choice plan. The superintendent Avas particularly articulate, in the opin ion of this court, in that his experience had validated studies that for whatever may be the cause there is a substantially different achievement rate between white and Negro children. It is a difference which seems to widen as the child attains greater age. In any event, it is clear from this evidence that an edu cational program of any type has to be geared to the average student group, and in considering a plan for Holly Springs based either upon the attendance zoning or pair ing, the educational effort, or the thrust of the curriculum, would have to be directed to the average group. Under either plan this would be necessarily lower than under a freedom of choice plan. It would constitute a real and serious injury to the educational function of the Holly Springs schools if their educational curriculum has to be drastically loAvered. This court finds from the undisputed facts that such would be the case under either an attendance zoning or pairing of schools plan. Also it is relevant to consider, and the court finds, that on a basis of any available zoning or pairing plan in the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 19a Holly Springs District, considering the necessary results of the school population, the percentage of Negro students to those of the white race would clearly pass and exceed all tolerance standards known to the educational field, which are sometimes referred to in this evidence as trigger points. When these tolerance standards are passed, this court is convinced there will result a loss in great numbers of white students from heavily integrated schools. This is a basic fact, one which this court does not have the time nor the wisdom to analyze, but its reality can not be ignored. Whites, regardless of what section of the country in which they live, and particularly in Holly Springs, flee and will flee from a public school operated under condi tions found intolerable because of a disproportionately high racial stratum. Without elaborating the point, sub stantial and uncontradicted evidence exists that white students will not long remain in a school system in all schools of which Negro pupils heavily predominate. This court finds that to force such results at this par ticular juncture in the history of the school district either through zoning or pairing will produce, not integrated schools but all-Negro schools. The beneficial effects deemed to flow from a biracial public school system would thus be denied school children of both races. These considerations have been regarded by the school district, and which this court accepts, as valid, highly persuasive factors overriding all other considerations, in concluding that freedom of choice, where it is honestly administered and carried out, is the most feasible method for this district to achieve the end result of keeping within a unitary school system the maximum number of educable children of both races. Strengthening this conclusion is Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 20a the added fact, as developed from this evidence, and which this court finds to be valid, that should an immediate zon ing and pairing in the Holly Springs schools be instituted, with the likely and anticipated loss in great numbers of white children from those schools, there would be a genuine loss of community support for the public school operation. This court finds from this evidence and judicially knows that local community support is vital for the morale, the dignity and worth of a public school system. Where there is no pride or backing on the part of the community in its public schools, there result inevitably inferior, neglected schools. Conversely, where the community’s interest is strongly maintained in its local schools, such schools are motivated and are able to do a better and more effi cient job of public education. Intelligent planning must be directed toward strengthen ing the public schools in these days of ever increasing responsibility thrown upon the average citizen of what ever race to make democratic processes more effective, and to that end there is no group that has a higher or greater stake than the white community for the successful opera tion of its public school system. I find as a fact from this evidence, which is largely un contradicted on this phase of the case, that the student freedom of choice plan is a plan which, when weighed with its alternatives, which I have discussed, promises the most meaningful progress toward achieving desegrega tion. That is not to deny the obvious fact that there would be an immediate and substantial statistical integration under either a zoning or a pairing plan, but mere statistics would be of little value in the face of wholesale withdrawal by white students from such heavily mixing as this court finds will take place here. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 21a Therefore, the school board at Holly Springs has met the heavy burden resting upon it, whatever its record for past performance might be, so as to at this time justify a valid preference for a freedom of choice plan. At this particular juncture that plan will do more, in the opinion of this court, from the standpoint of feasibility to ac commodate all interests and to consolidate public support importantly needed for the continuance of these schools as they face future desegregation likely to occur at a strikingly increasing rate under the freedom of choice plan. No one can adequately foresee those changes in im portant social attitudes on the part of pupils, parents and the public flowing from adjustments which relate to an effective and working freedom of choice plan, but it can not be overlooked that the rights of Negro children to enjoy an improved education in a unitary, nondiscriminatory sys tem of schools are bound up in this change of attitude on the part of the white community. In conclusion on this aspect of the findings, the school board at Holly Springs must recognize that freedom of choice is not, and can not be, an end of itself but is a transitional method yet needed in order for this district to be able to carry the burdens inherent here in success fully converting to a biracial, unitary school system. So much for the freedom of choice plan in the Holly Springs schools. I now find facts as to the two other important aspects of the operation of this school system, first the faculty and next the bus transportation. At a time when the board of trustees was having dis cussion with representatives of the Department of Jus tice about some measure of faculty desegregation a teacher Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 22a survey was conducted during- the summer of 1967, as I recall, more than a year ago, at which time the teachers of the Holly Springs schools were asked whether for the good of the district they would be willing to teach in a school other than the one that they were presently as signed to. A substantial number, or approximately 40% of those professional people, said that for the good of the district they would teach at a different school. Except for the one instance of the part time librarian at Sally Cochran and also except for the divided efforts of the white Spanish teacher there has been no faculty de segregation. Better than 60% of these schools’ funds for the payment of teachers’ salaries comes from the State of Mississippi. The balance is raised by local taxation. These defendants are agents of the State in the selection of teachers and as signment of teachers and they are under a constitutional duty to desegregate the faculty in these schools operated under the freedom of choice plan. The court finds that there is a factual basis for discrimination having been practiced in the selection of the faculty of the Holly Springs schools which has been unconstitutional. In these schools there is a full time instructional staff of 104 people. They have, except for the two instances I have noted, been distributed to schools where the predominant race was the race of the teacher. The court finds from the facts in this case that these defendants can achieve a greater measure of faculty desegregation and that this can be done with the teachers that they have under contract for the year beginning in September. The court further finds that efforts can be made, in the event those arrangements are not altogether and 100% possible, to recruit teachers at this time to meet this affirma tive obligation for faculty desegregation. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 23a I next go to the question of bus transportation. Until recently a considerable number of students, called “ county students”—about 228 in number—have been transported from the area of Marshall County School District into the Holly Springs Separate Municipal School District. That aspect of the case need not concern us because the evidence shows here that the Marshall County Board of Education has, for reasons of economy and cost, terminated that ar rangement, so that the bussing of 228 children from the out side county district into the municipal school district need not concern us at this time. However, Holly Springs does transport a substantial number of school children. As I have indicated earlier, it has a large territorial expanse. In many ways it is as much a rural district as it is a city district. It transports 281 children into the Holly High-Sally Cochran complex and 1,175 into the Sims-Frazier School complex. This district has 18 busses. The evidence shows that these bus routes, as heretofore composed and constructed, all tied into a particular school and with the consequence that there is considerable overlappng of routes. The trans portation map of Holly Springs in evidence shows the ex tent of this overlapping. All of the official information from the superintendent’s office indicates that there are two bus routes, one designated as Negro bus routes and the other designated as white bus routes. These routes are shown on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1, the so-called Negro city bus routes being indicated in black and the so-called white city but routes being indicated in red. It is apparent from this evidence that they have existed a long time and that they were developed for a truly dual, segregated school system. 100% of the money to defray the cost of that public trans portation comes from the State of Mississippi, and these Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 24a defendants in every sense of the word are acting as agents of the State in administering school transportation funds and the transportation equipment. The evidence shows that to the extent there are children of the Negro race attending either Sally Cochran or Holly High they ride, I believe, two busses that take them and presumably white children to those two schools. This evi dence shows that that is the only variation from racial pat terns in the school bus transportation plan. Again we have residential mixing of the children throughout the district, and those who are legally entitled to a free bus ride—under Mississippi law they must be children living outside the city limits and residing a mile or more from the nearest school— should freely ride. There is no reason not to freely allow them to. The court finds from the facts in this case that these bus transportation routes preexisted the freedom of choice plan and there has been no affirmative effort by these defendants to implement them in the light of the requirements of con trolling federal cases. The court finds that there is an un constitutional arrangement of school busses according to race. I next pass to findings of fact with respect to the Marshall County School District. In the interests of brevity the basic facts in this county school district mirror to some extent my fact findings for the Holly Springs schools. There are some differences which will be noted as I now proceed to take up this county wide school district. It is a district that includes all of Marshall County except for the land territory included within the Holly Springs District. It has a current year’s school population of 4,799 pupils, of whom 3,606 are Negro and 1,193 are white. There are some all-white schools in this district. For ex ample, there is Potts Camp Attendance Center, grades 1-12, Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 25a with 421 students, Slayden Attendance Center, grades 1-12, with 322 students. There are some all-Negro schools. For example, Henry Attendance Center, grades 1-12, with 1,685 students, Sand Flat Attendance Center, grades 1-12, with 1,111 students, Mary Reed Attendance Center, grades 1-8, with 263 students, and Galena Attendance Center, grades 1-8, with 525 students. The only school or attendance center in this county school district with any biraeial composition is the Byhalia At tendance Center, grades 1-12, with 22 Negro students there out of a total of 472 enrolled pupils. This district also adopted a freedom of choice plan in August, 1965 at about the same time Holly Springs adopted its. The plans were substantially the same in their general undertaking. The first year of the plan’s operation six students of the Negro race attended the former all-white school at Byhalia, the second year 14, and the third year, the year just closed, 22 Negro students attended the Byhalia School. At no time have white students attended any of the all-Negro schools. Still operating on the freedom of choice plan, this district as late as May, 1968, as I recall, sent out questionnaires to the parents requesting an election or choice of schools to attend for the session beginning in September, 1968. An ex cellent response has already been received to these question naires. On the basis of the known replies it is anticipated that 64 Negro students will signify their intention to attend previously all-white schools. There is reason to believe that that number will increase when all of the replies have been received. In the interest of its obligations the board of trustees of this district and its superintendent have met and have considered their obligations and duties to adopt a consti- Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 26a tutional plan for school attendance in these schools that are widely scattered throughout the county. The maps in evidence show that the Henry High Attendance Center and Byhalia are about a mile apart physically, the Slay- don and Sand Flat Attendance Centers are about three miles apart, and the Potts Camp and Mary Reed Attend ance Centers down in the southeast part of the county are about a mile apart, and the Galena School is off by itself in the southwest part, roughly speaking, of the county; but they are widely scattered so as to serve children that come from a large land mass both north and south of the Holly Springs Separate School District, and also somewhat to the west of it. The evidence shows that if a zoning plan were adopted in this district based on school classroom capacity and on logical school division lines marked by highways or other natural divisions separating elements of population from one part of the county to the other, that the results in so far as the composition of each one of these schools would be even more strikingly deleterious, shall we say, than would be true with respect to the Holly Springs municipal schools. Referring to Defendants’ Exhibit 12, put in by the su perintendent Mullikin, and to the map in evidence and to the evidence, which is uncontradicted, that this is a fair and logical arrangement according to zones, this court finds that there would exist at the Slayden Attendance Center a majority of three to one Negro pupils to white, at the Sand Flat Center the same majority, three to one, at Galena a majority of ten to one, Negro over white, at Mary Reed a majority of three to one, Negro over white, at Henry a majority of four to one, Negro over white, at Byhalia a majority of two to one, Negro over white. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 27a Only in the Potts Camp area would there be a variation, for there zoning would produce a majority of whites, one white to every statistical one-half Negro student. Defendants’ Exhibit No. 13 would illustrate virtually the same or not radically different results if a pairing plan were used. Here again these results are to be naturally expected when one takes into account the overall nearly three to one ratio in Marshall County rural areas of Negro to white. The evidence with respect to this school district, although not as well articulated as in the case of Holly Springs, nevertheless points the way to the same factual conclu sions : that at this time there is only one feasible, workable method for operating the public schools in the Marshall County School District. That plan should be pursued, it must be pursued, for the benefit of both the Negro and the white pupils. If that plan is rejected in favor of a plan requiring immediate zoning or pairing there will result first the definite educational injury to the system that I mentioned earlier, caused by the lowering of curriculum standards to meet the average of the students in each class. Since we are here dealing with schools, that con sideration is of utmost importance to this court. Likewise we have applicable to this district the well known fact that here, even more than in Holly Springs, the known tolera tion points in racial mixing of classes will be vastly ex ceeded. Here, even more than in Holly Springs, there will result mass departure of white pupils from these pub lic schools. These are attitudes which can not be changed overnight, and while these attitudes may not be inflexible or neces sarily permanent in the minds of large segments of white people, they do exist at this time so as to cause this court Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 28a to conclude that in Marshall County immediate pairing or immediate zoning would result in all-Negro student bodies. The considerations of a factual nature I touched upon with respect to Holly Springs apply here in so far as the freedom of choice plan is concerned, and I find from these facts that the freedom of choice plan, as presently insti tuted, is the only feasible plan. I find that when I assess and evaluate alternative plans, the institution of any such in this district at this time will be injurious to the rights of the school children of both races, particularly will it delay the day when the school children of the Negro race will achieve those salutary benefits deemed to flow from a truly biracial and unitary school system. I also conclude from the evidence here, largely uncon tradicted, that there would be a loss of confidence on the part of the public in the Marshall County public schools, with a weakening of public support and a loss of pride in those schools; that this would come at a time when to this county it is most important that there be an increased faith in the public school system as an instrument for understanding and working out problems that press upon people, of whatever race, in democratic processes. It is reasonable to believe, and I so find from this evi dence, that the further operation of the freedom of choice plan in these schools will promote at a strikingly increas ing rate desegregation of a biracial nature that can be tolerated and that will result to the best interest of these schools and the children who attend them. I next pass to faculty assignments. The evidence here is uncontradicted that there has been no faculty desegre gation in any of these schools. Approximately 60 to 70 per cent of the operational budget of these schools which pays the teachers’ salaries comes from the State of Missis- Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 29a sippi. The remainder of that money is derived from local taxation for the public funds. These defendants, in the operation of these schools, are representatives of the State and they are subject to constitutional duties. In this county school system there are 155 full time teachers paid with public funds. Because of the composi tion of the student body we find that there are about two and a half colored teachers to every one white teacher, there being 100 Negro teachers and 45 white teachers in this system. It was put to this district over a year ago that there was an obligation to have a measure of faculty desegregation. At that time the superintendent of these county schools conducted a questionnaire or survey among his teachers to determine whether they would consider teaching in a school which is predominately of a race other than their own. There were a number of replies to this questionnaire. 