Hunt v. Cromartie Brief Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants
Public Court Documents
September 1, 2000
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Brief Collection, LDF Court Filings. Hunt v. Cromartie Brief Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, 2000. 0c28e19d-b89a-ee11-be36-6045bdeb8873. LDF Archives, Thurgood Marshall Institute. https://ldfrecollection.org/archives/archives-search/archives-item/a898904c-80f8-4152-9c11-b4c2339c6e13/hunt-v-cromartie-brief-amicus-curiae-supporting-appellants. Accessed December 06, 2025.
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Nos. 99-1864 and 99-1865
In tf)t Supreme Court of tljr Hmteb States
James B. Hunt, Jr., Governor of N orth Carolina,
ET AL., APPELLANTS
V.
Martin Cromartie, et al.
Alfred Smallwood, et al., appellants
v.
Martin Cromartie, et al.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING APPELLANTS
Seth P. Waxman
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
William R. Yeomans
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
Barbara D. Underwood
Deputy Solicitor General
James A. Feldman
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
David K. Flynn
Louis E. Peraertz
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 5U-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
The United States will address the following question:
Whether the district court applied the correct legal stan
dards in finding that race was the predominant factor in the
drawing of District 12 of North Carolina’s 1997 congressional
redistricting plan.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Interest of the United States....... .......... ........... .............. 1
Statement................... ...... ............................ . 2
Summary of argument ............ .................. ............. 8
Argument:
I. The predominant factor tes t requires a district
court to engage in a particularly sensitive
inquiry into a S ta te’s in tent in drawing a
district, and it requires proof not merely tha t
race was a factor in drawing a district, bu t that
it was the predominant factor .... .............. ....... . 11
A. A Shaw claim requires proof that race was
the State’s “predominant factor” ................... 11
B. The predominant factor test is a demanding
one .................................. ..... ...................... 12
II. The district court improperly inferred a pre
dominant racial motive in this case ... .......... ...... . 16
A. The district court relied substantially on
evidence th a t was incompetent to distinguish
between race and politics as a factor in
District 12 .... ......................................................... 18
B. I t was clear error for the district court to
infer predominant racial motive from Dr.
W eber’s te s tim o n y .......................... ....................... 21
C. The district court’s conclusions from other
testimony were infected by its earlier errors
and in any event confuse evidence th a t
race was a factor in drawing District 12 with
evidence th a t it was the predom inant
factor .......................................................................... 26
Conclusion .................................................................................. 30
(III)
IV
TABLE OF AUTH ORITIES
Cases: Page
A bram s v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) ...... ...................... 13
Anderson v. City o f Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564
(1985) ............................................................................ .......... 24
Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. School Dist., 804
F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1986)......... ....................................... . 23
B ush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996)........................ 11-12,14,15,
16,18, 20, 28, 29
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975) ................................ 13
Clark v. Calhoun County, 21 F.3d 92 (5th Cir.
1994) ............................. 23-24
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960) ..... . 23
Cousin v. McWherter, 46 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995) ......... 23
Growe v. Em ison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993) ............ ......... 13
Harvell v. Ladd, 958 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1992) ....... .......... 23
H unt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) ... 2 ,3 -4 ,11 ,16 ,19 ,20
Johnson v. Hamrick, 196 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir.
1999) .................... .............................................. ...................... 23
Lawyer v. Department o f Justice, 521 U.S. 567
(1997).......... ..................................................................... 11,12,17
Lee County Branch o f the N A A C P v. City o f
Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1984) ............................ 23
M iller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) ...................... 12,13-14
Shaw v. H unt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) ........... 2 ,11,13,15, 28, 29
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)........................... 2 ,11,13, 28
Uno v. City o f Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995)....... 23
Velasquez v. City o f Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017 (5th
Cir. 1984) .................................................................................. 23, 24
Village o f Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Carp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) 12
V
Cases—Continued: Page
Westwego Citizens fo r Better Gov’t v. C ityofW estw ego,
872 F,2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1989) ............................................... 23
Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978).... ....................... . 12
Constitution, sta tu te and rule:
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (Equal Protection
C lau se)......................... ....................................—................ 1 ,2 ,11
Voting Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. 1971 et seq.:
§ 2,42 U.S.C. 1973 ............ ............................................... 1
§ 5, 42 U.S.C. 1973c............... ..................... ..................... 1
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ................................................................. 23
Miscellaneous:
The A lm anac o f Am erican Politics 1998 (1997)................ 19
i n tf)t Cupreine C o u rt of tfie U n ite d States*
No. 99-1864
J a m e s B . H u n t , J r ., G o v e r n o r o f N o r t h C a r o l i n a ,
ET AL., APPELLANTS
V.
M a r t i n C r o m a r t i e , e t a l .
No. 99-1865
A l f r e d S m a l l w o o d , e t a l ., a p p e l l a n t s
v.
M a r t i n C r o m a r t i e , e t a l .
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING APPELLANTS
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
This case concerns a district court’s finding that a state
election districting plan was drawn predominantly on the
basis of race, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States enforces
Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C.
1973, 1973c), which require, in part, that States and political
subdivisions not engage in voting practices that deny citi
zens an equal opportunity to elect representatives of their
choice on account of their race. Those statutes sometimes
require States to take the racial consequences of their
districting decisions into account. The United States has an
interest in ensuring that States have reasonable leeway to
(1)
2
design districts that comply with both the Voting Rights Act
and the Equal Protection Clause. The United States has
participated in all three prior appeals in related litigation.
The United States was a party-defendant in Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993), and filed briefs as amicus curiae in
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), and in Hunt v. Cro-
martie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
STATEMENT
1. In Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (Shaw IT), this
Court struck down North Carolina’s 1992 congressional dis
tricting plan under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four
teenth Amendment. The Court held that District 12 in that
plan had been drawn predominantly on the basis of race, id.
at 907, and that it did not satisfy strict scrutiny, id. at 910-
918.
After this Court’s decision, the North Carolina General
Assembly attempted to enact a new districting plan. The
state Senate had a Democratic majority and the House had a
Republican majority. State Senator Roy A. Cooper, III, and
State Representative W. Edwin McMahan, the chairmen of
the Senate and House redistricting committees, provided
affidavits and testimony detailing the goals and purposes of
the committees. J.S. App. 81a-87a; J.A. 179-230 (Cooper);
J.S. App. 137a-154a; J.A. 231-244 (McMahan). Among the
avowed goals of the committees were “curing the consti
tutional defects of the 1992 Plan by assuring that race was
not the predominant factor in the new plan” and “drawing
the plan to maintain the existing partisan balance.” J.S.
App. 11a. To achieve that partisan goal, “the redistricting
committees drew the new plan (1) to avoid placing two in
cumbents in the same district and (2) to preserve the
partisan core of the existing districts to the extent consistent
with the goal of curing the defects in the old plan.” Ibid.
