Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants
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December 29, 1999

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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Thornton v. Davis Jurisdictional Statement, 1964. 6dfe1323-c69a-ee11-be37-00224827e97b. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/1efe23df-a021-4438-abac-81035f3cbe71/thornton-v-davis-jurisdictional-statement. Accessed August 19, 2025.
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IN THE Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1965 No. W il l ia m S. T h ornton , E dward L. S lade, Jr ., Jo h n M. B rooks, W . F erguson R eid, F r a n k l in J. Gayles, George A. P a n n ell , T in sley Spraggins, Jo h n T. D rew , Sr., O th e l N. S parks, E lise F r a n k l in , E lsie T. R obinson , Richmond Plaintiff-Intervenors, Appellants, v. L evin N ock D avis , A lexander M. H arm on , Jr ., and R obert C. B ayliss , Secretary and Members, State Board o f Elections, et al., Appellees. On Appeal From The United States District Court For The Eastern District Of Virginia JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT Sam u el W . T ucker H enry L. M arsh , III 214 East Clay Street Richmond, Virginia 23219 Attorneys for Appellants TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Jurisdictional Statem en t ........................................................................ 2 O pin io n Below .............................................................................................. 3 Jurisdiction ........................................................................ 3 T he Statutes I nvolved ............................................................................... 3 T he Q uestions P resented ........................................... 3 Statem en t of th e Case ............................................................................ 4 The Facts ................ - ......................................................................... *5 The Circumstances Surrounding the Adoption of the 1964 Reapportionment Statutes .............. 8 Equally Weighted Votes Was Not the Legislative Concern .... 14 T he Q uestions A re Su b s t a n t ia l ..................................................... 17 Conclusion ......... —................................................................................. —- 23 A ppendix A Order on Petitions and Complaints of Intervenors from Hen rico County, City of Richmond and Shenandoah County .... 1 Opinion ................................................................................................ 4 A ppendix B Order on Mandate......................................................... -.................. 1 Opinion upon Order on M andate................................. ................ 5 A ppendix C Chapter 1— Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, Extra Session 1964............................................ ................ ,.......-.......... 1 Chapter 2— Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, Extra Session 1964.................................................................................. A ppendix D Public Documents Reflecting Virginia’s Official Reaction to Brown v. Board of Education and Related Fourteenth Amendment Rights ..................................................................... TABLE OF CITATIONS Cases Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond (4th Cir. 1963), 317 F. 2d 4 2 9 ...................................................................................... Davis v. Mann (1964), 377 U. S. 678, 12 L. ed. 2d 609, 84 S. Ct. 1441 ........ ...................................................................... 3, 4, 9, 10, Fortson v. Dorsey (1965), 379 U. S. 433, 13 L. ed. 2d 401, 85 S. Ct. 498 ..................................................................... 3, 17, 18, 19, Gomillion v. Lightfoot (1960), 364 U. S. 339, 5 L. ed. 2d 110, 81 S. Ct. 1 2 5 ............................................................................................ Mann v. Davis (1962), 213 F. Supp. 571 ......................................... N AA C P v. Button (1963), 371 U. S. 415, 9 L. ed. 2d 405, 83 S. Ct. 328 ................................................................................................ Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U. S. 533, 12 L. ed. 2d 506, 84 S. Ct. 1326 ................................................................................. 3, 18, Wade v. City of Richmond (1868), 18 Gratt. (59 Va.) 583 .... 19, Wright v. Rockefeller (1964), 376 U. S. 52, 11 L. ed. 2d 512, 84 S. Ct. 603, reh den 376 U. S. 959, 11 L. ed. 2d 977, 84 S. Ct. 964 ........................................................................................................ 5 1 6 13 23 22 4 17 21 20 22 28 U. S. C. Statutes Page §2101 (b ) ...................................................................... - ................ 3 §2281 .................................................................................................. 3 §2284 ................................................................................. -~......... - - 3 42 U. S. C. § 1983 ............................................................................... — .............. 3 § 1988 .................................................................................- - - - - - ...... 3 Va. Const., 1902 § 41 ....................................................................................................... 20 § 42 ................................-..................................................................... 20 § 43 .......................................................................... -................... ....... 20 § 44 ..................................................................................... .............. 20, 21 Va. Code, 1950 § 24-12 .............................................................................................. 3, S § 24-14 .............................................................................................. 3. 5 IN THE Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1965 No. W il liam S. T h ornton , E dward L. Slade, Jr ., Jo h n M. B rooks, W . F erguson R eid, F r a n k l in J. Gayles, George A. P an n e ll , T insley Spraggins, Jo h n T. D rew , Sr ., O th el N. S parks, E lise F r a n k l in , E lsie T. R obinson , Richmond Plaintiff-lntervenors, Appellants, v. L evin N ock D avis, A lexander M. H arm on , Jr., and R obert C. Bay liss , Secretary and Members, State Board of Elections; T hom as R . M iller, Clerk, Hustings Court of the City of Richmond; W ilm er L. O ’F lah erty , Sue D. B roun and R obert C. C h appell , Members, Electoral Board of the City of Richmond; H elen D. Clevenger, Clerk, Circuit Court of Henrico County; L inwood E. T oombs, E. R. B oisseau and C. K emper L orraine, Secretary and Members, Electoral Board of Henrico County; H arrison M a n n , K a th r y n Stone, Jo h n C. W ebb and Jo h n A. K. D o navan , Original Plaintiffs; H. B ruce Green , Clerk, Circuit Court of Arlington County; D e n m a n T. R ucker, M aynard Carlisle and R alph K im ble , Members,, Electoral Board, Arlington County; T hom as P. C h a p m a n , Jr ., Clerk, Circuit Court of Fairfax County; P au l K incheloe, E bner L. D u n ca n , Jones Jasper, Members Electoral Board, Fairfax County; C harles L. Glanville , W illiam L. S hepheard , P aul, M. L ip k in and Jack R. W il k in s , Norfolk Plaintiff-lntervenors; 2 W il liam L. P rieur, Jr., Clerk, Corporation Court of the City of Norfolk; James M. W ilcott, Joseph T. F itzpatrick and James E. B aylor, Members, Electoral Board, City of Norfolk; Jesse D. F un kh ou ser , H enry L. H oller, W . H olmes F owle, W il liam P. L ineburg , J. E ldred S w artz and Cletus R. L indamood , Shenandoah Plaintiff-Intervenors; M arvin G. S igler, Clerk, Circuit Court of Shenandoah County; W arren B. F ren ch , Sr., P au l S hutters and F red H e ish m a n Members, Electoral Board, Shenandoah County, Appellees. S im eon A. B urnette , B. E arl D u n n , E d w in H. R agsdale and L. R ay S h adw ell , Jr ., Co-Appellants. On Appeal From The United States District Court For The Eastern District O f Virginia JURISDICTIONAL STATEM ENT Appellants, William S. Thornton, et al., designated as the Richmond Plaintiff-Intervenors, appeal from the judg ment of the three-judge United States District Court for the Eastern District o f Virginia, entered April 9, 1965, dismissing the intervening petition and complaint filed by appellants in the civil action therein pending under the style, Harrison Mann, et al., v. Levin Nock Davis, et al., to challenge the constitutionality o f the Virginia Reapportion ment Acts o f 1964 and submit this statement to show that the Supreme Court o f the United States has jurisdiction of the appeal and that a substantial question is presented. OPINION BELOW The opinion o f the three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia is not yet reported. The opinion and the order thereon are printed as Appendix A hereof. 3 JURISDICTION This proceeding stems from the intervention by certain citizens of the City o f Richmond in a suit styled Davis v. Mann instituted on April 9, 1962, to test the validity of the statutory apportionment of seats in both houses of the General Assembly of Virginia. The original action and the intervening petition and complaint of appellants were brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3 ) to assert rights pur suant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 and to obtain injunctions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. The judgment now sought to be reviewed is dated and was entered on April 9, 1965. No rehearing was requested. Notice of appeal was filed by the instant appellants on June 7, 1965, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District o f Virginia. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review this decision by direct appeal is conferred by 28 U.S.C.§§ 1253, 2101 (b ). The following decisions sustain the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review the judgment on direct appeal: Fortson v. Dorsey (1965), 379 U.S. 433, 13 L. ed 2d 401, 85 S.Ct. 498; Davis v. Mann (1964), 377 U.S. 678, 12 L. ed 2d 609, 84 S.Ct. 1441; Reynolds v. Sims (1964), 377 U.S. 533, 12 L. ed 2d 506, 84 S.Ct. 1362. THE STATUTES INVOLVED The state statutes, the validity of which is involved in this appeal, are Sections 24-12 and 24-14 of the Code of Virginia 1950, as amended by the 1964 Extra Session of the General Assembly of Virginia. They are set out in Appendix C hereof. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Do the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments pro hibit a state from combining two multi-member legislative 4 districts into one multi-member legislative district in which the voting strength of a minority racial element o f one of the former districts will be minimized or canceled out; par ticularly when no other suggested purpose for such change is plausible ? 2. Do the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments pro hibit a state from requiring that all of a city’s legislative representatives be elected by the voters of the city at large, when the purpose or effect o f such a requirement is to mini mize or cancel out the voting strength of a racial minority ? STATEM ENT OF CASE This litigation was commenced on April 9, 1962, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia by certain residents, taxpayers and qualified voters of Arlington and Fairfax Counties, charging that they were subjected to invidious discrimination in the apportionment of seats in the General Assembly o f Virginia as provided by the 1962 statutes. Residents of the City of Norfolk inter vened to show that the statutes effected invidious discrimin ation against that area as well. On November 28, 1962, the three-judge District Court sustained the plaintiffs’ claims. Mann v. Davis, 213 F. Supp. 577. On appeal by the state officials, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964). By its September 18, 1964 order, on the mandate, the District Court further stayed the enforcement of its Novem ber 28, 1962 order to permit the General Assembly to enact constitutionally valid reapportionment statutes for both houses and provided that if such reapportionment legislation as might be enacted failed to meet the requirements of the Constitution, then the plaintiffs, the plaintiff-intervenors and any party granted leave to intervene may apply to the court for such further orders as may be required. 5 The General Assembly of Virginia, by acts approved December 2, 1964, amended §§ 24-12 and 24-14 o f the Code of Virginia. The effect o f the amendment o f § 24-12, as far as is material to this appeal, was to allot eight dele gates to the 36th House o f Delegates District consisting of the City of Richmond and the County o f Henrico which, prior to 1962, had been entirely separate districts. The effect o f the amendment of § 24-14, as far as is material to this appeal, was to allot two senators to the 30th Senatorial District consisting of the entire City of Rich mond. Certain residents, taxpayers and voters o f the County of Henrico (Simeon A. Burnett and others), designated as Henrico Plaintiff-Intervenors, filed their intervening peti tion asserting that, insofar as the amendment to § 24-12 combines the County of Henrico with the more populous City of Richmond for representation in the House of Dele gates, the statute effects an invidious discrimination against voters of Henrico County who are entitled to be represented by three delegates elected by the voters of the county at large. Certain residents, taxpaj^ers and voters o f the City of Richmond all of whom are Negroes ( William S. Thornton and others, sometimes referred to as Richmond Plaintiff- Intervenors), filed their petition asserting that both sta tutes as amended violate their rights under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments inasmuch as the at-large elec tion arrangements serve to dilute the effectiveness of those Negro voters who, by reason of the segregated residential pattern, inhabit certain sections o f Richmond in such num bers that they would be in predominantly Negro districts if Richmond were divided into single-member districts. Further, the Richmond Plaintiff-Intervenors contend that the purpose and effect of the combination of Richmond 6 and Henrico was and is to diminish and cancel out the rela tive strength of the Negro vote in Richmond. The District Court rejected the contentions o f both sets of intervenors. THE FACTS In 1934, approximately one-fourth of the Negroes in the City of Richmond resided in “ East-End” and approxi mately one-half o f Richmond’s Negroes resided in the downtown or “ Central” area o f the city. The Master Plan for the Physical Development of the City o f Richmond as adopted by that city’s governing body in or subsequent to 1945 suggested that low rental housing be located in vacant areas in sections of the city removed from the then existing downtown slums; and that those slums could be replaced by “ downtown apartments for white collar workers and other income groups or for some industrial or public pur pose” (R. pp. 74-75). Accordingly, the Council caused four o f the five public housing projects now occupied by Negroes to be located in Richmond’s “ East End” (R . p. 75). The continued efforts o f the city’s school board to retain racial segregation in the public schools accommodated and contributed to the racially segregated residential pattern. It is stipulated that until March of 1963, when it adopted a “ Freedom of Choice” policy with respect to racial segre gation in public education, the school board attempted to meet the problem of overcrowding in Negro schools by building new schools in Negro neighborhoods, making addi tions to existing Negro schools and converting white schools to Negro schools (R. p. 73). An illustrative occurrence is related in Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, 317 F. 2d 429 (4th Cir. 1963), viz: “ At a special meeting held on September 15, 1958 (approximately two weeks after the beginning of the school term), the School Board voted to request the Pupil Placement Board to trans 7 fer the pupils then attending the Nathaniel Bacon School (white) to the East End Junior High School (white), and that a sufficient number o f pupils be transferred from the George Mason (N egro) and Chimborazo (N egro) schools to the Nathaniel Bacon building to utilize its capacity, thus converting Nathaniel Bacon to a Negro School.” Public authority accomplished its expressed purpose of “ siphoning” Negroes from the older slum areas in the central part of the city (R . p. 75) by developing a concen tration of Negroes in Richmond’s East End. The 1960 Census shows that o f 92,331 non-white persons residing in the City of Richmond, 41,899 or 45.4% lived in the East End; 31,910 or 34.5% in Central; 10,062 or 10.9% in Northside; 7,850 or 8.5% in Southside and 610 or 0.7% in West End (Richmond Exhibit 10). Substantial equality of population in these five major divi sions of the city might be achieved by extending “ West End” eastwardly into “ Central” and by extending “ North- side” southwardly into “ Central” (Richmond, Exhibits 10, 15). These adjustments would leave “ East End” with a pop ulation larger than either of the other four units— a fact which does not detract from the force of the arguments here advanced. So distributed, Negroes (comprising 42% of Richmond’s total population) would constitute 88.6% of East End’s total population of 47,275; 54.9% of Central’s total population of 44,503; 40.8% of Northside’s total popu lation of 44,350; 20.4% of Southside’s total population of 38,453; and 0.01% of West End’s total population, of 45,- 377 (Richmond Exhibit 15). It is impossible to divide Richmond into five House of Delegates Districts o f sub stantially equal population without creating one or more districts in which Negroes will predominate (Gayles, Dep. 58). Any logical division of Richmond into two senatorial districts o f substantially equal population is likely to create 8 one in which Negroes will predominate (Gayles, Dep. 43- 54). Only 5% of Henrico’s population of 117,339 is non white. As will be next seen, the General Assembly was aware of the concentration o f Negroes in the City o f Richmond when it convened in Extra Session to effect a legislative redistrict ing in accordance with the directives of the Court. The Circumstances Surrounding The Adoption of the 1964 Reapportionment Statutes The Committee on Privileges and Elections o f the House of Delegates had conferred prior to the convening- o f the General Assembly on November 30, 1964. Its report to the House of Delegates recommended 2 delegates for Henrico County separately and 6 Delegates for Richmond City and Henrico County together (Henrico Exhibit 7, R. 441, 443). The Committee had before it the report, dated No vember 15, 1961, of the Commission on Redistricting ap pointed by the Governor in January o f 1961, which recom mended 3 delegates for Henrico County and 6 delegates for Richmond City (Henrico Exhibit 6, R. 415, 427). That Commission had requested the Bureau o f Public Adminis tration, University of Virginia, to analyze the problems and make recommendations. Its report to the Commission of July 17, 1961, presented Plan A which provided 3 delegates for Henrico and 6 delegates for Richmond City (Henrico Exhibit 5, R. 403, 406). The recommendation of the House Committee on Privi leges and Elections was not unanimous. One of its members who had been chairman of the Governor’s Commission on Redistricting filed a written dissent in favor of the recom mendations of his Commission (Henrico Exhibit 7, R. 458). In so doing he said: 9 “ In the extensive deliberations of the Committee, I consistently observed and commented on the obvious efforts o f a majority o f the Committee to shield and protect numerous members of the House whose seats were in jeopardy.” The recommendation o f the House Committee on Privi leges and Elections was embodied in House Bill No. 1 and presented to the House o f Delegates by its sponsors, one o f whom was a Richmond City resident and member of the joint delegation representing Richmond City and in part Henrico County in the House o f Delegates under the 1962 apportionment statute declared unconstitutional by this Court in Davis v. Mann, supra. House Bill No. 1 created a 36th District composed o f Henrico County alone, having 2 delegates, and a 56th District composed o f Rich mond City and Henrico County o f 6 delegates (Henrico Exhibit 8, R. 461,462,463). The General Assembly also had before it a resolution of the Board of Supervisors of Henrico County, unanimously adopted October 28, 1964 (Henrico Exhibit 9, R. 464; Burnette Dep., R. 338) and a resolution o f the Council of the City of Richmond, unanimously adopted November 30, 1964 (Henrico Exhibit 10, R. 466; Crowe Dep., R. 232), both of which strongly urged separate representation for the city and county. It was also advised that merger of Richmond City and Henrico County had been defeated by a Henrico County vote of 13,647 to 8,862 on December 12, 1961, while voters in Richmond City favored the merger by 15,050 to 6,698 (Henrico Exhibit 20, R. 507). The House Committee on Privileges and Elections held a public hearing on House Bill No. 1 at which the Mayor o f Richmond City, the Chairman of the Legislative Com mittee of the Richmond City Council and the Chairman o f 