45 teachers answered yes, 74 teachers answered no. The affirmative answer was 37.88. I do not know from the record how many of those answering yes were of the white or the Negro race. Pre sumably the greater part of those answering yes were of the Negro race and not of the white race. This court finds that there is evidence in this record to believe that white teachers who are professional people are willing to teach in schools other than of their own race and that those teachers can be found in Marshall County, Missis sippi. From these facts there is no conclusion this court can reach other than that there is a practice of unconstitu tional segregation with respect to teachers. I now pass to Marshall County school bus transporta tion. School bus transportation is big business for this Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Laiv 30a district. Each school day this district transports 4,506 children to these schools. Of that number 983 are white students, 3,523 are Negro students. The district owns 68 busses to transport these children and is about to acquire 15 new busses. Bus plans for the transportation of the school children in this district have existed for some years. It is reason able to conclude, and this court finds, that they pre dated the freedom of choice plan, which was adopted in August, 1965, that the only variation in that school bus plan has been to utilize four busses to take to the Byhalia school some 22 children of the Negro race. Those children who have elected to go to that school ride in company with white children. As regards the remainder of the school children of this county, they are transported according to race and according to the school that they attend. There is a very great overlapping of these bus routes, as plaintiffs’ exhibit would show, and from the informa tion that is filed in the superintendent’s office and sub mitted to the State there are separate bus routes for these county busses. Green is the color for the routes that indi cate the busses moving to the all-Negro schools, carrying Negro passengers only. Yellow is the color indicating the bus routes moving to the white county schools, carry ing all-white except 22 Negro students attending Byhalia. It is not necessary for this court to go into the de ficiencies that may or may not exist in the equipment and quality and riding time of the busses provided under this dual plan. Sufficient is it to say that from this evidence there is only one conclusion that can be honestly drawn and that is that there exists a public transportation sys tem provided for school children by the State of Missis sippi which is based upon segregation and an unconstitu- Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 31a tional application of those funds and that equipment to the transportation of school children here. That concludes my findings of fact. If I have been verbose it is only because of my feeling of the importance of this case to the people of this county, as well as my obligation to find these facts in this case. Following a recess that I will now declare I shall give my separate conclusions of law and announce my decision. The court is now in recess until 11:25. B y the Court Crier: The court is now in recess until 11:25. (At 11:05, a.m., a recess was taken until 11:25, a.m.) B y the Court : Conclusions of law which will be common to both of these districts may be stated as follows: the basic legal issue is the constitutionality of the freedom of choice plan. That plan has been specifically approved by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court under which I operate, in the case of The United States vs. Jefferson County Board of Education, decided in an en banc opinion March 9, 1967, and incorporating substantially the same provisions as these plans of both of these defendants now before the court. On May 27, 1968 in the United States Supreme Court in the case of Green vs. County School Board, there arose a very serious critical examination of the feasibility of the freedom of choice plan and it was rejected for New Kent County, Virginia. It is my obligation to pay heed to what was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Green case, and to carefully assess and weigh the feasi bility of other alternative plans against the freedom of Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 32a choice plan for the reason that the high court observed the rate of desegregation was apparently too slow under the freedom of choice plan and it imposed the burden of af firmative action upon parents and pupils more than upon the school board, where the obligation should rest. In these cases I have as best I can assessed the alterna tives to the freedom of choice plan and I have to the best of my ability tried to weigh and evaluate the evidence from the standpoint of which would be more feasible in promoting meaningful desegregation as applied to the terms of the Green decision. The Green decision did not rule out freedom of choice as unconstitutional but left to the trial court the obliga tion and duty, as well as privilege, of looking at the evi dence in a particular local school district and concluding what the constitutional arrangements ought to be. Under that authority I find, as a conclusion of law, that the freedom of choice plans for the attendance of children in these two school districts as presently adopted are legal, are constitutional, and that there is no cause for injunc tive relief to adopt a contrary plan or plans based upon zoning or pairing. However, in so concluding I am fully aware of the fact that under the Green case there is thrust upon the District Courts an even greater duty of giving a more critical consideration to the progress of any school district in eliminating its previously state-imposed segregated sys tem of education. On all of the facts in this case I hold that, under the command of the Green case, the most feasible method of bringing meaningful desegregation to the school districts now before the court will be under the freedom of choice plan, which is to be honestly and faithfully admin istered and carried out. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 33a My second conclusion of law relates to faculty desegrega tion, which exists only in very small degree in the Holly Springs Municipal School District and not at all with the Marshall County School District. In this respect the desegregation plans under which these defendants have operated since August, 1965 have specifically called for the elimination of faculty segregation but there has not been performance to match those words. There has been oppor tunity, but which went without taking. I conclude that these school boards, these defendants here, are both under the affirmative duty at this time to take action to desegre gate the faculties of these schools subject to our jurisdic tion, and as my yardstick and guideline for that require ment I feel obliged to follow the principles and reasoning laid down by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on June 3, 1968 in the case of The United States v. Board of Edu cation of the City of Bessemer. In that case the school district had long been in litiga tion of this type and had falteringly achieved only a modicum of faculty desegregation. The Fifth Circuit Court in very clear language ruled that it is a major error of the law for school boards to be governed in their racial assignments by the desires or wishes of the teachers but that the obligation rests upon school boards and those in charge of schools to employ and to direct the assignment of teachers who are paid out of public funds. Under the rule of that case and according to the dic tates of my own conscience I find that there is a failure to constitutionally desegregate these two school faculties and that both of these districts must without delay insti tute a plan looking o a program of faculty desegregation. In the order that I shall read following my conclusions of law the details is of that plan and that faculty desegrega tion will be spelled out. Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 34a The third and last conclusion of law relates to school bus transportation. On the uncontradicted facts in this record this court can conclude only that there has been a departure from constitutional standards, or a failure to adhere to constitutional standards, in the transportation of school children and that these districts have failed to eliminate from their system segregation in bus transporta tion to public schools, which is nothing more or less than free transportation provided by a beneficent State for the school children within a particular school district. By saying free does not mean that it is not paid for by someone. Of course it is, by the taxpayers of the State as a whole. My conclusion, therefore, of law is that these districts must come forward with a plan of transportation no longer based on race, no longer based even on a particular school, but based upon residential patterns and upon concepts of modern transportation, with the aim that all children will be treated substantially alike, regardless of their race, and with the aim of eradicating unconstitutional defects in these systems. Freedom of choice has no legitimate place in the trans portation plan of students. The requirements have long been established by law that public money must be spent in a nondiscriminatory fashion. There is no court that may hold to the contrary, and I can not conclude from these facts anything except that there exists upon these defend ants, as I have said, a positive and affirmative duty at this time to initiate a new method of school transportation, the details of which shall be spelled out in my order. # # # Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 35a Order (Filed July 22, 1969) In accordance with findings of fact delivered from the bench at hearings conducted on June 30, 1969, and July 17, 1969, conclusions of law more fully set forth by this court in United States of America v. Sunflower County School District, No. GC 6637-K, by opinion released June 24, 1969; it is Ordered That the defendant, Holly Springs Municipal Separate School District, its agents, officers, employees, successors and all those in active concert and participation with them, be and they are hereby permanently enjoined from dis criminating on the basis of race or color in the operation of the school system of the Holly Springs Municipal Sepa rate School District. As hereinafter set out, they shall take affirmative action to disestablish all school segregation and to eliminate the effects of the dual school system. I . S tudent Desegregation (1) F or the school year 1969-70, the school children of the district shall be assigned to attendance centers as follows: (a) Grades 1 through 4 shall be assigned to attendance centers on the basis of standardized tests given to the students of such grades prior to the beginning of the 1969-70 school year by an outside disinterested testing agency. Students entering the first four grades shall be uniformly given the California Test of Basic Skills or a comparable recognized achievement test. All tests shall 36a Order be scored by a disinterested agency and the results made known to the school district prior to the commencement of said school year. The 81 highest scoring students in each of said grades shall be required during the 1969-70 school year to attend Sallie Cochran Elementary School, and the remaining students in each of said grades shall be required to attend Frazier Elementary School in Holly Springs, Mississippi. Each student shall be required to attend the attendance center to which his score assigns him; provided, however, that in case of overcrowding, school officials of the district may assign children to at tend another school. During the month of April or May of each school year hereafter beginning with April or May 1970, the same or similar tests shall be given to each student desiring to enroll in any one of the said four grades during the next ensuing school year, and said tests shall be scored and students assigned to schools as here inabove provided. (b) Students enrolled in grades 5 through 10 shall be assigned to district schools in accordance with freedom of choice of the individual student. Students in grades 11 and 12 shall also be assigned in accordance with freedom of choice, provided, however, that the school district shall first satisfy the positive desegregation requirements of these two grades as next provided in (c). (c) For the school year 1969-70 only, 20% of the en rollment in grades 11 and 12 of the formerly all-white high school located at Holly Springs shall be Negro students assigned by the school district on the basis of proximity of residence, freedom of choice or other method as it may select. 37a Order (2) For the school year 1970-71, the school children of the district shall be assigned to attendance centers as follows: (a) Grades 1 through 4 shall be assigned in accordance with ( l ) (a ) above. (b) Grades 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall be assigned to attendance centers on the basis of test scores on a uniformly standard ized achievement test as provided in ( l ) (a ) above, except that said tests shall be administered in April or May of each school year begnining with April or May 1970, and also except that the 81 highest scoring students for grades 7 and 8 shall be assigned to Holly High School and the remaining students in each of said grades shall be assigned to Sims High School. (c) Students enrolled in grades 9 to 12 shall be assigned to attendance centers according to student’s freedom of choice, provided, however, that the school district shall first satisfy positive desegregation requirements of these grades as next provided in (d). (d) For the school year 1970-71 only, 20% of the en rollment in grades 9 to 12 of the formerly all-white high school located at Holly Springs shall he Negro students assigned by the school district on the basis of proximity of residence, freedom of choice or other method as it may select. (3) For the school year 1971-72 and thereafter, the school children of the district shall be assigned to attend ance centers as follows: (a) Grades 1 through 8 shall be assigned in accordance with ( l ) (a ) and (2 )(b) above. 38a Order (b) Grades 9 through 12 shall be assigned to attendance centers uniformly on a nationally recognized standard achievement test, with the 81 highest scoring students assigned to Holly High School, and the remaining students assigned to Sims High School. (4) Notwithstanding the foregoing paragraphs ( l ) (a ) , (2 )(b) and (3 )(b), in event the number of students com posing the higher scoring group shall, at the commence ment of any school year, fail to utilize the maximum recom mended capacity of available classroom space, the district shall assign to that school such greater number of next highest scoring students as may be needed to fully utilize said capacity. (5) New students entering any grade of the district’s schools shall be given the tests for that grade and assigned to schools according to their scores. (6) Request for transfer by a student to attend school in another attendance center of the district will be subjejct to review by defendants and may be granted, but only if the granting thereof will either 1) relieve a crowded school condition; 2) assist a physically handicapped child; or 3) promote desegregation. Moreover, defendants shall, on request, permit any student to transfer from a school where students of his race are a majority to any other school within the system where students of his race are a minority, and they may assign students on such basis; provided, however, that such request for transfer may be denied in the event the transfer would be to an already overcrowded grade or center. 39a Order II. F aculty and S taff Desegregation Within the full extent of the district’s ability so to do, including the availability of qualified personnel, not less than one of every six classroom teachers of a different race shall be employed and assigned to each of the schools or attendance centers for the 1969-70 school year; and for the 1970-71 school year and thereafter there shall be full faculty and staff desegregation, to such an extent that the faculty at each school is not identifiable to the race of the majority of the students at any such school. m . T ransportation The district shall provide a unitary plan for the trans portation of school children based upon territorial zones or other natural grouping of pupil residence, irrespective of race, and seeking to eliminate insofar as practicable overlapping or duplicating routes. All children of what ever race shall be treated substantially alike as to seating capacity, bus schedules, length of route, riding time, etc., depending upon the physical factors governing each par ticular bus route. IV. Services, F acilities, A ctivities and P rograms No student shall be segregated or discriminated against on account of race or color in any grade, service, facility, activity, or program (including transportation, athletics, or other extracurricular activity) that may be conducted or sponsored by the school in which the student is enrolled. 40a Order v. New Construction The defendants, to the extent consistent with the proper operation of the school system as a whole, shall locate any new school and substantially expand any existing schools with the objective of eradicating the vestiges of the dual school system. VI. P rotection of P ersons E xercising R ights U nder T his Decree Within their authority, school officials are responsible for the protection of persons exercising rights under, or otherwise affected by, this order. They shall, without de lay, take appropriate action with regard to any student, teacher or staff member who interferes with the successful operation of the provisions of this order. Such interfer ence shall include harassment, intimidation, threats, hos tile words or acts, and similar behavior. I f officials of the school system are not able to provide sufficient protection, they shall seek whatever assistance is necessary from other appropriate officials. Moreover, school officials may apply to this court for protective orders against any person or persons interfering with the execution of the terms of this order. VII. Reports to the Court (a) On or before October 15, 1969, and annually there after, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the defend ants shall submit the following reports to the court: 41a Order 1. The name, race and teaching station of each member of the faculty and staff of each attendance center of the district; and 2. The number of children, by race, in attendance in each attendance center of the district, by grades. Said report shall disclose the range of test scores for the children of each grade assigned to different buildings, and indicating by number and by race the children so assigned by test scores. (b) On or before October 15, 1969, and quarterly there after until otherwise ordered by the court, the defendants shall submit the following reports to the court: 1. The name, race and age of each student who has been granted a transfer on account of crowded school situation or to aid a physically handicapped child, giving the name of the school from which the student transferred, the school to which the transfer was made, and the grade involved. 2. The name, race and age of each student granted a transfer in order to promote desegregation, the grade involved, the name of the school from which the transfer was granted, and the school to which the transfer was made. (c) That defendants when filing reports pursuant to the provisions of this order shall serve duplicate copies upon opposing counsel. It is further Ordered (1) Jurisdiction of this cause shall be, and the same hereby is, retained for all purposes, and especially for the 42a Order purpose of entering any and all further orders which may become necessary for the purpose of enforcing or modify ing this order, either or both. (2) The Clerk of this court shall he, and he hereby is, directed to mail certified copies of this order by certified mail to all counsel of record and to note such mailings on the docket. This, 22nd day of July, 1969. W illiam C. K eady Chief Judge United States District Court 43a APPENDIX 3 Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Dated June 26, 1969) IN THE United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT N o . 2 7 4 4 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Intervenor-Ap pell ant, versus JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees. N o . 2 7 4 4 5 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF BESSEMER, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (June 26, 1969) 44a Before BELL and GOLDBERG, Circuit Judges and ATKINS, District Judge. BELL, Circuit Judge: These appeals contest the or der of the district court denying further relief in the Bessem er and Jefferson County Board of Education school desegregation cases from the standpoint of re quiring student assignments on a basis other than free dom of choice. The appeals also complain of the denial of relief with respect to school construction programs. In the case of Bessemer, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the construction of specific schools. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. These school boards were involved in the appeals which resulted in the promulgation of the model de cree in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 5 Cir., 1966, 372 F.2d 836, aff’d on rehearing en banc, 380 F.2d 385, cert, den., 389 U.S. 840. The m odel decree was entered in these cases on April 17, 1967. The motions for further relief sought to have this decree modified with respect to the assignment of students.1 Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 'These school systems were first before this court in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 5 Cir., 1965, 349 F.2d 1021; and United States v. City of Bessemer Board of Educa tion, 5 Cir., 1965, 349 F.2d 10201. They were recently here on a modification of the Jefferson decree with respect to faculty assignments. United States v. Board of Education of the City of Bessemer, 5 Cir., 1968, 396 F.2d 44. That same question is again pending in this court. No. 26,582, United States, et al v. Board of Education of the City of Bessemer; No. 26,583, United States, et al v. Board of Education of the City of Birmingham; No. 26,583, United States et al v. Jefferson County Board of Edu cation, argued and submitted November 21, 1968. 45a The Jefferson model decree was promulgated to car ry out the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) which was to effectuate a tran sition from dual school systems to unitary racially non discriminatory systems. The model decree has resulted in 3.45 per cent of the Negro students in the Bessemei system attending school with white students for th< year 1968-69. There are eleven schools in Bessemer: one all white, four all Negro, and six desegregated The school population of the Bessemer system for the year 1968-69 was 8,615; 5,360 Negroes and 3,255 whites In the Jefferson County system, 3.43 per cent of the Negro students attended previously all white schools in the year 1968-69. The school population was 65,659; 47,830 whites and 17,829 Negroes. There were 105 schools; 48 remained all white, 28 all Negro, and 29 were desegregated. In no school in either system has a white student chosen to attend a Negro school. There has been somt assignment of both white and Negro teachers in each system to teach in schools where their race is in th( minority but not to a marked degree. The Supreme Court handed down additional defini tive decisions in the school law area in 1968. Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia. 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Education of Gould, Arkansas, 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners of the City of Jackson, Tennessee 391 U.S. 450 (1968). These cases emphasize the constitu tional obligation of school boards to disestablish the Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 46a dual school system by converting immediately to uni fied systems in which racial discrimination has been com pletely eliminated. “The transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to be brought about . . 