District 12 in the 1997 Plan is different from the district
found unconstitutional in Shaw II in important respects. As
3
this Court noted in its prior decision in this case, Hunt v.
Cromartie (Hunt I), 526 U.S. 541, 544 (1999), District 12
splits six counties, as opposed to ten in the unconstitutional
plan. The distance between its farthest points has been
reduced from 160 miles to 95 miles. Ibid. African-Americans
are no longer a majority in the district, constituting approxi
mately 43% of its voting age population, 46% of registered
voters, and 47% of its population. Ibid. District 12 is also
fully contiguous and, unlike the unconstitutional District 12
in the 1992 plan, it does not employ artificial devices such as
“crossovers” to achieve contiguity. J.S. App. 83a.
The 1997 Plan was enacted by the legislature on March 31,
1997, despite an earlier belief by many that the party divis
ion between the two houses of the legislature would make
such agreement impossible. J.S. App. 2a, 82a, 138a; J.A. 240.
Twelve of the 17 African-American members of North
Carolina’s House of Representatives voted against the plan.
J.S. App. 140a.
2. a. Appellees filed an amended complaint alleging that
District 12 under the 1997 Plan is, like its predecessor, an
unconstitutional gerrymander. See Hunt /, 526 U.S. at 544.
The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment
and, in April 1998, the district court, by a 2-1 majority,
granted appellees’ motion. Id. at 545; see J.S. App. 243a-
282a.
b. On May 17, 1999, this Court in Hunt I unanimously re
versed the order granting summary judgment to appellees.
The Court noted that “[t]he task of assessing a jurisdiction’s
motivation * * * is an inherently complex endeavor” and
that it “requir[es] the trial court to perform a sensitive in
quiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent
as may be available.” 526 U.S. at 546 (citation omitted).
Assessing the summary judgment record, the Court noted
that appellees had offered “circumstantial” evidence con
sisting of geographic and demographic data, id. at 547,
which, “[vjiewed in toto, * * * tends to support an
4
inference that the State drew its district lines with an
impermissible racial motive—even though they presented no
direct evidence of intent.” Id. at 548-549. The Court also
noted, however, that appellants had produced testimony by
the legislators who drew the plan that their intent was “to
make District 12 a strong Democratic district,” and what the
Court described as “[m]ore important” expert testimony
examining the demographics and the entire boundary of the
district. Id. at 549. That testimony tended to show “a high
correlation between race and party preference,” id. at 552,
because “in precincts with high black representation, there is
a correspondingly high tendency for voters to favor the
Democratic Party” and vice versa, id. at 550. The expert,
Dr. David W. Peterson, concluded that “the data as a whole
supported a political explanation at least as well as, and
somewhat better than, a racial explanation” for the con
figuration of District 12. Ibid.
The Court noted that a political explanation for District 12
would make the district constitutional, since “a jurisdiction
may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even
if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be
black Democrats and even if the State were conscious of that
fact.” 526 U.S. at 551. To reject that political explanation,
the district court had necessarily “either credited appellees’
asserted inferences over those advanced and supported by
appellants or did not give appellants the inference they were
due.” Id. at 552. In either event, “it was error in this case for
the District Court to resolve the disputed fact of motivation
at the summary judgment stage.” Ibid.
3. On remand, the three-judge district court held a three-
day trial. On March 7, 2000, the court ruled by a 2-1 margin
that District 12 “continues to be unconstitutional.” J.S. App.
35a.
a. The majority initially repeated, virtually verbatim,
many of the same facts regarding the racial composition,
party registration, and statistical measures of compactness
5
that it had relied on in granting summary judgment to
appellees. That evidence tended to show that cities and
counties were divided such that the portions within District
12 had substantially higher percentages of African-Ameri
cans than the portions outside District 12, see J.S. App. 12a-
14a, and that the boundary of District 12 excluded certain
precincts in which 54-69% of the voters had registered as
Democrats, see id. at 13a-14a. It also showed that District
12 scored relatively low on statistical measures of com
pactness. Id. at 15a-17a. Compare J.S. App. 247a-253a (dis
trict court opinion at summary judgment stage).
The majority also referred to evidence presented by
plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Ronald Weber. According to the court,
Dr. Weber “showed time and again how race trumped party
affiliation in the construction of the 12th District and how
political explanations utterly failed to explain the composi
tion of the district.” J.S. App. 26a. The majority also stated
that Dr. Weber had “presented a convincing critique” of
the “boundary segment” analysis presented by the State’s
expert, Dr. David Peterson, and discussed by this Court in
its opinion in Hunt I, and that Dr. Weber had found that Dr.
Peterson’s study “‘has not been appropriately done,’ and was
therefore ‘unreliable’ and not relevant.” Id. at 27a. The
majority did not itself specify the particular respects in
which Dr. Peterson’s analysis was deficient.
The majority finally referred to two other items of evi
dence to support its conclusion that race, and not politics,
was the predominant factor underlying the creation of Dis
trict 12. First, the majority referred to the testimony of
Senator Cooper. The majority stated that “[t]he conclusion
that race predominated was * * * bolstered by” an allusion
by Senator Cooper to a desire to achieve “racial and partisan
balance” as factors underlying the redistricting plan. J.S.
App. 27a. The majority found “simply not credible” Senator
Cooper’s contention that “he did not mean the term ‘racial
balance’ to refer to the maintenance of a ten-two balance be
6
tween whites and African-Americans.” Ibid. Second, the
court referred to an e-mail to Senator Cooper that had been
written by Gerry Cohen, the legislative employee who had
been responsible for technical aspects of drawing the 1997
and earlier state plans. See id. at 8a. The e-mail discussed
the racial composition of a different district—District 1—
and then added that “I [Cohen] have moved Greensboro
Black community into the 12th, and now need to take [ajbout
60,000 out of the 12th. I await your direction on this.” Ibid.)
see J.A. 369 (full text of e-mail). The majority stated that
the e-mail “clearly demonstrates that the chief architects of
the 1997 Plan had evolved a methodology for segregating
voters by race, and that they had applied this method to the
12th District.” J.S. App. 27a.
The majority concluded that the legislature had “es
chewed traditional districting criteria such as contiguity,
geographical integrity, community of interest, and com
pactness in redrawing the District,” but instead had “utilized
race as the predominant factor in drawing the District.” J.S.
App. 29a. The court entered an injunction against use of
District 12 in this year’s elections. Id. at 35a.1
b. Judge Thornburg dissented from the panel’s holding
that District 12 is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
J.S. App. 37a-68a. In his view, appellees—who had the
burden of proving that race was the predominant factor—
had “failed to carry their burden through either direct or
circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 45a. He stated that the
State had “produced ample and convincing evidence which
1 The district court also held that District 1 was -subject to strict scru
tiny, but it found that the State had satisfied that standard. J.S. App. 30a-
35a. Appellees did not perfect their appeal from that ruling, and the
district court granted appellants’ motion to dismiss appellees’ appeal on
August 3, 2000 (Docket No. 178). Accordingly, although the district
court’s ruling that District 12 is unconstitutional is now before this Court,
the district court’s ruling that District 1 is constitutional is no longer at
issue, and will not be further addressed herein.