10 the Board o f Supervisors of Henrico County each spoke for separate and independent representation in the House of Delegates and recognized necessary conflicts in the joint representation of the two independent political subdivisions (Crowe Dep., R. 232, 235; Wheat Dep., R. 331, 334; Burnette Dep., R. 339-340). Richmond City and Henrico County were represented in the 1964 Extra Session of the General Assembly under the 1962 reapportionment statute declared unconstitutional by this Court in Davis v. Mann, supra. Under that statute Henrico County had one independent delegate and Rich mond City and Henrico had eight delegates jointly (Henrico Exhibit 36A, R. 638). O f those eight, five Democrats and two Republicans lived in the City of Richmond, and one Democrat resided in Henrico County (Pollard Dep., R. 228; Sutton Dep., R. 116; Bradshaw Dep., R. 285; Herrink Dep., R. 354-355; Andrews Dep., R. 94-97). House Bill No. 1 was recommitted to the House Commit tee on Privileges and Elections on November 30, 1964 (Henrico Exhibit 12, R. 470). On December 1, 1964, the Committee reported the bill with amendments that elimi nated altogether any independent delegate for Henrico and consolidated Richmond City and Henrico County into a single House district to be represented by eight delegates elected at large (Henrico Exhibit 12, R. 472). The Com mittee amendments were proposed by Delegate Andrews, a resident of Richmond City, after consulting the other members o f the Richmond-Henrico delegation who were also residents o f Richmond, but without consulting those residing in Henrico County (Andrews Dep., R. 80-82). The Committee amendments were adopted and floor amend ments offered by the two delegates residing in Henrico County to restore separate representation were defeated. The bill with the Committee amendments passed by a vote 11 of 74 to 22. The five Democratic delegates resident in Rich mond City voted for the bill and the two Republican dele gates from Richmond City and the two delegates resident in Henrico County voted against it (Henrico Exhibits 12, R. 474; 13, R. 478). All of the delegates representing Richmond City and Henrico County were keenly aware o f the great upsurge in voter registration during 1964, particularly in Richmond City during October of 1964, and o f the increasing Negro vote in Richmond City (Pollard Dep., R. 254; Dervishian Dep., R. 189, 201). The growing Republican vote in Hen rico and Chesterfield Counties had also been noted (Pollard Dep., R. 254). Peculiar interest had been shown by the dele gates in analyzing the trends indicated by the Congressional elections o f 1962 and 1964 for the Third District, consisting of Richmond City and Henrico County as well as Chester field County and Colonial Heights. The reasons expressed by some of the five Democratic incumbents resident in Richmond City for insisting upon the consolidation o f the two political subdivisions into one dis trict were summarized as follows: “ I think that the expressed opinions involved the re tention in the members of the House of persons of conservative political philosophy and also concern about racial relations would be the principal reasons that have been discussed.” (Sutton Dep., R. 130). The same delegate testified further, as follows: “ Q. Picking up right here, Mr. Sutton, getting a little more specific about the concern for race relations, was there not some discussion(s) as to whether a Negro might be elected into the General Assembly from the Richmond area? 12 “A. That has been discussed. “ Q. Was it not pointed out in this discussion that the combination of Richmond and Henrico would tend to prevent or lessen the chance of a Negro being elected to the General Assembly, in view of the growing vote in Richmond? “ A. That has been discussed. “ Q. And this was discussed by members of the present legislature from the Richmond area, the Dem ocratic members? “ A. That is correct.” (Sutton Dep., R. 131). Such discussions were confirmed by other Delegates (Dervishian Dep., R. 198-200; Herrink Dep., R. 189-191). The Richmond City member of the Committee on Privileges and Elections agreed that annexation was not the only reason for the consolidation (Andrews Dep., R. 91-92). Another delegate testified that annexation was the only reason “ argued before the Committee or on the floor o f the House” (Pollard Dep., R. 245). The statutes which were enacted combined for the first time in the history o f the Commonwealth two separate and independent political subdivisions each of which was entitled to more than one representative in the House of Delegates according to the population ratio per delegate then prevailing under the latest decennial census. It consolidated into a sin gle multi-member district Richmond City, having a 1960 population o f 219,958 and 67,003 registered voters, and Henrico County, having a 1960 population o f 117,339 and 34,220 registered voters (Henrico Exhibits 1, R. 375 ; 2, R. 380, 383; 21A, R. 511-513; 22A, R. 517). It awarded the single district eight delegates to be elected at large by the voters o f both Richmond City and Henrico County. 13 The excuse publicly assigned for this novel departure from tradition was the pendency during the special session o f an annexation proceeding brought by the City of Rich mond against Henrico County in which the annexation court had by its written opinion o f April 27, 1964 (Defend ants’ Exhibit 4, R. 668), and its interlocutory order of July 31, 1964 (Defendants’ Exhibit 3, R. 663), awarded the city 17 square miles o f Henrico territory containing ap proximately 45,000 residents. Only the financial adjust ments remained for decision. That award was subsequently refused (R . 698; Crowe Dep., R. 233-234; Wheat Dep., R. 334-335). Annexation was not the basic motivating cause.1 The Richmond City member of the Committee on Privileges and Elections conceded that an allotment of two delegates to Henrico County, five delegates to Richmond City and one floater delegate for the county and city together would have solved all o f the problems claimed to have been presented by the pending annexation suit (Andrews Dep., R. 105-106). Such an amendment was offered in the Senate and was defeated (Henrico Exhibit 14, R. 479, 480). This Court has recognized that such was the traditional use in Virginia o f the “ floterial district” . Davis v. Mann, supra, footnote 2. (See also Bradshaw Dep., R. 295). The real reason for combining the city and county into a single House district was the grave concern of the Democratic members o f the House o f Delegates resident in Richmond City over the upsurge in voter registrations during 1964 (particularly in Richmond City during Octo ber, 1964), the growing Republican vote in Henrico County, 1 The District Court made no finding on this point, notwithstanding the fact that the pendency of the annexation proceeding was the only reason the state authorities suggested for the combination of the two independent political subdivisions. 14 that a Negro might be elected to the General Assembly from the Richmond area in view of the increasing voting strength of Negroes in concentrated areas of the City, and race relations in general. Retention in the House o f Delegates o f members from the Richmond area of conservative political philosophy was the objective that the scheme to consolidate Richmond City and Henrico County into a single multi-member district was designed to accomplish. Such a purpose the evidence plainly establishes. Never before, so far as is known, in the history of the Commonwealth have two separate and independent political subdivisions, each entitled separately and independently to more than one delegate in the House o f Delegates accord ing to the population ratio per delegate then existing, been combined and consolidated into a single district and awarded delegates jointly to be elected at large by the voters of both separate and independent political subdivisions. (See Hen rico Exhibits 23A through 37D, R. 520-655). The chief objection voiced by one Richmond City Councilman was that “ it was the only city that would not have had any individual representation, separate representation” (Wheat D'ep., R. 334). Equally Weighted Votes Was Not The Legislative Concern The District Court considered as controlling the facts next quoted from its opinion. “ Ideal representation in the House of Delegates, when Virginia’s total population ac cording to the 1960 census is distributed among its 100 delegates, is 39,669 persons for each member. * * * Rich mond alone could justify 5 delegates with 21,613 towards a sixth. T o have awarded only 5 delegates to Richmond would have meant that each of its delegates represented 43,911, or 4,242 persons in excess of the norm.” (App. A. 15 p. 6.) However, o f Virginia’s 50 districts which are not affected by floterial representation, 12 have populations in excess o f 43,911 per delegate, v iz : 2nd Accomack, Northampton— 1 delegate—47,601 per dele gate 6th Alleghany, Botetourt, Covington, Clifton Forge— 1 delegate— 45,173 per delegate 16th Russell, Dickenson— 1 delegate— 46,501 per delegate 24th Clarke, Frederick, Winchester— 1 delegate— 44,993 per delegate 26th Hampton— 2 delegates— 44,629 per delegate 28th Fauquier, Warren, Rappahannock— 1 delegate-—44,- 089 per delegate 32nd Carroll, Grayson, Galax— 1 delegate—-45,822 per dele gate 38th Isle o f Wight, Southampton, Franklin— 1 delegate— 44,359 per delegate 47th Nansemond, Suffolk—-1 delegate—43,975 per delegate 61st Spotsylvania, Stafford, Fredericksburg— 1 delegate— 44,334 per delegate 62nd Tazewell— 1 delegate— 44,791 per delegate 50th-59th Page, Rockingham, Shenandoah, Harrisonburg — 2 delegates— 44,899 per delegate (Henrico Exh. 2). It can hardly be supposed that the Legislature was so much concerned for mathematical precision with respect to the City of Richmond when it showed so little concern for such precision in so many other places. 