391 U.S. at p. 436. It was again stated that the burden was on school boards to com e forward with plans to this end. In Green it was made plain that the use of freedom of choice would only be acceptable where . . it offers real prom ise of aiding a desegregation program to effectuate conversion of a state-imposed dual system to a unitary, nonracial system. . .” . 391 U.S. at 440-441. The court went on to hold that “ . . . if there are reason ably available other ways, such for illustration as zon ing, promising speedier and more effective conversion to a unitary, nonracial school system, ‘freedom of choice ’ must be held unacceptable.” 391 U.S. at 441. This court has subsequently reviewed freedom of choice plans in use in several school systems. The tes has been in term s of the effectiveness to dises tablish the dual system. In Adams v. Mathews, 5 Cir.. 1968, 403 F.2d 181, 188, we said: ‘ ‘If in a school district there are still all- Negro schools or only a small fraction of Ne groes enrolled in white schools or no substan tial integration of faculties and school activi ties then, as a matter of law, the existing plan fails to meet constitutional standards as estab lished in Green.” Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit See also Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of 47a Mobile County, 5 Cir., 1969,____ F .2d_____ , [Nos. 26,886, 27,491, 27,260, slip opinion dated June 3, 1969]; Hall v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969,____ F .2d_____ , [Nos. 26,450, and 27,303, slip opinion dated May 28, 1969]; Anthony v. Marshall County Board of Education, 5 Cir., 1969 ------- F .2 d ------- [No. 26,432, slip opinion dated April 15, 1969]; United States v. lndianola Municipal Separate School District, 5 Cir., 1969,____ F .2 d _____ , [No. 25,655, slip opinion dated April 11, 1969]; Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District, 5 Cir., 1969, ____ F .2d -------, [No. 23,255, slip opinion dated March 6, 1969]; United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School District, 5 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d 1086; Graves v. Walton County Board of Education, 5 Cir. 1968, 403 F.2d 189; Board of Public Instruction of Duval County v. Brax ton, 5 Cir., 1968, 402 F.2d 900. It is clear that the freedom of choice has not dis established the dual school systems in Bessemer or Jefferson County. The district court was of the view that it would in time but this probability will not meet the test of Green if there are other methods available which will disestablish the dual system now. For aught that appears, attendance zones would now accom plish the objective insofar as student assignment is con cerned. The district court is directed on remand to consider zone assignments in each system. The school construction program must also be con sidered by the district court to the end of insuring that the program will be used to disestablish the dual system. The Bessem er school construction of which plaintiffs com plain is well under way. The schools can Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 48a be desegregated in a meaningful manner on a zone assignment basis and thus any discrimination flow ing from site location can be dissipated. The sum of these cases is that they must be con sidered anew by the district court. In keeping with the teaching of Green, the time is now at hand to dises tablish the dual school systems in Jefferson County and Bessemer. This will mean substantial changes in stu dent and faculty assignment, in school bus routes, in school and extracurricular activities including athletic program s. Disestablishment, in the main, will com e from local effort and through the cooperation of those having a direct interest in the education process. The passage of time has m ade the task of disestab lishment m ore com plex. In Brown v. Board of Educa tion, 347 U.S. 483, 495, (1954), the question of im ple menting the decision was posed in term s of immediate implementation or a deliberate speed concept. Fn. 13. Immediate implementation was couched in terms of admitting Negro children forthwith to schools of their choice within the limits set by norm al geographic school districting. This postulate was the subject mat ter of the second Brown decision where instead the deliberate speed concept was promulgated. 349 U.S. £94, 298-99 (1955). This simple rem edy of im m e diate student admission, thought to be too drastic then, appears by hindsight and today’s standards, to be sim ple indeed. From the standpoint of local cooperation, neithei of the school boards here have Negro m embers. This Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 49a means that help from such sources will not be available to assist in disestablishing the dual systems. The plain tiffs in each case are, however, represented by Negro lawyers who reside in the Birmingham area and are familiar with the school systems and the neighborhood patterns. The school boards and their attorneys can receive valuable assistance from these lawyers in for mulating disestablishment plans. It becam e clear on oral argument in this court that the development of such a plan in each system can be readily accomplished by local effort2 and this will be particularly true under the leadership of the district court. The district court, in addition to this type of assis tance, will also have available the resources of the Office of Education of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under the terms of the following order which is similar to the order issued on June 3, 1968 in Davis v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County supra. The order is also similar to the order issued in Wittenberg v. Green ville County School District, CA No. 4396, D.C.S.C. dat ed March 1, 1969, and, on remand in the Louisiana cases considered in Hall v. United States, supra. More over, it appeared from oral argument that assistance in formulating disestablishment plans m ay be avail able from the University of Alabama. The order of the district court in each case is reversed and the cases are remanded to the district court with the following direction: Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2There was testimony that white students would not attend formerly Negro schools. This is not a legal argument. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 50a 1. The cases shall receive the highest priority. 2. The district court shall forthwith request the Of fice of Education of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare to collaborate with the defendant school boards in the preparation of plans to disestablish the dual school systems in question. The disestablishment plans shall be directed to student and faculty assignment, school bus routes if transpor tation is provided, all facilities, all athletic and other school activities, and all school location and construc tion activities. The district court shall further require the school boards to make available to the Office of Education or its designees all requested information relating to the operation of the school systems. 3. The required disestablishment plans for the re spective systems shall be effective for the beginning of the 1969-70 school term and shall be com pleted and approved by the district court no later than August 5, 1969. 4. The district court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the efficacy of any plan which is approved to immediately disestablish the dual school system in question. Jurisdiction should be re tained, however, under the teaching of Green, 391 U.S. at 439 and Raney, 391 U.S. at 449, until it is clear that disestablishment has been achieved. 5 5. A copy of such findings, conclusions, and orders as are entered, together with copies of disestablish ment plans, shall be lodged with the clerk of this court. Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 51a Because of the urgency of formulating and approv- ing plans to be effective for the 1969-70 school term it is ordered as follows: The mandate of this court shall issue immediately and will not be stayed pending petitions for rehearing or certiorari. This court will not extend the time for filing petitions for rehearing or briefs in support of or in opposition thereto. Any appeals from orders or decrees of the district court on remand shall be expedited. The record on any appeal shall be lodged with this court and appellants’ brief filed, all within ten days of the date of the order or decree of the district court from which the appeal is taken. Appellee’s brief shall be due ten days thereafter. The court will determine the time and place for oral argument if allowed. No consideration will be given to the fact of interrupting the school year in the event further relief is indicated. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Adm. Office, U.S. Courts— Scofields’ Quality Printers, Inc., N. O., La. 52a APPENDIX 4 Order (Filed August 5, 1969) I n the U nited States District Court F or the N orthern D istrict of A labama S outhern D ivision Civil A ction N o. 65-396 L inda S tout, by her father and next friend, B levin S tout, Plaintiff, U nited S tates of A merica, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. Jefferson County B oard of E ducation, et al., Defendants. On the basis of the findings of fact and conclusions of law set out in separate opinion of the court, in this cause this day entered and filed, It is, therefore, Ordered, A djudged and Decreed by the court as follows: (1) That the plan for integration of the Jefferson County School System filed by the Jefferson County Board of Ed ucation in this cause on August 1, 1969, be and the same hereby is approved. 53a Order (2) That the objections to the plan filed on behalf of the plaintiffs be and the same hereby are overruled and denied. (3) The motion of the Jefferson County Board of Educa tion to dismiss this cause is treated and considered as a petition for summary judgment and the court hereby finds and declares that the plan filed by the Jefferson County Board of Education does immediately disestablish the dual system and does immediately establish a unitary system in Jefferson County. Jurisdiction is retained in this case for the limited and restricted purpose of supervising the ad ministration of the plan of the County Board as filed and herein and hereby approved. (4) That the petitions for intervention filed in this cause on behalf of David Borello, et al., be and the same hereby are denied. (5) Prior orders entered in this cause to the extent con sistent with the new plan filed by the County Board and herein approved are to remain in effect. The County School Board hereby is required to report to this court, with copy to the parties, any changes in zone boundaries made pursu ant to Chapter TV, Part D (p. 19), of the County School Board plan. D one and Ordered this 5th day of August, 1969. / s / C. H. A llgood United States District Judge 54a (Filed August 5, 1969) This cause comes on to be heard on the reports filed by the Jefferson County Board of Education (County Board) and the Office of Education of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW ), to disestablish the dual school system in Jefferson County, Alabama, to formulate and present a plan for the establishment of a unitary school system including students, facuties, trans portation, all facilities, athletics and other school activities and school location and construction. In addition to its re port, the County Board has filed a motion to dismiss the subject action, setting out that the zoning attendance plan proposed in its report effectively establishes a unitary school system in Jefferson County that complies with every judicial and constitutional requirement and to eliminate all vestiges of the dual system. The reports were prepared and filed under order of this court and entered on June 27, 1969, by Chief Judge Seybourn H. Lynne acting pursuant to mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued in this case on June 26, 1969, which said order directed: “1. That the defendants be and they are hereby re quired to prepare plans to disestablish the dual school systems presently being maintained in Jefferson County, Alabama, and forthwith to request the Office of Education of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare to collaborate with them in the preparation thereof. “2. That such plans shall be directed to (a) student and faculty assignment, (b) school bus routes, (c) all facilities, (d) all athletic and other school activities, and (e) all school location and construction activities. O p in io n o f th e C o u rt 55a “3. That defendants be and they are hereby re quired to make available to the Office of Education, or its designees, all requested information relating to the operation of such school system. “4. That the disestablishment plans required hereby shall be effective for the beginning of the 1969-1970 school term and shall be completed and filed in the of fice of the Clerk of this court on August 1, 1969, and shall be submitted for the approval of the court at 10:00 a.m., on August 4, 1969. All interested parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard on such date, and only on such date, with respect to objections or exceptions to such plans.” The plans of the County Board and HEW were timely filed in this court on August 1, 1969, and were set for hear ing as directed and ordered on August 4, 1969. The order of the Fifth Circuit further directed that the plans for dis establishment of the dual system and creation of the uni tary system “ shall be considered and approved by the Dis trict Court no later than August 5, 1969.” All parties appeared in court on August 4, 1969, through their respective attorneys of record. The plaintiffs filed objections to the integration plan sub mitted by the County Board which were heard together with the reports and plans filed by the County Board and HEW. Petitions for intervention were filed in this cause on behalf of David Borello, etc., et al., by Ralph E. Coleman, Esq.; an oral petition for intervention was recorded and urged on behalf of parents residing in Pleasant Grove by John Schmarkey, Esq. The petitions for intervention having been considered and understood by the court, same were denied. Opinion of the Court 56a Opinion of the Court B ackground of the Case This case commenced by a complaint filed on behalf of the individual plaintiffs in this court on June 4,1965. With in less than a month, a plan for desegregation was filed by the County Board which, in the opinion of this court, com plied with the law as then construed by the District Court and by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Following hear ing, the plan, as filed, with modifications, was approved by the District Court. The Justice Department appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 17, 1965, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 349 F.2d 1021: “For further consideration in light of Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, et al, 5 Cir. 348 F.2d 729, decided by this court on June 22,1965, and Price v. Denison Independent School District Board of Education, et al, 5 Cir., 348 F.2d 1010, decided by this court on July 2, 1965.” Within ten days the County Board filed its amended plan to conform to the decision of the Fifth Circuit. The plan was approved by this court and the Government appealed. This appeal led to the uniform “Model Decree” and the de cision of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, affirmed on re hearing en banc (3/29/67), 380 F.2d 385. Following and pursuant to that decision, the District Court entered “ the model decree” set out by the Fifth Circuit on April 17, 1967. The plaintiff and the Justice Department then filed a mo tion seeking a modification of the Jefferson decree with re spect to faculty assignments. On June 3, 1968, in United States v. Board of Education of the City of Bessemer, 396 Opinion of the Court F.2d 44 (which was consolidated with the Jefferson case), the Fifth Circuit reversed the order of the District Court and directed accelerated faculty integration. The action taken by the County Board with respect to this order was submitted to the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, Fifth Circuit, No. 26584.1 The Fifth Circuit remanded that case to this court for action in connection with the subject proceeding. The United States, intervenor, filed a motion seeking to require the County Board to file another plan for the desegregation of schools in the County System based on geographical zoning. This court sustained “ Freedom-of-Choice” in Jefferson County and its administration by the County Board, but, following appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed on June 26, 1969. The District Court issued the subject order pursuant to that mandate of the Fifth Circuit. The testimony of record in these proceedings admittedly shows that not a single complaint was communicated to the County Board by any citizen of Jefferson County—white or Negro— regarding the “Freedom of Choice” plan or its administration by the County Board. Following hearing on the “Freedom-of-Choice” plan and its administration in the County System, Chief Judge Seybourn H. Lynne, in his memorandum opinion of March 7, 1969, specifically noted that: “ There is not a whisper of evidence that any pupil of either race has been harrassed, intimidated or influ enced in any manner in the exercise of his choice of a school . . . ” 1 Consolidated with No. 26582, United States v. Board of Edu cation of the City of Bessemer, and No. 26583, United States v. Board of Education of the City of Birmingham. 58a In addition, the County Board continuously has taken speci fied accelerated and meaningful steps toward the integra tion of its school system and has achieved remarkable re sults in the face of many difficulties. It is further noted that every plan filed by the County Board generally satisfied the standards or guidelines es tablished by HEW and the Fifth Circuit at the time the plans were filed in the District Court, hut as noted by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Board of Education of the City of Bessemer, 396 F.2d 44, 49: “And the moving finger having writ was soon writing everywhere.” The result was that while the plans were substantially in keeping with the appellate decision at the time they were filed in the District Court, the position of the appellate court was being modified pending the appeal, and when the appeals reached the Fifth Circuit remandment fol lowed with additional corrections. The Jefferson County School Board has had a very short time in which to perform a herculean task. They have met their responsibilities and submitted a plan which this court finds in full compliance with the mandate of the Fifth Circuit. It is recognized that under the circumstances some minor adjustments may have to be made. Some changes in the plan not affecting its basic purpose and intent may be required. These matters can be worked out and agreed upon by the School Board and HEW, without further burden to this court and to the Court of Appeals. This plan ends the dual system of schools in Jefferson County. In this court’s opinion, it meets the requirements set out Opinion of the Court 59a in the mandate of the Fifth Circuit. It should end litiga tion. It is my thought that further litigation in this case for any reason other than that reserved by the court would serve no good purpose. Objections were filed on behalf of the United States Department of Justice requesting and suggesting that the court’s order include a provision retaining in effect pro visions of earlier orders not inconsistent with the new plan and requiring periodic reports. The court has care fully considered these objections and has incorporated herein substantial and material portions of the Depart ment’s suggestions. The court has carefully studied the reports and plans for integration filed by the County Board and HEW, has heard evidence with respect to the plans and the argu ments of counsel and makes the following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order herein. F indings of F act (1) The plans submitted by the County Board and HEW follow identical geographical zones. As directed by the Fifth Circuit, the County Board made available to HEW all requested information, including the subject plan filed by the County Board which HEW has approved, in sub stance. 2 (2) The plan of the County Board effectively eliminates all vestiges of the dual school system in Jefferson County and creates a unitary system that complies with all judicial and constitutional requirements. Opinion of the Court 60a (3) In considering and fixing school attendance zones, the County Board correctly used and applied the following pertinent factors: (a) Capacity of the schools. (b) Geographical and natural boundaries. (c) Condition of facilities. (d) Residence of students. (e) Boundary lines of other school systems. (f) Accessibility. (g) Separate cities. (h) Accreditation. (i) Permanency of descriptions. All of these factors were applied by the County Board without discrimination to disestablish the dual and create an effective unitary school system. (4) That approval and execution of the plan effectively establishes a unitary system of schools in Jefferson County is evidenced by the following statistical result. The Fifth Circuit having previously noted in Bessemer: Opinion of the Court “As figures speak and when they do courts listen.” Students Attending and Projected in the Jefferson County School System 1968-1972 Year White % Negro % Total 1968-69 48,032 73.% 17,765 27.% 65,797 1969-70 50,223 73.9% 17,731 26.1% 67,954 1970-71 50,452 74.4% 17,393 25.6% 67,845 1971-72 50,469 74.8% 17,001 25.2% 67,470 61a In the 1967-68 school year, 350 Negro students attended predominantly white schools in the County System. In 1968-69, 615 Negro students, or 3.43%, attended County Schools in integrated situations. The County Board plan (if it can be accomplished) results in the following amazing figures. In 1969-70, 13,174 of 17,731 Negro students, or 74.29%, will attend County Schools in integrated situations. In 1970-71, 14,812 of 17,393, or 85.16%, of the Negro students will attend County Schools in integrated situations. In 1971-72, all—100%—of the Negro students will be attending schools in integrated situations. 