7
demonstrates that political concerns such as existing consti
tuents, incumbency, voter performance, commonality of
interests, and contiguity, not racial motivations, dominated
the process surrounding the creation and adoption of the
1997 redistricting plan.” Id. at 45a-46a. He noted that the
1997 Plan’s drafters “recognized the necessity of creating a
plan which would garner the support of both parties and
both houses” by “protect[ing] incumbents and thereby
maintain[ing] the then existing 6-6 partisan split amongst
North Carolina’s congressional delegation.” Id. at 46a. Since
District 12 had a Democratic incumbent, “common sense as
well as political experience dictated ascertaining the strong
est voter performing Democratic precincts in the urban
Piedmont Crescent.” Id. at 47a. The fact “[t]hat many of
those strong Democratic performing precincts were majority
African-American, and that the General Assembly leaders
were aware of that fact, is not a constitutional violation.”
Ibid.
Judge Thornburg addressed Dr. Weber’s testimony that
District 12 was drawn on a predominantly racial, and not
political, basis, because the District failed to include some
Democratic precincts that had relatively low African-Ameri
can populations. Judge Thornburg noted that “there is no
dispute that every one of the majority African-American
precincts included in the Twelfth District are among the
highest, if not the highest, Democratic performing districts
in that geographic region.” J.S. App. 50a. He noted that to
include other well-performing Democratic precincts identi
fied by Dr. Weber would have meant excluding “the highest
performing Democratic precincts.” Ibid. He also explained
that “few of the strong Democratic precincts to which Dr.
Weber referred could have easily been included in the
Twelfth District” because few of them “actually abutted” the
District. Id. at 50a n.21. Judge Thornburg also noted Dr.
Weber’s testimony that he had “considered no hypothesis
other than race as the legislature’s predominant motive” be
8
cause he had believed, mistakenly, “that the person drawing
North Carolina’s districts could only see racial data” on his
computer screen. Id. at 51a. Finally, Judge Thornburg
noted that Dr. Weber had also “specifically failed to inquire
about real world political or partisan factors which might
have influenced the process.” Ibid.
With respect to the Cooper-Cohen e-mail, Judge Thorn
burg explained that it “does little more than reinforce what
is already known, and what is not constitutionally imper
missible: North Carolina’s legislative leaders were conscious
of race, aware of racial percentages, on notice of the po
tential constitutional implications of their actions, and
generally very concerned with these and every other politi
cal and partisan consideration which affected whether or not
the redistricting plan would pass.” J.S. App. 48a n.18. Those
facts “contribute little to [appellees’] efforts to show that
racial motives 'predominated. ” Ibid.
4. On March 16, 2000, this Court entered an order
staying the district court’s injunction. 120 S. Ct. 1415.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents the Court with what is likely to be its
final opportunity to clarify the legal standards governing a
racial gerrymandering claim before state legislatures begin
the redistricting process triggered by the decennial census.
Both in the Shaw context and elsewhere, this Court has
frequently emphasized the extraordinary sensitivity of re
districting and high costs of unnecessary federal court
intrusion into the primary authority of the States in this
area. For those reasons, it is crucial that the “predominant
factor” test that governs a racial gerrymandering claim not
be interpreted to give district courts a free-ranging license
to substitute their judgments for those of state legislatures
in the quintessential^ political determination of how appro
priately to draw electoral districts.
This Court’s decisions have established that a district is
subject to strict scrutiny when it is drawn with race as the
predominant factor; the plaintiff must prove that traditional
race-neutral districting principles were subordinated to
race—not to some other factor—before strict scrutiny
applies. As the Court has repeatedly explained, the “pre
dominant factor” test is a demanding one. It does not license
a district court to intrude in the core state function of re
districting merely because the State has drawn a district
that is majority-minority or that has a higher minority popu
lation than neighboring districts. Nor does it permit a
district court to intrude in state redistricting merely because
racial considerations were a factor among others in drawing
a particular district or in making some of the subsidiary
districting decisions that go into a districting plan. Rather, a
district court may intrude in districting in this context only if
the State’s dominant and controlling rationale was race.
Under that standard, the district court in this case erred
in concluding that the predominant factor in drawing Dis
trict 12 was racial. First, the district court relied sub
stantially on evidence that was incompetent to distinguish
between race and politics as a factor responsible for the
configuration of District 12. The crucial and uncontroverted
fact is that in North Carolina African-Americans reliably
vote overwhelmingly—90% or more—for Democratic can
didates. Accordingly, any district that, like District 12, is
drawn to concentrate reliable Democratic voters will tend as
well to concentrate African-American voters. The evidence
on which the district court relied that District 12 is unusually
shaped in a way that tends to correspond with race thus
tends only to frame the question—whether the district was
drawn with race or political motives as predominant-—but
not to answer it. The district court also relied on evidence
showing that District 12 fails to include some precincts with
high Democratic registration figures. But in a State like
North Carolina, in which registered Democrats frequently
9
10
vote Republican, that evidence is entirely consistent with
the legislature’s professed desire to create a district that
would be solidly Democratic on election day, and it provides
no basis for doubting the State’s professed political motive.
Second, the district court committed clear error in infer
ring from certain evidence presented by appellees’ expert,
Dr. Ronald Weber, that race was the predominant motive
underlying District 12. For example, the district court relied
on Dr. Weber’s testimony that precincts that had voted for
Democratic candidates in past elections were omitted from
District 12. The evidence on which the court relied would
have been sufficient to tend to disprove the State’s partisan
objective of creating District 12 as a solidly Democratic dis
trict only if appellees had shown that including the omitted
precincts would have resulted in a District 12 with a higher
overall Democratic voting strength. Omitting precincts with
Democratic voting patterns in favor of precincts with even
more solidly Democratic voting patterns is entirely consis
tent with the State’s professed objective. It cannot support
an inference of predominant racial motive.
Third, the district court, based in large part on the faulty
inferences discussed above, inferred a predominant racial
motive from statements by Senator Cooper and legislative
employee Gerry Cohen. Insofar as the district court’s in
ferences in this regard were based on its earlier errors, the
court’s conclusions should be disregarded. In any event,
however, the inferences the district court drew from these
statements showed at most that race was a factor underlying
District 12. The district court thus failed to distinguish
between a State’s mere desire to achieve a racial objective in
districting as one factor among others and the desire to
achieve a racial objective as a predominant motive under
lying District 12; only the latter is subject to strict scrutiny.
Where there is as close a coincidence of race and politics as
in this case, a district court may not conclude that race was
the predominant factor based solely on isolated findings that
11
in particular respects the process or result of the State’s
districting shows that the State was aware of the racial con
sequences of its actions or that race was a factor; to do so
would leave States that engaged in entirely constitutional
districting at risk of a district court’s inference that, because
they had some racial knowledge or motivation, it must have
been predominant.