16 The General Assembly was aware o f the increasing efforts o f Negroes in Richmond to make effective political expression. On at least seven occasions between 1947 and 1961 some Negro citizen has sought the Democratic nomi nation (tantamount to election) for one of Richmond’s seats in the House of Delegates.2 In 1959, the Negro candidate, bidding with eight others for one of the seven seats, re ceived 10,975 votes; but the successful aspirants received votes ranging from 12,723 to 14,000 (R . p. 71). In 1964, there were approximately 18,355 Negroes quali fied to vote in non-federal elections in Richmond City, ap proximately 52,179 white persons qualified to vote in non- federal elections in Richmond City (Henrico Exh. 21B), and approximately 933 Negro and 40,660 white persons so qualified in Henrico County (Henrico Exh. 22B). Negroes in Richmond and elsewhere in Virginia have the most compelling reasons for seeking a change from the “ conservative” Democratic forces which control Virginia’s government. The statutes of Virginia, past and present, are replete with evidence of the age-old preoccupation o f the General Assembly with establishing and preserving racial segregation and discrimination as a cherished way of life.3 The dissatisfaction of Richmond’s Negroes with these facets o f their environment was expressed on November 4, 1964, when the city’s ten largest Negro precincts cast 14,111 votes for President Johnson as against 115 for Senator Gold- water, thus helping to put Richmond in the Democratic column by a count of 35,662 over 27,196 (Richmond Exh. 2 In the July 13, 1965, Democratic Primary, two Negroes and ten whites competed for the eight Richmond-Henrico seats. The high est number of votes for any candidate was 22,610. The eighth highest number was 14,588. In ninth place was Wm. Ferguson Reid, a Negro, who received 14,556 votes. ( Richmond Nezvs-Leader, July 14, 1965, p. 8.) 3 See Appendix D. 17 3). This Court, in N AACP v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 435 noted: “ W e cannot close our eyes to the fact that the militant Negro civil rights movement has engendered the intense resentment and opposition of the politically dom inant white community of Virginia.” Six o f the seven delegates and one of the two senators who live in Richmond reside in “ West End” (Andrews, Dep., 31, 33; Dervishian, Dep. 106-108) which is probably the most affluent area in the city (Andrews, Dep. 29, 33). The other delegate and the other senator live in “ Northside” (Andrews, Dep. 31, 33). None of the incumbent legislators, by reason of residence, economic interests or political out look (especially with respect to race relations), can be said to reflect the thinking of any considerable number o f resi dents o f “ East End.” THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL I. The District Court, citing Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), held that the possibility (indeed the certainty) that all of the delegates may be chosen from one part rather than from all parts of a multi-member district “ exposes no defect” in the apportionment scheme, even where the sub stitution of single-member districts would necessarily create some constituencies in which persons o f racial or political minorities would predominate (App. A. pp. 7-9). In Fortson, the Court made clear its reservation of opinion whether under the circumstances of a particular case a multi-member constituency scheme would unconstitutionally operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength o f racial or political elements of the voting population. That question, unanswered in Fortson, is the exact question pre sented by the facts in the instant case. Georgia’s 1962 18 Senatorial Reapportionment Act, reviewed in Fortson, re quired that “ [e]ach Senator must be a resident of his own Senatorial District” ; but it also provided that “ the Senators from those Senatorial Districts consisting of less than one county shall be elected by all o f the voters o f the county in which such Senatorial District is located.” In considering this latter proviso, the Court had no occasion to suggest that all delegates o f a multi-member district might be validly chosen from one part o f the district. I f such suggestion can be found in the Fortson opinion, it lies in the quotation from Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to which we now turn. II. As the Court began Section V of its opinion in Reynolds, it noted that it had said all that was necessary to its decision of the issues then before it. However, to illustrate the propo sitions that identity in the composition or complexion o f the two bodies of a bicameral legislature need not follow from the fact that one criterion controlled the apportionment o f representation in both houses, the Court did suggest that “ One body could be composed of single-member dis tricts while the other could have at least some multi member districts.” (377 U.S. at 577.) But, in Section V I of the Reynolds opinion, the Court stated a more pervasive guide which, for the instant case at least, overshadows all else which has been written on the subject: “ What is marginally permissible in one State may be unsatisfactory in another, depending on the particular circumstances o f the case.” (377 U.S. at 578.) Our attention is thus deflected from consideration of the abstract question whether all the delegates may be chosen 19 from one part of 'a multi-member district to the really per tinent questions in this case, v iz : May the Commonwealth of Virginia, where racial dis crimination under color o f law yet prevails, arbitrarily com bine two multi-member districts when such results in mini mizing or cancelling out the voting effectiveness of Negroes in the City of Richmond ? May the Commonwealth of Virginia, where racial dis crimination under color of law yet prevails, arbitrarily re tain multi-member legislative districting for the City of Richmond, when single-member districting would neces sarily produce a predominantly Negro district? III. Virginia could have divided Richmond into single-member districts for both houses of the legislature and thus afforded every voter in each of such districts an opportunity (equal to that enjoyed by voters in the forty-six single-member House of Delegates Districts and the twenty-eight single member Senatorial Districts) to cast his ballot for that one o f his neighbors and acquaintances who, in the voter’s per sonal opinion uninfluenced by city-wide political machina tions, would best represent him. Such a course would have comported with the Federal constitutional concept of Equal Protection in the sense indicated by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Fortson v. Dorsey, supra, v iz : “ But to allow some candidates to be chosen by the elec tors in their districts and others to be defeated by the voters of foreign districts is in my view an ‘invidious discrimination’— the test o f equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment” . Such a course, and only such a course, would have complied with the view of Virginia’s highest court in Wade v. City of 20 Richmond, 18 Gratt. (59 V a.) 583 (1868) that the appor tionment of representation in the General Assembly among the counties, cities and towns, which the Constitution of 1851 effected, was in all reality but a means of reflecting representation o f “ persons and property comprised in these local departments.” Such a course, and only such a course, would have complied with the letter o f the Constitution of Virginia (1902), as amended, viz [emphasis supplied]: “ § 41. Number and election o f senators.— The Senate shall consist o f not more than forty and not less than thirty-three members, who shall be elected quadrennially by the voters of the several senatorial districts on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November. “ § 42. Number and election of delegates.— The House of Delegates shall consist o f not more than one hundred and not less than ninety members, who shall be elected biennially by the voters of the several house districts, on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday in November. “ § 43. Apportionment of Commonwealth into sena torial and house districts.— The present apportionment of the Commonwealth into senatorial and house dis tricts shall continue; but a reapportionment shall be made in the year nineteen hundred and thirty-two and every ten years thereafter. “ § 44. Qualifications of senators and delegates; who ineligible; removal from district vacates office.— Any person may be elected senator who, at the time o f elec tion, is actually a resident of the senatorial district and qualified to vote for members of the General Assembly; and any person may be elected a member o f the House of Delegates who, at the time of election, is actually a resident of the house district and qualified to vote for members o f the General Assembly. * * * The removal 21 of a senator or delegate from the district for which he is elected shall vacate his office ” The creation of multi-member districts for either house is patently a legislative subversion of the above quoted pro visions o f the State Constitution. In Reynolds v. Sims, supra, the Court observed: “ In those States where the alleged malapportionment has resulted from noncompliance with state constitu tional provisions which, if complied with, would result in an apportionment valid under the Equal Protection Clause, the judicial task of providing effective relief would appear to be rather simple.” (377 U.S. at 584.) By its mere failure to provide single-member districts for the City of Richmond, the State made it reasonably certain that the votes o f the citizens o f an identifiable predominantly Negro constituency would be absorbed into the larger and predominantly white community and thereby be rendered as ineffective as if they had not been cast. The 10,975 votes cast for the Negro candidate in the 1959 Democratic Primary were simply submerged by the votes cas«£by the majority of the city’s electorate for the slate o f candidates which had the most influential endorsement. With single-member district ing, some o f those 10,975 votes would have been effective. Not only did the Legislature fail to adopt the course pre scribed by the State’s Constitution which would have ren dered meaningful and effective the elective franchise of Richmond’s Negro citizens; the Legislature further widened the gap between the text and the application of the Consti tution by enlarging the district for the purpose o f further diluting or submerging the votes of Richmond’s Negro cit izens. What had, or would have been, a 42% potential vot ing effectiveness of Richmond’s Negroes in electing five 22 delegates to the General Assembly was reduced to a 29.2% potential voting effectiveness in electing eight delegates to the General Assembly. That such a merger, in Virginia, was an abridgment of the right to vote because of race and color in violation o f the Fifteenth Amendment appears to be clear. Just as Go-million v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (I960), struck down Alabama’s attempt to nullify Negroes’ political effectiveness by zoning them out o f the City o f Tuskegee, so should fall Virginia’s patent attempt to nullify the political effectiveness of Rich mond’s Negro citizens by zoning them into a larger district in which their number will be overwhelmed. As in Gomillion is suggested, judicial approval o f this manuever “ would sanc tion the achievement by a State o f any impairment o f voting rights whatever so long as it was cloaked in the garb o f the realignment of political subdivisions” or legislative appor tionment (364 U.S. at 345). “ ‘The [Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.’ ” Gomillion v. Lightfoot, supra. These appellants have not contended and do not contend that any state is required to carve out legislative districts so as to insure (or make possible) representation by persons o f any particular race, religion or place of national origin. W e are in agreement with so much of Mr. Justice Douglas’ dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 62, 66 (1964), as is quoted in the opinion of the Court below. Specifically, we agree that “ government has no business designing electoral districts along racial or religious lines.” What is here contended is that government should not com bine electoral districts to deny effective political expression from those who are confined within racial or political lines. 23 As this Court has noted in Forison v. Dorsey, supra, the precise questions here presented have not been settled. Unquestionably, the resolution of these issues will have far reaching effect upon the meaningfulness of the franchise to Negro people in their quest for their rightful share of the opportunities which are America’s promise to all. The past and current efforts o f the legislative and executive arms of our national government to enforce the Fifteenth Amend ment will amount to naught if a state may meet and over come the increasing political strength of Negroes in any given area by expanding the political constituency from time to time so as to submerge their votes in the votes of the larger white community. CONCLUSION It is respectfully submitted that the questions here pre sented are substantial and important and that they should be considered and decided by this Court. Richmond, Virginia August 6, 1965 Sam u el W . T ucker H enry L. M arsh , III 214 East Clay Street Richmond, Virginia 23219 Attorneys for Appellants APPENDIX A 1 U N ITED STA TE S D ISTR IC T COU RT FOR TH E EA STE RN D ISTR IC T OF V IR G IN IA At Alexandria Civil Action No. 2604 Harrison Mann, et al. v. Levin Nock Davis, et al. ORDER ON PETITIONS AND COMPLAINTS OF INTER- VENORS FROM HENRICO COUNTY, CITY OF RICHMOND AND SHENANDOAH COUNTY Upon consideration of the intervening petition and com plaint o f Simeon A. Burnette, et al., designated as the Henrico County intervenors, the intervening petition and complaint o f William S. Thornton, et al., designated as the City of Richmond intervenors, and the intervening petition and complaint o f Jesse D. Funkhouser, et al., designated as the Shenandoah County intervenors, the answers thereto, the evidence adduced thereon, as well as the arguments of counsel, on brief and orally, the court for the reasons stated in its opinion this day filed, which is adopted as its findings o f fact and conclusions of law, orders as follows: 1 1. That the petitions and complaints o f the Henrico County and the City of Richmond intervenors be, and they are hereby, dismissed, the respondents thereto recovering their costs o f the said intervenors; 2 2. That the petition and complaint o f the Shenandoah County intervenors be, and they are hereby, sustained in respect to the apportionment o f representation o f that county in the House of Delegates; 3. That the State and local election officials who are de fendants to the said intervening petition and complaint of Shenandoah County be, and each of them is hereby, enjoined and restrained from acting under and pursuant to so much o f Chapter 2 o f the Acts o f the General Assembly o f V ir ginia, Extra Session 1964, as declares the representation in the House o f Delegates for the 50th and 59th districts; that the court now reapportions the said districts so that the counties o f Page, Rockingham and Shenandoah and the City of Harrisonburg shall be represented jointly by two delegates; that the reapportionment of the 50th and 59th districts o f Virginia as aforesaid shall be effective for the elections, both primary and general, o f members of the House o f Delegates from the counties o f Page, Rocking ham and Shenandoah and the City of Harrisonburg in the year 1965 and thereafter until the General Assembly of Virginia shall provide a Constitutionally valid apportion ment of representation in the House o f Delegates for Shenandoah County; and 4 4. That the court hereby approves the reapportionment Acts o f the General Assembly of Virginia adopted at its Extra Session in December 1964, insofar as such approval may be required to remove any question or doubt o f the 3 validity of any legislation which has been, or may be, passed by the General Assembly since the adoption of the said re apportionment Acts. Nothing further remaining to be done in this action, it is ordered stricken from the docket, and this order is final. A lbert V. B ryan United States Circuit Judge W alter E. H offm an United States District Judge O ren R. L ew is United States District Judge April 9th, 1965. 4 U N ITE D STA TE S D ISTR IC T COU RT FO R T H E E A STE R N D ISTR IC T OF V IR G IN IA At Alexandria Civil Action No. 2604 Harrison Mann, et al. v. Levin Nock Davis, et al. (Argued March 10, 1965 Decided April 9, 1965) Before B ryan , Circuit Judge, and L ew is and H offm an , District Judges. OPINION A lbert V. B r ya n , Circuit Judge: Virginia’s 1964 reapportionment of the State into dis tricts for the election of delegates and senators in her General Assembly, following our invalidation of the 1962 5 redistricting,1 is here attacked as denying Fourteenth Amendment equal protection of the laws. The assault is made in three separate intervening petitions in the original action, each dealing with a local problem, by certain citizens of Henrico County, the City of Richmond and Shenandoah County. W e think only Shenandoah can prevail. Henrico County The grievance asserted by these intervenors is that Henrico County and Richmond were placed in a single dis trict, No. 36, for representation in the House of Delegates, rather than each made an independent district. Combined, these two political subdivisions were given 8 delegates, but Henrico pleads for 3 delegates o f its own, leaving the re maining 5 to Richmond. The injury from the consolidation, according to the county, is that as Richmond has a voting power greater than Henrico, the city will be able to elect all 8 delegates and Henrico will have no representation by its own citizens. This result, says Henrico, is due to a general disregard by the General Assembly of the guide lines and ground rules thus far enunciated for legislative apportionment by the Supreme Court. E.g. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ; 1 Mann v. Davis, 213 F.Supp 577 (1962), affirmed sub. nom. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964). By order entered September 18, 1964 this court restored its injunction which had been suspended during the appeal. Thereupon the Legislature adopted a new apportionment in December 1964. The statute re lating to the State Senate appears as Chapter 1, and the enactment relating to the House of Delegates as Chapter 2, of the Acts of Assembly, Extra Ses sion 1964. 6 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963 ); Westberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964 ); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964 ); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964 ); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) ; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964) ; Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964 ); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Our examination o f the record discloses no such trespasses or fouls. To demonstrate the correctness o f this conclusion, we review the 1964 reapportionment (the A ct), touching particularly upon the features on which Henrico found its accusations. Ideal representation in the House of Delegates, when Virginia’s total population according to the 1960 census is distributed among its 100 delegates, is 39,669 persons for each member. Richmond had a population of 219,958, Henrico 117,339. Applying these figures, it appears that Henrico would be entitled to 2 delegates and wanting but 3,668 residents for a third. Richmond alone could justify 5 delegates, with 21,613 towards a sixth. To have awarded only 5 delegates to Richmond would have meant that each o f its delegates represented 43,911, or 4,242 persons in ex cess of the norm. With Henrico* not quite earning 3 dele gates, but Richmond due more than 5, the solution of the Virginia Assembly was to give the two areas 8 delegates jointly. There would then be 42,164 persons per delegate, a representation fairly nearing the par of 39,669. A multi-member district, though linking more than one political subdivision, is not Constitutionally impermissible. 7 Fortson v. Dorsey, supra, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). A multi county or a county-city district is also legal. Id. But the possibility that a delegate or delegates may be chosen from one part o f a district— whether a multi-county or a county- city district— rather than from another exposes no defect in the allotment. Id. In passing, it is at least noteworthy that Henrico made no objection in 1962 when the reappor tionment act gave Henrico 1 delegate and then assigned 8 delegates jointly to Richmond and Henrico. While this dis tribution was in effect in 1963, we are told that a number o f the 8 winning candidates, although resident in Richmond, received more votes in Henrico than did the candidates from that county. This would seem to refute somewhat Henrico’s insistence that its citizens prefer to have their delegates come from Henrico. The multi-member policy here does not have the “ un desirable features” mooted in Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, supra, 377 U.S. 713, 731 with footnote 21 (1964). The unification does not constitute so spacious or “ populous” a territory as to demand the establishment of “ identifiable constituencies.” Indeed, Henrico now pledges its willingness to have 3 delegates elected at large from among its whole population of 117,339 and without a smaller constituency than its entire area. The effect o f the Act has not been to obliterate the tradi tional integrity in Virginia o f city and county lines. The custom was sanctioned in Davis v. Mann, supra, 377 U.S. 678, 686 (1964). The individuality of Henrico and Rich mond is observed by the design o f a separate senatorial district for each. W e see no inconsistency in allocating senators on a different basis from delegates. Such a varia tion has been authoritatively approved, when, as presently, 8 it may tend to “ balance off minor inequities.” Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 579 (1964). Physical factors could reliably have directed the judg ment o f the General Assembly in determining upon the union of Richmond and Henrico. They form a compact and contiguous territory. I f they may not agree politically, con- cededly their interests are interknit and common in many aspects. The county is the residence of hundreds of business, professional and otherwise occupied persons plying their callings in the city. In fact, while the two are distinct governmental units, the courthouse of the county is situate well within the city’s corporate limits. At all events, the Act does not in any degree devalue the vote in either Rich mond or Henrico below the Constitutional standard of weight and fineness, “ one person, one vote.” City of Richmond Certain Richmond Negro residents question the fusion of the city and Henrico County for the election o f delegates on the ground that it deprives Negro citizens o f a chance to elect one o f their race to the General Assembly. They point out that the population o f Richmond consists of 92,331 non-white and 127,627 white persons; that in Henrico the non-white residents number 6,070, the white 111,269; and that the potential vote of Negroes in Richmond is, by the coadunation, reduced from 42% (the percentage of non white in Richmond) to 29% (the percentage of non-whites in the aggregate population o f the city and Henrico.) Further, they suggest that the Negro communities in Richmond are so located that any division of the city into 9 S fairly equal segments, each embracing a sufficient number o f inhabitants for a delegate, would create 1 or more dis tricts in which Negroes would be the majority. Additionally, they say that if the city were divided into 2 substantially equal districts with the allotment o f 1 o f Richmond’s 2 senators to each district, the colored population in at least 1 might elect a senator. Consequently, these intervenors suggest that Richmond be assigned 5 delegates apart from Henrico, and that the 5 be distributed, 1 to a district, among 5 substantially equal districts. Likewise, they ask that the city be fairly split into 2 senatorial districts. These contentions are underbraced by advertence to the Virginia constitutional injunction that legislators be elected by the voters of the several senatorial and house districts, and that apportionment of the “State” into such districts be made every ten years.§§ 41, 42 and 43. From this they conclude that these clauses command legis lative allocation, both within and without city and county marches, by population and not according to existing governmental units. Omission of such delineations inside the city and State-wide, the intervenors aver, violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as a deprivation of equal protection o f the election laws and abridgement of the right to vote. W e disagree. To begin with, we reaffirm our earlier declaration of the validity o f conjoining Richmond and Henrico. Moreover, as we have also shown, adherence to municipal boundaries in establishing legislative districts has been declared to be altogether free of legal infirmity. Furthermore, the racial exclusion decried in Gotnillion v. Lic/Jitfoot, 364 U.S. 399 (1960) and universally forbidden is not evident. Neither 10 Richmond, nor any other city or county in Virginia has in her history ever been sub-districted. Even councilmen for the local government of Richmond are elected at large, and this without question by either race. The concept of “ one person, one vote” we understand, neither connotes nor envisages representation according to color. Certainly it does not demand an alignment of districts to assure success at the polls o f any race. No line may be drawn to prefer by race or color. As Justice Douglas, though in dissent but obviously undeniably, tartly put it in Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 62, 66 (1964): “ The fact that Negro political leaders find advantage in this nearly solid Negro and Puerto Rican district is irrelevant to our problem. Rotton boroughs were long a curse o f democratic processes. Racial boroughs are also at war with democratic standards.” Page 66: “ . . . The principle o f equality is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on. . . . O f course race, like religion, plays an important role in the choices which individual voters make from among various candidates. But government has no business designing electoral districts along racial or religious lines. . . . ” 11 Previously Justice Douglas had said for the Court in Gray v. Sanders, supra, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) : . . The concept o f political equality in the voting booth contained in the Fifteenth Amendment extends to all phases o f state elections, . . . and, as previously noted, there is no indication in the Constitution that homesite or occupation affords a permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified voters within the State.” Shenandoah County Certain citizens of Shenandoah County protest they have been deprived of Constitutional rights by the 1964 assign ment of delegates in the 50th and 59th districts. The former, which has been assigned 1 delegate, comprises Page, Rockingham, Shenandoah Counties and the City o f Har risonburg. The 59th district encompasses only Rockingham County and Harrisonburg but it is also given 1 delegate. Harrisonburg is geographically within Rockingham County. Over-representation o f Shenandoah County under the 1962 reapportionment was noted in Davis v, Mann, supra, 377 U.S. 678, 688; it had “ one seat in the Virginia House” although its population was 21,825 as compared to the “ ideal ratio o f one delegate for each 39,669 persons.” In 1964 Shenandoah’s 21,825 people were leagued with Rockingham’s 39,559, Page County’s 15,572, and Harrison burg’s 12,842, increased to 13,804 by an annexation in 1962.* Obviously this readjustment erects a district of * These figures are taken from the face of the complaint of the Shenandoah Intervenors. The U.S. Bureau of Census’ U.S. Census o f Population : 1960 General Population Characteristics, Virginia. Final R ep ort P C (1 )-4 8 B , reveals Rockingham’s population as 40,485 and Harrisonburg’s as 11,916 rather than 12,842 prior to annexation. 12 90,760, far above criterion of 39,669. Rockingham and Harrisonburg are saved from injustice by their additional delegate, but Shenandoah with Pag'e suffers from a clear under-representation. Invidious discrimination has thus been visited upon Shenandoah. With primary elections for the General Assembly scheduled for July of this year, and candidates’ filing times therefor expiring in April, correction of this injury to Shenandoah County cannot await the convening o f the General Assembly in 1966. Consequently, we are required to act to prevent the watering down of the Shenan doah votes. Until the General Assembly can rectify the inequity, we must set aside the 1964 apportionment o f the 50th and 59th districts. In lieu of the present provision for them, the court will order that the counties o f Page, Rock ingham and Shenandoah and the City o f Harrisonburg be assigned 2 delegates to represent all four of these political subdivisions jointly. This adjustment will effectuate a rep resentation o f 45,380 persons per delegate. While this is above the proper ratio, we do not deem it an unfair approach in the circumstances. Recapitulation The record does not authorize attribution to the General Assembly or caprice or an unacceptable motive in the Henrico and Richmond reapportionment. To the contrary, a firm foundation may be seen for it. For Shenandoah County, however, the imbalance in representation is obvious and fatal. 13 An order will be entered dismissing the intervening com plaints o f Henrico and Richmond, but sustaining the claim of the Shenandoah intervenors, with the relief we have prescribed. The order will also express our approval o f the Act insofar as such approval is required to remove any question or doubt o f the validity of any legislation which has been, or may be, passed by the General Assembly since the adoption o f the Act, our order of September 18, 1964 having required the General Assembly acting thereafter to make a Constitutionally valid reapportionment o f the State before undertaking any other legislation. APPENDIX B 1 IN T H E U N ITE D STA TE S D ISTR IC T COURT FO R T H E EA STE R N D ISTR IC T OF V IR G IN IA At Alexandria Civil Action No. 2604 H ARR ISO N M AN N , et al., v. LE V IN NOCK D A V IS, et al., ORDER ON MANDATE This action came on to be heard upon the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States affirming the judg ment order of this Court entered November 28, 1962, upon the motions of the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs for an order on said mandate and the argument o f counsel; upon a consideration of all of which it is 2 D eclared, A djudged and O rdered : 1. That the Governor o f Virginia and the Attorney Gen eral be dismissed as parties defendant to this action; 2. That the motion o f the defendants to dismiss the com plaint and intervening petition be denied; 3. That the acts o f the General Assembly of Virginia, approved April 7, 1962, appearing as Chapter 635, page 1266, and Chapter 638, page 1269 of the 1962 Acts o f the Assembly of Virginia, deny the plaintiffs and plaintiff-in terveners and those persons similarly situated the equal protection of the laws in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment o f the Constitution of the United States, and that the said acts for that reason are void and of no effect; 4. That the order entered by this court on November 28, 1962 be in all respects reaffirmed but the enforcement o f said order be further stayed until December 15, 1964 inso far as necessary to afford ample time for the General As sembly of Virginia to be called and convened in special ses sion, if the Governor or the requisite number o f members o f the General Assembly are so advised, for the purpose of enacting constitutionally valid reapportionment statutes for both houses of the General Assembly, and enact statutes to effectuate said reapportionment by providing for the election of members o f both houses of the General Assembly from the districts of the State as reapportioned; 3 5. That, for the reasons set forth in the opinion filed this day, the terms of the present members o f the House of Delegates shall not be terminated by force of the said order before, but shall terminate upon, the expiration o f the terms for which they were elected in November, 1963 or in any special election thereafter, that is on the day before the second Wednesday of January, 1966; 6. That, for the reasons set forth in said opinion, the terms o f the present members of the Senate, who were elected in November 1963 or in any special election there after, shall not be terminated by force of the said order before, but shall terminate upon, the expiration o f the terms o f the members o f the House of Delegates elected in November, 1963 or thereafter -as aforesaid, that is the day before the second Wednesday in January, 1966; 7. That the motion o f the plaintiffs and plaintiff-inter veners that the present General Assembly be enjoined at this time from enacting any legislation other than the said re apportionment statutes be denied; but by way o f a declara tory judgment the court now states that after the enact ment of a constitutionally valid reapportionment statute the present General Assembly may until the 2nd Wednesday in January 1966 consider and pass such legislation as it deems necessary or proper in the public interest, unless before that date through special elections a General As sembly is chosen in conformity with the new reapportion ment statute. 