5 (5) Under the proposed plan, the faculty of the County System will be completely integrated. During the 1967-68 school year, only ten teachers in the County System taught in integrated situations in six schools. In the period of less than two months following the decision of the Fifth Circuit on June 3, 1968, in Bessemer, this number had been increased by the County Board to 133 teachers in 92 schools, of which 93 teachers were assigned to teach in 66 schools attended predominantly by white students and 40 white teachers were assigned to teach in 26 schools attended predominantly by Negro students. Ninety-two of the 105 schools in the County System then had integrated facilities. The remaining thirteen schools each had six teachers or less and were small schools located in remote rural sections of the county. The composition of the faculty, by race, in the County System, for each of the years 1968-1972, as projected, under the County Board plan, would be as follows: Opinion of the Court 62a Faculty Teaching and Projected in the Jefferson County School System 19Q8-72 Opinion of the Court Year White % Negro % Total 1968-69 1,789 72.1% 692 27.9% 2,481 1969-70 1,762 72.5% 668 27.5% 2,430 1970-71 1,780 71.9% 697 28.1% 2,477 1971-72 1,842 72.5% 700 27.5% 2,542 Approval and execution of the County Board plan would result in the following number and percentage of integra tion among the faculty of the County System: 6 Non- Year Integrated % integrated % Total 1969-70 2,403 99.0% 27 1.0% 2,430 1970-71 2,464 99.5% 13 .5% 2,477 1971-72 2,533 99.6% 9 .4% 2,542 (6) Under the County Board plan, eighteen schools in the county would be closed to accomplish integration, be ing specifically Mt. Olive Junior High, Roebuck Plaza Ele mentary, Mineral Springs Elementary, Alden Elementary, Docena North, Mulga North, Leeds Primary, Westfield High, Pleasant Grove Elementary, Overton, Wilkes, Rob- ertstown, Zinnerman, Johns, Hooper City, Pipe Shop, Red Ore and Raimund Elementary. The present market value of these schools is $1,260,101.70. Their replacement cost is reliably estimated to be $4,090,000.00. To complete the construction that will be reasonably necessary to fully implement the County Board plan will result in construc tion costs of $13,856,000. The County Board does not have the funds with which to accomplish this tremendous and required construction program. 63a The County Board has adopted and followed a “pay as you go” program and constructs additional facilities where students are in attendance. Its proposed construction plans are directed toward the implementation of the integration plan filed with this court. (7) The plaintiffs introduced no evidence in support of their objections. The County Board introduced testimony specifically relating to and answering each objection. The court finds that the objections are without merit and likely were prompted, to a substantial extent, by a misunderstand ing on the part of plaintiffs of the integration plan filed by the County Board. The evidence of record establishes that students will not be bussed out of their zones passed schools consisting largely of members of the opposite race. Fur ther, the evidence establishes that the County Board has no new construction plans except those related to the plan as filed. There is no evidence to sustain plaintiffs’ objection and statement that Negro students would be bussed by white schools in order to attend Negro high schools. To the con trary, the evidence is and the court finds that there are no white schools or Negro schools upon execution of the plan, but only schools. The dual system and all vestiges thereof has been effectively eliminated and a unitary system has been created in the County School System. The testimony clearly shows and the court finds that Negro principals are being retained in a number of the county schools, being those at Brighton, Moton, Raimund, Wenonah and Rose- dale. The court finds that the plaintiffs’ objections are with out merit and there is no evidence in the record to sustain same. It is obvious that objections filed are not supported by the facts in this case. This is due to the apparent lack of fa miliarity with the proposed plan. The court is well aware Opinion of the Court 64a of the fact that the time schedule in this case does not allow sufficient time to study and analyze the plan. However, the record does show that Attorney Clemon and his associates were consulted from time to time during the preparation of this plan and that he and his associates did approve of the plan, in substance. (8) The court finds, as suggested by the United States Department of Justice, that provisions of earlier orders in this cause not inconsistent with the new plan be continued and that the County Board be required to report to the court and to the parties “ any changes in zone boundaries made pursuant to Chapter IV, Part D (p. 19) of the County School Board plan.” Since the court will retain jurisdiction to supervise the effect and administration of the plan, it deems presently unnecessary any orders relating to construction of facilities since admittedly all construction is related directly to the plan and no new construction presently is proposed by the County Board except that specifically set out in and made an integral part of the proposed plan. From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now makes the following: Opinion of the Court Conclusions of L aw (1) That the integration plan filed by the County Board complies with all judicial and constitutional requirements for the abolition of all vestiges of the dual school system and the establishment of an effective unitary school system in Jefferson County, including, but not limited to, student and faculty assignment, transportation, all facilities, all ath letics and other school activities, and all school location and construction activities. 65a (2) The plan of the County Board should be and hereby is approved as filed. It should be noted that the plan of the County Board has met with the approval of HEW. In addition, the plan has the approval of Dr. Bascomb Woodward, Director, Bureau of School Services, of the University of Alabama, who was requested by HEW to carefully analyze the plan. Dr. Woodward expressed the opinion that the plan completely disestablishes all vestiges of the dual system and creates an effective unitary system of schools in Jefferson County. Contemporaneously with its plan, the County Board filed a motion to dismiss this proceeding alleging (correctly) that the plan complied with every judicial and constitutional requirement to accomplish a unitary school system for Jefferson County. It is the opinion of this court that “all litigation must sometime come to an end,” but in the subject case, the Fifth Circuit noted that: “ The district court shall enter findings of fact and con clusions of law regarding the efficacy of any plan which is approved to immediately disestablish the dual school system in question. Jurisdiction should be retained, however, under the teaching of Green, 391 U.S. at 439 and Raney 391 U.S. at 449, until it is clear that dis establishment has been achieved.” The court is treating the motion of the County Board to dismiss as a petition for a summary judgment that the County Board plan complies with all judicial and constitu tional requirements and the court hereby finds and declares that the attendance zone plan filed by the County Board does immediately disestablish the dual school system and does immediately establish a unitary system in Jefferson County. Opinion of the Court 66a Opinion of the Court The court retains jurisdiction of this case for the limited and restricted purpose of supervising the administration of the plan of the County Board as filed and herein and hereby approved. An express order of this court will be entered accordingly. This 5th day of August, 1969. / s / C. H. A llgood United States District Judge 67a APPENDIX 5 Memorandum Opinion of the Court (Filed August 5, 1969) I n the U nited S tates D istrict Court F or the N orthern D istrict of A labama S outhern D ivision Civil, A ction N o. 65-366 D oris E laine B rown, et al., Plaintiffs, U nited States of A merica, Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. B oard of E ducation of the City of B essemer, et al., Defendants. On April 17, 1967, in this case this court entered the precise mandated decree issuing from the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F. 2d 836, adopted on rehearing en banc, 380 F. 2d 385. Motions were filed on behalf of the plaintiff and the plaintiff-intervenor for an order requiring the defendants to adopt and imple ment a plan of pupil assignment based on criteria other than “Freedom of Choice” , and after appeal, in case No. 27444 on June 26, 1969, the Court of Appeals for the 68a Fifth Circuit promulgated another decree wherein it found that the “Freedom of Choice” had not disestablished the dual school system in Bessemer. The order of the Court of Appeals directed this court to require the School Board to file a plan to disestablish the dual system and to request the office of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare to collaborate with the defendant School Board in the prepara tion of such plans. Precise dates for the filing of such a plan were set out. An order of this court was issued on the 27th day of June, 1969, in compliance with the mandate of the appel late court. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare filed a plan on Friday, August 1, 1969. This plan only contemplated the initial step and in such plan stated: “ The demographic and geographic complexities of Bessemer require a much greater detailed examination than is normally required in desegregation plan development. The present size, location, and organiza tion of the schools require an intensive facilities and site survey in greater depth than is normally required. The lack of public and school-supported transporta tion necessitates a more in depth, time distance route survey. More collaboration and interaction is needed between the HEW team and local officials in order to develop a terminal plan that may require a complete reorganization of the entire school system.” The court was informed that this change necessitated the Bessemer Board deadline for filing its plan to be ex tended to Monday, August 4, 1969, and an order was entered to this effect. In chambers, the Departmnet of Health, Education and Welfare and the Justice Department agreed that the Memorandum Opinion of the Court 69a Bessemer plan was acceptable as a temporary measure and in open court the attorneys for the United States sub sequently confirmed this agreement. The Bessemer Plan only varied in relatively small details from the HEW plan. The current regulations of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare on school integration do not re quire total integration for the 1969-1970 school year where either the entire school system is more than 50 percent Negro or where a construction project is in construction which would affect the school integration plan. The Besse mer School System meets both of these tests. In addition to the percentage, it has under construction a large school which is planned to house grades 7 through 12, the enroll ment capacity of about 1,300 students. The plans show that there are 5,200 colored students and 2,951 white students in the Bessemer School System. Of the white students, 587 attend Greenwood Elementary School, which is located four to five miles from the nearest other city school. This school is also attended by students from Jefferson County under a special agreement with the County Board of Education. There are no colored students in the area, within the city limits. Any colored students who would attend this school would, of necessity, be zoned in under the county zoning plan. The results then show that in the heart city, those capable of being in school, in integrated schools, would only be 2,364 white students. The percentage of these whites and colored in this area is 32 percent white and 68 percent colored. Excluding the Greenwood Elementary School, the City of Bessemer at present operates four all Negro schools and six schools attended by children of both races which in the past have been all white. All faculties in the system, at all schools, were integrated during the past year. Memorandum Opinion of the Court 70a Under the Bessemer plan all of the formerly white schools within the City of Bessemer will be integrated with the exception of Greenwood. All other schools will be integrated from 15 to 38 percent of capacity and a total of 35 percent of the students attending these schools will be Negro during the coming school year. The faculties and staffs of all schools will be desegregated and in no case will the racial composition of the staff or faculty indicate that a school is intended for Negro or white students. On this date, August 5, 1969, counsel for the individual plaintiffs filed “ Objections to the Temporary Plan Offered by the City of Bessemer.” No evidence was introduced at the hearing in support of these objections and counsel for the individual plaintiffs agreed that additional time would be required to develop a terminal plan for the Bessemer School System. Memorandum Opinion of the Court F indings or F act (1) The interim plan submitted by the Bessemer School Board meets the requirements of the Fifth Circuit mandate to the extent reasonably possible at this time, and the court agrees with the observation of the Justice Depart ment, HEW and the Bessemer School Board that additional time, collaboration and interaction is needed between the parties to develop a terminal plan that may require the complete reorganization of the entire school system. 2 (2) The interim plan of the Bessemer School Board, as agreed by HEW and the Justice Department, is acceptable as a temporary measure and further time will be required to effect a plan that will create a completely unitary system in Bessemer. The court, at the suggestion of the parties, finds that such a plan might reasonably be formulated and filed by November 15, 1969. 71a Conclusions of L aw (1) That the interim plan as submitted by the Bessemer Board of Education is the best and most effective plan that could reasonably be formulated within the time allowed and, to that extent, complies with the mandate issued pur suant to the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals entered in this cause of June 26, 1969. (2) Action on the objections filed by and on behalf of the individual plaintiffs should be stayed pending the final report from the Bessemer School Board. 3 (3) All parties having agreed that additional time is required for the Bessemer Board “ to develop a terminal plan” , this court should give effect thereto in the absence of some compelling reason to the contrary which does not exist. An express order of this court will be entered accordingly. This 5th day of August, 1969. / s / C. H. A llgood United States District Judge 72a Order (Filed August 5, 1969) On the basis of the findings of fact and conclusions of law set out in a separate memorandum opinion of the court, in this cause this day entered and filed, It is, therefore, Ordered, A djudged and Decreed by the court as follows: (1) That the interim plan for the integration of the Bessemer School System filed by the Bessemer Board of Education on August 4,1969, be and the same hereby is approved. (2) That action on the objections to the plan filed on behalf of the individual plaintiffs on August 5, 1969, be and the same hereby is stayed and will be considered at the time the terminal plan of the Bessemer Board is filed and presented to the court. (3) That the Bessemer School Board be and it hereby is given until November 15, 1969, to prepare and file with this court a terminal plan to eliminate all vestiges of the dual system and to effectively establish a unitary plan for the operation of the Bessemer School System. (4) The Bessemer Board of Education shall continue to collaborate with the Office of Education of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the preparation of a final plan to disestablish the dual school system, and that such plan shall be filed by November 15, 1969. (5) Jurisdiction is retained until it is clear that the dis establishment of the dual system has been achieved. D one and Ordered this 5th day of August, 1969. / s / C. H. A llgood United States District Judge 73a APPENDIX 6 Order (Filed August 1, 1969) I n the U nited States D istrict Court F or the Southern D istrict or A labama S outhern D ivision Civil A ction No. 3003-63 B irdie M ae Davis, et al., and Plaintiff, U nited States of A merica, by Ramsey Clark, Attorney General, etc., Plaintiff -Inter venor, v. B oard of S chool Commissioners of M obile County, et al., Defendants, and T wtla F razier, et al., Intervenors. It is difficult for one unschooled in the field of education to implement a plan to operate the Mobile County Public School System in any fashion, but I am confronted with doing just that in what I hope will he a practical and workable way within the law. 74a Order The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal have inter preted the law. We may agree with their interpretation or not, but we must follow it. In approaching this task, which is without doubt the most difficult as well as important that I have ever encountered, I have called upon any and every source at my command for assistance. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, with inadequate time, has filed a plan with which I can agree in part and disagree in part. It contains some provisions which I think are both impractical and educationally un sound. HEW readily acknowledges that this plan is not perfect and invites the School Board to suggest improve ments. The School Board has filed absolutely no plan for the assistance of the court. The professional staff of the Mobile Public School System did, as authorized by the School Board, work with HEW in attempting to formulate such a plan, but their efforts did not meet with the ap proval of the School Board. The court has the benefit of such work, but wishes to make it clear that such was never approved by the School Board, though the end results in many areas were substantially in accord with HEW. With eight years of litigation, entailing countless days and weeks of hearings in court, it has been clearly estab lished that the Mobile County School System must forth with be operated in accordance with the law of the land. What this school system needs is to educate children legally, and not to engage in protracted litigation. After all, the children are the ones in whom we should be most inter ested. With this in mind, I get to the business at hand. The plan filed by HEW calls for its implementation by the beginning of the 1969-70 school term of all rural schools and all metropolitan areas west of Interstate Highway 65. 75a Order It clearly states that its plan for all metropolitan areas east of 1-65 cannot possibly be implemented before the 1970-71 school term. In this, the court is in complete agree ment. As to the rural schools and all metropolitan areas west of 1-65, the Court Orders, A djudges and Decrees the fol lowing plan under which the Mobile County School System will operate, beginning with the school term of 1969-70: I . Attendance area zones for all rural schools of the Sys tem, elementary, junior high and high schools, are directed in accordance with maps hereto attached, marked Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. II. Attendance area zones for the metropolitan schools lo cated west of 1-65, elementary, junior high and high schools, are directed in accordance with maps hereto attached, marked Exhibits 4, 5 and 6. III. Attendance area zones for the metropolitan elementary and junior high schools located east of Interstate Highway 65 shall be the identical zones as those utilized for the past school year, 1968-69. IV. The metropolitan senior high schools located east of In terstate Highway 65, including the Toulminville High School, shall operate under the freedom of choice desegre gation plan and each student shall attend the school which was selected during the recent choice period of May, 1969; 76a Order however, every senior high school student living west of Interstate Highway 65 must attend the senior high school serving his attendance area, notwithstanding the student’s choice to attend a high school located east of Interstate Highway 65. V. The court is not satisfied with the Plan set out by HEW for the metropolitan schools lying east of 1-65 for imple mentation for the 1970-71 school term. The court knows that further study will result in a far better and more practical, as well as legal, plan. VI. The School Board is hereby ordered to file with the court, not later than December 1, 1969, a suggested desegregation plan for all of the metropolitan schools located east of 1-65. This plan shall be formulated by the School Board in consideration of the mandate of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals of June 3, 1969 and after further study and col laboration with HEW officials. The School Board is hereby ordered to file a detailed progress report to the court on October 10, 1969 and November 20, 1969 outlining the steps taken in formulating the plan. The court fervently hopes that the decree herein entered and the plan of December 1, 1969 will end further litigation for the public school system of Mobile County. VII. F aculty For the 1969-70 school term and subsequent years, the faculty of each school, including the principals, teachers, tearcher’s aides, and other staff members wTho work directly Order with the children, shall have a racial composition not iden tifiable as a school for negro or white students. For the upcoming year, the School Board shall assign, as far as is educationally feasible, the staff described above so that the racial composition of each school’s faculty shall reflect substantially, the racial composition of the teachers in the entire school system. Staff members who work directly with children, and pro fessional staff who work on the administrative level, shall be hired, assigned, promoted, paid, demoted, dismissed and otherwise treated without regard to race, color, or national origin, except to the extent necessary to erase segregation. I f there is to be a reduction in the number of principals, teachers, teacher-aides or other professional staff employed by the school district, which will result in a dismissal or demotion of any such staff members, the staff member to be dismissed or demoted must be selected on the basis of objective and reasonable non-discriminatory standards from among all the staff of the school district. In additions, if there is any such dismissal or demotion, no staff vacancy may be filled through recruitment of a person of a race, color, or national origin different from that of the indi vidual dismissed or demoted, until each displaced member who is qualified has had an opportunity to fill the vacancy and has failed to accept an offer to do so. “ Demotion” as used above includes any reassignment (1) under which the staff member receives less pay or has less responsibility than under the assignment he held previ- ouly, (2) which requires a lesser degree of skill than did the assignment he held previously, or (3) under which the staff member is asked to teach a subject or grade other than one for which he is certified or for which he has had substantial experience within a reasonably current period. 