ARGUMENT
I. THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR TEST REQUIRES
A DISTRICT COURT TO ENGAGE IN A PARTI
CULARLY SENSITIVE INQUIRY INTO A
STATE’S INTENT IN DRAWING A DISTRICT,
AND IT REQUIRES PROOF NOT MERELY THAT
RACE WAS A FACTOR IN DRAWING A DIS
TRICT, BUT THAT IT WAS THE PREDOMINANT
FACTOR
A. A Shaw Claim Requires Proof That Race Was The
State’s “Predominant Factor”
In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw I), this Court
first recognized a claim for racial gerrymandering in vio
lation of the Equal Protection Clause. In Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995), the Court articulated the governing
standard: strict scrutiny is triggered only when “race for its
own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legis
lature’s dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its
district lines.” Id. at 913. Race must thus be shown to be
“the 'predominant factor motivating the legislature’s [re-
districting] decision.” Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996)
(plurality opinion) (emphasis in original); see also Shaw v.
Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996) (Shaw II); Lawyer v. Depart
ment of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 582 (1997); Hunt v. Cromartie,
526 U.S. 541, 547 (1999) {Hunt 7).
The “predominant factor” test is not the same inquiry
applicable “in cases of ‘classifications based explicitly on
12
race/ ” Bush, 517 U.S. at 958, or in cases in which facially
neutral practices are challenged on the ground that race is a
“motivating factor in the decision,” Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977). A necessary consequence of the Court’s holding
that a district is subject to strict scrutiny only when race
was the State’s “predominant factor” in drawing it is that a
Shaw claim is not made out when race is merely one of the
motives or factors considered—but not the predominant
one—in drawing the district. Indeed, the plurality in
Bush made that point expressly, rejecting the view “that it
suffices [in making out a Shaw claim] that racial considera
tions be a motivation for the drawing of a majority-minority
district.” Bush, 517 U.S. at 959 (emphasis in original). In
short, “[sjtrict scrutiny does not apply merely because re
districting is performed with consciousness of race,” id. at
958, “[n]or * * * is the decision to create a majority-
minority district objectionable in and of itself,” id. at 962. As
Justice O’Connor has explained, under the “predominant
factor” test, “States may intentionally create majority-
minority districts, and may otherwise take race into
consideration, without coming under strict scrutiny.” Id. at
993 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
B. The Predominant Factor Test Is A Demanding One
1. This Court has frequently noted, both in Shaw cases
and in other redistricting cases, that “redistricting and reap
portioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the
federal courts should make every effort not to pre-empt.”
Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539 (1978). Of course,
federal courts serve a “customary and appropriate backstop
role,” Bush, 517 U.S. at 985, when a state redistricting plan
“runs afoul of federal law,” Lawyer, 521 U.S. at 577. But be
cause “reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsi
bility of the State,” Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975),
and is “a most difficult subject for legislatures,” Miller, 515
13
U.S. at 915, “the States must have discretion to exercise
the political judgment necessary to balance competing
interests,” ibid. “The task of redistricting is best left to
state legislatures, elected by the people and as capable as the
courts, if not more so, in balancing the myriad factors and
traditions in legitimate districting policies.” Abrams v.
Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 101 (1997). See also Growe v. Emison,
507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993). Because of the serious consequences
of federal judicial intrusion into this most sensitive of state
legislative tasks, “[t]he courts, in assessing the sufficiency of
a challenge to a districting plan, must be sensitive to the
complex interplay of forces that enter a legislature’s redis
tricting calculus.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-916. See also id. at
916 (“[T]he sensitive nature of redistricting and the pre
sumption of good faith that must be accorded legislative
enactments * * * requires courts to exercise extraordinary
caution in adjudicating claims that a State has drawn district
lines on the basis of race.”); id. at 915 (“the good faith of a
state legislature must be presumed”).
2. The extraordinary sensitivity of the redistricting pro
cess, coupled with the high costs of undue federal court
intrusion into that process, demands that a district court
scrupulously observe the substantive requirements of the
“predominant factor” test before finding a Shaw violation.
In some cases, of course, “[t]he evidentiary inquiry is . . .
relatively easy.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 913. For example, “[i]n
some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may be so
highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be
understood as anything other than an effort to ‘segregate]
. . . voters’ on the basis of race.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646-
647. Similarly, the redistricting record or the subsequent
litigation may disclose the relevant State officials making
clear that their “overriding purpose was * * * to create
* * * congressional districts with effective black voting
majorities.” Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 906; Miller, 515 U.S. at 918
(State was “driven by its overriding desire to comply with
14
[racial] maximization demands”)- These are mere examples;
other facts can also demonstrate that race was the pre
dominant factor in a particular case.
In other cases, it cannot so readily be inferred that race
was the predominant factor. For example, when (as is true in
this case) race correlates highly with partisan voting be
havior, it is predictable that a State that wants to create a
district whose borders tend to concentrate members of a
particular political party will, as a byproduct, create a
district whose borders tend to concentrate members of a
particular race. If that alone were sufficient to support a
finding that strict scrutiny applies (and that the district is
unconstitutional absent a compelling interest), a State would
have to forego its otherwise lawful option of forming
districts on the basis of partisan choices. Indeed, it would
have to do so only in one category of cases—where race
correlates highly with partisan voting behavior. That con
travenes the settled principles that “incumbency protection,
at least in the limited form of ‘avoiding contests between
incumbent[s],’ [is] a legitimate state goal,” and that “political
gerrymandering” should not be subjected to strict scrutiny.
Bush, 517 U.S. at 964.2
Even if the State has taken race into account to some
extent in drawing the district in such a case, that is still not
sufficient to show that the “predominant factor” underlying
the district is racial. As discussed above, strict scrutiny is
not triggered where race is merely “a motivation,” Bush, 517
U.S. at 959, in drawing a district; a Shaw claim requires
proof that race was the 'predominant factor. Therefore,
2 See Bush, 517 U.S. at 968 (“If the State’s goal is otherwise
constitutional political gerrymandering, it is free to use * * * political
data * * * —precinct general election voting patterns, precinct primary
voting patterns, and legislators’ experience—to achieve that goal regard
less of its awareness of its racial implications and regardless of the fact
that it does so in the context of a majority-minority district.”) (citations
omitted).