8. That the motion o f the defendants for a continuance is also denied, in view of the stay herein granted of the effectiveness o f the order issued by this Court on November 28, 1962. 4 9. That the plaintiffs and plaintiff-interveners recover o f the defendants their statutory costs, assessed or assess able in the Supreme Court and in this court, and that the motion of the plaintiff-inteveners for an allowance of counsel fees as a part o f said costs is denied; and 10. That if the steps stated in paragraph 4 hereof for reapportionment be not taken before December 15, 1964, or if taken they do not meet the requirements of a constitu tionally valid reapportionment, then the plaintiffs, the plain- tiff-interveners and any part ( sic) hereafter granted leave to intervene, may apply to the court for such further orders as may be required; and jurisdiction of this action is hereby retained for entry o f such other orders as may be necessary or proper. United States Circuit Judge United States District Judge -United States District Judge September 18, 1964. 5 IN T H E U N ITED STA TE S D ISTR IC T COURT FO R T H E EA STE RN D ISTR IC T OF V IR G IN IA A t Alexandria Civil Action No. 2604 H A R R ISO N M AN N et al„ v. LE V IN N OCK D A V IS et at, (Argued September 10, 1964 Decided 1965) Before B r ya n , Circuit Judge, and H offm an and L ew is, District Judges. OPINION UPON ORDER ON MANDATE A lbert V. B ryan , Circuit Judge: A foremost concern in framing the order on the mandate o f the Supreme Court affirming our original decree is the question of the maximum period in which the present, 1963, General Assembly elected under the condemned statute may still function and with what powers. In our opinion it must expire as to both houses not later than the 2nd Wednesday in January 1966. 6 W e think the 1963 Assembly necessarily is empowered to enact the requisite reapportionment laws. There is no other body to do so, and unless its jurisdiction is recognized for this purpose the State would be helpless to accomplish the reapportionment. The Supreme Court has tacitly ap proved this accordance o f provisional vitality to the existing legislature. Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 675 (1964 ); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964) adopting the view expressed by Justice Douglas concurring in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250 footnote 5. W e think, also, that after the 1963 Assembly has enacted a constitutionally valid reapportionment statute— but not before then— and during the interval between its adoption and the commencement of the terms of the Senators and Delegates chosen in the 1965 elections, vide post, the A s sembly should not be restrained from considering and pass ing such legislation as it considers necessary or proper in the public interest. I f the present legislature could not act in this interim, a potentially dangerous interregnum could result, for there would be no legislature available in an emergency. Moreover, if this authority were not conceded, special elections for the creation of a new General Assembly would have to be called immediately after the passage of the reapportionment statute. This would mean an election of Delegates to serve for a matter of months, when a primary election o f Delegates is probable in July and a regular general election is set for November, 1965. That would be an undue burden upon the State elective processes. In these exigencies general principles o f equity, as noted by the Supreme Court in the decisions just cited, sustain an order permitting such a temporary continuance o f the powers of the current legislature. 7 In the effort to minimize disruption of the State’s elective processes as far as possible, but still consistently with our first order, it is well to recall those processes and consider their application here. When our finding of invalidity in the legislative apportionment was made in November 1962, both houses o f the General Assembly were to stand for elec tion the following year, 1963. During the temporary stay of enforcement of this finding, the 1963 election proceeded upon the unconstitutional apportionment. Delegates were then chosen for 2-year terms expiring on the 2nd Wednes day in January 1966, and the Senators were selected for 4 years each, that is until the 2nd Wednesday in January 1968. Orderly procedure would, therefore, suggest that the 1963 House of Delegates should continue in being until the expiration o f their terms in January 1966. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (June 15, 1964). In the November 1965 general election a House of Delegates will, under the Virginia law, be elected to assume their duties on the 2nd Wednesday in January 1966. O f course, the 1965 House would be serving under the new apportionment. As noted, however, the 1963 Senate would not normally leave office until January 1968. Elected on a void pattern of representation, there is no warrantable foundation for its accreditation beyond January 1966. Further, if it should be allowed to survive until 1968, the General Assembly— from January 1966 to January 1968— would be composed of a House of Delegates elected on one (a valid) scheme of ap portionment with a Senate elected upon another (in 8 validated) plan. This too, would be constitutionally un justifiable. Together the two houses in a bicameral system form a unitary and entire Legislature. For equality of popular reprsentation they are mutually complementary, and constitutional validity is not fulfilled if one house is deliberately permitted to lag behind the other in seeking fairness o f representation. Cf. Maryland Committee v. Tarwes, supra, 377 U.S. 656, 673. Incidentally, practical difficulties might develop if the life o f the 1963 Senate lasted until 1968. In the event of vacancies in the Senate, as an illustration, they could not be filled because no elections may be conducted under the nulli fied apportionment statutes. Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. 533, 585. Probably none could be held under the new act because o f the subsequent rearrangement o f the district. While such eventualities might occur in the House of Delegates also, the opportunity there for such con tingencies is for one year only— 1965. For these reasons we hold that the terms of the 1963 elected Senators as well as Delegates must come to an end not later than January 1966. Unavoidably, this will mean a special election of Senators to serve from January 1966 to January 1968. However, to repeat, we have stated only the maximum limits o f the life o f the present legislature. W e do not mean to say that special elections may not be called 9 earlier than November 1965, if the legislature desires, so that a General Assembly under the new reapportionment statute might be constituted before January 1966. United States Circuit Judge September 18, 1964. W e concur: United States District Judge United States District Judge APPENDIX C 1 Henrico Plain tiff-Intervenars’ Exhibit 37D C H A P TE R 1 An Act to amend and reenact § 24-14, as amended, of the Code of Virginia, relating to State senatorial districts. [S 1] Approved Dec. 2, 1964 Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia: 1. That § 24-14, as amended, o f the Code o f Virginia, be amended and reenacted as follows: § 24-14. The State is hereby divided into * thirty-three districts entitled to senators as follows: First.— The counties o f Accomack, Northampton, * Mathews, Gloucester and York, one. Second.— Norfolk city, * three. Third.— * The cities of Chesapeake, Portsmouth and Vir ginia Beach, three. Fourth.— The counties of Halifax, Charlotte, * Prince Edward, Lunenburg and Nottoway and the city of South Boston, one. Fifth.— The counties o f Isle o f Wight, Nansemond, Southampton, and the cities o f Suffolk and Franklin, one. 2 Sixth.'— The counties o f Greensville, Janies City, Prince George, Surry and Sussex, and the * cities o f Hopewell and Williamsburg, one. Seventh.— The counties o f Brunswick, * Dimmddie and Mecklenburg, and the city of Petersburg, one. Eighth.— The counties o f * Arlington and Fairfax, and the cities of Fairfax and Falls Church, one. Ninth.— Arlington county, one. * Tenth.— The counties o f Appomattox, Buckingham. * Amherst, Nelson and * Campbell, one. * Eleventh.— * Bedford County and city o f Lynchburg, one. ^Twelfth.— The counties o f Henry, Patrick and Pittsyl vania, and the cities of Danville and Martinsville, two. * Thirteenth.— The counties o f * Carroll, Floyd, * Frank lin and Montgomery, and the * cities of Galax and Radford, one. * Fourteenth.— The counties of Washington, Lee and Scott and the city o f Bristol, one. * Fifteenth.— The counties o f Dickenson, Russell and Wise and the city of Norton, one. * Sixteenth,— The counties o f Buchanan, * Smyth and Tazewell, one. * Seventeenth.— The counties o f Bland, Giles, Pulaski, Craig, Grayson and Wythe, one. 3 * Eighteenth.— The counties o f Alleghany, * Bath) Bote tourt, * and * Roanoke, and the cities o f * Clifton Forge and Covington, one. * Nineteenth.— The counties: o f Augusta, * Rockbridge and Highland, and the cities of Buena Vista, Staunton and Waynesboro, one. * Twentieth.— The counties o f Page, Rappahannock, Rockingham and Warren, and the city of Harrisonburg, one. * Twenty-first.— The counties of Clarke, Frederick, Shenandoah and Loudoun and the city of Winchester, one. * Twenty-second.— The counties o f Albemarle, Fluvanna, Green, Cumberland, Powhatan and Madison, and the city of Charlottesville, one. * Twenty-third.— The counties o f Goochland, Louisa, Orange, * Spotsylvania, Culpeper, Caroline, King George. and the city of Fredericksburg, one. * Twenty-fourth.— The counties o f Fairfax and the cities of Fairfax and Falls Church, two. * Twenty-fifth-—The counties o f * Prince William, * Stafford, and Fauquier, one. * Twenty-sixth.