78a Order In general and depending upon the subject matter involved, five years is such a reasonable period. VIII. The Toulminville School for the year 1969-70 is to be operated in the same grade level as it was last year. IX. The five per cent transfer provision for children of minor ity groups set out in the court’s plan of last year is com pletely deleted. X. P ublic N otice The School Board shall publish or cause to have pub lished in the local newspaper, the complete text of this decree and the maps, identified as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, to this court’s decree. The decree and maps shall be published once a day for three consecutive days, alter nating the morning and evening editions of the newspaper. In addition, the School Board shall post or cause to he posted in a conspicuous place in each school in the System, and at the offices of the School Board, copies of the map outlining the particular school’s area attendance zone. This notice provision also applies to those elementary and junior high schools, east of 1-65, which shall operate under last year’s attendance area zones. Dated: August 1, 1969. / s / Daniel H. T homas 79a APPENDIX 7 Order (Filed June 20, 1969) I n the U nited States D istkict Court F or the Southern D istrict of Georgia A ugusta D ivision Civil A ction N o. 1369 N eely B ennett, et al., vs. Plaintiffs, R. E. E vans, et al., Defendants. Civil A ction No. 1443 A llene P atricia A nn B ennett, a minor by R. B. Bennett, her father and next friend, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. B urke County B oard of E ducation, et al., Defendants. These two cases were consolidated by me for hearing under an order entered on May 8, 1969. In the first action (No. 1369) petitioners attacked the constitutionality of the Georgia statutes governing election of school board mem bers by grand juries. Plaintiffs also sought ancillary dam- 80a Order ages. The complaint did not expressly seek desegregation of the dual system of white and black schools. Petitioners did allege, however, that they and other Negroes are de nied the full and equal benefit of public education in Burke County, free of discrimination or segregation because of their race or color. A Three-Judge Court which was convened in No. 1369 dissolved itself and left future questions to a single district judge. The constitutional issue in a similar case is noiv before the Supreme Court of the United States. The other case (No. 1443) which is brought by some of the same plaintiffs attacks the “ freedom of choice plan” in existence in Burke County and seeks injunctive relief from the operation of a compulsory bi-racial school system. An evidentiary hearing was held in this case, involving the desegregation issue only, at Augusta on June 17th. I announced my views at the completion of the evidence and now formalize them by Findings of Fact and Conclu sions of Law. I also expressed my intentions as to an interlocutory order. The order which appears at the end of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law utilizes the provisions of Title 42, §2000c-2, United States Code, providing for expert technical assistance by the Office of Education in the preparation, adoption and implementa tion of plans for desegregation of public schools. F indings of F act 1. Burke County, Georgia, at the last census had a popu lation of 20,596 inhabitants of whom 13,699 were Negroes and 6,927 were whites. 2 2. During the 1968-69 school year the total school popu lation was 5,433 of whom 1,586 were white students and 81a Order 3,847 black. Negroes comprise 70.1% of the school enroll ment. 3. There are eleven schools in the public school system. Of these seven are Negro and four are white. The Burke County system is organized, and always has been, as a dual one based upon race. Since the school year 1965-66 a free- doom of choice plan has been in existence. Prior to that time only colored students to seven schools. 4. Under the freedom of choice plan no white student attended during the past year any Negro School. No Ne groes attended two of the four white schools. Out of a total enrollment of 782 pupils there were 27 colored stu dents at Waynesboro Elementary. Three Negroes attend Waynesboro High School which has a total enrollment of 380. 5. The percentage of Negro students in other than en tirely black schools is approximately 0.7% of the total colored pupil population. 6. During the 1968-69 school year the number and race of the students enrolled at the eleven schools was as follows: Pupils Pupils School Grades White Black Cousins (Sardis) ............. ..... 1-8 0 366 Girard (Girard) ............... ..... 1-8 0 336 S. R. Dinkins (Midville) ........ 1-8 0 359 Palmer (Keysville) ......... ..... 1-8 0 214 Gough (Gough) ................. ..... 1-7 0 349 82a Order School Grades Pupils White Pubils Block Blakeney Elementary ....... (Waynesboro) ..... 1-7 0 1126 Blakeney High .................. (Waynesboro) .... 8-12 0 915 Waynesboro Elementary ...... 1-8 755 27 Waynesboro H igh ......... ..... .... 9-12 377 3 Sardis-Girard-Alexander .. (Sardis) .... 1-12 357 0 Midville Elementary ......... .... 1-7 49 0 7. The total number of faculty members in the Burke County school system is 212 of whom 139 are Negro. No white teachers teach in black schools. No black teachers teach in white schools. 8. The school bus system is maintained on a segregated, duplicative and overlapping basis. 9. In 1966 H.E.W. cut off Federal assistance funds to the Burke County system, which aid amounted at that time to $209,340.58 annually. 10. Six of the seven Negro schools have lost accredita tion because, or mainly because, of over-crowded conditions. Conclusions of L aw 1. The defendants have discriminated against Negro stu dents on account of their race in violation o f the Four teenth Amendment in the operation of the Burke County system by maintaining a dual school system based on race. 83a Order 2. Until the freedom of choice plan not a single white child, and this is the invariable pattern, has chosen to attend the traditionally Negro schools. More than 99% of the colored children continue to attend all-Negro schools. This is constitutionally unacceptable. Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Raney v. Board of Education of the Gould School, 391 U.S. 443 (1968); United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School District, et al., (5th Cir., April 11, 1969); United States v. Greenwood Municipal Separate School District, et al., (5th Cir., February 4,1969); Adams et al. and United States v. Mathews et al., (5th Cir.), 403 F.2d 181. 3. The existing freedom of choice approach offers no hope of achieving at any time in the near future the degree of integration necessary to satisfy the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in these and other decisions. 4. “ It is an affirmative duty of each school board in this circuit to abolish the vestiges of state-compelled segre gation and to establish a unitary system which achieves substantial desegregation . . . At the very least this means that this school board has an obligation to see that schools in this district remain no longer all-Negro schools or all-white schools enrolling only an infini tesimal fraction of Negro students.” United States v. Indianola Municipal Separate School District, supra. O b d e e It is ordered that the Board of Education of Burke County shall promptly submit to the Office of Education, 84a Order H.E.W., the existing methods of operation of the System and shall seek to develop by July 30, 1969, in collaboration and co-operation with the experts in the Office a workable and acceptable plan of desegregation and operation of the schools consonant with the practical and administrative problems faced by the Board. If such a plan can be agreed upon by July 30th, this Court will approve same unless the Plaintiffs at a hearing makes a satisfactory showing that the plan does not meet constitutional standards. If no plan is developed within the period referred to, the Office of Education is respectfully requested to submit to the Court as soon as practicable their recommendations for a workable plan. Absent a showing by the parties at a hearing, this Court will, after due consideration of any plan so submitted by the Office of Education, enter a de cree. Such a hearing will be held at Savannah on August 8, 1969 at 10:00 o ’clock a.m. The Court expresses the earnest hope that an acceptable plan will evolve— one which, while satisfying judicial inter pretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, will not produce, through overnight revolution, complete disruption and an end product of a second or third rate education for the children of Burke County. This June 20th, 1969. A lexander A . L awrence Chief Judge, United States District Court Southern District of Georgia 85a Order (Filed August 22, 1969) There came on to be heard on August 15, 1969 the matter of approval of the interim plan of desegregation of schools in the public school system of Burke County, Georgia de veloped by the Burke County Board of Education in col laboration with the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and submitted pursuant to the order passed herein on June 20, 1969 to be effective for the 1969-70 school year; and it appearing that the proposed plan is acceptable to and has the approval of the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Edu cation and Welfare as applicable to that particular school year; and after hearing from counsel for plaintiffs and defendants, no satisfactory showing having been made why such plan should not be approved; I t is ordered that said interim plan be and the same is hereby approved to be effective for the school year 1969-70 with the Board of Education of Burke County to take the necessary steps to implement the same in all respects, which plan is substantially as follows: Student Desegregation 1. All predominantly white schools will be brought up to capacity with Negro students so as to result in a minimum of 68 Negro students assigned to and enrolled in Waynes boro High School, a minimum of 167 Negro students as signed to and enrolled in Sardis-Girard-Alexander Elemen tary and High School, a minimum of 89 Negro students assigned to and enrolled in Waynesboro Elementary School and a minimum of 35 Negro students assigned to and en rolled in Midville Elementary School. 86a Order 2. Vocational Department at Blakeney High School to serve the entire County with the schedule to be worked out by the Burke County Board of Education. Desegregation of Faculty and other Staff 3. Full desegregation of faculty and other staff in the grades affected by the assignments of students as above, including district-wide desegregation of faculty and other staff in each school to at least 7 white and 14 Negro of the recommendation contained in Part 1 of Section III as set forth on page 4 of the document transmitted to the Court by the United States Office of Education, H.E.W., under date of August 11, 1969. It is f u r t h e r o rdered that the Board of Education of Burke County proceed promptly to consult and collaborate with the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare toward the development of a work able and acceptable plan of desegregation and operation of the schools in said County for the 1970-71 school year consonant with the practicable and administrative prob lems involved, and satisfying the constitutional require ments of the Fourteenth Amendment as judicially inter preted, and to submit such plan to the Court for consider ation and approvul as soon as the same shall have boon developed and agreed upon. Should no such plan be agreed upon and submitted by the Burke County Board of Educa tion as herein provided within a reasonable time hereafter, the Court shall thereupon require the Office of Education of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to pre pare and submit to the Court its plan and recommendation following which the Court shall take appropriate action for the adoption and approval of a plan to be effective for the 87a Order 1970-71 school year which shall be acceptable to the Court as meeting constitutional standards. The Court retains jurisdiction for the passage of such further orders as may be appropriate with respect to any relief to which any party may hereafter be entitled in the premises. This day of August, 1969. / s / A lexander A . L awrence Chief Judge, United States District Court Southern District of Georgia 88a APPENDIX 8 Order (Filed August 12, 1969) I n the U nited States D isteict Court F or the M iddle D istrict of Georgia M acon D ivision Civil A ction N o. 1926 Shirley B ivins, et al., v. Plaintiffs, B ibb County B oard of E ducation and Orphanage for B ibb County, et al., Defendants. B ootle, District Judge: The schools in the Bibb County system began their de segregation program on a graduated basis, certain grades by certain years, under order of this court dated April 24, 1964. Later by order dated June 29, 1967 a Jefferson-type decree was entered requiring compulsory freedom of choice by all students and desegregation of all grades commencing with 1967-68. On June 28, 1968, plaintiffs, encouraged by and citing, Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 20 L. ed. 716 decided May 27, 1968, filed their Motion for further relief. An evidentiary hearing was held on August 19, 1968. Then on September 16, 1968 this court issued an interim order reciting that 89a Order (1) of the total of 58 schools 34 had been desegregated as to students, and 55 as to faculty; (2) 20% of the Negro students were attending formerly all-white schools; (3) freedom of choice was complete and unfettered; (4) no student choosing to attend a school where his race was in the minority was being denied his right to do so; (5) 62% of all students were then attending bi-racial schools; (6) that four formerly all-white schools had virtually reached the overall countywide ratio of 60% to 40% Negro; (7) that one formerly all-white school had obtained the ratio of 53% Negro and 47% white; (8) that ten other formerly all-white schools then ranged in Negro student attendance from 9% to 26%; (9) that out of a total faculty of 1614, 139 were then teaching in schools of predominantly the opposite race, and ordering the defendants to reassess the situation and submit by November 28,1968 a plan showing what they pro posed to do in light of then current court decisions. Accordingly, on November 29, 1968 defendants replied that unquestionably in their judgment the freedom of choice plan is the only one by which a “unitary, non-racial system” for Bibb County can be obtained on a permanent basis, that in order to attain such a system so far as students are con cerned, such a system as to faculty must first be attained, that great progress was being made in all respects and 90a Order particularly with reference to obtaining faculty cross-overs, that these faculty cross-overs were being obtained even on a voluntary basis, that the cross-overs of 139 mentioned in the interim order had already (by November 29, 1968) in creased to 181 (with 307 seen possible by June 1, 1969). The plan accompanying this response proposed and strongly advocated the continuance of the freedom of choice plan and recited: “ The freedom of choice for students has progressed very satisfactorily, except for the failure of white stu dents to choose all-Negro schools for attendance. “The prospects are bright for continued integration of Negro students into formerly all-white schools; and, if some satisfactory method can be attained to expe dite integration of the faculties in the Negro schools, integration of students in these schools will improve.” Forwarded to the court with this response and proposed plan were certain brochures, some of them containing pho tographs, which defendants’ staff had been keeping concern ing integrated activities at these schools including “ 1) Workshop and seminar for desegregation; “2) Sports; “3) Steering Committee for Curriculum Development; “4) ‘Inkwell,’ weekly newspaper of A. L. Miller Senior High School, Friday, October 4, 1968; “ 5) ‘The Lasseter Lantern,’ weekly newspaper of Las- seter High School, Friday, October 25, 1968; “ 6) Loose-leaf notebook with pictures of various inte grated classrooms from various schools, showing stu dents at work; 91a Order “ 7) Loose-leaf notebook showing ‘some of the integrated activities of Bibb County Schools, as reflected in news releases, etc.’ ; “8) Loose-leaf notebook with pictures showing further integration in various schools, etc. of the system; “9) Loose-leaf notebook disclosing additional pictures of classrooms and activities in the schools.” Plaintiff filed no objections to the proposed plan of November 29, 1968 except such as are contained in their “Motion for Further Relief” filed June 4, 1969. This latest motion for further relief makes no contention that freedom of choice is not really free, admits that over 20% of the Negro students in the County are attending formerly all- white schools, complains that actually too many Negro stu dents have chosen to attend four of the formerly all-white schools and lists the following figures: “ 1968 Choice P eeiod School R ace T otal (1) Alexander II White 341 Negro 266 (2) J. W. Burke White 489 Negro 254 (3) Clisby White 384 Negro 197 (4) Winship White 254 Negro 284 92a “ 1969 Choice P eriod S chool (1) Alexander II (2) J. W. Burke (3) Clisby (4) Winship Order R ace T otal White 268 Negro 357 White 315 Negro 333 White 295 Negro 263 Whdte 196 Negro 342.” So it is that the gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint, if not their sole complaint (other than not enough faculty inte gration) is the fact that thus far no white students have chosen to attend any of the 20 formerly all-Negro schools. They thus argue that freedom of choice is not working, or is not working fast enough, to suit them and they pray for attendance zoning plus consolidation of grades or schools or both. Defendants’ response to this June 4, 1969 Motion for Further Relief tiled June 17, 1969, alleged, inter alia, that: 1. Twenty-seven per cent of the Negro students are now attending previously all-white schools and that by Septem ber 1, 1969 this will be increased to at least 30%; 2. The 139 faculty cross-overs above mentioned had increased to 184 (118 Negroes and 66 whites) with an esti mate of at least 239 by September 1, 1969; 3 3. Plans have been completed for the operation begin ning 1969-70 of a driver education center at a formerly all-Negro High School for 600 students completely inte- 93a Order grated, and that plans were underway for a complete duplication of this program at another of the formerly all- Negro High Schools also beginning 1969-70. 