15
where race and partisan voting behavior correlate highly,
and a State draws a district with mixed political, racial, and
other motivations, a district court may not merely seize on
isolated evidence tending to show the State’s racial moti
vation in drawing the district to conclude that race was the
predominant factor. To permit that inference would para
doxically hamstring state legislatures in achieving their
political objectives in any State where race correlates highly
with partisan voting behavior. For even if a legislature paid
no attention whatever to race, its politically motivated
districting decisions would likely be susceptible to a racial
interpretation. And if the State exercised its lawful
authority to take race into account to some extent, it would
inevitably risk the finding of predominant racial motive that
was made here. That result would be inconsistent with
bedrock principles recognizing that state legislatures—and
not federal courts—have primary responsibility for the
politically highly charged task of drawing districts, and that
federal courts must be particularly cautious before intruding
into state prerogatives in this area. To trigger strict scru
tiny, the party challenging the district must satisfy the
heavy burden of proving that “[r]ace was the criterion that,
in the State’s view, could not be compromised.” Shaw II, 517
U.S. at 907.
Bush v. Vera illustrates these principles. The plurality in
Bush initially noted findings “that the State substantially
negleeted traditional districting criteria such as compact
ness, that it was committed from the outset to creating
majority-minority districts, and that it manipulated district
lines to exploit unprecedentedly detailed racial data.” 517
U.S. at 962. The plurality stated, however, merely that
those factors “together weigh in favor of the application of
strict scrutiny”—not that they required its application. Ibid.
The plurality explained that it must therefore “consider
what role other factors played in order to determine whether
race predominated.” Id. at 963. As the plurality explained,
16
“[b]ecause it is clear that race was not the only factor that
motivated the legislature to draw irregular district lines, we
must scrutinize each challenged district to determine
whether the District Court’s conclusion that race predo
minated over legitimate districting considerations, including
incumbency, can be sustained.” Id. at 965. Only after con
cluding that there was exceptionally strong evidence suffi
cient to show not merely that race was a factor, but that it
was the predominant factor, did the plurality determine that
the districts in question should be subject to strict scrutiny.3
The same inquiry was required here.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY IN
FERRED A PREDOMINANT RACIAL MOTIVE IN
THIS CASE
As this Court noted in its decision in Hunt I, the lines of
District 12 correlate highly with race. District 12 contains
portions of six counties; in each of them, the portion of the
county within District 12 has a substantially higher African-
American population than does the portion of the county
outside District 12. See Hunt I, 526 U.S. at 548 & n.4.
Moreover, the boundary lines of District 12 are irregular in
shape. See id. at 547-548. Plaintiffs’ claim has always been
3 See Bush, 517 U.S. at 969 (evidence that the State itself explained
the district “in exclusively racial terms”), 970 (evidence that “districting
software * * * provided only racial data at the block-by-block level,” and
that district lines were in fact determined at that level), 970 (evidence of
use of “race as a proxy”), 971 (evidence that shape of district was “far from
the shape that would be necessary to maximize the Democratic vote in
that area”), 972-973 (“intensive and pervasive use of race both as a proxy
to protect the political fortunes of adjacent incumbents, and for its own
sake in maximizing the minority population of District 30 regardless of
traditional districting principles”), 975 (“racial demographics and voting
patterns * * * belief] any suggestion that party politics could explain”
two adjoining districts, because “[t]he district lines correlate almost
perfectly with race, while both districts are similarly solidly Democratic”)
(citation omitted).
that this evidence demonstrated that District 12 was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
As the Court explained in Hunt I, however, the State
advanced a different explanation for the lines of District 12.
At the time of the 1997 Plan, the North Carolina legislature
was divided between Republicans and Democrats, with the
Republicans in control of the House and the Democrats in
control of the Senate. Similarly, the State’s congressional
delegation was evenly divided between six Democrats and
six Republicans. The State contended that the legislators in
charge of redistricting concluded that, in this situation, the
only way to get a redistricting plan through the legislature
would be to adopt a plan that maintained the six-six partisan
split in the congressional delegation and that protected all of
the incumbents. See J.S. App. 82a-83a, 138a-139a; J.A. ISO-
182, 235, 240-241. Because District 12 had a Democratic
incumbent, the result was to craft District 12 in such a way
as to solidify the Democratic vote there. Further, it is
undisputed that 90% or more of African-Americans in North
Carolina regularly vote Democratic. See, e.g., J.A. 130
(“over 90 percent” in a series of studies); J.A. 139 (“95 to 97
percent”). Accordingly, the State contended that the cor
relation between the district lines and race was a mere by
product of the State’s desire to create a solidly Democratic
District 12; the result of the State's attempt to concentrate
Democratic voters in the district was that the most
reliable Democratic voters—African-Americans—tended to
be included.4
17
4 It is also significant that District 12—with a 43% African-American
voting age population and a 47% total African-American population—is
not a majority-minority district. As the Court explained in Lawyer, “[t]he
fact that [the challenged district] is not a majority black district * * *
supports the * * * finding that the district is not a ‘safe’ one for black-
preferred candidates, but one that offers to any candidate, without regard
to race, the opportunity to seek and be elected to office.” 521 U.S. at 581
(internal quotation marks omitted).
18
In short, this was a “mixed motive” case, like Bush v.
Vera. See 517 U.S. at 959. On remand, what remained
for the district court was to determine whether plaintiffs
could carry their burden at trial of proving that, as between
the two motives, race—and not the kinds of partisan con
siderations urged by the State—was the predominant factor
underlying the District. "The district court’s conclusion that
plaintiffs had carried that burden was fatally defective, for
three reasons.
A. The District Court Relied Substantially On Evidence
That Was Incompetent To Distinguish Between Race
And Politics As A Factor In Drawing District 12
Much of the district court’s opinion is an almost verbatim
repetition of the court’s previous opinion on summary judg
ment. Compare J.S. App. 10a-17a (final judgment opinion),
23a-26a (same), 28a-30a (same) with J.S. App. 246a-253a
(summary judgment opinion), 258a-261a (same), 262a-263a
(same). The portions of the majority’s opinion repeated from
its summary judgment opinion recite findings that District
12’s boundaries correspond with race; that District 12 splits
each of the cities and counties it enters on lines that cor
respond with race; and that District 12 is unusually shaped
under statistical and other measures of compactness.
The facts recited by the district court are accurate, and in
an appropriate case they could provide substantial evidence
of a predominant racial motive. In the circumstances of this
mixed motive case, however, the evidence recited above only
frames the question; it does nothing to provide an answer. It
merely shows that there must have been some motive
behind this unusually shaped district and that that motive
might have been race. But the State produced substantial
evidence showing that its predominant motives were politi
cal, and that political motives would result in a district with
the same unusual shape and the same racial composition.
The evidence that District 12’s boundaries tend to corres
19
pond with race does nothing to distinguish between the two
motives and to determine which was the predominant
one—the primary issue that remained open for trial after
this Court’s remand.
Nor is that inquiry advanced by the fact, noted by the dis
trict court in its summary judgment opinion and repeated
verbatim after trial, that “the uncontroverted evidence dem
onstrates * * * the legislators excluded many heavily-
Democratic precincts from District 12, even when those
precincts immediately border the Twelfth and would have
established a far more compact district.” J.S. App. 25a; see
id. at 261a (summary judgment opinion). It is true that Dis
trict 12 excludes a number of adjacent precincts with high
Democratic registration; the district court enumerated those
precincts in its opinion. See id. at 13a-14a; compare J.S. App.