— The counties o f * Hanover, King W il liam, Essex, King and Queen, Middlesex, Westmoreland, Nor thumb er land, Richmond and Lancaster, one. * Twenty-seventh.— City o f Newport News *, one. 4 * Twenty-eighth.— City of Hampton, one. * Twenty-ninth.— The counties o f Charles City, Chester field, * Amelia and New Kent and the * city o f Colonial Heights *, one. * Thirtieth.— Richmond city, two. * Thirty-first.— County of Henrico, one. * Thirty-second.— City of Roanoke, one. * Thirty-third.— City o f Alexandria, one. Dec. 10, 1964. A TR U E COPY, T E S T E : George R. R ich Clerk of the House of Delegates and Keeper of the Rolls of the State 5 Henrico Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Exhibit No. 11 C H A P T E R 2 An Act to amend and reenact § 24-12, as amended, o f the Code of Virginia, relating to apportionment of the mem bers of the House of Delegates. [H 1] Approved December 2, 1964 Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia: 1. That § 24-12, as amended, o f the Code o f Virginia, be amended and reenacted as follows: § 24-12. Members o f the House o f Delegates shall be distributed and apportioned, and each county, city and combination is entitled to representation in the House of Delegates by a delegate, or by delegates as follows: * First.— Chesapeake, two. Second.— Accomack and Northampton, one. Third.— Albemarle and Greene, one. Fourth.— Charlottesville, one. Fifth.— Alexandria, two. Sixth.— Alleghany, Botetourt, Covington and Clifton Forge, one. Seventh.— Amelia, * Lunenburg and Nottoway, one. 6 Eighth.— Amherst and Lynchburg, one. Ninth.— Arlington, * four. Tenth.— Augusta, Highland, Staunton and Waynesboro, two. Eleventh.— Bedford, one. Twelfth..— Bland, * Craig, Giles, Pulaski and Wythe, * two. * Thirteenth.— Danville and Pittsylvania, one. Fourteenth.— Brunswick and * Dinwiddie, one. Fifteenth.— Buchanan, one. Sixteenth.— Russell and Dickenson, one. * Seventeenth.— Roanoke City and Roanoke County, one. Eighteenth.— Campbell, one. Nineteenth.— Caroline, King George, Essex and King and Queen, one. * Twentieth.— Fairfax County, and the cities of Alexan dria, Fairfax and Falls Church, one. Twenty-first.— * James City, * York and Williamsburg, one. Twenty-second.— Charlotte, Cumberland and Prince Ed ward, one. 7 Twenty-third.— Chesterfield and Colonial Heights, * two. Twenty-fourth.— Clarke, Frederick and Winchester, one. Twenty-fifth.— Danville, one. Twenty-sixth.— Hampton, * two. Twenty-seventh.— Fairfax County and cities o f Fairfax and Falls Church, * six. Twenty-eighth.— Fauquier, Warren and Rappahannock, one. Twenty-ninth,— Fluvanna, Goochland, * Louisa and Powhatan, one. Thirtieth.— Franklin County and Floyd, one. Thirty-first.— Gloucester, Mathews, New Kent, Charles City and Middlesex, one. Thirty-second.— Carroll, Grayson and Galax, one. Thirty-third.— Greensville, Surry and Sussex, one. Thirty-fourth.'— Halifax and South Boston, one. Thirty-fifth.— Hanover and King William, one. Thirty-sixth.— Henrico, * and city of Richmond, eight. Thirty-seventh.— Henry, Patrick and Martinsville, two. Thirty-eighth.— Isle o f Wight, * Southampton and * city of Franklin, one. 8 Thirty-ninth.— Northumberland, Westmoreland, Lancas ter and Richmond County, one. Fortieth.— Newport News, three. Forty-first.— Lee, Wise, and city o f Norton, two. Forty-second.— Loudoun and Prince William, * two, Forty-third.— Lynchburg, one. Forty-fourth.— Madison, Culpeper and Orange, one. Forty-fifth.— Mecklenburg, one. Forty-sixth.— Montgomery and Radford, one. Forty-seventh.— Nansemond and Suffolk, one. Forty-eighth.— Nelson *, Appomattox and Buckingham, one. * Forty-ninth.— Norfolk City, * seven. * Fiftieth.— Page *, Rockingham, Shenandoah and Har risonburg, one. * Fifty-first.— Petersburg *, one. * Fifty-second.—Pittsylvania, * one. * Fifty-third.— Portsmouth, * three. * Fifty-fourth.— Prince George * and Hopewell, one. * Fifty-fifth.— * Virginia Beach, two. * Fifty-sixth.— Roanoke County, one. * Fifty-seventh.— Roanoke City, two. * Fifty-eighth.— Rockbridge, Bath and Buena Vista, one. * Fifty-mnth.— Rockingham and Harrisonburg, * one. * Sixtieth.— Smyth, one. * Sixty-first.— Spotsylvania, Stafford and Fredericks burg, one. * Sixty-second.— Tazewell, one. * Sixty-third.— Washington, Scott and Bristol, two. And the districts hereby created are hereby numbered one (1 ) to * sixty three (63) inclusive. The reference to a county or city in this section is to the area comprising such county or city as of January one, nineteen hundred sixty-five. 2. I f any part or parts, section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase o f this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is for any reason declared unconstitutional, such decisions shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this act which shall remain in force as if such act had been passed with the unconstitutional part or parts, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase or such ap plication thereof eliminated; and the General Assembly hereby declares that it would have passed this act if such 10 unconstitutional part or parts, section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase had not been included herein, or if such application had not been made. Dec. 10, 1964 A TR U E COPY, T E S T E : George R. R ic h Clerk of the House of Delegates and Keeper of the Rolls of the State APPENDIX D 1 APPENDIX TO AND EXCERPT FROM RICHMOND PLAINTIFF-INTERVENORS’ REPLY BRIEF IN THE DISTRICT COURT Public Documents Reflecting Virginia’s Official Reaction To Brown v. Board of Education And Related Fourteenth Amendment Rights Senate Document No. 1, 1955 Extra Session— Report o f Commission on Public Education. Acts o f Assembly 1955, Extra Session, Chapter 2— Pro posing amendment to § 141 of the Constitution. Acts o f Assembly 1956, Chapter 1— Providing for con stitutional convention. Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, 1956 Session— Interposi tion. Acts o f Assembly 1956, Extra Session: Ch. 31— Registration of corporations supporting litiga tion. Ch. 32— Same; Penalties for refusing information. Ch. 33— Provision for disbarment or suspension of lawyers. Ch. 34— Committee on Offenses Against the Adminis tration of Justice. 2 Ch. 35— Redefining Barratry. Ch. 36—-Punishing the encouragement o f litigation. Ch. 37— Committee on Law Reform and Racial Activ ity. Ch. 39— Accreditation of certain public and private schools. Ch. 47— Prescribing conditions for legal aid. Ch. 56— Making public school funds available for private schools. Ch. 57— Authorizing payment o f local funds. Ch. 58— Requirement of funds for nonsectarian schools. Ch. 59— Providing that no child be required to attend integrated school. Ch. 60— Providing for payment of pupil transporta tion. Ch. 61— Superintendent given power to assign and re assign teachers. Ch. 62— School Board empowered to pay grants with out approval o f Supervisors. 3 Ch. 63— Providing for employment o f attorneys to defend school boards. Ch. 64— Extending retirement benefits to private school teachers. Ch. 65— Authorizing Attorney General to assist school boards. Ch. 66-—Providing for shortening school terms. Ch. 67— Adjusting school budget procedures. Ch. 68— Vesting power to control schools in Governor. Ch. 69— Defining efficient system of public schools. Ch. 70— Creating Pupil Placement Board. Ch. 71, Items 133, 134,137, 138 and 143— Amendment o f Appropriation Act. Acts o f Assembly, 1958: Ch. 4b— Authorizing Governor to operate schools policed by military troops. Ch. 213— Providing for appearance o f attorneys in certain proceedings. Ch. 253— Regulating legal aid; disbarment for viola tion. 4 Ch. 319— To close schools under certain conditions. Ch. 373— Committee on Offenses Against the Admin istration o f Justice. Ch. 500— Pupil Placement Board. Ch. 506— Registration of members o f corporations “ engaged in practice of law.” Ch. 540— Orders from Federal government to State Militia. Ch. 608— Subpoena power of joint committees. Ch. 631— Restoring closed school to school system. Ch. 642, Item 129—Mixed schools not efficient. House Joint Resolution No. 50, 1958 Session— Directing Virginia State Bar to review and act upon information ob tained by legislative investigating committees. Acts o f Assembly 1959, Extra Session: Ch. 1— Tuition grants. Ch. 3, Item 158A— Appropriation for tuition grants. Ch. 6— Tuition grants. Ch. 32— To close schools policed by Federal authority. 5 Ch. 39— R e : Committee on Offenses Against the Ad ministration of Justice. Ch. 49— Transportation grants for school children. Ch. 50— Repayment o f teachers’ scholarships. Ch. 53— Scholarship grants. Ch. 71— Pupil placement. Ch. 79— Changed local school budget procedure. Ch. 80— Waiver of building standards for private schools. Ch. 96, Items 158 A and B— Scholarship grants. Acts o f Assembly, 1960: Ch. 97— Increased penalties for trespass. Ch. 98— Encouraging others to trespass. Ch. 99— Conspiring to trespass. Ch. 191— Tax credits for contributions to private schools. 6 EXCERPT FROM REPLY BRIEF * * * [page 7] There yet remain in Virginia’s Constitution and statutes several items o f legislation the history, purpose or effect of which reflect official opposition to the aims of the framers o f the Fourteenth Amendment or suggest legislative reex amination in the light o f the policy o f the Nation on the subject of race relations, e .g .: [page 8] The 1956 Amendment to Section 141 of the Con stitution permitting support o f “ private” segregated schools. Section 140 of the Constitution yet purporting to proscribe the teaching o f white and colored children in the same school. Code § 1-14. Colored persons and Indians defined. Code §2-86.1. Advice and legal assistance to local school boards. (1956 Ex. Sess., C. 65.) Code § 2-90.1. Attorney General may expend funds for special counsel to prosecute persons illegally prac ticing law. (1958, C. 235.) Code §7-35. Official song (for text o f which see Acts 1940, p. 942). [Carry Me Back to Old Virginia] Code §§ 9-48.1 through 9-48.6. Commission on Con stitutional Government. (1958, C. 233.) Code §§20-50 through 20-60. Colored Persons; Mar riage between white and colored persons. 7 Code §§ 22-115.29 through 22-115.37. Grants for Educational Purposes. Code §§ 22-188.50 and 22-188.51. Schools disturbed by Federal Policing. (1959 Ex. Sess., C. 32.) Code §§ 22-232.1 through 22-232.31. Enrollment or Placement of Pupils. (1956 Ex. Sess., Ch. 70; 1959 Ex. Sess., Ch. 71.) Code §§ 23-10 through 23-13. Aid to persons denied admission to state institutions of higher learning. Code §§ 23-165 through 23-181 Virginia State Col lege and Virginia State School. Code §§ 30-42 through 30-51. Committee on offenses against the administration o f justice. (A revision o f Ch. 37 Acts 1956, Extra Session.) Code §§ 37-5, -6, -7, -183, -185, -192, -212, etc. (State Institutions for Insane Persons, etc.)