4. There was a steady improvement in the quality of education in the formerly all-Negro schools; 5. That included in the general presentments of the Bibb County Grand Jury for the October and December Terms, 1968 was the following: “ The Bibb County Board of Education is to be com mended for the programs and over-all performance of all phases of the system along with the good race relations that exist in the schools. “We find that the present plan of freedom of choice for students is working well and it is hoped that the courts will see fit to let this plan prevail. Progress has also been made in the integration of teachers and will continue under the present program.” An amended response filed July 7, 1969 alleged, inter alia, (1) that the faculty cross-over figure had already reached 231 and revised the estimate for September 1, 1969 from 239 to 278; (2) that a Summer School program was then being conducted involving an enrollment of 5,373 students, 673 whites and 4,700 Negroes; that of these, 82 white and 623 Negro students were in the Head Start Program conducted at seven centers, one at a formerly all- Negro school and six at formerly all-white schools; that all seven would have been at formerly all-Negro schools except that the United States required that these six be at for merly all-white schools; that of this Summer enrollment 500 white and 1,500 Negro students were involved in a 94a Order library program conducted at nine centers, 8 formerly all- Negro and 1 formerly all-white, with some white students participating at each of the eight formerly all-Negro centers; of the remaining students participating in this program 21 whites attended Hamilton, formerly all-Negro, 8 whites attended Maude Pye, formerly all-Negro, 1 white attended Hartley formerly all-Negro, and 8 whites attended Ballard Hudson Jr., formerly all-Negro, and at Winship School there were 41 white and 59 Negro students. An evidentiary hearing was held on July 7 and July 8, 1969. At this hearing there was admitted into evidence over the objections of plaintiffs all of the brochures and photographs above mentioned. The evidence adduced amply proved and established all of the factual allegations con tained in the above mentioned pleadings of the defendants and I find the facts to be as so alleged and as above recited. At the conclusion of that hearing this court requested the defendants to study the Green case carefully and to submit proposed amendments to their present freedom of choice plan setting forth what additional steps they can take and are willing to take (meaning without impairing the educational efficiency of the schools, of course) in order to disestablish the racial identifiability of these 20 formerly all-Negro schools. Accordingly, on July 18, 1969, defendants filed their “Proposed Amendments to Present Freedom of Choice Plan” consisting of eight typewritten pages. The plaintiffs have filed their written objections to these proposed amend ments and all these matters have been carefully considered. The proposed amendments speak for themselves. A very brief discussion will suffice. Paragraph 1 will effectually prevent resegregation of any school by permitting defendants to limit the right of a 95a Order child to transfer to any school where his or her race in that school exceeds the percentage that the child’s race occupies county-wide. Paragraph 2 sets forth fifteen additional steps defendants propose to take to eliminate completely and permanently any racial identification that may still persist with respect to any of the schools in the system, as follows: (a) driver education courses in 2 formerly all-Negro High Schools and a formerly all-Negro Junior High School; (b) a Pre-Vocational Laboratory-Oriented Program in formerly all-Negro Elementary schools; (c) special reading clinics in formerly all-Negro ele mentary schools; (d) continuance of “ Summer School Learning Adven tures 1969” almost exclusively in all-Negro schools; (e) Confining the regular Summer School program of 1970, and thereafter if feasible, to formerly all-Negro schools; (f) prompt study of feasibility and desirability of closing certain of the formerly all-Negro schools; (g) issuing certificates and diplomas by the System without identifying the name of any particular school; (h) rotating seminars for gifted students throughout the system with emphasis on holding same at formerly all-Negro schools; (i) encouraging joint school activities involving stu dents from both formerly all-Negro and all-white schools, such meetings to be scheduled wherever fea sible at formerly all-Negro schools; 96a Order (j) studying the feasibility of constructing an Instruc tional Materials Center for joint use by teachers and students of both races; (k) doing away with the unintentional and (until recently) unnoticed survival of the ancient practice of listing white and Negro schools separately in the System’s Yearbook; (l) holding in-service meetings of teachers primarily at formerly all-Negro schools; (m) complete integration of transportation facilities including assignment of some Negro bus drivers to busses primarily having white students; (n) soliciting public cooperation in supporting the plan as amended; (o) periodic review of these measures and careful attention and study of other action that might be under taken in the future. Paragraph 3 proposes in view of recent appellate deci sions binding upon this court, including United States v. Baldwin County Board of Education, 5 Cir. 1969, ------ F. 2d ------ , [No. 27281, July 9, 1969], immediate faculty in tegration to the extent that the race of at least 1 of every 5 faculty members in a school must be different from the race of the majority of the faculty members of that school. This court hereby approves the proposed amendments and hereby makes said proposed amendments a part of said plan. This court finds that the defendants are acting in good faith in the premises and that the plan as hereby amended has '“ real prospects for dismantling the (former) state- imposed dual system ‘at the earliest practicbale date’ ” . 97a Order Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 20 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968), and that it will do so “ in any way that will improve rather than disrupt the education of the children concerned.” H.E.W.’s Statement of Policy, July 4, 1969. This court further finds as facts and concludes as matters of law: (a) that this plan as hereby amended will be effective “to effectuate a transition to a racially nondis- criminatory school system.” Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301; Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 28 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968). This assumes, of course, as this court has a right to assume and expect, full and complete compliance with said plan as amended; (b) said plan is adequate “to convert [the former dual system] to a unitary system in Avhich racial discrimination a [would] will be eliminated root and branch” ; Green, supra; (c) the plan as amended “promises realistically to work now” , Adams, et al. v. Matthews, et al, 5 Cir. 1969,------ F. 2d ------- [No. 26501, August 26,1968], (d) inasmuch as the defendants are acting in good faith and the plan has real prospects for disman tling the former state-imposed dual system at the earliest practicable date “ it provide(s) effective relief.” Green v. School Board of Neiv Kent County, supra. For this court’s appraisal and appreciation of freedom of choice as being entirely lawful and the best and fairest method yet suggested for accomplishing desegregation, see memorandum opinion in the case of Hilson, et al v. Ousts, et al, in Civil Action No. 2449, Macon Division, August 8 1969. This memorandum is intended to suffice as findings of a fact and conclusions of law. So Ordered, this 12th day of August, 1969. / s / W . A. B ootle United States District Judge 98a APPENDIX 9 Order (Filed August 12, 1969) I n the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT F oe the M iddle D istrict of Georgia M acon D ivision Civil A ction N o. 2077 Oscar C. T homie, J r ., et al., Plaintiffs, v. H ouston County B oard of E ducation, Defendant. B ootle, District Judge: The schools of this system are operating under a freedom of choice plan approved by this court originally on May 20, 1965. That plan was on a graduated basis, desegregating certain classes by certain years. The plan was accelerated by a further decree of April 24, 1967. Later and on Sep tember 7, 1967 “ as of” June 22, 1967, a full Jefferson-type decree was entered desegregating all grades commencing 1967-68 and requiring all students both white and Negro to exercise free choice annually. Then on June 28, 1968, inspired by and relying upon, Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 20 L. Ed. 716, decided May 27, 1968, plaintiffs filed their Motion for Further Relief complaining that during the March, 1968 choice 99a Order period only 17.9% of the 3,210 Negro students had chosen to attend previously all-white schools and that no white students had chosen to attend previously all-Negro schools. They seek some form of forcible assignment of students as by zoning, or pairing “designed to effect racially balanced schools.” Defendants’ response to the Motion alleged that the March, 1968, choice percentage was approximately 19% rather than 17.9%, as alleged; that freedom of choice had not failed, and that in any event defendants would be un able to perform and comply with a decree such as plain tiffs sought. On August 19, 1968 an evidentiary hearing was held. On September 30, 1968, an interim order was issued correctly reciting that considerable progress had been made under the Jefferson decree; that of the total of 23 schools, 16, had been desegregated as to students and 20 as to faculty; that 18.8% of the Negro students were attending formerly all-white schools, counting 53 Negro students re questing and approved for enrollment in previously all- white schools but who as of September 6, 1968 had not enrolled in any school in the system and whom the school authorities were attempting to locate (if these 53 are not counted the correct percentage would be 17.2); freedom of choice is really free and unfettered; 77.7% of all students were attending bi-racial schools; total enrollment was 15,512, 12,217 (78%) white and 3,295 (22%) Negro; in one formerly all-white school Watson Elementary 23.3% enrollment was Negro, and that as to faculty 25 persons out of a total of 668 had crossed-over, exclusive of 8 white persons working systemwide in all schools. Said order invited the defendants to reassess the situation and submit an amended plan. 100a Order The defendants’ response, filed November 27, 1968, sub mitted that freedom of choice was working satisfactorily and that the suggested alternative methods were not rea sonably available, and were not feasible. It submitted fur ther that the condition of having only Negro students in a few schools would “ resolve itself as students transfer, Ne gro faculty transfer out and white faculty transfer in.” A second interim order dated June 18, 1969 requested up-to-date information and defendants responded on June 25, 1969, inter alia, that whereas there were 33 faculty cross-overs in 1968-69 they planned 43 for 1969-70, 33 Ne gro and 10 white. On June 25, 1969 plaintiffs filed their second Motion for Further Relief seeking zoning and consolidation of grades or schools or both. A second evidentiary hearing was held on July 8, 1969, at the conclusion of which the court ordered the defendants to file proposed amendments to their freedom of choice plan setting forth all steps they thought they could safely take toward disestablishing the racial identifiability of all the schools in this system in cluding a fair and somewhat liberal transfer of faculty members, meaning of course without impairing the educa tional efficiency of the schools. The plaintiffs were also invited to file a proposed plan. And the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was invited to confer with defendants and file a proposed plan except that if all three could agree, only one plan would be necessary, or if any two and only two could agree on a plan, then only two plans would be necessary. H.E.W. filed a proposed plan and so did the defendants. The plaintiffs did not. The defendants have filed many detailed specific objections to the H.E.W. plan which was based on zoning, pairing and consolidation, alleging that it is unworkable and would dis rupt the system bringing chaos and confusion. 101a Order The ease is now ready for a final order insofar as an order in a school case is ever final. This memorandum is intended to suffice as findings of fact and conclusions of law. I find the facts to be as recited in the pleadings of the defendants and as stated and summarized above. I find additonally that the faculty ratio is approximately 20% Negro and 80% white, with substantial vacancies now existing, approximately the same as the student enrollment recited above as 22% Negro and 78% white. Defendants have many and difficult problems in faculty recruitment. An unusually large percentage of faculty comes from out side the County. In a good faith effort to achieve faculty desegregation in the fall of 1968, 9 additional Negro teach ers were assigned to teach in white schools but resigned. This brings us now to a brief discussion of the defen dants’ proposed amendments. They cover six typewritten pages and speak for themselves. Paragraph 1 deals with the faculty and this court is convinced that the defendants have conscientiously, with respect to faculty integration as well as with respect to all other matters dealt with in said proposed amendments, fairly gauged their own. ability with respect to going as far as they safely can in an effort to disestablish the racial identifiability of all schools in the system without impair ing the educational efficiency of the system. In substance, they propose to achieve a ratio of five Negro teachers to one white teacher in all of the formerly all-Negro schools in the system, transferring to the formerly all-white schools all Negro teachers displaced by the white teachers. All staff meetings and all faculty meetings will be integrated as will all teacher in-service meetings. Paragraph 2 deals with students and points out that at the end of the free choice period recently held 21.1% of 102a Order the Negro students have chosen to attend formerly all- white schools. This figure will jump to 28% this fall when grades 9— 12 in the Pearl Stephens High School, formerly all-Negro, is phased out causing some 204 Negro students to be moved into two formerly all-white schools. Addition ally, Elberta School, presently attended only by Negro stu dents, will be discontinued thereby giving its 176 Negro students the further opportunity to choose formerly all- white schools if they so desire. Additionally, consideration is being given to the feasibility of phasing out the seventh and eighth grades in Pearl Stephens School, formerly all Negro, thus necessitating the choice of some other school by those students. School bus transportation is to be completely nonsegregated. Resegregation is to be avoided by the Board’s being authorized to restrict pupil transfers and the exercise of freedom of choice to a reasonable ap proximation of the race ratio existing in the school popu lation. Paragraph 3 lists eight additional steps to be taken by the defendants, namely: (a) the initiation of a minimum of 15 interchanges of classes per school term for seventh and eighth grade students in industrial arts, home econom ics, and academic activities between Rumble and Tabor Junior High Schools, formerly all-white, and Pearl Ste phens School, formerly all-Negro; (b) the initiation of a minimum of 15 such exchanges per school term in classes in vocational and academic activities in the Perry area in predominantly Negro and predominantly white schools; (c) the initiation of an exchange of students at the elementary level from formerly all-white schools to formerly all-Negro schools, and vice versa, it being contemplated that all classes in the formerly all-Negro schools will have this experience during the school year and that necessarily a 103a Order comparable number of classes from the formerly all-wbite schools will make the exchange over into the formerly all- Negro schools; (d) the initiation, if defendants’ application for funds therefor is granted, of a comprehensive driver training program to be held daily on a fully integrated basis; (e) joint meetings once each quarter on a rotation basis between the schools of student councils, newspaper staffs, annual staffs, and class officers in the seventh through twelfth grades; (f) converting Elberta School, formerly all-Negro, into an Adult Basic Educational Learning Cen ter fully integrated; (g) the holding of the Summer School program exclusively at formerly all-Negro schools at the elementary level; and (h) a feasibility study looking to ward closing certain other formerly all-Negro schools and finding further activities to eradicate racially identifiable schools. Defendants represent to the court that these proposed amendments are wise and prudent at this time and that their implementation will not cause a deterioration in the quality of education provided to the students in the system. They represent to the court further that in their opinion nothing further can be accomplished at this time without placing in jeopardy the quality of education provided for the children of the County. This court hereby approves the proposed amendments and hereby makes said proposed amendments a part of said plan. This court finds that the defendants are acting in good faith in the premises and that the plan as hereby amended has “ real prospects for dismantling the (former) state im posed dual system ‘at the earliest practicable date.’ ” Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 20 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968), and that it will do so “ in a way 104a Order that will improve rather disrupt the education of the chil dren concerned.” H.E.W.’s Statement of Policy, July 4, 1969. This court further finds as facts and concludes as matters of law: (a) that this plan as hereby amended will be effec tive “ to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscrimina- tory school system.” Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301; Green v. School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 20 L. Ed. 2d 716 (1968). This assumes, of course, as this court has a right to assume and expect, full and complete compli ance with said plan as amended; (b) said plan is adequate “ to convert [the former dual system] to a unitary system in which racial discrimination [would] will be eliminated root and branch” ; Green, supra; (c) the plan as amended “ promises realistically to work now,” Adams v. Mathews, 403 F. 2d 181 (5th Cir. 1968), (d) inasmuch as the defen dants are acting in good faith and the plan has real prospects for dismantling the former state-imposed dual system at the earliest practicable date “ it provide(s) effec tive relief.” Green v. School Board of New Kent County, supra. For this court’s appraisal and appreciation of freedom of choice as being entirely lawful and the best and fairest method yet suggested for accomplishing desegregation, see memorandum opinion in the case of Hilson, et al. v. Ousts, et al., Civil Action No. 2449, Macon Division, August 8, 1969. So Ordered, this 12 day of August, 1969. W . A. B ootle United States District Judge 105a APPENDIX 10 Order (Filed March 4, 1969) I n the U nited States D istrict Court F or the Northern District of F lorida M arianna D ivision M arianna Civil A ction No. 572 Jean Carolyn Y oungblood, et al., Plaintiffs, U nited States of A merica, vs. Plaintiff-Intervenor, T he B oard of P ublic I nstruction of B ay County, F lorida, et al., Defendants. The Court has concluded that there was no need what soever for an evidentiary hearing for consideration of defendants’ proposed plan for school year 1969-70. Every conceivable scrap of factual data about the operation of the schools under the defendants’ jurisdiction has been placed upon the record, including a detailed so-called “ dot map” showing the residences of school children and the location of the schools. In addition, the record is replete with statis tics which show precisely the racial composition of each school with respect to pupils, teachers and administrative personnel. There are simply no more relevant facts to be obtained. Every request for information and data by either 106a Order party has been buttressed by an order of the Court and has been complied with. At hearing on this motion, counsel suggested that evi dence might be presented by experts to advise the Court what, in their opinion, would be the best solution to the various problems. By denying this motion for evidentiary hearing, counsel is not precluded from filing with the Court any suggestions supported by scholars or experts in any field and the same will be fully considered. This may be made part of counsel’s brief if it is so desired. In the final analysis, however, the posture of this litiga tion for this year simply calls for a judicial decision which must be made by the Court upon the facts now thoroughly and fully developed. Moreover, there is a time factor involved here. This school system is operating under a Jefferson-type decree which went into effect September 1967. Further protracted delays could only lead to the waste of public funds for educational purposes in the necessary planning for the open ing of the schools in September 1969, together with attend ant utter confusion for thousands of school children, fac ulty, and those charged with the administration of the public schools. Realizing this, this Court in January 1969 directed that all basic data needed by either party be made part of the record as soon as practicable. A schedule was established looking first to a hearing on April 10. Upon reconsideration, the Court determined that this schedule was too slow and was accelerated to the point that all the factual data was required to be filed much earlier. Under the direction of the Court the defendants filed their plan under the accelerated schedule. Counsel for plaintiffs have made oral motion for an opportunity to file further brief or comment with respect to the proposed plan heard and 107a Order considered on March 3, 1969 and this is granted under a schedule whereby all briefs, by both plaintiffs and defen dants, will be filed by March 14, 1969. Done and Ordered in Chambers at Tallahassee this 4th day of March 1969. G. H arrold Carswell Chief Judge 108a Order (Filed April 3, 1969) All facts were fully developed upon this record showing the composition of the various schools under the jurisdic tion of this defendant Board of Public Instruction by race with respect to both students and teachers. The plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor both moved for the defendant to file a “dot map” showing the location of children by race within the system and the location of the various school buildings to which they were to be assigned. Numerous hearings have been held with counsel present and all of the various proposals have been considered, including plan sub mitted by the defendant Board and filed herein on Feb ruary 20, 1969, together with objections to such plan by plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor. The record shows that the Jefferson type decree under which this school system has operated since April 19, 1967 has resulted in substantial desegregation throughout the county. It is clear, however, that 4 of the 26 schools under the jurisdiction of this Board, 3 of them being elementary, are attended by Negroes only, i.e., Shaw, Patterson, Harris, and Rosenwald Junior High School. (There are some white kindergarten students presently enrolled at Patterson Ele mentary School.) The Board has proposed basically that steps be taken to bring about the racial integration of these particular schools. The Court concludes that the only alternative which has been suggested that is likely to eliminate segre gation in these particular areas would require either jerrymandered districts or extensive bussing, neither of which are practicable or commensurate with the conduct of educational purposes for small children. Moreover, the Court concludes that there would actually be substantially 109a Order less integration in the system as a whole if the rigid requirements proposed by plaintiff-intervenor and plain tiffs were put into effect with no relevant benefit to pupils or teachers alike. It is, therefore, upon consideration, hereby Ordered: 1. Insofar as it is not inconsistent with the specific requirements of this order the decree of this Court dated April 10, 1967 and filed April 19, 1967, remains in full force and effect. 