249a-250a (summary judgment opinion). But, as this Court
noted in Hunt I, the State’s evidence “showed that, in North
Carolina, party registration and party preference do not al
ways correspond.” 526 U.S. at 551. Indeed, the undisputed
evidence showed that a large number of registered Democ
rats in North Carolina regularly vote Republican. See J.A.
397, 780; J.S. App. 173a-174a; 213a-225a.5 Accordingly, the
State asserted that it used actual election returns by pre
cinct—not registration figures—to assess the partisan make
up of precincts and to construct its 1997 plan. The fact that
District 12’s boundaries sometimes omit precincts that are
heavily Democratic by registration does nothing to disprove
5 For example, in 1996, 54% of the State’s voters were registered as
Democratic, while only 34% were Republicans. The Almanac of Ameri
can Politics 1998, at 1056 (1997). Yet the Republican candidates won in
the 1992 and 1996 presidential elections, the State’s two Senators at the
time of the redistricting were both Republicans (although a Democrat
defeated one of them in the 1998 election), and the State’s delegation to
the 105th Congress consisted of six Republicans and six Democrats
(although one of the Democratic seats was won by a Republican in the
1998 election). Id. at 1057.
20
the State’s contention that its predominant motive was to
create a solidly Democratic District 12, as measured by
actual election returns.6
This Court stated in Hunt I that “[e]vidence that blacks
constitute even a supermajority in one congressional district
while amounting to less than a plurality in a neighboring
district will not, by itself, suffice to prove that a jurisdiction
was motivated by race in drawing its district lines when the
evidence also shows a high correlation between race and
party preference.” Hunt I, 526 U.S. at 551-552. At bottom,
the evidence repeated from the district court’s former opin
ion did no more than show what this Court determined
would “not suffice” to prove a racial motivation, much less a
predominant racial motivation. Accordingly, the district
court’s conclusion in this part of the opinion that “where
cities and counties are split between the Twelfth District and
neighboring districts, the splits invariably occur along racial,
rather than political, lines,” J.S. App. 25a, must be rejected
as unsupported by the evidence.7
6 There is an additional defect in the district court’s inference, because
the district court disregarded “the necessity of determining whether race
predominated in the redistricters’ actions in light o f what they had to work
with.” Bush, 517 U.S. at 972 n.*. The fact that District 12 excludes even
some adjacent precincts with Democratic voting patterns would be of little
significance, unless it could be shown as well that including those precincts
would make the District as a whole more Democratic. Where, for
instance, the district lines tend to exclude precincts with Democratic
tendencies while including precincts with more pronounced Democratic
tendencies, the exclusion of the former casts no doubt on the State’s claim
that it was attempting to draw as highly a Democratic district as possible.
The evidence in fact showed that this was precisely what happened here,
whether measured by party registration or actual election returns. See Jt.
Exhs. 107-109; see also J.A. 140 (testimony by Dr. Weber agreeing that
excluded white precincts are not “as heavily Democratic” as the precincts
within District 12.).
7 The State supported its conclusion that the district was drawn along
political lines by showing that Republican victories were common in pre
21
B. I t Was C lea r E r ro r F o r T he D is tr ic t C o u rt T o In fe r
P re d o m in a n t R acia l M otive F rom Dr, W eb er’s T e s t i
m ony
The district court added a brief additional portion to its
prior opinion. See J.S. App. 26a-28a. That portion purports
to address further the question whether race or partisan
considerations was the predominant factor in drawing Dis
trict 12. Some of the evidence to which the district court
refers in this portion of its opinion is essentially repetitious
of the evidence discussed above, and it is thus no more help
ful in distinguishing between racial and partisan motivations
underlying District 12. But the district court also relied on
a number of portions of the testimony of Dr. Ronald Weber,
appellees’ expert, which the district court stated showed
“time and again how race trumped party affiliation in the
construction of the 12th District and how political explana
tions utterly failed to explain the composition of the district.”
J.S. App. 26a. That conclusion, however, was plainly wrong.
Initially, as discussed above, “party affiliation”—as op
posed to actual partisan voting conduct—is of little relevance
in this case and of no use in the analysis. See pp. 19-20,
infra. It was therefore error to rely on portions of Dr.
Weber’s testimony that were based on registration data.
Beyond that, however, the evidence presented by Dr. Weber
on which the district court relied was not significantly pro
bative of race as the predominant factor in drawing District
12. Accordingly, the court committed clear error in relying
on that evidence.
1. The district court cited a portion of Dr. Weber’s testi
mony in which he referred to the fact that District 12
has more Democratic voters than adjoining Democratic
cincts abutting District 12, see J.S. App. 213a- 225a, and that the splits in
counties and municipalities divided Democratic portions in District 12
from Republican portions outside District 12, see id. at 189a, 191a-192a.
The district court did not address that evidence.
22
District 8. He stated that the State, had it been following its
partisan objectives, would have “want[ed] to take some of
the voters in the district that you are drawing that’s overly
safe and put them into [an] adjacent district so as to make
that district more competitive.” Tr. 162 (J.A. 91).8
The State, however, explained the reason for this con
figuration. District 12, in general, is no more solidly partisan
than are at least two Republican Districts—Districts 6 and
10. See J.S. App. 80a (election results). The proportion of
Democrats in District 12 is therefore not suspect. And with
respect to the specific line dividing Districts 12 and 8, the
State explained that that line runs along the border between
Cabarrus County (in District 8) and Mecklenburg County (m
Districts 9 and 12). See J.A. 501 (map). To put some District
12 Democrats into District 8, the State would have had to
violate two political constraints that were important to the
legislature: it would have had to move some of Mecklenburg
County into District 8, which would have divided the county
into three districts and thus violated the State’s consistent
policy in the 1997 Plan of placing no county in more than two
districts, see J.A. 179, 474-475, 780-782; see also J.A. 658; and
it would likely have required moving some of Cabarrus
County out of District 8 to District 12 in return, thus violat
8 The district court referred to another portion of Dr. Weber's testi
mony, in which he made essentially the same point, when it stated that
“Dr. Weber showed that, without fail, Democratic districts adjacent to
District 12 yielded their minority areas to that district, retaining white
Democratic precincts.” J.S. App. 26a (citing Tr. 255-256 (J.A. 134-135)).
The district court’s misapprehension of the record is apparent from its
references to “Democratic districts adjacent to District 12,” since it is un
disputed that, of the five districts adjacent to District 12, only one
(District 8) had a Democratic incumbent in 1997. Moreover, the district
court did not specify any majority-minority precincts that had been in
District 8 in a prior plan and subsequently were “yielded” to District 12,
and we are unable to identify any. As the map of District 12 and its
surroundings reveals, see J.A, 483, there are no majority-minority pre
cincts near the border between Districts 8 and 12.
23
ing the desire of Democratic incumbent Hefner in District 8,
who lived in Cabarrus County, to represent his entire home
county, see J.S. App. 85a; J.A. 205-206.
The district court did not discuss the State’s proffered ex
planation or otherwise explain why it might be deficient.9 Dr.
9 Under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district
court “shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon.” As this Court has stated, “there comes a point where find
ings become so sparse and conclusory as to give no revelation of what the
District Court’s concept of the determining facts and legal standard may
be.” Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 292 (1960). The courts of
appeals, led by the Fifth Circuit, have required that district courts exer
cise special care under Rule 52(a) in the redistricting context, and the
district court’s failure to exercise such care is itself grounds for reversal.
As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[bjecause the resolution of a voting
dilution claim requires close analysis of unusually complex factual pat
terns, and because the decision of such a case has the potential for serious
interference with state functions,” district courts must “strictly adhere[]
to the [Rule] 52(a) requirements” that they “find the facts specially” and
must “explain with particularity their reasoning and the subsidiary factual
conclusions underlying their reasoning.” Westwego Citizens for Better
Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201,1203 (1989) (quoting Velasquez v.
City of Abilerie, 725 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1984)). Other courts of
appeals similarly “require a particularly definite record for voting rights
cases.” Cousin v. McWherter, 46 F.3d 568, 574 (6th Cir. 1995); accord
Johnson v. Hamrick, 196 F.3d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir. 1999); Lee County
Branch o f the NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473, 1480 (11th Cir.
1984); Harvell v. Ladd, 958 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1992); Buckanaga v.
Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist., 804 F.2d 469, 472 (8th Cir. 1986). The “bedrock
rule” that a district court’s findings must be “sufficiently detailed to
permit a reviewing court to ascertain the factual core of, and the legal
foundation for, the rulings below * * * has particular force in cases of
this genre.” Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 988 (1st Cir. 1995). That
includes the requirement that “the district court must discuss ‘not only the
evidence that supports its decision but also all the substantial evidence
contrary to its opinion.’” Ibid.; see also Velasquez, 725 F.2d at 1021
(remanding for district court, which wrote a “long and detailed” opinion, to
“take note of substantial contrary evidence presented by the appellants”).
It also includes the requirement that “when the statistics are the principal
evidence offered * * *, the district court must ensure that it thoroughly
24
Weber admitted that he did not take into account any
of the political considerations advanced by the State. See
J.A. 135 (“I don’t know anything about what Congressman
Hefner asked.”), 136 (answering “No” to question whether
he “inquired about any real world political issues that might
have been going on that might have determined why the
Legislature drew the line where it did”). Without some rea
son to discredit the State’s explanation, Dr. Weber’s analysis
does not provide significant evidence of discrimination.
Accordingly, the district court’s inference of predominant ra
cial motive from Dr. Weber’s evidence was “illogical” and,
hence, clearly erroneous. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer
City, 470 U.S. 564, 577 (1985).
2. The district court also relied on Dr. Weber’s testimony
that District 12 contains virtually all (76 out of 79) precincts
that are 40% or more African-American in the six counties
that comprise the district, but it does not contain as high a
percentage of precincts with Democratic tendencies, even as
measured by election results. Tr. 204-205 (J.A. 105-106).
The district court clearly erred in inferring a racial motive—
much less a predominant racial motive—from that testi
mony. The question is not whether there were other
precincts in the six counties with Democratic voting patterns
that were left out of District 12; the question is whether, if
there are such precincts, including them in District 12 would
have raised or lowered the overall likely Democratic vote in
District 12. If the omitted Democratic precincts are far from
the borders of District 12, including them would frequently
not have been practical, and, even if it would, expanding the
district to include them could easily have required including
or excluding other precincts that would have resulted in an
discusses its reasons for rejecting that evidence.” Clark v. Calhoun
County, 21 F.3d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1994).
25
overall boost in Republican strength in District 12.10 Dr.
Weber, however, did not attempt to show that the omitted
precincts could have reasonably been included in District 12
or that their inclusion would have in fact raised Democratic
strength in the district. Cf. J.S. App. 50a n.21 (Thornburg,
J., dissenting) (State’s evidence showed that “few of the
strong Democratic precincts to which Dr. Weber referred
could have easily been included in the Twelfth District”).
Without such evidence, Dr. Weber’s testimony on this point
proves nothing.11
3. The district court also relied on page 221 of Dr.
Weber’s testimony (J.A. I ll) in which he argued that split
ting a single precinct in Mecklenburg County (Precinct 77,
the only split precinct in District 12, see J.S. App. 84a)
showed that race was the predominant motive. The State
explained that the purpose of splitting that precinct, located
at the southernmost tip of Mecklenburg County, was to con
nect the two portions of Republican Representative Myrick’s
district without including additional Democratic voters in
her district. See J.S. App. 208a; J.A. 20, 617-618. That in
turn was in service of the overall goal of protecting incum
bents and therefore splitting Mecklenburg County between
the two incumbents who lived there—the Democratic incum
bent in District 12 and the Republican incumbent in District
9. See J.A. 597-598. Neither the court nor Dr. Weber ad
10 Insofar as Dr. Weber referred to precincts with Democratic voting
patterns adjoining District 12, the evidence showed that those precincts
were uniformly less Democratic than the precincts included in the district.
See p. 20 n.6, supra.
11 The district court also referred to pages 262 (J.A. 139-140) and 288
(J.A. 156-157) of the transcript. In those portions of his testimony, Dr.
Weber was being cross-examined regarding his claim that Democratic
precincts were left out of District 12. His testimony on cross-examination
adds nothing to the analysis. At page 251 of the transcript (J.A. 131), Dr.
Weber simply states the conclusion that “[r]ace is the predomina[n]t[]
factor.” That too adds nothing to the analysis.
26
dressed that explanation. Although evidence of a single split
precinct is unlikely to be significantly probative in any event,
the failure by Dr. Weber or the court to explain why the
State’s explanation was deficient undermines the court’s re
liance on this testimony to infer predominant motive. See n.
9, supra.
4. Taken individually or together, none of the portions of
Dr. Weber’s testimony on which the district court relied
were significantly probative even of race as a factor in draw
ing District 12. Moreover, even if it were otherwise and Dr.
Weber’s testimony on these points were significantly pro
bative that race was a factor in drawing District 12, neither
a slight increase in the percentage of Democrats in District
12, a failure to include some isolated Democratic precincts,
nor the splitting of a single precinct would suffice to show
that race was the predominant factor. The district court
committed clear error in finding Dr. Weber’s testimony suffi
cient to support an inference that the State’s predominant
motive in drawing District 12 was race.