2. The defendant Board of Public Instruction of Bay County, Florida, and the defendant Superintendent of Pub lic Instruction of Bay County, Florida, he and they are hereby directed as follows: (1) That special attention shall be given to the four schools found to be all or predominantly Negro, namely Patterson Elementary School, Shawr Elementary School, Harris Elementary School, and Rosenwald Junior High School, in an effort to attract white students under freedom of choice to choose one of said schools, including but not limiting its action as follows: (a) Upon application the Board shall allow any Negro student in these four schools to transfer to any other school in the county during the school year 1969-70 or subsequent years conditioned only on space being available in the school requested or unless strong and compelling reasons appear to deny said request. (b) Upon application the Board shall allow at any time during the 1969-70 school year or subsequent school years the transfer into any of these four schools by any white 110a Order student conditioned only on space being available or unless strong and compelling reasons appear to deny said request. (c) The Board shall establish such programs in these four schools to make them more attractive for students of all races. These programs shall include but not be limited to remedial reading programs, the use of para-professional assistants to teachers in each of the four schools, up-grading of the library facilities, including films and laboratory equipment. (d) The Board is directed to make substantial increase in the desegregation of the faculty in each of the above four schools. The Board shall attempt to procure said desegregation voluntarily but should that fail involuntary assignments shall be made. The Board shall have a mini mum of one-third and no more than one-half of the faculty in each of the said four schools of a different race than predominates in the school body in each of the said four schools. (e) The Board shall schedule athletic events between all athletic teams represented by the above-named predomi nantly Negro schools and all predominantly white schools throughout the county 1969 and subsequent years. 3. For long range planning the Board is directed that new school sites shall be selected in geographic locations where the likelihood of racial integration would be the normal result in the neighborhood surrounding the site. 4 4. No substantial additions may be made to the physical plants of Shaw Elementary School, Harris Elementary School, Patterson Elementary School, and Rosenwald Ju nior High School while the same are all Negro or nearly all Negro in the composition of their respective student 111a Order bodies. The Board shall, however, keep these physical plants in repair and minor renovations are not prohibited to existing facilities where needed for a proper educational program in said schools. 5. The Board is directed to work toward the establish ment of school zones in the county so as to accomplish a student body composition of approximately 20% Negroes in all of the schools of Bay County, with the exception of rural outlying communities where there are either no Ne groes or very few Negroes, or no whites or very few whites, in residence there. 6. The choice period as set forth by the decree of this Court filed April 19, 1967 is hereby amended to provide that freedom of choice period shall begin on April 14, 1969 and end on May 16, 1969. 7. The defendant Board is hereby authorized to reassign any and all students who have previously chosen to attend a school where their race is in a minority to the same school, or where appropriate by grade advancement or for other compelling reasons, to another school where their race is in a minority. The only exception to this shall be for good and compelling reasons. 8. This order is effective as of this date for the opera tion of the school year 1969-70. 9 9. The Court retains jurisdiction of this cause for the entry of such further orders as may be advisable. D one and Ordered in Chambers at Tallahassee this 3rd day of April 1969. G. H arrold Carswell Chief Judge 112a APPENDIX 11 Order (Filed March 4, 1969) I n the U nited States D istrict Court F or the N orthern D istrict of F lorida Gainesville D ivision Gainesville Civil A ction N o. 367 L avon W right, a minor, by R everend T. A. W right, her father and next friend, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. B oard of P ublic I nstruction of A lachua County, F lorida, as public body corporate, et al., Defendants. The Court has concluded that there was no need what soever for an evidentiary hearing for consideration of de fendants’ proposed plan for school year 1969-70. Every conceivable scrap of factual data about the operation of the schools under the defendants’ jurisdiction has been placed upon the record, including a detailed so-called “ dot map” showing the residences of school children and the location of the schools. In addition, the record is replete with statistics which show precisely the racial composition of each school with respect to pupils, teachers and admin istrative personnel. There are simply no more relevant facts to be obtained. Every request for information and 113a Order data by either party has been buttressed by an order of the Court and has been complied with. At hearing on this motion, counsel suggested that evi dence might be presented by experts to advise the Court what, in their opinion, would be the best solution to the various problems. By denying this motion for evidentiary hearing, counsel is not precluded from filing with the Court any suggestions supported by scholars or experts in any field and the same will be fully considered. This may be made part of counsel’s brief if it is so desired. In the final analysis, however, the posture of this litiga tion for this year simply calls for a judicial decision which must be made by the Court upon the facts now thoroughly and fully developed. Moreover, there is a time factor involved here. This school system is operating under a Jefferson-type decree which went into effect September 1967. Further protracted delays could only lead to the waste of public funds for educational purposes in the necessary planning for the opening of the schools in September 1969, together with attendant utter confusion for thousands of school children, faculty, and those charged with the administration of the public schools. Realizing this, this Court in January 1969 directed that all basic data needed by either party be made part of the record as soon as practicable. A schedule was established looking first to a hearing on April 10. Upon reconsideration, the Court determined that this schedule was too slow and was accelerated to the point that all the factual data was required to be filed much earlier. Under the direction of the Court the defendants filed their plan under the accelerated schedule. Counsel for plaintiffs have made oral motion for an opportunity to file further brief 114a Order or comment with respect to the proposed plan heard and considered this date and this is granted under a schedule whereby all briefs, by both plaintiffs and defendants, will be filed by March 18, 1969. Done and Ordered in Chambers at Tallahassee this 4th day of March 1969. / s / G. H arrold Carswell Chief Judge 115a Order (Filed April 3, 1969) After full development of all pertinent facts concerning the operation of the public schools under the jurisdiction of the defendant Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, Florida, and after several hearings with counsel for all the parties being present and heard, the Court finds that the factual data on this record fully supports the Court’s conclusion that the plan for the operation of the public school system of Alachua County under the juris diction of this defendant as filed with this Court on Feb ruary 28, 1969, should be approved. The Court finds that the freedom of choice plan under which this system has operated since September 1967 has worked effectively in all but a very few instances. It is apparent that the freedom of choice plan has not worked effectively, or rather not at all, in three elementary schools, i.e., Duval, Williams, and A. Quinn Jones. The Court con clude that the establishment of arbitrary zone lines at this point, however, would definitely result in substantially less integration in the system then is now the case and even more importantly, this Board, through its plan filed Feb ruary 28, 1969, has effectively come forward with concrete proposals which will eliminate the last vestiges of segrega tion throughout the entire system. The Court notes with particular emphasis that the county system is being divided into four broad zones and that as soon as buildings are completed, all now funded and some under construction, the plan will be fully effective and operative, and no later than 1971. Due to the fortuitous geographical distribution of the races in Alachua County, Florida, and the foresight of the Board in good faith compliance with the Constitutional mandate upon it segregation will be eliminated if this plan is carried out. There simply will be no black or white schools within the ambit of the Board’s jurisdiction, just 116a Order schools. While percentages of racial population of the schools, either students or faculty, is not arbitrarily re quired, it is clear that the school children and teachers will bear a fair and reasonable relationship to the popula tion as a whole of the entire county in each school building. It is difficult to conceive of a plan which would more nearly meet Constitutional requirements in this regard. There is no basis whatsoever for suspecting that the Board will not fully comply with the provisions of the plan here approved. On the contrary the Court specifically finds that this Board has operated in all good faith in an effort to meet fully the requirements of the law. It is, therefore, upon considera tion, hereby Ordered: 1. The plan proposed for the operation of the schools under the jurisdiction of the defendant, the Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, Florida, he and it is hereby approved and adopted by this Court and by this reference made a part of this order. 3. Insofar as it is not inconsistent with the specific re quirements of this order the Decree of this Court dated and filed April 25, 1967 remains in full force and effect. 4. The Court retains jurisdiction of this cause for the entry of such further orders as may be necessary or advisable. D one and Ordered in Chambers at Tallahassee this 3rd day of April 1969. / s / C. H arrold Carswell Chief Judge 117a APPENDIX 12 Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 IN THE United States Court of Appeals FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT N o . 2 6 2 8 5 DEREK JEROME SINGLETON, ET AL, versus Appellants, JACKSON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL, Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi N o . 2 8 2 6 1 CLARENCE ANTHONY, ET AL, versus Appellants, MARSHALL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi 118a Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 N o . 2 8 0 4 5 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant, versus CHARLES F. MATHEWS, ET AL, Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas N o . 2 8 3 5 0 LINDA STOUT, by her father and next friend BLEVIN STOUT, ET AL, Plaintiff s-Appellants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Intervenor, versus JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees, DORIS ELAINE BROWN, ET AL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Intervenor, versus THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF BESSEMER, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees. 119a Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 N o . 2 8 3 4 9 BIRDIE MAE DAVIS, ET AL, Plaintiff*-Appellant*, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Intervenor, versus BOARD OF SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS OF MOBILE COUNTY, ET AL, Defendants-Appellee*, TWILA FRAZIER, ET AL, Defendants-Intervenor-Appellee*. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama N o . 2 8 3 4 0 ROBERT CARTER, ET AL, Plaintiff s-Appellants, versus WEST FELICIANA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees, SHARON LYNNE GEORGE, ET AL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus C. WALTER DAVIS, PRESIDENT, EAST FELICIANA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL, Defendants-Appellee*. 120a Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana N o . 2 8 3 4 2 IRMA J. SMITH, ET AL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus CONCORDIA PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana N o . 2 8 3 6 1 HEMON HARRIS, ET AL, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross Appellees, versus ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees-Cross Appellants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 121a Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 N o . 2 8 4 0 9 NEELY BENNETT, ET AL, versus Appellants, R. E. EVANS, ET AL, Appellees, ALLENE PATRICIA ANN BENNETT, a minor, by R. B. BENNETT, her father and next friend, Appellants, versus BURKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL, Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia N o . 2 8 4 0 7 SHIRLEY BIVINS, ET AL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus BIBB COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ORPHANAGE FOR BIBB COUNTY, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia 122a Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 N o . 2 8 4 0 8 OSCAR C. THOMIE, JR., ET AL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus HOUSTON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia N o . 2 7 8 6 3 JEAN CAROLYN YOUNGBLOOD, ET AL, Plaintiff s-Appellants, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Intervenor, versus THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida 123a Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1 , 1969 N o . 2 . 7 9 8 3 LA VON WRIGHT, ET AL, Plaintiff s-Appellants, versus THE BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF ALACHUA COUNTY, FLORIDA, ET AL, Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida (D ecem ber 1,1969) Before BROWN, Chief Judge, WISDOM, GEWIN, BELL, THORNBERRY, COLEMAN, GOLDBERG, AINS WORTH, GODBOLD, DYER, SIMPSON, MORGAN, CARSWELL, and CLARK, Circuit Judges, EN BANC.* PER CURIAM: These appeals, all involving school desegregation orders, are consolidated for opinion pur poses. They involve, in the main, com m on questions of law and fact. They were heard en banc on successive days. ‘ Judge Wisdom did not participate in Nos. 26285, 28261, 28045, 28350, 28349 and 28361. Judge Ainsworth did not participate in No. 28342. Judge Carswell did not participate in Nos. 27863 and 27983. Judge Clark did not participate in No. 26285. 124a Following our determination to consider these cases en banc, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 1969,____ U.S______, 90 S.Ct_____ , 24 L.Ed.2d 19. That de cision supervened all existing authority to the contrary. It sent the doctrine of deliberate speed to its final rest ing place. 24 L.Ed.2d at p. 21. The rule of the case is to be found in the direction to this court to issue its order “ effective immediately de claring that each of the school districts . . . m ay no longer operate a dual school system based on race or color, and directing that they begin immediately to operate as unitary school systems within which no per son is to be effectively excluded from any school be cause of race or color.” We effectuated this rule and order in United States v. Hinds County School Board, 5 Cir., 1969,____ F.2d____ , [Nos. 28,030 and 28,042, slip opinion dated Nov. 7, 1969]. It must likewise be effectu ated in these and all other school cases now being or which are to be considered in this or the district courts o f this circuit. The tenor of the decision in Alexander v. Holmes County is to shift the burden from the standpoint of tim e for converting to unitary school systems. The shift is from a status of litigation to one of unitary oper ation pending litigation. The new modus operandi is to require immediate operation as unitary systems. Sug gested modifications to unitary plans are not to delay implementation. Hearings on requested changes in uni tary operating plans m ay be in order but no delay in conversion m ay ensue because of the need for m odifi cation or hearing. Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 125a In Alexander v. Holmes County, the court had unitary plans available for each of the school districts. In ad dition, this court, on remand, gave each district a limi ted time within which to offer its own plan. It was ap parent there, as it is here, that converting to a unitary system involved basically the m erger of faculty and staff, students, transportation, services, athletic and other extra-curricular school activities. We required that the conversion to unitary systems in those districts take place not later than Decem ber 31, 1969. It was the earliest feasible date in the view of the court. United States v. Hinds County, supra. In three of the systems there (Hinds County, Holmes County and Meridian), because of particular logistical difficulties, the Office of Education (HEW) had recom m ended two step plans. The result was, and the court ordered, that the first step be implemented not later than Decem ber 31, 1969 and the other beginning with the fall 1970 school term. I Because of Alexander v. Holmes County, each of the cases here, as will be later discussed, must be con sidered anew, either in whole or in part, by the district courts. It happens that there are extant unitary plans for some of the school districts here, either Office of Education or school board originated. Some are operat ing under freedom of choice plans. In no one of the dis tricts has a plan been submitted in light of the prece dent of Alexander v. Holmes County. That case resolves all questions except as to mechanics. The school dis tricts here m ay no longer operate dual systems and must begin im m ediately to operate as unitary systems. The focus of the m echanics question is on the accom - Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 126a plishment of the im m ediacy requirement laid down in Alexander v. Holmes County. Despite the absence of plans, it will be possible to m erge faculties and staff, transportation, services, ath letics and other extra-curricular activities during the present school term. It will be difficult to arrange the m erger of student bodies into unitary systems prior to the fall 1970 term in the absence of m erger plans. The court has concluded that two-step plans are to be im plemented. One step must be accom plished not later than February 1,1970 and it will include all steps neces sary to conversion to a unitary system save the m er ger of student bodies into unitary systems. The student body m erger will constitute the second step and must be accom plished not later than the beginning of the fall term 1970.’ The district courts, in the respective cases here, are directed to so order and to give first priority to effectuating this requirement. Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1 , 1969 To this end, the district courts are directed to re quire the respective school districts, appellees herein, to request the Office of Education (HEW ) to prepare •Many faculty and staff members will be transferred under step one. It will be necessary for final grades to be entered and for other records to be completed, prior to the transfers, by the trans ferring faculty members and administrators tor the partial school year involved. The interim period prior to February 1, 1970 is allowed for this purpose. The interim period prior to the start of the fall 1970 school term is allowed for arranging the student transfers. Many stu dents must transfer. Buildings will be put to new use. In some instances it may be necessary to transfer equipment, supplies ot libraries. School bus routes must be reconstituted. The period allowed is at least adequate for the orderly accomplishment of the task. 127a plans for the m erger of the student bodies into unitary systems. These plans shall be filed with the district courts not later than January 6, 1970 together with such additional plan or modification of the Office of Educa tion plan as the school district m ay wish to offer. The district court shall enter its final order not later than February 1, 1970 requiring and setting out the details of a plan designed to accom plish a unitary system of pupil attendance with the start of the fall 1970 school term. Such order may include a plan designed by the district court in the absence of the submission of an otherwise satisfactory plan. A copy of such plan as is approved shall be filed by the clerk of the district court with the clerk of this court.2 The following provisions are being required as step one in the conversion process. The district courts are directed to make them a part of the orders to be entered and to also give first priority to implementation. The respective school districts, appellees herein, must take the following action not later than February 1,1970: Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1 , 1969 2In formulating plans, nothing herein is intended to prevent the respective school districts or the district court from seeking the counsel and assistance of state departments of education, uni versity schools of education or of others having expertise in the field of education. It is also to be noted that many problems of a local nature are likely to arise in converting to and maintaining unitary systems. These problems may best be resolved on the community level. The district courts should suggest the advisability of bi- racial advisory committees to school boards in those districts having no Negro school board members. 128a DESEGREGATION OF FACULTY AND OTHER STAFF The School Board shall announce and imple ment the following policies: 1. E ffective not later than February 1, 1970, the principals, teachers, teacher-aides and other staff who work directly with children at a school shall be so assigned that in no case will the racial composition of a staff indicate that a school is intended for Negro students or white students. For the remainder of the 1969-70 school year the district shall assign the staff described above so that the ratio of Negro to white teachers in each school, and the ratio of other staff in each, are substantially the same as each such ratio is to the teachers and other staff, respectively, in the entire school system. The school district shall, to the extent neces sary to carry out this desegregation plan, direct m em bers of its staff as a condition of continued employment to accept new assignments. 