C. The District Court’s Conclusions From Other Testi
mony Were Infected By Its Earlier Errors And In Any
Event Confuse Evidence That Race Was A Factor In
Drawing District 12 With Evidence That I t Was The
P redom inant Factor
1. The district court stated that “[t]he conclusion that
race predominated was further bolstered by Senator
Cooper’s allusion to a need for ‘racial and partisan balance’”
in a statement made to the state House Committee on
Congressional Redistricting. J.S. App. 27a. At trial, Senator
Cooper testified that by “partisan balance,” he meant
“[kjeeping the 6-6 split,” and by “racial balance,” he meant
“that African Americans would have a fair shot to win both
the First and 12th Districts, and I think that’s racially fair.”
J.A. 222. The district court stated, however, that “[t]he
Senator’s contention that although he used the term
‘partisan balance’ to refer to the maintenance of a six-six
27
Democrat-Republican split in the congressional delegation,
he did not mean the term ‘racial balance’ to refer to the
maintenance of a ten-two balance between whites and
African-Americans is simply not credible.” J.S. App. 27a.
When the district court made that credibility finding re
garding Senator Cooper’s testimony, it had already made the
errors recounted above in determining that the statistical
and demographic evidence in the case supported an infer
ence of race as the predominant motive. The district court
was no doubt influenced by those erroneous conclusions in
determining that Senator Cooper’s contrary testimony was
not credible. Moreover, the district court’s inference that
because “partisan balance” meant a six-six split, “racial ba
lance” must have also meant a fixed numerical split, is belied
by the fact that Senator Cooper’s original testimony did not
merely refer to “partisan and racial balance,” see J.S. App.
27a, but to “geographic, racial and partisan balance,” J.A. 460
(emphasis added). Because the term “geographic balance”
does not suggest the kind of division into neat numerical
categories that the term “partisan balance” does, it is ap
parent that Senator Cooper did not consistently mean by
“balance” a fixed numerical division of the districts, as the
district court apparently believed.
For the above reasons, the district court’s credibility
finding regarding Senator Cooper is unsupported. Even if
the district court’s finding were accepted, however, it would
show at most that race was a motivation in Senator Cooper’s
attempt to configure District 12. He had already testified,
however, that “we did pay attention to race,” and that
“[tjhat was one of the factors that was considered,” but that
“it was certainly not the predominant] factor.” J.A. 222.
The question in the case thus was never whether race was
considered, but whether race was the predominant factor.
Neither Senator Cooper’s statement that he was seeking
“geographic, racial and partisan balance,” nor his asserted
failure to explain what he meant by “racial balance” suggests
28
that racial balance was the predominant motive underlying
the creation of District 12—that “[r]ace was the criterion
that, in the State's view, could not be compromised.” Shaw
II, 517 U.S. at 907.
2. Finally, the district court relied on the Cooper-Cohen
e-mail, in which Gerry Cohen, the legislative employee re
sponsible for actually drawing the 1997 Plan on the com
puter, had said “I [Cohen] have moved Greensboro Black
community into the 12th, and now need to take [ajbout
60,000 out of the 12th. I await your direction on this.” J.S.
App. 8a; see J.A. 369 (full text of e-mail). Cohen’s e-mail on
its face merely identified the general characteristics of the
community that had been moved into District 12 by referring
to its racial composition—which, as this Court has noted,
“the legislature always is aware of * * * when it draws dis
trict lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, relig
ious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demo
graphic factors.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646; see also Bush, 517
U.S. at 958 (“Strict scrutiny does not apply merely because
redistricting is performed with consciousness of race.”).
Accordingly, the question presented by the e-mail is whether
the district court properly inferred from that awareness that
“the chief architects of the 1997 Plan had evolved a
methodology for segregating voters by race, and that they
had applied this method to the 12th District.” J.S. App. 27a.
As with the Cooper statement, the district court made its
inference with respect to the e-mail only after having made
its erroneous findings that the statistical and demographic
evidence demonstrated a predominant racial motive. Had
the district court not made the earlier errors, it might have
seen the e-mail in a different light, and it might not have
drawn the dramatic conclusion from the e-mail that it did.
Indeed, the State had explained that the reason for moving
the community into District 12 was in part to avoid splitting
Guilford County into three districts—a goal that, as noted
above, see p. 23, supra, the State followed consistently with
29
respect to every county in the State in the 1997 Plan—and in
part to bolster the Democratic vote in District 12 (a goal de
sired by the Democratic state Senate and Congressman
Watt, the incumbent there) and to subtract Democrats from
the vote in neighboring District 6 (a goal desired by Republi
can Congressman Coble, the incumbent there). See J.A. 192,
193, 195-196, 216, 264-265, 268. The district court did not
specifically address or assess the State’s evidence that
these were the primary motivations for moving the portion
of Greensboro into the Twelfth District. See n. 9, supra.
Without an explanation of the district court’s reasons for re
jecting the State’s proffered explanation, the district court’s
conclusion from the e-mail is insupportable.
Finally, even if the e-mail were viewed as persuasive evi
dence that race was a factor in moving that portion of
Greensboro into District 12, it would not provide sufficient
evidence to infer that race was the predominant factor in
constructing District 12 as a whole. In this respect, again,
Bush is instructive. In that case, the plurality noted evi
dence that “the decision to create the districts now chal
lenged as majority-minority districts was made at the outset
of the process and never seriously questioned,” 517 U.S. at
961, and that those drawing the challenged districts made
use of “uniquely detailed racial data,” id. at 961-962. None
theless, the plurality viewed that evidence merely as setting
forth the question whether race or politics predominated in
drawing the challenged districts, not as providing an answer
for that question. Similarly here, even scattered evidence
that race was a factor taken into account in determining one
or another particular feature of District 12 is insufficient to
show that race was the predominant motive underlying Dis
trict 12 as a whole.
3. As is apparent from a review of the district court’s
opinion, the court erred in concluding that race was the pre
dominant motive in the creation of District 12. To a signifi
cant extent, the court relied on evidence that could not
30
resolve the central question before the court: whether race
or politics predominated in the construction of District 12.
Even insofar as the district court, however, relied on evi
dence that had to do with racial considerations, the evidence
showed at most that race was taken into account in creating
District 12—a fact that the State conceded from the begin
ning. Because the district court failed correctly to ap
preciate and apply the difference between race as a factor
and race as the 'predominant factor, the district court’s con
clusion that District 12 is an unconstitutional racial gerry
mander cannot stand. To permit a district court to find a
predominant racial motive in a case like this would put state
legislatures that have acted entirely constitutionally at risk
that a district court, finding that race was a factor in one or
another feature of a districting plan, could declare the entire
plan unconstitutional. That would threaten to immerse the
district courts deeply in the highly political thicket of re
districting, and it cannot be squared with the kind of sen
sitivity toward state legislative efforts in this field that this
Court has always required.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
Seth P. Waxman
Solicitor General
William R. Yeomans
Acting A ssistan t A ttorney
General
Barbara D. Underwood
Deputy Solicitor General
James A. Feldman
A ssistan t to the Solicitor
General
David K. F lynn
Louis E. Peraertz
Attorneys
September 2000