2. Staff m em bers who work directly with chil dren, and professional staff who work on the ad ministrative level will be hired, assigned, pro moted, paid, demoted, dismissed, and other wise treated without regard to race, color, or national origin. 3 3. If there is to be a reduction in the number of principals, teachers, teacher-aides, or other Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1 , 1969 129a professional staff employed by the school dis trict which will result in a dismissal or demo tion of any such staff m embers, the staff m em ber to be dismissed or demoted must be se lected on the basis of objective and reasonable non-discriminatory standards from among all the staff of the school district. In addition if there is any such dismissal or demotion, no staff vacancy m ay be filled through recruit ment of a person of a race, color, or national origin different from that of the individual dis missed or demoted, until each displaced staff m em ber who is qualified has had an oppor tunity to fill the vacancy and has failed to ac cept an offer to do so. Prior to such a reduction, the school board will develop or require the development of non- racial objective criteria to be used in selecting the staff m em ber who is to be dismissed or de moted. These criteria shall be available for public inspection and shall be retained by the school district. The school district also shall record and preserve the evaluation of staff m em bers under the criteria. Such evaluation shall be m ade available upon request to the dismissed or demoted employee. Demotion as used above includes any re assignment (1) under which the staff m em ber receives less pay or has less responsibility than under the assignment he held previously, (2) which requires a lesser degree of skill than did the assignment he held previously, or (3) under Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1 , 1969 130a which the staff m em ber is asked to teach a subject or grade other than one for which he is certified or for which he has had substantial experience within a reasonably current period. In general and depending upon the subject matter involved, five years is such a reason able period. MAJORITY TO MINORITY TRANSFER POLICY The school district shall perm it a student at tending a school in which his race is in the m a jority to choose to attend another school, where space is available, and where his race is in the minority. Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 TRANSPORTATION The transportation system, in those school districts having transportation systems, shall be com pletely re-examined regularly by the superintendent, his staff, and the school board. Bus routes and the assignment of students to buses will be designed to insure the transporta tion of all eligible pupils on a non-segregated and otherwise non-discriminatory basis. SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND SITE SELECTION All school construction, school consolidation, and site selection (including the location of any tem porary classroom s) in the system shall be 131a done in a manner which will prevent the re currence of the dual school structure once this desegregation plan is implemented. ATTENDANCE OUTSIDE SYSTEM OF RESIDENCE If the school district grants transfers to stu dents living in the district for their attendance at public schools outside the district, or if it permits transfers into the district of students who live outside the district, it shall do so on a non-discriminatory basis, except that it shall not consent to transfers where the cumulative effect will reduce desegregation in either dis trict or reinforce the dual school system. See United States v. Hinds County, supra, decided N o vem ber 6, 1969. The orders there em brace these same requirements. Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 II In addition to the foregoing requirements of general applicability, the order of the court which is peculiar to each of the specific cases being considered is as fol lows: NO. 26285 — JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI This is a freedom of choice system. The issue pre sented has to do with school building construction. We enjoined the proposed construction pending appeal. 132a A federal appellate court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. Bell v. State of Mary land, 378 U.S. 226, 84 S.Ct. 1814, 12 L.Ed.2d 822 (1964). We therefore reverse and remand for com pliance with the requirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. Our order enjoining the proposed construction pending appeal is continued in effect until such time as the district court has approved a plan for conversion to a unitary school system. NO. 28261 — MARSHALL COUNTY AND HOLLY SPRINGS, MISSISSIPPI This suit seeks to desegregate two school districts, Marshall County and Holly Springs, Mississippi. The district court approved plans which would assign stu dents to schools on the basis of achievement test scores. We pretermit a discussion of the validity per se of a plan based on testing except to hold that testing cannot be employed in any event until unitary school systems have been established. We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. NO. 28045 — UNITED STATES V. MATTHEWS (LONGVIEW, TEXAS) This system is operating under a plan approved by the district court which appears to be realistic and workable except that it is to be implemented over a period of five years. This is inadequate. Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 133a We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. NO. 28350 — JEFFERSON COUNTY AND BESSEMER, ALABAMA These consolidated cases involve the school boards of Jefferson County and the City of Bessemer, Alabama. Prior plans for desegregation of the two systems were disapproved by this court on June 26,1969, United States of America v. Jefferson County Board of Education, et a l ,____F .2d _____ (5th Cir. 1969) [No. 27444, June 26, 1969], at which time we reversed and remanded the case with specific directions. The record does not re flect any substantial change in the two systems since this earlier opinion, and it is therefore unnecessary to restate the facts. The plans approved by the district court and now under review in this court do not com ply with the standards required in Alexander v. Holmes County. We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. NO. 28349 — MOBILE COUNTY, ALABAMA On June 3, 1969, we held that the attendance zone and freedom of choice method of student assignment used by the Mobile School Commissioners was constitution ally unacceptable. Pursuant to our mandate the dis trict court requested the Office of Education (HEW) to collaborate with the board in the preparation of a Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 134a plan to fully desegregate all public schools in Mobile County. Having failed to reach agreement with the board, the Office of Education filed its plan which the district court on August 1, 1969, adopted with slight modification (but which did not reduce the amount of desegregation which will result). The court’s order directs the board for the 1969 - 1970 school year to close two rural schools, establish attendance zones for the 25 other rural schools, make assignments based on those zones, restructure the Hillsdale School, assign all stu dents in the western portion of the metropolitan area according to geographic attendance zones designed to desegregate all the schools in that part of the system, and reassign approximately 1,000 teachers and staff. Thus the district court’s order of August 1, now before us on appeal by the plaintiffs, will fully desegregate all of Mobile County schools except the schools in the eastern portion of metropolitan Mobile where it was proposed by the plan to transport students to the western part of the city. The district court was not sat isfied with this latter provision and required the board after further study and collaboration with HEW of ficials, to submit by Decem ber 1, 1969, a plan for the desegregation of the schools in the eastern part of the metropolitan area. The school board urges reversal of the district court’s order dealing with the grade organization of the Hills dale School and the faculty provisions. We affirm the order of the district court with direc tions to desegregate the eastern part of the metropoli tan area of the Mobile County School System and to otherwise create a unitary system in com pliance with Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 135a the requirements of Holmes County and in accordance with the other provisions and conditions of this order. NO. 28340 — EAST AND WEST FELICIANA PARISHES, LOUISIANA East Feliciana is operating under a plan which closed one rural Negro elementary school and zoned the four remaining rural elementary schools. All elementary students not encompassed in the rural zones, and all high school students, continue to have free choice. Ma jority to minority transfer is allowed on a space-avail able basis prior to beginning of the school year. The plan has not produced a unitary system. We re verse and remand for com pliance with the require ments of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. West Feliciana is operating under a plan approved for 1969-70 which zones the two rural elementary schools. These schools enroll approximately 15 per cent of the students of the district. The plan retains “ open enrollment” (a euphemism for free choice) for the other schools. The plan asserts that race should not be a criterion for employment or assignment o f person nel. However, the board promises to seek voluntary transfers and if substantial com pliance cannot be ob tained by this method it proposes to adopt other means to accom plish substantial results. This plan has not produced a unitary system. We re verse and remand for com pliance with the require Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 136a ments of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. NO. 28342 — CONCORDIA PARISH, LOUISIANA The plan in effect for desegregating this school dis trict has not produced a unitary system. It involves zoning, pairing, freedom of choice and som e separation by sex. We pretermit the question posed as to sex separation since it m ay not arise under such plan as m ay be approved for a unitary system. This plan has not produced a unitary system. We re verse and remand for com pliance with the require ments of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. NO. 28361 — ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH, LOUISIANA This school district has been operating under a free dom of choice plan. The parish is divided into two sec tions by the Mississippi River and no bridge is located in the parish. The schools are situated near the east and west banks of the river. A realistic start has been m ade in converting the east bank schools to a unitary system. It, however, is less than adequate. As to the west bank schools, the present enrollment is 1626 Negro and 156 whites. The whites, under freedom of choice, all attend the same school, one of five schools on the west bank. The 156 whites are in a school with 406 Negroes. We affirm as to Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 137a this p art o f the plan . W e do not b e lieve it n e c e ssa ry to divide this sm a ll n u m b er of w hites, a lread y in a de se greg a te d m in ority position, a m o n g st th e five schools. We reverse and remand for com pliance with the requirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions o f this order. NO. 28409 — BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA The interim plan in operation here, developed by the Office of Education (HEW ), has not produced a uni tary system. The district court ordered preparation of a final plan for use in 1970-71. This delay is no longer permissible. We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the oth er provisions and conditions of this order. NO. 28407 — BIBB COUNTY, GEORGIA This is a freedom of choice system on which a special course transfer provision has been superimposed. Special courses offered in all-Negro schools are being attended by whites in substantial numbers. This has resulted in some attendance on a part time basis by whites in every all-Negro school. Some three hundred whites are on the waiting list for one of the special courses, remedial reading. The racial cross-over by faculty in the system is 27 per cent. Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 138a The order appealed from continues the existing plain with certain modifications. It continues and expands the elective course program s in all-Negro schools in an effort to encourage voluntary integration. The plan calls for a limitation of freedom of choice with respect to four schools about to becom e resegregated. Under the present plan the school board is empowered to limit Negro enrollment to 40 per cent at these schools to avoid resegregation. Earlier a panel of this court af firm ed the district court’s denial of an injunction a- gainst the quota provision of this plan pending hearing en banc. The prayer for injunction against continuation of the quota provision is now denied and the provision m ay be retained by the district court pending further consideration as a part of carrying out the require ments o f this order. It is sufficient to say that the district court here has em ployed bold and imaginative innovations in its plan which have already resulted in substantial desegrega tion which approaches a unitary system. We reverse and remand for com pliance with the requirements o f Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. NO. 28408 — HOUSTON COUNTY, GEORGIA This system is operating under a freedom of choice plan. Appellants seek zoning and pairing. There is also an issue as to restricting transfers by Negroes to for m erly all-white schools. Cf. No. 28407 — Bibb County, supra. In addition, appellants object to the conversion of an all-Negro school into an integrated adult educa Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 139a tion center. As in the Bibb County case, these are all questions for consideration on remand within the scope of such unitary plan as m ay be approved. W e reverse and remand for com pliance with the re quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. NO. 27863 — BAY COUNTY, FLORIDA This system is operating on a freedom of choice plan. The plan has produced im pressive results but they fall short of establishing a unitary school system. We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. NO. 27983 — ALACHUA COUNTY, FLORIDA This is another Florida school district where im pressive progress has been made under a freedom of choice plan. The plan has been implemented by zoning in the elementary schools in Gainesville (the principal city in the system ) for the current school year. The results to date and the building plan in progress should facilitate the conversion to a unitary system. We reverse and remand for com pliance with the re quirements of Alexander v. Holmes County and the other provisions and conditions of this order. Opinion in Court o f Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 140a III In the event of an appeal or appeals to this court from an order entered as aforesaid in the district courts, such appeal shall be on the original record and the parties are encouraged to appeal on an agreed statement as is provided for in Rule 10(d), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (F R A P ). Pursuant to Rule 2, FRAP, the provisions of Rule 4(a) as to the time for filing notice of appeal are suspended and it is ordered that any notice of appeal be filed within fifteen days of the date of entry of the order appealed from and notices of cross-appeal within five days thereafter. The provisions o f Rule 11 are suspended and it is order ed that the record be transmitted to this court within fifteen days after filing of the notice of appeal. The provisions of Rule 31 are suspended to the extent that the brief of the appellant shall be filed within fifteen days after the date on which the record is filed and the brief of the appellee shall be filed within ten days after the date on which the brief of appellant is filed. No reply brief shall be filed except upon order of the court. The times set herein m ay be enlarged by the court up on good cause shown. The mandate in each of the within matters shall issue forthwith. No stay will be granted pending peti tion for rehearing or application for certiorari. REVERSED as to all save Mobile and St. John The Baptist Parish; AFFIR M E D as to Mobile with direc tion; AFFIR M E D in part and REVERSED in part as to S*t. John The Baptist Parish; REM ANDED to the dis trict courts for further proceedings consistent herewith. Adm. Office, U.S. Courts— Scofields’ Quality Printers, Inc., N. O., La. Opinion in Court of Appeals Dated December 1, 1969 141a APPENDIX 13 Judgment of the Court of Appeals I n t h e U nited States Court of A ppeals F or the F ifth Circuit October T erm, 1969 No. 28407 D.C. Docket No. CA 1926 S hirley B ivins, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus B ibb County B oard of E ducation and Orphanage F or B ibb County, et al., Defendants-Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA Before Brown, Chief Judge, W isdom, Gew in , B ell, T horn- berry, Coleman, Goldberg, A insworth, Godbold, Dyer, Simpson, M organ, Carswell, and Clark, Circuit Judges, E n B anc.* * Judge Wisdom did not participate in Nos. 26285, 28261, 28045, 28350, 28349 and 28361. Judge Ainsworth did not participate in Nos. 28342. Judge Carswell did not participate in Nos. 27863 and 27983. Judge Clark did not participate in No. 26285. 142a This cause came on to be heard en banc on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, and was argued by counsel; O n Consideration W hereof, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment appealed from in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said District Court for compliance -with the requirements of Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 1969, ------U .S .------- , 90 S .Ct.------ , 24 L.Ed.2d 19, and the other provisions and conditions of the order of this Court this day entered. It is further ordered that appellees, School Board, pay the costs on appeal in this Court. Judgment of the Court of Appeals December 1, 1969 Issued as Mandate: December 1, 1969 N O T E : Judgments identical to the above were entered in the fol lowing cases: Bennett v. Evans (and Bennett v. Burke County Board of Education) (S.D. G a .); Thomie v. Hous ton County Board of Education (M.D. G a .); Youngblood v. The Board of Public Instruction of Bay County, Fla. (N.D. F la ) ; Anthony v. Marshall County Board of Edu cation (N.D. M iss.); Wright v. Board of Public Instruc tion of Alachua County, Fla. (N.D. F la .); Stout v. Jeffer son County Board of Education and Brown v. Board of Education of the City of Bessemer (N.D. Ala.). 143a I n the U nited States Court of A ppeals F or the F ifth Circuit October T erm, 1969 No. 28349 D.C. Docket No. CA 3003-63 J u d g m e n t o f th e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls B irdie M ae Davis, et al., Plaintiffs- Appellants, U nited States of A merica, Plaintiff-Intervenor, versus B oard of S chool Commissioners of M obile County, et al., Defendants-Appellees, and T wila F razier, et al., Defendants-Intervenors-Appellees. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 144a Before B rown, Chief Judge, W isdom, Gew in , B ell, T horn- berry, Coleman, Goldberg, A insworth, Godbold, Dyer, Simpson, M organ, Carswell, and Clark, Circuit Judges, E n B anc.* This cause came on to be heard en banc on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, and was argued by counsel; O n Consideration W hereof, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the order of the District Court appealed from in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with directions to desegregate the eastern part of the metropolitan area of the Mobile County School System and to otherwise create a unitary system in compliance with the requirements of Holmes County and in accordance with other provisions and conditions of the order of the Court this day rendered. It is further ordered that appellee, School Board, pay the costs on appeal in this Court. Judgment of the Court of Appeals December 1, 1969 Issued as Mandate: December 1, 1969 * Judge Wisdom did not participate in Nos. 26285, 28261, 28045, 28350, 28349 and 28361. Judge Ainsworth did not participate in Nos. 28342. Judge Carswell did not participate in Nos. 27863 and 27983. Judge Clark did not participate in No. 26285. 145a I n the U nited States Coubt of A ppeals F ob the F ifth Cibcuit Octobeb T eem, 1969 No. 26285 D.C. Docket No. CA 3379 J u d g m e n t o f th e C o u rt o f A p p e a ls Deeek Jebome Singleton, et al., Appellants, versus Jackson M unicipal Sepaeate S chool D isteict, et al., Appellees. APPEAL FEOM THE UNITED STATES DISTEICT COUBT FOE THE SOUTHEBN DISTEICT OF MISSISSIPPI Before B eown, Chief Judge, W isdom, Gew in , B ell, T hoen- beeey, Coleman, Goldbeeg, A inswoeth , Godbold, Dyee, Simpson, M oegan, Caeswell, and Claek, Circuit Judges, E n B anc.* This cause came on to be heard en banc on the transcript of the record from the United States District Court for the * Judge Wisdom did not participate in Nos. 26285, 28261, 28045, 28350, 28349 and 28361. Judge Ainsworth did not participate in Nos. 28342. Judge Carswell did not participate in Nos. 27863 and 27983. Judge Clark did not participate in No. 26285. 146a Southern District of Mississippi, and was argued by counsel; On Consideration W hereof, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court that the judgment appealed from in this cause be, and the same is hereby reversed and that this cause be, and the same is hereby remanded to the said District Court for compliance with the requirements of Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 1969, TT.S.------ , 90 S.Ct.------ , 24 L.Ed.2d 19, and the other provisions and conditions of the order of this Court this day entered. It is further ordered that the order of this Court enjoin ing the proposed construction pending appeal is continued in effect until such time as the District Court has approved a plan for conversion to a unitary school system. It is further ordered that appellees, School Board, pay the costs on appeal in this Court. Judgment of the Court of Appeals December 1, 1969 Issued as Mandate: December 1, 1969 MEILEN PRESS INC. — N. Y. C. 219